AIRFORCES brief to MINEWARA:AIRFORCES brief to MINEWARA:MCM from the AirMCM from the Air

21 May 0921 May 09

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MCMMCMRELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCERELEVANCE AND IMPORTANCE

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MISSILE TORPEDO AIRPLANE SMALL BOAT MINEUSS STARK USS LIBERTY USS LIBERTY

USS HIGBEEUSS COLE USS MAGPIE

USS PIRATEUSS PLEDGE

USS PARTRIDGEUSS SARSIUSS BRUSH

USS MANSFIELDUSS WALKE

USS E.G. SMALLUSS BARTON

USS WESTCHESTER COUNTYUSS WARRINGTONUSS S.B. ROBERTS

USS TRIPOLIUSS PRINCETON

USS TRIPOLI

USS COLE

USS PRINCETON

TERRORIST

IRAQ

IRAN

ISRAEL

VIETNAM

KOREA

2000

1991

1987-88

1967

1969-72

1950-52

US SHIP CASUALTIES BY WEAPON TYPE1950-PRESENT

Rising

Influence

Moored

Contact Floating

Contact Bottom

Influence

Buried/Partially

Buried Anti-Invasion Moored

Influence

The real goal of a minefield is Sea Denial, NOT the damage or destruction of a specific ship.

The Sea is a maneuver area. Navy goal is to assure Access, support STOM/OMFTS, NOT counter every mine.

The Threat to Assured Access

• Over 300 Mine Types

• Over 50 Countries Possess

• Low Cost but High effects

• Simple to Deploy

• Asymmetric 4

SUMMARY OF MINING EVENTS (1980 – PRESENT)

• 50-60 VESSELS SUNK OR DAMAGED

– MAJORITY IN SRI LANKA

• MANY ARMED CONTACT MINES ADRIFT

– PERSIAN GULF

• > 20 LIVES LOST AT-SEA & ASHORE

• COSTLY SHIP REPAIRS/REPLACEMENTS

• EXPENSIVE MULTI-NATIONAL MCM OPERATIONS

• EXTENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

60+ COUNTRIES WITH MINING CAPABILITIES

MINING OF MISRATAH

• MINED BY LIBYAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (29 Apr 11) – ATTEMPT TO CLOSE PORT

• MINES DEPLOYED OUTSIDE HARBOR ENTRANCE

– 2 “QUICKLY CLEARED” – 1 “DRIFTED AWAY”

• “ANTI-SHIPPING” MINES – MOORED CONTACT MINES

• LIBYA PROVEN MINER – 1984 RED SEA MINING

(Reuters) - NATO minesweepers searched the approaches of Misratah harbor Monday for a drifting mine that has blocked aid supplies to the besieged Libyan city and halted evacuation of foreigners and wounded Libyans.

LIBYAN MOORED CONTACT MINE

NAVAL MINE TRENDS

• Increasing Lethality Ranges and Minable Waters – Torpedo-mines – Deeper anchor depths

• Emerging Anti-Helo and ACV Capabilities • Mine Employment More Difficult to Detect

– Denial & Deception improving – Standoff employment

• Improved Target Discrimination/CCM Features – Microprocessor controlled triple influence TDDs/upgrade kits – Target libraries improving

• Minehunting Increasingly Difficult – Stealth technology application growing

• Security and Flexibility of Minefield Control Improving – Wireless Remote Control (Acoustic, EM, RF)

CONVERGENCE OF WEAPONS, DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WIDE AREA SENSORS NETWORKS

Straight Rising Propelled Warhead Mines

• PROPELLED-WARHEAD MINE

– STRAIGHT-RISING

– ROCKET PROPELLED

• PASSIVE ACOUSTIC

• 130 kg WARHEAD

• CASE DEPTH: 50-150 m

• ANCHOR DEPTH: 55 – 200 m

• SUBMARINE, SHIP-LAID

• ASUW

EM55

Encapsulated Torpedo Mines

• PMK-2 • PASSIVE / ACTIVE ACOUSTIC • MPT-1M THERMAL TORPEDO • CASE/ANCHOR: 400/1000 m • WIDE AREA COVERAGE

• EXERCISE MINES LOADED ON SMALL BOATS

Agile Minelayers

ROCKET LAUNCHER WATER IMPACT

DRIFTING MINES?

ROCKET LAUNCHED MINES

IRREGULAR SHAPES NON-MAGNETIC CASES

CASE BURIAL

CLOSE-TETHER MOORINGS

MINE STEALTH

ACTIVE CASE BURIAL

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AIRLANT role in MCMAIRLANT role in MCM

AMCM

SMCMUMCM

MCM TriadMCM TriadMCM Triad

Man, Train and Equip• HM-14

• HM-15

• HSC-Expeditionary

Dedicated

Organic

Today

Future

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Today’s Dedicated AMCMToday’s Dedicated AMCM

Around the world in 72 Hours

HM-14 – homeport NorfolkDet 1 supporting C7F in Pohang, Korea (2 a/c)

HM-15 – homeport change to Norfolk Sept 09 (BRAC)

Det 2 supporting C5F in Bahrain (4 a/c)

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What makes up an HM squadron?What makes up an HM squadron?

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• Provide a 72-hour rapid-response Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) capability worldwide to support COCOM requirements.

• Provide secondary capability for Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) and Heavy Lift.

• Operate from ship or fully expeditionary shore self-support capable

HM Mission RequirementsHM Mission Requirements

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Requirement: 28 total aircraft inventoryRequirement: 28 total aircraft inventory

• 20 AMCM aircraft to cover multiple OPLAN and NORTHCOM HLD AMCM requirements– Includes 4 VOD a/c to cover EUCOM or other COCOM heavy lift

logistic requirements and NORTHCOM HA/DR relief requirements.

– HM AMCM to cover requirement with HC-4 Decom in Sept 07

• 4 Aircraft on the line for FRS throughput

• 2 RDTE a/c in P-City (supports alternative platform Organic AMCM systems DT/OT)

• 2 aircraft for pipeline (10% of inventory)

Bottom Line:20 MH-53E provide world-wide AMCM response

capabilityNo comparable NATO/coalition capability exists

Bottom Line:20 MH-53E provide world-wide AMCM response

capabilityNo comparable NATO/coalition capability exists

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AMCM CapabilitiesAMCM Capabilities

• Rapid mine sweeping– Actuate influence mines (MK-105)

– Sever moored mines from their tether (MK-103 Mechanical Sweep)

• Mine hunting– Uses sonar or laser energy to locate,

classify, and identify mines

• Requires follow-on intervention for disposal

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Capability: Mine HuntingCapability: Mine Hunting

AN/AQS-24A

AN/AQS-24

UNCLASUNCLAS

MantaManta MK 36

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MK-36CRN 73

AQS-24 Sonar

AN/AQS-24 Laser Line Scan

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AMCM Contingency SystemsAMCM Contingency Systems

AQSAQS--20 Configuration20 Configuration

Three of five OAMCM systems MH-53E compatible:• AQS-20 and AMNS contingency systems approved for MH-53E

• Both systems have passed OPTEVFOR OA test program on MH-53E

• Full OT not funded in favor of MH-60S platform

• OASIS currently undergoing CT testing on MH-53E

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Pacing Capability: Influence Mine SweepingPacing Capability: Influence Mine Sweeping

MK-105

MK-104

AN/SPU-1/W

Magnetic Orange Pipe

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AN/SPU-1W (MOP)

• AN/SPU-1W: Remains effective against influence mines in brackish to fresh water. In service.

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MKMK--104104

• Acoustic minesweeping system.

• Generates a sound field capable of actuatingacoustic mines.

• Streamed, towed and recovered from MH-53E.

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MK-105 MOD IV

• Hydrofoil towed andremotely controlledfrom helicopter.

• Launched from ships,ramps or remote sites.

• Provides a safe andreliable method ofdetonating magneticinfluence mines.

• MK-106: combinationacoustic / magneticsweeps.

(MK-104 + MK-105 = MK-106)

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MKMK--103103

• Mechanical minesweeping system used for sweeping moored mines.

• Streamed, towed and recovered from MH-53E.

• Consists of a port and starboard diverted wiresweep armed with cutters.

• Sweep wires diverted by otters and supported by marker floats.

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Austere Site AMCM OperationsAustere Site AMCM Operations

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HM NVD transitionHM NVD transition

Crawl – walk – run implementation within the MH-53E fleet

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Other MCM in R&DOther MCM in R&D

Counter-mine system (JDAM)

Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA)

Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS)

Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3)

UUV Low Frequency Broad Band Sonar (UUV LFBB)

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MHMH--53E: What has changed since 2005?53E: What has changed since 2005?

•OAMC

• OAMCMMH-53E demand evolving beyond AMCM:

• Sea Base CONOPS: - Heavy Lift ICD approved by JROC

• OIF/GWOT Heavy lift requirements- ISO 3rd Army in Iraq

• Increased demand for HA/DR assets

Sea Base AR/LSB

GWOT / OIFTSUNAMI HA/DR OPS

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DSCA supportDSCA support

• Surveys of 12 DoD ports underway• Surveys allow change detection• In experiments change detection:

– Eliminated 54% of mine-like objects– Reduced clearance time by 30%

• Surveys of 12 DoD ports underway• Surveys allow change detection• In experiments change detection:

– Eliminated 54% of mine-like objects– Reduced clearance time by 30%

• Change detection will reduce time to clear a port.

• Heavy lift provides unmatched capability responding to civil emergencies.

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MHMH--53E Look53E Look--backback• Tsunami Relief JAN-MAR 05 HADR (PACOM)• JTF KATRINA AUG-SEP 05 HADR (NORTHCOM)• JTF RITA SEP 05 HADR (NORTHCOM• RIMPAC 06 JUN–AUG 06 MIW (PACOM)• PANAMAX 06 AUG–SEP 06 MIW (SOUTHCOM)• JTF LEBANON AUG – Nov 06 NEO (EUCOM)• POTUS MAR 07 Uruguay/Mexico SOUTHCOM • 3P (C7F AOR) MAY-NOV 07 HADR/GWOT (PACOM)

HM-15 deliver essential supplies during Katrina MH-53E during RIMPAC Sled Ops

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FDNF FDNF –– CENTCOM AORCENTCOM AOR

• Pakistan Relief OCT-NOV 05 HADR

• FAWOMOEX 05-2 OCT 06 MIW

• NAUTICAL UNION JUL 06 MIW

• SAIPAN MK-105 SEP – NOV 06 MIW

• RFF 3rd Army IRAQ JAN06-JAN 07 GWOT support

HM-15 conducting HADR in Pakistan MK-105 SAIPAN C5F Ops

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MHMH--53E FLEX53E FLEX

• MH-53Es begin reaching their structural service life limit in FY-07

• Fatigue Life Extension (FLEX) –extends fatigue life limit of a/c from 6900 to 10,000 hours

• Costs $500,000 per a/c ($4M for 16 AMCM aircraft)

• Limited FLEX (16 a/c) maintains inventory through FY 15.

• Allows Navy flexibility in assessing long term requirement for MH-53E or HLR

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MHMH--53E53EProgram MilestonesProgram Milestones

• 1987 MH-53E enters service as Navy’s AMCM platform • PR07 MH-53E Fatigue Life Extension (FLEX) extends service

life from 2009 to 2014• POM 08 Navy VOD (HLR) strategy (AR/LSB ICD):

– IOC 2015– FOC 2020– Inventory Objective: 20 - 32 (notional) AOA to inform

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10

15

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25

30

35

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03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Year

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mb

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Air

fra

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MH-53E Total Active Inventory

MH-53E Requirement AR/LSB VOD (HLR)?

RO

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MHMH--53E Sustainment53E Sustainment

= POM-08 IssueFully Funded

= Partially Funded

= Unfunded

1. MH-53E Fatigue Life Extension Program2. Integrated Threat Warning System3. Night Vision Device (NVD) Capability4. Integrated Mechanical Diagnostic/Health and Usage Monitoring

System (IMD/HUMS)5. Leverage off USMC HLR Program for MH-53E Follow-on Aircraft 6. Leverage off USMC T-64 Engine Reliability Improvement Program7. Replace Kapton wiring8. Continue to Fund MH-53E Simulator9. Leverage off USMC Common Defensive Weapon System (GAU-21)10. #2 Engine Exhaust Redesign

=Pom 08

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Take AwayTake Away

• H-53E increasingly high demand - low density platform for COCOMs– GWOT demand exceeds USMC/USA heavy lift capacity

• Evolving non MIW mission requirements will continue for MH-53E given GWOT/HADR demand

• HC-4 Decommissioning removes Navy’s remaining non AMCM heavy lift response option– Limited AMCM assets will now be pressed for non MIW missions

• Potential impact on core MIW readiness and primary AMCM response posture

• Required: Unified Navy understanding of and response to future RFF for non MIW deployments of the MH-53E

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AMCM OutlookAMCM Outlook

CAPT Paul LluyCOMHSCWINGLANT