Post on 31-Dec-2015
transcript
Building Sustainable Inspection Reforms
Jordan Coordination Model
Wafa’a M. Aranki
June 2014
Amman – Jordan
Work Plan
Problem Definition & Institutional Options
Impact Assessment (Legal, Economical)
Selection of “Best options Presentation to the GoJ
Political decision and legalization
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• Quick Scans ®
• Framing the options
• Analysis – per option• Consultation
• Selection of preferred option
• Draft action plans
• Political decision• Drafting legal measures
Options Considered for the Jordan Case
Option 0: No Action Option
Option 1: Cooperation Agreement / Memorandums of Understanding
Option 2: Coordination Body – Slovenia, Netherlands
Option 3: Merger of inspections with similar policy areas - Lead Agency - UK
Option 4: Consolidated functions into single inspectorate – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
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Option 0: No Action
Cons
‐ Estimated Government cost at $20 M‐ Estimated private sector cost at $60 M
(time, samples , fees, etc)‐ Ineffective visits‐ Expected increase in formal sector
Pros
Law enforcement to ensure compliance and protection of public interest
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Continue working with the current enforcing system without introducing any changes
Option 1: Cooperation Agreements /MOUs
Cons
‐ CAs and MoUs need to be renewed and monitored frequently
‐ Not binding and depends on the inspectorates commitment and willingness
‐ May not ensure sustainability given frequent changes in top management
‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap
Pros
‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M
‐ Streamlined requirements expected to increase compliance
‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process
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Signing cooperation agreements or MoU between two or more inspectorates to coordinate inspection functions jointly or on behalf of each others. Examples are Jordan Food and Drug Administration and Greater Amman Municipality, Ministry of Health and JFDA, MoH - GAM
Option 2: Coordination Council
Cons
‐ May not address the root causes of duplication and overlap
‐ Require political well and commitment to ensure proper functioning of the council
Pros
‐ Estimated savings at $50 M‐ Streamlined requirements expected to
increase compliance ‐ Streamlined requirements expected to
enhance the quality of regulations and efficiency of the process
‐ Streamlined requirements expected to enhance risk based targeting
‐ May not require major restructuring of inspection authorities
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Establish a coordination body responsible for the strategic directions of reform that enjoy the power and resources required to draft policies, execute reforms and monitors performance of the different inspectorates
Option 3: Merging Inspectorates with Similar Functions Lead Agency
Cons
‐ May not serve inspectorates with limited or narrow mandate
‐ Difficult to reverse if proven ineffective
Pros
‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $30 M
‐ Creating a collaborative culture
‐ Enhance efficiency and effectiveness of inspection functions
‐ Optimal use of resources
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Merging inspectorates that has similar mandates under one agency and could include giving the lead agency (e.g. Environment, Food, Safety, etc) the sole authority to inspect certain sectors
Option 4: Consolidated FunctionsSingle Inspectorate Approach
Cons
‐ Requires strong political well and commitment to sustain and finance
‐ Requires substantial change in the government structure
‐ Sudden and transformational change could create confusion
‐ Very difficult to reverse if proven ineffective
Pros
‐ Estimated Savings for GoJ at $60 M
‐ Powerful and influential inspectorate to enforce regulations
‐ Consistent law enforcement system due to common practices under one authority
‐ Expected to enhance risk based targeting
‐ Enhance public accountability and responsibilities
‐ Optimal use of resources
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Creating a single authority where all the inspection functions in the different authorities are moved under a one authority
Complementary Option:Inspection Legal Framework
Cons
‐ Cost of drafting and enactment of a legal framework could reach $3M
‐ Needs supporting enforcement and awareness to execute efficiently and effectively
Pros
‐ Ensures sustainability and maintenance of reforms
‐ Ensures underlying inspection principles are adopted and implemented
‐ Ensures proper governance and transparency of the system
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Enacting a legal framework to authorize the inspection structure, the adoption best practices, roles and responsibilities of regulators and firms, and the like
“Best” Option within the Jordanian Context
Coordination council titled
The Higher Committee for Inspection Reform
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Higher Committee’s Goal
Create a national committee from highest ranking officials to oversee and monitors inspection reform with the following mandate
− Setting policies and strategic plans to improve regulatory delivery in Jordan
− Ensure that reform initiatives are implemented across inspectorates
− Monitor and Evaluate performance to ensure results are achieved
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Higher Committee – Org Structure
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Council of Ministers
Economic Development
Ministerial Committee
Co- Chairpersonship Minister of Industry and Trade and Supply and
Minister of Public Sector Development
IFC – Technical Advisor
Secretary General - MoIT
HC – Secretariat MoIT Inspectorates – Working Groups – Technical Committees
Sec Gen/ DG Agency 1
Sec Gen/ DG Agency 2
Sec Gen/ DG Agency ….n
Private Sector Reps
Identify Reform Priorities
Approve
Form Relevant Working Groups
Define the objectives and scope of the WGs
WGs puts proposals for the HC
HC evaluates proposals
Involved Agencies:
‐ Inspectorates
‐ Higher Committee
‐ Working Groups
‐ HC – Secretariat
‐ IFC
‐ Private Sector representatives
‐ Council of Ministers
HC submits to the CoM
Implementation
Yes
No
Approve Yes
No
Evaluation and Continuous Improvement 13
Higher Committee – Workflow
Jordan Council of Ministers Decree approving the Higher Committee mandate, roles and responsibilities Dated October 24, 2013
Thank You
Questions and Answers