“3S” Concept Implementation - Sparex Nuclear...

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“3S” Concept Implementation

Strategy

Dr. Lucian Biro

General Manager

SPAREX Nuclear 3S Ltd.

Nuclear Safety, Security & Safeguards Consulting

Romania

BIT's 4th Annual New Energy Forum – 2014

Forum 6: Nuclear Energy

Qingdao International Convention Center,

Qingdao, China

September 21-23, 2014

IAEA Nuclear Security Related Definitions

Lessons learned from the past

“3S” Concept

NPP Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities

NPP Safety & Security Characteristics

Design Basis Threat

Final remarks

References

Content

IAEA Nuclear Security Related

Definitions

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20

Definitions (1)

Defense in depth.

The combination of successive layers of nuclear

security systems and nuclear security measures for the

protection of targets from nuclear security threats.

Nuclear facility.

A facility (including associated buildings and

equipment) in which nuclear material is produced,

processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of and

for which an authorization or license is required.

Definitions (2)

nuclear security culture.

The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and

behaviours of individuals, organizations and

institutions which serve as a means to support,

enhance, and sustain nuclear security.

nuclear security system.

An integrated set of nuclear security measures.

Definitions (3)

nuclear security regime.

A regime comprising:

The legislative and regulatory framework and administrative

systems and measures governing the nuclear security of

nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated

facilities and associated activities;

The institutions and organizations within the State responsible

for ensuring the implementation of the legislative and

regulatory framework and administrative systems of nuclear

security;

Nuclear security systems and nuclear security measures

Lessons learned from the

NPP Nuclear Accidents

NPP Sites from Satellite

9/11 Terrorist Attack in New-York

Lessons learned from the past

NPPs Nuclear Accidents

Windscale (Anglia) 1957

Three Miles Island (USA) 1979

Chernobyl (Ukraine) 1986

Fukushima (Japan) 2011

NPPs Nuclear Accidents

NPP Sites from Satellite

Germany: Biblis NPP

France: Flamanville NPP Site

Ukraine: Chernobyl NPP Site

Romania: Cernavoda NPP Site

9/11 Terrorist Attack

in New-York

Targets Size Comparison

- US NEI Presentation-

208’ x 1,353’

Pentagon

1,489’ x 71’

Spent Fuel Bay

80’ x 40’

Reactor Building

130’ x 160’

Storage

Containers

10’ x 20’

Rethinking the Nuclear

Threat

Changing of terrorists’ motivation

Interest for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Using the technology to exploit the vulnerabilities of a

particular society

Development of black markets may offer access to

weapons

The rapid spread of technological knowledge can boost

terrorists weapon attem

Rethinking the Nuclear Threat

“3S” Concept

Nuclear safety:

to operate a nuclear facility in such manner that protects the

public and environment;

Nuclear security:

to protect nuclear facility against the intruders who whish to

damage or destroy it in order to harm people and the

environment;

Nuclear safeguard:

to verify the compliance with NPT requirements.

“3S” Concept (1)

The “3S” concept takes into consideration the links,

influences, synergies, feed-beaks between nuclear

safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards;

The objectives are to eliminate the gaps and

vulnerabilities on a nuclear facility operation in normal,

abnormal and accident conditions;

“3S” Concept (2)

Nuclear Safety & Security Synergy

Nuclear

Safety

Nuclear

Security

Nuclear Security

Vulnerabilities

Lack of procedures

Inefficient procedures

Inefficient Physical Protection Systems

Lack of Facilities Personnel Training

Radioactive Sources Lost or Theft

Inefficient Transportation Physical Protection

Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (1)

Lack of coherent strategy

Gaps in Legal Framework

Inadequate Equipment

No specialized response units

Permissive Border Control

No background history of radioactive sources

No security culture

Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (2)

NPP Safety & Security

Characteristics

Comprehensive measures for safety and security;

Comprehensive emergency and security plans;

Robust containment, spent fuel pools, and spent fuel

storage containers;

Redundant and diverse plant safety systems;

Trained plant staff, skilled in accident and event

response;

Well-trained, well-armed security forces.

Requirements for NPPs

CANDU-6 Multiple Layers Protection

Reactor Building

Bio Shield

Calandria Vessel

Reactor Fuel

Design Basis Threat

Physical Protection Regulations in Nuclear Field

Design Basis Threat

Regulations on using DBT

Regulations on requirements for guards and security

personnel qualification

Nuclear Security Related Regulations

Principle of “defense in depth”

Categorization of nuclear material

Vital areas protection

Detection, delay, response

People trustworthiness

Design Basis Threat Concept

NPP Physical Protection Arrangements

- US NEI Presentation -

Area Controlled

by the Owner

Protected

Vital Area

Access Control

Area protected

by Double

Fences

An assessment of physical, cyber, biochemical, and

other terrorist threats;

The potential for attack on facilities by multiple

coordinated teams of a large number of individuals and

several insiders;

Th�e potential for suicide attacks;

The potential for water-based and air-based threats;

US NRC: factors considered in new DBT (1)

The potential use of explosive devices of considerable

size and other modern weaponry;

The potential for attacks by persons with a

sophisticated knowledge of facility operations;

The potential for possibly long-lived �fires.

US NRC: factors considered in new DBT (2)

DBT for Spent Fuel

Transportation by Airplane

Security Measures for SNF Transportation (1)

Security Measures for SNF Transportation (2)

Spent Fuel Loaded in Airplane

“3S” Concept is designed for an integrated approach to

be used in the area of nuclear safety, nuclear security

and nuclear safeguards;

Final Remarks

1) US NRC Security Spotlight, May 2007

2) IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20:

Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s

Nuclear Security Regime (2013)

References

Thank you for your attention !

Dr. Lucian BIRO

General Manager

Sparex Nuclear 3S Ltd.

Nuclear Safety, Security & Safeguards

Consulting

Romania

Mobile: + 40-753-090-897

E-mail: sparex_nuclear_3s@yahoo.com

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