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Rethinking Moral Economy
Author(s): Thomas Clay ArnoldSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 85-95Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117630 .
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AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 95, No. 1 March2001
RethinkingoralconomyTHOMAS CLAYARNOLD Emporia State University
establishthreecloselyrelatedclaims. Thefirst two are interpretive,he thirdtheoretical. 1) Theprevailing onceptionof moraleconomy n politicalscience,presupposed y opponentsas wellasadvocates, ests ooheavily n thedistinction etween onmarket ndmarket-basedocieties. 2) The
prevailing onception f moraleconomy educes o theundulynarrow laim thateconomic ncorporation
of a nonmarket eople is the basis or themoral ndignationhat leadsto resistance nd rebellion. 3)Reconceptualizing oral economyin termsof social goods revealsadditionalgrounds or politicallysignificantmoral ndignation ndpermitsmoral-economicolitical analysisof a larger et of casesandphenomena.WaterpoliticsnthearidAmericanWestllustratehepowerofa conception fmoraleconomybasedon socialgoods.
oliticalscientistsdebateas intenselyas ever theidea of a moral economy,whichcontainsboth
descriptiveand prescriptiveelements. The de-
scriptiveelement reflects the contributions f, amongothers, anthropologists nd refers to the various,es-
sentially noneconomic norms and obligations (e.g.,reciprocity) hat mediate the centralsocial, political,and/oreconomic relationsof a given (almost alwayspre- or nonmarket)people. The prescriptive lementrefers to moral economy's status and value as aninstrument or social and political analysis.Whetherused to evaluate the distinctive social and politicalfeaturesof varioussystemsof exchange Booth 1993a;Dalton 1961;Polanyi1957) or to explaininsurgencyand rebellion (Gosner 1992; Scott 1976;Thompson1971),the idea of a moraleconomy s a claimabouttheconductof inquiry, f what to studyand how. Formanypolitical scientists committedto alternative orms of
inquiry,moral economy easily means above all else
spiriteddiscussionabout themostcrucialquestionsofmethod and interpretation Booth 1993b,953).Parties to this debate in political science differ
sharplyover thevalueof whatFrerejohn 1991,301,n.
1) hasfruitfully escribedas theethnographictartingpoint, the assertion,embracedby moraleconomists,that theproperplace to begin social analysis s withthe meanings embedded in the social practices in
question, hatsocialpractices form he basis for theidentificationof actorsand choices. Describedmore
fullybelow, the debateover moral-economic oliticalsciencereflects npartmoraleconomists'opposition othe assumptionsand approachesof rational-choiceformsof
inquiry,hatis to
say,economic
assumptionsabout humanbehaviorapplied in settings in which,moraleconomistsargue, narrowly elf-interestedcal-culationsof gainor efficiency re absentor secondary.
Curiously,he spiriteddebate npoliticalsciencehasnot featured the conceptitself. In starkcontrastwiththe disputesover the value of moral-economic oliticalscience, the question of what constitutes a moral
economy drawslittle attention or controversy.Yet,moral-economic oliticalscience is onlyas effectiveastheconceptof moraleconomyon which t rests.Silenceon this centralissue begs two questions.Whatis theunderlying onceptionof moraleconomypresupposedby the parties to the dispute?More important, s itadequate?The next two sectionsreconstructand cri-tique the prevailingbut largelyunquestionedconcep-tionof moraleconomy npolitical cience.Reconstruc-tion and critiqueestablish wo points:The traditional
conceptionof moraleconomyin politicalscience (1)reststoo heavilyon the distinctionbetweennonmarketand market-based ocieties and (2) reduces to theundulynarrowclaim that economic ncorporation f anonmarketpeople is the basis for the moralindigna-tionthat leads to resistanceandrebellion.Theremain-
ing two sectionsdevelopa more effectiveconception.Combiningoverlooked aspects of early moral-eco-nomicanalysiswithinsightsdrawn romrecentstudies
of communityand collectiveaction,I recastthe con-cept in lightof the constitutive, ommunal,and,espe-cially,nestedpropertiesof socialgoods.
A conceptionof moral economy based on social
goods capturesthe groundsfor politicallysignificantmoral indignationmore preciselythan does the pre-vailing view. It demonstratesthat the grounds for
politically ignificantmoral ndignationdo not lie onlyor even predominantly t the level of clashingecono-mies or cultures.They ie insteadatthe level of specificsocial goods, at the intersection of nested sets ofmeaning and value called into question by equallyspecificchanges n circumstance.
Myrevision also refines
analysis.Given the nestedpropertiesof social goods, instances of resistancetowhat traditionalmoral economists often describe ascommodificationeed not be viewedasresistance o allforms or degreesof commodity xchange,even of thegood in question.Moreover,by focusingon specificsocial goods, rather than on overarchingeconomicsystems,I account for politicallysignificant althoughnot necessarilyrebellious) moral economies wheretraditionalmoraleconomistswould eastexpectto findthem:withinmodem, market-structuredommunitiesand societies.Waterpolitics nthearidAmericanWestillustrate hepowersof a conceptionof moraleconomybased on socialgoods.
ThomasClay Arnold is Associate Professorof PoliticalScience,EmporiaStateUniversity,Emporia,KS66801-5087.
The author s deeply ndebted o KimArnold,MichaelHandley,Phil Kelly, Chris Phillips, Greg Schneider,and the anonymousreviewersor theirmanyhelpfulcomments.
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RECONSTRUCTION
The traditionalnotion of moraleconomyin politicalscience reflects the seminal works of Karl Polanyi(1957) and E. P. Thompson(1971). It features the
extraordinary henomenonof a poor,premarketpeo-ple contestingthe dictatesof a much more moderneconomic order.' Polanyi contributes the importantdistinctionbetweenembeddedandautonomous con-omies.Embedded, ypicallyancientor primitive con-omies submergeproductionand exchange o the pur-poses and practices of far more significantsocial,political,or religious nstitutions.Autonomousecono-mies functiondifferently. roduction ndexchangearemuch more significant, ncreasinglyserve economic
ends, and operate accordingto the constraintsof
pervasive, impersonalmarkets. Autonomous econo-mies definethe modernera.
Thompsoncontributes everal hings.Beyondpopu-larizing he term moraleconomy,he explainshowand
whythe transition rom an embeddedeconomyto anautonomousmarketgeneratedsocialand
politicalun-
rest,evensustainedorganized iolence.Drawingon his
studyof eighteenth-century nglish oodriots,Thomp-son (1971,78, 79) finds the delicate issue of tradi-tionalsocial normsandreciprocitiesunableto accom-modate the cash-nexus of the emerging marketorder.The clash was often traumatic.Those most atthe mercyof the emergingorderregarded he transi-tion as unjust.Moral outrageand direct action fol-lowed.Thompson'smostsignificant ontributions hisunderstated onceptof a moraleconomy,whichpolit-ical scientistsdo not incorporate sfullyastheyshould.
Generalizing rom the particularsof the food riots,Thompson conceives moral economy as a popularconsensus about what distinguishes egitimate fromillegitimatepractices,a consensusrooted in the pastand capableof inspiringaction (pp. 78-9, 108, 112,131-6).
Reflecting the discipline's longstandingdesire toaccount for peasant and Third World insurrections
(BatesandCurry1992;Lichbach1994),the prevailingconcept in political science emphasizesconflict andresistance.Thisemphasis peaksfar moreto a patternof behavior ratherthan, as Thompsoninstructs, henatureof and sourcesfor communalnotions of legiti-macy. Illustrationsabound. Consider Scott's (1976)analysisof peasantrebellionsin early-twentieth-cen-
turyBurmaand Vietnam. Peasantsrebelled,he con-cludes,out of their desire to resist intensifyingEuro-pean colonialismand to restore ancientpeasantwaysandrights.Eric Wolf(1969,276) explainspeasantwarsin Cuba,Russia,China,Mexico,andAlgeria n similar
terms,emphasizinghepredatory atureandculturallydisruptive ffectsof NorthAtlanticCapitalism.
This pattern of behavior has even been used to
reinterpretaspectsof U.S. social andpoliticalhistory,in particularhe actionsof nineteenth-century remar-ket farmersn largeportionsof Georgia,Missouri,andTexas. Convincedthat their communitiesand atten-dant habitsof mutuality were threatenedby a grow-
ing and impersonalmarket,yeomanfarmersresortedto, among other things, populist revolt and social
banditry(Hahn 1983, 53; see also McMath 1985;Thelen 1986). Resistanceto economicincorporationalsoemerges nStrickland's1985)studyof newly reedblacks n the rice-plantingectionsof the South Caro-linaLowCountry.nthisinstance,LowCountry lacks
jealouslyretained he independenceandunsupervisedtime long afforded lavesbythe traditionalmannerofrice cultivation taskwork argely outof the master's
eye )despite postwareffortsbyenterprisingwhites to
regulate aborrationally n the basis of time,supervi-sion, and wages.2Blacksresistedthe emergingorder
simply by refusingto
participate.Their subsistence
skillsand,unlikeother sectionsof theSouth, herefugeof theirwell-established, xtended families sustainedthe resistance.Judging rom the literature,resistanceto economic ncorporations indeed thepreferred, nd
typically he only,recognizedpattern.The prevailing onceptionof moraleconomy s also
a response to a prominent issue in contemporarypoliticalthought, thecontroversy ver 'the economic
approacho humanbehavior,' ver rationalchoice andrelated heories,andespeciallyver heunderstandingfnonmarket societies (Booth 1994, 653, emphasisadded).Thisdisputedominates he literature, ender-
ingmoraleconomymore a labelfor the debatethana
category ororganizing xperience.Although heargu-ments for and especiallyagainstmoral-economicinesof inquirydo not debate the concept per se, they are
revealing.Summarizedbelow, they confirmthe nar-rowness of the prevailingview and point, if onlyindirectly, o a compellingalternative.
Traditionalmoral economistsmaintain hat,insofaras the economicapproachprivileges he self-interestedindividual,who narrowlybut rationallycalculatesonthe basisof unforgiving ompetitionandthe principleof utilitymaximization,t cannotfruitfully ngagethe
many nstances n which economicbehavior s embed-ded in noneconomic institutions and values. Tradi-
tional moral economistsarguethatscholarsgainlittle,if anything,by analyzing ehavior n termsof what theactors themselveswould recognizeas strangeor im-moral, f even comprehensible. cott (1976,166) con-cludes that a strictly conomicapproachoverlooks hemore tellingsociocultural omponentsof behavior; t
1 This notion is found throughout the literature, among early advo-cates as well as recent critics. Scott (1976) is the leading example of
early moral-economic analysis in political science. More recentstudies include Posusney 1993 and Heilke 1997. Among contempo-rary critics are Bates and Curry (1992) and Booth (1994), whoseworks are second-order analyses of the topic, although both rely in
part on the authors' earlier studies of premarket societies, African
and ancient Greek in particular.
2 The real social and cultural significance of the task system lay inthe fact that a slave could finish the day's work at his or her ownchosen rate. ... Slaveswho worked quicklyoften assisted otherswhowere slower, thereby making task labor a collective experi-ence.... Task work thus helped to fashion a moral economy that
prized the virtues of independence, self-determination, and personalachievement, while encouraging collective responsibility for the
completion of assignments (Strickland 1985, 145).
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misses the centralfact that the peasant s born into a
societyand culturethat providehim a fund of moralvalues,a set of concretesocialrelationships, patternof expectationsabout the behaviorof others, and asense of how those in his culture have proceededtosimilargoals in the past.
In thetraditional iew,the moreappropriatempha-sis is on cultural ormsandvalues,onwhatHahn(1983,
6, 85) describesas the web of social life, meaningideas about justice, independence,obligation,andother aspects of social and political life, rooted in
specificrelationshipsand refracted hroughhistorical
experiences. Scott (1976, 167) agrees: Woven ntothe tissue of peasantbehavior, hen,whether n normallocal routinesor in the violenceof an uprising, s thestructure f a sharedmoraluniverse,a commonnotionof what is just.It is this moralheritage hat,in peasantrevolts,selects certaintargetsratherthanothers,cer-tain forms ratherthan others, and that makespossi-ble.. . action born of moral outrage. The abstract,atomistic,andnarrowly tilitarian ssumptions f eco-nomic analysissimplywill not do. Instead, analysismustbe phenomenological, apableof comprehendingthe culturalself-understandingsf the actors them-selves,that is, theirsense of propriety, ustice,obliga-tion, and the like (Scott 1976, 3, 4).3
Responsesto these arguments arybut fall intooneof threecategories.The mostcommon s the claimthatthe norms and reciprocitiesof anygiven moralecon-
omy are reducible to and best explained n terms ofself-interested,politicaleconomy.Popkin (1979, 18),for instance,in a studyof Vietnamesepeasantsthat
overlapsScott's,arguesthat byapplying heoriesofindividualdecision-makingo villages,we canbeginto
developa deductiveunderstanding f peasantinstitu-
tions andmove the analysisbackone step to the levelof the individual.By usingthe conceptsof individualchoice and decision-making,we can discuss how and
whygroupsof individuals ecide to adoptsomesetsofnorms while rejectingothers. Peering beneath theveneer of collective behavior and a shared moraluniverse,Popkinfindsa familiar unifyingnvestment
logic (p. 244) to Vietnamesepeasant ife, a logic lessmaterialistic r income-oriented hanthat in the West,but rationalandmaximizing onetheless.
A second and relatedresponse s that moralecono-mistshavea too-pinchedonceptionof theeconomic(Booth 1994,659). In short,they fail to appreciate tsinfluence in social formationsother than that of themarket.Studies of the firm,family,and governmentdemonstrate,criticsargue,how obviouslynonmarketfeatures and institutionsare clearly the product ofprimary conomicforcesand calculations.Summariz-
ing the conclusionsof DouglassNorth,RobertBates,MichaelHechter,EdwardLeClair,and Neil Smelser,Boothwrites thatnonmarket conomiesare best un-derstood n the lightof the transactionostsassociatedwith markets p. 658, emphasisadded).The logic ofthis responseis clear-converting nonmarket nstitu-tions into full-blownmarketones simplyincurs toomany information,measurement,and enforcementcosts. Retaining nonmarketfeatures is in these in-stancescost efficient.The point,however, s thatnon-marketdoes not necessarilymean noneconomic.ForBooth, peasant moral economies in particular lendthemselves o retranslationnto the vocabulary f theeconomicapproach, hereupon itbecomesapparentthatmanyof theirbehaviorsandinstitutionalormsareeconomizingresponsesto a situationof severe riskinregardto subsistencegoods (p. 659). The work ontransactioncosts by North and others questionstheassumptionof manytraditionalmoraleconomists hatmodernity s distinguishedby the role and place ofeconomiccalculation.
The thirdand even more substantiveresponsead-dressesdirectly he masterassumption Booth 1994,653) of moraleconomists,the conceptof embedded-ness.According o Granovetter1985),embeddednessis in the end a matterof the degreeto whicheconomicbehaviors affectedbyorsubmergednsocialrelations.
Traditionalmoral economistserr in two ways.First,moraleconomists o deeplyembedeconomicbehaviorin whattheythink are socialrelations hat economicbehavior s not literallyeconomic(oversocialization).Second,what moraleconomistspresentas economicbehavior is actually an attribute of a generalizedmorality, which Granovetterdefines as a widelysharedset of implicitagreements o certainkindsof
regard for others (p. 489, citing Arrow 1974, 26).Generalizedmoralities,however, ead to otherdifficul-ties.
Accordingto Granovetter 1985), generalizedmo-ralities,whatever heircontent,arenot socialrelations.
Truly social relations involve relativelycontinuous,concrete,and specificinterpersonal ies; actors,fullyawareof these ties andcircumstances,espondaccord-ingly.Truly ocialrelationsareongoing, continuouslyconstructedand reconstructedduring nteraction p.486). In contrast,generalizedmoralitiesare external,fairlyfixed systemsof norms and values internalizedthroughsocialization.Because they are internalized,their behavior-inducing lout is contained, so tospeak, insidean individual'shead (p. 486). There-fore,behavior s automatic, ven mechanical, ndongoing social relations are irrelevant p. 486).Moraleconomistswho embedbehavior n generalizedmoralitiesparadoxicallyetain that to whichthey ob-
3 Compare this kind of criticism of rational-choice modes of analysiswith those of Sen (1977) and Monroe (1996), two scholars who workoutside the tradition of moral economy. Sen recognizes that calcu-
lations of (even personal) welfare are much more complex than theundiluted model of self-interest indicates. They involve multiplerankings of different kinds of preferences, some of which are basedon a sense of duty, as affected by morals and culture and as mediated
by commitment to religion, class, group, or community (1977,326-9).
Based upon her study of altruism, Monroe (1996) rejects individ-ualistic self-interest as an all-embracing theory of human behaviorbecause it distorts and limits our understandingof what it means tobe a human being (p. 236). Altruists in particular act well outsidethe context of calculated costs and benefits; their often personallyrisky acts of selflessness are instead spontaneous and rooted in their
deeply felt connection to all other human beings. Monroe prefers an
approach she describes as perspectival (p. 15), in which nonutili-tarian world views, core values, and a sense of self figure at least as
prominently as self-interest.
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ject in the strictlyeconomicapproach: atomizedde-cisionmakingevenwhen decisionsareseen to involvemorethan one individual pp. 486-7).
Booth adds to the critiqueof embeddedness.He
rejectsthe use of the conceptby moral economists o
distinguish harply he characterand mannerof sub-
merged,premodern conomies frommodern,autono-mous ones, a distinction that many of them take
somewhat orgranted.Contraryo the claimsof Pola-nyi in particular,he believes close study of ancientGreeceproves hatnarrowlyational, conomicbehav-ior is never so embedded that it is theoreticallyindistinct, ot to mention invisible Booth1993a,6;1994, 654,655).Furthermore,tudyof modernmarket
societyproves hatnarrowlyational,economicbehav-ior is never so autonomous hat the very conceptof
economymustbe regardedas a productof modern
society and not trulyapplicable to the theoretical/moraluniverseof non-orprecapitalistworlds Booth1993a,6). In the end, the notion of embeddednessblindsmoraleconomiststo the analyticallymportantfact that all economies
(ancientand
modern)are
simultaneously conomizingand normativen nature,although n varyingdegrees.4
CRITIQUE
According o its severestcritics,moral-economic olit-icalanalysiss flawed.It misreads he natureof humanbehaviorand,therefore, hepolitics hatflowfrom t. It
maystimulatereflectionbut is not a particularly ow-erful or credible ine of inquiry.Rejection,however, s
premature. Rejection presumes that the traditionalnotion of moral economy is conclusive. It is not.
Interestingly,Booth'sstudyof ancientGreeceis itself
causeforrethinkinghe concept,although or reasonsother thanthose Booth emphasizes.5
Accordingto Booth, the moral architectureand
economyof ancientGreece reflected undamental nds
and values of the household,the primaryeconomicunit. As epitomized by Ischomachos n Xenophon'sOeconomicus,he household rested on careful,evenrationalcalculations f utility.Moreprecisely,ts econ-
omy turnedon the managerialrole of the wife [inrelation to servants and children] ... the need foroverseers[in relation to slaves],and.., .the issue ofhow to motivate the wife and overseer to do the
master'sworkefficiently Booth1994,659).The valueof efficiency,however, ay not in maximizinghe mas-ter'swealthbut his leisure,a prerequisiteormeaning-fulparticipationnpoliticalaffairs ndforlivinga goodand beautiful ife.
The exampleof ancientGreece,used by Booth torefute the radicalexceptionalism 1994, 662) ofmarket society, yields other insights.In short, that
societydoes not conform o whatcontemporary olit-ical science would have us believe constitutesa moral
economy.Itwasunquestionably normativelymbed-ded economyand society,which Booth describes as
anticommercial, s dedicated o a life of detachmentfrom
provisioningactivity p. 660),but it was not a
marginalsociety of subsistence-oriented easantsre-belling against he callousforces of economic ncorpo-ration. The Greek example challengespolitical sci-ence's preferencefor conceivingmoral economy intermsof premarket ommunities ndculturesclashingwith far more commercialones. Equally tellingchal-
lengesare not limited o cases drawn romtheprecapi-talistworld,as tworecent studies demonstrate.
Somerset County,Maryland
Community, ulture,and economicdevelopmentarethe subjectsof MeredithRamsay's 1996)researchon
PrincessAnne and Crisfield,Maryland,wo SomersetCounty communitiesrecently grippedby economiccrisis. Both were in trouble because longstandingmodes of production (agriculture n PrincessAnne,commercial ishingand seafood packing n Crisfield)sharplyand irrevocablydeclined between 1986 and
1991,makingMaryland's oorestcountyonly poorer.Calls for economic revitalizationwere frequentand
popular,but residentsroutinelyrejectedcommercialreal estateprojects. n fact,elite-sponsored eal estateinitiativesnPrincessAnnespawnedanunprecedentedelectoraluprising.Voterssweptout of officea numberof progrowth stablishment fficialsand even elected
their first black representative. Ramsay attributes theseand other outcomes to a nearlyuniversal commitmentto a shared way of life (1996, 8), despite racial, class,and other divisions, a way of life in which communitymattered (p. 9).
Two aspects of Ramsay's study stand out. First, her
study is firmly grounded in the moral-economic axiomthat all economies are enmeshed in the political,social, and moral life of particular places (1996, 9).6
Echoing Hahn, Ramsay emphasizes way-of-life vari-
4 According to Booth, market society is itself normativelyembedded.
In particular, labor and exchange now reflect the freedom, equality,and moral pluralism of modernity rather than, as in the past, the
hierarchyand domination of the preliberalhousehold. The transition
to market society was not, as Polanyi claims, a fateful disembeddingof economy and society but an historic moral redrawing of the
community and of the place of the economy within it (Booth 1994,
661). This perspective distinguishes Booth as a critic of moral-
economic political science. Although sharplycritical of one (from his
pointof
view, fundamental)feature of it
(analysis predicatedin
parton the embeddedness distinction), Booth supports another by ana-
lytically linking the economy of a given time and society to thenormative context within which that economy is situated. In Booth's
case, however, the linkage is general rather than specific, at the level
of economic systems writ large. As such, his quasimoral-economicargument cannot address the issue at the center of my social goodsversion: how and why moral economies (some even contrary to the
spirit of the modern market society) emerge within commercialized
market societies.5 Booth's effective critique of a sharp, Polanyian distinction between
submerged and autonomous economies does not directly questiontraditional moral economists' related claim that economic incorpo-ration of a pre- or nonmarket people often leads to collective actionrooted in moral outrage. What needs reappraisal is whether resis-tance to economic incorporation is today the only or even most
important foundation for a moral economy.
6Ramsay (1996, 135, n. 18) acknowledges Scott's influence, charac-
terizing her own work on Maryland as an independent collabora-tion.
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ables (p. 107). A more finely tuned grasp of local
policy s achieved,shewrites,bypaying carefulatten-tion to the ... socialstructures ndculturalvaluesthat
give security,predictability,haracter,andmeaning othe life of a given community p. 22). In Somerset
Countysocial structuresand relationswere suchthatresidentswere reluctant o abandonor degradethemin the name of economicdevelopment.
Second,Ramsay's tudy s not of a pre- or nonmar-ket people.Localagriculture ndfishingconformed oandoperatedwithin he largermarketeconomy.Givenmodernmodes of production,hepolitically ignificantmoral economies of PrincessAnne andCrisfielddifferin origin, orm,andto somedegreecontentfromthoseassociatedwiththe Asian, African,or South American
corporatevillagesemphasized n the literature.7
Owens Valley, California
John Walton's (1992) study of the Owens Valley inCaliforniacomplimentsRamsay'sexaminationof thesocial roots of local action, althoughin his research
rebellion returns as the critical event. The tale isremarkable.At the turn of the century his ruralvalleyjust east of the Sierra Nevada rangeconfrontedthe
City of Los Angeles over access to valley water. In1924,at least twentyyearsinto the confrontation,he
dispute turned violent when residents seized andbombed hecity'swater-related oldingsandstructureswithin the valley.Led by two bankers,the bombingswere numerous,strategic,andpopular.Localsupportfrustratedefforts by Los Angeles to prosecute the
perpetrators.One investigator or the city was con-vinced nolocalgrand urywouldindict,and no courtconvict he fortyto sixtypeople he believed directly
involved Walton1992,169).LosAngelesgotthewaterit wanted,but dynamiting,arson, and other acts ofrebellioncontinuedperiodicallynto the 1970s,endingonly when new environmental aws allowed valleyresidentsto wage theirresistance hroughthe courts.Walton'sexplanationof this extraordinaryffaircom-bines elements from a numberof schoolsof thought..At the center of his explanation,however, lies anaccountof moraleconomydifferent romandsuperiorto thatusually oundin the discipline.
Walton akes to heartThompson's tatementsabouta popularconsensusrootedin the pastandcapableof
inspiringaction. He agrees with Scott, Hahn, andothersthat
operativeconceptionsof justiceand injus-tice emerge from local history, from the concretemeanings, raditions, nd mechanisms f daily ife. Thehistoryof OwensValley,frominitial white settlement
at least up to the moment of rebellion,was one ofpersistentdifficulty, acrifice,and isolation.Hardshipwas the unrelentingorder of the day, and collectiveendeavor-in the form of an elaborate, f not alwaystolerant,stringof voluntaryorganizations civil soci-ety)-was the only abundantsocial resource. Thesefrontierpeople were willingto endure hardshipandsacrifice n the hopethatprosperitywouldsomedaybe
theirs,as theirpioneeringheritage old themit would.Thisvalleyof expectantcapitalists aw the opportuni-ties and marketsassociatedwithmines,railroads,andreclamationas their commercial alvation.Unlikethecommunitiesn Burmaand Vietnamstudiedby Scott,security lay in perfecting,not rejecting,the spiritofenterprise.
According o Walton(pp. 90-103), the moralecon-omyof OwensValleyreflected tsuniquesituationandhistory.It combineda vibrantbut as yet unrealizedcommitment o commercial nterprisewith a propen-sityfor civicorganization nd collectiveendeavor.Thecombinationprovedexplosivewhenhopesforprosper-itywererepeatedly aised and dashed.Miningcompa-nies and railroads flirted with the valley but neverestablishedongoing economicventures,leavingit asdestituteas ever. Reclamationwas the last and besthope andproved he greatestdisappointment.Chosenby the newlyformed ReclamationService as an idealsite for fulfilling he promiseof the 1902ReclamationAct, which was designedto promotewestern settle-ment, small-scale family farming, and democracythroughirrigationof arid lands (no more than 320acres of irrigated and per couple), the valley finallyseemedpoisedfor transformation. bundantrrigationwater,residentsnoted, would lead to an agriculturalbonanza, population growth, a cash economy, and
economicsecurity.Moraloutragewas swift and pronouncedwhen theresidents earned that Los Angeleshad cheatedthem(throughfraud n some cases, intimidation n others)byobtainingitle to keyparcelsandall-important aterrights(pp. 154-6). Evenworse, the city had used itsinfluencewith state and federal officialsto convincePresidentTheodoreRoosevelt,ironicallya prominentadvocatefor the ReclamationAct and its ideals, tosupporta changein the project:Ratherthan use thewaterforfarmingn the OwensValley,export t to LosAngeles to subsidizethe city's alreadyphenomenalgrowth.Certainthey were the victims of a massive
injustice the Rapeof the OwensValley ),residentsdrew on their civic traditionsand rebelled (pp. xviii,168-82, 292, 312).
The studies by Ramsay and Walton support theargument that the prevailing conception of moraleconomy npolitical cience s undulynarrow.Given tsemphasison the distinctionbetween premarketandmarketsocieties, the prevailingconceptionof moraleconomyin politicalscience cannotexplainthe non-rebelliousmoraleconomiesof market-structuredom-munities n Maryland,whichhad achieveda degreeofeconomicdevelopmentbut were reluctant o developfurther, venin the face of economicdecline. Given tsemphasison resistance to commercial ncorporation,
7 The power of the prevailingconceptionof moral economy inpoliticalscience is in partterminological, s is evident n Ramsay'sstudy.Drawing n Scott's 1976) anguage,Ramsay efers o PrincessAnne andCrisfield s subsistence ommunities, n awkwardhoiceatbest. Scott'scommunities reprecapitalistndpeasant;Ramsay'sare not, even thoughtheyhave a risk-minimizing,ommunal thicthat s basedupontrust .. andmutualobligation nd s dedicatedto preserving aparticularmoralorder Ramsey1996,120).Moraleconomymust be conceivedin such a way as to account moreaccurately or the broadlysimilarnorms and reciprocities hatemanate romsharplydifferent ocial andeconomiccircumstances.
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the prevailingconceptionof moral economycannot
explain he moralindignationandrebellionof a non-marketvalleyin Californiadesperatefor commercial
incorporation.These and related cases require an
altogetherdifferentapproach o the issue of a moral
economy.Thompson'snotion of communalegitimacyoffersa promisingalternative.
As employedbyThompson, egitimacys recognition
bya communityhat a givenstate of affairs onforms oknownandacceptedrulesandprinciples.Well-knownandlong acceptedrulesandprinciplesare the ground,Thompsonargues, or consensusandcollectiveaction.Moral economists ooselysharethis viewbut too oftencouch legitimacyin the diffuse languageof shareduniversesor traditionalnormsandobligations, estat-
ingin effectMaxWeber's amousbutgenericreferenceto the legitimacy f the eternal esterday GerthandMills1958,78). Whatis even moreproblematic,egit-imacyis complex;no one set of legitimizingrules or
principlesprevails n or acrossall cases.Dependingon
circumstances,marketrules and principlesmay well
givewayto
political,religious,or stillother
principles.Consequently, hrases uchas sharedmoraluniverse
(Scott 1976, 167) and sharedway of life (Ramsay1996, 8) too often suppressrather than reveal thevarious sources of communal egitimacyavailableat
any one time; they inhibit a clearerunderstanding f
why communities hoose one set of legitimizing ulesandprinciplesoveranother.8
Basing moral-economicpolitical analysison social
goodsis a muchmoreeffectivealternative.Given theirnature and properties,describedbelow, social goodsharbor he principles ommunities anvasswhenjudg-ingwhetherspecificdevelopmentsare legitimate.
SOCIALGOODS
Goods are objectsand qualitieswhose possessionor
consumption onferssomekind of benefit and satisfieshumanneedsandwants.Formany,goodsareunques-tionablymaterialandcommercialn nature.Everydayillustrationsnclude oreignand domesticgoods,dura-ble and nondurablegoods, basic and luxury goods.Contemporaryphilosophersagree that goods satisfyhumanneeds and wantsbut acknowledgeand often
emphasize their less material and noncommercialforms. Examples from contemporarywork include
primaryand secondarygoods (Rawls1971), goods of
excellence and goods of effectiveness (MacIntyre1988), additive and nonsubtractivegeneric goods(Gewirth 1978, 1982), and mutual and convergentgoods (Taylor1989).These deliberatelyabstract ate-gories feature such goods as opportunities,powers,rights, security, community,and well-being,that is,goods forwhich it is the task of a theoryof justicetoprovidedistributive rinciples Swift1995,224).
Theconceptof socialgoodsdevelopedbelowclearlyfalls into the latter categoryand drawscruciallyonWalzer(1983,6-10). The followingversion,however,differs n certainrespects.WhereasWalzeruses social
goods as his foundation for developinga theory of
justicethatchampionspluralism ndcomplexequality,my conceptaddresses he narrowerssueof collectiveaction that emanates from communalperceptionsof
legitimacy.Thisreorientationbrings nto evensharperrelief the centralrole of socialgoodson the identities,obligations,and relationshipsof both personsand a
people. In otherwords,a collectiveaction orientationfeatures hegoods-based ensesof self andcommunityWalzer'sgeneral theoryof justiceclearly ncorporatesbut need not alwaysemphasize n the sameway (seebelow).By analyzing ocial goods as grounds or col-lective actionI extendWalzer'sconcept, revealing nturn both the nested nature of social goods and thebasis for mytheoryof moraleconomy.
In Walzer's ustice-basedapplicationas well as myown,the notion of socialgoodsis first andforemostastatement about the universalnature of all human
goods. Even goods consideredpure commoditiesaresocial,for theyconsist of sharedunderstandingsboutthe beneficialcharacteristics ttributed o a givenob-
ject.Anyidentification f anobjectas a goodunavoid-
ably draws on culturallyconstructedand culturallytransmittedideas about human needs, wants, andbenefits. Goods don't just appear in the hands ofdistributiveagents who do with them as they like ;goods first comeinto people'sminds Walzer1983,6-7). Like the meaningof words, hevalueand mean-
ingfulnessof goods are sociallydetermined. n Walz-er's theoryof justice,the principlesof shared under-
standingsand sociallydeterminedvalue are central:
Alldistributionsre ustorunjust elative o the socialmeaningsof the goodsat stake p. 9). Moreprecisely,when we understand he social meaningof a givengood, we understandhow, by whom, and for whatreasonsit ought to be distributed p. 9).9 Althoughcentral,these principlesdo not exhaustWalzer's he-
ory. Significantly, is accountalsoincludesconstitutiveand communal enses of socialgoods,and when theseare analyzedexplicitly rom the perspectiveof collec-tive action,they speak directly o the issueof sourcesfor communalperceptionsof legitimacy.
Constitutivesocial goods establish and symbolizeimportantsenses of self. They reflect a manner of
individualand collectiveidentification hat is charac-teristicof humanbeings(Appadurai 986;DouglasandIsherwood1979). Humansacquire concrete identi-ties throughthe ways in which they conceive andcreate, and then possess and employ social goods
8 Walton makes a similar point: The fact that repertoires [of
politically significant collective action] are associated with culture
does not tell us wherestandardsof justice come from, how they affect
the state and the economy, or whether culture is a causal force or
simply a setting (1992, 325, emphasis added).
9 No one principle of distribution holds in all cases. Some goods are
justly distributedaccordingto principles of merit, others accordingto
principles of exchange or need, and so on. As a general rule,
however, no social good x should be distributed o men and womenwho possess some other good y merely because they possess y and
without regardto the meaning of x (Walzer 1983, 20, emphasis in
original). In effect, each social good is its own sphere of justice. My
concept of moral economy is consistent with and supportive of
Walzer's general theory of justice.
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(Walzer 1983, 8). People inevitablytake stock ofthemselvesandinterpret he identitiesof others argelyin terms of social goods. Moreover,patterneduse,display,and exchangeof socialgoods place people in
specificsocial, economic,and even politicalrelations.
Amongthe Nuerof Africa, orinstance,cattle connect
people to one another n vitalways,not just as herds-
man, buyer,or seller. Cattle structure he status,ca-
pacities, and obligations of individuals. Owned byfamilies,cattlereflectandreproduce he all-importantnetworkof kinshipties (Evans-Pritchard940, 17).
Nuer allocate cattle accordingly, nd theirmovementfrom one kraalto another is equivalento lines in a
genealogicalchart p. 18). Couplesfinalizethe unionof marriage hroughritualistic laughterof cattle,andtheirlegalstatusas a married oupleis inpart defined
by cattlerightsandobligations p. 17). Cattlearenot
simplybeasts of burdenor sources orfood,psycholog-ically and sociologically hey are an integral part ofwhat it meansto be a Nuer. They are socialgoods in
wayscompatiblewith butdeeperthanthatconveyedbythe notion of sharedunderstandings lone;cattle are
the foundationfor importantprocesses,roles, identi-ties, andrelationshipswithout which it wouldbe verydifficult o speakof Nuer societyand culture.
The value of these identity-orienting,ole-shapinggoods extendsbeyond their purelymaterial or com-mercialproperties. nsofaras constitutive ocialgoodsstructure he status and obligationsof persons,theirvalue includesthe meaningfulness f the relationshipsand the sensesof selfgenerated.Undercertaincircum-
stances,this identity-relatedalue overrides heir nar-rowercommodity alue. Choices n these instancesmaywell reflectrationalesother than the strictly conomic.
Equallyimportant,at least from the perspectiveof a
theoryof moraleconomy,deeplyvalued identitiesandrelationships re latent but easily triggered ources or
assessing he legitimacyof both proposedand emerg-ing developments.
Considerrice in Japan.It is, of course,a food,yet itis much more. Accordingto Ohnuki-Tierney 1993,102),rice is the criticalmetaphorbyandthroughwhich
Japanese thinkabout themselves n relation to other
peoples. These reflections are in turn an equallycriticalpartof theirconceptof thecollectiveself ' p.102). It was in terms of short-grain ice (agri)culturethat the Japanese recognizedthemselves as a peoplesignificantlydifferent from the meat and wheat ori-
ented West and, more important, he long-grainriceculturesof Asia,inparticularChina.AlthoughJapan sno longer predominantlyagricultural,a rice-basedsense of self persists.Rice and ricepaddiesremain hedefining ymbolsof Japanand its ancestral and. Com-pared to bamboo, sashimi,or many other Japanesefoods and symbols, rice is sacred. Its harvest andconsumption ften are a matterof ritualand collectivecelebration,ts whiteness s a symbolof Japanesepurityand virtue. This significancereaches and affects theconduct of everyday ife. Rice is the most commonoffering n the ancestralalcovesfound in many Japa-nese homes,a gesturethatpreservesa sense of familycontinuity s well as conveysrespect.The role of rice in
reproducing ndmaintaining sense of familyextendsto the meal itself:
Whereas ishesareserved n individuallatesaheadoftime in urbanJapanesehouseholdsoday,rice aloneremainshecommonood o be distributedythewomanof the house.Commensalityithin he households sym-bolizedby the act of distributingice from a singlecontainer....The collectiveelfof thefamily-themost
basic unit of Japanese ociety-is constructedhroughsharingiceduring ailymeals p.95).
Rice is a trulysocialgood, andits longstanding nd
ongoingrole in establishing Japanesesenseof collec-tive self is at times a prominentfactor in evaluatingemergingdevelopments.n the late 1980s, orexample,when officialsannouncedplans to importCaliforniarice (it was far moreplentifuland much ess expensivethan the declining uppliesof Japaneserice),the socialvalue of rice prevailedover its value as a staple.10Although the Japanese import and consume otherAmerican ood products, hey vigorouslyopposedand
ultimatelydefeated the proposal o importrice. Urban
Japanese,women in particular,made the difference.Theiroppositionwas broadand decisive but contraryto their nterestsas consumers.EventhoughCaliforniarice had been sown from short-grain tocksimportedfromJapan, heJapanese oundit impure, foreign,corruptionof the lastsacredrealm, and a threat to
Japanese identity and autonomy (Ohnuki-Tierney1993, 111). In this instance,the seeminglyirrational
opposition o importation eflecteda commitmento a
deeper,more important alue,unrelated o price. 1In addition o theirinfluenceon identityandstatus,
select social goods are intrinsically ommunal n na-ture. Thesegoods produce(or at leastreproduce) hesensibilitiesand specialcommitment o one another
(Walzer 1983, 62) that make associated people acommunity.Although relative to each community,intrinsicallyommunal ocialgoodsare the foundationfortrulycommonactions.Unlike othergoods,theyarenot simply convergent nnature,a matter orme and
(then)foryou.Intrinsicallyommunal ocialgoodsaremutual and indivisible,a matter for us (Taylor1989,166-9). The goods of security,welfare,and member-
shipillustrate;n each case participationn a commonlife is, as Walzer 1983, 65) putsit, simultaneouslyhe
prerequisiteof provisionand one of its products.Because these goods are mutual and indivisible, heylinkpeopleascitizens,and as citizenspeoplerecognize
joint responsibilities ndpursuewhat are now unmis-
10 Walzerdistinguishes etweenthe not alwayscompatiblemoralandphysical necessities f goods.Which et of necessitiesprevailsdependson circumstances.read,Walzer 1983,8) notes,is notjusta fooditem; t is thebodyof Christ, he symbolof the Sabbath,hemeansof hospitality, ndso on. For the devoutwho viewbread as
symbolic f important eligiousvaluesandrelationships,t maywellbe somethinghat,depending n circumstances,eopleshouldbakeanddestroyrather han sell or eat.11Reminiscentof Monroe, Ohnuki-Tierney1993, 9) finds theeconomic assumptionsof rational-choiceheory inappropriate.Rice,sheconcludes, isnotsimply oodto fillthestomach. apaneseattitudesand behaviors owardrice are not governedby economicrationale p. 29).Instead, heyreflect hecomplex ocialpsychologyof rice as self.
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RethinkingMoralEconomy March2001
takably ollectiveaffairs. f,asWalzerargues,member-
ship in human communityis the most importantgood (p. 29) we distribute to one another, then
intrinsically ommunal ocial goods are an additionaland perhapseven morepotentbasison whichpeoplejudge legitimacy.
Social goods are not as singularor discrete as
analysismustsometimesportray hem. As with rice in
Japan,socialgoodscan and do harbormore than onekind of meaningandvalue,particularlyf the good in
question akesa commodityorm.Like the nestedpotsin a backpacker'skit, multiplesets of meaningandvalue serve differentpurposes but rest within theconfines of one another.Tobacco, for instance,has
longbeengrown orits commercial alue,andfortuneshavebeen made from its cultivation. n 1849,Missouri
plantersproducedmore than 17 millionpoundsof it,surpassingeven North Carolina. Planters sold theirtobaccoin the marketsof St. Louis and New Orleans,but they did not regard t simplyas a cash crop.ForMissouriplanters,muchlike theirKentuckyand Vir-
giniaancestors,obaccowas a social
good;the
rhythmsand ritualsof its cultivationwere an important ourcefor collectivedentity and harmony Phillips2000,123).More thaneven profit,verdant ieldsof tobaccowere a shared ign of communityhealth and mem-
bership,as central to the collective sense of self (andunrelatedto market price) as rice paddies for the
Japanese.12Defyingthe logic of marketsand profits,Missouriplanters ncreasedproductiononly modestlywhentobaccopriceswere at all timehighs(otherstates
tripledproduction)but doubledproductionwhen theirtobacco-centered enses of self and communitywereassailedby a decade-longruinouscollapse in prices(pp. 123, 124). Similarto the rice example,tobacco
illustratesmportantpointsfor moral-economic oliti-cal analysis. Beyond the fact that many goods arenestedcomplexesof value thatdiffer n kindaswell as
degree, the constitutiveand communalpropertiesofsocialgoodsoften set theboundarieswithinwhich heirother values operate.A social good's commodity ta-tus,then(should t haveone), need not clash automat-
icallyor completelywith that good's less commercialroles.
A focus on social goods facilitatesanalysis n stillotherways.Multiplebut nestedvalues and meaningsaccountfor the diverse(butnot alwaysperfectlycom-
patible) practices surroundinggiven goods. Nested
valuesanddiversepractices xplain nturn hebasisforconflict.Significantly,he conflictrelated to such com-
plex socialgoods as rice and tobaccois not justaboutmore favorableallocationsor greatermaterialgain; tinvolveswhatkind of value shouldprevail nparticular,often changing ituations.Nested sets of meaningandvalue also explain how, given even only slightlychangedcircumstances, reviouslyaccepted practices
(suchas commodity-likexchange)maycome to gen-erate perceptionsof illegitimacy. n Japan,rice is in
many respectsa commodity,appropriatelyubjecttothe competitivepressures f commercial xchange,but
onlyto apoint.Beyond hatpoint,whenrice-based nd
quintessentially apaneseidentities and relationshipsarecompromised, ice'ssocialvalueprevails.Likewisefor tobaccoin nineteenth-centuryMissouri and else-
where); t was aneconomically aluablecommodity utwas even more valuable as a mediumfor stable and
fulfilling ocialrelations.13In some communities ocial goods are clusteredas
well as nested. Clustered social goods intensifyfelt
impressionsof
belongingand
membership,addingtexture andweightto the notion of culturallydistinctbut sharedwaysof life. Linkagesamongclustersaresuch that, for those who enjoythem, affiliatedgoodsmaywell stand or fall together.Amongyeomanfarm-ers and artisansin nineteenth-centuryMissouri,forinstance,work,family ife, religion,and politicsweredistinct but deeplyintertwined ocial goods;each re-flected and in turn sustained an economy in which
production,consumption,and pricingwere governedby local, self-sufficient ommunitiesbased upon per-sonal networksand face-to-face elations.Farmersandartisans understoodall too well the implicationsof
expandingrailroads; mpersonal,commercialsociety
would alter not justthe localeconomybut life as theyknew it (Thelen 1986,9-25).
Given their nature andmeaningfulness,onstitutiveandintrinsicallyommunal ocialgoodsare sources orshared notions of legitimacy.Roles, identities, andcommunitiesgrounded n social goods contain withinthem the criteria or evaluating pecificdevelopmentsas appropriate r inappropriate,t least for those who
recognize he goodsin questionas socialgoods.These
meaningsand related criteriaare the foundation or a
conceptionof moraleconomybasedon socialgoods.A
preliminaryketch, demonstration, ndjustification fthis conceptfollows.
MORAL ECONOMY REDEFINED
Conceptually,moraleconomyremainsa popularcon-sensus rooted in the past and capable of inspiringaction. With Thompson, t reflects a claim about thenatureof and sourcesfor communalnotions of legiti-macy.In this versionof moraleconomy,however, he
12Tobaccoculture osteredpowerfulandofteninsularconceptionsof community. ccordingo Waldrep 1993,13-4), whodidresearchin westernKentuckyand Tennessee, tobacco armersdevelopedunusuallyclose ties with their neighbors.Even a small crop oftobaccorequired o mucheffort hat[they]swappedoffworkingoneach other'sfarms. Womenfrequentlyoined their husbandsandfathersin the fields.... Neighborhoodwomen worked so closelytogether o clothetheirfamilies,sharingpatternsandsewing ech-
niques,that communitiesdevelopeddistinctive tylesof dress andresidents ould mmediatelydentifyoutsidersbytheirclothes.Onlyrarelydidneighborhood irlsmarry utsidethe community. reen
(1984, 251, 261) speaksof an earlyAmerican obacco cultureinwhichcultivationwassimultaneouslyhebasisfor social ohesion,a mechanismorforginga publicdentity, nd emblematic f the
larger ocialorder'spastandfuture.
13Tobacco-based enses of self and community ueled the BlackPatch War (1890-1915) in westernKentuckyand Tennessee,a
region famousfor its darktobaccoand fierce hostility o outsideinterests ent onunderminingocalcommunityontrol.SeeWaldrep1993.
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popularconsensusabout whatdistinguishesegitimatefromillegitimatepracticesresides n the nestedmean-
ings of specific constitutiveand/or communal social
goods. These meaningsharbor mplicitnotions about
legitimatepracticesas well as legitimaterelationsinandamongaffectedgroupsand individuals.14 signif-icant threat o or a sustained,deliberatedeviation rom
accepted practicesand relations promptsorganized
response,whichcan rangefrompubliccriticism,egalchallenges,and policy initiativesto more unconven-tionaland violent formsof protest, ncluding ebellion.Water n the aridAmericanWest is a particularlyoodillustrationor two reasons.
First,water has longbeen associatedwith a numberof generallydesirablebutfrequently ompetingvalues.It is valued not onlyas a sourceof sustenancebut alsoas an instrumentof agriculture,object of beauty,industrialcommodity,means of transportation,om-
munitygood, fuel for urbandevelopment,clean and
pure resource,and place for recreationand wildlifehabitat Wilkenson1990).The West'spersistentaridity(manyareasreceive ess than 12inchesof precipitationayear)complicatesdecisionmaking,becauseallwater-related values cannot be realizedequally.Moreover,realizationof anyone valuemaywell preclude hat ofone or more others.Consequently,he just allocationof scarce water is a constant challenge, the fertile
settingfor a moraleconomyof a complexgood.Second,water s a constitutiveandintrinsicallyom-
munalsocialgood.Westernersdentify hemselvesandrelate to others ntermsofwater,whichplaysmuch hesame role as rice in Japanor tobacco in nineteenth-
centuryMissouri.The most important orms of rela-tion and identificationderive from the fact that long-termcommunity ndpolity n the aridAmericanWest
are not possiblewithout an ongoing ability o procureand allocatewater.Figurativelyf not literally atthecenter of humancommunities Bateset al. 1993,14),water is embedded in the very notion of collectiveexistence. It relates communityresidents as citizens,impressing upon them in particulartheir mutual
dependency, ommonenterprise, ndjointresponsibil-ity (Sax 1990,17).15
Founded n partonwater,westerncommunities ndtheir residentsrecognizeand frequently nteractwithone another in terms of shared or contested rivers,watersheds,and aquifers.Waterrightsand practices,diversionstructures,and a varietyof water-oriented
districts,nstitutions, ndorganizationsdentifypeoplein even more particularways: water rights holderversusnonholders, uniorversus senior appropriator,
up-versusdownstreamommunity,owerversusupperbasinstate,and so on. The web of physical, egal,andadministrative tructuresthat capture and allocatewaterconstitutes n effect a social andpoliticalmatrixthat individuals,communities,and states invariablytake into account. In other words,water is a vitalmediumforsocialandpoliticalrelations,a mediumatthe center of processesof community, ven regional
self-identificationBrownandIngram1987).Water's status as a constitutive and intrinsicallycommunal ocialgood accounts or the factthat west-erners conceive and cherish water in terms beyondthose of mere economicutility.It is not simplya liquidwith certainphysicalproperties,a thingunto itself, a
commoditywhose value is realizedonly or essentiallyin economic exchange.Water symbolizes inherentlydesirable states of affairsachieved and experiencedonly in concert with others, in particular he mutual
advantages f schools,churches,and sociallife, of acivic and moralas well as economicprogress (Mead1903,382;see also Hundley1992;Pisani1984;Sherow
1990).16Becauseof these deeplyvaluedand clustered
senses of community ndself,water ssues turn on farmore than questionsof how to allocateefficientlyan
increasingly carceyet increasingly aluableresource.Also involved s the more difficult ut importantques-tion of whichwater-relatedvalue should prevailand
whyin givensituations.As in the examplesof rice and
tobacco,water-related enses of communityand self,especiallywhen threatened,establish the context forevaluationand action.
The deeplyrooted and politicallysignificantmoral
economy of water springsfrom its constitutiveand
intrinsicallyommunalproperties.Longvalued for itsrole in creatingand maintainingcivicallyrewarding
communities,waterhas a moralthrust that is funda-mentallynegative;neffect,waterallocationsnthe endshouldnot undermineachieved or expectedcommu-
nity. Simplyput,transfers nd allocations hat threatenor undermine he integrityof communityare illegiti-mate. Subordinatinghe dispositionof water to the
integrity f communitys legitimatebecausetheauton-
omy,welfare,andidentityof westerncommunities retied directly o water.17
The embeddedandnegativenatureof water'smoral
economyaffectshowwesterns nvoke it. Becauseem-bedded,its longstandingmeaningsandunderstandingsat times are taken forgranted.Consequently,western-
ers invoke t sporadically, ften in responseto specificcircumstancesand with the objectiveof more firmly
14 Myideais similar o Wuthnow's1987)conceptof a moralorder:a concept essentially boutculture.., an attributeof social rela-tions (p. 58). Moralorders expressboundaries, o thatwe mayknow theplaceof things, ndthey nclude implicit ategorieshatdefineproperrelationsamong ndividuals ndgroups p. 69).15Theseintrinsicallyommunal ropertiesqualifywateras a sphereof security ndwelfare,whichWalzer 1983,64) describesn partas
political ommunityorthe sake of provision, rovisionorthe sakeof community. hecommunal roperties nd effectsof water nthearidWest can be compared o those of education, umptuaryaws,relief,andransomof captivesnWalzer's nalysis f medieval ewishcommunitiespp. 71-4).
16 Ingram ndOggins 1990,5, 10) emphasizehenoneconomic iewof water. nasurvey f leadersnArizona,NewMexico,andwesternTexaswhose communities tood to lose waterthrough ntensifiedwatermarketingeconomically rivenrural-to-urbanransfers),he
overwhelmingmajority haracterizedhe loss as damaging o ruralcommunitiesand not subjectto compensation.According o one,whena communityosesitswater t loses tspresent, tspast,and tsfuture.17Bateset al. (1993,182)refer o this asa principle f equity, ooted
in the shared,publicnatureof water. Equitydictates, hey con-clude, that water-relateddecisions nvolve and reflect thewhole
community, ot just those partsthat were there firstor that have
moneyor power p. 178).
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securing he integrityof specificcommunities includ-ingstates).18 heseinvocationspairacts of rediscoverywith calls for change. In each instance westerners
negotiatewater'smultipleuses andmeaningsnlightofboth new circumstances and water's fundamentalmoralimperative.
Beyondpublicandoftenemotionally hargeddecla-rationsof concernor injustice,19esternersnvokethe
moraleconomyof waterthroughappealsfor reform,new legislation,reinterpretation f existinglaws, ormore directaction, includingviolence (Babbitt1988;Dunbar 1983; Pisani 1984; Sherow 1990; Walton
1992).20Results have been broadlyand consistentlyregulatory.Many of these regulations,unlike thoseassociatedwithothernaturalresources,shelterwaterfromfullyself-interested,privatized, r market-driven
transactions,which qualifieswater as an exampleofwhat Walzercalls a blockedexchange. 21he limitswesternershaveplacedon the exchange,sale, appro-priation,or transferof water ncludegrantingt publicownershipor publicresourcestatus;nonexport aws;
publictrust,welfare,or interest review of proposed
transactions; eneficialuse requirementsofficiallyn-terpretedn somestatesasa prohibition n speculationin waterforprofit);and,since the OwensValleyaffair,area-of-origintatutes,which ncludevesting rrigationandotherwater-related istrictsor associationswithaveto over all out-of-watershedransfers DuMarsandMinnis 1989; Hoffman-Dooley 1996; MacDonnell
1990; MacDonnelland Howe 1986; Sax 1989; Tre-
garthen1983).22Coupledwith ongstandingearsaboutwatermonopolies (Alston 1978),these limitationsre-flect deep concernsaboutwater-relatedmeasures hatwouldsubjectstatesor communities o external,arbi-
trary control and, consequently, compromise theiridentities as states and communities.23 ooted in the
past and in water'sstatus as a constitutiveand intrin-
sicallycommunalsocial good, the moraleconomyofwaterremains he basisfordetermininghe legitimacyof a numberof water-related ctivities.
A moral-economic oliticalanalysisbased on social
goods is justified or at least three reasons.First,this
concept,unlikethe prevailingview, is not limitedbytime orculture.Socialgoodsand theirattendantmoraleconomies are characteristicof modern as well as
premoderncommunities.Political science need notrestrictmoral-economicnalysis o the clashof embed-dedversusautonomous conomies,or, for thatmatter,to the phenomenonof rebellion.Second,socialgoodsand moral economies are plural,not singular.Eachmoral economy is a separate althoughoften nested
sphereof action-inspiringegitimacy.Unlike the over-
ridingeconomicutilityof rational-choiceheoryor theundifferentiated ebs-of-lifeof traditionalmoralecon-
omy, my revision honors the moral complexityofhumancommunities,and it capturesmuchmore pre-cisely the groundsfor politicallysignificantmoralin-dignation.Third,the groundingn socialgoods mini-mizes the riskof under-or oversocialized onceptionsof economic behavior.Because of the mutual,consti-tutive,and subjectivelymeaningfulpropertiesof spe-cific social goods, moral economy is embedded in
concrete,ongoingsocial relations,not in generalized,mechanicalmoralitiesor romanticizedpasts.In sum,importantkinds of political and economic activityreflectthe inherently ulturalpropertiesof meaningfulgoods,and a moral-economic nalysisbased on social
goods is especiallywell suited to explain hem.
18 This sporadic aspect supports Walzer's argument that the distri-
butional autonomy of social goods is a critical principle, that the
demand for autonomy is more likely to make for occasional
reformation and rebellion than for everyday enforcement (Walzer1983, 10).19For example, residents across sixcounties in the San Luis Valley of
Colorado recently responded to plans to sell the valley'sgroundwaterto Denver and other large cities. They placed a notice in the Denver
Post: We, the undersigned citizens, are committed to preservingthe
water within Colorado's San Luis Valley for land and life. Private
marketers are drawing up plans to take water from the Valley and
sell to other parts of Colorado or other regions. Weare opposed to
theseplans.....
We are committed to fight efforts to take water from
this beautiful place, the San Luis Valley. Help us to protect land and
life (Johnston et al. 1996, 5 B, emphasis in the original).20
Secretaryof the Interior Babbitt, a former governor of Arizona,
characterized unfettered, market-driven rural-to-urban transfers of
water as economic Darwinism and recommended protective regu-lations and oversight. Otherwise, he predicted, big cities will
inexorablysqueeze the water and the life out of small communities
(Babbitt 1988, 7).21 Blocked exchanges set limits on the dominance of wealth
(Walzer 1983, 99). Due to their shared understandings, some goods
(e.g., human beings, rights, criminaljustice) properly fall outside the
sphere of money altogether. Other goods (medical care, education,
and, I argue,water in the aridAmerican West) are partiallyblocked;market-like exchanges are permitted but only to the extent that the
sphere of money does not jeopardize the core, noncommodity values
associated with those goods.22 Area-of-origin statutes limit interbasin transfers to prevent envi-
ronmental, political, and/or economic losses to the areas from which
the water is transferred.
23Westerners' historical objections to water monopolies effectivelyillustrate Walzer's theory of social goods, dominance, and monopoly.Walzer (1983, 10-3) defines dominance and monopoly as the unjustconversion of one social good into another. In the end, he concludes,
dominance of goods makes for the domination of people (p. 19),which is precisely what westerners fear about water monopolies.
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