Canada, the U.S. and the Defence of North America

Andrea Charron, PhD

Director and Associate Professor

Centre for Defence and Security Studies,

University of Manitoba

Agenda

1) CANUS defence relationship

2) NORAD in the North American Arctic

3) NATO in the Arctic

3) Implications

What do we mean by North American Defence/Defense?

U.S. used to see a continent; that is changing. Canada has always seen 2, distinct borders.

NORAD = binational agreement

NORAD is mandated to see Canada and U.S. as “one”. Binational means the Commander of NORAD defends North America not just the U.S. or not just Canada.

CANUS Defence Relationship

• NORAD is the foundation. Trust in NORAD has facilitated broader and deeper mil-to-mil partnerships.

• 100+ MOUs and bilateral agreements that facilitate the joint defence of N. America and aid to the civil powers

• Resource quantity vs quality disagreements persist between U.S. and Canada (70,000 U.S. Special Forces vs. 63,000 regular CAF)

• Canadian PM William Lyon Mackenzie King pledged to defend Canada to also help defend U.S. This pledge remains in effect as does U.S. pledge by Roosevelt to defend Canada from attack to defend the U.S.

Joint defence of North America

• Permanent Joint Board on Defense (needs resuscitation!) There are consultations between MCC, CDS/CJCS and other formal mechanisms.

• Joint training and exercises E.g. Ex Vigilant Shield

• Many imbedded senior U.S. and Canadian personnel in other’s military

• Fraternity/sorority of the uniform insulates against political machinations

Similar understandings concerning near peer competitors

• U.S. “emergence of long-term, strategic competition with revisionist powers” (NSS 18).

• Canada “shifting balance of power, changing nature of conflict and rapid evolution of technology” (SSE 2017).

• North American Arctic is not target but throughway

• Differing levels of capabilities

CANUS Arctic Relations

• CJOC/NORAD/USNORTHCOM relationship is stronger

• All domain awareness is goal for both U.S. and Canada

• Managed disagreements although China’s use of “historic internal waters” argument could place pressure on CAN-US NWP disagreement

• NWS modernization and EvoNAD - looking at future of N. American defence of which Arctic is an area of responsibility

• Disconnect between Canadian and U.S. at federal levels concerning severity/causes of climate change (but similar at state/territorial level).

NORAD is reflexively referenced whenever

CANUS relations are perceived as rocky

Mentioned several times in SSE and impetus for following defence announcements- Modernization of NWS- Consolidation on C2- Alignment of CADIZ

NORAD rarely, if ever, mentioned in U.S. documents. Clear asymmetric interest in this binational agreement.

Access to BOTH heads of government is the genius behind the binational command. Canada will guard this jealously.

Canada has a different definition of the Arctic. (North of 600) vs. U.S. Arctic CircleExample of the managed differences/caveats of CANUS relationship

Responses by Canada and U.S.

• CADIZ alignment

• FOL reconsideration (including Thule)

• Trying new C2 arrangements with testing

of NORAD CFACC (Combined Forces Air

Component Commander) based in Tyndall

Florida (CONR – 1 AF AFNORTH)

• New assets and improvements to domain

awareness

Arctic Geopolitics

China

UK and

France

Singapore, India,

South Korea, Japan,

Switzerland

Poland, NL,

Italy Germany

Spain

France

13 Arctic Council Observer states

8 Arctic States

Original concept from Council on Foreign Relations.

Outliers (Belong to only 1 category):Singapore, India, South Korea, Switzerland and Japan

Canada turns to Arctic Council/UNCLOS to mitigate tensions

Historically, neither Canada nor U.S. wanted NATO exercises in North American Arctic

New focus on seams and gaps and globally integrated military planning and exercises might change this.

NATO changes with repercussions

• Return of variant of SACLANT position to

Norfolk, VA (New joint force command for

the Atlantic for SLOC ) (co-located with US

Fleet Forces Command and NAVNORTH)

• (return) focus on GIUK gap

• USEUCOM/USNORTHCOM AORs and

NORAD- NATO coordination to minimize

seams and gaps

Implications

• No appetite to open the binational agreement

• Unlikely to have NATO exercises in N.

American Arctic. GIUK gap is preferred focus

• Strategic ex of seams and gaps essential

• Anxiously waiting for capital projects (NWS,

Radar Constellation, satellite communication)

• EvoNAD (air, maritime, cyber, aerospace,

space, and land) findings will be important

CADIZ as of 24 May 2018

Questions?