Post on 30-May-2018
transcript
Balancing Fiscal Responsibility with National
Security
Mr. D. Mark Peterson, Panel Chair Chief Financial Officer/ Comptroller, U.S. Special Operations Command Mr. Mike Maxwell Director of J1/J8, Africa Command Ms. Elaine A. McCusker Director, Resources and Analysis, Headquarters U.S. Central Command Mr. James L. McGinley Director of Program Analysis and Financial Management, U.S. Transportation Command
Agenda
• Defining the Unified Combatant Command
• The Federal Budget
• Linking Strategy to Resources
• “Budget Informed” QDR
• Balancing Fiscal Responsibility with National Security – USCENTCOM
– USAFRICOM
– USTRANSCOM
– USSOCOM
• Q&A?
2
Unified Command Structure
Chairman JCS
Service Chiefs
USAF USN USA
Combatant Command Support Agent
Updated: 20140505
3
President
Secretary of Defense
Geographic
Service Secretaries
Functional
4
What is a COCOM?
COCOM (AKA: UCC, GCC, FCC)
At least 2 Military
Departments
Broad, continuing
mission
Geographical or Functional
Led by a Four-Star GO/FO
Reports directly to President and SecDef
Communicates through CJCS
Unified Command Plan
(UCP)
UCCs are legally mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(Title 10 USC Chapter 6, Combatant Commands, 2011)
5
Federal Budget by Category FY1962 – FY2019
6
Pe
rce
nt
of
Fed
era
l Bu
dge
t
*PB15 Estimate FY14-19
43%
23%
27%
7%
FY65
20%
19% 53%
8%
FY05
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2015, Office of Management and Budget, Tables 8.5 & 8.7.
Mandatory
Net Interest
Non-DoD Discretionary
DoD Discretionary
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
FY6
2
FY6
5
FY6
8
FY7
1
FY7
4
FY7
7
FY8
0
FY8
3
FY8
6
FY8
9
FY9
2
FY9
5
FY9
8
FY0
1
FY0
4
FY0
7
FY1
0
FY1
3
*FY
16
*FY
19
16%
14%
63%
7%
*FY15
$200
$638
$400
$559
$390
$591
$395
$753
$575 $589
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
$800
19
48
19
51
19
54
19
57
19
60
19
63
19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11
20
14
20
17
20
20
Constant FY15 $B
73-year Avg ($499B)
Vietnam Reagan Buildup
Korea OEF/OIF
Can we decrease the budget at projected rates without hollowing out the force?
-37% over 2 years (18.5% yr avg.)
-30% over 7 years (4.3% yr avg.)
-33% over 13 years (2.6% yr avg.)
-23.6% FY10-FY15 (4.7% yr avg.)
Source: FY2015 National Defense Budget Estimates (Green Book); Table 6-1 DoD TOA (Constant dollar adjusted) by Title. FY16-19 represents OSD (Comptroller) estimates, including OCO, from the FY15 Budget Rollout brief (Mar 14).
Context: Historical Reductions
Start of All-Volunteer Force
- Young force structure - Low OPTEMPO - Fading peer competitor - Stable Security Environment
- Older force structure - High OPTEMPO - Emerging peer competitor - Dynamic Security Environment
Key difference with current
context Peace dividend…..
without the peace?
$1.9T (CY15$) above historical avg. from 2002-2014 (of which,
approx. $1.5T was war funding).
7
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/CFO, Rollout Brief MAR 14
8
Linking Strategy to Resources
The UCP informs COCOMs and Services, tying resources to assigned missions 9
Balancing the QDR
10
Cyber Missile Defense Nuclear Deterrence Space Air/Sea Precision Strike Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance (ISR) Special Operations (CT)
Renewable Energy Fighters and Bombers Marine Security Guard
Readiness Weapons Modernization Facilities Improvements Science, Tech, R&D
Force Structure Army Military End Strength Marine Military End Strength Single mission aviation
platforms Air Craft Carrier USS GW
Military Pay/Benefits Annual military pay raises Housing allowance growth
rate TRICARE programs Commissary subsidies
Readiness Maintenance Training
Using OGSI* if approved
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
* Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI)
“Budget Informed” QDR
11
• Potential Sequestration Impacts (2016) • Increase risk to Military operations
• Military would be unbalanced and
eventually too small
• Undermine the confidence of our allies
and partners
• Diminish ability to build security
globally, preserve stability, deter
conflict, and reassure allies
• Reduce the ability to counter terrorism,
conduct exercises and training activities
with partners
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
• Timing & Focus: COCOM Joint and Execution Year requirements compete with service-centric core responsibilities and FYDP
• Fiscal Uncertainty: Service providers unable to meet demand/strategy given current constraints
• Complex Web of Authorities
COCOM Challenges
12
WHO IS THE CUSTOMER?
13
So how does the
“COCOM Customer” help shape the discussion for the
Services/Agencies PROVIDERS?
Fiscal Responsibility
National Security
$
6/16/2014 CCJ7-TT/SIC 14
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Ms Elaine McCusker
Director, Resources & Analysis
29 May 2014
Balancing Fiscal Responsibility
with National Security
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
15
National Strategic Guidance
• Pillars of U.S. Defense Strategy
– Protect the Homeland, Build Security Globally, Project Power and
Win Decisively
• National Security Interests
– Survival of the Nation
– Prevention of Catastrophic Attack
– Security of Global Economic System
– Security/Confidence/Reliability of Allies
– Protection of Americans Abroad
– Preservation and Extension of Universal Values
• Strategic Guidance – Central Region
• “The United States will continue to seek more innovative and flexible approaches to
meeting its enduring commitment to security the Middle East.” -QDR
• “The Department will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region –
one that can respond swiftly to crises, deter aggression, and assure our allies, while
making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats.” -QDR
16
CENTCOM Vision and Mission
USCENTCOM Vision
Ready, engaged, and vigilant – effectively integrated with
other instruments of power, strengthening relationships with
partners, and supporting bi-lateral and multi-lateral collective
defense relationships to counter adversaries, improve
security, support enduring stability, and secure vital national
interests in the Central Region.
USCENTCOM Mission Statement
With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation
among nations, responds to crises, deters or defeats state and non-state
aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in
order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity.
CENTCOM Theater Strategy –
Informs the Theater Campaign Plan
and interagency preparation of
Integrated Country Strategies
prepared by each Country Team
within the AOR. Strategic Approach –
Manage, Prevent, Shape
17
Tajikistan
Qatar
Kuwait
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Iran
U.A.E.
Oman
Yemen
Saudi Arabia
Iraq Jordan
Egypt Bahrain
Lebanon
Syria
USCENTCOM Strategic Environment Approved: 21Feb14
TERRORISM • AOR instability portends a
persistent AQ Movement • Epicenter of VEOs & terrorism • Hezbollah-linked threats
SYRIA • Internal unrest, sectarianism &
civil war • Emerging AQ safe haven
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN • Emotionally charged and
unlikely to be resolved • Fuels sectarianism, violence
PERCEPTION OF U.S. DISENGAGEMENT • Misperceptions of U.S. commitment
and abandonment • Competition grows to replace U.S.
regional influence
UNDER-GOVERNED AREAS • Political & economic drivers
will lead to regional unrest • Arab Awakening persists • Regional impacts
SUNNI-SHIA • Social unrest, sectarian
violence to increase • Flashpoints threaten regional
conflicts and civil wars
PAKISTAN-INDIA • Militants threaten high value
targets in the region • Sporadic cross-border fire “3”
Confrontations
“2”
Situations
“4”
Conflicts
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
IRAN • Persistent nuclear ambitions • Expanded operational reach, lethality
and defense of spheres of influence
AFGHANISTAN • Internal stability challenges • PAK safe haven an enabler for
insurgency
USCENTCOM’s strategic environment is characterized by fragile political transitions, civil wars, sectarianism, under-governed spaces, and a resilient al-Qaida movement.
18
Requirements Process
1. Strategic Guidance (NSS/NMS) 2. Strategic Plans (UCP/JSCP/GEF/DPG) 3. Strategic Environment & Risks 4. OPLANS/CONPLANS/PLNORDs (TCP/DRRS/JMET) 5. Commanders & Deputies Guidance & Priorities 6. Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM) 7. CJA Process Model (Plans - Strategy - Resource) 8. Vital National Security Interest (VNSI)
Requirements Filter & Screen
19
Challenges
• Sequestration/Budget Control Act/APOM
• SECDEF 20% MHQ
• Readiness
• Future Force Structure
• Continuing Resolutions, Shutdown - Uncertainty
– Bipartisan Budget Act - FY14 and FY15 only
• Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
– 45% of CENTCOM HQ is OCO funded
– 34% of our C4 enduring requirement is funded in OCO
– Permanent forward posture and presence are OCO-funded
– Contingency Authorities
J1/8 - Resourcing the Command's Strategy
Director of Resources
Balancing Fiscal Responsibility with National Security
ASMC National PDI–Seattle, Washington
29 May 2014
J1/8 - Resourcing the Command's Strategy 21
AFRICOM Missions and Objectives
Illicit Trafficking AQEA /
Al-Shabaab
Piracy
LRA
Instability
AQIM
Boko Haram
LRA/M23
Instability
Illicit Trafficking
AQIM
Boko Haram
AQEA /Al-Shabaab
Illicit Trafficking
Piracy
Exercises Exercise Peacekeeping, Humanitarian, Security, Counter Terrorism and Disaster Relief scenarios with partner nations
MISSION: United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense
capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national
interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity
Security Cooperation
Strengthen the defense
capabilities of key African
states and regional
partners.
Operations
Protect Americans, our
interests, and allies by
deterring or defeating Al
Qaeda & other VEOs
directly or through coalition
partners.
Political Unrest/Weapons
Proliferation
Lines of Effort
• Counter VEOs and their networks
• Support defense institution building
• Assured access and freedom of
movement
• Maritime Security
• Counter illicit trafficking
• Peacekeeping and crisis response
J1/8 - Resourcing the Command's Strategy
HQ Management, Civilian Pay, OEF-TS, SOCAF (MFP2)
Operations, Exercises, Security Cooperation HQ AFRICOM
USARAF, MARFORAF, NAVAF, AFAF,
SOCAF (MFP11), CJTF-HOA Components
DA, GHP-STATE, ESF, INCLE, NADR ADF, ADB, ADF, FMF, IMET, PKO (GPOI,
PREACT, TSCTP, AMSI) State Dept
GHP-USAID (incl PEPFAR) USAID
e.g., CN, CTFP, 1203, 1206, FY14 1208 (1206-CLRA), HA-O, DHP, HMA, PRP, CCIF,
CE2T2, ERC, JETP Other
DoD/JS
~ $250M
~ $250M+
~ $250M+
~ $250M+
~ $6.5B+
e.g., 1208, MISO, CMPF, OOC, Other SO-Peculiar SOCOM
$7.5B+
Total “Modest investments, in the right places, go a long way in Africa” (GEN Rodriguez)
======
USG Resources into AFRICOM AOR
LRA/M23
Instability
Illicit Trafficking
AQIM
Boko Haram
AQEA /Al-Shabaab
Illicit Trafficking
Piracy
Political
Unrest/Weapons
Proliferation
J1/8 - Resourcing the Command's Strategy 23
Resourcing Challenges for USAFRICOM
“If sequestration continues, there would be fewer U.S. military forces in other regions,
such as the Western Hemisphere and Africa, than there are today. These regions are
already seeing the impact of increasingly constrained resources” (2014 QDR)
• Synchronization of resources
between DoD and other
government agencies
• Articulating resource
requirements for Africa with a
strategy focused on a “pivot to
the Pacific”
• Understanding the “uniqueness” of Africa and the implications
for defense resources
J1/8 - Resourcing the Command's Strategy 24
Observations
• Constrained resources drives greater need to synchronize funding
streams and planning efforts
• Integrating financial and human resource decision making leads to
greater optimization
• Transparency enhances the collective ability to provide quality
resource recommendations to senior Departmental leadership
• Managing the healthy tension between the Service and COCOM
perspectives on the allocation of scarce defense resources
• Lack of a dedicated cadre focused on strategic defense resourcing
• Absence of a common understanding of what the IPL is and does
• Despite progress, current JCIDS process still needs refining
25
Together, we deliver.
OPR: TCJ5/4-SS Current as of 27 February 12
SEATTLE PDI 29 May 2014
USTRANSCOM J8: Mr. James McGinley
OPR: USTRANSCOM/J8
National Security Strategy
Rebalancing Defense Efforts during a period of
Fiscal Restraint Protect the Homeland
Build Security Globally
Project Power and Win Decisively
Sustaining the World’s Finest Military Smaller DoD with an agile Joint Force
Well-trained and fully equipped
More powerful role for mobility forces
TRANSCOM’s Total Force Team Provide global mobility and strategic enablers
USTRANSCOM’s mission is to deliver – anywhere, anytime
OPR: USTRANSCOM/J8
GLOBAL MISSION - DEPLOY, SUSTAIN, RETROGRADE
USTRANSCOM Challenges
Readiness Levels USTRANSCOM depends on Service capabilities & fiscal
posture
TWCF provides flexibility to balance between customer O&M
funding, workload levels and sufficient cash reserves
DoD Drawdown/Retrograde/Contingencies
USTRANSCOM provides strategic flexibility
Requires partnership with commercial and organic providers
Controlling Costs
Provide customers with transportation cost options
Control TWCF operations and overhead consistent with
workload
OPR: USTRANSCOM/J8
GLOBAL MOBILITY READINESS
USTRANSCOM Command Strategy
Preserve Readiness Capability Established Enterprise Readiness Center to integrate future
readiness requirements; revising Defense Transportation
Regulations; engaging with industry and business partners
Achieve IT Management Excellence Developed an Information Technology Roadmap to better align
systems/capabilities to our operational mission that support cost-
based multimodal transportation solutions
Align Resources & Processes for Mission Success Created a disciplined corporate governance process to make
resource decisions taking readiness and costs into account
Develop Customer-focused Professionals Improved our professional development programs to focus on
customer requirements and enhancing workforce capability
OPR: USTRANSCOM/J8
POSTURING FOR THE FUTURE
USTRANSCOM Fiscal Responsibility
Working Capital Fund Cost Management Financial authority enables more efficient operations
Demands cost awareness and control
Customer Collaboration and Innovation Utilize multimodal transportation solutions
Provide operational cost-based decision support analysis
Simplify and standardize TWCF Rates
Distribution Process Owner Enterprise-wide efficiencies to optimize DoD supply chain
Unites stakeholders across DoD and other Federal agencies
Drives cost avoidances and savings
OPR: USTRANSCOM/J8
BALANCING REQUIREMENTS WITH FISCAL REALITY
Questions/Comments
TOGETHER, WE DELIVER
Mission
Provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to
defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks
Vision
A globally networked force of SOF, interagency, allies and
partners able to rapidly or persistently address regional
contingencies and threats to stability SOCOM Strategy 2020
USSOCOM Mission and Vision
Enduring Role of SOF
SOF is critical to the transition as the direct combat role of the US in
Iraq and Afghanistan comes to an end
“We chose further reductions in troop strength and force structure in every military service –
active and reserve – in order to sustain our readiness and technological superiority, and to
protect critical capabilities like Special Operations Forces and cyber resources.”
“Accordingly, our recommendations favor a smaller and more capable force – putting a
premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining platforms that can defeat more
technologically advanced adversaries...Our recommendations seek to protect capabilities
uniquely suited to the most likely missions of the future, most notably special operations
forces used for counterterrorism and crisis response. Accordingly, our special
operations forces will grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 66,000 today.”
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, FY 2015 Budget
Preview, 2014
Rebalancing Capability, capacity, and readiness within the
Joint Force
We will grow overall Special Operations Forces end strength to 69,700
personnel, protecting our ability to sustain persistent, networked,
distributed operations to defeat al Qa’ida, counter other emerging
transnational threats, counter weapons of mass destruction, build the capacity
of our partners, and support conventional operations.
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
A Unified
Combatant Command
… with
Service, Military
Department, and
Defense Agency-like
responsibilities
USSOCOM
A Unique Organization
35
Service Common
Support to SOF
36
USSOCOM Budget/Manpower
$6.0 $6.1 $6.2 $6.2 $6.9 $7.4 $6.9
$7.7
$3.3 $2.8 $3.7 $4.1
$3.9 $2.4 $2.3
$9.3 $8.9 $9.9 $10.3
$10.8
$9.8 $9.2
$7.7
54.2 66.3 69.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
$0.0
$2.0
$4.0
$6.0
$8.0
$10.0
$12.0
FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11 FY 12 FY 13 FY 14* FY 15*Base OCO Manpower End Strength
Military (ES) / C
ivilian (FTE) in
Th
ou
sand
s $ in
Bill
ion
s
* FY 08-13 totals represent EOY actuals; FY 14 represents enacted base/OCO funding; FY 15 OCO to be submitted separately .
Army 24.1%
Navy 23.6%
Marine Corps 6.2%
Air Force 27.8%
USSOCOM 1.6%
DW (Other) 16.7%
Resourcing Challenges
• Special Operations is not a separate Service
– MFP-11 is for SO-Peculiar capabilities
• OCO to Base (O2B) for enduring requirements
– Services and Agencies
• Reserving Flexibility in an era of uncertainty
• Auditability
– Through Service accounting systems
38
The Fifth SOF Truth: Most SOF operations require non-SOF Support
Questions?
39