Post on 13-Jul-2020
transcript
Case No. 11/09
THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
Claimant:
Denize Lace
Respondents:
Denticare (Isle of Man) Limited (First) (Trading as Denticare Dental Spa)
Denticare Limited (Second)
DECISION OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL
HELD AT: Douglas
CHAIRMAN: Mr Robert Quayle
ON: 12'h August and 2nd November 2011
MEMBERS: Mr David Maddox Mr Maurice Trace
REPRESENTATION
The Claimant represented herself on the first day of the Hearing. On the second day she was
represented by Ms caren Hyde.
The Respondent was represented by Mr Christopher Brooks.
DECISION
The Claimant was not constructively dismissed.
Although the Claimant, in her submission, also sought to be re-imbursed for overtime work
allegedly undertaken but not claimed for, such claim was withdrawn. It would have failed as
no formal claim for unauthorized deductions from pay was submitted within the relevant
time limit.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1. The Claimant submitted a claim to the Tribunal on 30th January 2011 for Constructive
Dismissal. The Claim was supported by a lengthy statement of claim detailing the
Claimant's grounds for making the claim.
2. The Claim was originally against the First and Second (originally designated Second
and Third) Respondents and against, as First Respondent, Mr Colin Hancock, a
director of the two other Respondents.
3. The original First and Second Respondents submitted a Response denying the Claim
on 8th March 2011. The original Third Respondent issued a formal Response on 1st
April 2011 denying that it was the employer of the Claimant.
4. After an application from the Respondents, a Chairman of Tribunals sitting alone on
6th May 2011 made an Order on a Preliminary Point dismissing Colin Hancock as First
Respondent.
EVIDENCE
5. Both parties submitted bundles of relevant documents. Although there were no
agreed bundles, there was a substantial overlap of documentation and, whilst the
basic facts and relevant dates were not in contention, there was significant
disagreement over the interpretation of those events, the various key incidents and
the way in which these were dealt with.
6. It was common ground that the Claimant had been appointed to the post of Practice
Manager to the Respondents' Douglas based dental practice on 24'h September 2008
on the terms and conditions set out in a document entitled "Principal Statement of
Employment Terms and Conditions" headed "Denticare" and signed "for and on
behalf of Denticare Limited" by Annamarie Petsis Jones.
7. The Claimant resigned from the position on 27'h January 2011.
THE CLAIMANT'S CASE
8. The Claimant had submitted a number of lengthy papers recounting her recollection
of events and her interpretation of them. Her written evidence was not formally
submitted but was read and noted by the Tribunal, and was referred to throughout
the oral evidence of the Claimant
9. The Claimant had commenced employment with the First Respondent on 24th
September 2008 at an annual salary of £25,000 on the terms and conditions set out
in her Contract of Employment. She was not clear whether she was employed by the
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First or by the Second Defendant - or by Mr Colin Hancock who was a director and
shareholder of both companies.
10. The Claimant, both in her written and oral submissions, referred first to the non
payment of her salary for January 2011. She acknowledged that her contract
specified that her salary should be paid 'on or around the 27th of each month.
However, as evidenced by her pay slips which she produced, she had always been
paid on 25th of each month. In January 2011 she had received her pay slip on 25th
and then checked with the bank that her salary had reached her account. On finding
that it had not, and having checked with colleagues who confirmed that they had
been paid, she then rang the Industrial Relations Service who confirmed that non
payment of salary could constitute a breach of contract. She did not contact anyone
at her employers and could give no reason for not doing so. She acknowledged she
was angry, short of money and she resigned on 27'h January regarding the non
payment of salary as being the last straw in a gradual deterioration of her
relationship with her employer, the First and/or Second Respondent.
11. The Claimant acknowledged that she had been paid on 28th January, but by then she
had resigned.
12. The Claimant recalled that, at the outset, she had been highly committed and
enthusiastic in her role and had worked long hours to build up the First Respondent's
practice without claiming any overtime payments.
13. She believed the deterioration in her relationship with her employer had started in
November 2010 when, as a result of feeling physically and emotionally drained, she
was advised by her doctor to take time off work. Her state of health had been made
worse by the stress of caring for her new grandchild who had significant health
issues, and a former colleague who was terminally ill.
14. Although she had been offered a sick note, she agreed with Mrs Nicola Bawden, the
Corporate Governance Officer of the Second Respondent, whom she regarded as her
line manager, that she would instead use the balance of her annual leave and some
unpaid leave. Because she believed she had a good record with her employers, her
request for time off was granted, and it was even suggested she should take a longer
period (3-4 months) although she did not believe this was necessary. At the time, she
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expressed her gratitude for her employers' understanding and support and an e-mail
expressing such appreciation was produced.
15. On 9'h December, in anticipation of returning from her holiday in New Zealand, she e
mailed Mrs Bawden and advised her she would return to work on 20'h December. In
her response Mrs Bawden had confirmed that the date was alright, and advised that
her own planned visit to the island on 21s' had been cancelled on Mr Hancock's
instruction.
16. On 16'h December, the Claimant received a phone call from Mrs Bawden advising that
Mr Hancock required her to get a return to work certificate from her doctor before
she could resume her role. She was reluctant to do this not only because she had not
been required to produce a sick note when she took leave, but also because she
knew that her GP would be unable to give her an appointment for some weeks. The
requirement for a return to work certificate was confirmed by her colleague, Mr Ian
Hulme-Rigby, the resident dental surgeon. She responded that, in her view, it was
inappropriate for him, as a colleague, to be discussing her employment situation with
Mr Hancock. Feeling uneasy about the situation, she sought advice from the
Industrial Relations Service who allegedly advised that they did not think a return to
work certificate was needed as she had not taken sick leave.
17. On 17'h December she received a further call from Mrs Bawden who advised that Mr
Hancock would be contacting her over the week-end - but he failed to do so.
18. On 20'h December she arrived early for work to be told by Mr Hulme-Rigby, in the
presence of Amanda Curphey, the Receptionist, to contact Mr Hancock. She had,
again, objected to Mr Hulme-Rigby's involvement as he was not her line manager and
also the presence of a colleague, Mrs Curphey, who none-the-Iess took notes of the
meeting, as requested by the Claimant; these notes were produced to the Tribunal.
19. Having failed to contact Mr Hancock initially, she sought further advice from the
Industrial Relations Service and then at 9.20am received a call from Mr Hancock. She
produced a note of the conversation. Reference was made to her using some of her
time off to acquire further clinical qualifications. When she mentioned that she had
taken advice, Mr Hancock's reaction changed and he allegedly suspended her and
ordered her to leave the surgery forthwith.
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20. Later that day she received a call from Mrs Bawden asking her to hand in her keys
which she did - and the following day she received a letter from Mrs Bawden
confirming that she should not attend work until she had been passed as fit to return,
that the Respondents would pay for a rnedical examination and would continue to
pay her salary during the interim. Two days later she received a further letter
confirrning that Mr Hancock had used the word 'suspended' incorrectly and that she
was not suspended, but was being paid pending her appointment with an
occupational health doctor.
21. The Claimant confessed to being completely confused. On 5th January she was
advised by Mrs Bawden that she (Mrs Bawden) had been told by Mr Hancock to have
no further involvement and not to talk further to the Claimant. She regarded Mrs
Bawden as her line manager so was disturbed by this change in her accountability
and support function.
22. On 21st January she attended the occupational health appointment, and received the
report on 27'h January, but believes her employers received the report on the
previous day. The report passed her as fit to return to work.
23. The non-payment of her salary then occurred, which she regarded as the last straw.
In retrospect she interpreted the Respondents' actions as being directed to secure
her resignation. She believed she had made a mistake by being honest and
straightforward, particularly in explaining her need for a holiday in November and
that, until her January salary had not been paid, she had enjoyed a good relationship
with her employers. The non-payment of salary she interpreted as being part of an
orchestrated cost cutting exercise and a ploy to secure her resignation.
24. The Claimant also took issue with certain matters which had been raised by the
Respondents in their written Response and gave her understanding of the issues
raised, even though these had not formed part of her original submissions.
25. With reference to her need for qualifications, she expressed surprise that Mr Hancock
did not appear to have realized, when she was appointed, that she would need to
uprate her existing qualifications in order to continue to provide nursing and clinical
support which had not been part of her original job description anyway. The
Claimant's evidence suggests that she thought this matter was being addressed by
other staff changes - she did not volunteer any observations on any perceived or
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expressed need for her to undertake courses with a view to rectifying any
shortcomings in her own qualifications.
26. As regards certain private dental surgery she had received, a matter which was raised
by the Respondents but which she considered to be irrelevant, she believed that it
was her right as an employee to have that treatment, citing examples of other
employees of Denticare in the UK who had received such treatment, and denying the
treatment had taken place in normal working hours. In any event she produced notes
of a meeting in support of her contention that Mr Hancock had regarded the matter
as being closed.
27. The Claimant, in a written submission, believed that the non-payment of her January
salary had been a deliberate and pre-meditated act by Mr Hancock to cause her
stress, a malicious act to cause her more anxiety and financial hardship. It had
necessitated her borrowing from her daughter. She believed this alleged motivation
allowed her to claim damages for injury to feelings.
28. With regard to financial loss, the Claimant gave details of her efforts to find
alternative work - the general response had been that she was over-qualified. As a
result she had partiCipated in a course on setting up a small business and had
subsequently established a property cleaning business in rnid-February. A former
colleague (later identified as Mrs Curphey, the First Respondent's Receptionist), who
had initially supported her as a 'sleeping partner', became a working partner in a new
business subsequently identified as 'Broomsticks'. She refuted any suggestion that
she had been planning the move for some time and before her employment by the
First Respondent ended.
29. The Claimant called Mrs Nicola Bawden, described as her former line manager, to
give evidence. Mrs Bawden described her role as Clinical Governance Officer, with the
responsibility to manage and support Practice Managers such as the Claimant.
30. She referred to her brief Witness Statement describing the circumstances of the
Claimant's suspension on 20th December and related conversation. She had granted
the original application for extended leave arising from the Claimant's health issues,
in mid-November after consultation with Mr Hancock. It had always been intended to
be an absence of 3-4 weeks but, on the Claimant's return, she suspected Mr Hancock
did not really want her back.
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31. Under cross-examination she confirmed that she had made the appointment for the
Claimant's health check - it was the first available appointment, and she believed that
all involved were genuinely concerned for the Claimant's health. On 5th January Mr
Hancock had decided to deal directly with the Claimant - she did not know if this was
a result of a perception of an over close relationship between her and the Claimant.
She conceded that Mr Hancock believed she was being rnanipulated by the Claimant,
and even though she believed that was not true, she had no alternative but to step
back.
32. Once she had stepped back from her contact role with the Claimant, she understood
that Annemarie Petsis Jones, the HR manager for the Second Respondent, had
become involved, though she did not recall giving the Clairnant any contact details for
her.
33. Nor could she recall any involvement with the delayed/withholding of the Claimant's
January salary - she was aware that, once a message had been conveyed to Mr
Hancock that withholding could constitute a breach of contract, the payment was
immediately made. She knew that an instruction to withhold payment may have been
made, but not by whom - and she could not recall whether she learnt this before or
after the event.
34. Mrs Bawden confirmed that she had been made redundant on 16th June 2011 and
was no longer in the employment of the Second Respondent.
35. In conclusion and on being asked by the Tribunal, the Clairnant indicated that, if
successful, she would not be seeking re-instatement or re-engagement.
THE RESPONDENT'S CASE
36. The Respondents gave oral evidence through Colin Hancock and Ian Hulme-Rigby,
and by affidavit through Andrew Hitchcock.
37. Mr Hancock gave evidence as follows. He explained the ownership and governance
structure of the two Respondents. He is the owner and a director of the First
Respondent, which trades as Dental Spa, and a director and part owner of the
Second Defendant and of a company called Denticheck Ltd. The Second Respondent
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and Denticheck Ltd. provide professional and administrative services to the First
Respondent, primarily clinical governance and human resources since, as a small
operation, the First Respondent could not provide a full range of services itself.
However the dental services provided in the Isle of Man are provided, exclusively,
through the First Respondent which also employs all Isle of Man based employees. Mr
Hancock acknowledged that the Claimant's Statement of Employment Terms and
Conditions was in the form issued by the Second Respondent to its UK based
employees and had been signed, in good faith but incorrectly, by the Human
Resources Manager for the Second Respondent. He pOinted out that the Claimant's
payslips correctly showed the First Respondent as being the employer.
38. The Claimant was recruited as Practice Manager and to assist with clinical work. It
was known that she had previously worked in a clinical role at Nobles Hospital though
it was not appreciated at the time of her appointment, that her qualifications to work
in a clinical role in a dental practice would not comply with new regulations. The
Claimant worked alongside a variety of clinicians, including dental surgeons and
hygienists, some of whom were employees and some self-employed.
39. The deficiencies in the Claimant's qualification, and her inability to provide services
which were regulated by the General Dental Council C'GDC',) were recognized shortly
after her appOintment, and continuing consideration was being given to the means
whereby the Claimant might obtain such qualification, or how those services might be
provided by others.
40. In mid 2009, Mr Hancock had been approached by his UK based employee, Nicola
Bawden, who provided clinical governance support to the Isle of Man practice,
enquiring what the Respondent's policy was on employees receiving personal dental
treatment. He had replied that employees could receive routine treatment outside
normal surgery hours with the co-operation of other profeSSional staff.
41. In mid 2010 Mr Hancock made an unannounced visit to the Isle of Man on other
matters, and discovered the Claimant receiving dental treatment during normal
surgery hours - she was clearly discomforted by his presence. Subsequent enquiries
showed that the Claimant had booked an extensive course of cosmetic and implant
surgery, having assured colleagues that it was being undertaken with Mr Hancock's
knowledge and approval. The retail value of that work was, in his view, some
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£25,000. He subsequently discovered that she had made certain payments in
connection with the treatment directly to clinical professionals and suppliers which
might be a breach of GDC regulations.
42. He also subsequently discovered that the practice Receptionist, Amanda Curphey,
had also received private treatment without his knowledge, although to a lesser
value. Mrs Curphey has now also left the First Respondent's employment and is in
business in partnership with the Claimant.
43. At the time, he claimed he decided not to make a major issue of the unauthorized
private treatment, being more anxious to build an effective and committed team to
run the Douglas practice. Because he thought the Claimant was good at her job, he
was anxious to retain her enthusiasm in anticipation of an expansion in the dental
practice.
44. Shortly after this he received a message from the Claimant through Mrs Bawden
asking about payment for fees for courses she would need to undertake to continue
to assist with clinical procedures. Although he had paid, principally on success, for
training courses for his staff, he responded that, in the light of the extensive dental
treatment she had received, he felt under no obligation to re-imburse course fees. He
believed that the Claimant was proposing to book herself into a course, but he
subsequently discovered she never had.
45. In or about November 2010 he learnt that the Claimant had been unwell and, as a
result of a doctor's appointment, had been prescribed 4 weeks off work. Subsequent
conversations as to the seriousness of her health led to his agreeing to the Claimant
taking leave of absence. She proposed to take this as a mixture of annual leave, and
unpaid leave rather than relying on a sick note. Although the timing was unfortunate
with the last two months of the year usually being exceptionally busy, he suggested
that, if a longer period of absence was needed he would be happy to agree up to 3
months, not least because he had plans for building up the practice in the early
months of the following year and needed the Practice Manager to be fully fit. He
never saw the sick note mentioned.
46. In conjunction with Mr Hulme-Rigby and the Receptionist, Mrs Curphey, he discussed
contingency cover for the Claimant's absence - discussions which he subsequently
learnt were interpreted (wrongly) by the Claimant in a negative way. However he
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noted the Claimant's effusive message of thanks to him for his support dated 19th
November.
47. In early December he was advised that the Claimant was proposing to return to work
on 17'h December. In the light of the reported serious nature of her health when she
went on leave, he felt he needed to know she was fit to return to work and asked Mr
Hulme-Rigby and Mrs Bawden to advise the Claimant that he would see her to
discuss her return to work when he visited the Island on 17th December to attend the
practice Christmas party.
48. There was some uncertainty as to whether the Claimant would be free to meet Mr
Hancock on 17'h due to an unspecified hospital appointment. In the event, he was
unable to travel to the Island due to adverse weather. Instead he received an e-mail
from the Claimant insisting that she would be returning to work on Monday 20th
December.
49. Mr Hancock was unable to contact the Claimant over the weekend - he attributed
this to a combination of not having full contact details on his mobile phone and a
possibly incorrect e-mail address. However the Claimant had also admitted problems
with her laptop in an earlier e-mail. Because he had failed to make direct contact, he
sent a message via Mr Hulme-Rigby.
50. Mr Hancock and the Claimant spoke on the phone on Monday 20th December, as a
result of the message conveyed to her through Mr Hulme-Rigby. Mr Hancock stressed
his concerns over her health, and his need to know she was fully fit to return. Her
response was that she was the best judge of that. He suggested a visit to her original
doctor, and re-iterated the ongoing clinical concerns but she was obdurate concluding
by advising that she had "taken advice". Since it was clear that she was not going to
be persuaded, and since she had admitted taking advice on her position, he felt he
had no alternative but to suspend her on full pay. This suspension was for medical
reasons but also on account of her insubordination. He said that the conversation was
calm, but that he had never experienced such a response from an employee in 42
years involvement in the dental profession.
S!. He noted that the Claimant and Mrs BaWden subsequently spoke - but the fact of,
and the contents of the conversation were never reported to him.
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52. Subsequently the Claimant agreed to an occupational health examination which could
not take place until 21 st January. He was frustrated that the appointment could not
have been earlier and the situation resolved. However he made it clear that the
Claimant would continue to be paid in the interim.
53. Nicola Bawden, who had originally been a conduit of communication with the
Claimant had become, in Mr Hancock's view, too close to the Claimant. There had
also been an alcohol related incident at a Christmas party which he inferred, reflected
adversely on her. He therefore gave instructions, in early January, that she should
not be involved any longer. (Mrs Bawden had subsequently left his employment). By
this stage Mr Hancock was concerned at what the Claimant rnight do, relying on the
advice she had sought and received. As a result of the disclosure of the internal
memorandum of 6th January 2011, he acknowledged that he was aware of possible
compromise discussions between the First Respondent and the Claimant and had
given instructions to his accounts department to hold any salary payments pending
conclusion of such discussions.
54. To his knowledge the Claimant had her medical examination and was passed fit to
return to work. He confessed he was surprised that there was no mention of the high
blood pressure which he had understood to be one of the causes of her alleged ill
health in mid-November.
55. Before she could return to work the Claimant resigned, claiming that she was not
paid her January salary.
56. There is some confusion in Mr Hancock's evidence - in his witness statement he said
he had not singled the Claimant out for special treatment and thought she would be
paid as usual. In his oral evidence he acknowledged having advised his accounts
department that an agreed departure was in the offing, and to hold salary payments
pending a larger amount being agreed.
57. In fact, whilst on holiday in Thailand, he had received a message to say that the
Claimant had not been paid, and that the Industrial Relations Service had advised
that this would constitute a breach of contract. He gave immediate instructions that
the Claimant should be paid - fortuitously this took place on 28th January, which fell
within the contractual obligation to pay 'on or around 27'h of each month'. He was
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unaware that payments tended to take place a few days earlier, usually on 25th of
each month.
58. Mr Hancock denied he had any agenda to dismiss the Claimant - her departure was
not his objective and, as far as he is concerned, her resignation was orchestrated by
herself. In 42 years experience, he has never been involved in any employment
disputes and, not only would never single out an individual staff member for special
or hurtful treatment, but was happiest when all were gainfully employed, delivering a
good service. However he believed he was not only within his rights as an employer,
but also acting responsibly towards his patients by insisting that an employee, who
had taken prolonged leave for health reasons, was properly fit to resume work.
59. Mr Hancock drew a distinction between a disciplinary suspension and a medical
suspension. Although he believed he was fully within his rights to suspend the
Claimant in the light of her refusal to accept his instruction not to return to work, his
principal concern was clinical - what he described as a 'medical suspension'. The
subsequent intervention of his HR Department which might have lead the Claimant to
believe that the disciplinary supervision might have been incorrect, was taken without
his knowledge, though he believed the motive was to resolve the acrimonious
disagreement.
60. Mr Ian Hulme-Rigby then gave oral evidence. He was a self-employed consulting
dentist and the principal dental surgeon working in the First Respondent's Dental
practice.
61. Mr Hulme-Rigby described his involvement with the First Respondent and with the
Claimant in her role as Practice Manager. He also recounted how he had become
involved in providing the Claimant with complex and expensive cosmetic and implant
surgery. He had been advised by the Claimant that her surgery had been approved at
director level, even though his understanding was that employees were entitled only
to routine treatment. Her course of treatment was performed to the highest standard,
at her request.
62. He confirmed the surprise of Mr Hancock at finding the extent of dental treatment
being provided to the Claimant, and Mr Hancock's assertion that such treatment had
not been authorized - but also that Mr Hancock had decided not to make an issue
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out of it, although he met with both the Claimant and the Receptionist to talk about
the unauthorized dental treatment both had received.
63. After this incident, Mr Hulme-Rigby expressed the view that the Claimant's attitude to
work changed - she showed far less commitment, and was constantly absent, often
without notice or explanation. He believed she took advantage of the absence of any
line management on site, but he recognized her involvement with the former
hygienist who was a close personal friend, and terminally ill - and her grandchild who
had health problems.
64. He also referred to the Claimant's use of the practice computers to book holidays -
often taken at very short notice and without prior consultation. Indeed she had taken
a holiday in October 2010.
65. In mid-November the Claimant approached him and told him that she had various
health issues, including high blood pressure, something which surprised him as she
was not, according to the Claimant herself, taking any medication; subsequently he
was advised that, with the agreement of Mr Hancock and Mrs Bawden, the Claimant
would be taking some four weeks leave of absence using outstanding holiday
entitlement and unpaid leave rather than relying on a sick note, which she alleges
she had been offered.
66. Mr Hulme-Rigby was surprised when the Claimant, just prior to taking time off, voiced
the concern that Mr Hancock was trying to 'get rid of me'. He had assured her that, in
his view, this was not the case - quite the contrary. He also denied that certain
conversations as recounted by the Claimant in her Claim concerning the appOintment
of a new hygienist had ever taken place.
67. After her holiday, which he subsequently discovered had been in New Zealand, he
received a copy of her e-mail of 9th December intimating her intention to return to
work on 20th December, having initially suggested 17th December. He expressed the
view that she deliberately deferred the start date to avoid meeting with Mr Hancock
who, she knew, would be attending the practice Christmas party.
68. Mr Hulme-Rigby recounted his recollection of the events or 17th and 20th December
he was surprised that, in the light of the Claimant's alleged unavailability to meet Mr
Hancock on the afternoon of 17th
, he had seen her at the Receptionist's home on 17th
December. He also explained how he had passed a message to the Claimant, at Mr
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Hancock's request, that she should not return to work on 20th December - and how
he had insisted on the Receptionist's presence when he conveyed the message to the
Claimant, to ensure the conversation was witnessed. He was surprised at the
Claimant's objection to his involvement as she had never objected to his involvement
in an intermediary or quasi-management role in the past.
69. He was not party to subsequent conversations between the Claimant and Mr Hancock
- but was aware that the Claimant had not been allowed to return to work. He was
also aware that the Claimant resigned at the end of January. His only subsequent
meeting with her was when she called to collect her possessions on 4th February, and
ignored him.
70. He subsequently was advised of the Receptionist's resignation to join the Claimant in
a new business venture, Broomsticks. He suspected they had been planning the
venture for some time.
71. Under cross-examination Mr Hulme-Rigby admitted he was nervous of alienating the
other staff as he knew they were aware of some problems he had experienced with
the General Dental Council which involved certain restrictions being placed on his use
of a particular medication. He also conceded that he had foolishly allowed staff to
know his computer access code which would have enabled them to access his dental
treatment records.
72. Referring to the alleged deletion of certain of the Claimant's dental records on 21st
July, as explained in the affidavit of Mr Hitchcock, he acknowledged that any of the
staff could have used his access code to carry out the deletion - he himself had not
been in surgery that day, playing golf with family members.
73. The Respondents submitted a sworn Affidavit from Mr A Hitchcock, the IT manager of
the IT Respondent. UtiliSing technology, Mr Hitchcock had ascertained that certain
computer records setting out details of appointments involving the Claimant and the
treatment she had received, had been deleted from the First Respondent's computer
system on 21st July 2010.
74. Mr Hitchcock was not present to give oral evidence. Accordingly his evidence was not
tested. The Claimant did not contest that the records might have been deleted, but
questioned the relevance of the allegations, and denied that she had been in the
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surgery on the day they were apparently deleted. She denied that she had deleted
the records.
75. The Respondent also produced an internal memorandum from Annamarie Petsis
Jones to Mr Hancock dated 6th January 2011. Part of that memorandum was
redacted. The Claimant challenged the production of a part redacted document and
insisted that, if it was to be produced, it should be fully disclosed. The Tribunal gave
the Claimant the opportunity to view the memorandum in full and after doing so, she
agreed to its disclosure without the paragraph redacted. This paragraph referred to
negotiations over the possible agreed termination of the Claimant's employment and
the different perceptions of the Claimant and the Industrial Relations Service over
how much compensation would have been payable. Under normal circumstances,
such discussions would have been privileged, but since the Claimant agreed, indeed
insisted that the whole content of the memorandum should be disclosed, the Tribunal
has no alternative but to note that discussions were clearly taking place in early
January on the subject. No evidence was given as to the reason why such
negotiations had not reached a conclusion by January 28th although the
memorandum makes it clear that the Claimant instigated them as an alternative to a
claim for constructive dismissal.
THE QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE
76. On the first day of the Hearing, the Claimant did not have the benefit of legal
representation. Nonetheless she presented her case cogently and clearly.
77. There was little disagreement over the basiC facts in this matter - there was,
however, significant disagreement over the relevance, interpretation and application
of those facts. Inevitably both parties gave evidence of the way in which events
unfolded from their own perspectives. Very little corroboration could be obtained
from the evidence of the other witnesses since all, to a greater or lesser degree, had
a possible bias which might have affected their interpretation of what happened. Mrs
Bawden, the Claimant's witness had, herself, left the Respondents' employment
through redundancy: the Receptionist, Mrs Curphey, was not called despite her
involvement in the events recounted - but her evidence may have proved of little
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help as she is now in business with the Claimant and was also involved in receiving
expensive dental treatment, possibly without proper authority. Mr Hulme-Rigby is still
under contract to the First Respondent and, as was admitted, has had some problems
with the GDC which might have influenced his stance on certain matters. The
Tribunal has concluded that the evidence of each has to be taken with a degree of
awareness that it might not be wholly objective.
78. As for the Claimant and Mr Hancock, both struck the Tribunal as forceful individuals
who believed passionately in the rightness of their actions. Their evidence was,
inevitably, selective and sometimes appeared less frank than would have been
helpful. Sometimes it was not so much a case of what was said rather than what was
left unsaid. The Claimant's evidence appeared, on balance, more selective - she only
covered certain issues, such as the unauthorized dental treatment and the reasons
for her leave of absence in November, when this was raised by the Respondents -
and then had to be pressed to be transparent. The first issue did not reflect
particularly well on her if the Respondent's evidence is reliable. On the second, there
are significant gaps in the Claimant's evidence, not least her apparent unwillingness
to produce the original medical evidence which prompted her to seek leave of
absence in November, and her apparent reluctance to get a certificate to return to
work. On balance, although it was not an easy choice, the Tribunal found the
Respondent's case more credible though it acknowledges that Mr Hancock was an
articulate and determined witness who stood his corner under cross examination and
ensured that the version he wished to present came across as he intended.
79. The Claimant was the Practice Manager for the Respondent - as such she was the
senior employee of the First Respondent in its Isle of Man operations. She had no line
management on the Island and appeared to resent the periodic involvement of the
dentist, Mr Hulme-Rigby when his involvement did not accord with her view as to
how matters should develop. She did appear to have difficulties with any form of
management which went counter to the way she wanted to go, even if that came
from her ultimate manager, Mr Hancock. There was also a degree of inconsistency
over the involvement of colleagues - resented on the one hand, and yet accepted
when it suited her purposes.
16
80. The Claimant came across as being somewhat impetuous and quick to reach
conclusions as to the motives of others, often without firm evidence. Her attitude to
authority and her inconsistent approach to colleagues comes through in her evidence
and inevitably influences the Tribunal's understanding of her claim.
81. On the other hand, Mr Hancock acting on behalf of the First Respondent, was not a
paragon of good practice - his communication and man management skills were, at
times, clumsy and confrontational; he all too easily blamed subordinates for taking
decisions with which he subsequently disagreed, and he was selective in following
procedures which had been in place and upon which others had placed reliance. He
displayed a tendency to make up the rules as he went along and to ignore
established procedures when it suited.
FINDINGS
82. Thus the Tribunal has had to look at each incident over which there is a divergence
of interpretation to see which version appears more credible and makes the following
findings:
83. Identity of Employer. In her original claim, the Applicant identified three possible
Respondents namely Denticare Dental Spa Isle of Man, Denticare Limited (a UK
incorporated company) (DUK) and Colin Hancock. Mr Hancock was removed as
Respondent by decision on a preliminary point by an Employment Tribunal Chair.
84. Mr Hancock, in his evidence, explained the relationship between the First and Second
Respondents, the respective shareholdings, and the identity of Denticare Dental Spa,
which is the trading name of Denticare (Isle of Man) Limited. The identity of the
Claimant's employer was confused since her Contract of Employment was signed on
behalf of the Second Respondent whereas her monthly pay slips were issued by First
Respondent. Mr Hancock explained that although the contract was in the form used
by the Second Respondent and was signed by one of its employees acting as a
contracted resource to the First Respondent; the clear intention was that the
Claimant's employer was always intended to be the First Respondent. The Claimant
herself appeared not to take issue with that clarification and accordingly the Tribunal
17
finds that the Claimant's employer was Denticare (Isle of Man) Limited, the First
Respondent.
85. Private Dental Treatment. It was common ground in the evidence of the parties
that the Claimant had received some quite significant dental treatment and oral
surgery whilst in the employment of the First Respondent. Such work was carried out,
principally by Mr Hulme-Rigby. The retail value of this work was not inconsiderable,
possibly in the region of £25,000. The Claimant contended that she had paid for any
third party expenses directly, but an e-mail supported by a delivery note produced by
the First Respondent suggested that some external costs remained outstanding.
86. Mr Hulme-Rigby stated that he and his specialist dental implant colleague had spent
30-40 hours undertaking this surgery. He had not claimed any fees from the First
Respondent for this work - and had not received any recompense from the Claimant.
It was not clear whether his colleague had received any payment.
8? Mr Hancock and Mrs Bawden in their evidence both confirmed that the Claimant had
sought, through Mrs Bawden, clearance for routine dental work to be done. Mr
Hancock confirmed that it was normal practice for employees of his dental practices
to be given free routine treatment but free treatment did not extend to cosmetic or
implant work. Mr Hulme-Rigby stated that he was assured by the Claimant that she
had obtained the specific approval of Mr Hancock to the course of cosmetic and
implant surgery that she had asked him to perform and he undertook the work on
that understanding. In her evidence the Claimant did not deny that she had not
sought specific consent to cosmetic and implant surgery but argued, inter alia, that
other employees of the Respondents had received such treatment and that, in any
event, the matter was closed and/or irrelevant.
88. The Tribunal Finds that the Claimant had not sought or obtained consent to the
course of treatment and had misled both Mrs Bawden and Mr Hancock as to the
nature and extent of work she was seeking. She subsequently misled Mr Hulme-Rigby
by assuring him that Mr Hancock had consented to the full course of treatment. What
is less clear is why Mr Hulme-Rigby did not seek any reimbursement from the practice
for such work - it may be that he was anticipating direct payment from the Claimant.
The Tribunal makes no finding on that point, which seems to have little bearing on
matters under consideration.
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89. Mr Hancock himself, although he claimed to have "moved on" from the incident, and
having decided not to pursue it, appears to have retained a sense of grievance which
undoubtedly contributed to a gradual lessening of trust in the Claimant's motivation
on his part.
90. The deleted appointment records. According to the Affidavit of Mr A Hitchcock
submitted by the Respondents, many of the records of the Claimant's appointments
for her personal dental surgery were deleted from the Respondents' computers. The
majority of such deletions took place on 21st July 2010. The deletions appear to have
been made possible through the use of Mr Hulme-Rigby's password which he
admitted, was known to the other staff within the practice.
91. Mr Hulme-Rigby claimed he did not delete the records - he was playing golf that day
with members of his family. The Claimant argued that she had not been at work that
day, being at the hospital with her seriously ill grandchild. No evidence was produced
to support either alibi. The Claimant did not contest the fact that the records had
been deleted, although she contested the relevance of the evidence to her Claim. Mr
Hitchcock's evidence was submitted by affidavit and not in person - he was therefore
unavailable to be questioned on that evidence and the Tribunal has had to take that
into account in determining how much weight to place upon it.
92. It is entirely possible that another employee might have deleted the records but it is
hard to see why they might have done so. Since Mr Hancock was already aware that
the unauthorised work had taken place, it is also hard to see why anyone would go to
the trouble of deleting the records, unless they wanted to obscure the amount of
dental treatment undertaken. The Claimant would appear to have had most to gain
from the deletion, and it has been noted that she did not raise the matter in
evidence, whereas Mr Hulme-Rigby, who might have had less pressing reasons to
wish to obscure the amount of work he had undertaken, specifically referred to the
deletion in his evidence.
93. It is not possible to reach a conclusion whether the records were deleted deliberately
- even if Mr Hitchcock's affidavit infers that they were, and the fact that most of the
records concerned one patient, namely the Claimant, seems more than just a co-
19
incidence .. Both the Claimant and Mr Hulme-Rigby denied that they had anything to
do with the deletion and the Tribunal feels unable to make any finding.
94. Leave of absence. In November 2010, the Claimant who, according to the evidence
of Mr Hulme-Rigby had been showing less commitment to her work and taking
increased numbers of unauthorised and often spontaneous periods away from the
office, advised the Respondents that her doctor wished to sign her off work for 4
weeks due to ill health. The Claimant wished to take time off, despite having only just
returned from a foreign holiday, but did not wish to rely on a doctor's note and take
formal sick leave, despite claiming she had a doctor's note. After discussion with Mrs
Bawden, and through her Mr Hancock, it was agreed that the Claimant could take an
extended period of leave, part as unused annual leave entitlement, and partly as
unpaid leave. No specific limit was imposed on the length of this absence, but there
appears to have been an expectation that it would roughly be the same period as had
been allegedly prescribed by the Claimant's doctor.
95. Mr Hancock mooted the idea of a longer period of absence and appeared genuinely
concerned to ensure that the Claimant took the opportunity to get well. The actual
existence of a doctor's note was accepted by the Respondents although they did not
seek sight of it.
96. It is not clear from the evidence why the Claimant was reluctant to seek sick leave,
and why she insisted on a mixture of annual leave entitlement and unpaid leave but it
was clear that the Respondents only agreed to such absence because of their
concerns for the Claimant's health. The Tribunal detected no ulterior motive in Mr
Hancock's agreement to such leave and, in particular, no suggestion that he saw it as
an opportunity to 'get rid of' the Claimant as she subsequently appears to have
suspected and communicated such suspicions in conversation with Mr Hulme-Rigby.
97. The Tribunal finds, on the basis of the evidence, that the reason for the leave of
absence, was the Claimant's health - indeed she has not contested the reason,
acknowledging that she had felt completely exhausted. However she did contest
whether it constituted sick leave. Since she had volunteered to use a mixture of
annual and unpaid leave as an alternative to reliance on a sick note, the absence of
such note is of little relevance, as she was not relying on it to obtain sick pay. The
terms and conditions of employment are ambiguous on this matter envisaging the
20
need to produce a sick note and/or a certificate of fitness to return to work only in
the context of claiming sick pay. However, in the light of this finding, the Tribunal has
concluded that it was not unreasonable for the Respondent, as a responsible
employer and one involved in the health care sector with its emphasis on the safety
of patients, to seek some assurance that the Claimant was fully restored before
agreeing to her return to work. As a consequence, her reluctance to participate in
such an exercise either through a return to work interview, or through a medical
examination was surprising, and in the circumstances, unreasonable whereas Mr
Hancock's insistence on the production of a medical certificate appears reasonable.
98. The Return to Work. There was a very clear disagreernent between the Claimant
and Mr Hancock over when she should return to work after her period of absence in
November and December. The Tribunal has already made its findings on the
reasonableness or otherwise of the Respondent's insistence on being satisfied that
the Claimant was fully fit to return to work. The process of agreeing to a timetable for
the return was obviously acrimonious and confused by the intervention of certain
employees of the Respondents who Mr Hancock appears to have believed were less
objective than he might have wished; they were further complicated by the pressure
of Christmas activities and travel difficulties which prevented his travelling to the Isle
of Man on 17th December as planned.
99. The Claimant avers that, even had Mr Hancock been able to travel as planned, she
could have seen him in the morning but not in the afternoon as she had an important
hospital appOintment. Mr Hulme-Rigby's evidence suggests that he saw the Claimant
on that same afternoon in the home of the Receptionist, Amanda Curphey. What is
clear is that the Claimant did not agree with Mr Hancock's insistence on a medical
certificate or return to work interview, sought to circumvent the requirement and
proposed to return to work on December 20th notwithstanding his clear instruction
not to do so. In those Circumstances, and notwithstanding any technical deficiencies
in the process, Mr Hancock's purported 'suspension' of the Claimant was
understandable even if the delivery of such an instruction was confused.
100. In his evidence, and arising from the actions of the Respondent's own HR
Department suggesting that the suspension was not for disciplinary purposes, Mr
Hancock sought to explain that the suspension was a 'medical suspension', and not
21
part of any disciplinary process. He appeared to be suggesting that the distinction
was based on protection of patients, and clinical imperatives rather than as a result of
any disciplinary issues, though he conceded that the Claimant's apparent refusal to
accept his instructions not to return to work was, in his view, ample grounds for
disciplinary suspension. The terms and conditions of employment make no mention of
"medical suspension" nor what would trigger such a suspension.
101. In the absence of any evidence as to the particular constituents of a 'medical
suspension', the Tribunal cannot make any finding as to whether the suspension was,
as alleged by Mr Hancock in his evidence, medical rather than disciplinary. However
the Tribunal has concluded that, in the light of the Claimant's avowed intention to
return to work on December 20th, and the difficulty for the Respondents in enforcing
Mr Hancock's direction with him in the UK and the Claimant in the Isle of Man, some
form of suspension and the practical precaution of retrieving her keys to the surgery
was not unreasonable. The Tribunal rejects the Claimant's allegation that the removal
of her keys was demeaning - it was a sensible management precaution in the light of
her apparent unwillingness to accept the direction issued by Mr Hancock, her ultimate
line manager.
102. Communication Difficulties. The Claimant argued that Mr Hancock had failed to
contact her during the weekend of 18/19 December to discuss her return to work,
and had, instead, involved Mr Hulme-Rigby who was not her line manager and, in
effect, a disinterested third party. She attributed this failure as indicative of the
Respondent's altered attitude to her, and Mr Hancock's perceived desire to 'get rid of
her'. She may have been unduly sensitive on the pOint, through worry that she might
have to continue on unpaid leave longer than she had intended.
103. Mr Hancock acknowledged he had not been able to contact the Claimant, but
attributed this to his having an incorrect e-mail address for the Claimant, having no
phone number for her, and the pressures of the pre-Christmas social round. On being
challenged to produce evidence from his Blackberry (which he claims he was relying
upon) Mr Hancock was unable to comply and thus the Tribunal has no grounds upon
which to determine whether these excuses are valid. Indeed it senses he may not
have tried as hard as he claimed. However his use of Mr Hulme-Rigby to convey a
message to the Claimant was not a matter of dispute even though its appropriateness
22
was strongly challenged by the Claimant. The Tribunal does not find it unreasonable
- Mr Hulme-Rigby was the senior clinician in the practice and had been involved to a
greater extent in the running of the practice during the Claimant's leave of absence.
The Respondents had no-one else upon whom they could rely. Indeed the Claimant's
views on the involvement of third parties seems inconsistent - she objected to the
Receptionist's attendance at the meeting on 20th December but asked her to take a
note of the meeting which she then produced in evidence.
104. In general, the Tribunal found the line management structure of the Respondents
confusing. Mr Hancock appeared to intervene when it suited him or when he sensed
that others, such as Mrs Bawden, were not handling matters as he would wish. He
was at pains to point out that Mrs Bawden was only responsible for clinical
governance and was not the Claimant's line manager - but he also appeared willing
to allow her to exercise a line management role when it suited him. It is small
wonder that the Claimant might have been confused as to whom she was
accountable and to whom she should look for directions - but it also appears that she
exploited that confusion at times when it suited her.
105. Compromise Discussions. The introduction of evidence of any compromise
negotiations into the hearing of a Claim is unusual and is usually the subject of
privilege. The objection of the Claimant to a redacted section of an internal
communication produced by the Respondents in evidence, and her subsequent
consent to the full text of the letter being disclosed, had the unintended consequence
of introducing, as evidence, the fact that compromise discussions were taking place
between Claimant and Respondent in early January 2011 with a view to her early
resignation. The memorandum indicates that the Claimant instigated the issue as an
alternative to seeking constructive dismissal, a point not challenged by the Claimant,
but the Tribunal is not aware of other details of such negotiations, save that the
Industrial Relations Service was involved, and it appears that the only outstanding
issue was the size of the termination payment. However it is clear that negotiations
had begun, and that they had not concluded by January 28th, the date of the
Claimant's resignation. It is also clear, and the Tribunal finds accordingly, that the
parties' actions subsequent to 6th January, were infiuenced by the fact of such
negotiations which were directed to the Claimant being offered an inducement to
23
resign her employment. The Tribunal does not find that the fact of such negotiations
was, necessarily, proof that the Claimant's suspicions were true.
106. Conversely the Tribunal was not convinced that the new business started by the
Claimant after her resignation was in contemplation before she left, as the
Respondents sought to prove. There is no persuasive evidence to support such a
conclusion.
107. The final straw. In her letter of resignation, and in her subsequent evidence, the
Claimant argues that the 'final straw' prompting her resignation, was the First
Respondent's failure to pay her salary in January on the agreed date. It must be
recalled that the Claimant had been assured that she would be paid notwithstanding
her enforced absence from work pending a medical certificate confirming she was fit
to return.
108. The sequence of events appears to have been as follows: on 25th January, which the
Claimant argues was the normal date for monthly salary payments to be made, she
received her pay slip but no money was paid into her account. She sought advice
from the Industrial Relations Service who contacted the Respondent's HR Department
and advised them that such failure could constitute a breach of contract.
109. Mr Hancock concurs with the evidence of Mrs Bawden that his payroll department, in
particular a Mr Baggot, had been alerted to the possibility of a compromise
agreement with the Claimant, and had been told to withhold payment of monthly
salary in the meantime. On being told that such withholding could constitute a breach
of contract, Mr Hancock (then on holiday in Thailand) authorised immediate payment.
110. Fortuitously for the Respondents, the Claimant's contract specified that the monthly
payment date was 'on or about 27'h of each month', and the release of funds ensured
that the Respondents had not committed a technical breach of the Claimant's
contract, although it strikes the Tribunal as bizarre that a pay slip was issued giving
the impression that payment was being made as normal. The Tribunal also finds less
than credible Mr Hancock's assertion that he was unaware what date the employees
of his companies were paid.
111. The Tribunal has some sympathy for the Claimant's consternation that she had not
been paid, and for the obvious financial embarrassment this may have caused, albeit
for a very short time. The Claimant's advocate argued that this action, alone, was a
24
sufficiently serious and repudiatory breach to justify the Claimant's resignation and
subsequent claim for constructive dismissal. The fact is, however, that
notwithstanding the reasons for the late release of funds, the Claimant was paid
strictly in accordance with her contract. Previous monthly payments, as evidenced by
pa slips, had all been made on 25th of each month, but the Respondent's advocate
argued that such a variation in the Claimant's favour, could not be regarded as an
agreed variation to the Claimant's contract and was unenforceable by the Claimant.
112. Because the payment was strictly in accordance with the Claimant's contract, even if
it was later than normal, the Tribunal Finds that the Respondent was not in breach
of contract by the alleged late payment of the Claimant's salary for January 2011.
THE LAW
113. The relevant sections of the Employment Act 2006 (,the Act') are as follows.
Section 111 - right not to be unfairly dismissed.
Section 112(c) - entitlement to terminate without notice by reason of
employer's conduct.
Section 140 -143 - calculation of awards and compensation.
114. The case law on constructive dismissal has been set out in the case of O'Sullivan v
Mees Pierson Intertrust Ltd (Case No 633). However for the sake of completeness it
is reiterated here. Constructive dismissal arises in terms of Section 112 (2)(c) of the
Act (previously Section 42(2)(c)of the Employment Act 1991) which states that an
employee shall be treated as being dismissed by his employer if the employee
terminates the contract with or without notice in circumstances such that he is
entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer's conduct. This is for
the Claimant to prove and, to do so, must establish to the satisfaction of the Tribunal
that the conduct in consequence of which he terminates his Contract of Employment
amounted to a fundamental breach of that contract on the part of the Respondent.
115. The UK leading case on the matter (to which the Tribunal can refer as persuasive
authority) is that of Western Excavating (EEC) Ltd. v Sharp 1978. Essentially the case
states that the requirements for success in a claim for constructive dismissal includes
proof of a fundamental breach of the contract on the part of the employer and that it
25
was that breach that caused the employee to resign. Furthermore the breach must be
sufficiently important to justify the resignation or it must be the last in a series of
incidents which justify the resignation ('the final straw'). This case has indicated that
it is not enough for an employee to resign merely because the employer has acted
unreasonably.
116. The case of Woods v W~1 car Services (Peterborough) Ltd. holds that any breach of
the implied term of trust and confidence will amount to a repudiation of the Contract.
It is necessary for the Tribunal to view objectively whether the conduct complained of
is likely to destroy or seriously damage the trust and confidence. It is not necessary
to show that the employer intended the breach. The Tribunal must look at the
employer's conduct as a whole and determine whether it is such that its effect,
judged reasonably, is such the employee cannot be expected to put up with it. (Malik
and Anor v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA 1997 IRLR.
DECISION
117. The Claimant alleges that various events, particularised in her case, individually
constitute serious offences and taken together constitute repudiatory breaches of
sufficient seriousness to justify her resignation. The essence of the first criteria is that
the relationship of mutual trust and confidence, which is an implied term in an
employment contract, has been destroyed by the actions of the employer.
118. The relationship between Claimant and Respondents in this matter was undoubtedly
troubled in the period leading up to the Claimant's resignation on January 28th 2011.
The downward trajectory appears to have started earlier in 2010 on the discovery, by
Mr Hancock, that the Claimant had embarked on an extensive, costly and
unauthorised programme of dental surgery. Mr Hulme-Rigby, in his eVidence,
suggests that the Claimant was speculating, shortly thereafter, whether the
Respondents may have been seeking to 'get rid of her'. There appears to be little
evidence that this suspicion had any foundation other than, perhaps, a fear that his
discovery of her private treatment, might give him cause to do so.
26
119. The First Respondent's ready agreement to the Claimant's request for leave of
absence is not indicative of any concerted programme of oppressive behaviour
towards the Claimant. Nor, in the Tribunal's view, is the First Respondent's insistence
on a return to work health clearance. The Claimant's insistence that she knew best
herself whether she was fit to return, and her rejection of a reasonable instruction
from her employer not to return to work until such clearance had been obtained,
particularly when linked to continued payment of her salary, was less than
reasonable.
120. A breach of contract through non-payment of salary might have 'bucked that trend'
but, as explained in paragraph 112, the Tribunal has found that there was no breach,
albeit more through luck than judgement. The Tribunal's view that this issue was not
the final straw as alleged is reinforced by the memorandum of 6th January which
clearly indicates that, at that date, the Claimant was already holding out the
possibility of constructive dismissal several weeks before the alleged "final straw".
121. What is clear is that the relationship between Claimant and First Respondent
deteriorated - what is less clear is the extent to which the Fi rst Respondent, as
employer, bears responsibility for such deterioration. The First Respondent's
behaviour was not beyond reproach, but the Tribunal has concluded that, on the
basis of the eVidence, the Claimant must bear a Significant level of blame for the
increasing level of mistrust and suspicion. She has, thus, to an appreciable degree,
been the architect of her own misfortune. Whatever the other criteria that need to be
fulfilled to justify a finding of unfair constructive dismissal, the one prerequisite is that
it must be predominantly the employer's actions that destroy the implied term of
mutual trust and confidence. In this matter, it is not clear that such is the case.
Indeed the evidence suggests that, certainly until December 20th, the First
Respondent acted reasonably, indeed generously and the responsibility for any
deterioration lay prinCipally at the Claimant's door.
122. In the light of the Tribunal's conclusions that the Respondent does not bear sole or
the main responsibility for the breakdown in the relationship of employer and
employee, and that any breaches for which the Respondents may bear some
responsibility are not sufficiently serious to be repudiatory, the Tribunal has no need
27
to consider whether the remaining criteria of immediacy and proximity of resignation
to the final straw incident are met.
123. The Tribunal has concluded that the Claimant was not unfairly (constructively)
dismissed and her claim therefore fails.
s;g""lM'B:xk Mr R B M Quayle -~man
Date: ..... .ls: . .{.~.f.n ......................................... ...................... .
Sent to Parties on: .... 1.5.:.1..\.1,. .. /..\..\ ...................................... .
Entered in Register: . ..I.5.J.I.?.:.l..U ....................................... .
Clerk to the Tribunal: ..... r.?:.d.: .. ~~ ........... .
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