Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasonsfaculty.philosophy.umd.edu/PGreenspan/Crs/chs. 4-5.pdf ·...

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Chapter 5: Internaland External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’sRelativism

Ch. 5: Setting theStage

Ch. 5: “The Theory”

Ch. 5: Millgram’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’sChallenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’sChallenge

Chapter 5: Internal and External Reasons

Julius & Aleks

03/27/2014

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Julius & Aleks

Ch. 4: Harman’s Relativism

Ch. 5: Setting the Stage

Ch. 5: Millgram’s Challenge

Ch. 5: Hampton’s Challenge

Ch. 5: Korsgaard’s Challenge

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The Overall Argument

For any x:

(1) If x morally ought to φ, then x ought to φ regardless ofwhether he cares to, regardless of whether φ-ing satisfies anyof his desires or furthers his interests.

(2) If x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason for φ-ing.

(3) Therefore, if x morally ought to φ, then x has a reason forφ-ing regardless of whether φ-ing serves his desires or furthershis interests.

(4) But there is no sense to be made of such reasons.

(5) Therefore, x is never under a moral obligation. [Joyce][p. 42]

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Harman’s Relativism

◮ Harman’s idea is to “save” ordinary moral discourse byinterpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for theagent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumentalreasons).

◮ Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motiondiscourse, should hold of morality as well.

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Harman’s Relativism

◮ Harman’s idea is to “save” ordinary moral discourse byinterpreting our moral judgments as elliptical for theagent-relative judgments (stemming from some instrumentalreasons).

◮ Motion discourse as a paradigm. What holds of motiondiscourse, should hold of morality as well.

◮ Joyce: the analogy does not hold, since

(1) there is no new discovery in the case of morality, and..(2) moral discourse is essentially (or unnegotiably) non-relative.

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The Aims of the Chapter

◮ William’s main argument: Any theorythat supports non-instrumental reasonsnecessarily makes a mistake.

No non-instrumental account of practical rationality ⇒ Moralerror theory.

◮ Joyce’s aims: (1) describe the theory, (2) cricize theopposition.

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A Little Bit of Reasonology

(1) Objective rational reasons

(2) Subjective rational reasons

(3) Irrational reasons

(4) “William’s-style” reasons

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A Little Bit of Reasonology

(1) Objective rational reasons

(2) Subjective rational reasons

(3) Irrational reasons

(4) “William’s-style” reasons

Definition (Williams)One has a reason to φ if and only if one would be motivated to φ

after the process of fully informed [and] correct deliberation.

◮ (1) = (4)?

◮ Of course, Joyce goes for (2) [= normative reasons].

◮ ‘[..T]here are many different normative systems, and thereforemany different kinds of normative reasons. [..] However, withSmith I will use “normative reason” in restricted sense, tomean something that is justified according to practical

rationality.’ [Joyce][p. 70, fn. 21]

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Joyce’s real interest

◮ William’s argument against external reasons.

Definition (External Reason)An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject ofthe ascription regardless of what his desires are.

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Joyce’s real interest

◮ William’s argument against external reasons.

Definition (External Reason)An external reason claim is one that is applied to the subject ofthe ascription regardless of what his desires are.

◮ For Williams smth. is a reason only if its consideration could(potentially) motivate the agent.

◮ Joyce:

◮ this is OK, as lons as we focus on normative reasons;◮ all normative reasons are internal.

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The Argument

◮ How does an internal reason explain an action?

◮ .. one can tell a story about psychological causation – acertain desire + a certain belief cause a certain action.

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The Argument

◮ Now, suppose that I have a (external) reason not to drinkcoffee because it is tapu. How can this reason explain myaction?

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The Argument

◮ .. clearly, I must have“internalized” it in some way, i.e.,

◮ I must believe that the coffee is tapu,

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The Argument

◮ .. clearly, I must have“internalized” it in some way, i.e.,

◮ I must believe that the coffee is tapu,◮ .. but this alone doesn’t seem to be enough.

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Humean conception of action (orthodoxy)

◮ In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires.

◮ Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparentintuitiveness.

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Humean conception of action (orthodoxy)

◮ In a nutshell: action requires beliefs & desires.

◮ Virtues: simplicity, explanatory breadth, and apparentintuitiveness.

◮ The opposing view is commited to “besires”.

◮ “Direction of fit” against the naive besire theorist.

◮ Against the more subtle besire theorist.. all we have to is toimagine the desire element and the belief element of somegiven besire coming apart.

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Millgram’s Challenge

◮ Against Williams’ presupposition: Millgram describes a casein which (purportedly) S has a reason to φ, but φ cannotexplain any of S ’s actions:

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Archie is insensitive towards people around him. Thisinsensitivity deprives him of certain satisfactions (say, fulfillingfriendships), but due to being insensitive Archie cannotappreciate their values.

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◮ Joyce considers: (1) Archie’s reason for fulfilling friendships,and (2) his reason to go to counseling.

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◮ Joyce considers: (1) Archie’s reason for fulfilling friendships,and (2) his reason to go to counseling.

◮ Archie1, Archie2, . . ., Archien, Archie+

◮ in the background: (a) Archie1 isn’t stuck, (b) Williams-stylereasons

◮ Importantly, Archie+ is not the exemplar, but theadvice-giver.

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Hampton’s Challenge

◮ Williams style internalism:

◮ Internal reasons = ... correct deliberation ...

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◮ Hampton’s challenge: Explicating ”correct deliberation” leadsto a dilemma

◮ First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation = ... internalreasons ...

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◮ Hampton’s challenge: Explicating ”correct deliberation” leadsto a dilemma

◮ First Horn - Circularity: Correct deliberation = ... internalreasons ...

◮ Second Horn - Self-undermining: Correct deliberation = ...external reasons ...

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The first horn - Cicularity

◮ Joyce argues:

◮ Internal reasons are ”involved” in correct deliberation, but”correct deliberation” is not defined in terms of internalreasons. Therefore, there is no circularity.

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◮ Joyce argues:

◮ But might there be further circularity problems with regard towhen and how we ought to deliberate? For instance:

◮ ”When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reasonto deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfactionof my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that Iwould have after correctly deliberating under conditions offull information. Isn’t that circular?”

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◮ Joyce argues:

◮ But might there be further circularity problems with regard towhen and how we ought to deliberate? For instance:

◮ ”When I am in calmer circumstances, then I may have reasonto deliberate because doing so is conducive to the satisfactionof my desires. Not just my actual desires, but those that Iwould have after correctly deliberating under conditions offull information. Isn’t that circular?”

◮ Joyce’s answer: No, because here nothing is defined.

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The second horn - the self-undermining objection

◮ The objection: Correct deliberation= ... external reasons ...

◮ First interpretation: ”correct deliberation” is the kind ofdeliberation that we ought to partake in.

◮ Joyce: We ought always to act in accoradance with correctdeliberation, but not always deliberate correctly.

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◮ Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirementscan be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The widescope reading entails external reasons.

◮ narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to takethe means to satisfy D.

◮ wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D,then take the means to satisfy D.

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◮ Second interpretation: Instrumental normative requirementscan be formulated wide scope and narrow scope. The widescope reading entails external reasons.

◮ narrow scope: If A has desire D, then A has a reason to takethe means to satisfy D.

◮ wide scope: A has a reason such that: if she has a desire D,then take the means to satisfy D.

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The self-undermining objection II

◮ Joyce: there are no wide scope normative requirements,because that would lead to an implausible proilferation ofreasons.

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◮ How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe notso bad, after all.

◮ Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantagethat, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy therequirement by giving up the end.

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◮ How bad would this proliferation of reasons be? Maybe notso bad, after all.

◮ Wide scope instrumental requirements have the advantagethat, if we have some devious end, we can satisfy therequirement by giving up the end.

◮ Third interpretation: Even if we accept the narrow scopeformulation we can ask for a reason to follow this (narrowscope) principle.

◮ ”In even asking th second question the questioner is evincingan allegince to instrumentalism” (123)

◮ ”the questioner does not properly understand what the word”reason” means.” (123)

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Korsgaard’s Challenge

◮ Korsgaard’s idea: After a process of correct deliberation allagents will converge on th esame moral desires.

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◮ Joyce’s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases.And she can’t.

◮ ”let him consider Harman’s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactlywhat deliberative defects this imaginary agent is sufferingfrom.” (124)

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◮ Joyce’s reply: Korsgaard needs to explain the relevant cases.And she can’t.

◮ ”let him consider Harman’s Mafia hit man, and tell us exactlywhat deliberative defects this imaginary agent is sufferingfrom.” (124)

◮ Korsgaard’s first argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception.

◮ Joyce: The mafia man’s actions are in line with hisself-conception as ’member of the family’.

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◮ Korsgaard’s second argument: An action must be in line withone’s self-conception as a human.

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◮ Joyce’s reply: Valuing one’s conception as a human does notimply valuing everybody’s humanity. At least, one would needan extra argument to make that transition.

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◮ Joyce’s reply: Valuing one’s conception as a human does notimply valuing everybody’s humanity. At least, one would needan extra argument to make that transition.

◮ Korsgaard’s third argument: reasons need to becommunicable. Therefore, they cannot be agent relative.

◮ Joyce: Agent relative reasons are communicable. Just as a Ican communicate that this piece of property belongs to meand not to you I can communicate that this reason is mine annot yours.

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Korsgaard’s Challenge (continued)

◮ Korsgaard’s fourth argument: reasons must be justifiable toeveryone. Therefore, they can’t be agent relative.

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◮ Joyce’s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons arejustifiable to others.

◮ ”Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason tokill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, ofcourse, doesn’t mean that Ortcutt has to like it.” 129)

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◮ Joyce’s reply I: In one sense, agent relative reasons arejustifiable to others.

◮ ”Ortcutt well-understands that A1 has a very good reason tokill him, and no particular reason to refrain. But that, ofcourse, doesn’t mean that Ortcutt has to like it.” 129)

◮ Joyce’s reply II: Not even the moral reasons favored byKorsgaard are sharable and justiable to all:

◮ ”Perhaps A1 and his ”family” think that ordinary law-abidersare naive fools.” (131)

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