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Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Engineering & Society:Projects & Ethical Case Studies III
Dr. Gershon Weltman
Engineering 183EW, UCLA SEAS
Lecture 16
2Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Engineering Projects are Difficult
Problems are not completely solvable Conflicting requirements and motivations of stakeholders Limitations of technology and physics Data that are incomplete, contradictory, or non-existent
There are a large number of interrelated tasks Many different disciplines are involved
Technical Non-technical
Diverse teams of people are required Organizing them and their work is difficult Being simultaneously efficient and effective is difficult
But yet we are able to define, perform and complete successful projects!We do so through a combination of organization and management.
But yet we are able to define, perform and complete successful projects!We do so through a combination of organization and management.
3Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Project Definition
Technical Activity with Specific Objectives Research, Technology Development, Design, Prototype, Production, Operation, Maintenance
Bounded in Several Dimensions Inputs - Requirements, Constraints Outputs - Deliverable Products, Data, Reports, Services Budget - Financial Resources, Funding Profile Schedule - A Beginning, an End Resources – Personnel, Facilities, Equipment, ...
Staffed with Dedicated Personnel Scientific & Technical Management Administration and Support
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Project Components
SystemRequirements
SystemRequirements OrganizationOrganization
Systems EngineeringSystems Engineering
System Design Concept -Subsystem Definitions-Subsystem Requirements
System Design Concept -Subsystem Definitions-Subsystem Requirements
Project PlansTasks, Milestones,
Logic, Phases, Schedules, Budgets,
Responsibilities
Project PlansTasks, Milestones,
Logic, Phases, Schedules, Budgets,
Responsibilities
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System Requirements
Customers
Users
Marketplace
Corporate
Personnel
Legal
Nature
Sources
Customers
Users
Marketplace
Corporate
Personnel
Legal
Nature
Sources
Performance
Financial
Schedule
Interfaces
Background Technology
Existing Facilities, Equipment
Laws of Physics
Operational
Reporting
Character
Performance
Financial
Schedule
Interfaces
Background Technology
Existing Facilities, Equipment
Laws of Physics
Operational
Reporting
Character
Requirements are frequently in conflict with one another!Requirements are frequently in conflict with one another!
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Project Components: System Engineering
SystemRequirements
SystemRequirements OrganizationOrganization
Systems EngineeringSystems Engineering
System Design Concept -Subsystem Definitions-Subsystem Requirements
System Design Concept -Subsystem Definitions-Subsystem Requirements
Project PlansTasks, Milestones,
Logic, Phases, Schedules, Budgets,
Responsibilities
Project PlansTasks, Milestones,
Logic, Phases, Schedules, Budgets,
Responsibilities
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System Engineering
Establishes a system concept and defines the subsystems.
Documents system requirements; uses TBDs where necessary.
Structures the system requirements as a complete set of subsystem requirements and/or subsystem specifications.
Quantifies all system and subsystem specifications.
Constructs a system model including trade-offs among technical and operational parameters.
Acquires data by analysis, experimentation or prior sources.
Verifies that each requirement and/or specification is achievable
System Engineering is a critical engineering function; it is generally not now taught as a discipline in universities, but must be learned on the job.
System Engineering is a critical engineering function; it is generally not now taught as a discipline in universities, but must be learned on the job.
8Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Example: Laser Cloth Cutting System
Laser Subsystem
Optics Subsystem
Work TableSubsystem
Controls Subsystem
Assemblies:Laser Beam GeneratorLaser OpticsElectrical SupplyReactant SupplyCoolant SupplyExhaust/RecirculationElectrical I&C
AssembliesOptical ElementsBeam ConditioningAlignment SystemProjection Optic Pattern Tracking
and Focussing
Mechanical StructureSubsystem
Programmable Pattern ControlsOperational Controls for Laser,
Optics, and Work Table Diagnostics and Displays
AssembliesFabric Feed & RemovalPattern Registrationand Motion (if any)
Golden Laser Equipments, Ltd., http://www.goldenlasers.com/products.htm
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Project OrganizationManagement
Project ManagerAssistant PM
MarketingMarket RequirementsCompetitor Analysis
SupportProject ControlFinanceSubcontractsPurchasingLegal
Systems Engineering
LaserSubsystem
OpticsSubsystem
-System Engineer -Beam Generator-Laser Optics-Electrical Supply-Reactant Supply-Coolant Supply-Exhaust/Recirculation
-Electrical I&C
-Requirements-InterfaceControl
-System ModelTrade Studies
-System Testand
Evaluation-DesignValidation
Electronics& Controls
Structures
-Pattern Controls-OperationalControls for Laser, Optics, and WorkTable
-Automated Safety -Diagnostics-Displays
-SupportStructures-AlignmentActuators
-Work Table, Fabric Feed, andPattern Mechanisms
-System Engineer-Optics -Beam Transfer-Alignment System-Projection Optic -Pointing,Pattern Trackingand Focussing
Test Facilities &Operations
-Laser-Optics-Test Bed-Planning-I&C-Operations
Organization is a combination of project subsystems and functional elementsOrganization is a combination of project subsystems and functional elements
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Project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) Laser Cutter
Work Breakdown Structure
Program Management
10000
LaserSubsystem
12000
SystemsEngineering
11000
Optics Subsystem
13000
Structures14000
Electronics& Controls
15000Subscale
Experiments16000
PDRPreparation& Conduct
17000These areas will also have task and budget breakdowns
These tasks will break down to greater levels of detail
12100-Laser SystemsEngineering
12200-Laser Cavity12300-Fluid System12400-Power System12500-Laser Optics12600-Laser Controls
and Instrumentation12700-Reactant Supply12800-Laser Thermal
Control
11100-SystemRequirements
11200-SystemModelling
11300-TradeStudies
11400-Exp’t Des11500-Subsystem
Requirements11600-Interface
Control
10100-Management10200-Chief Engr.10300-Proj. Control10400-Contracts10500-Purchasing10600-Legal10700-Marketing10800-Plans and
Reports10900-Reserve
WBS is an accounting of all the cost categories and associated tasksWBS is an accounting of all the cost categories and associated tasks
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Project Phases
Conceptual - Design Concept, Feasibility Analysis, Requirements Documentation (with TBDs), Total Program Cost Estimates, Plans for Preliminary Design.
Design - Experiments, Analyses, and Studies resulting in Completion and Verification of Requirements (all TBDs resolved). Revised total program estimates. Plans for Initial Design
Prototype - Initial Design, Procedures, Software, Prototyping and Qualification (Verification of Design), Manufacturing Plans, Production Cost Estimates. Plans for Final Design.
Production, Delivery, Operations – Final Design, Manufacturing, Assembly, Installation, Support, Maintenance.
Completion of each phase is a Major Milestone. A Formal Review certifies completion and provides the basis for Go/No-Go Program Decisions
Completion of each phase is a Major Milestone. A Formal Review certifies completion and provides the basis for Go/No-Go Program Decisions
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Management Tools: Sample Task Schedule
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Management Tools: Sample Headcount
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Management Tools: Sample Cost Graph
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Management Tools: Sample Review Cycle
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Project Management Is…..
An end in itself or a means to an end?
Stifling creativity or freeing technical expression?
Enabling or restricting?
Boring or fascinating?
Both Inspirational Leadership and Responsible Management are required for complete success of minor and major
projects.
Both Inspirational Leadership and Responsible Management are required for complete success of minor and major
projects.
17Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Ethical Case Study: A Project Gone Bad
The Engineering Project The Company The Teams The Main Ethical Issues The Results
Explorer Rollovers Litigation Damaged Reputations
The Ethical Implication
The 1991 Explorer SUV
The Ford Motor Company
Management, Engineering, Marketing
Safety vs. Schedule & Cost
Deaths and Injuries
Sample Lawsuit
Automotive Press, Books, Articles, etc.
The ‘Bright Line’ Between Ethical and Unethical Engineering Practice
18Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Ford Explorer SUV Background 1989 Timeframe Off-road SUVs migrating to “Town & Country”
Rugged off-road looks Tame suburban performance Average family loads Affordable family pricing
Ford’s goal: Rapid entry into growing market Main decision options:
Develop a totally new ‘Urban SUV’ product Re-engineer an existing product
Main decision factors: Time to market – Want to make as short as possible Production facilities – Want to use what’s available Production cost – Want to make as low as possible
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System Requirements
Customers Users Marketplace Corporate Personnel Legal Nature
Size & Appearance Performance Pricing & Cost Marketing Schedule SUV Technology Production Facilities Laws of Physics Operational Characteristics Reporting Advertising
Sources Character
20Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Ford Explorer Family Tree
1972-82 Courier LT
1983 Ranger LT
1984-90 Bronco II SUV1989-96 Explorer SUV
For the Explorer, Ford used the same light pickup platform used before for the Ranger and Bronco II
Made by Mazda
Made by Ford
21Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Bronco and Explorer Comparison
Bronco II
(1989)
Explorer
UN-46
(1990 Design)
Front Suspension1 Twin I-beam independent
Twin I-beam independent
Rear Suspension1 Hotchkiss underslung leaf
spring
Hotchkiss underslung leaf
spring
Steering1 Recirculating ball Recirculating ball
Wheel base (in) 94.0 111.9
Average track (in) 56.9 58.1
Curb weight (lb) 3371 3800
C.G. height (in) 26.7 27.6
SSF 1.07 1.07
Narrow track, poorly sprung Bronco II has a well known history of excessive rollover
Narrow track, poorly sprung Bronco II has a well known history of excessive rollover
“NHTSA Investigates Bronco II Rollovers,” Automotive News, 3/20/89
“Magazine Gives Ford’s Bronco II ‘Avoid’ Rating,” Wall Street Journal 5/8/89
“Bronco Performance Criticized,” New York Times, 5/18/89
“Consumer Reports Criticizes Ford Bronco II’s Handling,” Washington Post, 5/18/89
“Explorer: Ford’s Bronco II Will be Renamed When Model Debuts Next Spring,” Automotive News, 8/14/89
“NHTSA Investigates Bronco II Rollovers,” Automotive News, 3/20/89
“Magazine Gives Ford’s Bronco II ‘Avoid’ Rating,” Wall Street Journal 5/8/89
“Bronco Performance Criticized,” New York Times, 5/18/89
“Consumer Reports Criticizes Ford Bronco II’s Handling,” Washington Post, 5/18/89
“Explorer: Ford’s Bronco II Will be Renamed When Model Debuts Next Spring,” Automotive News, 8/14/89
22Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Bronco and Explorer Comparison
Bronco II
(1989)
Explorer
UN-46
(1990 Design)
Front Suspension1 Twin I-beam independent
Twin I-beam independent
Rear Suspension1 Hotchkiss underslung leaf
spring
Hotchkiss underslung leaf
spring
Steering1 Recirculating ball Recirculating ball
Wheel base (in) 94.0 111.9
Average track (in) 56.9 58.1
Curb weight (lb) 3371 3800
C.G. height (in) 26.7 27.6
SSF 1.07 1.07
Early engineering tests show that the narrow track, larger and heavier Explorer has the same type of rollover problem due to its identically low Static Stability Factor
Early engineering tests show that the narrow track, larger and heavier Explorer has the same type of rollover problem due to its identically low Static Stability Factor
23Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Static Stability Factor (SSF)
67.5”
70”
27.1”
58.1”
29”
CG = Height of Center of Gravity
T= Track of Wheels
SSF = ½ (T/CG) = ½ (58.1/27.6) = 1.07
SSF = ½ (T/CG) = ½ (58.1/27.6) = 1.07
Ford Explorer
24Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
V1
V2
Rollover Forces & Moments
r
Centrifugal Force Momentum Force
V
FW
MC = FCCG MM = FMCG
FC or FM
MW = FW½T
FC = W x V/32 x r FM = W x ∆V/32 x ∆t
FC
FM
CG
½T
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Effect of SSF on Probability of Rollover Probability of Rollover in Single Vehicle Incident
Static Stability Factor (SSF)
Ford Explorer
Ford Explorer
NHTSA graph based on data from six states adjusted to national average road use
Off the Market
Off the Market
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Ford’s Response to Rollover Problem
1. Lower the engine & CG No. Too expensive and time consuming
2. Widen the Track No. Would require new production line
3. Use smaller tires No. Contrary to “rugged” SUV look
4. Stiffen the springs Yes, but. Partially implemented
5. Lower the tire pressure Yes. Recommend to service groups
6. Degrade performance No. Contrary to marketing publicity
Engineers recommend: Management responds:
Management chooses Time and Cost over known Safety Fixes!Management chooses Time and Cost over known Safety Fixes!
27Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Ford’s Earlier Case of Cost vs. Safety
1971 Ford Pinto
The Pinto problem: Rear end collision causes gas tank to move forward into differential bolts, causing frequent gas leak, explosions, injuries and deaths
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Pinto Engineering Solutions
1. Protective Shield in Front of Bolts
2. Puncture-Proof Tank Material
3. Baffles in Tank
1971 Ford Pinto
Ford Motor Company was reluctant to apply any solution whatsoever before
being required by new safety standards, and because of the cost of the solutions.
Ford Motor Company was reluctant to apply any solution whatsoever before
being required by new safety standards, and because of the cost of the solutions.
29Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Smoking Gun: Ford’s Internal Memo Shows Clearly the Factors Affecting Its Decisions
“Fatalities Associated With Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires”
“Fatalities Associated With Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires”
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Ford Memo Method and Conclusion
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Ford’s Benefit–Cost Analysis
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In Terms of a Decision Tree
Fix Defect
Benefits
Costs Production = - $137M
- $137M
Benefits
Costs Litigation = - $49.5M
- $49.5MIgnore Defect
Net Value
Financials = $0
DecisionPoint
<Injury/Death = $0
33Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
In Terms of a Decision Tree
Fix Defect
Benefits
Costs Production = - $137M
- $137M
Benefits
Costs Litigation = - $49.5M
- $49.5MIgnore Defect
Net Value
Financials = $0
DecisionPoint
No Injury/Death = $0
Ford’s Decision Path
34Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Other Decision Factors
Fix Defect
Benefits
Costs Production = - $137M
?
Benefits
Costs Litigation = - $49.5M Reputation = $? Unanticipated = $?
?Ignore Defect
Net Value
Financials = $0
DecisionPoint
<Injury/Death = $0>Safety PR = $?>Ethics Climate = $?
35Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
“Pinto Madness,” Mother Jones, September/October 1977
“News: Mother Jones has obtained secret documents showing that for seven years the Ford Motor Company sold cars in which it knew hundreds of people would needlessly burn to death.”
“News: Mother Jones has obtained secret documents showing that for seven years the Ford Motor Company sold cars in which it knew hundreds of people would needlessly burn to death.”
Public Discovery
36Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Lasting Repercussions
“Biggest Business Decisions of the 20th Century,” Fortune, June 27, 2005, p.77
37Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Ford Explorer Play-Out Explorer becomes best selling SUV in 1990s Thousands of death- and injury-causing rollover incidents 1996 partial redesign
Does not address fundamental Track and CG problems Does not change SSF Does not reduce the rate of rollovers
2000 Firestone tire problem exacerbates rollover problems Production defects at Firestone plants Lowered tire pressure increases rate of blowout and rollover Firestone defense highlights low SSF and oversteer response
Thousands of new ‘Explorer Rollover’ lawsuits Damage judgments against Ford as high as $22 million each
2002 Ford finally makes basic changes Improves Track and Suspension Raises SSF to 1.14
38Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Typical “Explorer Rollover” Lawsuit
Initial Positions of the Parties Plaintiff claims simple fender-bender turned into a rollover
with life-changing injury because of Explorer’s fundamental and previously known but unpublicized product defects
Ford claims that Explorer is safe vehicle, rollover was plaintiff’s fault or due to unique accident characteristics
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Rollover Reconstruction
No
rth-
So
uth
Ave
East-West St
Bush
26’
17’
9’
35 mph = 51.3 fps
t = 0
t = -0.7
t = -1.2
20 mph = 29.3 fps
0 mph = 0 fps
t = 0 t = -3.1t = -1.27
Ford Taurus
Ford Explorer
N
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Urban Intersection Incident Site
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Damage to Explorer
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3D Simulation
- 3.10
Explorer at Stop Sign
Clinton St
Edinburgh Ave
Blocked Visibility
Explorer
Taurus
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3D Animation
44Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Typical Rollover Lawsuit
Initial Positions of the Parties Plaintiff claims simple fender-bender turned into a rollover
with life-changing injury because of Explorer’s fundamental and previously known but unpublicized product defects
Ford claims that Explorer is safe vehicle, rollover was plaintiff’s fault or due to unique accident characteristics
Litigation Proceeds First judge-ordered arbitration fails due to “low-ball” offer Plaintiff submits pretrial motion to allow full presentation of
Ford Bronco and Explorer safety history – Ford opposes Judge rules against Ford on relevance of product history;
allows full development history of Explorer and Bronco II Ford requests new arbitration, which makes progress
Ford and Plaintiff finally settle out of court in compromise between initial offer and potential jury award
45Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Subsequent Results
Ford agrees to settle 'rollover' suit 2 hours, 35 minutes ago
US auto giant Ford Motor Co said Wednesday it had reached a settlement in a class-action lawsuit lodged by people claiming the company's popular Explorer vehicle was prone to rollovers.A spokeswoman for Ford refused to give details of the settlement in an emailed statement to AFP, saying more information would be revealed when the deal is presented before a judge in Sacramento on Monday.
"For the reasons that will be presented in court on Monday, we believe this settlement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interests of our customers and our shareholders," the spokeswoman said.Around one million people in four states -- California, Connecticut, Illinois and Texas -- had filed suit asserting that Explorers made between 1991 and 2001 were liable to rollover.
Ford has battled a wave of wrongful death and injury lawsuits following accidents involving older models of the Explorer, regarded as Ford's flagship sports utility vehicle.A federal investigation was launched in 2000 following concerns about the Bridgestone/Firestone tires fitted on the vehicle, leading to a legal feud between Ford and the tire manufacturer.
In 2005 Bridgestone Firestone agreed to pay 240 million dollars to Ford to settle liability over the recall of defective tires in 2000 and 2001 linked to numerous deaths.• US auto giant Ford Motor Co said Wednesday it had reached a settlement in a class-action lawsuit lodged by people claiming the company's popular Explorer vehicle was prone to rollovers.• A spokeswoman for Ford refused to give details of the settlement in an emailed statement to AFP, saying more information would be revealed when the deal is presented before a judge in Sacramento on Monday.• "For the reasons that will be presented in court on Monday, we believe this settlement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interests of our customers and our shareholders," the spokeswoman said.• Around one million people in four states -- California, Connecticut, Illinois and Texas -- had filed suit asserting that Explorers made between 1991 and 2001 were liable to rollover.• Ford has battled a wave of wrongful death and injury lawsuits following accidents involving older models of the Explorer, regarded as Ford's flagship sports utility vehicle.
November 29, 2007
46Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
So Who’s at Fault in the Explorer Case?
Nobody: Just a Mistake Ford’s Management Ford’s Engineers Ford’s Customers
Does society’s willing acceptance of risk affect the analysis? Does society’s willing acceptance of risk affect the analysis?
47Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Society’s Levels of Acceptable Risk
Generally not the result of deep knowledge
Choices involved are often hidden or obscure
Actual risk tolerance often differs from stated positions
Statistics may best reflect the “real” societal priorities
48Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
U.S. Death Rates, Year 2010
Statistics from National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2012
1Base population = 275.3 million, rate is per 100,000308.7
CAUSE DEATHS RATE1
All Injuries 175,835 53.84
Unintentional Injuries 120,800 39.15
Violence Related Injuries 55,035 17.83
Unintentional Injuries
Motor Vehicle 35,332 11.44
Poisoning 33,041 10.70
Falls 26,009 8.42
Drowning 3,782 1.22
Motorcycles 2,704 0.98
Natural/Environmental 1,643 0.60
Machinery 676 0.25
Violence Related Injuries
Firearms 30,814 9.98
Non-Firearms 24,221 7.84
49Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
U.S. Deaths: Automobiles
Population
Deaths/100K PeopleDeaths/100K Miles
Miles/year
Annual Deaths
20081954
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U.S. Deaths: Terrorist vs. Gunfire
51Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
The Conclusion
As in the case of “illness cause of death” estimates, small numbers with compelling stories carry more weight
than larger numbers about “routine” deadly accidents.
“The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”
Attributed in various forms to:
Eric Maria RemarqueGerman WWI veteran and author, Der Schwartze Obelisk, 1956
Joseph StalinRussian dictator, to US ambassador Averill Harriman, ~1947
Kurt Tucholsky,German journalist in Franzosischer Witz, 1932
“The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of millions is a statistic.”
Attributed in various forms to:
Eric Maria RemarqueGerman WWI veteran and author, Der Schwartze Obelisk, 1956
Joseph StalinRussian dictator, to US ambassador Averill Harriman, ~1947
Kurt Tucholsky,German journalist in Franzosischer Witz, 1932
52Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Some Relevant Ethical Questions
Can we put a dollar value on death and injury? Do we now?
Can we ethically ignore some safety problems? Do we now?
Can we ensure that all relevant factors are included in safety-related engineering decisions? Do we now?
Can the public be properly informed of decisions that affect its safety? Can the public understand and evaluate such decisions?
Is there a “Bright Shining Line” between “legitimate” engineering failures and unethical engineering conduct?
53Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Example Engineering Failure
Photo © Poppyseed Bandits on Flickr
Los Angeles TimesBy P.J. Huffstutter November 14, 2008
“Federal investigators on Thursday placed the blame for last year's deadly Minnesota bridge collapse on engineering design flaws that led steel plates to buckle under the weight of construction equipment and supplies, rather than on corrosion or a lack of upkeep.”
Design errors are blamed in Minnesota bridge collapse
54Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
The Bright Line Concept
EthicalUnethicalLegal Criteria for
Punitive Damages
Ford Pinto
Ford Explorer
Minnesota Bridge
55Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Legal Criteria for Punitive Damages
Malicious Prior knowledge Harmful intent
Fraudulent False representation Suppression of true facts
Oppressive Imposition of power Denial of basic rights
56Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
In the Ford Explorer Case Malicious
Ford Introduced a product that the Company knew was defective and unsafe due its propensity to roll over, and refused to correct the built-in defects of this product prior to its introduction and during most of its life purely to maintain the highest possible profit margins
Fraudulent
Ford represented and sold the Explorer as safe for its intended purpose when Ford knew the case to be otherwise, while actively suppressing the true results of its testing and the full facts of the defective nature of the product and of the fundamental changes necessary to make it safe
Oppressive
Ford used its great power in the market place and with its agents to deny its customers their basic rights to life and safety by foisting on them a product Ford knew to be defective and dangerous.
Ford’s managing agents were clearly on the wrong side of the line!Ford’s managing agents were clearly on the wrong side of the line!
57Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Example Engineering & Ethical Failure
Japan Nuclear MeltdownTOKYO (AP) – Just four hours after a tsunami swept into the Fukushima nuclear power plant, Japan's leaders knew the damage was so severe that the reactors could melt down, but they kept their knowledge secret for months.
Larger than expected tsunami floods reactors
58Copyright Gershon Weltman, 2014
Bright Line Reexamined: Bright Zone?
Ethical
Unethical
Ford Explorer
Minnesota Bridge
Fukushima Reactor
Bright Z
one: Utilit
arian & Pragmatic Issues & Values