Post on 25-Feb-2016
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All Director’s Training2010
Session 4: Critical Incidents
Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison
July 12, 2009
Background of Facility Good facility on surface
ACA Accreditation Low drug use and incidents of trafficking Good overall metrics
Better culture Positive staff/offender relationships T.C. environments Many offender organizations
Description of Critical Incident On July 12, 2009 at 1030 hours (CST) Shift Supervisor was notified that three (3) offenders were missing from I-Cell house.
An emergency count was conducted at 1100 hours. It was verified that three (3) offenders were missing at 1107.
Nationwide search commenced with multiple Federal, State, and local agencies.
Charles Smith#876055Murder
95 years
Lance Battreal #988084
Rape53 years
Mark Booher #996357Murder
85 years
An internal search of the prison grounds turned up a change of clothes in the I-
Cell house tunnel area.Offenders gained
access to the I-Cell house midway
utility area unsupervised.
Once in midway offenders were able
to access tunnel system beneath the
facility.
After entering I-tunnel they were able to breach two walls
which allowed access to D-Cell house tunnel
The offenders were able to cut a chain securing a security grate and breach
another wall allowing access to the Main
Street tunnel system
From D-cell house tunnel they climbed through an access door
separating the ventilation feed/return system into the
return side of the ventilation system and crawled to the New
Service Building (NSB) basement area.
Offenders maneuvered through the Main Street tunnel system over to
Back Street tunnel.At the beginning of the Back Street tunnel they
cut through the tag shop gate to gain
access to Back StreetOffenders utilized
carbon tipped cutting blades to breach the
security grates (approximately 7
minutes cutting time)
Once through the Back Street gate they cut through the bars surrounding the storm drain enclosure
From there they climbed through the hole previously broken in the storm drain …
… where they gained access to the 10th street storm drain system managed by the city. They went through the city
system and came up through a manhole lid on 7th street and
Grant
7th Street & Grant Ave
FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE Procedure breakdowns:
Staff allowed offender workers unauthorized and unsupervised access to Midway.
Supervisory staff were not conducting walk-through inspections of housing units.
I-Cell house (honor dorm) offenders were allowed out of cell time from 0345 hours until approximately 2100 hours with exception of counts.
Counselor was compromised and admitted to trafficking with offender.
Lack of effective security practices and comprehensive Security Plan of Inspection.
Tunnel officer post frequently closed due to staff shortages.
Tunnel officers failed to report a broken/cut hinge on security door in tunnel areas approximately two weeks prior to escape.
Maintenance staff complacent and over familiar with offender maintenance workers.
Tunnels poorly maintained (repair debris removal needed). Facility maintenance staff would not work tunnels.
Physical Plant shortfalls: Tunnels not properly alarmed with security
electronics. Tunnel gates not updated with current technology.
FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE
PLAN OF ACTION – IMPROVEMENTS
Tunnel system cleaned and additional lighting added.
Fiber optic motion sensors and stun fencing placed on security grate – all alarms routed to control.
Guard One installed in tunnel system to monitor security inspections.
Enhanced staff search procedures implemented at facility entrances to prevent introduction of prohibited property.
High strength aircraft grade stainless steel bars installed throughout storm/sewer drains.
All midway keys removed from the unit (must be a Lieutenant or above to draw)
Policy changes (no offenders allowed in tunnel system)
Status of I housing unit changed. No additional out of cell house time allowed.
FOLLOW-UP Comprehensive Security Plan of
Inspection implemented to include inspection of storm drain security systems.
Annual security audits to enforce compliance with inspection procedures.
Initiated complacency drills throughout agency to challenge staff and ensure we are thinking about basic security practice ALL OF THE TIME.
“Those who don’t know history are destined to repeat it.”
- Edmond Burke
Questions/Comments?