Boko Haram: An Assessment of and Policy Options SMA-AFRICOM... · A Department of Homeland Security...

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National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Based at the University of Maryland

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BokoHaram:AnAssessmentofStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptionsReporttotheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,DepartmentofDefense,andtheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,DepartmentofHomelandSecurityJanuary2015

AboutThisReportTheauthorofthisreportisAmyPate,ResearchDirectoratSTART.QuestionsaboutthisreportshouldbedirectedtoAmyPateatapate@start.umd.edu.ThefollowingNigerianconsultantsassistedwithfieldinterviews:BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin(Abuja),Kop’epDabugat(AbujaandKano),andChrisKwaja(Jos).SadiqRaddaassistedinidentifyinginformantsandcollectingadditionalpublishedmaterials.Theresearchcouldnothavebeencompletedwithouttheirparticipation.Thefollowingresearchassistantshelpedwiththebackgroundresearchforthereport:ZannIsaacson,GregShuck,ArielleKushner,andJacobSchwoerer.MichaelBouvetcreatedthemapsinthereport.ThisresearchwassupportedbyaCentersofExcellenceSupplementalawardfromtheOfficeofUniversityProgramsoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecuritywithfundingprovidedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)officeoftheDepartmentofDefensethroughgrantawardnumber2012ST061CS0001‐03madetotheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).Theauthor’straveltothefieldwassupportedbytheDomesticNuclearDetectionOffice(DNDO)oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)throughContractHSHQDC‐10‐A‐BOA36.Theviewsandconclusionscontainedinthisdocumentarethoseoftheauthorandshouldnotbeinterpretedasnecessarilyrepresentingtheofficialpolicies,eitherexpressedorimplied,ofSMA,DoD,DNDO,DHS,orSTART.

AboutSTARTTheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)issupportedinpartbytheScienceandTechnologyDirectorateoftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecuritythroughaCenterofExcellenceprogrambasedattheUniversityofMaryland.STARTusesstate‐of‐the‐arttheories,methodsanddatafromthesocialandbehavioralsciencestoimproveunderstandingoftheorigins,dynamicsandsocialandpsychologicalimpactsofterrorism.Formoreinformation,contactSTARTatinfostart@start.umd.eduorvisitwww.start.umd.edu.

CitationsTocitethisreport,pleaseusethisformat:Pate,Amy.“BokoHaram:AnAssessmentofStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptions.”ReporttotheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,DepartmentofDefense,andtheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.CollegeParkMD:START,January2014.

Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options

ContentsExecutiveSummary...............................................................................................................................................................................i

Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................................................1

DataandMethodology.........................................................................................................................................................................1

ContextualizingBokoHaram............................................................................................................................................................2

GeographyandDemographics.....................................................................................................................................................2

Politics....................................................................................................................................................................................................3

BritishColonialism......................................................................................................................................................................3

Post‐Independence......................................................................................................................................................................4

TheFourthRepublic...................................................................................................................................................................5

TheNigerianEconomy....................................................................................................................................................................6

IslaminNigeria...................................................................................................................................................................................7

KeyDynamicsinNigeria..............................................................................................................................................................10

BokoHaram...........................................................................................................................................................................................11

FoundingandEvolutionunderMohammedYusuf..........................................................................................................11

BokoHaramafterYusuf...............................................................................................................................................................13

IdeologyandGoals....................................................................................................................................................................13

LeadershipandDecision‐makingStructures................................................................................................................15

RecruitmentandMembership.............................................................................................................................................16

PatternsofViolence.................................................................................................................................................................18

RelationshipswithOtherActors.........................................................................................................................................22

Funding..........................................................................................................................................................................................23

ResponsestoBokoHaram..............................................................................................................................................................25

LegalFramework............................................................................................................................................................................25

FederalResponses.........................................................................................................................................................................26

SecurityResponses...................................................................................................................................................................26

Negotiations.................................................................................................................................................................................31

Counter‐radicalizationandDe‐radicalization..............................................................................................................33

VictimSupport............................................................................................................................................................................37

DevelopmentalResponses....................................................................................................................................................39

StateandLocalGovernmentAuthorities.............................................................................................................................41

Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................41

Evaluation.....................................................................................................................................................................................41

CivilianGroups.................................................................................................................................................................................42

Non‐Security................................................................................................................................................................................43

Security..........................................................................................................................................................................................44

InternationalResponses..............................................................................................................................................................46

Overview.......................................................................................................................................................................................46

Evaluation.....................................................................................................................................................................................48

AssessingStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptions..................................................................................................50

BokoHaram:StrengthsandVulnerabilities.......................................................................................................................50

PartnersandPolicyOptions......................................................................................................................................................50

ExecutiveSummaryTheIslamistgroupJama'atuAhlas‐Sunnahli‐Da'awatiwal‐Jihad,commonlyreferredtoasBokoHaram,hasemergedasaviolentchallengertotheauthorityoftheNigerianstate.TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)wastaskedwithexaminingBokoHaraminsupportoftheU.S.EngagementOptionsinSub‐SaharanAfricaproject,fundedandcoordinatedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice(SMA)oftheDepartmentofDefense.Specifically,STARTexploredthefollowingresearchquestions:

1. WhatareBokoHaram’sstrengthsandpotentialvulnerabilities?2. WhatpoliciescanbeemployedtocounterBokoHaram’sstrengthsandexploititsweaknesses?3. WhatareUSAFRICOMoptionsforengagingU.S.governmentandforeignpartnerstodeploy

policiestocounterBokoHaram?Datainformingthiscasestudycamefrommultiplesources.Open‐sourcematerials,includingmediareports,academicanalyses,governmentdocuments,andintergovernmentalreports,wereobtainedfrommultipleweb‐baseddatabases.TheauthoralsotraveledtoNigeriatoconductfieldinterviewsfromAugust11throughAugust28,2014.Duringthatperiod,theauthorandlocalconsultantsconducted46interviewsinAbuja,Kano,andJoswithgovernmentofficials,diplomaticsources,andcivilsocietyactorsworkinginmissionspacesrelatedtothecrisisengenderedinnortheasternNigeriabyBokoHaramactivities.TheauthoralsoprocuredadditionalpublishedmaterialswhileinthefieldthatwerenotavailableintheUnitedStates.SeveraldynamicsshapetheNigerianpolityinwaysthatfacilitatethatriseofgroupssuchasBokoHaram,including:

ThepersistentdividebetweentheNorthandSouth,withtheNortheconomicallyandincreasinglypoliticallymarginalized;

Pervasivecorruption,withpoliticalpoweraprimarymeansofeconomicempowerment;and Recurrentethnicandsectarianconflict.

Takentogether,thesedynamicserodesocialtrust,resultinwidespreaddisillusionmentwiththegovernment,andcontributetoapoolofpotentialrecruitsforextremism.FoundedbyMuhammedYusufin2002inMaiduguri,BornoState,BokoHaramwasinitiallyfocusedonda’waandthecreationofamicro‐societyexemplifying“pure”Islam.Salafistinorientation,thegroup’sgoalwastheIslamizationofNigeria.However,itwaslargelynonviolentuntil2009.MemberswererecruitedviathecharismaticnatureofYusufandfinancialincentives.AfterYusuf’sarrestandextrajudicialexecutionbyNigerianpoliceinJuly2009,AbubakarShekauemergedasthenewleaderofthegroup.UnderShekau’sleadership,BokoHaramhasshifteditsfocustojihad,withadramaticincreaseinthefrequencyandlethalityofitsattacks.Inthepastyear,thegrouphasreliedmoreheavilyonconscriptionforrecruitmentwhilealsoseizingandtryingtoholdterritory,ashift

fromprevioushit‐and‐runtactics.Despitedeclaringacaliphate,BokoHaramhasmadelittleattemptatgoverningtheterritoryithascaptured.TheanalysishasidentifiedthefollowingaskeystrengthsofBokoHaram:

Abilitytouseungovernedspacesforstrategicretreatandregrouping Maintenanceofresourceflows(bothmaterialandfinancial)throughuseofhigh‐levelcriminal

activity,includingrobberies,extortion,kidnapping,andlooting; Infiltrationofvarioussecurityservicesandcapacityforintelligencegathering;and Superiorandadaptivefightingtechniques,ascomparedtoNigerianforces.

Theanalysisalsoidentifiedthefollowingvulnerabilities:

Growingrelianceonconscription; Dependenceonlocalresources,whichmaybeincreasinglydepleted;and Needtomaintaincontrolofterritory,aswellasexpand.

TheNigeriangovernmenthasreliedoverwhelminglyonmilitaryresponsestoBokoHaram,whichhavefailed.Over‐relianceonmilitaryresponseshasempoweredratherthandefeatedtheorganization.Therefore,goingforward,amorebalancedandcoordinatedapproachtocounteringthegroupiscalledfor.PossiblepolicyoptionstocountercontextualconditionsthatadvanceBokoHaraminclude:

Supportanti‐corruptionreformers; Supporteffortstobuildnationalnarrativesandidentities;and Increasedevelopmenteffortsinnortheast.

PolicyoptiontocounterBokoHaram’sstrengthsinclude:

PartnerwithneighboringcountriestorestrictaccesstosafehavensforBokoHaram; Worktocountermilitarycorruption;and Supportbetterintelligenceandinformation‐sharing.

PolicyoptionstoexploitBokoHaram’svulnerabilitiesinclude:

Increasecounter‐radicalizationandderadicalizationefforts,includingprovidingexitoptionsfornon‐committedfighters;and

Usenegotiationstoincentivizedefections.

Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options 1

IntroductionTheIslamistgroupJama'atuAhlas‐Sunnahli‐Da'awatiwal‐Jihad,commonlyreferredtoasBokoHaram,1hasemergedasaviolentchallengertotheauthorityoftheNigerianstate.Despiteasignificantinfluxofmilitarypersonneltotheareasofitsstrongholds,BokoHaram2remainscapableoflaunchingsignificantattacks.TheNationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)wastaskedwithexaminingBokoHaraminsupportoftheU.S.EngagementOptionsinSub‐SaharanAfricaproject,fundedandcoordinatedbytheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice(SMA)oftheDepartmentofDefense.Specifically,STARTexploredthefollowingresearchquestions:

4. WhatareBokoHaram’sstrengthsandpotentialvulnerabilities?5. WhatpoliciescanbeemployedtocounterBokoHaram’sstrengthsandexploititsweaknesses?6. WhatareUSAFRICOMoptionsforengagingU.S.governmentandforeignpartnerstodeploy

policiestocounterBokoHaram?

Thisreportisstructuredasfollows.First,themethodologyforthestudyisoutlined.BackgroundinformationonNigeria,includingafocusonthedevelopmentofIslamistmovementsinthecountry,isthenprovided.ThereportthenturnstoadeepdescriptiveanalysisofBokoHaram.FollowingananalysisofcurrentpoliciesdeployedbyNigerianandinternationalactorstocounterBokoHaram,thereportprovidesanassessmentofoptionsforpolicyengagementbyAFRICOMandotherU.S.actors.

DataandMethodologySincetheimpositionofastateofemergencyinMay2013inthethreeNortheasternstatesinwhichBokoHaramactivitiescenter–Borno,Yobe,andAdamawa–informationandreportsonBokoHaramactivitieshasbecomelimited.Fieldinterviews,especiallywithindividualswhonormallyliveintheNortheastorregularlytravelthere,canhelpprovideinformationonvisible,butotherwiseunreportedBokoHaramactivities..Atthesametime,however,inthemidstofgovernmentrestrictionsoninformationandtheinevitablelimitsofindividualfirst‐handknowledge,rumorsandunconfirmedallegationshaveproliferated.Additionally,withnationalelectionsscheduledforFebruary2015,thereisthepossibilityofmanipulationofinformationforpoliticalgain.Therefore,totheextentpossible,triangulationthrough

1“BokoHaram”isfrequentlyreportedasbeingHausafor“Westerneducationisforbidden.”Whilethatishowthetermisusuallyinterpreted,“boko”isbettertranslatedas“inauthentic,”“fraudulent,”or“involvingdeception.”Byextension,incommonunderstanding,colonially‐imposedWesternformsofeducation(aswellasothervehiclesforWestern,andspecificallyWesternChristian,culture)areculturallyinauthenticandfraudulent.Forafulleranalysisoftheetymologyof“boko,”seeNewman,Paul.2013.“TheEtymologyofHausaboko.”Mega‐ChadResearchNetwork.http://www.megatchad.net/publications/Newman‐2013‐Etymology‐of‐Hausa‐boko.pdf.2LeadersofBokoHaramaswellassomescholarswhofollowthegroupandpolicymakersseekingtocounterthegrouphaverejectedthename“BokoHaram,”arguingthatthegroupshouldbecalledbyitsself‐givenappellationortheabbreviationsJASorJASLAW.Theseconcernsareherenoted,buttheterm“BokoHaram”willbeusedthroughoutthisreport,duetoitsubiquityinWestern,andspecificallyAmerican,accounts.ThemostprevalentnameforthegroupamongtheaudiencesforthisreportisBokoHaram.

multiplesourcesunrelatedtooneanotherisdesirableto,wherepossible,validateinformationandplacetheviewsoffieldinterviewsubjectsintotheappropriatecontext.Datainformingthiscasestudycamefrommultiplesources.Open‐sourcematerials,includingmediareports,academicanalyses,governmentdocuments,andintergovernmentalreports,wereobtainedfrommultipleweb‐baseddatabases.TheauthoralsotraveledtoNigeriatoconductfieldinterviewsfromAugust11throughAugust28,2014.3Duringthatperiod,theauthorandlocalconsultantsconducted46interviewsinAbuja,Kano,andJoswithgovernmentofficials,diplomaticsources,andcivilsocietyactorsworkinginmissionspacesrelatedtothecrisisengenderedinnortheasternNigeriabyBokoHaramactivities.4TheauthoralsoprocuredadditionalpublishedmaterialswhileinthefieldthatwerenotavailableintheUnitedStates.

ContextualizingBokoHaramBokoHaramdidnotemergenordoesitexistinavacuum.Rather,itisaproductofandresponsivetoNigeriandemographics,history,politics,andeconomics.Thus,inordertounderstandthegrowthofBokoHaramandtoevaluatepolicyoptionstocounterthegroup,itisnecessarytocontextualizeBokoHaramwithinNigeria.ThissectionreviewskeyfactorsregardingNigeriangeographyanddemographics,itspoliticalhistoryandcurrentdynamics,theNigerianeconomy,andIslamisminNigeria.

GeographyandDemographicsNigeriaislocatedinWestAfricaontheGulfofGuineaandisborderedbyBenin,Niger,Chad,andCameroon.Thecountry’s36statesaredividedintosixgeopoliticalzones,adoptedin1995:

North‐Eastern:Taraba,Borno,Bauchi,Adamawa,Gombe,andYobe; North‐Central:Kogi,Niger,Benue,Kwara,Plateau,Nassarawa,andtheFederalCapitalTerritory; North‐Western:Kaduna,Kebbi,Zamfara,Sokoto,Kano,Jigawa,andKatsina; South‐Eastern:Ebonyi,Enugu,Imo,Abia,andAnambra; South‐Southern:Akwa‐Ibom,Bayelsa,Edo,CrossRiver,Rivers,andDelta;and South‐Western:Ekiti,Oyo,Ogun,Lagos,Ondo,andOsun.5

3Theauthor’straveltothefieldwasfundedbytheDomesticNuclearDetectionOffice(DNDO)oftheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)throughContractHSHQDC‐10‐A‐BOA36.4InAbuja,interviewswereheldwith10governmentactorsand22civilsocietyactors.InJos,interviewswereheldwithsixgovernmentactorsandfourcivilsocietyactors.InKano,interviewswereheldwithonegovernmentactorandfivecivilsocietyactors.WhilethelocationsofinterviewswereAbuja,Kano,andJos,severaloftheinformantswerenormallybasedorregularlytraveledtotheNortheast,inparticularMaiduguri,BornoState,fortheiractivities.Toprotectconfidentiality,especiallyofthoseinformantswholiveorworkintheNortheast,noindividualnamesororganizationalaffiliationswillbecitedinthisreport.Instead,citedinformantswillbedescribedintermsoftheirgovernmentalversuscivilsocietystatusandintermsofthemissionspaces(e.g.,security,humanitarianassistance)inwhichtheywork.5“TheSixGeopoliticalZonesofNigeria.”2012.ReportsonNaija.July2.http://reportsonnaija.blogspot.com/2012/07/six‐geo‐political‐zones‐of‐nigeria.html;Odiegwu,Mike,OziomaUbabukoh,LekeBaiyewu,andAllwellOkpi.2012.“Constitution:SixGeopoliticalZonesDivideNorth,South.”August12.Punch.http://www.punchng.com/news/constitution‐six‐geopolitical‐zones‐divide‐north‐south/.

NigeriaisthemostpopulouscountryinAfrica,withanestimated2012populationof166.6million.6Nigeriacontinuestohaveahighfertilityrate,andasignificant“youthbulge”withnearly71percentofthepopulationundertheageof307andover40percentundertheageof14.8Nigeria’spopulationisdiverse,withmorethan250distinctethnicgroupswithmorethan500languagesanddialectsspoken.9ThethreelargestethnicgroupsaretheHausa‐Fulani,whocompriseapproximately29percentofthepopulation,theYoruba,atanestimated21percent,andtheIbo(orIgbo),with18percentofthepopulation.10Despitesignificantinternalmigration,ethnicgroupsremainfairlyconcentratedindistinctregionsofthecountry,withYorubamainlyintheSouth‐Westzone,Hausa‐Fulaniinthethreenorthernzones,andIbointheSouth‐Easternzone.11Othersignificantethnicgroups,eachwithapopulationofmorethanonemillion,includetheKanuri(concentratedintheNorth‐East,whereBokoHaramactivityismostprevalentwithpopulationsalsoinneighboringNiger,Chad,andCameroon),Tiv,andIbibio.12ReligioninNigeriais,ingeneral,affiliativeratherthanascriptive.Thatis,individualslargelychoosethepracticeofaparticularreligiousfaith.However,ethnicdivisionstendtocoincidesomewhatwithreligiousdivisions.13Muslims,whomakeupanestimated50percentofthepopulation,areconcentratedinnorthernzones,whileChristians,withanestimated40percentofthepopulation,areconcentratedinthesouth.Theapproximate10percentofthepopulationthatpracticestraditional,animisticreligions,isalsoconcentratedinthesouth.14

PoliticsBritishColonialismNigeriafellunderBritishcolonialruleinthelate19thcentury,withformalestablishmentofaBritishcolonyonNigerianterritoryin1900,underSirFrederickLugardasthefirstHighCommissionerofNorthernNigeria.15WhileSouthernandNorthernNigeriawereinitiallygovernedasseparateentitiesdue

6“NigeriaProfile:Facts.”2013.BBC.May21.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa‐13949547.7Kingsley,Patrick.2014.“DoesaGrowingGlobalYouthPopulationFuelPoliticalUnrest?”March19.TheGuardian(London).http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/growing‐youth‐population‐fuel‐political‐unrest‐middle‐east‐south‐america.8“Nigeria.”2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/ni.html.9“Nigeria.”2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/ni.html.10“Nigeria.”2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/ni.html.11“AboutNigeria:People.”2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012‐10‐29‐11‐05‐46/people.12“AboutNigeria:People.”2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012‐10‐29‐11‐05‐46/people.13Thereinforcingnatureofethnicandreligiouscleavagesresultsinmanycommunalconflictsbeinglabeledalternatelyasethnicorreligiousinnature,attimestosuitthedesiresorpreconceptionoftheanalystorthedominantdiscourseatagiventimeratherthanreflectingthenatureoftheconflict.Forexample,conflictsinPlateauStatethatwereformerlylabeledasethnicinnaturehaveinrecentyearsbeendescribedasreligious,althoughtheprimaryactorshavenotchanged.14“AboutNigeria:People.”2012.FederalRepublicofNigeria.http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012‐10‐29‐11‐05‐46/people;“Nigeria.”2014.TheWorldFactbook.CIA.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/ni.html.15Hickey,Raymond.1984.“The1982MaitatsineUprisingsinNigeria:ANote.”TheRoyalAfricanSociety83,no.331:251.

toculturaldifferences,theBritishunifiedtheirgovernancein1914foreconomicreasons.16However,“evenafterunification,northandsouthremainedseparateasthecolonialsystemofindirectrule–governingtheprotectoratesthroughindigenousrulers–merelyinstitutionalizedexistingdivisions.”17Colonialadministrators,rulingthroughtraditionalrulerswhoacquiescedtotheirdirectives,didsetclearlimitsontheactivitiesoftraditionalrulers.18BritishcolonialismhadseveraldistincteffectsonNorthernNigeria.First,colonialismresultedintheintroductionofWesternformsofeducationintoanarenathathadbeenafocalpointofIslamiceducationforcenturies,withitsowntraditionsandelites.Thus,Westerneducationwas“seenasbothathreatandasymboloftheincreasingimpactofanalien,colonial,Christian,materialistandcorruptprocessofWesternization.”19Second,theeconomicpoliciesofcolonization,includingthedevelopmentofinfrastructureinthenorth,resultedinthemigrationofsouthernlaborers,particularlyethnicIboandYoruba,intoNorthernNigeria.ThesegroupsformedhomogenouspocketswithinlargelyHausa‐Fulanicities,initiating“asharpindigene/settlerdichotomythatbecameapowerfultoolthroughwhichpoliticiansmobilizedsupportersfornarrowpoliticalmotives.”20ThepotentialforthisdynamictocontributetosocialviolencecanbeseenintheKanoriotsof1953,whichisnotedaswhen“thefirstcollectiveoutburstbetweentheSouthernersandtheNorthernersormorecorrectly,betweenthemajorpoliticalparties,wasrecorded.”21Theindigene/settlerdichotomycontinuestocontributetosocialconflicttothepresent.

Post‐IndependenceNigeriagainedindependencefromtheUnitedKingdomin1960andestablishedarepublicunderthepresidencyofNnamdiAzikiwe.Thefirstpost‐independenceelectionswereheldin1964.However,amilitarycoupin1966,ledbyYakubuGowon,endedthebriefexperimentwithdemocraticrule.InFebruary1966,thelargelyethnicIjawNigerDeltaVolunteerForcedeclaredanindependentrepublicandfoughtwithfederalforcesfor12daysbeforebeingdefeated.22Shortlythereafter,inresponsetoincreasesinethnicviolence,anethnicIboseparatistmovementdeclaredtheRepublicofBiafrainMay1967withintheEasternRegionofNigeria.23Civilwarbrokeout,resultinginuptothreemilliondeathsandmass

16Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.17Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.18Hill2010,1419Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.13920Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.21Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:856.22Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:856.23Duruji,MosesMetumara.2009.“SocialInequity,DemocraticTransitionandtheIgboNationalismResurgenceinNigeria.”AfricanJournalofPoliticalScienceandInternationalRelations.3:1.54‐65.http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1379759106_Duruji.pdf

displacementofIbos.Additionally,withtheBiafranstatelocatedintheoil‐producingregionsofNigeria,theeconomywasshattered.Thefederalgovernmentwereabletoreassertcontrol,withtheBiafranresistancesurrenderinginJanuary1970.24Leadershiptransitionbycoupandcounter‐couphavebeendominantinNigeria’spost‐independencehistory.MurtalaMohammedoustedGowonin1975inacoup,whileMohammedhimselfwaskilledinafailedcoupattemptin1976andwassucceededbyOlusegunObasanjo.Obasanjo,overaperiodofthreeyears,ledconstitutionalreformleadingtoarestorationofciviliangovernmentin1979.However,onceagain,democraticrule,underPresidentAlhajiShehuShagari,provedtobeshort‐lived.Nigeria’sSecondRepubliccametoanendonDecember31,1983,whenthemilitaryunderMuhammaduBuharionceagainseizedpowerinacoup.BuharialsofelltoacoupledbyGeneralIbrahimBabangidainAugust1985.Babangida,in1993,ledtherestorationofcivilianruleunderanInterimNationalGovernment;however,lessthansixmonthslater,inNovember,GeneralSaniAbachaoverthrewtheinterimgovernmentandinstalledhimselfasdictator,apositionhemaintaineduntilhisdeathin1998.25

TheFourthRepublicAfterAbacha’sdeath,hischiefofdefenseAbdulsalamiAbubakarledthetransitiontocivilianrule,overseeingfirstlocal,thenstate,andfinallynationalelectionsbetweenDecember1998andFebruary1999.FormermilitaryleaderObasanjowonthepresidencywithhisparty,thePeople’sDemocraticParty(PDP)alsowinningalegislativemajority.WhileNigeriahasmaintainedcivilianandelectedrulesince1999,ithasnotexperiencedanychangeinpartyleadership.ThePDPhaswoneverypresidentialelectionsince1999,withUmaruYar’AduawinningpresidentialelectionsinApril2007.26CurrentpresidentGoodluckJonathansucceededYar’Aduaafterthelatter’sdeathin2010andwonre‐electionin2011.27ThenextfederalelectionsarescheduledforFebruary2015.ThedominantpoliticalpartyisthePeople’sDemocraticParty,which(priortoJonathan)hadaninformalinternalpolicytoalternateleadershipbetweenMuslimNorthernersandChristianSoutherners.WithJonathan,thisinternaldynamichasbrokendown,whichhasalsoexposedthepartytodefections.28TheprimaryoppositionpartyistheAllProgressivesCongress(APC),whichwasestablishedin2013whenfouroppositionparties–theActionCongressofNigeria,theCongressforProgressiveChange,theAllNigeriaPeoplesParty,andpartoftheAllProgressivesGrandAlliance–mergedinordertochallengethedominanceofthePDP.29

24“CountryProfile:Nigeria.”2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.25“CountryProfile:Nigeria.”2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.26“CountryProfile:Nigeria.”2008.Washington,DC:LibraryofCongress.July.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf.27“Profile:Nigeria’sGoodluckJonathan.”2013.BBC.September11.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa‐12192152.28Campbell,John.2011.“WhyNigeria’sNorthSouthDistinctionIsImportant.”February7.TheHuffingtonPost.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amb‐john‐campbell/why‐nigerias‐north‐south‐_b_817734.html.29“AboutAPC.”2013.AllProgressiveCongress.http://apc.com.ng/index.php/about‐apc.

UndertheFourthRepublic,Nigeriahasexperiencedaseriesofintercommunalandsectarianconflicts,includingtheriseofBokoHaram.TheNigeriaSocialViolenceProjectrecordednearly30,000deathsfromsocial(largelycommunal)violencebetweenJanuary1998andAugust2014.From1998through2008,societalviolencewasconcentratedintheSouth‐SouthandtheMiddleBeltstates.Since2009,socialviolencehasshiftedtotheNortheast.30IntheNigerDelta,ethnicmilitias–mostrecentlyastheMovementfortheEmancipationoftheNigerDelta(MEND)–haveengagedinviolenceregardingtheexploitationofoilresources.31ViolenceintheMiddleBeltstatesisrelatedtoavarietyofconflicts,includingfarmer‐pastoralistcompetition,indigene‐settlerrivalries,andinterethnicandinter‐religiousconflicts.32

TheNigerianEconomyNigeriaisnowthelargesteconomyinAfrica,havingrecentlysurpassedSouthAfrica.Despiterecentimprovementsinthenon‐oilsector,drivenbyagricultureandtradeandservices,theeconomycontinuestobedominatedbythepetroleumindustry,whichprovided96percentofexportearningsin2013aswellas60percentoffiscalrevenue.33Nigeriaisthefifth‐largestOPECproducerandamajorexporterofoiltoWesternstates,includingtheUnitedStates.34Ithasalsoexperiencedhigher‐than‐averageeconomicgrowth(comparedtobothWestAfricaandsub‐SaharanAfricaasawhole)inrecentyears,withestimatedgrowthof7.4percentin2013and6.5percentin2012.35ThebenefitsofthiseconomicgrowthareconcentratedtoafewNigerians.DespitesomegainsinachievingMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,anestimated63percentofNigeriansremaininpoverty.36Povertyratesalsovarybyregion,whichreinforcesothersectarianandidentity‐baseddividesinNigeria.Inthenorth,whereBokoHaramemerged,povertyrateshoverabove70percent;thiscomparestoratesof27percentinthesouth(includingthecommercialcapitalofLagos)and25percentintheNigerDelta(theoil‐producingregion).37

30NigeriaSocialViolenceProject.August2014.http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/wp‐content/uploads/2014/10/Social_Violence_Summary_Web3.pdf.31El‐Bushra,Judy,SarahLadbury,andUkohaUkiwo.2013.“FromDesigntoImplementation:AddressingtheCausesofViolentConflictinNigeria.”Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development.3:1):1. 1‐18,DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cy.32El‐Bushra,Judy,SarahLadbury,andUkohaUkiwo.2013.“FromDesigntoImplementation:AddressingtheCausesofViolentConflictinNigeria.”Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development.3:1):1. 1‐18,DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cy.33Barungi,Barbara.2014.“Nigeria.”AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.3.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.34 Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861. 35Barungi,Barbara.2014.“Nigeria.”AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.2.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.36Barungi,Barbara.2014.“Nigeria.”AfricanEconomicOutlook.AfricaDevelopmentBank.12.http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Nigeria_EN.pdf.37Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861.

IslaminNigeriaIslamfirstappearedintheterritorythatisnownortheastNigeriasometimeduringtheseventhandeighthcenturiesofthecommonera,althoughitwasslowtospreadintermsofnumbersofconverts.MaiIdrisAlooma,leaderoftheKanem‐Bornuempire(whichcoveredmuchofwhatisnownortheastNigeriaaswellasneighboringareasofCameroonandNigerandmostofChad),attemptedtoestablishIslamiclawinthe16thcentury.38IslaminnorthernNigeriawaslargelypropagatedbytheQadiriyaandTijaniyaSufibrotherhoods,whichcontinueasthedominantIslamicordersincontemporaryNigeria.39Intheearly19thcentury,SheikUsmandanFodiolaunchedanIslamicreformmovement,aimedatremovingHausaleadershesawascorruptandas“indulging”un‐Islamicpractices.40Withhisfollowers,hedeclaredajihadbetween1802and1812,41bywhichtimeheestablishedafederationofIslamicstatesknownastheSokotoCaliphateundertheleadershipoftheSultanofSokoto.42TheSultanruledthroughanetworkofemirs.Atitsheightinthemid‐1800s,thecaliphatecoverednorthernNigeria,partsofsouthernNiger,andnorthernBenin43andremainedintactuntil1903,whenoverthrownbyBritishcolonization.However,evenundercolonization,theimplementationofindirectrulebytheBritishallowedformorecontinuitythandisruptioninthecaliphate’sinternallegalauthoritystructures.44Followingindependence,theformalpoliticalpoweroftheSultanofSokotowasremoved;however,thepositionmaintainsastatusastheleaderofNigeria’sMuslims.While“thesultanhasnoformalpoliticalpowers,hisinfluenceisconsiderable.”45ContemporaryIslamistmovementsinNigeriafrequentlyclaimthelegacyofUsmandanFodio’sjihad,withthe(re‐)establishmentofacaliphatewithformalpoliticalpoweraswellasreligiousauthorityastheultimategoal.46NigeriahasseentheriseofseveralinfluentialIslamistmovementsfromwhichBokoHaram’sleadershiphasdrawn,tosomedegree,inspiration.Asonescholarnotes,“Inmomentsofcrisisandrapidsocialchange,theologicalargumentsacquireparamountimportancefortheself‐definitionofanewreligiousmovement.”47AmongthemostprominentofthesemovementshavebeenMaitatsine,YanIzala,andtheIslamicMovementofNigeria.CentraltoeachofthesemovementswascritiqueanddesiretoreformNigerianpoliticalinstitutions,aswellascritiqueoftraditionalreligiouselites.

38Sodiq,Yushau.1992.“AHistoryofIslamicLawinNigeria:PastandPresent.”IslamicStudies.31:1.85‐108.39Mahmud,SakahSaidu.2013.ShariaorShura:ContendingApproachestoMuslimPoliticsinNigeriaandSenegal.NewYork:LexingtonBooks.18.40Sodiq,Yushau.1992.“AHistoryofIslamicLawinNigeria:PastandPresent.”IslamicStudies.31:1.85‐108.41Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.42Hickey,Raymond.1984.“The1982MaitatsineUprisingsinNigeria:ANote.”TheRoyalAfricanSociety83,no.331:251.43Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.44Reynolds,JonathanT.1997.“ThePoliticsofHistory:TheLegacyoftheSokotoCaliphateinNigeria.”JournalofAsianandAfricanStudies.32:1‐2.50‐65.45 Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.“SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounter‐Radicalization?”StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.15. 46Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,255.47Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3..

TheMaitatsinemovement,called“Nigeria’sfirstviolentextremistgroup,”48wasestablishedbytheCameroonianMuhammedMarwa,whosettledinKanoandestablishedalargecommunityofsupportersthere.49Marwa,whowascalledMaitatsine,50wasimprisonedandthendeportedin1962forhisradicalpreaching,butlaterreturned.Maitatsinepreachedtheradicalrejectionofallnon‐Quranicinnovation,51whichincludedpracticesfromrelyingonhadithtotheuseofwristwatches.52Manyofhisteachingswereheterodox,includingrejectionoftheProphetMohammedanddeclaringhimselfaprophet.53Maitatsinerecruitedfromtheurbanpoor,inparticularthealmajiris,54whocametoKanoasacenterofIslamiclearning.55Maitatsine’ssupporterswereinvolvedinviolentclashesinKanoasearlyas1972,withincreasingviolencein1979and1980.56In1980,anestimated6,000peoplewerekilledbytheNigerianarmywhenMarwaandhisfollowerstriedtostormamajormosque,includingMarwahimself.57However,Marwa’sdeathdidnotleadtotheendofhismovement,andclasheseruptedin1982,1984,1985and199358inmultiplelocalesinnorthernNigeria,includingYola,Gombe,outsideKaduna,andnearMaiduguri.59WhileBokoHaramdrawssupportersfromsimilarsocialstrataasdidMaitatsine,itismorecloselyrelateddoctrinallytoJama’atIzalatal‐Bidaawa‐IqamatasSunna,commonlyknownasYanIzala.YanIzalaisthelargestreformmovementinNigeriaandanoutspokenopponentoftheestablishedSufi

48Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.3.49Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.“TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria1980‐1985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.”JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.50Maitatsineistranslatedas“onewhodamns,”amonikerearnedthroughMarwa’sfiercecondemnationofpracticeshedeemedun‐Islamic,inparticularNigerianstateinstitutionsandWesterntechnologies.SeeAdesoji,Abimbola.2011.“BetweenMaitatsineandBokoHaram:IslamicFundamentalismandtheResponseoftheNigerianState.”AfricaToday.57:4,101.51Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.140‐14152Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.“TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria1980‐1985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.”JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.196;Kastfelt,Niels.1989.“RumoursofMaitatsine:ANoteonPoliticalCultureinNorthernNigeria.”AfricanAffairs.8:350,83.53Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.“TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria1980‐1985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.”JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.196;Kastfelt,Niels.1989.“RumoursofMaitatsine:ANoteonPoliticalCultureinNorthernNigeria.”AfricanAffairs.8:350,83.54AlmajirisareyoungboyswhoattendKoranicschoolsunderthetutelageofIslamicscholars.However,theymayreceivelittleeducation,areusedforbegging,andaresubjecttoabuse.TheNigeriangovernmenthasattemptedtomodernizethesystemofIslamiceducation,integratingKoranicschoolswithWestern‐styleeducation.However,numerousunregulatedschoolsandscholarspersist.55Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.140‐14156Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.“TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria1980‐1985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.”JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.57Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.140‐14158Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.140‐14159Isichei,Elizabeth.1987.“TheMaitatsineRisingsinNigeria1980‐1985:ARevoltoftheDisinherited.”JournalofReligioninAfrica.17:3.194.

orders.60Foundedin1978byIsmailaIdrisinJosunderthespiritualleadershipofSheikhAbubakarGumi,YanIzalaisaSalafistorganizationthatembracesalegalistandscripture‐centricunderstandingofIslam,withagoalofpurgingthepracticeofIslamofforeignideasandpractices.Toaccomplishthis,Izalaproponentsencourage“thefaithfultolivebyitsquiteliteralinterpretationoftheQur’an,sunnah,andhadith;toemulatethesalafs.”61YanIzalahasbeenattheforefrontofthemovementfortheimplementationofshar’iainnorthernstates,andinsomecities(suchasKano)itsmembersmakeupthecoreoftheIslamicpolice(thehisba).62Furthermore,asdiscussedbelow,BokoHaramfounderMohammedYusufwasinfluencedbytheteachingsofYanIzala,andBokoHaram’searliestrecruitsreportedlycamelargelyfromYanIzala.YanIzalaappealedtoyouth,especiallyunemployedgraduates,withitsemphasison“individual,unmediatedexaminationoftheSunna.”63Additionally,withitsfocuson“purifying”NigerianIslamfromun‐Islamicpractices,YanIzalarejectedmanysocialcustomsthatyouth,inparticular,foundconstraining,includingmarriagepayments.64Thus,whilejoiningYanIzalamaymeanbreakingwithparentsandtraditionalpractices,italsoallowedforgreaterindividualfreedomandagencyforsome.65YanIzala,despiteitsSalafiststance,alsoattractedsignificantfemaleparticipation.Unlikesomeofitsideologicalcolleagues,YanIzalahaspromotedIslamiceducationforwomenandtheparticipationofwomeninthepublicsphere(althoughunderlimitationsof“separatebutequal”activities).YanIzalathereforerepresentsamoreindividualautonomy‐centeredIslamistoptioninsomesensesthantraditionalIslamicpracticesinNorthernNigeria.66Shi’aIslamwaspracticallynonexistentinNigeriauntilthe1980s,67withfewerthanfivepercentofNigeria’sMuslimpopulationthatisShi’a.68DespitethedemographicweaknessoftheShi’a,theIslamicMovementinNigeria(IMN),foundedbyIbrahimal‐Zakzaky,69isasignificantplayerintheNigerianlandscape.InspiredbythesuccessoftheIranianRevolutionin1979,Zakzakybegantopromotethecause

60Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.14361Hill2010,1862Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.14663Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,264.64Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.141;Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.65Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.66Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,265.67Umar,Farouk,andEstelleShirbon.2008.“TensionsbetweenMuslimsSimmerinNigerianCity.”Reuters.March19.http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/20/us‐nigeria‐muslims‐idUSL1880839220080320.68ForumonReligion&PublicLife.2009.MappingtheGlobalMuslimPopulation:AReportontheSizeandDistributionoftheWorld’sMuslimPopulation.October.PewResearchCenter.40.http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/10/Muslimpopulation.pdf.69Hill2010,20

ofIslamicrevolutioninNigeria,beginninginthe1980stothepresent.TheIMN,whichincludessomeSunnisaswellasShi’as,haspetitionedforthefullimplementationofshari’alaws,70arguingthat“secularauthoritieswerenotfittoholdpower,andthatthetraditionalreligiousrulers,eitherthroughcowardiceorself‐servinginterest,facilitatedtheirabusesbyrefusingtostanduptothem.”71ThegroupallegedlyreceivesfundingfromIran,usingittoprovidesocialservicesandeducationtothepoor.72TheIMNreportedly“recruitedamongthemostradicalelementsoftheIslamistcommunity,callingforcampaignsagainsttheWest,Christians,the‘YanIzala,andthemilitarygovernments.”73SomesourcesallegethatMohammedYusufinitiallyapproachedtheIMNasapossibleorganizationalvehicleforhisvision,althoughhisinvolvementintheIMNcannotbeconfirmed.74TheIMNalsohasatrainedmilitiaunit,theHoras.BasedontheRevolutionaryGuardsinIran,theyaretaskedwithprovidingsecurityatgroupmeetingsandevents.Inthepast,theyhaveclashedwithrivalgroups.75

KeyDynamicsinNigeriaSeveraldynamicsshapetheNigerianpolityinwaysthatfacilitatethatriseoftheIslamistgroupsdiscussedabove,aswellasmoreviolentmanifestationssuchasBokoHaram.Firstisthepersistentdividebetweennorthandsouth.Thenorth,largelyMuslim,remainseconomicallyunderdeveloped76and,increasingly,politicallymarginalized.77Accesstopoliticalpowerisaprimarymeansforbothindividualandcollectiveenrichment,whichencouragessometouseextrememeasures,includingasometimesrecklessexploitationofethnicandreligiousidentities,inordertoobtainpoliticalpower.Asoneanalystnotes,“Nigerianpoliticswereandremaincharacterizedbyakeencompetitionforsocioeconomicresourceswiththestateseenasthemaindispenserofthesebenefit….[I]nthecompetitionforallocationofpoliticalpowerandresources,ethno‐religioussentimentsareexploited.”78Anothernotes,“PoliticsinNigeriaisthegatewaytosuddenwealth,anostentatiouslifestyleandself‐aggrandizement.Itisazerosumgame,whichproducesabsolutewinnersandlosers.Thischaracterofpoliticsencouragestheresorttoanymeans,includingviolenceandmobilizationofethnicandreligioussentiments,aswellastheradicalizationoforganizationssuchasBokoHaram.”79Aswillbeseenbelow,BokoHaraminitsearlyyearswasempoweredandprovidedresourcesasamanifestationofthesedynamics.

70Hill2010,2371Hill2010,2372Hill2010,24‐2573Lubeck,PaulM.2011.“Nigeria:MappingaShari’aRestorationistMovement.”InShari’aPolitics:IslamicLawandSocietyintheModernWorld,editdbyRobertHefner.Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,266.74Adesoki,AbimbolaO.2011.“BetweenmaitatsineandBokoHaram:IslamicFundamentalismandTheResponseoftheNigerianState.”AfricaToday57,no.4:100.75Hill2010,2376Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:861.77Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:862.78Sodipo,MichaelOlufemi.2013.“MitigatingRadicalisminNorthernNigeria.”AfricanSecurityBrief,no.26.NationalDefenseUniversityAfricaCenterforStrategicStudies:WashingtonD.C.4.79Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:868.

ThepreviousfactorsareexacerbatedbypervasivecorruptionintheNigerianstate.Spoilsaccruetothefewelites,withlimiteddistributionviapatronagesystems.Thus,despiteawealthofnaturalresourcesandconsiderableeconomicgrowthinrecentyears,manyNigerians(especiallythoseinthenorth)remainshutoutfromeconomicopportunities.Finally,sincedemocratizationin1999,Nigeriahasbeenshakenbyrecurrentethnicandsectarianviolence,drivenlargelybycompetitionforpoliticalandeconomicresources.Morethan30,000Nigerianshavediedintheseconflicts,80erodingsocialtrustandfurtherintensifyingthezero‐sumnatureofpoliticalandeconomiccompetition.Thestate’sresponsetosuchconflictshasalsobeenlargelycoerciveandrepressive,aswellasattimesindiscriminate,81weakeningtrustintheNigeriangovernment.

BokoHaram

FoundingandEvolutionunderMohammedYusufMohammedYusuffoundedthemovementthatwouldevolveintoBokoHaramin2002inMaiduguri,thecapitalofBornoState.82YusufwasastudentofSheikAbubakarGumi,spiritualleaderoftheIzalamovement,intheearly1990s83andwasalsomentoredbySheikJafaarAdam.84Reportedly,manyofYusuf’searliestfollowerswerefromtheIzalamovement.85HemovedintoaleadershippositionattheNdimiandDaggashmosquesinMaiduguri,BornoState,althoughhewasexpelledfrombothby2002duetohisincreasingextremism.86AfterhisexpulsionfromNdimiandDaggash,YusufestablishedhisownmosqueandIslamicschool“toserveasamagnetforprimaryandsecondaryschoolpupilswho,inresponsetohisteachings,wouldabandonWesternizedschoolsinthebeliefthatWesterneducation[Boko]isasin[Haram].”87PreachingradicalsermonsagainsttheMuslimestablishmentaswellasthestate,Yusufattractedawidefollowing,

80NigeriaSocialViolenceProject.August2014.http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/wp‐content/uploads/2014/10/Social_Violence_Summary_Web3.pdf.81Aghedo,IroandOarheOsumah.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprising:howshouldNigeriaRespond?”ThirdWorldQuarterly33,no.5:857.82Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.“SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounter‐Radicalization?”StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.2683Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.84Owolade,Femi.2014.“BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.”GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria#85Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.86Owolade,Femi.2014.“BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.”GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria#87Owolade,Femi.2014.“BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.”GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria#;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria.

originallycalledtheYusufiyya,innorthernNigeriaandborderingareasofChadandNiger.88InfluencedbySaudiArabianscholarAbubakarbin‘AbdullahAbuZayad’,YusufrejectedthemodernIslamicschoolsembracedbytheIzalamovementaswellasseculareducation.HealsoturnedagainsttheNigerianstateandrejectedthesultanofSokotoasthenominalheadofallNigerianMuslims.Initiallynon‐violent,Yusufattracteddisillusionedyouthwhoviewedhimasa“moralcrusader.”89Yusufgavegrantsandfinancialassistancetohisrecruits,includingloanstostartupsmallbusinesses;90inturn,recruitscontributedfunds(gainedeitherlicitlyorillicitly)backtothecommonpurse.91In2004,Yusufandseveralthousandofhisfollowersestablishedasettlement,called“Afghanistan,”nearKannamma,Yobestate,reportedlyinemulationoftheProphetMohammed’smigration(orhijra)fromMeccatoMedina.92MultipleinformantsnotedthatformerBornoGovernorAliModuSheriffempoweredYusuf’sgroupinitsearlyyearsbyarmingandotherwisefinancingthemandemployingthemforelectioneeringactivitiesinapersonalmilitiaknownasEcomog;buildingpersonalmilitiasduringelectionseasonisarelativelycommonpracticebypoliticians.93SmallskirmishesbetweenYusuf’sfollowersandNigerianauthoritiesfirsteruptedinlate2003andearly2004.TheNigerianmediathenlabeledthegroup“theNigerianTaliban,”94oneofseveralnicknamesthegroupwouldgainoveritsevolution.InSeptember2004,followingmoreattacks,theNigerianarmywentontheoffensiveagainstthegroup,dismantlingthe“Afghanistan”settlementandkilling27followers.95ViolencesubsideduntilJune2009,althoughthegroupdidnotdisband.Thenextconfrontationwaspromptedbynewlawsregardingmotorbikes,includingabanondrivingatnightandrequirementtowearahelmet.Policecheckpointswereusedtoenforcethenewrules.Followingtherefusalbythesect’smemberstofollowthenewlaw,aclasheruptedwithpoliceinBauchistateinwhich17memberswere

88Adegbulu,Femi.2013.“BokoHaram:TheEmergenceofaTerroristSectinNigeria2009‐2013.”AfricanIdentities.11:3,266.DOl:10.1080114725843.2013.839118.89Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.90Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Religioussocietyrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactor(media).InterviewedbyAmyPate.August24,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.91Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria.92Hill,JonathanN.C.2010.“SufisminNorthernNigeria:ForceforCounter‐Radicalization?”StrategicStudiesInstitute:Carlisle.26.93CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyBukolaAdemola‐AdelehinandKop’epDabugat.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria94Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.15095Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.150

shot,96settingoffaseriesofattacksandcounter‐attacks.97TheviolencespreadfromBauchitofouradditionalnorthernNigerianstates,withatleast900killedinMaidugurialone.98Yusufwastakenintopolicecustodyandextrajudiciallyexecuted.99ThemomentofYusuf’skillingbyNigeriansecurityagentsiswidelyseenasthecriticalturningpointintheevolutionofBokoHaram.100

BokoHaramafterYusufFollowingYusuf’sdeathandthesubsequentcrackdownonsuspectedsupporters,BokoHaramwentunderground.Nigerianauthoritiesannouncedvictoryoverthegroup.However,ayearlater,inSeptember2010,thesectre‐emergedundertheleadershipofYusuf’ssecond‐in‐commandAbubakarShekauwithanattackonaNigerianprison,resultingintheescapeof700prisoners,including150BokoHarammembers.101UnderShekau’sleadership,BokoHaramhasevolvedfromafringereligiousmovementintooneofthemostlethalterroristorganizationsintheworld.102

IdeologyandGoalsTheideologyofBokoHaramisborrowedfromSalafistthoughtandwritings,103“whichtreatsanythingwesternascompletelyun‐Islamic.”104YusufwasreportedlystronglyinfluencedbythewritingsofthemedievalscholarIbnTaymiyya,105whocalledforjihadagainstrulers(includingMuslimrulers)whodid

96Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.15197Agbiboa,DanielE.2014.“PeaceatDaggersDrawn?BokoHaramandtheStateofEmergencyinNigeria.”StudiesinConflict&Terrorism.37:56.DOI:10.1080/1057610X.2014.853602.98Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.15199Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.151100Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Loimeier,Roman.2012“BokoHaram:TheDevelopmentofaMilitantReligiousMovementinNigeria.”AfricaSpectrum.47:2‐3.151.101Abubakar,Aminu.2010.“ManhuntBeginsAfterPrisonBreak.”September9.IOLNews.http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/manhunt‐begins‐after‐prison‐break‐1.680173#.VBgRSPldUYM.102Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastro‐Reina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.“BokoHaramRecentAttacks.”STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.103Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.104“Youths,RadicalisationandAffiliationwithInsurgentGroupsinNorthernNigeria.”2014.MonographSeries,No.20.CLEENFoundation,Lagos.18.http://www.cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf105Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.

notfollowandapplyshari’alaw.106WhileattheNdimimosque,healsospecializedinthehadithcollectionentitledRiyadhal‐Salihin,byMuhyial‐Dinal‐Nawawi.Thiscollection,whichfocusesonethics,mannersandconductforapiousMuslim,alsoemphasizesthevirtueandsuperiorityofmilitantjihadandthosethatpursueit.107However,inBokoHaram’searlydays,thefocusoftheorganizationwasprimarilyonda’wa(proselytizingandconversion).108ItwasaftertheextrajudicialexecutionofYusufthatthefocusturnedtojihad.109Yusuf,andBokoHaram,alsoembracedaredistributionisteconomicideology.UmarMamodu,aBokoHaramhistorianandscholar,states,“Yusufbelievedinthecreationofaneworderinwhichthewretchedshouldinherittheearth.”110Thisrejectionofthecurrentsocio‐politicalhierarchyhasprovenappealingtothepoor,theunemployed,andtheuneducated.111Whilethegrouphasespousedredistribution,italsorejectsthevaluationofgroupsorindividualsonthebasisoftheirmaterialwealth.Instead,membersaretoldtovaluespiritualandmetaphysicalachievements.112BokoHaramisbestknownforitsrejectionofWesterneducation.113Westerneducation(aswellasotherformsofWesterninfluence,intermsoflifestyles,entertainment,andgovernance)areviewedasinauthentictonorthernNigeriaandasinfiltratingthenorth’straditionalwayoflife.114ThereisaperceptionwithinnorthernNigeriathatWesterneducation,whichwasintroducedinitiallybyChristianmissionaries,isavehicletoconvertnorthernMuslimstoChristianity.115So,notonlydoesBokoHaramrejectWesterneducationbecauseofsomeofthecontentofthecurriculum,butalsobecause“evangelismdeceptivelycamouflagedasWesterneducationisIslamicallyunacceptable.”116ItshouldbenotedthatBokoHaramdoesnotrejectthecontentofWesterneducationinitsentirety–ithasembracedtechnicalandengineeringsolutions,forexample.Rather,asYusufexplicatedduringhisinterrogationbyNigerianpolice,“PeopleshouldnotseektheknowledgethatcontravenestheteachingofIslam.AllknowledgethatcontradictsIslamisprohibitedbytheAlmighty…sihiri[sorceryormagic]isknowledge,butAllahhas

106Jansen,JohannesJ.G.1987‐1988.“IbnTaymiyyahandtheThirteenthCentury:AFormativePeriodofModernMuslimRadicalism.”QuadernidiStudiArabi.5/6,394‐295.IbnTaymiyyahwaswritinginthecontextoftheMongolinvasionofMuslimlands.107Ulph,Stephen.2013.BokoHaram:InvestigatingtheideologicalbackgroundtotheriseofanIslamicmilitantorganization.WestminsterInstitute.20.108Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.109Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.110Owolade,Femi.2014.“BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.”GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria#111Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.43.112Alao,DavidOladimejiandAlao,Oluwafisayo.2012.“Boko‐HaramInsurgenceinNigeria:TheChallengesandLessons.”SingaporeanJournalofBusinessEconomics,andManagementStudies,IlishanRemo,Nigeria.1:6113Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria114CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.115Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.44.116Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.44.

forbiddenit,shirk[polytheismorsharingorassociatingpartnerstoAllah]isknowledgebutAllahhasforbiddenit….”117SpecificWesternteachingsorscientifictheoriesthatBokoHaramrejectsincludethewritingsofvariousphilosopherswhoquestiontheexistenceofgod,theBigBangtheory,Darwinism,thelawofconservationofmatterandenergy,andtheraincycle.118BokoHaram’sgoalscenterontheIslamizationofNigeriansocietyinallitsfacets–political,economic,andsocial.119Initially,YusufandBokoHaramexpressedthisgoalthroughwithdrawalfromwhattheyviewedasacorruptsocietyandthecreationofamicro‐societywhere“pure”Islamcouldbeexpressed.Eventually,though,theambitionshiftedtothedisplacementofthesecularNigerianregimeforaSalafistgovernment.120Thisincludes,accordingtoitsspokesman,theapplicationofshari’athroughoutNigeria(includingmajorityChristianareas).121YusufalsoresolutelyrejecteddemocracyasanappropriateformofgovernanceforaMuslimsociety.122Whatislessclear–bothinYusuf’sstatementsandwritingsaswellasinBokoHaram’scurrentconfiguration–isthegeographicscopeofBokoHaram’sambitions.TheestablishmentofanIslamicstateinNigeriaisclearlyagoal;however,itremainsanopenquestionifBokoHaramalsoseekstheterritorialexpansionofsuchasstateintoneighboringcountriesorWestAfricaasawhole.123

LeadershipandDecision‐makingStructuresShekauistheemirofBokoHaram,sittingatthetopoftheleadershipstructure.HeissupportedbyaShuraCouncil,124althoughhedoesmakesdecisionsattimeswithoutreferringtothecouncil.125MembersoftheShuraCouncilhaveresponsibilityforspecificcellsofthegroup,whichhaveeitherfunctionalor

117Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.104.118Mohammed,Abdulkareem.2010.TheParadoxofBokoHaram.Kano:MovingImageLimited.52.119Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria120Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.121Owolade,Femi.2014.“BokoHaram:HowaMilitantIslamistGroupEmergedinNigeria.”GatestoneInstitute,March27.http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4232/boko‐haram‐nigeria#122Alao,DavidOladimejiandAlao,Oluwafisayo.2012.“Boko‐HaramInsurgenceinNigeria:TheChallengesandLessons.”SingaporeanJournalofBusinessEconomics,andManagementStudies,IlishanRemo,Nigeria.1:5‐6123Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria124DifferentsourcesprovidedifferentestimatesoftheShuraCouncil’smembership,rangingfrom11upto30.TheNigeriangovernmentreleasedalistof18members(notincludingShekau)in2012.SeeNwankwo,Sunny.2012.“Nigeria:JTFDeclares19BokoHaramCommandersWanted.”AllAfrica,November24.http://allafrica.com/stories/201211250093.html.125Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf

geographicfoci.126Accordingtoopensources,theShurararelymeetsinperson,relyinginsteadonmobilephonesformostcommunication.Membersatlowerlevelsmaynotknowmembersofothercells.127Shekauisreportedlyauthoritarianinhisleadershipstyle;128hehasorderedthe“deathpenalty”foranyonewhodidnotfollowhisordersandhaskilleddefectors.129Beheadingshavebeenusedinthepasttotargetmoremoderatemembersandmemberswhohadbeenarrestedandwerethereforenolongertrusted.130Shekau’sleadershipstyleandhisexpansionoftargetingtosofttargetsledtotensionswithinBokoHaramanditseventualsplit,131withMammanNur(whoreportedlyintroducedShekautoYusuf)formingAnsaruin2012withamorelimitedtargetingrepertoire(primarily,thekidnappingofforeigners).WhileShekaumaintainsoverallleadership,132individualcellcommandersalsohavesomeabilitytoactunilaterallyinanopportunisticmanner,withoutdirectordersfromShekau.133

RecruitmentandMembershipBokoHaramusesbothvoluntaryandcoercivestrategiesforrecruitment.Fightersjoiningvoluntarilymaybemotivatedforideologicalandreligiousreasons,butmayalsojoinduetopastvictimizationbytheNigerianmilitary,whichhasbeenaccusedofhumanrightsviolationsinthefightagainstthesect.134BokoHaramalsoreportedlyusesmonetaryincentivestoattractrecruits.135Forexample,gangmembersinDiffa,Niger(acrosstheborderfromBornoState)reportedthatBokoHaramwereregularlyrecruiting

126GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August22,2014.Jos,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf;Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel.7:2(February).27.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria.127Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).8.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf128Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria129Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):25.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria130Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).6.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf131Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria132Overtheyears,Shekau’sdeathhasbeenreportedmultipletimes,includingatleasttwiceinSeptember2014.However,mostindicationsarethatheisstillaliveandincontrolofthegroup.However,asoneinformantnoted,“I’mnotsureifitmattersifhe’saliveordead–theideaofhimexists.”Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.133Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria134Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria135Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria

youthusingfinancialincentives. 136Uneducated,unskilledyouthareapopulardemographicfromwhichthegrouppulls.Youngpeopleareamongthemostaffectedbytheworseningpovertyrate,andunemployment,alongwithothersocioeconomicwoes,contributestoanindividualmoresusceptibletoradicalizationandindoctrination.137SurveysconductedinBornoandKadunastatesfoundthehighunemploymentandpovertyinthoseareasasthesecondmostimportantreasonwhyyouthengageinreligious‐basedviolence.138Almajiris139areanotherpopulationvulnerabletorecruitmentformaterialandpsychologicalaswellasreligiousreasons.140BokoHaram,initsraidsagainsttownsandvillages,alsohasroutinelykidnappedindividualswhoarelaterforcedtofightorotherwiseprovidesupporttothegroup.141Informantsalsoreportedotherusesofcoercionandintimidationtorecruitfighters,142withcoercivestrategiesbecomingincreasinglyimportantsincespring2013.143SeveralinformantsreportedthepresenceofforeignfightersinBokoHaram’sranks.OneinformantreportedbeinginvolvedinthearrestofforeignfightersinKanoinpreviousyears,althoughhecouldnotdivulgethenationalityofthosearrested.144Accordingtootherinformants,attackvictimshaveidentifiedattackersasnon‐Nigeriansandnon‐Kanuri,145specificallyTuaregs.146TheCamerooniangovernmentalsoindicatedthatithadidentifiedtwoTuaregfightersamongBokoHarammilitantskilledinaclashinSeptember2014.147

136Fessy,Thomas.2014.“NigerHitbyNigeria’sBokoHaramFallout.”BBCNewsAfrica,April22.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa‐27111884137Onuoha,FreedomC.“WhyDoYouthJoinBokoHaram?”2014.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,SpecialReport348:6.http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348‐Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf138Onuoha,FreedomC.“WhyDoYouthJoinBokoHaram?”2014.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,SpecialReport348:6.http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348‐Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf139AlmajirisareyoungboyswhoattendKoranicschoolsunderthetutelageofIslamicscholars.However,theymayreceivelittleeducation,areusedforbegging,andaresubjecttoabuse.TheNigeriangovernmenthasattemptedtomodernizethesystemofIslamiceducation,integratingKoranicschoolswithWestern‐styleeducation.However,numerousunregulatedschoolsandscholarspersist.140Therrell,Lane.2014.“BokoHaramRecruitsNigerianAlmajiriChildren:CameroonNextTarget?”GaurdianLibertyVoice,August21.http://guardianlv.com/2014/08/boko‐haram‐recruits‐nigerian‐almajiri‐children‐cameroon‐next‐target/141CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBornoengagedinhumanitarianassistance.PhoneinterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August21,2014.Kano,Nigeria142CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBornoengagedinhumanitarianassistance.PhoneinterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August16,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria143Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria144GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August21and22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.145Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria146GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria147Wallis,William.2014.“BokoHaramOpensNewFrontagainstNigerianForces.”FinancialTimes,September9.http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5aed8f88‐3836‐11e4‐9fc2‐00144feabdc0.html#axzz3DYm0tAtp.

PatternsofViolenceFollowingShekau’sassumptionofleadership,BokoHaramgreatlyincreaseditsviolenceintermsoffrequencyofattacks,averagelethality,andscopeoftargets.Asoftheendof2013,accordingtotheGlobalTerrorismDatabase(GTD),BokoHaramhascarriedoutmorethan800attackssince2009whichhaveresultedinnearly4,000fatalities,makingBokoHaramoneofthemostactiveterroristgroupsintheworld,intermsofattackfrequencyandoveralllethality.148Figure1breaksdownthetargetsofthoseattacks.149BokoHaramhasalsoshown,toafargreaterdegreethanotherterroristgroups,apropensityforcoordinatedattacks,definedasattacksagainstmultipletargets(eitherinthesamegenerallocationordispersedgeographically)inthesameday.Morethan40percentofitsattacksbetween2009and2011werepartofcoordinatedevents,comparedto10percentofallattacksgloballyduringthesametimeperiod.150WithinNigeria,BokoHaramviolenceisconcentratedinthenortheast,especiallyinBornoState,itsbirthplace.BokoHaramhasalsolaunchedoccasionalattacksacrosstheborderintoCameroonandNiger.However,despiteaconcentrationofattacksinnortheastNigeria,BokoHaramhasdemonstratedanabilitytostrikefurthersouth,includinghigh‐profileattacksinAbuja,thecapital.Figure2mapsthegeographicandtemporaldistributionofattacksfrom2010through2013intermsoffrequency,whileFigure3mapsthegeographicandtemporaldistributionofattacksbetween2010and2013intermsoflethality.151Thesefiguresrevealseveralpatterns.First,althoughBokoHaramhaslaunchedattacksacrossthenorthandMiddleBeltregionsofNigeria,themajorityofattacksareinthenortheast,withBornoStatetheprimaryareaofconcentration.Second,thisdynamicseemstohaveintensifiedsincetheimpositionofthestateofemergencyinMay2013,withanoticeablegeographiccontractionofBokoHaramactivityin2013ascomparedto2012.Third,whilethefrequencyofBokoHaramattacksdecreasedfrom2012to2013,

148Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastro‐Reina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.“BokoHaramRecentAttacks.”STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.149Simonelli,Corina,MichaelJensen,AlejandroCastro‐Reina,AmyPate,ScottMenner,andErinMiller.2014.“BokoHaramRecentAttacks.”STARTBackgroundReport.May.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaramRecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.150Menner,Scott,andErinMiller.2013.“FTODesignation:BokoHaramandAnsaru.”STARTBackgroundReport.November.http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaram_Nov2013.pdf.151NationalConsortiumfortheStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START).2013.GlobalTerrorismDatabase[Datafile].http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

FIGURE1:BokoHaramTargetTypes,2009‐2013

lethalityincreased.Thatis,theaveragenumberofdeathsassociatedwithaBokoHaramattackhasincreased.Thisislikelyduetoashiftinthegroup’stacticalrepertoire,asitdecreaseditsuseofbombingandassassinationandincreaseditsarmedassaults(sometimeswith200to300militantsinvolved)ontownsandvillages.Inotherwords,in2013,BokoHarambegantorelymoreoninsurgencyorguerrillawarfarethanclassicterroristtactics–perhapsinresponsetothedeclarationofthestateofemergencyandinfluxofmilitarypersonnelintothenortheast.Duringthesummermonthsof2014,BokoHarambeganseizingcontroloftownsinnortheastNigeriainashiftfromitsprevioushit‐and‐runtactics.Shekau,mimickinglanguageusedbytheIslamicStateintheLevant(ISIL),declaredacaliphate.TownsseizedincludeBama,thesecond‐largestcityinBornoafterMaiduguri,aswellasastringofsmallertowns.152WhiletheNigerianmilitaryhaslaunchedcounterattacksandusedairpowerinanattempttodislodgethemilitants,theirsuccesshasthusfarbeenlimited.

152Akingule,Gbenga,andDrewHinshaw.2014.“BokoHaramExtendsControloverNortheastNigerianCity:BamaRefugeesSayIslamistInsurgencyForciblyRecruitingYoungMenandKillingResidents.”TheWallStreetJournal,September12.http://online.wsj.com/articles/boko‐haram‐extends‐control‐over‐northeast‐nigerian‐city‐1410534697.

Figure2:GeographicandTemporalDistributionofBokoHaramAttacks

Figure3:BokoHaramLethality,2010‐2013

RelationshipswithOtherActorsOpensources,aswellasinformantsinNigeria,indicatedthatBokoHaramhasrelationshipswithotherterroristgroupsinAfrica,particularlyintheSahel.Themostfrequentlycitedoftheseisal‐QaidaintheIslamicMaghreb(AQIM),153whichhasreportedlyprovidedtraining154andsomefinancingtoBokoHaram.155InJune2010,AbdelmalekDroukdel,akaAbuMusabAbdal‐Wadoud,theemirofAQIM,announcedcommunicationwithBokoHaramanddiscussedpossibleassistanceforthegroup.156In2011,AbubakarAdamKambarandal‐Barnawi(amemberofBokoHaram’sShura)reportedlymetatanAQIMtrainingcampinAlgeria.MammanNur(wholatersplitfromBokoHaramandfoundedAnsaru)alsoreportedlytrainedwithAQIM.157BokoHaramalsoreportedlysentmilitantstosupportAQIMandtheMovementforUnityandJihadandWestAfrica(MUJAO)intheirassaultagainsttheMalianstatein2012.158However,oneinformantindicatedthattherelationshipwithAQIMmayhaveweakenedinrecentyears.Keyindividualswhobrokeredtherelationship(e.g.,NurwithinBokoHaramandMokhtarBelmokhtarwithinAQIM)haveeitherbeenkilledormovedontodifferentorganizations.AQIM,withtheFrenchinterventioninMali,isalsonowmorefocusedonitsownsurvival.159ThereisnoindicationwhetherornottheTuaregsrecentlykilledfightingforBokoHaraminCameroonwerealsoaffiliatedwithAQIMoranotherSaheliangroupinvolvedinthe2012Maliuprising.SourcesalsomentionapossibleBokoHaramrelationshipwithal‐ShabaabinSomalia,primarilyintermsoftraining.160NurreportedlytrainedinexplosivesinSomaliwiththegroup.161However,linkagesmaybepurelyindividualratherthanorganizationalinthecaseofal‐Shabaab.162

153Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria154GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria155Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sInternationalConnections.”CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐international‐connections;JointSubcommitteeHearing:TheContinuingThreatofBokoHaram,BeforetheSubcommitteeonAfrica,GlobalHealth,GlobalHumanRights,andInternationalOrganizationsandtheSubcommitteeonTerrorism,Nonproliferation,andTrade,113thCong.(2013).(StatementofJacobZenn).http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint‐subcommittee‐hearing‐continuing‐threat‐boko‐haram.156Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria157Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria158Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sInternationalConnections.”CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐international‐connections.159Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria160GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):24.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria161Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sInternationalConnections.”CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):8.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐international‐connections.162Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

FundingLikemanyterroristandinsurgentgroups,BokoHaramusescriminalitytosupportitsotheractivities.Someofthiscriminalityistransnationalandcross‐borderinnature,whileotherformsofcriminalitytakeplaceintheNigeriancontext.ThissectiondetailsBokoHaram’scriminalbehaviorsoutsideitsterroristandinsurgentactivity.WhileBokoHaramisfrequentlypresumedtobeactiveinillicittraffickingmarkets,fieldresearchindicatesthatthegrouphasperhapsnotexploitedNigeria’sstatusasakeytraffickinghub.BokoHaramdoesusenon‐traffickingrelatedcriminalityextensivelyinordertosustainitselffinanciallyandmaterially,includingextortionandprotectionrackets,bankrobbery,looting,andkidnappingforransom.

IllicitTraffickingBokoHaramisfrequentlycitedasanactorintheinternationalillicitweaponsmarket(forwhichNigeriaasawholeisakeymarketandoccasionaltransitpoint).WhilesomesourcesrefertoBokoHaramassmugglingweapons,163informantsbasedinNigeriadownplayedthecharacterizationofBokoHaramastraffickerandemphasizedthegroupasaconsumerwithinthemarket.ThedegreetowhichBokoHaramitselfisfacilitatingthemovementofarmsintoNigeria,versusbuyingarmsotheractorstraffickedintothecountry,wasasubjectofsomedebate.164NoinformantindicatedthatBokoHaramwasengagedinanyweaponssmugglingoutsidetheimmediateregion(i.e.,fromneighboringcountriesintoNigeriaorvice‐versa).SeveralinformantsalsoreferencedindicationsthatBokoHarammaybeinvolvedtosomeextentindrugtrafficking,althoughthegroup’sexactrolewasnotelaborated.165DespiteNigeria’sstatusasahubformultipletraffickingmarketsintheregion,BokoHaramatthispointintimedoesnotseemtobeparticipatinginextensivetraffickingbehavior,perse.166MultiplemodalitiesareusedtomoveweaponsacrossNigeria’snorthernbordersfromneighboringstates.Pickuptrucks167andothervehicleshavebeenused,witharmsembeddedinlegalgoodsorhiddeninsecretcompartments.168Therearealsoreportsofherdsoflivestockbeingused,169withleatheror

163Zenn,Jacob.2014.“LeadershipAnalysisofBokoHaramandAnsaruinNigeria.”CTCSentinel7,no.2(February):27.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/leadership‐analysis‐of‐boko‐haram‐and‐ansaru‐in‐nigeria164GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August21,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria165Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria166Someofthebehaviorbeinglabeledas“trafficking”or“smuggling”inopensourcesmaybeBokoHarammembersmovingthemselvesandtheirarmsbetweenNigeriaandCameroon,Niger,andChadforpurposesofevadingstateactorsinthoselocations.167Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sEvolvingTacticsandAlliancesinNigeria.”CTCSentinel6,no.6(June):14.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐evolving‐tactics‐and‐alliances‐in‐nigeria.168Onuoha,FreedomC.2013.“PorousBordersandBokoHaram’sArmsSmugglingOperationsinNigeria.”AlJazeeraCenterforStudies,September8.http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.htm169Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sEvolvingTacticsandAlliancesinNigeria.”CTCSentinel6,no.6(June):12.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐evolving‐tactics‐and‐alliances‐in‐nigeria.

thatchedbagsattachedtocamels,donkeysorcowstoconcealweapons.170BokoHaramhasalsousedwomentosmuggleweaponsontheirpersonsbecausetheycanfrequentlypassthroughcheckpointswithoutbeingsearched.171

ExtortionExtortionwasamongtheearliestformsofcriminalityadoptedbyBokoHaram.172Thegrouphascoercedmerchantsintopayingprotectionmoney.Multipleinformantsalsorelatedstoriesofnortheasternpoliticiansortheirfamilies,particularlyinBornoState,beingthreatenedwithphysicalharmiftheydidnot“donate”toBokoHaram’scause.173Informantsalsoindicatedthatpoliticiansinothernorthernstates,suchasKatsinaandJigawa,maybepayingBokoHaraminordertopreventtheirlocalesfrombeingattacked.174

RobberyandLootingBokoHaramalsoengagedinacampaignofbankrobberiesinthenortheast.175A2012reportsuggestedthatBokoHaramhadstolenupto3millionUSD,althoughthatfigurecouldnotbeverified.176Whilebankrobberywasofparticularimportanceupuntilthesummerof2013,177ithasdeclinedsincethedeclarationofthestateofemergencyinMay2013.178BokoHaramhasalsoengagedinlootingwhenitattackstowns,villages,andsecurityinstallations.InformantsreportedthatwhenBokoHaramattacks,itsmembersfrequentlycarryoffeverythingofvaluethattheycanfind,includingcash,foodstuffs,toiletries,medicalsupplies,andweapons.179

170Onuoha,FreedomC.2013.“PorousBordersandBokoHaram’sArmsSmugglingOperationsinNigeria.”AlJazeeraCenterforStudies,September8.http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.htm171Maram,Ndahi.2013.“JTF,BokoHaramSuspectsFemaleVigilanteArrest.”Vanguard,August17.http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5952‐XMS1‐JBJ4‐21T9&csi=361894&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true172Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sInternationalConnections.”CTCSentinel6,no.1(January):11.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐international‐connections173Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Governmentofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.174Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria175Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August20,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).5.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf;Soniyi,TobiandSenatorIroegbu.2013.“Nigeria:SevenBokoHaramMembersArraignedforBankRobbery.”AllAfrica,February21.176Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatisBokoHaram?”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace308(June).5.http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko‐haram/SR308.pdf.177Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria178GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria179Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.

KidnappingThesinglelargestsourceoffundingforthegroupmaybekidnapransoms.WhileBokoHaram’skidnapping(sometimesincollaborationwithAnsaru)ofWesternershasgainedsignificantmediaattentionandgarneredforthemlargeransoms,informantsalsoindicatedthatBokoHaramroutinelykidnapslocaleldersandbusinesspeopleforsmallerransomswhichcumulatetosignificantsums.180Asoneinformantstated,“Whenyou’retalkingmillionsofdollars,itisautomaticallythemajorsourceoffunding.”181

ResponsestoBokoHaramNigerianandinternationalactorshavelaunchedavarietyofinterventioneffortstocounterBokoHaram.Thissectionwilldetailtheseefforts,focusedoninterventionssince2009.

LegalFrameworkEarlyNigerianlawsregardingterrorismwerebasedonsection11ofthe1999Nigerianconstitution,whichstipulatesthattheNationalAssemblyisresponsibleforpublicsafetyandorderandcanmakelawstoensuretheirmaintenanceandsecurity.182In2011,theNationalAssemblypromulgatedtheTerrorism(Prevention)Act(TPA),whichmorespecificallydefinedactsofterrorismwhilealsoprovidingaframeworkfortheinvestigation,prosecution,andinterdictionofsuspectsinterrorismcases.183TheTPAwasamendedseveraltimesin2013,largelytoaddressconcernsexpressedbyinternationalanddomesticactorsregardinghumanrightsabusedbyNigeriansecurityforces,aswellastocontinuetopressureBokoHaramthroughlegalaction.184Significantaspectsoftheseamendmentsincludethefollowing:

Delineatingtheboundarybetweenterrorismandconspiracy;

August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria180Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August21and22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Zenn,Jacob.2013.“BokoHaram’sEvolvingTacticsandAlliancesinNigeria.”CTCSentinel6,no.6(June):11.http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko‐harams‐evolving‐tactics‐and‐alliances‐in‐nigeria.181Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria182Dakas,CJDakas.2013.“Nigeria’sAnti‐TerrorismLawsandPractices:TheImperativeOfMainstreamingHumanRightsIntoCounter‐TerrorismAdmimistration.”PaperpresentedataworkshopoftheNigerianCoalitionontheInternationalCriminalCourt(NCICC),Abuja,May14.2.183Dakas,CJDakas.2013.“Nigeria’sAnti‐TerrorismLawsandPractices:TheImperativeOfMainstreamingHumanRightsIntoCounter‐TerrorismAdmimistration.”PaperpresentedataworkshopoftheNigerianCoalitionontheInternationalCriminalCourt(NCICC),Abuja,May14.2.184Dakas,CJDakas.2013.“Nigeria’sAnti‐TerrorismLawsandPractices:TheImperativeOfMainstreamingHumanRightsIntoCounter‐TerrorismAdmimistration.”PaperpresentedataworkshopoftheNigerianCoalitionontheInternationalCriminalCourt(NCICC),Abuja,May14.3.

Specifyingfunctionsandresponsibilitiesofagencieswithresponsibilitiesincounter‐terrorismarena;

ExpandingtheroleoftheOfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor(ONSA)asthemaincoordinatorforallcounter‐terrorismenforcementactivity;and

ChargingtheAttorneyGeneraltoprovideoversightensuringthatallcounter‐terrorismactivitiesconformtointernationallaw.185

Additionally,thedeathpenaltywasaddedasalegalpunishmentforterrorismconvictions,andsecurityforceswereprovidedtherighttoconfiscatevehicles,aswellastoenterandbarpeoplefromtheirhomeswithoutawarrant.186Despitechanges,humanrightswatchdogscontinuetoexpressconcernsregardingtheTPA,especiallysection9,12,26,and28.187

FederalResponsesTheFederalGovernmentofNigeriahasbeentheprimaryinterveneragainstBokoHaramtodate.FederalagenciesthathaveplayedaroleincounteringBokoHaramandrespondingtothecrisesengenderedbythegroup’sactivitiesincludethevariousbranchesofthearmedforces,thePresidency,theNigerianNationalAssembly,theDepartmentofStateServices(DSS),theOfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor(ONSA),theNigeriaPoliceForce,theNigeriaSecurityandCivilDefenceCorps(NSCDC),andtheNigerianEmergencyManagementAgency(NEMA).However,themilitaryhasbeenthedominantactorengagedagainstBokoHaram.Tothisend,theNigeriangovernmenthasincreaseditsdefensebudgettocombatBokoHaramfrom$625millionin2010,to$6billionin2011and$1trillionin2012,2013and2014.188

SecurityResponses

OverviewInJune2009,underorderstoeliminateBokoHaram,theNigerianmilitarydestroyedmultipleBokoHarampositionsinandaroundMaiduguriwithinfantryandartillery,capturedMohammadYusuf,andafterabriefinterrogationreleasedhimtotheNigerianpolice.Thepolicesubsequentlyexecutedhim,hisfather‐in‐law,andBujiFoi,thenStateCommissionerofReligiousAffairswhowasfundingBokoHaram.189AvideotapeoftheseexecutionswerereportedlyreleasedtoYouTube.190Duringthefollowingmonths,achaoticcrackdownensuedinwhichmoreextrajudicialkillingsoccurred,includingthetargetingof

185“Nigeriansenatepassesnewanti‐terrorismactwithdeathpenaltyforoffenders.”NigerianWatch,February21,2013.186“Nigeriansenatepassesnewanti‐terrorismactwithdeathpenaltyforoffenders.”NigerianWatch,February21,2013.187Dakas,CJDakas.2013.“Nigeria’sAnti‐TerrorismLawsandPractices:TheImperativeOfMainstreamingHumanRightsIntoCounter‐TerrorismAdmimistration.”PaperpresentedataworkshopoftheNigerianCoalitionontheInternationalCriminalCourt(NCICC),Abuja,May14.3‐4.188“CurbingViolenceinNigeria(II):TheBokoHaramInsurgency.”2014.InternationalCrisisGroup,AfricaReportN0.216,April3.30.189Last,Murray.2009.“ThePatternofDissent:BokoHaraminNigeria2009.”AnnualReviewofIslaminAfrica,no.10,UniversityCollege,London.8.190Last,Murray.2009.“ThePatternofDissent:BokoHaraminNigeria2009.”AnnualReviewofIslaminAfrica,no.10,UniversityCollege,London.8.

beardedindividuals.191Directlyafterthesearrests,clashescontinuedbetweengovernmentandBokoHaramforcesthatledtothedeathofaround700people.192Duringthistime,securitypersonnelcooperatedwithlocalimamsandothertraditionalrulerstopinpointmembersofBokoHaram.Thepropertyofallegedmemberswasconfiscatedanddistributedtothecommunityleadersthathelpedidentifythem.193Afterthesummerof2009,theNigerianmilitary,mobilepolice(riotpolice),andDSScontinuedtoactincombinationaspartoftheJointTaskForceinBornoandYobestatestocombatBokoHaram.194However,theseforcesconcentratedonthecapitalsofthesestatesandtheareasaroundtheirownbases,whichallowedBokoHaramtoremainlargelyunmolestedinforestedandotheruninhabitedorlightlypopulatedareaswithinthelargestates.195In2011,theNigerianmilitarysentsome3,600troopsalongwithsomeChadianandNigeriantroopstopatrolnorth‐easttownsandpreventBokoHaramsmuggling,butthisfailedasthereweretoofewtroopstoadequatelyguardthelargeborderregion.196In2013,anadditional2,000troopsandairsupportweremovedtothenorthtosupporttheoffensive.In2014,another3,000troopsweredeployedaspartofajointtaskforceofinternationalmilitarycooperationbetweenNiger,Nigeria,ChadandCameroon.197InAugust2013,theJTFcombinedpoliceandmilitaryforcesheadingtheoffensiveagainstBokoHaramwasdisbandedandreplacedbyaspecializedmilitaryunit,198namedthe7thInfantryDivisionandplacedunderthecommandofMajor‐GeneralObidaEtnan.199BasedinMaiduguri,theunitwasinitiallycomposedofatleast8,000troops,including7,000fromarmyheadquartersinYolaandanadditional1,000troopsreturningfromMali.200Thethreearmybrigadesstationedinthenortheastunderthe3rdArmoredDivisionarealsonowunderthecontrolofthisdivision.201AsrecentlyasJune2014,reportscontinuetosurfacethatthisnewdivisionsuffersfromseriousproblems,mostnotablyariftbetween

191Last,Murray.2009.“ThePatternofDissent:BokoHaraminNigeria2009.”AnnualReviewofIslaminAfrica,10.UniversityCollege,London.8.192Alao,DavidOladimejiandAtereClementOlusegun.2012.“Boko‐HaramInsurgenceinNigeria:TheChallengesandLessons.”SingaporeanJournalofBusinessEconomics,andManagementStudies,1:4,8.193Walker,Andrew.2012.“WhatIsBokoHaram?”SpecialReport308,June.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,Washington,DC,4.194Higazi,Adam.2013.“InsurgencyandCounter‐InsurgencyinNorthEastNigeria.”CERI,July.2.195Higazi,Adam.2013.“InsurgencyandCounter‐InsurgencyinNorthEastNigeria.”CERI,July.2.196CurbingViolenceinNigeria(II):TheBokoHaramInsurgency.”InternationalCrisisGroup,AfricaReportN0.216,April3,2014.34.197Dixon,Robyn.2014."THEWORLD;MilitantsstrikeinCameroon;IslamistsbelievedtobelinkedtoBokoHaramkidnapwifeofaviceprimeminister."LosAngelesTimes.July28.198Ross,Will.2014.“DidNigerianmilitarysplitshelpBokoHaram?”BBCNews,January31.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐25978785199Omonobi,Kingsley.2013."JonathanCreatesNewArmyDivision,Sends8,000TroopsAfterBokoHaram."Vanguard(Lagos).August18.LexisNexisAcademic.200"JonathanCreatesNewArmyDivision,Sends8,000TroopsAfterBokoHaram."Vanguard(Lagos).August18,2013.LexisNexisAcademic.201Mutum,Ronald.2013."Insurgency‐ArmyCreatesNewDivisioninNorthEast."DailyTrust(Abuja).August19.LexisNexisAcademic.

officersandenlisted.202Officershaveaccusednon‐commissionedofficersandenlistedsoldiersofcowardice,indiscipline,andmutiny,203whileNCOsandenlistedhaveaccusedofficersofcorruptionandofaidingtheenemybysellingequipmentandintelligencetoBokoHaram.204Additionally,sinceitscreation,thedivisionhashadfourcommandingofficers.205

EvaluationMilitarybuild‐upinBorno,Yobe,andAdamawasinceMay2013hashaduncertainresults,dislodgingBokoHaramfromsomepositionsbutfailingtoaddresstheirstrengthininhospitableandlargeregionsthatincludeporousborderswithNiger,Chad,andCameroon.206Reportedly,NigeriansecurityforceshavebeeninfiltratedbyBokoHaram,particularlyinthenorth,andaccusationsofcorruptionandcollusionbetweenitandstateforcesarerampantamonglocalcitizens.207Intelligencepracticessufferfrominter‐agencycompetitionandmistrust,aswellasunderreporting,poorinformationsharing,andbadrecruitmentpolicies.208Inearly2014,Jonathanfiredallofhismilitarychiefsofstaffstoreplacethemwithnewleadership.Althoughitwasneverclearlystated,thismovewaslikelyduetothepoorhandlingofcombattingBokoHaraminthepast,particularlytheinabilityofthemilitarybranchestocooperateandworktogethereffectively(orsimplyapoliticalmovetoshoreupsupportforthe2015elections).209Despitechangesinleadershipandchangesintheconfigurationofmilitaryforcesdeployed,BokoHaramcontinuedtolaunchsuccessfulattacks,includinggainingcontroloftownsandvillagesin2014.TherehavealsobeenrecurrentallegationsofhumanrightsabusesbytheNigerianmilitary,aswellastheCivilianJointTaskForces(discussedfurtherbelow).InAugust2014,videoevidencewasleakedofNigerianmilitaryandCivilianJointTaskForcemembersengaginginextrajudicialkillings(systematicallycuttingprisoners’throatsatmassgraves)againstwhatappeartobeunarmedcivilians.AnAmnestyInternationalreporthighlightedtheincidentandnotedthattheNigerianmilitaryandCJTFengageinsuchactivity“regularly.”210

202Iroegbu,SenatorandMichaelOlugbode.2014."HowCracksBetweenOfficers,Soldiersin7DivHinderWarAgainstTerror."ThisDay(Lagos).June11.LexisNexisAcademic.203Iroegbu,SenatorandMichaelOlugbode.2014."HowCracksBetweenOfficers,Soldiersin7DivHinderWarAgainstTerror."ThisDay(Lagos).June11.LexisNexisAcademic.204Iroegbu,SenatorandMichaelOlugbode.2014."HowCracksBetweenOfficers,Soldiersin7DivHinderWarAgainstTerror."ThisDay(Lagos).June11.LexisNexisAcademic.205“7thInfantryDivision.”2014.GlobalSecurity.org.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/7div.htm.206Higazi,Adam.2013.“InsurgencyandCounter‐InsurgencyinNorthEastNigeria.”CERI,July.4;Abati,Reuben.2014.“ABATI:Nigeria’soffensiveagainstBokoHaram.”TheWashingtonTimes,July9.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/9/abati‐nigerias‐offensive‐against‐boko‐haram/?page=all207Okpaga,Adagba,UgwuSamChijiokeandOkechukwuInnocentEme.2012.“ActivitesofBokoHaramandInsecurityQuestioninNigera.”ArabianJournalofBusinessandManagementReview(OMANChapter),vol.1,no.9:78.208CurbingViolenceinNigeria(II):TheBokoHaramInsurgency.”InternationalCrisisGroup,AfricaReportN0.216,April3,2014.33.209Ross,Will.2014.“DidNigerianmilitarysplitshelpBokoHaram?”BBCNews,January31.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐25978785210Larson,Jordan.2014.“GraphicVideoImplicatesNigerianMilitaryinWarCrimesWhileBattlingBokoHaram.”ViceNews,August5.https://news.vice.com/article/graphic‐video‐implicates‐nigerian‐military‐in‐war‐crimes‐while‐battling‐boko‐haram

MostinformantsinNigeriacritiquedthegovernment’sover‐relianceonmilitaryandsecurityresponses.Inparticular,manyinformantsidentifiedtheextrajudicialkillingofMohammedYusufasakeytriggertoBokoHaram’sembraceofviolence.211Othercommoncritiquesincluded:

Prevalenceofhumanrightsabuses; Highlevelsofcorruptionwithinthemilitary;and Lackofequipmentandcounter‐insurgencytrainingfortherank‐and‐file.

InformantsidentifiedhumanrightsabusesasasignificantbarriertosuccessinthefightagainstBokoHaram.First,militarybrutalityunderminesthegovernment’seffortstoengageincounter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalization.212Second,humanrightsabusesbysecurityforcesunderminescommunitytrust,makingitmoredifficulttoobtainactionableintelligencethatwouldaideffortstocounterBokoHaram.213Informantswhocommentedonthereasonsforabusesattributedthemtofrustrationonthepartofthemilitary,lackoftraining,andlackoflocalknowledge.214Commentsregardingthemilitary’sapproachtocommunitiesandhumanrightsincluded:

“Thearmy’sunderstandingandperceptionoflocalsmakesthemattackcommunitiesindiscriminately.”215

“Thehigh‐handednessofthecounter‐insurgencycampaignhasfueledgrievancesagainstthestate.Thestateistheenemyofcommunitiesinthenortheast.”216

211Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria212Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Internationalcivilsocietyorganizationengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.213Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria.214Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandpeacebuilding.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August22,2014.Jos,Nigeria;215Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria216Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

“Themilitaryiskillingoutoffrustration,inresponsetokillingofsoldiers.Thishasneverworked;itjustfuelstheinsurgency.”217

“Ithinkweneedtocontinuewiththemilitaryeffort,butthatisnottheultimatesolution.Weneedtoensurethatmilitaryandpolicearenotviolatingrights.Themoresomeviolaterights,themorewecreatespaceforyoungpeopletobecomemilitant.”218

“Youdonotusebulletsordeathstointimidateterroristsbecausetheyhavealreadyembraceddeath.Sotherepressivestrategyiswrong.”219

Informantsalsonotedthatcorruptionwithinthemilitaryisalsoacriticalissue.Corruptionwasseenastakingtwoforms.First,severalinformantsallegedthatmoneyallocatedforarmingandtrainingforcesfightingBokoHaramhasinsteadbeenmisappropriatedbymilitaryandpoliticalleadersfortheirpersonalgain.220Second,informantsexpressedconcernthatBokoHaramhasinfiltratedmilitaryforcesandco‐optedsomemilitarycommanders.221Commentsregardingmilitarycorruptionincluded:

“Militaryleaderspocket$9outof$10ofbudgetforthemilitarycampaign.…Themilitaryisbecomingacriminalnetwork.”222

“They[themilitary]shouldalsoputtheirhouseinorderasthereareelementswithinthegroupsthatcompromisethemthroughgivingoutofintelligencetotheinsurgents.”223

“They[BokoHaram]havesupportersamongthepeoplethataresupposedtofightthem,thatis,themilitaryandothersecurityforces.Andthatisthebiggestproblem.”224

Someinformantslinkedcorruptionandmisappropriationofdefensefundsdirectlytoalackofequipmentandtrainingforrank‐and‐filesoldiersdeployedtothenortheasttofightBokoHaram.225Othersalso

217Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria218Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.219GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria220Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Internationalcivilsocietyorganizationengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.221Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;222Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria223Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria224Civilsocietyactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria.225Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria

discussedalackofproperequipmentandtrainingwithoutlinkingittotheproblemofcorruption.226Thelackofsupportfortherank‐and‐fileisseenasresultinginlowmorale,whichhasmanifestedintheformofprotestsandevenmutiny.227Furthermore,thelackoftrainingisseenascontributingtotheproblemofhumanrightsabuses.Representativecommentsregardingthelackofequipmentincluded:

“ThefirepowerofBokoHaramseemstobeoverwhelmingthefederalgovernment.”228 “Thereissomuchmoney,butsuchapoorstateintermsofequipmentandthewelfareoftherank‐

and‐file,whichexplainsthelackofmotivationonpartoftherank‐and‐file.BokoHaramunderstandsthisandexploitsit.”229

“IthasbeenalongtimesincethegovernmenthasbeenbudgetingfortheupgradingofammunitionsfortheNigerianArmy,sohowcantherebecomplaintsthatthearmydoesnothaveweaponstoengagetheinsurgents?”230

“[W]hentheaveragesoldierinthebattlefrontissayinghedoesn’tevenhaveammunitiontofight,thatmeansthereisaproblemandwehavebeenhavingbillionsofnairabeengivenforsecurity.Whatishappeningtothismoney?”231

Negotiations

OverviewThefederalgovernmenthasalsoengagedinlimitedattemptsatnegotiationwithBokoHaramsince2009.In2011,formerpresidentObasanjoheldtalkswithsomeBokoHarammembersinMaiduguri,passingalongtheirdemandstoPresidentJonathan.However,noformaltalksorconcreteactionsemergedfromthiseffort.232In2012,afterColonelSamboDasukiwasnamedtheNationalSecurityAdvisor,hebegantravelingtothenorthtopersuadecommunityleaderstoengagewithBokoHaramelementsandseekapeacefulresolution.233Dasukimadeitclearthathewasopentonegotiation,butBokoHaramdismissed

226Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August18,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandpeacebuilding.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria227Internationalcivilsocietyorganizationengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.228Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria229Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria230Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria231Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria232“Analysis:HurdlestoNigerianGovernment‐BokoHaramDialogue.”2012.IRIN,November28.http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/analysis‐hurdles‐to‐nigerian‐government‐boko‐haram‐dialogue.233Murdock,Heather.2012.“SamboDasuki‐NewfaceofNigerianSecurity.”VoiceofAmerica,July12.http://www.voanews.com/content/sambo‐dasuki‐new‐face‐nigerian‐security/1403681.html.

hisefforts.234Inlate2012,theNigeriangovernmentbegannegotiationwithBokoHarammembersthrough“backchannels”ofcommunicationtodisarmandde‐radicalizeterrorists,whichreportedlycontinuedinto2013.235TheNigeriangovernmenthasalsoattemptedtonegotiatewithBokoHaramtoexchangemorethan200schoolgirlskidnappedfromChibokfor12imprisonedBokoHaramcommanders.236Inmid‐October2014,agovernmentspokespersonannouncedthataceasefireagreementhadbeenreachedwiththegroup,whichwouldincludethereleaseofthegirls,237althoughBokoHaramlaunchedadditionalattacks(includingabductionsofupto60additionalwomenandgirls)inthefollowingweek.238NegotiationsdidreportedlyleadtothereleaseofChineseworkersandCameroonianhostages(includingthewifeofCameroon’sdeputyprimeminister)seizedbythegroupinnorthernCameroon.239AsoftheendofOctober2014,apresidentialspokespersoncontinuedtoclaimtalkswereongoingwiththegroup,240whichdeniedtheexistenceofaceasefireanditsparticipationinnegotiations.241

EvaluationInformantshadmixedviewsregardingeffortsatnegotiationwithBokoHaram.Somefeltthatthegovernmentshouldhadoptedfornegotiationinitially,insteadofrelyingonmilitaryoptions.242However,manyinformantsfounditdifficulttoascertainhowtonegotiatewithagroupusingthelevelofviolenceofBokoHaram.InformantswerealsosomewhatskepticaloftheabilitytoidentifyandnegotiatewithBokoHaramrepresentativesthatcouldactuallyenforceagreementsamongthemembership,especiallygiventheelusivenatureofBokoHaram’sleadership.Representativecommentsinclude:

“Dialogueisaveryimportantthingbutthenyounegotiatewithsomeonewhenyouknowwhattheywant.NobodyknowswhatBokoHaramwants.Howcanyounegotiate?It’saveryviolentgroup.”243

“Whoarethepeoplewearegoingtotalkto?Arewegoingtonegotiatewithghosts?”244

234Murdock,Heather.2012.“SamboDasuki‐NewfaceofNigerianSecurity.”VoiceofAmerica,July12.http://www.voanews.com/content/sambo‐dasuki‐new‐face‐nigerian‐security/1403681.html235“CurbingViolenceinNigeria(II):TheBokoHaramInsurgency.”InternationalCrisisGroup,AfricaReportN0.216,April3,2014.33.However,Jonathanlaterdeniedthattalkswereinprocess,sayingallcontactwas“indirect.”236Mark,Monica.2014."StudentfirsttoescapefromBokoHaramkidnappers."TheGuardian(London)‐FinalEdition.September26.237Sanchez,Ray,andAminuAbubakar.2014.“Nigeria,BokoHaramReachCeasefireDeal,KidnappedGirlstoGoFree,OfficialSays.”CNN.October17.http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/17/world/africa/nigeria‐boko‐haram‐ceasefire/.238Sanchez,Ray,andAminuAbubakar.2014.“DespiteSo‐calledCeasefire,BokoHaramKidnappingsContinue.”CNN.October23.http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/23/world/africa/nigeria‐boko‐haram‐kidnappings/.239Adamu,LawanDanjuma.2014.“Nigeria:FearsOverCeasefire–HowWeBrokeredNigeria/BokoHaramDeal–Chad.”DailyTrust.October26.http://allafrica.com/stories/201410272349.html.240“NigeriasaysBokoHaramnegotiationsare‘ongoing.’”2014.BBC.October28.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa‐29801187.241“BokoHaramDeniesCeasefireClaimbyNigeria’sGovernment.”2014.BBC,October31.http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa‐29859587.242Academic.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria243Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria244Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August21and22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

Counter‐radicalizationandDe‐radicalization

OverviewUndertheleadershipofDasuki,theONSAhastakentheleadindevelopingcounter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalizationprogramminginNigeria.The2014CounteringViolentExtremism(CVE)programheadquarteredinAbujahasanationalcoordinator,statecoordinators,andlocalcoordinators.ItseekstocounterBokoHarambyimplementingmultiplegovernment‐sponsoredinitiativesthataddressterroristmotivations,grievances,andbehaviorsonthelocal,stateandfederallevels.245TheONSA’sCVEprogramalsohasdevelopedandisimplementingade‐radicalizationprogramforprisoners.246TheONSA’scounter‐radicalizationeffortincludesreligious,cultural,communication,andgovernancecomponents,withmanyfocusedspecificallyfocusedonat‐riskyouth,workinginpartnershipswithavarietyofotheractors.Religiouslyandculturallyfocusedprogramsinclude:

CreatinginterfaithdialogueswithinregionssusceptibletoBokoHaram’sinfluence;247 Implementinganimamtrainingprogramtounderscorethestate’sinterpretationofIslaminthe

faceofBokoHaram’s;248 Gatheringinformationonschoolsandreligiousplacestounderstandhowthesegroupsoperate;249 CreatingadatabaseofIslamicfiguresandinstitutionstohelpauthoritiesunderstandwhich

threatsaremorepertinent;250 EmpoweringresearchtodiscoverandaddresshowMuslimyouthsarebeingradicalizedthrough

simplisticIslamiceducationandmanipulativeterroristleadersinthearea;251 Buildingdiversionaryprogramsforyouththatfocusonextracurricularactivitiessuchassportsor

art,aswellasimplementingmentorshipprograms.252TheONSAhasalsodevelopedastrategiccommunicationsinitiative,focusedonharmonizingthegovernment’scounter‐terrorismcommunicationsandtocounterextremistnarratives.Theprograminvolvesmediaorganizations,civilsocietyorganizations(includingthosefocusedonwomen’sandyouthissues),theNigeriaInter‐religiousCouncil,theCouncilofUlamas,andtheArmyCivilMilitaryRelations

245“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.246“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.13.247“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.248“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.9.249“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.250“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.251“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.4.252“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.

Unit,aswellaskeycommunicatorsingovernmentalministries,departments,andagencies.253OnekeypointoffocusforONSA’scommunicationseffortsisthedevelopmentanddeploymentofcounter‐narratives,including:

Creatingadatabaseofreligiousmaterialthatcanactasacounter‐narrativetoBokoHaram’sradicalreligiousbeliefs;

Buildinga“rapidresponsemediateam”willbecreatedtoquicklyandeffectivelycounterextremistmessagesinprint,electronicandonlinemedia;254

Persuadinglocalleaderstospeakoutagainstviolentextremism;255 DeployingTVandradiomessagesthatpromoteacounter‐narrativetoBokoHaramby

delegitimizingtheirideologies/causesandallowingterroristvictimstovoicetheiroutrage; GeneratinganddistributingTVdocumentaries,radiosongs,andIslamicaudiotapeswithreligious

teachingsthatactascounter‐narrativestoBokoHaram;256 DesigningtextmessageprogramstodisseminateSMSmessagesfromtheQuranandHadiththe

denounceBokoHaramandadvocatepeaceandtolerance; Supportingpressconferences,mothersandstudentreligiousgroupstospeakoutagainstviolence

andradicaljihad;257 Offeringcounter‐narrativesonlineandinpersonthatcountertheideologiestaughttoNigerian

youthsaspartofBokoHaram’srecruitment; Developingchildren‐orientedmediaprogrammingthatseekstodelegitimizeBokoHaram’s

propagandathroughrationalexercisesthroughsimplisticmediasuchascartoons,books,andgames.258

Additionally,theONSAworkswiththemediathrough“workshops,seminarsandperiodicmeetings”toreiteratethethreatsofBokoHaramandensurethemediaisreportingappropriatelyonsecurityissues.259Theofficeisalsoimplementingan18‐monthmediacampaignthatseekstoaddressissuesof“nationalidentity,tolerance,interfaithandcommunityresilience.”260Finally,someaspectsoftheCVEprogramfocusonimprovinggovernanceinaffectedareas.Oneprogramseekstoworkwithlawenforcementtocreatenewmeansofcommunitypolicingandcitizen/law‐

253“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.15.254“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.14.255“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.256“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.14.257“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.4.258“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.10.259“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.9.260“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.14.

enforcementcooperation.261Anotherendeavorstoimproveengagementwithcommunitiesandgovernment‐localinteractions.262Inadditiontoitscounter‐radicalizationprogramming,theONSAhastakentheleadondevelopingandimplementingprisonerde‐radicalizationprogramsforconvictedandsuspectedterroristsalreadyincustody.Thisincludes:

Establishingscreeningpoliciesforprisonworkerstohelpthemassessdegreeofradicalizationwithintheprisonpopulation;

Creationofunitstohandleterroristsuspectsandprisonersseparatefromregularcriminals; Provisionofspecializedtrainingforunitsdealingwithterroristsuspectsandprisoners; Trainingandemploymentofspecialists,includingimams,religiousscholars,psychologists,and

socialworkers,toprovidereligiousre‐education,counseling,andtrainingtoprisoners; Provisionofbasiceducationandvocationaltrainingtoprisoners,alongwithdevelopmentof

economicskills; Implementationofasportsandartsprogram;and Developmentofanafter‐careprogramforindividualsthatrenounceterrorism,focusedon

providingpsychosocialandeconomicsupportfortheirre‐integrationintoNigeriansociety.263TheONSAworkscloselywiththeNigerianPrisonsServiceonde‐radicalizationprogramming.Additionally,theofficeinvolvesIslamicleaders,thePsychologicalSocietyofNigeria,aswellaslocalandinternationalNGOs.264

EvaluationThemajorityofinformantsweresupportiveofcounter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalizationprogramming,265althoughsomebelievedthegovernmenthastakentoolongtodevelopandimplement

261“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.8.262“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.9.263“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.11‐12.264“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.13.265Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandsensitization.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria

it.266InformantsalsohadverypositiveopinionsregardingtheroleoftheONSA,althoughsomefearedthattheoffice’seffortswouldfaceresistancebymilitaryleaders.Additionally,atleastafewinformantsquestionedthetractiontheONSAhadwiththePresidency.However,ofalltheresponseeffortsdiscussedbyinformants,theONSA’sprogrammingwasuniformlyseenasthebestconceivedandwithsignificantpotentialtoeffectlong‐termchangeifimplementedfully.Somerepresentativecommentsregardingcounter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalizationprogramminginclude:

“Ittooktoolongtodevelopacounter‐terrorismpolicy.Thecurrentpolicyisgood,withanemphasisonasoftapproach.Itskeyelementsofasoftapproach,includingcounter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalization,areveryimportant.De‐radicalization–actuallychangingtheideology–issignificant,butcounter‐radicalizationalsoimportant.”267

“Weneedtoimplementde‐radicalizationprograms,especiallyofyoungpeoplearrestedandinjail.Weneedtoengageyoungpeopleindifferentcommunitiespriortoradicalization.”268

“Thereisaneedtouseasofterapproachasacomplimentarystrategyattherationof30:70oratmost40:60withmoreofde‐radicalization.Ifthey[BokoHaramsupportersandmembers]arede‐radicalized,thechainisbrokenandgraduallytheirrecruitmentdriveswillwane.Theinsurgentsthatarecapturedshouldbemeaningfullyengagedthroughloveanddialogue.PeoplelikeSheikhAlbaniandSheikhJaafarweresupposedtobeengagedinade‐radicalizationpolicybythegovernment,buttheywerenot[engagedbygovernment]andtheinsurgentseventuallykilledthem.Whilethatisbeingdoneadetailedengagementstrategyforde‐mobilizationshouldalsobeinitiated.Thereisaneedtousethemonies,forexamplethemoniesusedtotraintheNigerDeltamilitants,toestablishtrainingcentersinNigeriawherethepeoplewillbetrainedandawholelotofotherswillbenefitfromthemaswell.”269

“Thepolicyisheavilyderivedfromrigorousresearchonde‐radicalization,counter‐radicalization,strategiccommunication,etc.Forme,thebigquestionisthebuy‐in.TowhatextentdoestheONSAhavetractioninthesystem?I’venotseenitinfluenceNigerianbehavioratall.”270

“TheNSApolicyofder‐adicalizationissound.Ittooktwoyearstodevelop,butisn’tyetimplemented.Thatistheonlyone[policythathasbeenwell‐conceived].”271

Thesoftapproachis“dealingwithrootcauses/driversoftheentireissue:whatturnsyouthtoviolenceextremism;whatcausesradicalization;howtodealwithrecruitmentbase.Itisintelligenceandresearchdriven.Lotsofresearchhasbeencommissionedtounderstandwhatthe

266Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.267Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria268Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.269GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria270Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria271Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.

issuesareandproperlyapplysolutions.SomeofthatworkNSRP[NigeriaStabilityandReconciliationProgramme]isworkingonwithONSA.Akeyaspectdealswithde‐radicalization–ONSAhascommissionedquiteanumberofstudies.Also,thereisaunitthatdealswithstrategiccommunication.Foralongtime,theseguys[BokoHaram]havestolenthenarrative.Therewasnocounter‐narrative,muchlesspositivemessaging.They’re[ONSA]workingwithreligiousclericssoyoucandealwiththataspectofBokoHaram,becausewronginterpretationofreligionhasbeencoreoftherecruitmentbase.”272

VictimSupport

OverviewNEMAistheprimaryactorwithinthisspace,focusingontheprovisionofhumanitarianrelieftovictimsofviolence,especiallydisplacedpopulations.ThePresidency,throughthePresidentialInitiativefortheNorthEast(PINE),andtheONSAalsohavelimitedprogrammingforvictimsupport.Violenceinthenortheastdisplacedapproximately400,000peoplebetweenJanuaryandJuly2014,accordingtoNEMA.273NEMAhassetupIDPcampsinBorno,274Yobe,Adamawa,275andGombe.276However,fewofthedisplacedresideincamps,choosinginsteadtostaywithhostfamilies(sometimesfriendsorfamilymembers)inurbanareasorsouthernstates.277Manyofthehostfamiliesandcommunitiesinthenortheastalreadyexperiencehighlevelsofpoverty,withthepresenceofIDPsstrainingresourcesandresultinginfoodinsecurity.278NEMAprovideshumanitarianrelief(includingfood,sanitationsupplies,educationalservices,andhealthservices),butitsaccesstoIDPsishamperedbothbytheirdispersionandbythelevelofinsecurityinthenortheast,particularlyBorno.279ThePresidentialInitiativefortheNorthEast(PINE,discussedinmoredetailbelow)incorporatestheVictimsSupportFund.Launchedin2014,thefundprovideseconomicassistancetofamilieswhohave

272Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandsensitization.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria273Olugbode,Michael.2014.“BokoHaram:400,000PersonsInternallyDisplacedinNortheast,SaysNEMA.”ThisDayLive,August13.http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko‐haram‐400‐000‐persons‐internally‐displaced‐in‐northeast‐says‐nema/186235/.274“CholeraKills5BornoResidentsDisplacedbyBokoHaram.”2014.PremiumTimes,August2.https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/165950‐cholera‐kills‐5‐borno‐residents‐displaced‐by‐boko‐haram.html.275Olugbode,Michael.2014.“BokoHaram:NEMADelivers3TruckloadsofReliefMaterialstoAdamawaIDPs.”ThisDayLive,September13.http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko‐haram‐nema‐delivers‐3‐truckloads‐of‐relief‐materials‐to‐adamawa‐idps/188932/.276“9DisplacedBornoWomenGiveBirthInGombeCamp.”2014.BizWatchNigeria,September5.http://bizwatchnigeria.ng/9‐displaced‐borno‐women‐give‐birth‐in‐gombe‐camp/277“NeedtoRampUpAidResponsesinNigeria’sViolence‐TornNortheast.”2014.IRIN,April22.http://www.irinnews.org/report/99971/need‐to‐ramp‐up‐aid‐response‐in‐nigeria‐s‐violence‐torn‐northeast.278OCHA.2014.“NortheastAssessmentRevealsDireSituationinNortheast.”HumanitarianBulletinNigeria,June.http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HB%20Nigeria%20JUNE%20FINAL.pdf.279Abdul’Aziz.2014.“Ambush,AttacksHamperNEMA’sWorkinAdamawa,Borno,Yobe.”Blueprint,May21.http://www.blueprint.ng/2014/05/21/ambush‐attacks‐hamper‐nemas‐work‐in‐adamawa‐borno‐yobe/.

lostmemberstoBokoHaramattacks.280Afteran18‐monthdevelopmentprocess,theONSAisalsostartingtoimplementprogrammingtoprovidepsychosocialsupportforvictimsofviolence,focusingonthediagnosisandtreatmentofpost‐traumaticstressdisorder(PTSD).TheofficehasestablishedaninstituteonPTSD,whichservesastheumbrellaforthethree‐tierprogram.TheinstituteisnowincludedintheNigerianmentalhealthprogram,meaningprovidersarerequiredtohavetraininginPTSD.Theofficeisinvolvedintrainingfront‐linehealthworkersineveryNigerianstate,aswellasdevelopingareferralsystem.APTSDclinicwassetupinKanoin2014,oneofseveralplanned.TheONSAisalsoestablishingcentersofexcellenceinsixgeopoliticalzones.281

EvaluationIndiscussingvictimsupport,informantsfocusedontheprovisionofhumanitarianassistancetomeetthebasicneedsofdisplacedpersonsandonpsychosocialsupportforvictimsofviolence.Theredidseemtobelessawarenessamongcivilsocietyinformantsofemergentgovernmenteffortsforthelatter.Regardinghumanitarianassistance,informantsbelieveditneededtobeextended,especiallytoensurethatdisplacedpersonsresidingoutsideofcampsreceivedadequatesupport.However,informantsdidnotcriticizeNEMAoritspartnersintheircurrentandpreviouseffortstoprovidehumanitarianaidtothesepopulations.Representativecommentsregardingvictimsupportincluded:

“Thehumanitarianaspectshouldbehuge.Securitymaybeparamount,butthehumanitarianisalsoveryimportant.Thereisarefugeeproblem,acholeraoutbreak,lackofaccesstothebasics–food,health,etc.isverypoor.Howdoyougethelptothecommunities?Itisverydifficult.Refugeesarenotjustincamps.Refugeesarealsolivinginprivatehouses/homes.Whatformofassistanceforthose?Successdependsonhowwellresourcesarechanneled.…Humanitarianassistancecannotbeconstrainedjusttocamps.”282

“Verylittleemphasisonvictimsupportorvictimprotection.”283 “Now,thereismoreemphasisonvictimsupport.But,whatdoesvictimsupportmean?Whatwill

theprogramlooklike?Whatwillbethefocus,andwhatistheroleofcivilsociety,oftheprivatesector?Howwillsecurityforcesprovideprotectionforavictimsupportprogram?”284

“Anotherimportantpolicyneededisadeliberatepolicyaimedataddressingtheneedsoftraumavictims.”285

280“JonathanPromisesEconomicBoomForNorth‐EastToEndBokoHaram.”NewspotNigeria,October,2014.http://www.newspotng.com/jonathan‐promises‐economic‐boom‐north‐east‐end‐boko‐haram/281Governmentsecurityofficial.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August27,2014.Abuja,Nigeria282Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria283Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria284Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria285Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria

“Onethingisthatpsychosocialsupportisalmostmissing.Thissupporthastobecontext‐specific,thekindofcommunitydeterminesitneeds.Wecan’twaituntilthepost‐conflictperiodtobeprovidingthis.”286

DevelopmentalResponses

OverviewThePresidencyistheprimarydriveroffederaldevelopmentaleffortsinresponsetotheinsurgencyinthenortheast.TheONSA’sCVEprogramalsoincludessomedevelopmentaleffortsfocusedonsupportingsmallbusinessesandjobcreation.287In2014,JonathanannouncedaplancalledthePresidentialInitiativefortheNorthEast(PINE),whichwillseektoalleviatetheeconomicmotivationsbehindterrorism,suchaspovertyandilliteracy.288Thisinitiativewillserveasanumbrellaforsomepreviouseffortsaswellasintroducenewprogramming.Theplanseekstofast‐trackeconomicgrowthintheregion.289SpecificeffortsunderthePINEumbrellaincludea$2.3billiondollarprogramtoboostdomesticsugarandriceproductioninordertoeaserelianceonimports.290PINEisalsoprovidinganestimated$187.5milliondollarsforrebuildingschoolsandotherpublicbuildingsdestroyedbyBokoHaramandthefightinginthenortheast,with$60millionprovidedbythefederalgovernmentwhiletherestwascontributedbytheprivatesector,foreigngovernments,andanonymousindividuals.291Thefederalgovernmentisalsofunding,inpart,theSafeSchoolsInitiativethatwasinitiatedin2014inthenortheasttoensuresafetywithinschools.292

EvaluationDevelopmentaleffortsaredifficultinthefaceofBokoHaramviolenceinthenortheast.Informants,however,routinelycitedtheneedformoredevelopmentalresponsestoBokoHaram,aswellasattributingtheriseofBokoHaraminparttodevelopmentalneglectofthenortheasternregion.Informantsfocusedprimarilyonthethemeofgoodgovernance,aswellaseducationandpovertyalleviation.

286Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria287“Nigeria’sCVEProgram:ChangingMindsandInfluencingCommunities.”OfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor,FederalRepublicofNigeria,2014.9.288“JonathanPromisesEconomicBoomForNorth‐EastToEndBokoHaram.”NewspotNigeria,October,2014.http://www.newspotng.com/jonathan‐promises‐economic‐boom‐north‐east‐end‐boko‐haram/289“JonathanPromisesEconomicBoomForNorth‐EastToEndBokoHaram.”NewspotNigeria,October,2014.http://www.newspotng.com/jonathan‐promises‐economic‐boom‐north‐east‐end‐boko‐haram/290Wallis,William.2014.“BlightedeconomyinNigeria’snorthfuelsbrutalinsurgency.”TheFinancialTimes,May.http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1fc5b242‐daa7‐11e3‐a448‐00144feabdc0.html#axzz3FOSVVS6b291“Nigeriatolaunch$187.5mnfundforBokoHaramvictims.”WorldBulletin,July10,2014.http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/140401/nigeria‐to‐launch‐1875mn‐fund‐for‐boko‐haram‐victims292“JonathanPromisesEconomicBoomForNorth‐EastToEndBokoHaram.”NewspotNigeria,October,2014.http://www.newspotng.com/jonathan‐promises‐economic‐boom‐north‐east‐end‐boko‐haram/

TypicalresponsesregardingdevelopmentalneglectofthenortheastasfuelingtheBokoHaraminsurgencyincluded:

“TheNigeriangovernmenthasreportedlyfailedataddressingthesocio‐economicplights,politicalgrievances,andlackofphysicalsecurityformostlocalsinNorthernNigeriaandareasundertheinfluenceofBokoHaram.”293

“Thestatehadnosystematicdesigntodealwithunemployment,poverty,illiteracy,socialmarginalization.YoucanhavenowinBornoState,61%ofchildrennotgoingtoschool.Thatiswhatiscreatinganarmyofyoungpeoplereadytocarryarms.Povertymakesthemvulnerable,susceptibletomanipulationtotakeuparms.…Ithinkweneedtocontinuewiththemilitaryeffort,butthatisnottheultimatesolution.”294

Characteristicresponsesregardingtheneedtoincreaseeffortstodevelopandintegratethenortheasternstatesincluded:

“Anypolicythatwillnottemperwiththebeliefsystemorchangetheinnercoreofthegrouporaddressunderlyingconditionslikepovertyandthevulnerabilityofthepeoplethatbecomemembers,thatwillnotengagethecommunitiesandisbasedonformsofdiscrimination,iswastingitstime.Itwillnotsucceed.Thereisneedtotalkaboutresilience,solvepovertyandforthecommunitiestobevigilantintheirneighborhoods.”295

“Developmentprojectsshouldalsobeprioritizedbecauseifthereisdevelopment,theBokoHaramideologywillbeeffectivelycounteredanditwillloseitssympathies.”296

“Thegovernmentneedstoemployastickandcarrotapproachtotheissue,suchthathasworkedintheNigerDelta.Thereisaneedforthegovernmenttoalsomakeeffortstoreducepovertyandalsotrytogivethepeopleasenseofbelongingandastakeinpeace.…Thereissomuchstealingingovernmenttosuchanextentthatgovernmenthasalienateditselffromthepeopleandtheydonotseethemselvesasstakeholders.Sowhenaninsurgentgroupbeginstoattackthegovernmentandpoliticians,thepeoplewillnotbebothered.…TheymustalsotakemeasurelikeitwasdoneintheNigerDeltawiththeaimofempoweringpeopleindeeppovertysoastoalleviatetheproblemofyouthrestiveness.”297

“Afoodcrisisiscoming.Weneed…toboosttheideathatthenortheastispartofNigeria.PINEisunderfundedforthesizeoftheproblem.”298

“Theotherangle,gettingpositiveeducationtotheyouthandthosewhomaybecomeattractedtoBokoHaram’sideas,tomakethemunderstandthatisnotthewaytogo.Weneedtoempower

293Afeno,OdomovoS.2012.“TheBokoHaramUprisingandInsecurityinNigeria:IntelligenceFailureorBadGovernance?”inConflictTrends,1:40.294Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria295GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria296Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria297Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandsensitization.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria298Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

peopleeconomicallyandwithskillstobecomemoreproductive–thiswillmakethemlesslikelytobeattractedtodestructiveideas.Thisissomethingthatcouldbedevelopedfurther.”299

StateandLocalGovernmentAuthoritiesOverviewThefederalgovernmentcontrolsallsecurityagencieswithinNigeria,includingthepolice.Therefore,stateandlocalauthoritieshaveplayedasomewhatlimitedroleincounteringtheactivitiesofBokoHaram.Furthermore,manylocalauthoritieshavethemselvesbeendisplacedbytheviolence.Accordingtooneinformantwhosupportsconflictmanagementworkinthenortheast,localgovernmentalauthoritiesarefunctionalinonlyafewareasoutsideMaiduguri.300Stategovernments,particularlyBornoState,haveprovidedvictimsupportactivities.Forexample,BornoState’sMinistryofWomenAffairsandSocialDevelopmenthasworkedwiththeUNICEF,theNationalHumanRightsCommission,andNEMAtoprovidepsychosocialsupportservicestopopulationsaffectedbyBokoHaramviolence.301KashimShettima,thegovernorofBornoState,hasalsovisitedaffectedcommunitiesandprovidedsomefinancialsupporttovictims.302BornoStatealsosupportssecurityefforts,especiallytheformalizationoftheCivilianJointTaskForces(CJTF,discussedinmoredetailbelow),byprovidingmonthlystipends.303

EvaluationMostinformantsviewedthecapacityofstateandlocalgovernmentstocounterBokoHaramaslimited,relegatingprimaryresponsibilitytothefederalgovernment.Localgovernments,inparticular,wereviewedasbeingsodisruptedbyBokoHaramviolenceastorenderthempowerless.Functionsthatinformantsdidseeasbeingcarriedoutbystateandlocalgovernmentsincludedadvocacyonbehalfoftheirconstituentswiththefederalgovernment,awarenessandinformationcampaigns,anddistributionofhumanitarianaid.Reviewsoftheseactorsinperformingthesefunctionswasmixed.Someillustrativeresponsesregardingtheperformanceofstateandlocalgovernmentsincluded:

“Thestategovernmentisquitediscriminatinginhowtheydistributethereliefmaterials,religiousdiscriminationintheirdistribution.”304

“Thestategovernmentshaveenforcedtheirsecuritypersonnel;itnowincludeslocalcommunitypolicingusingvigilantegroupscomprisingofresidentsofthelocalcommunity.…TheLocalGovernmentAreashavecollaboratedstronglywiththeirvariousstategovernmentstopassinformationaboutanysuspectedactivitiesintheseareas,Infact,thefederal,stateandlocal

299Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria300Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandpeacebuilding.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.301“BokoHaram:Borno,UNICEFtoGiveTraumaServicestoVictims.”2014.DailyTimes,July20.http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/boko‐haram‐borno‐unicef‐give‐trauma‐services‐victims.302Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria303Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria304Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

governmentshavedevelopedmultifacetedandcollaborativeapproachestocombatBokoHaraminNigeria.”305

“ThestategovernmentshouldputpressureonthefederalgovernmenttopayattentiontocertainthingspeculiartothestatebecauseallNigerianstatesarenotthesame.Moreattentionshouldbepaidontrustbuildingamongthestatepopulaceandstategovernment.Lettherebeopenforumwiththestategovernmentasmanyproblemsarenotcommunicatedtothemainactorsofthegovernment.”306

“ThelocalandstategovernmentsareincompetenttoaddresstheproblemposedbyBokoHaram.Keytotheissueisthefederalgovernmentasthisismoreofanationalissueandmoreneedstobedone.”307

“Thecentralizationofpoliticsdoesn’tallowstatestotakeresponsibility.IntheNorth,thepolicyonroamingprophetsandpreachershasbeenwatereddown.Allstateshavepoliciesthatpreachershavetobecertified–notonlyIslam,alsoChristianity.Theyarenotbeingenforced.”308

Somerespondentsalsoremarkedonhowpoorperformanceinthepastbystateandlocalgovernmentsmakeeffectiveresponsenowmuchmoredifficult.Someillustrativeresponsesinthisveinincluded:

“Somestatesarenotalivetotheirduties,forexample,theestablishmentofSEMAs.Ifyoutakeahugesumofmoneytohelpthepeopleyougovern,butdon’testablishanagencyfundsoastobeinastateofpreparedness,howdoyoucoordinateaquickresponseshouldanemergencyhappen?The,ifithappens,whodothepeoplelookto?”309

“Mysenseisthatthenortheasthashadtheworstgovernanceoverthedecades–thathasplayedaroleindeepeningpovertyandcreatingstructuralbasisforthesegrievances[fuelingBokoHaram].Thelargenumberofout‐of‐schoolyouthisapool.Theproblemwiththiscountryisthatwedevelopgreatpoliciesthatweneverimplement.…Whatarestates/LGAsdoingtoensurekidsaregoingtoschool?Theseareas–education,health–aretheirprimaryresponsibility.But,inNiger,justaspooranduneducated,sobecarefulofconclusions.Also,wehaveanalmajirisystem.SignificantnumberofchildreninBornoareinthealmajirisystem;itcreatesapool.Itistheresponsibilityofcommunitiestodealwiththestructuralconditionsthatpredisposetothistypeofresponse.”310

CivilianGroupsCiviliangroups,includingnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGOs),religiousgroups,andothers,havebeenlargelyoverwhelmedbyBokoHaram’sonslaught.Nonetheless,respondentsidentifiedseveralroles

305Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria306Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria307Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August22,2014.Jos,Nigeria308Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinanti‐corruption.InterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria309Governmentactorengagedinhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.310Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

inbothnon‐securityandsecurity‐relatedrealmsthatcivilsocietyhasbeenplayinginnortheasternNigeria,frequentlyatgreatpersonalrisk.Theroleofciviliangroups,outsideofthe#BringBackOurGirlscampaignandthecivilianvigilantegroups,haslargelynotbeenexploredinopensources.Whileinformantsmentionedseveralnon‐securityrealmsinwhichcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)havebeenactive,mostfocusedmoreonthesecurityrolevigilanteshaveassumedinthefaceofthemilitary’sfailuretocontainBokoHaramviolence.

Non‐SecurityCivilsocietyactorshaveemergedinavarietyofcapacitiesincounteringBokoHaram.Theseinclude:

Promotinginterfaithdialogue311andworkingtocounterBokoHaram’sreligiousnarratives; 312 Conductingresearchandreportingresults;313 Servingasadvocatesforhumanrights,goodgovernance,andvictimsupport;314and Providinganddistributinghumanitarianrelief.315

Informantslargelydidnotprovidedetaileddescriptionsoftheworkbeingcarriedoutbycivilsocietyactorsintheseareas.Forthemostpart,civilsocietygroups(bothreligiousandnon‐religious)actaspartnerstogovernmentalactors.Thishasbeenduetoboththerelativeweaknessofcivilsocietyinthenortheast,aswellasthedeterioratingsecurityconditionsthere.Forexample,oneinformantnoted,“Thecivilsocietyistooweakandfragiletobeeffective.Broadnetworkingamongcivilsocietyandreligiousleadersshouldbestrengthened.Suchnetworkscanbeformedthroughfunding.Fundingcanensurethat

311Internationalcivilsocietyorganizationengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August18,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromYobeengagedinhumanrights,women’sissues,andconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.312Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August18,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Religiousorganizationrepresentative.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria;GovernmentSecurityOfficial.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August18,2014.Kano,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria;CivilsocietyrepresentativefromYobeengagedinhumanrights,women’sissues,andconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.313Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August18,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinanti‐corruption.InterviewwithAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria314Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August21,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinwomen’sissues.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August22,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria315Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindemocracyanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August14,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentactorengagedinconflictmanagement.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August18,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

peoplearebetterorganizedtoaddresstheissues.Generally,thatistheproblemacrossthenorththatCSOshavenocapacity.”316Severalinformantsnotedthatthefederalgovernmenthasnotengagedcivilsocietyontheissue.Illustrativeresponsesreflectingthisperceptionincluded:

“CSOs[civilsocietyorganizations]areleftwithnooptionthantoplaywhatIcallamarginalrole,verymarginalroleactually.…CSOscanplayverycriticalroleIbelieveiftheyaresupportedtodoso,iftheyarerecognizedaspartnersinprogressinthefightagainstterrorinthiscountry.”317

“Manycivilsocietyorganizationsandactorshaveknowledgetoaddresstheissuebuttheyarehardlybeingconsulted.Civilsocietyiscreatingawarenessbutwhattheyaredoingislimitedbecauseofthelackoffunds.Theonlywaytoboostwhatthecivilsocietyisdoingisforthegovernmentandthecivilsocietytoworktogether.”318

Security

OverviewTheinabilityoftheNigerianmilitarytocounterBokoHaramledtothedevelopmentofself‐protection,vigilantegroupsinmultiplemunicipalitiesinnortheasternNigeria.FoundedandorganizedinJune2013,319thesegroupsarelargelymadeupofyoungmeninunitsof50to60lightlyarmedindividuals.320Thesegroups,termedthe“CivilianJTF,”havebeenespeciallyprevalentinMaiduguriandworkedinconjunctionwiththeNigerianmilitarytoidentifyandapprehendBokoHarammembers.321Theorganizationpatrols,setupcheckpointsanddetainssuspectedBokoHarammilitants.322Asaresult,suspectedCJTFmembersareoftentargetedbyBokoHaramattacksinambushesandassassinations.323InMay2014,CJTFlegaladvisorBarristerJibrinGundaandspokespersonBelloDambattarequestedthattheirgroupreceivearmsfromtheNigeriangovernmenttocombatBokoHaramandprotectcivilians.324Bythistime,thegrouphadorganizationalcapacityinmorethan25LGAsinnortheasternNigeria.325InSeptember2014,thegovernmentannounceditwouldbeginprofessionallytrainingtheCJTFand

316Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandsensitization.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria317Academic.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August18,2014.Jos,Nigeria318Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria319Strochlic,Nina.2014.“Nigeria’sDo‐It‐YourselfBokoHaramBusters.”TheDailyBeast,May16.http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/nigeria‐s‐do‐it‐yourself‐boko‐haram‐busters.html320Strochlic,Nina.2014.“Nigeria’sDo‐It‐YourselfBokoHaramBusters.”TheDailyBeast,May16.http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/nigeria‐s‐do‐it‐yourself‐boko‐haram‐busters.html321Higazi,Adam.2013.“InsurgencyandCounter‐InsurgencyinNorthEastNigeria.”CERI,July.3.322Strochlic,Nina.2014.“Nigeria’sDo‐It‐YourselfBokoHaramBusters.”TheDailyBeast,May16.http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/nigeria‐s‐do‐it‐yourself‐boko‐haram‐busters.html323"Attacksonyoungvigilanteskills20inNigeria."TheNewZealandHerald.August28,2013.LexisNexisAcademic.324“CivilianforceinnorthernNigeriaseeksarms‘toprotectcivilians.’”BBCNews,May15,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.325“CivilianforceinnorthernNigeriaseeksarms‘toprotectcivilians.’”BBCNews,May15,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.

incorporatingitintothegovernmentwithmorethoroughoversight.326AlsoinSeptember2014,around12,000volunteersshowedupinMaiduguritojointheCJTF.327

EvaluationTheCJTFhasbeenaccusedofwidespreadhumanrightsabusesandextrajudicialkillings.328Forexample,inAugust2014,videoevidencewasleakedofNigerianmilitaryandCivilianJointTaskForcemembersengaginginextrajudicialkillings(systematicallycuttingprisoners’throatsatmassgraves)againstwhatappeartobeunarmedcivilians.AnAmnestyInternationalreporthighlightedtheincidentandnotedthattheNigerianmilitaryandCJTFengageinsuchactivity“regularly.”329TheCJTFhasalsobeenaccusedofrecruitingchildrentoassistinattacksandspy.330CJTFelementshavebeenknowntocolludewiththeenemyandleaksecretormisleadinginformationtothemedia.331ChiefofDefenseStaffAirChiefMarshalAlexBadehcreatedanoversightcommitteewithinthegovernmenttoregulateCJTFactivities.332TheinitiativerecognizesthattheCJTFhashadsomesuccesses,butthatsomeofitselementshavecommittedhumanrightsabuses,andaimstocounterthislattertrendwithfirmergovernmentoversight.333InformantsgavemixedevaluationsoftheCJTF.ThemajorityofNigerianinformantssupportedthegroup,whileinternationalinformantsweremorelikelytoexpressskepticismandconcernsregardingitsactivities.PositiveevaluationsoftheCJTFincludedthefollowing:

“Forus,inBorno,weallbelievewearelivinginBornostillbecauseoftheCJTF.”334 “TheCJTFisaconfidence‐buildingmeasure.Societysaid‘enough,wedon’twantaBHsiege.’So,

boldyouthsmobilizedaneighborhoodwatch.Theseyouthsneedtobeorganized.…Theyarenowthepartnersofthesecurityagency.Theyhaverulesofengagement.Theyhavesufferedcasualtiesinpast,whichisatestimonythatitistryingtojoingovernmenttorestorepeace.”335

“TheCJTFhasbeenaveryusefultoolforpositivelyengagingcommunities.IftheseyoungpeoplewerenotengagedbytheCJTF,theywouldhavebeenengagedbyBokoHaram.Theyhelpgetintelligenceandinformationforthemilitary.Fromthesignsweget,they[BokoHaram]knowthat

326"MilitaryConvertsCivilianJTFtoProfessionalFightingForce."ThisDay(Lagos).September20,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.327"About12,000Nigerianvolunteer"services"inBokoHaramcrackdown."BBCMonitoringAfrica‐PoliticalSuppliedbyBBCWorldwideMonitoring.September5,2014328Strochlic,Nina.2014.“Nigeria’sDo‐It‐YourselfBokoHaramBusters.”TheDailyBeast,May16.http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/nigeria‐s‐do‐it‐yourself‐boko‐haram‐busters.htmlfffffffffff329Larson,Jordan.2014.“GraphicVideoImplicatesNigerianMilitaryinWarCrimesWhileBattlingBokoHaram.”ViceNews,August5.https://news.vice.com/article/graphic‐video‐implicates‐nigerian‐military‐in‐war‐crimes‐while‐battling‐boko‐haram330Wakili,Isiaka.2014."WatchlistCondemnsAbuseofChildreninNorth‐East."DailyTrust(Abuja).September05.LexisNexisAcademic.331"MilitaryConvertsCivilianJTFtoProfessionalFightingForce."ThisDay(Lagos).September20,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.332"MilitaryConvertsCivilianJTFtoProfessionalFightingForce."ThisDay(Lagos).September20,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.333"MilitaryConvertsCivilianJTFtoProfessionalFightingForce."ThisDay(Lagos).September20,2014.LexisNexisAcademic.334CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria335Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

CJTFconstitutesanimportantinstrumentforthegovernment.Ifgovernmentcanleveragethatresource,injectafewmorecreativeideas,weshouldseemoregoodresults.”336

TheCJTF“hashelpedalotwithintelligence,providinginformationbecausetheyareyouthwithinthecommunities,especiallyinMaiduguri.It’sagrassrootsinitiative.…TheyareabletoidentifyBokoHarammembers.…[M]ostwelcomedtheir[CJTF]participation.Itgoestotheimportanceofcommunityparticipation,whichhadbeenoverlookeduntiltheCJTFmadetheirownspace.”337

NegativeevaluationsoftheCJTFincluded:

“It’sveryscary,theCJTF.IwenttoMaiduguritwicenow.BythetimeIgotthere,Ihadbeenstoppedat20to30CJTFroadblocks.TheCJTFarejusteverywhere.…Formilitary,it’seasyforthemtoabusetheCJTF.Ifyouneednottobeaccountable,sendintheCJTF.Howdotheyjoin?Isthereanyscreening?Forme,ifwedon’tdosomethingwithinthenextsixmonths,we’llhaveproblems.Ipreferthemilitarytotheseguys.Initiallytheymayhavebeenuseful.Butnow,theyarejustscary.”338

“Thecommunitygroupsarenotagoodidea.Ifyouhaveaneffectivearmythatisstrong,supportedinallramifications,usebestpractices,youdon’tneedanysupportfromcivilians,whoareunarmed,untrained.”339

“Iamverysuspiciousofinvolvingcivilians.Itcouldhaveconsequencesforthefuture–engagingyoungpeopleinviolentactivitieswithouttherequisitetraining.…Ihavehearditissuccessful,butIdon’thaveenoughinformation,operationallyspeaking,tojudge.But,Iamverysuspicious.”340

InternationalResponsesOverviewInternationalresponsestotheBokoHaraminsurgencyhaveincludedeffortstodesignatethegroupbyavarietyofactorsasaterroristorganization,militaryassistancetoandcoordinationwithNigeria,anddevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.SeveralcountriesandinternationalorganizationshavedesignatedBokoHaramasaterroristorganization.Suchdesignationstriggersanctionsagainstthegroupanditsmembershipintermsofassetseizureandtravelrestrictionswhilealsocriminalizingtheprovisionofmaterialorfinancialsupporttotheorganization.InJune2012,theUnitedStatesnamedAbubakarShekau,Khalidal‐Barnawi,and

336Governmentactorengagedinconflictresolution.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria337Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria338Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandpeacebuilding.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.339Governmentactorengagedinhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August22,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.340Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

AbubakarAdamKambarasSpeciallyDesignatedGlobalTerrorists.341TheUnitedKingdom’sHomeOfficeaddedBokoHaramtoitslistofproscribedterroristorganizationsinJuly2013.342TheU.S.designatedBokoHaramasaforeignterroristorganization(FTO)inNovember2013.343TheUnitedNationsandtheEuropeanUniondesignatedthegroupasaterroristorganizationinMay2014,followingtheChibokkidnapping.344Intherealmofmilitaryresponses,manyinformantsnotedmilitarycooperationbetweenNigeriaanditsneighborsascritical.InMay2013,ajointinternationaltaskforceconsistingofunitsfromCameroon,NigerandNigeriabeganacampaignagainstBokoHaramundertheprecedentoftheLakeChadCommission.345However,NigerianofficialshavesaidthatCameroonandNigerhavenotcommittedallofthetroopsthattheyoriginallypledgedtocombatBokoHarammilitantsintheborderregions.346NigeriaalsobegansharingintelligencewithCameroonandBeninonBokoHaramactivitythroughitsjointGulfofGuineaCommissionthatwascreatedtoprotectbordersandensurestability.347InMay2014,CameroongaveNigerianairforcepilotstherighttoentertheirairspacewhileinhotpursuitofanyBokoHarammilitants.348Westernpowers,includingtheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,andFrance,havealsoprovidedadviceandtrainingtotheNigerianmilitary,aswellasfacilitatingbroaderpartnerships.InternationalmilitaryassistanceappearstohaveincreasedconsiderablyfollowingtheChibokkidnapping.Nigeriaisamajorrecipientofinternationaldevelopmentassistancefromavarietyofdonors,includingtheUnitedNations,theUnitedStates,andtheUnitedKingdom.ProgramsinthestatesmostaffectedbyBokoHaramviolencehavefocusedonhealthinitiatives,agriculturaldevelopment,andeducation,althoughthesehavebeensomewhatdisruptedsincetheupsurgeinviolence.Thereisalsoincreasinglysupportfordisplacedpersons,whosenumbershaveincreasedsince2013.

341OfficeoftheSpokesperson.2012.“TerroristDesignationsofBokoHaramCommanderAbubakarShekau,Khalidal‐BarnawiandAbubakarAdamKambar.”UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,June12.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/193574.htm.342“ProscribedTerroristOrganizations.”2014.HomeOffice,August20.https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/354891/ProscribedOrganisationsAug14.pdf.343OfficeoftheSpokesperson.2013.“TerroristDesignationsofBokoHaramandAnsaru.”UnitedStatesDepartmentofState,November13.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm.344“PressRelease:TheEUListsBokoHaramasaTerroristOrganisation.”2014.EuropeanUnion,June2.http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2014/140605_01_en.pdf.345Abati,Reuben.2014.“ABATI:Nigeria’soffensiveagainstBokoHaram.”TheWashingtonTimes,July9.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/9/abati‐nigerias‐offensive‐against‐boko‐haram/?page=all346“NigeriasaysCameroonhasn’tfulfilledtroopsurgepledgeoverBokoHaram.”2014.Africa–NewsandAnalysis,October8.http://africajournalismtheworld.com/2014/10/08/nigeria‐says‐cameroon‐hasnt‐fulfilled‐troop‐surge‐pledge‐over‐boko‐haram/347Abati,Reuben.2014.“ABATI:Nigeria’soffensiveagainstBokoHaram.”TheWashingtonTimes,July9.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/9/abati‐nigerias‐offensive‐against‐boko‐haram/?page=all348Somorin,Zaccheus.2014."ArchbishopofCantebury'sAideinNegotiationtoFreeKidnappedGirls."ThisDay(Lagos).June2.LexisNexisAcademic.

EvaluationInformantsuniformlyrecognizedtheimportanceofinternationalcooperationandassistanceincounteringBokoHaram.ThecooperationofNiger,Chad,andCameroonwasseenasparticularlycrucial,givenBokoHaram’spropensitytomoveacrossthoseborderstorecruit,procureresources,andfindsafehavens.France’sdiplomaticeffortsinregardstoitsformercolonieswasalsoseenasveryconstructive.349Ingeneral,militarycooperationandassistancewasmostfrequentlymentionedasdesirable,primarilyintermsofintelligencesharing,training,andprovisionofstate‐of‐the‐artequipmentfortroops.Someinformantsalsomentionedtheneedfordevelopmentassistancetoaddresspovertyinthenortheast,whileothersmentionedeffortstofightcorruptionandincreasegovernmentaccountabilityandtransparency.Characteristiccommentsregardingthesefacetsofinternationalresponsesincluded:

“Whenweneedyoumost[is]intermsoftraining.IftheNigerianmilitarywasworkinghand‐in‐handwithaninternationalforce,itwouldhelpbuildtrustwithlocalcommunity.”350

“Theinternationalcommunityshoulddotwothings:first,theinternationalcommunityshouldappreciatethecircumstancesthathasbroughtaboutthecurrentsituationandembarkonhonestandsincereeffortsforreducingthescopeofsomeoftheseproblems.Theinterventionsoftheinternationalcommunityaremostlyintechnicalsectorsthatseektoassistinstrengtheningthestateinstitutions.Butthereareshort‐tomedium‐terminterventionsthatcanhelptoalleviatetheproblemofcrushingpoverty.Thesecondthingthattheinternationalcommunitycandoisforthemtocomedownheavilyonthegovernmenttodemandthattheyaremoreinclusive,transparentandaccountableandmakethegovernmenttodirectlyinterveneinthepovertyproneareasthroughspecialpovertyalleviationskillsacquisitionprograms.”351

“Thereisrole–obtainingandsharingintelligence,helpingwithadviceingeneral.”352 “BokoHaramisnotinPakistanorIraqorSyriaorAfghanistanorSaudiorYemen.Itisalocal

problem,andNigerianeedstotakecareofit.But,theinternationalcommunityhasnotputenoughpressureonNigeriangovernmenttodotherightthing.”353

AminorityofinformantswerecriticalofthelevelofsupporttheNigeriangovernmenthadreceivedfromtheinternationalcommunity.Commentsrepresentativeofthisminorityopinionincluded:

“Attheinternationallevel,NigeriahasbeenoneofthemostconsistentandpersistentnationsthathasbeenpartoftheUnitedNationsMissioninallcrisisallovertheworldbutNigeriahasbeensufferingfrominsurgencyformanyyearsbutnoeffort.Youcanquotemeanywhere–noeffort

349Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August19,2014.Jos,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria;Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate.August26,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.350CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria351Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinconflictmanagementandsensitization.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria.352Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria353Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedinhumanrightsanddevelopment.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria.

fromtheUNtohelpinanyway;eventheheadquartersoftheUNwasbombedinNigeria,buttheUNhasnotdeemeditfittointerveneintheNigeriacase.”354

“WeunderstandFrancophonecountriesgetsupportwithFrance.Franceresponds.WehavenotseenthatfromtheUSandtheUK.Whatistheinterestifyoudon’tintervene?”355

Alargerproportionofrespondents,whilerecognizingtheimportanceofinternationalcooperationandassistance,critiquedthelackofcoordinationamongdonorsandatendencyofdonorstorespondinanadhocmannertohighlyvisibleevents(suchastheChibokkidnapping)356ratherthanengaginginamoresystematicandstrategicmanner.Illustrativecommentsinthisveinincluded:

“Alltheseeffortscanworkbetteriftheyareharmonizedandcoordinatedeffectively.Thereisanoinformationsharingpolicybysomeoftheactorsinvolvedwithsomeoftheseprograms.”357

“Everybodyisofferingassistance,andwearewelcomingallofthem.But,whoisharmonizingallthesethings?”358

Finally,anumberofrespondentsrecognizedthedifficultiestheinternationalcommunityhasfacedinworkingwithNigerianactors.LimitedcapacityamongkeyNigerianstateactors,reluctanceoftheNigeriangovernmenttoacceptassistance,andfrustrationswithcorruptionandhumanrightsabuseswereallraisedassignificantobstaclesforinternationalactors.Suchresponsesincluded:

“But,they[U.S.military]can’tworkwithtroopswhosehands‘aresoiled,’andtroopsingeneralhavealowcapacitytofight.”359

“Therearetwothingsabouttheresponseoftheinternationalcommunity.Numberone,thereisexasperationwiththecharacterofthecurrentregime.Theyareatalossastowhatcanhelpwiththisregime.Theydon’tthinkithascapacity.Thatpresentsadilemma–howdoyouprovidesupport?Howdoyouintervene?Issueshavebeencompartmentalized–notholistic.Then,thereisfurtherexasperation.Thatisabigproblems.Issueshavebeenraisedanddiscussed;assistancehasbeenoffered,butthenitdoesn’tgoanywhere.Thereisnotransparency,accountability.Wehavetomovebeyondoccasionalintelligencesupport.Intelligenceisonlyaseffectiveasitsutilization.Lotsofwillingnesstosupport,becauseitisinthesecountries’intereststocontainglobalterrornetwork.But,thereisalackofagencyonthepartoftherecipientofsupport,duetotheunderestimationofthethreatandpride.”360

“There’sonlysomuchyoucandoifthesystemcan’torwon’tletyou.”361

354Civilsocietyactorengagedindevelopment.InterviewedbyChrisKwaja.August20,2014.Jos,Nigeria355CivilsocietyrepresentativefromBorno.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August21,2014.Abuja,Nigeria356Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria357Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandconflictresolution.InterviewedbyKop’epDabugat.August19,2014.Kano,Nigeria358Governmentresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August19,2014.Abuja,Nigeria359Civilsocietyrepresentativeandresearcher.InterviewedbyAmyPate,BukolaAdemola‐Adelehin,andKop’epDabugat.August13,2014.Abuja,Nigeria360Civilsocietyrepresentativeengagedindevelopmentandhumanitarianassistance.InterviewedbyAmyPate,Kop’epDabugat,andBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August15,2014.Abuja,Nigeria361Diplomaticsource.InterviewedbyAmyPateandBukolaAdemola‐Adelehin.August20,2014.Abuja,Nigeria

AssessingStrengths,Vulnerabilities,andPolicyOptions

BokoHaram:StrengthsandVulnerabilitiesBokoHaramhasdemonstratedconsiderablymoreresiliencethaninitiallyanticipatedbytheNigeriangovernmentorinternationalactors.Itskeyadvantagesmaybesummarizedasthefollowing:

Abilitytouseungovernedspacesforstrategicretreatandregrouping,includingtheSambisaForestandporousbordersbetweenNigeriaandCameroon,Niger,andChad;

Maintenanceofresourceflows(bothmaterialandfinancial)throughuseofhigh‐levelcriminalactivity,includingrobberies,extortion,kidnapping,andlooting;

Infiltrationofvarioussecurityservicesandcapacityforintelligencegathering;and Superiorandadaptivefightingtechniques,ascomparedtoNigerianforces.

Despitetheseadvantages,therearepotentialvulnerabilitiesthatcanbeexploited.Theseinclude: Growingrelianceonconscription; Dependenceonlocalresources,whichmaybeincreasinglydepleted; Seemingneedtoholdontototerritory,aswellasexpand.

Informantsnoted,withoutexception,thatBokoHaramismaintainingandgrowingitsforcesincreasinglythroughconscriptionandothercoercivemeans.Someinformantsbelievethatcoercionisnowtheprimaryrecruitmentmechanismforthegroup.Thisindicatesclearlimitstothegroup’spopularitywithintheregion.Furthermore,BokoHaram(unlikesuchgroupsasISIS)hasshownneithertheabilitynortheinclinationtobringinmembersfromoutsidetheregion.Conscriptsmaybelesscommitted(andlessskilled)fighters,aswellasbeingmoresusceptibletoco‐optationordefection(iftheyhavesomewheretodefectto).AsecondvulnerabilityisBokoHaram’sdependenceonlocalresources,includingforday‐to‐dayneeds.InformantsnotedthatBokoHaramreliesoncriminality(especiallyrobbery,looting,andextortion)inordertosupplyitselfwithweapons,food,medicalsupplies,andothernecessities.Multipleinformants(especiallythosewithdirectknowledgeofthesituationonthegroundinBorno)notedthatareasarebecomingde‐populatedandthatnormaleconomicactivities(suchasfarmingandmarkets)havebeendisrupted.BothofthesetrendsmeansthatBokoHarammaybeforcedtogofurtherafieldinordertosupplyitself.Thispresentsapotentialvulnerabilityfortheorganization.Finally,theincreasedscopeinBokoHaram’sambitionsmaypresentavulnerability.Previously,BokoHaramdependedonhit‐and‐runtactics.Indeclaringacaliphate,BokoHaramneedstocontrolvillages,towns,andcities,whichbothstretchesitspersonnelresourcesaswellasmakingthemmorevulnerabletocounter‐attackbymilitaryforces.

PartnersandPolicyOptionsBasedonthepreviousanalysis,severaloptionspresentthemselves.First,intermsofpotentialpartnersforengagement,theOfficeoftheNationalSecurityAdvisor(ONSA)emergedasthefederalactorwiththemostpositiveevaluationsfrominformantsandalso,perhaps,themostneedforexternalpartnershiptobolsteritsinternalstanding.TheONSAistaskedwithcoordinatingcounter‐terrorismefforts,butmany

informantsexpressedreservationsregardingthedegreeofbuy‐infromotherkeyactors,includingelectedleadersandthemilitary.Furthermore,theONSAwasseenasusingabalancedapproachthatwasrigorouslyresearched,whileitwasnotseenastaintedbyhumanrightsviolations.TheONSAmayalsobethebestsituatedtoprovideacoordinationfunctionwhichseveralinformantssaidissorelyneeded.Therearealsomultiplepolicyoptions,althoughallaredifficultintheshort‐term.First,basedoninterviewsandopensources,itseemsclearthattheNigerianmilitarywillcontinuetobeakeyactor.However,thesituationinthenortheasthasbeenoverlysecuritizedwhilerank‐and‐filetroopsarebothunder‐equippedandunder‐trained.However,theprimaryreasonformilitaryfailurehasnotbeenalackofresourcesallocatedtothemilitary.Rather,itistheillicitdiversionofthoseresourcestoprivatepurposesthatseemstobetheprimaryproblem.Therefore,furtherincreasingresourcesallocatedtothemilitarywillnotlikelyincreasesubstantiallymilitarycapacitywhilealsoconstrainingresourcesthatcanbedevotedtootherneeds,includingdevelopmentpriorities,whichhavelong‐termeffectsontheviabilityofBokoHaram.Thus,militarycorruptionbecomesanimportantareaforengagement.Furthermore,todate,themilitaryhasbeenlargelyreactive,astancewhichhasclearlyfailed.Whilethisreactivestanceisinpartduetolackoftrainingandequipment,itisseemstobemorestronglyrelatedtopoorintelligenceandtohighlevelsofmistrustwithinthemilitary.Supportingbetterintelligenceandinformation‐sharingprocessesmayhelpalleviatethefirstproblem.However,thesuccessfulutilizationoftheintelligencedependsontherank‐and‐filetrustingtheircommandersandvice‐versa.Widespreadbelief(withsomeempiricaljustification)thatBokoHarammembershaveinfiltratedthemilitarysimultaneouswithpoorconditionsoftroopsmaketrustadifficultobjectivetoachieve.Policiestoimprovemoralecouldthereforebepursued.Finally,intermsofsecurityresponses,theroleoftheCJTFneedstobeconsidered.Giventhefailureofthegovernmenttoprovidesecuritytociviliansinthenortheast,itisnotsurprisingthatself‐organizationofsecurityhasemerged.However,suchexperimentsinothercontextshaveprovendifficulttocontrolinthelongertermandhaveunderminedlong‐termgovernanceanddevelopment,whileexacerbatingviolenceandhumanrightsabuses.Therefore,policiestoreducetheroleoftheCJTFwhilealsoregularizingitshouldbeconsidered.Aspreviouslymentioned,theemphasisonmilitaryresponsehasresultedinotherresponseoptionsbeingunder‐utilized.Counter‐radicalizationandde‐radicalizationpolicies,whicharecurrentlyintheearlystagesofimplementation,needtobesupportedandexpanded.Suchpolicies,whilehelpfulintheshort‐term,arecrucialinpreventingtheemergenceofotherextremistgroupswhichcouldeitherjoinortaketheplaceofBokoHaram.Negotiationsalsocontinuetobeapolicyoption.Givenrecentevents,includingafailedceasefireandShekau’sinsistencethatnegotiationsarenotongoing,someanalystshaveadvancedthatallattemptsatnegotiationshouldbeabandoned.However,whilenegotiationswithShekauandhisinnercirclemaynotbefruitful,itmaybepossibletopromotedefectionsbysomecommandersorunitsusingnegotiations.Thus,negotiationsshouldnotbeabandonedintheirentiretyduetorecentfailures.Finally,inthelong‐term,thenortheastneedstobedevelopedandintegratedintotheNigerianstate.Thenortheast,evenpriortotheBokoHaraminsurgency,sufferedfromunderdevelopmentandalackofconnectiontotheNigerianstate.Manyinformantsnotedthatwithoutamorecomprehensivedevelopmentstrategy–builtandimplementedwithinputfromkeystakeholdersinthenortheast–

violencewillremainaviablestrategyforthedisillusioned,evenifthatviolencedoesnottaketheformofBokoHaram.BokoHaramhasentrencheditselfinNigeria’snortheast,provingitselfresilientinthefaceofpastattemptstodislodgeanddismantleit.Over‐relianceonmilitaryresponseshasempoweredratherthandefeatedtheorganization.Therefore,goingforward,amorebalancedandcoordinatedapproachtocounteringthegroupiscalledfor.

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