19520710 NU AFNE--537-2542-03-52 Report on Allied Air Forces · top secret coctno, 3c Headquarters,...

transcript

z s - t - z c o s m i c ; <3P t o p s e c r e t c o c t n o , 3c

Headquarters, Com.ianâer-in-Chief, A l l i e d Forces northern Surope.

Oslo. 10 J u l y 1952.

No. APNS 537/25U2.03/52.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLI5SD POWEBS BDROPB\ (Copies to :- The Chief of Defence S t a f f N o r w a y

The Chief o f Defence* Denmark The Oenrm nder-in-Chief, A l l i e d Air Porcea

Central Europe The Commanâer-in-Chief, A l l i e d Air Poreee

Southern Europe 'Jhe Cotnmanderj A l l i e d Land Forces Norway rhe Commander, A l l i e d La .d Forces Denmark The Commander, A l l i ed Naval Forces

Northern Europe The Commander, A l l i e d Air Forces

Northern Europe (without enc losures) . )

REPORT ON ALLIED AIR FORCES., NORTHERN EUROPE

AIRNORTH l e t t e r Afl 3070 PI dated 23 June 1952, en-closing a report on the Al l ied . Air Vorce3 Northern Europe f o r the per iod 1 June 1951 t o 23 June 3952, i 3 forwarded f o r in-format ion. This report embodies t i e experience and recommen-dations of COMAIENORTH a f t e r a j ea r i n the northern Cratma nd.

2. I have not yet studied i t i n d e t a i l and there are cer ta in controvers ia l matters with which I do not f u l l y agree, no ta t Iy paragraph 21 about Maritime A i r Forces. Furthermore, I am persona l ly handl ing the question of Command Structure for the Command as a whole and wish to cont inue to do so (paragraph 7 r e f e r s ) .

3. My co lits nts w i l l he forwarded soon, hut i n the mean-whi le , the report furn ishes a most va luab le bas is f o r study and f o r f u tu re p lann ing .

JX Enclosure!

(Pa t r i ck Brind) ADMIRAL.

AIRNORTH l e t t e r No. Afl 3070 PL dated 23 June 1952.

ACTION COPY j AG CEUTaftL FILES CGFlN

C ^wira Copy No. 201

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED AIR FORCES NORTHERN EUROPE

Os lo , Norway

COSMIC TCP SECRET

23 June 1952

AO 337O ?L

SUBJECT: A Report on The A l l i e d A ir Poroes Northern Europe

THRU: Commander-in-Chief A l l i e d Forces Northern Eureye Os lo , Norway

TO: Supreme Headquarters A l l i e d Pewera Europe Marly, Franc«

Forwarded herewith are copies o f a r e po r t . » «

the progress and c a p a b i l i t y o f A l l i e d A ir Forces Northern

Europe covering the per iod 1 June 1951 through 22 June 1952.

/ , I K. TAYEOR ,.

Major General , USAF I n c l Commanding

Report on AAFNE (IOoys)

COSMIC'TOP SECRET _ _ G5 ' Gr"' { Report on the A l l i e d A i r Forces

Korjbhern, Europe

(From ï * Ïïtno ' 19?1 t o 23 Juno 1952)

i^^^ODÜCTip j i

Crea t i on of HeadquartersAAFHE

1. Headquarters A l l i e d A i r Forces Northern Europe was created

by SHAPE on 29 March 1951* Major General R. K. Taylor -was assigned

as i t s Commander on 2 A p r i l 1951- The Headquarters was es tab l i shed

i n London on 1 June 1951 and l a t e r t r ans fe r red to i t s present and

p er man-'it l o c a t i o n in-Oslo , Norway^on 22 June 19?1.

2 . The m iss ion assigned by t he Supreme A l l i e d Commander Europe

i n h i s l e t t e r o f 29 March 19 ?1 to the Commander AAFNE was as f o l l ows !

a . "Your primary miss ion w i l l he the defense o f the North-

ern BuropeE1Ji a rea . I n accompl ish ing t h i s m i s s i on , you w i l l ma in t a i n

c l ose cooperat ion w i t h the Commander, A l l i e d A i r Forces, Cen t ra l

Europe, and the Commanders o f other forces i n Northern Europe.

b . "Forces w i l l be a l l o c a t ed or earmarked for your Command

by the A l l i e d Commander-in-Chief, nor thern Europe, from forces desig-

nated to him by me. I n war, you w i l l exerc ise ope ra t i ona l command

over these forces under the s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n o f the A l l i e d

Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe .-

c . " I n peace your pr imary task i s to ensure t h a t the forces

a l l o c a t e d or to be a l l o c a t ed t o your Command i n t ime o f war are organ-

i z e d , equipped, t r a i n ed , and ready to perform t h e i r war m i s s i o n s . "

The Task

3 . So f a r no u n i t s have been earmarked or a l l o c a t ed to the

A l l i e d A i r Porces Northern Europe. Therefore, i t has been poss i b l e

t o i n f l uence the development o f Norwegian and Danish a i r forces

on ly by means o f adv ice and d i s cuss i ons . Fu r the r , agreement on sev-

e r a l matters o f major p o l i c y has no t been reached as yet and imple-

menta t ion o f p l ans i s hampered as a r e s u l t . The most important

p o i n t s upon which agreement has no t been reached w i l l ba discussed

i n greater d e t a i l i n the sec t ions o f t h i s repor t where they are

most app rop r i a t e . I n s p i t e o f the f a c t t h a t fo rma l assignment o f

a i r u n i t s has not taken p l a ce , p l ann ing i s proceeding on the bas is

[ A F N E / ^ / /52

c9 O t h a t a l l the ope r a t i o na l resources o f the RHAF and RIlAP w i l l be

a v a i l a b l e t o Commander AAFHE on t he outbreak o f war and t h a t they

w i l l rece ive adequate l o c i s t i c suppor t .

Content o f the Import

b . This repor t i s broken down under three genera l head ings :

p l a nn i ng , opera t iona l- and a dm i n i s t r a t i v e ma t te r s . I t con ta ins o.

b r i e f account o f the major problems which have been encountered,

the progress made dur ing the pas t year , and concludes w i t h an

ana l y s i s o f the combat c a p a b i l i t y and p o t e n t i a l o f the a i r forces

of the Northern European Command.

l A^PLA®! !^: MTTHRS

<j. Huch o f the e f f o r t o f the Headquarters dur ing the pas t

year has been d i rec ted towards the c r e a t i o n ef p lans f o r defense .

I n t h i s respect two items of m^jor p o l i c y have been d iscussed a t

l e ng t h - the D i v i s i o n o f R e s p o n s i b i l i t y between NATO and Na t i ona l

Commanders i n the event o f war^ end the Command Orsan i z a t i on f o r the

opera t i on o f the forces which w i l l even tua l l y bo a l l o c a t e d to t h i s

Headquarters. Ilo agreement has been reached w i th the n a t i o n a l

a u t h o r i t i e s on e i ther o f these sub jec ts and the w r i t i n g o f a rea l-

i s t i c p l a n i s d i f f i c u l t , w h i l s t any l a rge sca le implementat ion nus t

awai t r e s o l u t i o n of var ious po i n t s ' s t i l l a t I s sue . I n order tha t

p l ans cou ld be prepared, however, c e r t a i n assumptions upon these two

sub jec ts have been nado. The A i r Defense P lan f o r Northern Europe

was issued on 7 June5 1952 to prov ide guidance to subord ina te r. ir

commanders i n the emergency pe r i od . Broadly speaking, i t i s an

a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the a i r aspects o f the Ou t l i n e Combined E.jor£ency

Defense P l an f o r Northern Europe, which was put i n t o e f f e c t by

Comiaander-in-Chief Northern Europe on 16 February 1952. Vtork i s

s t i l l i n progress on tho A i r P lan f o r 19 5*+} and w i l l be i s Sued to

co inc ide w i th the i n t r o du c t i o n o f the Combined P lan f o r t h a t per iod

which i s be ing prepared by Headquarters AFNE.

Buj5IdrJiHSi-Of A i r Forces

6 . There i s i n ex is tence a t the present t ime a program f o r

the phased bui ld-up o f a i r forces requ i red by t he Northern Coramiind

by m id-19 51:-. A l l p lans other than tho Bfiergency P l an w i th which

t h i s Headquarters has been invo lved have been based on the

0 0 r.ssi.iuotion thj-.t tljs präsent ex i s t i ng govo rmen t " ! n o l i c i s s i n

Koriray cjod DenrUJ-Ic v.feieh :: r Oi1Abxt the st.-itionimj of f o r e i gn forces

i n t heso two na t ions dur ing t i i c of pcaco v j i l l he ;--.ItcrocT. I f

these p o l i c i e s net chrx<;3d-, nny lo5>}> pleins W i l l , from

an a i r po i n t o f YioiT1 hc u n r e a l i s t i c siaco the Eorwesinn nnd Dcn-

i s h a i r forces w i l l cons t i t u t e only seaae 50/» of the a i r forces

Xfhich are required by 1954V: Since the a i r requirements o f t h i s Com-

mand assume tha t o. l l forces would be i n p lace and ready to f i^ht on

D-day, any system whereby hr. l f of the r.ir forces would not be ava i l -

ab le x in t i l some time a f t e r D-day would throw the plans cons iderably

out o f balcr.ce. Therefore, t h i s po l i cy o f p r oh i b i t i n g the s ta t ion-

ing o f fo re ign u n i t s i n Northern Europe i n peacetime i s one o f the

greatest s i ng l e obstacles which t h i s Command faces re l fct iva t o the

build-tup of the a i r forces The po l i cy has already had i t s weaken- •

ing e f fec t upon t h i s Command i n tha t i t has been necossary to

re fuse the deployment o f a much needed USAF Rescue F l i g h t i n North-

ern Europe. As time progresses; tho rea l impact of the p o l i c y w i l l

become inc reas ing ly f e l t i f the USAF un i t s now scheduled fo r deploy-

ment i n t h i s Command are not admi t ted . I f t h i s problem i s not re-

solved so as t o permit fo re ign u n i t s i n the Command by. mid-1953,

then a t t h a t t ime tho whole concept of the defense o f the North-

ern Flank should be reviewed.

Command QrffclO^zat ion

7 . A p l an has been prepared for an A l l i e d Air Command organ-

i z a t i o n f o r the Northern European Command a i r forces . I t creates

three t a c t i c a l commands immediately subordinate to t h i s Headquarters

and places- the l i g h t bombor fo rco , t ransport f o rce , and mari t ime a i r

forces d i r o c t l y under t h i s Headquarters fo r operat ions . The threo

t a c t i c a l commands ore organized to be capable of both pure a i r def-

ense operat ions and of t a c t i c a l operat ions i n con junct ion w i t h the

other services* This p l an has been submitted to the n a t i o n a l autho-

r i t i e s and i s s t i l l under d i scuss ion . I n these d iscuss ions t h i s

Headquarters has hold tha t the three t a c t i c a l command headquarters

Must be i n the SHAPE Channel of command immediately subordinate t o

A l l i e d A i r Forces Northern Europe and must be composed of person-

n e l from the na t ions whose forces are represented. Those subordinate

headquar ters Emst be e s s e n t i a l l y operat ions . ! i n character and re-

l i e v e d o f CJiy heavy a dm i n i s t r a t i v e or l o g i s t i c s burden. On the

other hand , the Danish a u t h o r i t i e s have he ld t h a t command o f a l l a i r

fo rces i n Denmark should be through the RDiiF Headquarters , as an

A l l i e d subord inate command. This Headquarters has accoptod t h i s •

arrangement f o r the emergency per iod bu t i s o f the op i n i on t h a t i t

i s unworkable as an u l t ima t e war o r g an i z a t i o n .

Diy.iÄiojX IoX .ReapoKslbi l i ty. .b.etwe.en HATO and. J iat ip.nal Cpfnm?jjds.

8* The l a ck o f an screed p o l i c y on t h i s i sub jec t has hampered

the p l ann i ng progress nado dur i ng t h i s 'past year . Had a p o l i c y been

es tab l i shed and had an A l l i e d Command o rgan i z a t i on been agroed e a r l y

i n the l i f e o f t h i s Headquarters , cons iderab ly nioro progress would

1 have been r e a l i z e d to da te .

I n f r a s t r uc tu re

9 . P lags - Hinetoen a i r f i e l d s have been planned f o r the Com-

mand, ten i n Norway, seven i n Denmark and two i n ï îor th Germany»

This number o f a i r f i o l d s w i l l bc s u f f i c i e n t to support a l l the a i r -

c r a f t programmed by SHAPE f o r t h i s Command, f ou r t een are program-

med to bo completed up to proscr ibed SHAPE standards under the

"Third Sl ice1 1 I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Program, seven i n 19?2 and seven i n

1953» The '-Pourth S l i c e " I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Program r^-hs f o r the com-

p l e t i o n o f f i v e more a i r f i e l d s i n 195V to b r i n^ the t o t a l up to

n ineteen* Xf the "Third S l i co M and t lPourth S l ico t ' Programs are rea-

l i z e d , tho f o l l ow ing nuabor o f a i r f i e l d s v / i l l bc a v a i l a b l e to t h i s

Cosuaand :

&Q£way Demark Romany

6 Kain 5 Main 1 Main

2 A l t e rna te 2 A l t e r n a t e 1 A l t e rna t e

2 Redeployment

10, j^rqy-es.s - Vtork on a i r f i e l d s programmed i n the "Third

S l i c e " i s progressing s a t i s f a c t o r i l y according to i n f e r n a l r epor t s

rece ived i n the Headquarters from the n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Sosno

delays were encountered bceau30 o f the l ack o f a f i rm set o f con-

s t r u c t i o n standards and some confus ion on the par t o f the n a t i o n a l

a u t h o r i t i e s concerning cons t r uc t i on d e t a i l s , but those d i f f i c u l t i e s

have apparen t ly been overcome. Norway has concentrated c i v i l and

m i l i t a r y engineer ing forces on i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a i r f i e l d s and p lans

r i o f t M i n T r i p A F P . P F T

OSMIC TOP s z z r . z ^

are be ing implementod- Denmark has not yet f o rma l l y submit ted any

p l ans to t h i s Headquarters f o r approval^ but i t i s expected t h a t

they w i l l soon be ready. Meanwhile^ smal l po r t i ons o f tho construc-

t i o n program f o r t ha t country a r c being prosecuted and the Danish

a u t h o r i t i e s aro con f i den t t h a t they w i l l be a b l e to meet a l l com-

mitments of the program. However, i t i s the op i n i on o f t h i s

Headquarters t h a t the l i m i t e d cons t r uc t i on capac i t y o f both Norway

and Denmark and the short cons t r uc t i on season i n Korway leave no

margin f o r de lay i f the r e q u i s i t e number o f a i r f i e l d s i s t o be a v a i l -

ab le f o r the Command i n 195½.

11. Base R igh ts Agreements - Ce r t a i n o f t he a i r f i e l d s pro-

grammed under "Third and Fourth S l i c e " are earmarked f o r occupa-

t i o n by f o r e i g n u n i t s o f t h i s Command. These a i r f i e l d s a re :

I n Norway Ir^Dermark

J a r l s bo rg Area T i r s t r up

L i s t a Vandel

Howevor, to date n e i t h e r Norway nor Denmark has concluded a b i l a t -

e r a l agreement w i t h any other n a t i o n which would a l low use o f these

a i r f i e l d s by f o r e i g n u n i t s i n peace. Lack o f s u i t a b l e baso r i g h t s

agreement threatens t o de lay cons t ruc t i on on these a i r f i e l d s f s ince

funds f o r t h e i r cons t ruc t i on to main base standards w i l l no t be

made a v a i l a b l e un less they are to be a c t u a l l y occupied by the desig-

nated u n i t s . No de lay has r e su l t e d as y e t , bu t to make f u l l use

o f the short cons t r uc t i on seasons and tho l i m i t e d f a c i l i t i e s a l -

ready re fe r red t o , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t any absence of agreement

which might tend t o re t a rd execut ion o f the programs should ho res-

olved as speed i ly as p o s s i b l e .

12. Subo rd i n a t.q, VJar Hoadquar to r s - The "Four th S l i c e " I n f r a-

s t r uc t u re Program p lans f o r the cons t ruc t i on o f the ope r a t i o na l

f a c i l i t i e s of three subord ina te war headquarters located a t Bodö

and Holmonkollen i n Norway and a t ICarup i n Denmark. Those head-

quar ters havo been planned on the assumption t h a t the command struc-

t u re s t i l l under d i scuss ion w i l l bo acceptod wi thout a l t e r a t i o n i n

t h i s r espec t . The v a l i d i t y o f t h i s aspect o f t he "Fourth S l i c o "

Program there fore depends on t he outcome o f the d iscuss ions on the

command s t r uc t u re .

C O S M t C T O P R T î P r -

custuic t o p s c c r î r r #

m - OperaiiIOkal matters

A v a i l a b i l i t y o f A i r Un i ts

13 . Tho current order o f b a t t l e o f the RDAP and RlfAP i s as

f o l l ows :

Loca t ion Ï3E 3 Homarfes

Gardermoen Vampiros IDF/FB ^squadroris,) __

Gardermoon 10 Delcotas M i l i t a r y t r anspor t a i r c r a f t

Bardufoss 16 S p i t f i r e IX F i g h t e r s , t o be mob i l i zed • not l a t e r than IH-1 _

K j o l l e r 3 S p i t f i r e XL Tac t i c a l recce a i r c r a f t

So la and 6 Ca t a l i n a s For a i r rescue and mari t ime deployed bases . . du t i e s

SoTa TETT Bm- - r • - Trrj isTiTionTraining ~ —

Locat ion TTPO „ Remarks

Karuq 2 ifetoor Xis^feyr.

JLaxup Trans i t i o n TrainjLng

Vaerlöse 12 S p i t f i r e IX F i gh t e r s , t o be mob i l i zed . no t lat.er than D+l

Vaer löse 3 S p i t f i r o X I Tac t i c a l recce a i r c r a f t

Copenhagen and 8 Ca t a l i n a s For t ranspor t and a i r res-deployed bases cuo d u t i e s . Four are ear-

marked by Denmark f o r SAC-LAHT

Kastrup 1 B17 Personnel t r anspor t a i r c r a f t

On the outbreak o f war tho above resources would be augmented by

mob i l i zed c i v i l t ranspor t and by the few Fß *1 s i n each country

now used f o r t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i ng-

,Sjtate o f , Pi1Iqt i Tra in ing

1½. The t r a i n i n g programs o f the f i g h t e r squadrons i n the

Royal Danish and Royal Norwegian A i r Forces have befen and are s t i l l

based on Royal A i r Force Annual Tra in i ng S y l l a b i , The c a l i b r e and

QDSMIC TOP StCRETrj # d i s c i p l i n a o f p i l o t s i n t he f i g h t e r squadrons o f both A i r Forces

i s h i g h . Lack o f c e r t a i n e s s e n t i e l t r a i n i n g equipment and f a c i l i -

t i e s i n both coun t r i es has , however, precludod the squadrons from

complet ing the f u l l annua l sy l l abus and t he re fo re cons iderab ly H a -

l t e d t he combat a b i l i t y o f the p i l o t s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , instrument

f l y i n g lias t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes been n e g l i g i b l e owing to

t ho absence o f let-down a i d s ; f o r the same reason n i gh t f l y i n g ,

except i n good weather c o n d i t i o n s , has not been undertaken.

1? . The p i l o t t r a i n i n g program has d i f f e r e d i n the two A i r

Forces. I n Denmark the Kcteor squadrons t r a i n i n a pure i n t e r-

ceptor r o l e and do not undertake ground support t r a i n i n g . Camera

gun exorcises arc floi,TI r e g u l a r l y from the squadron home base and

a l l ope ra t i ona l p i l o t s o f tho !Ietoor squadrons a t tend tho PiAF Am-

am^nt P rac t i co Camp a t S y l t f o r ono Lionth each year . Consequent ly,

tho s t a t e o f t r a i n i n g o f p i l o t s w i t h i n t he Danish f i^htor squadrons

can be sa id to be s a t i s f a c t o r y on ly i n the i n t e r cep to r r o l e . The

p o s i t i o n , however, i s f a r d i f f e r e n t i n the RNAF where p r a c t i c a l l y

no a i r - t o - a i r f i r i n g other than comora gun exorcises i s c a r r i od

o u t . This most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a t e of a f f a i r s , which i s caused

p r i m a r i l y by a lac l i o f t a r ge t towing a i r c r a f t , has boon brought

to the a t t e n t i o n o f tho Norwegian A i r S t a f f who are making every

endeavour to remedy the s i t u a t i o n . Tho Sorwegian Vampires, which

can bo used i n the f ighter-bomber r o l e , under take regu la r a i r- to-

ground bombing a t the RTTAF a i r - f i r i n g rangos a t L i s t a . Al though

thoso ranges are u n s u i t a b l e f o r rocket f i r i n g , some t r a i n i n g i n tho

f i e l d i s being accompl ished.

16. I n b r i e f , tho p i l o t m a t e r i a l i s exce l l an t i n both A i r

Forcos. Che Squadron Commanders thonse lves aro wo l l abovo average

both i n l eadersh ip and i n koonncss, and thcro i s no doubt t h a t i f

they wore g iven a l l necessary t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s t o carry out t h o i r

f u l l c j inual t r a i n i n g programs} tho p i l o t s would be i n a hi^h s t a t e

of ope ra t i ona l e f f i c i e n c y .

is i r JJe&snse. Caj&bU^ty

1 7 . As tho order o f b a t t l e shows, t he Comarjid's c a p a b i l i t y

f o r a i r dofonse i s conta ined i n the two Vampiro squadrons i n Nor-

way and tho two Kotcor squadrons i n Donmrk augmented by obso le te

S p i t f i r e I X ' s . Tho A i r c r a f t Con t ro l and Repor t ing systori t o

c o s m i c t o p s r r ^ n

C ^ M I C TOP SCCRET

cJLopt end operate these a i r c r a f t i s very */eak. I t cons i s t s o f :

a . two CaxXjr warning s t a t i o n s i n the south oast p a r t o f

Korway which;covor the Skageraic and the Os l o f j o r d .

b . f i v e GCI s t a t i o n s , t h ree i n the southern p a r t o f ITor-

vray and ono each a t Karup and Vaorlose (.in Donmark),

The équipaient i n uso i s obso le te B r i t i s h equipment and shor t o f

s pa res . I t s usefu lness i s f u r t h e r decreased by personnel short-

ages which a t present on ly a l l ow f o r i t be ing operated for e igh t

hours per day. U n t i l noro personne l aro t r a i n e d , the systoc could

no t be r o l l e d upon f o r any l eng th o f t imo on a twentyfour-hours-

por-day b a s i s . Therefore, t a k i n g i n t o cons i de ra t i on the numbers o f

a i r c r a f t , the s t a t e of t r a i n i n g o f the p i l o t s # a n d the r e s t r i c t i o n s

imposed by tho con t ro l and, r epo r t i ng system, the Command i s on ly

cap:.blo o f a l i r i i t o d fa i r-weather a i r dofenso o f South Norway, tho

Copenhagen area and c o n t r a l J u t l a n d . Tho v i t a l areas o f South

J u t l a n d and North Norway aro not covered by r ada r ; thoy could

thero foro on ly be defended aga ins t a i r a t t ack by s tand ing p a t r o l s

or o f f ens i ve sweeps oxpensivo i n f l y i n g hours , îioro radar cover-

age, noro personnel t o operate tho r ada r , more complote weapons

p r ac t i ce f a c i l i t i e s , and more bad-woathyr f l y i n c a ids must bo 'prov-

ided before tho Comr;;aid' s c a p a b i l i t y can increase t o che necessary

standards o f a l l-weather dofense.

^ ^ / ¾ ^ ¾ ¾ C j ^ i b i l i t y

13. I n Denriark the Kotcor squadrons aro no i t h c r t r a i n i n g nor

are they oquippod to carry out a i r /g round suppor t . Thorofore, there

i s no a i r /g round support c a p a b i l i t y i n Dormark not on ly f o r tho reas-

ons a iven above, but hecaasc the squadrons would bc too heav i l y out-

numberod and too f u l l y c igagcd i n the a i r b a t t l e to be d i ve r t od to

t ho ground support r o l e^ ~nd a l s o becausc today no support organ-

i z a t i o n ex i s t s i n the et u n t r y . Such on o rgan i z a t i on i s now p. an-

nod and i s boing c r o a t c . I n ïïorway, z,s i n Denmark, no a i r / f 'ound

si iuport o rgan i s a t i on cu r e n t I y ex i s t s though aga i n one i s cu ront-

I y ^eing planned and yr pared . Gub jcc t , t he re fo re , to the .rain-

i n g nd c o r t r o l l i i a i t a t ' uns a l ready ment ioned, the PitAF coaid

prov iso some very rostr i i . ted f ' ir-weather a i r /g round s u p p j r t .

I 1 , . Each n a t i o n a l A r Fo.. cc has one f l i g h t o f thr*---: S p i t f i r o s

XI T>û'or"aaissani.*. a i r c i -"t. P-ÎIM-« — — r ^

COSMIC T O P SECRET #

a i r c r a f t together wi th smal l photographic processing and i n te r-

pre t i ng f a c i l i t i e s % Wi th in the l i m i t a t i o n s necessar i ly imposed by

t h i s very t i n y force , some t a c t i c a l reconnaissonco c apab i l i t y exis ts

w i t h i n tho Air Forces of both countr ies .

A i r Rescnq

20. A i r rescue organizat ions ex is t i n both countr ies t o d is-

charge both m i l i t a r y and c i v i l commitments i n t h i s respect . Nor-

way uses her s ix Cata l inas and a number of Korsctaon f l o a t p i ".no s

augmented by sea-going launches^ plus a very l im i t e d amount o f res-

cue gear. Denmark's Ca ta l i na , Oxford, and Sea Ottor a i r c r a f t

are used t o discharge the RDiAF's r e s pon s i b i l i t y . These f a c i l i -

t i e s arc adequate i n Denmark but inadequate i n Horway to undertake

the tasks l i k e l y to bo encountered with present nunbers of a i r c r a f t

and w i l l havo to bo expanded as the a i r s t rength of the Comnujad

increases. Plans are being made to do t h i s and to take over

ex i s t i ng c i v i l organizat ions i n the event of wûr.

Marit ime ^Jieratior5S

. 21. There i s a requirement for fo r ty-s ix marit ime a i r c r a f t

for t h i s Command. The only con t r i bu t i on towards t h i s f i gu re

present ly ava i l ab l e i s the smal l force of C a t a l i m s cnuncratod i n

paragraph 13. Those are obsolete} soiic of thorn arc unarmed;

the Norwegian a ircr-Xt have a h igh s ta to of unscrv lceab i l i t y^

four o f the Danish a i r c r a f t have boon earmarked by the Danes for

SACLAKT. Re-equipping the n a t i o na l A ir Forcos wi th American a i r-

c r a f t has been considered, but i t cannot be undertaken without

creat ing unacceptable cuts i n the planned bui ld-up of othor tac t-

i c a l equipment. The Standing Group, i n t h e i r SG 135/3, agreed

Y/ith tho Northern European Regional Planning Group tha t Horway and

Denmark should not ouch attempt to croate a balanced a i r f o rce ,

but should coneentrâtc on tho smal ler , t a c t i c a l typo A/C. This

Command a l so agrees wi th t h i s concept and therefore fee ls t ha t

Marit ime Air Forces, l i k e the l i g h t bomber forces , which arc re-

quired by t h i s Command should be provided from sources other than

the BDAF and IlBAF. This Command assumes t ha t a dd i t i o n a l Ka r i t i n o

Air reconnaissance required i n an emergency mi^ht be obtained by

u t i l i s i n g the same procedures as arc now being set up by SHAPE for

request ing assistance from outs ide G i r commands such as tho RAF

Bomber Command, SACLAJiT, and U.S. S t ra teg ic Air Conmand.

COSMIC T O P SECRET O a i r c r a f t together w i t h sma l l photographic process ing and i n t e r-

p r e t i n g f a c i l i t i e s . , W i t h i n tho l i m i t a t i o n s necessa r i l y imposed by

t h i s very t i n y f o r ce , some t a c t i c a l reconnaissance c a p a b i l i t y ex i s t s

w i t h i n t he A i r Forcos o f both coun t r i e s .

A i r Rescuq

20. A i r roscue o rgan i z a t i ons e s i s t i n both coun t r ios to d i s-

charge both m i l i t a r y and c i v i l commitments i n t h i s respec t . Nor-

way usos her s i x Ca ta l i nas and a numbor o f Norsoraon f l o a t p l m c s

augmented by sea-going launches^plus a very l im i t e d amount o f ros-

cue gear . Denmark's C a t a l i n a , Oxford, and Sea Otter a i r c r a f t

aro used to d ischarge the RDAF1 s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . These f a c i l i -

t i e s aro adequate i n Denmark but inc.de que tu i n Noriroy to undertake

the tasks l i k e l y to bo oncountercd w i t h prosont numbers o f a i r c r a f t

and i-zill havo to be expanded as the a i r s t reng th of tho CommlJid

i nc reases . Plans aro be ing made to do t h i s and to take ovor

ex i s t i n g c i v i l o rgan i za t i ons i n the ovont o f w i r .

M t J i a iiEora^iPil3.

. 21. There i s a requirement f o r f o r t y-s i x mar i t ime a i r c r a f t

f o r t h i s Command. The only c on t r i b u t i o n towards t h i s f i g u r a

p resen t ly F.vai lablo i s the siua.ll fo rco o f Ca t a l i n a s enumerated i n

paragraph 13. Thoso are obso lc to j soiie o f thcra arc unarmedj

t he ïîorwegi'Ui a i r or."Xt have a h igh s t a t o o f u n s c r v i c e a b i l i t y j

four of the Danish a i r c r a f t have boon earmarked by the Danes for

SACLAHT. He-equipping the n a t i o n a l A i r Forces w i th American a i r -

c r a f t has boon considered, bu t i t cannot bc undertide en wi thout

c roa t i ng unacceptable cuts i n the planned bu i ld-up o f o thor tac t-

i c a l oquipmont. Tlie Stand ing Group, i n t h e i r SG 135/3? agreed

w i t h tho Hortl iern European Regiona l P lann ing Group tha t Norvray and

Denmark should not each attempt to croate a balanced a i r f o rce ,

bu t should concentrate on the s j j a l l o r , t a c t i c a l typo A/C. This

Command a l s o agrees w i t h t h i s concept and there fore f e e l s t h a t

Mar i t ime A i r Forces, l i k e the l i g h t bomber fo rces , which aro re-

qu i red by t h i s CoiBMand should bo provided from sources othor than

t ho RDAF and IaJj1LF. This Command assumes t h a t a d d i t i o n a l K a r i t i n e

A i r reconnaissance requ ired i n an emergency nii&ht be ob ta ined by

u t i l i s i n g th© same procedures as are now being set up by SHAPE f o r

reques t ing ass is taneo from ou ts ide a i r commands such as tho RAP

Bomber Command, SACLAIiT, and U.S . S t r a t eg i c A i r Concand.

ORpMIC T O P S E C R E T ^

ground Dofcnso Against A i r Attacks

22. Ant l-Aircraf t Un l t a . I n Norway, there are no f u l l - t ime

regu lar a n t i - a i r c r a f t u n i t s . Ex is t i ng u n i t s cons is t o f men who

havo completed t he i r m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and are now held on reserve.

On mob i l i s a t i o n , the Norwegian a n t i - a i r c r a f t forces would cons is t

of 39 heavy ba t te r ies o f h guns oach and 29 l i g h t ba t t e r i es of 6 guns

oach o f which 1? arc VO mm u n i t s . I n Denmark, the fo l lowing -Iimuli i r

• d^TSv^^gées can bo n ob i l i z e d :

Bv the Armyi

i e U e a ^ ba t t e r i es o f V guns each, c V ^ i j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e f j L , ,

1 / i 11-feiiL UaLLei les (Vcr win) u f O uunu wach.Cfr^ « J U U Ï I f r v y

^Sr-the Nayy;, C OM c V>s

1 heavy bat tery of 4- guns.

2? tw in Vo mm guns.

I n addition to the above number of b a t t e r i o s i n Denmark, a number

of 37 and 20 mm guns can be mob i l i zed .

2 3 . Ant i-Aircraft i Capab i l i t y . Although the above represents

a considerable though inadequate force on paper, opera t i ona l l y i t

has many major weaknesses. Th' Norwegian ba t t e r i es are mainly

equipped wi th ex-German obsolescent ma ter i a l o f res t r i c ted accu-

racy and with a l im i t ed ammunition supply that cannot bo augmented.

They have a " imi ted amount of American equipment but no f u l l y

t r a i ned personnel for i t as ye t . The Danish a n t i - a i r c r a f t u n i t s

are equipped wi th modern guns but aga in the prov is ion of t ra ined

men l a 0 s behind the prov is ion of equipment. Both countr ies su f fe r

from a shortaMo of f i r o cont ro l and t a c t i c a l con t ro l radars and

oporators , and tho incomplete con t ro l and warning system fu r the r

l im i t : : the opera t iona l e f f i c i ency of the a n t i - a i r c r a f t defenses,

2b* ComEtand an^ Deolovrient of Ant i-Ai rcra f t Un^ts. The

quest ion of opera t iona l cont ro l o f a n t i - a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y by the

A l l i e d Air Comracnder i n war and h i s powers t o redeploy n a t i o na l

forces i s s t i l l under cons i i o ra t i on ac par t of the d i v i s i o n of

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y between HATO and na t i ona l commanders and i s i n ur-

gont nood of solut-.on. The present deployment plans of both count-

r i e s are drawn up by t he i r respect ive Defense S t a f f s . Ava i l ab le AA

guns aro now dispersed over the Cosmaand rather than concentrated

around a few v i t a l key po i n t s . A Key Points Committee i s i n the

process of being estab l ished , which should provide a p r i o r i t y l i s t

f o r key po i n t s . I f guns are deployed i n accordance wi th t h i s

l i s t , the present s ta te of a f f a i r s w i l l be improved.

Cpnraimications , Fac i l i t i e . s

25. The communications ava i l ab l e at present i n the Command

area are inadequate to operato the very l im i t e d a i r c r a f t con t ro l

and repor t ing system and to give the commander some measure o f

con t ro l ovor the a i r un i t s i n the event o f war. Bhe ch ief commu-

n i ca t i ons de f i c ienc ies are i n long l i n e s to IiriIt Norway and Denmark

and to e f foc t l i a i s o n with adjacent formations i n Centra l Europe

and the United Kingdom. With in ï-îorway, comnunications are depend-

ent upon extremely vulnerable open-wire overhead routes . The

po s i t i o n i s u n l i k e l y to improve u n t i l new submarine cables are

provided under the Signals I n f ras t ruc tu re Program Z1Jid a micro-

wave system i s provided with!:- Norway. Early estimates regard-

ing the improvements to be expeeted i n the communieations-

e lec t ron ics f lo lc t , when the S igna ls In f ras t ruc ture and IiDAP Pro-

grams become, e f f ec t i ve , have had to bo revised recent ly i n

the l i g h t of prosont do l i ve r l es and forecasts of de l ivery dates

for new cab les . I t now appears very doubt fu l i f there w i l l bo any

marked improvement i n communications dur ing 19?2. Plans for VHF

l i n k s I-Torway-UK and Korway-Denmark have boon deleted from tho

current S ignals I n f ras t ruc tu re Program and the prov is ion of the

HPAF microwavo system under MDAP (upon which tho en t i re A i r Force

and control- and warning system commmications for Norway depends)

does not appear l i k e l y to bo ef fected i n 19?2 as planned.

COSMIC OP SCCREl

SWliC '»OP SZZP.^i 0 SsmssA .Training

26. During the per iod under review/ t he Commander, A l l i e d

A i r Forces , Northern Europe, i n the exercise o f tho peacetime

m i ss i on r.ssigned to h i s command, has i n i t i a t e d a system of t r a i n -

ing exerc isos and combat roadinoss t o s t s , a l though a formal agree-

ment on the procedures to he fo l lowed has not yet been accepted

by the n a t i o n a l Governments. The f i r s t Command post exerc ise

o f t h i s Command was the communications exercise "P i geon , " designed

to t o s t the emergency Commend o rgan i z a t i o n and i t s suppor t ing

communications. I t was known, p r i o r to the exerc ise , t h a t ex is t-

ing poacetime communications wore bare ly s u f f i c i e n t to a l e r t

the A i r Forcos i n an emergency. The r e s u l t s o f t he exercise

showed t h a t whi le the Command o rgan i z a t i on was, i n genera l , s a t i s -

f a c t o r y , the a d d i t i o n a l eommunicati-ns which can be provided

vjfithin 2l+ hours a f t e r an a l o r t w i l l provide on ly a very l i m i t e d

moans o f exerc is ing ope ra t i ona l command over the A i r ForccatCuiuqu

o f tho Command. Another r e s u l t o f the exercise was t h a t d e f i c i -

encies i n some ope ra t i ona l procedures needed co r rec t i on . Combat

read iness t e s t s were performed a t Karup and Gardermoen a i r f i e l d s

on t ho two j o t squadrons a t each o f theso bases. The t o t a l combat

e f f ec t i veness scores obta ined by the u n i t s tes ted aro i nd i ca t ed

bolow. Zhese low scores were due s la in ly to shortage o f "com-

ba t ready" p i l o t s i n those u n i t s , and to tho l ack o f a b i l i t y i n

a l l-woathcr f l y i n g and aor ia j . gunnory which i n t u r n was caused

by l ack o f t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s ;

Gardoimoon ( 3 3 6 t h and 337th F igh te r I n te rcep to r St is) ~ l8jS

Karup (723rd and 72Vth F ig l i ter I n t e r cep to r Sqs ) - 3(¾¾

I t i s p lanned t h a t , du r i ng 1952, t here w i l l be a d d i t i o n a l Com-

mand post exorcises performed through tho f a c i l i t i e s o f the RlIAF an^

KDAF and tinder tho ope ra t i ona l c o n t r o l o f t h i s Headquarters . Com-

bat read inoss t es t s o f each o f tho combat a i r u n i t s are a l s o t o

bo conducted dur ing tho rc ra i nder o f the year . I t i s f e l t t h a t

such exerc ises and read iness t o s t s w i l l he l p b r ing to the a t t e n t i o n

^COSMIC TOP S-a^py

o f a l l l e ve l s o f command the probloms t h a t must be solvod i n

order to b u i l d an o pe r a t i o n a l l y o f f e c t i v e a i r force«

IV ,-, .ADMINISTRATIVE MTTEjRS

Headquarters Porsojyiq iI

bu t duo to l i m i t e d Headquarters accommodations, r ap id expansion

t o au thor i zed s trength f i g u r e s has had t o be retarded w i t h a con-

sequent ly adverse o f f o c t upon the Headquarters a b i l i t y t o carry

ou t i t s t a s k . For example, the present au thor i zed s t reng th i s

2?6 personnel w i t h a foreseeab le increase o f 20 i n d i v i d u a l s t h i s

year , g i v i ng an est imated s t reng th o f 276 personnel by December

1952. However, the s t rength o f tho Headquarters a t tho moment i s

on l y 98 and these personnel are very overcrowded by normal o f f i c e

s tandards . Furthermore, due to personnel shortages i n t h e i r a i r

se rv i ces , the Danes and Norwegians have been unab lo t o f u r n i s h

t h e i r f u l l share to t h i s Headquarter^ personne l .

23. I t has been est imated tha t on ly two a d d i t i o n a l squadrons

w i l l become ope ra t i ona l i n Norway and Denmark respec t i ve l y i n 1952.

This os t imate has taken i n t o cons idera t i on the d i f f i c u l t i e s which

each o f the A i r Forces i s exporioneing i n procur ing s u f f i c i o n t

personnel t o permit expansion. I n Norway p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t has

been d i f f i c u l t t o procure pc . sonno l even up to present author-

i zed s t rengths due t o poor serv ice cond i t i ons such as :

a . Lack o f d e f i n i t o career prospec ts .

b . Low sca les o f pay*

c . Poor l i v i n g cond i t i ons oJ^HNAF i n s t a l l a t i o n s , p a r t i -

c u l a r l y f o r married men.

d . Lack o f adequate pens ions .

e . Lack o f other i ncen t i ves such as a l lowances, Commis-

sary and Post Exchange (.NAAFI>, and r e c r e a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s .

One o f tho major deterrents t o the development o f e f f e c t i v e A i r

Forces i s the shortage o f s t a f f o f f i c e r s . This e spec i a l l y app l i e s

t o the RDAF. I n order t o a l l e v i a t e t h i s shor tage , Commander AAFNE

has by agreement wi th the Danish A i r S t a f f , asked SHAPE to prov ide

C^MC TOP SZORgT

13 O .S . and U.K. o f f i c e r s f o r duty w i t h t he RBiAF Commander's s t a f f .

These personne l w i l l even tua l l y become a p a r t o f the subord inate

A l l i e d Headquarters i n Denmark. Up to t h i s t ime Norway has de-

c l i ned the uso o f f o r e i g n o f f i c e r s i n the RICAF Headquarters .

Maintenance

29. Maintenance f a c i l i t i e s o f the n a t i o n a l a i r forces are

adequate to support the equipment which they aro now opera t i ng ,

except f o r major overhau l o f B r i t i s h typo j o t a i r c r a f t engines and

accessor ies . I n tho pas t overhau l o f these engines and accessor ies

has been accomplished i n Swoden and the Uni ted Kingdom, r e qu i r i n g

s ix months or more f o r r epa i r and r e t u r n of each eng ine . F a c i l i -

t i e s f o r the Eiajor overhau l of Gob l i n eng inos , used i n Vampire a i r -

c r a f t , are now being es t ab l i s hed a t K j e l l e r and w i l l a l l e v i a t e t h i s

s i t u a t i o n as f a r as Norway i s concerned. Denmark i s a l so es t ab l i sh-

ing a f a c i l i t y to overhau l Derwcnt engines f o r t h e i r Metoors. Faci-

l i t i e s f o r the overhaul o f F-S^ type a i r c r a f t have not yet been

es tab l i shed I n the Command. Overhaul o f tho J-3? engine can bo

accomplished a t the present t i n e on ly i n Hol land and i n tho Uni ted

S t a t es . This would bo a d e f i n i t e weakness i n war, but u n t i l pros-

ont p o l i c i o s aro chongcd or tho numbers o f F-81)- a i r c r a f t i n the

Command warrant i t , no major J-35 engine o v e r h a u l . f a c i l i t i e s can

bc 0xpcctod to be es t ab l i s hed w i t h i n t h i s a rea .

3 0 . Considerable d i f f i c u l t y has boen encountered i n o b t a i n i n g

spare pa r t s to support the B r i t i s h typo a i r c r a f t which ore a t pres-

ent be ing used by the RNAF and RDAF. S inco ne i t h e r Norway nor Den-

mark were members o f the Western Union o f Ka t i ons , p r i o r i t i e s have

not been es tab l i shed through tho A i r M i n i s t r y w i th B r i t i s h producers

f o r f u r n i s h i n g necessary spare p a r t s . I n t he case o f a i r c r a f t ne i-

ther country has boen ab le to o b t a i n replacements f o r l osses due t o

a t t r i t i o n , and there i s a complete I n ck o f reserve a i r c r a f t i n bo th

o f the a i r f o rces . The de l i v e ry o f spare p a r t s and ground serv ic-

ing equipmont to support F-StJ- a i r c r a f t , thus f a r de l i ve red to Nor-

way CJid Denmark, has boon u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . These d e l i v e r i e s should

bo concurrent w i th a i r c r a f t d e l i v e r i e s , otherwise the t r a i n i n g re-

quired t o form new squadrons i n the CotiuiKiJicl t h i s year cannot bo rea-

l i z e d . I n tho event o f an emergency, cons iderab le d i f f i c u l t y would

^ i o p s e c : r

» Ov-- -j ï\ MlQ T O P SZCRE -

hc encountered in\Ae r e f u e l l i n g o f a i r c r a f t dtfe t o l a ck o f , and

obsolescence o f , r e f u e l l i n g t r ucks . This d i f f i c u l t y should be over-

come, however, upon de l i ve ry o f equipment t h a t has been p laced on

order by the MAAGfs» The po l i c y o f both Horway and Denmark i s t o

ma i n t a i n a l e v e l o f supply which i s greater than the SHAPE minimum.

Transpor ta t ion

31. R a i l , highway and water t ranspor t f a c i l i t i e s necessary t o

support wartime operat ions are no t adequate. At the present t ime ,

a l l a v i a t i o n f u e l i n Norway i s be ing handled through bu lk p l a n t s

l oca ted i n Oslo F j o r d . This procedure can be changed when a d d i t i o n a l

foi.'-L:s j u s t i f y the d i r e c t supply to other ex i s t i ng storage or t o

storage proposed f o r cons t ruc t i on i n the proximi ty o f a i r f i e l d s under

the I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Program. The shortage of coas ta l tankers ser ious ly

a f f e c t s the a b i l i t y t o resupply a i r bases a t the present t ime . This

de f i c i ency can be corrected i f proposed I n f r a s t r u c t u r e Programs are

approved and implemented. Since only one t ranspor t squadron of t en

Dakota type a i r c r a f t i s a v a i l a b l e , l i t t l e a i r t r anspor t a t i on support

can be expected a t the beginning of h o s t i l i t i e s .

Present Combat Capab i l i t y

32. The preceding paragraphs have enumerated b r i e f l y the var ious

f ac to rs which con t r i bu te tcward a r r i v i n g a t a measure o f the combat

c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h i s command. I n conclus ion i t can he s ta ted t ha t a t

p resen t , combat operat ions would be conf ined e s s e n t i a l l y to a l i m i t e d

number o f a i r i n t e rcep t i ons over a very few key defense po i n t s • These

i n te rcep t i ons could be conducted on ly i n good-weather, d ay l i gh t con-

d i t i o n s . Surface ta rge ts could not be attacked e f f e c t i v e l y . I n the

f ace of a determined and susta ined a t t ack by the Sov ie t s , t h e A i r

Arm would be non-ef fect ive i n a few days or poss ib ly i n a few hours .

Forecast f o r the Future

3 3 . An a d d i t i o n a l 100 a i r p l a n e s , which i t i s expected w i l l be

V C CItCLUS IONS

.qCSMIC TOP StCRE-J r ( ' »

i n opera t iona l u n i t s by January 19?3 t w i l l improve the s i t u a t i o n , but

t h i s equipment alone f a l l s f a r short of supplying the f u l l s o l u t i on

to a l l tho fac tors which havo retarded progress and which may continue

t o p r eva i l i n the f u t u re .

From the foregoing repor t , i t can be concluded tha t there i s an urgent

need f o r the ac c ompli s hm ont of the fo l l ow ing :

a s An ear ly changi i n the n a t i o n a l po l i c i e s which p roMb i t ,

the s ta t i on ing o f fo re ign u n i t s i n Worway and Denmark.

b . An agreed:

(1) D iv i s i on of Respons i b i l i t i e s .

^ * ¢2) Command Organizat ion .

c . A marked improvement i n communications.

d . Considerable increase i n Air Defense c a p a b i l i t y , i n c l ud "

i ng :

(1) An improved and enlarged C&R system.

(2) Prov is ion of nav iga t i ona l a ids i nc lud ing instrument

land ing ai' s ?

(3) Considerable increase i n a n t i - a i r c r a f t .

e . Assurance t ha t new equipment w i l l be manned and main-

ta ined by s u f f i c i e n t numbers o f properly t ra ined personnel .

f . The a b i l i t y to s t a f f a l l Headquarters organ izat ions wi th

properly t ra ined o f f i c e r s and s pe c i a l i s t s ,

g . Incredsed f a c i l i t i e s to a i d i n the accomplishment of

the f u l l squadron t r a i n i ng program.

h . The creat ion o f adequate maintenance and supply organ-

i za t i ons and f a c i l i t i e s , 4 n d pre-stocklng of s u f f i c i en t suppl ies to

support s tusfa ined combat a i r opera t ions .

I n order f o r the northern A i r Command t o meet eventual ly the minimum

stijridard of c apab i l i t y which i s essen t i a l f o r the implementation of

Defense Plans i n 195^» a considerable task l i e s ahead. A great dea l more mater i a l prbgress must be made i n the next year than has been

evidenced during thfô period of t h i s r epor t . The ensuing year i s in-

deed a very c r i t i c a l one, and the progress shown during the next few

months w i l l almost ce r t a i n l y f u rn i sh a barometer by which to guage

the eventual success or f a i l u r e of preparing the Air Arm for war read-

iness by Iaid-^StW

19520710 NU AFNE--537-2542-03-52 Report on Allied Air Forces · top secret coctno, 3c Headquarters,...

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