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CHAPTER III
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT : RECENT DEVELOFMENTS
CHAPTER III
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT RECENT DEVELOR-1:ENTS
The contemporary period in the history of the
Indian Ocean area is marked by the elimination of a single
dominant power concept. The modern.history of this area I
I
'-m.s ushered by the introduction of one power controlling
the traae in tb.e region through its political, economic and
strategic influence. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the pre-Gaman era was Largely characterized by peaceful
traders who did not give much attention to the military
aspects of seapower. The Europeans, especially the ~ortuguese,
had a different worldview of trade and economic prosperity.
Albuquerque's grand design was to controL the ingresses and
egresses of the Indian Ocean in order to control the trade
in the area, thereby increasing its economic migt:lt 1dth the
help of its miLitary superiority. Thus started the age of
systematic coLonisation of the area which was unprecedented
in the history of the Indian Ocean region. This ~ystem was
adopted by Britain which took control of the area after
eliminating the Portuguese. Seapower had its greatest
influence UI:)On world affairs between early seventeenth
- 70
71
ttWi late nineteenth century which was incidentally the higtl
water mark of the British naval prowess. But, unlike the
Portuguese, the British daninated this area for a very long
period, more than two centuries, making a judicious blend
of both sea and land p0111er \lklic:h the oi:her European nations
failed to achieve. A more permanent naval strength was
estabiished with trading posts and colonies, shore
establistliilents, weli-sigh.ted bases, ccmmercial shipping,
international alignments, industries, internal communications
etc. Britain was abie to project its military strength
more effectively beyond the seas, and prevented enemies
frcrn doing the same.
'l'he two world wars had teiling effect on the
British naval mastery, and the a1anged international
situation pushed Britain to the back seat. It can aisO be
argued that Britain's naval rise and fall has been closely
bound up with its economic rise and fall. The depletion of
resources caused by the World War II and the loss of over
seas colonies served to diminish its significance in world
affairs. The decline of the empire was due to, what Liddell
Hart called, •strategic over extension•. There were
numerous defence burdens and obligations without correspondinG
capacity to sustain them. 1 British strategic withdrawal,
1 Paul 1"1. Kennedy, '.Ib.e Rise and Fall of British Naval Hastery (London, 1976}, pp. -'41::S.1
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coupled with the reopening of the Suez Canal and the logic
of nuclear deterrence, drove the United States and the
Soviet Union to the Indian Ocean area. The augnented extra
regional navalfair forces, search for bases and their
upgradation, raising of swiftly deployable forces, supply
of arms to regional surrogates etc., cause heightened
insecurity in the region, and add to regional conflicts,
Which subsist for a host of historical, ethnic, religious
and territorial reasons. 2 It is further argued that in the
present cold war situation between the United States and
the soviet Union, unlike the period 1945-72, there are two
super-powers of equal capability, waging the war in an area
comprising no~aligned nations, the Indian Ocean arc.
Apart frcm the super powers, other extra-regional powers,
\'lhich have high econcmic stakes in the area, are reinforcing
their Indian Ocean fleet. Such efforts on the part of
extra-regional powers and support by their 'regional
surrogates' finds a response by the littoral and hinterland
states. In response to the unfolding political and
strategic scenario in the Indian Ocean, the peace-zone
concept t~s been evolved by the littoral and hinterland
countries. It has been pointed out that the great power
2 P.R. Chari, "Zone of Conflict", \'lorld Focus (New Delhi), vol. 2, no. 1, January 1931, p~ 4.·
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rivalry, if not controlled, can assume dangerous proportions.
Thus the study of strategic situation in the Indian Ocean
area includes four sets of countries - (i) The Western
Alliance led by the United States; (ii) The Soviet Union;·
(iii) Other outside powers with commercial interests in the
area; (iv) The littoral and hinterland states. Two factors
which have played important role in big power rivalry in
the Indian Ocean area are need for the security of supplies
and transportation route, and to foil the designs of
domination by a rival group. Hili tary presence and anns
supply agreements are important conponents of the Indian
Ocean strategies of big powers.
The \</estern Presence
'lhe very fact that almost all the countries on the
Indian Ocean littoral and its islands were the colonies of
major Euro~ean countries, explains the continued interest of
those powers in the area. The most important new entrant
was the United States after the Second World War. It
undertook the responsibility of defending the combined
western interest in the area. Before World War II, the
United States confined itself to the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans and left the Indian Ocean to the then daninant
power, the Great Britain. i'li ttl the impending British /
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withdrawal on the 'eastern side' , the United States began
to look at the Indian Ocean region an~. 3
The US presence in the Indian Ocean is seen as a
deterrent against any disruption of vital sealanes. Even
if the US interests are not affected to a great extent by
the disruption of trade routes, the loss of the economic
might of its two most vulnerable a.L.Lies, namely West Gennany
and japan, could tilt the balance of the industrial might 4 against the West. Moreover, there are ores and critical
materia.ls in the Indian Ocean littoral on which the industrial ·
economies of the United States, Europe and Japan depend
heavily. Except for offshore oil in the Persian Gu.lf,
the development of sea resources in the Indian Ocean area
lag far behind the rest of the world. The developed
countries are heavy users of the Indian Ocean both in
terms of resources and their sea line of communication
(SLOC). It offers them the best access to the lands around
it, as good land routes are not available due to geographic
peculiarities of the region and conflicts among sane
lit-coral states.
3 Manoranjan Bezboruah, u.s. Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response (New York, 1971), p. 55.
4 Ibid., pp. 39-4o.
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Powerful maritime nations have traditionally used
gunboat aiplamacy in order to secure advantage and avert
losses. Gunboat diplomacy comes in the form of interve~
tion, offensive deployment of surface ships and mi.ssile
submarines, ring of bases along with stations of military
communications and raising of swiftly deployable force.
The US attempt to intimidate the littoral countries was
witnessed during the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the Arab
Israeli \far of 1973. Tne US Task Force-74, headed by ' the aircraft carrier Enterprise, entered the Indian Ocean
on 16 December 19'71, the day on vmich the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution calling that warships and
military aircrafts may not use the Indian Ocean for any
threat or use of force against any littoral or hinterland
state. A few days Later, American journalist Jack
Anderson disclosed that the fleet was designed to ensure
the safety of US interests in the area. 5 Similarly in
October 1973 the Carrier Hancock, accompanied by a
tanker and destroyers, was despatched to the Persian Gulf
through the straits of MaLacca. This was resorted to
under the pretext of a periodic demonstration at the t~e
of ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. 'lbe main reason
for such intimidation tactics is that the economic and
5 Washington Post, 3'1 December 1971. Cited in Jagdish Vibhakar, AfrO-Asian Security and Indian Ocean (New De.ihi, 1974) , p. ·1 ).
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political transformation in many developing countries has
substantially narrowed sphere of Western influence. The
attempt to counter these changes have resulted in
Brzezinski's globally oriented theory of the. arc of crises
or arc of instabiiity. 6
Mahan's theoretical basis of the control of the
iifeline has cane a long way from battleship to nuclear
carriers and nuclear strike submarines \SSBNs). The
American military strategy today is not to attack or destroy
the enemy fleet or hameiand, but to destroy its means to
interfere with the American seapower. 7 'fhe overthrow of
the Shah of Iran and the entry of Soviet troops in
Afghanistan have resu..L ted in an enormous naval building,
acquisition and modernization programme on the part of the
United States. The sanction of $1.6 trillion for this
purpose includes a ~S 183.6 billion ship construction
progrrunme over ten years.8 This includes the deployment
of the new Ohio class sul:marines fitted wifu Trident C4
6
8
-
Aiexander Chicherov, "South Asia and the Indian Ocean in the 1980s", Asian Survey tBerkeley), vol. 24, no. 11, November 1~4, p. 11~1.
Seymour J. Dietchman, New Technology and Military; Power t Colorado, 1979) , pp. 83-87;
77
missiles. Towards the end of the decade, these missiles
will be replaced by Trident n5 missiles which have greater
throw-weigpt and accuracy to make it effective in attacking
Soviet missile silos. With ti1e ccmpletion of the sea
launched cruise missile \ SLCM) programme, nearly every
type of ship would become a potential nuclear attack
platfonn. 9 'lhe ship constr'Uction programme includes
carriers, cruiser-destroyers, guided weapons,frigates,
amphibious forces, mine counte~measures (MCM) etc. The
extent of funds and other resources coupled with rapid
technological innovations point towards the shape of things 10 to came. lne Indian Ocean is a major source of deployment
of these modern weapon systems. The enormous build-up
of forces do not take into account only the Soviet threat.
'l'he r'alklands and Lebanon wars have proved that challenges
other than that of the Soviet Union are far more likely to
confront the US and its allies. I1any third world countries .
have established substantial armed forces, as well as some
9 SIPRI, World 4 (London, 1 , p. :; ; r< .• J.L • .IJ~c\.er an onnan Friedman, "The 19tl5 u.s. Navy Lea~e Show : More Competitive than Ever", International Defense Review (Geneva), vol. '18, no. 6, 1 SB5, pp. 949=56.
10 For details of the US Naval building programme, see F. de Blocq Van Kuffeler, "Navies in 1984 : \'larsaw Pact and NA'1'0 11 , Na~ International (Surrey), vol. 9), no. 2, Fabruary 198 , pp. 112-13; IISS, 1he r11li tary Balance, 1934-85 ~London, '1934), pp. 3-lf.
78
key regimes have became vulnerable to internal and external
forces. A~l these developments in the third world in
general, and the Indian Ocean area in particular, have
prompted the United States to enhance its capabilities
in tenns of combat, sea control and surveillance.
The second important component of power projection
is a military base where fuel, ammunition and spare parts
can be stored, where planes of all sizes can land, and Where
a carrier task group can anchor, if need be. 11 American
s~rategists believe that US objectives in the Indian Ocean
area can be realized only through access to the region. In
order to have access, a country has to go back to the
tradi tiona~ concept of chokepoints. 'l'he United States has
agreements with various c~tries, in return of economic
aid and arms supplies, to use bases and other facilities:
wLth Egypt to use r<.as Banas, with Oman to use Salalah and
l'lasirah, with Kenya to use the .t-ort of Hombasa, and with
Britain to develop Diego Garcia as a major base and
communication station. ~~en the situation was reversed
in the Horn of Africa after the 11..)77 Wdr, the US gained
Soviet facilities in 13erbera a.Long "1i til fully developed
11 Elmo ~umwal t, On vlatch tNew York, 1976), pp.- 454-5.
. 79
12 airstrips. Moreover, South Africa and Australia, bordering
the Indian Ocean on ~vo sides, form important elements in
the strategy of the West, providing base and communication
facilities.
Diego Garcia, together with other bases, canmun1-
cation facilities and military forces, enables a quick
response build-up of forces to the region. It was chosen
under the strategic island concept of the Pentagon, for its
strategic location, protected lagoon and necessary ground
for airstrip. It could be used for urgent redeployment of
naval forces between the Atlantic and the Pacific, as
carriers could not transmit through Panama Canal, and the
Indian Ocean route was preferred to the one around South
America. The development of strategic submarine strike
system needed very low frequency (VLF) communication stations
to link them with the complex net-vrork of the US c001munications
system, including satellites. Initially the US Navy had
chosen Diego Garcia for its strategic location for
surveillance, low profile presence and the capability for
contineency operations by carriers, vbich were politically
no~ alarming and military limited goals. 13 Having foreseen
12
13 For the development of the Di.ego Garcia base, see K.S. JawaLkar~ Diego Garcia in International Diplomacz ~Bombay, 1 933;, -pp. 31-83; Bez'boruah, n. 5, pp. 53='78; A. J·. Cottrell and others, Sea po,·rer and Stratggf in the Indian Ocean (Beverly Hills arid London, 1 ), pp. 124=5.
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British withdra,~ from the Indian Ocean in the early
sixties, the Pentagon persuaded Britain to announce the
creation of British Indian Ocean Territory \BIOT) in 1965.
Three islands from the ~eychelles group \Aldabra, Desroches
and farqahar) and Chagos archipelago from Maritius were
detached for the construction of communications facilities.
Later the British decision to withdraw from east of
Suez and regular deployment by the Soviet Union favrured
the decision on Option B Plan \modest presence), a carefully
developed limited logistic facility on the island. The
construction of the base started in 1972, and became
operational in 1973, to become a link in me world v1ide
command and control system and to transmit satellite
in!'onnation to the Navy and the Air 1''orce. 14
·J.'he US strategic thinking was further reinforced
in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Vlhen sane Arab
countries threatened to withdraw facilities given to the
United States• forces, thus making it difficult to move
supplies to Israel. Even thou~ the Senate Armed Services
Committee did not approve of expansion of logistic, it
was started on the plea that Soviet Union was constructing
maJOr base at Berbera ( Sanalia). 'lhe military construction
14 Dieter Braun, 'lhe Indian Ocean :. Re~ion of Conflict or • Peace Zone•? /(Delhi, -1 §33), p. 1.
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programme included further facilities of anchorage, ai~
strip \for B-52 bombers) and improvement of radio
installations etc. 15 Apart fran Diego Garcia, there are
VLF communication systems instailed at Masirah \Oman),
North-West Cape and Cockburn Sound \Australia) etc., to
form a communication network for submarines. But VLF
communication can be effective only when submarines move
at shallow depth at low speed, thus jeopardising their
defences. '£he United .States is now well ahead witl1 a
project on extreme low frequency \ELF) ccmmunica tion
system, due to be completed in 1985, which can reach
submarines travelling at operational depth and cruising
speed. This will enhance -che command and control system
for s-crategic rruclear and space warfare.. 'Ihough the ELF
project a-c present does not cover the Indian Ocean area,
thel.'e are reports of plans for its installations in
Sri Lanka, extending the US- Sri Lanka agreement of December
1983 !'or establisllffient of Voice of America transni tters. 16
'1't1is syste-n will provide a sure method of ccmmunication
with s-crategic submarines, starting a more lethal arms
race in the Indian Ocean area.
15
16 Jas ji t Singh, "U.s,.. ·rransmi tters in Lanka: Grim Dangers for the Region", Times of India, 6 March 1935, p. 8.·
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Strategic mobility is a very important component
of seapower. The SLOC is the ability to resupply and re
inforce the military com~onents deployed overseas. After
the collapse of Shah's government in Iran and Soviet entry
in Afghanistan, President Carter made clear his concern
for the security of fue Persian Gulf. 17 'lhe Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) was established in 1980 to improve
the capability to deploy the US military forces to distant
areas. The policy of military sea lift and air lift is
the logical extension of bases, SSBNs, and communication
systems. The co~nand and control exercises, and field
exercises of the HDF ( Gal.lant Knitj'l t and Bright Star
manoeuvres) with some local powers like Egypt, Oman,
Somalia and Sudan clearly demonstrate the efforts to enhance
logistic capabilities for the Indian Ocean area. 18 In the
new structure, the capabilities of the Harine Corps and
infantry forces assume renewed relevance, and lanclpower
and sea[_)ower get closely linlced. Thus they v..rere reorganized
and further strengthened under a unified Central Command
17 'l'.A. l•'abyanic, 11Conceprual Planning and the RDJ.'l'F", Anned Forces and Societx (r'laryla:nd) , vol. 7, no. 3, spring 1981, p. 344.
18 Andrew Ambrose, 11U. s. Central Command : Revised Support Structure", Janes Defence Review (London), vol. 4, no. 7, ·1933, pp. 621-2; R. Lung'lerich, 11U. S. rta.pid Deployment Forces- LJSCENTCCM 11 , Anned Forces Journal (Washington, D.C.), vol. 23, no. 3, uctober 1934, pp. 88-120.
83
(CENTCOM) in 1983, with a clearly defined geographical res
ponsibility over Southwest Asia. 19 'l'he cartographic projec
tion of the Ct:NTOI11 touches the Indian borders, and hence
has serious security implications for us. RDF when tully
operational with about 45,000 marines in the area, covered
by the CE.l'l1'Cm1, will give the US forces in the Indian Ocean
tremendous mobility and strike pov;er. Its highly sophisticated,.
c3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) is
sustained by spy satellites, AV!ACS and Orion. ::iurveillance
aircrafts in Diego Garcia, increasing the surveillance,
sea control ·1nd can bat capabilities.
While analysing the US and Soviet presence in the
Indian Ocean, we should remember that it was facilitated by
the brealc-up of colonial empires and the departure of
colonial powers. The loss of ti1eir colonies and economic
migp t compelled in em to shape their Indian Ocean strategy
within the overall NATO framework. They respond favourably
to the American strategy in the area to protect their
interests. According to Article VI of the NATO agreement,
un nnned attaclc o.c;:11.nst one or more of ii:lan in Europe and
North America ,~uld be considered as an attack against them
19 For a discussion on the concept, missions and structure of the USCENTCCM, see US, Congress, Senate, Armed ::>ervices Committee, De~arilnent of Defense.- Author.ization for ~ppropriation for Y 1984, 98 Congress, iession 1, 2:J Harch 1~:.>, pp. 31o2-li3.
84
all. '1he forces of the manber countries canplanent each.
other and co-ordina·t;e their activities in the form of joint
exercises, communication links and use of each. other•s
facilities. The NATO doctrine of early escalation of
conflict in the event of a large scale Soviet attack to
the nuclear level has been supplemented,in recent times,
by large-scale strengthening of their conventional forces. 20
Thus in spite of economic constraints in recent years the
NATO powers have increased their naval build-up. They
realise that, in a lengthier conflict, the SLOC would be
essential for NATO logistics and fuose of local allies like
South Africa, ·~ustralia and some \'lest Asian countries.
Among NATO pov1ers, Britain has considerable
stake in the Indian Ocean area. In spite of its military
witi1drawal from the Indian Ocean area, Britain gives its
· t t . "d t' 21 It ti t overseas ~n eres s ser~ous cons~ era ~on. con nues o
maintain substantial trade, and even security ties, with
some littoral states in the Indian Ocean area. But now
the· security of its se<-tborne trade is almost fully dependent
on an alliance headed by the United States. Within ttle
20 Norman Friedman, "\1estern European and NATO Navies", Proceedings l US Naval Institute, Annapolis) , vol. 110, no. 5, lviarcn ·1 ~t}4, p. j5; see also vol. 111, no. 3, March 1985, pp. 37-~.
21 G. R. Villar, "Trends in f·1ari ~ime ·v/arfare' : 'Ihe Need for .I:-' ower Overseas?" in RlJSI, RUSI and Brass$::Y~s Defence Yearbook 193 4 (Oxford, 1 SB4) , pp. Z7 b.
85
NATO alliance, the British Navy was driven into a single
scenario oriented deep water anti-submarine role, as its
part in the con-cribution to NATO strategy. 22 '!he agreements
with Australia, Nev1 Zealand, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE were
meant to safeguard its commercial interests, under the
cover of maintaining peace and stability in the area. Now,
of course, it has surrendered most of its pedce-keeping
res lJOnsi bili ty to the US Navy, and has identified itself wi til
the latter'$' Indian Ocean strategy.
Tnough ccrnmi iment to NATO is the cornerstone of
the British defence policy, it has given enougp attention
towards building its ovm individual forces. The Falkland
war highli01ted the point that elements of presence and
operational effectiveness of their forces were as important
as allied cohesion. :fran an operational point of view it
seems significant that a substantial P~ber of British
23 warships still operate east of Suez. The ~oyal Navy has
very .Limited funds and scme defence cuts were also introduced
before the Falklands war. In spite of u1ose cuts continuing,
Britain s-cill spends the highest percentage of its ffi~P on
its navy as cern pared to other NATO allies. 'lhe Tnatcher
22 ,t-Jeter Stanford, 11 '1he Current Position of Royal Navy", Proceedings, fvJarch ·193 4, p. 103•
23 Friedman, n. 20, p. 41.
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government is going ahead with the construction of strategic
submarines Which will carry the latest Trident D5 missiles,
V/STOL carriers, minesweepers, torpedoes etc. 24 Though it
does not imply that Br~tain can operate outside the NATO
framework, it certainly has the capability to intervene
overseas, as demonstrated by the Falklands war.
France also considers the Indian Ocean within its
economic and strategic concern, and insists on maintaining
its capability to intervene in areas where it has interest
and commitment. It emphasises its complete independence
vis-a-vis other powers vmo have interest in the region.
The French navy is'unique in Europe for concentration on
strategic and overseas missions. 'i'he strategic mission is
symbolised by the construction of new SSBNs which is but
one aspect of the heavy nuclear weapons orientation of the
French defence policy. 'Ihe overseas mission derives fran
the assumption of responsibility in former French
possessions, particularly in Africa. 25 In the second half
of 1S63 the French navy kept a strong squadron of~Beirut
to support the peace-keeping forces. 'fhose ships '\'/ere
drawn fran the Nedi terranean fleet and others stations.-
'l'heir allocation to the Indian Ocean is limited to one
24 Ibid.; Van Kuffeler, n. 10, pp. '113-14.
25 Friedman, n. 20, p./ 38.
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extra small aviso, with occasionally a submarine for few
monfus. 26 France has an Indian Ocean l'liavaL Canmand which
patrols the Ocean with submarines, frigates, landing ships,
fast patrol boats, repair and maintenance.ships etc.'Zl
After 1976, the French developed a more mobile navy,
increasing the number of ships, \\bich vras further
strengchened by the operation of naval patrol aircrafts
fran .Ujibouti. Even after decolonisation, France maintained
its forces in Djibouti, Reunion, Hayotte and Mozambique
channel. This makes France one of the best naval facilities
in the Indian Ocean region having daninant influence in
and around the Red Sea-Suez approach and the lower Gulf.
After the energy crisis in the Seventies, France developed
bilateral relations vn·ti1 some oil-producing countries which
included bilateral supply agreements for arms, nuclear
technology etc. It also publicly supported the Arab cause 28 against Israel.
Due to its commi tnent in distant areas, the
French navy plans to continue operating aircraft carriers
in the foreseeable future, with a nuclear powered carrier
26 Van Kuffeler, n. 10, pp. '114-15.
27 Pierre Hanehouse, 11 France and the Indian Ocean11 ,
NayY International, vol. 86, no. 5, May 1~1, pp. 294=7 ..
28 Braun, n. 14, pp. / 103-4.
88
due to be deployed in 1985. The French five-year defence
plan (1984-88) reflects the traditional orientation towards
nuclear forces, including nevr generation SSBNs, SSNs and
nuclear attack aircraft carriers. 29 Naval yards at
Cherbourg, Brest and Lorient have been expanded with new
facilities not only for the construction of nuclear sub-
marines and carriers, but also destroyers, minehunters,
patrol boats and amphibious crafts etc. 30 , 'i'hougtl France
does not participate in the military planning and exercises
of NATO, there is greater interest on its part in recent ,
times for close co-operation 'VIi th the latter in a major
East- 1.'/est confrontation. 31
Soviet Response
It has been suggested that the Russians have had
a historic interest in the Indian Ocean area. An outlet to
the warm water, all-weather ports of the Indian Ocean v.ras
an extention of the old Czarist desire, dating fran the
time of Peter the Great. In 1940, this desire was reflected
in Ilrticle 4 of the secret protocol of Holotov-Ribbentrop
29 Friedman, n. 20, p. 38.
30 Van Kuffeler, n. 10, p. 115.
31 Ibid. ; I ISS , n. 10 , p. 31 • (
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talks, carving out spheres of influence south of Baku and
Batum, in the general direction of Persian Gulf. 32 SUch
speculations were a result of the British withdra~rcQ from
the area and the subsequent Soviet movements here. But
other strategic dnalysts have pointed out that it was
~ussophobia on the part of Britain that made too mud} out
of the lirni ted Czarist aspirations. 'Ihe naval thinking of
Klado and Hakarov, the Potemkin mutiny and the revolutionary
activities of Baltic sailors during world War I, and obscure
amphibious operations are hardly sufficient material on
vmich to predicate a naval heritage of the Soviet Union. 33
'l'he rise of the Soviet naval power in the 1950s under the
guidance of Admiral Gorshkov does not represent the fulfil-
men-c of me old Czarist dream; it "'as the product of new
interests and the need to respond to the massive \vestern
command of the seas. Admiral Gorshkov assesses the Western
naval threat in these words: " ••• The camp of imperialism
employs oc(•anic strategy as a basic concept of military·
doctrine. 'l'he ..Last war vvas a continental war ••• nov; "'e are
tnreatened by a coa~ition of maritime powers which, together
with land annies and aviation missile forces, deploy modern
j2 A. J·. Cottrell and J·.l"'l. Burrell, 11 The Soviet Navy in the lndian ucean 11
, Strate~c Keview \ \•lashington, D. c.) , vol. 2, no. 4, fall ·i 4, p. 2li0.
33 .1:-'.J· • .R.ollins, ".t-tussia• s Ficti:tiou.s Naval· Traditionn, Proceedings, vol. ~~.no. 1, January 1~73, pp. 65-71.
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naval forces. u34 'fhe teclmological changes and strategic
doctrines in the West shape the military strategy of the
Soviet Union even today. Soviet strategic thinkers, from
r'iakarov to Gorshkov, have follO\.'Ted developments in the West
European and American navies in order to introduce changes
in the Soviet naval forces. After the publication of
R. \'/. Herrick• s bool~ Soviet Naval Strategy (US Naval
Institute, Annapolis, 1968), each issue of Morskoi Sbornik
(Naval Digest) contains articles devoted to strategic conse-
quences of the Western revolutions in v1eapons technology,
and follow closely the discussions of American theorists. 35
The soviet Union• s commercial and trade relations
':Ji til the Indian Ocean countries have been maintained
continuously for a long time. It has a substantial fish
eaten frcm the Indian Ocean, and has fishing agreements with
some littoral countries. 'Iheir ships use the Indian
Ocean route, including same friendly countries' ports, as
it is an ice free route between western and eastern provinces.
It a~so reduces the burden on the trans-Siberian'railway,
and solves the problem of the northern route which is
marred due to tt1e Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet Union
34 Quoted in Souih (London), no. 49, November 1934, p. 16.
35 K.J-. Hagan and J.}v. Kipp, "U.S. & U.S.S.R. Naval Strategy", t:rocecdinss, vol; 99, no. 11, November 1~73, pp. 38-44._
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has also entered into international carrying trade, mostly 36 with the developing countries. In order to cater to the
needs of smaller countries, the soviet Union has concentrated
on medium size cargo ships and small tankers, rather than
giant super-tanlcers and container freigp.ters. It is.
alleged that the Soviet Union is interested in denying the
Hest the resources of the Indian Ocean area, especially
oil, and wants to co.11pete with the United States for off
shore concessions fr~1 the littoral states. Since it has
abundant energy resources of its own, it is said that the
Soviet Union' s strategy would be to cut off oil supplies
to the V/est and Japan in the event of a conflict.
Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has put it within
350 mil~s of the Arabian Sea, and ·~t:is has led to ala.nnist
projections of soviet threat. 37 Compared to the Soviet
Union, the American offensive capability is far ~~perior
as it includes at-sea logistic mobility, an overseas
network of bases, and sophisticated and balanced \·Tarfleet
in ti1e area. Its strategic umbrella stretching from the
oil.t'ields of Saudi Arabia to the far reach of Pakistan
malces the Soviet Union vulnerable.
36 Cordier, n. 8, pp. 49-50.
37 B. N. Banerjee, Indian Ocean VJh:irlpool· of Unrest \Delhi, 1 93 4) , .;;;.p,..-p ... --ri181:--3r_-,4;-;.~;,_.:,..,_;.;,.;:.;;.;;.~~.;.;;;;;..--.;;;;.....;;--.,...-;;,.-
'92
The Soviet Union kep G a close watch on American
activities in the Indian Ocean area, and made itso~n moves
for politico-diplomatic influence in the littoral countries.
The major objective of the Soviet policy has been to
11reduce the US military presence in the Indian Ocean which
is considerably more powerful". 38 The first appearance
of the soviet forces in the Indian Ocean was during the
Yemeni civil war in the early 196os, when TU-16 bombers of
Egyptian markings manned by Soviet crews, flew bombing
missions from Cairo against the Royal Yemeni forces.
Britain's delay in transferring pO\ver to Aden's moderates
resulted in the South Yemen' s government turning to the
Soviet Vnion. 39 Two strategic locations of Aden and
Socotra became available to the Soviet Union for fishing
bases. Simila1·ly it got a fooinold for fishing rights
in Hauri tius, v.Ji1.en Britain refused to assist the latter
in establishing a fishing industry. 'lhe military presence
of the soviet Union is supported by economic aid and
trade policies, and they took the advantage when the
\·/estern countries failed to respond to tile requirements of
)8 VJ. K. Anderson, "Soviets in the Indian Ocean : Much Ado About .::iomett1.ing - But \vhat?" Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. ~, September 1984, p. 928.
39 Havi Kaul, 11 'lhe Indo-Pakistani \'lar and the Changing Balance of Pov.rer in the Indian O.cean", Proceedings, vol. Y':l, no. 5, Nay 1973, p •. 178.
93
aid requested by lit~oral countries of the Indian Ocean.
This has provided them with anchorage and other facilities
in Asia and the African coast. After 1977 they gained
Perim at the mouth of the Red Sea, and Dahlak port, off
I'ftassawa (the Eri trean Port). 'lhis was due to the fact that
the war in the Horn of Africa resulted in reversal of
influence for the United States and the Soviet Union; the
Soviet Union lost influence in Somalia but gained in
Ethiopia, and vice versa for the United States. The Soviet
Union ctlso has facilities at Hodeida in Yemen Arab kepublic,
Aden in South Yenen, and Cam ttanh Bay in Vietnam for major
repairs and storage of strategic equipment. 40 Apart from
these faci~ities, the Soviet Union employs a system of
maintenance of ships, moored to buoys located outside
territorial waters of many countries in the Indian
ucean.
In spite of some maintenance, replenishment and
repair facilities, the main naval stay of the Soviet Union
is in the hi§h seas due to political and economic costs
associated ·with the policy of bases and shore-based
facilities. A form~dable Soviet fleet has emerged in the
1~j70s and l:BOs with a long-range impact. 41 Operations
4o H. '1'. Kaufman, "Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean", Times of India, 28 April 'l ':::B 1, p.· 8~
41 Cordier, n. ~, pp. 43-44; li-. Jacobs, "Soviet Navy : An update", Asian uefence Journal ~Kualalampur), April 1934, pp •. 62-'(2, 89.
94
far fran hane waters have vast.ly increased for the Soviet
fleet and their most dramatic deployment have been to the
Pacif'ic and "tile Indian Ocean. Initially sane cruisel'S and
destroyers v1ere detached fran V.iadivostok-based Pacific
fleet . .;.nd sent to the Indian subcontinent, Persian Gulf
and bast Africa. Since 1970 a somewhat permanent fleet was
stationed in the area, consisting of destroyers, fleet
mines-sweepers, cruisers, oilers, supply ships and oceano
graphic ships. 42 Additional ships, including guided
mis.sile frigates, attack submarines, helicopter carriers
etc. were sent during 1971 Bangladesh war and 1973 Arab-
Israeli "riar. Another instance was that of sending ships to
l'laputo narbour (IvJ:ozambique) against the South African
com::Jcmdo raid on black nationalist headquarters.
'lhe US deployment of SSBNs and precision guided
munitions have resu.l ted in Soviet investment in SSBN
procramne wi "th the latest SS-N- 20 missiles. An advanced
strategic armament technology including submarine strike
system gives them an enhanced strike capability fran their
for~vard based systsns. 43 Its Bast European allies have
42 us,congress, Senate, Foreign Affairs Corrunittee, Soviet B.ole in ii.Sia, I:;B Congress, session 1, 28 July 1~3, pp. 236:J21; Bezboruah, n. 3, p. 146.
43 J. J. TritJ:;en, "Soviet Navy : Threat Asses·sment 11 ,
IJavl International, vo.L. 813, ·no. "10, October 1934, p. 20.
95
serious economic difficulties which restricts their ability
to expand and modernise their armed forces. Except for
Poland and Homania, which recently acquired missile
corvette and frigates respectively, and East Germany which
has so~me production facilities, no other \'!TO ally has given
any inaication of even a small independent naval build up.
The total figure of the WTO military expenditure is heavily
domin.:l.tect by the Soviet Union, and the allies are totally
dependent on the former for their defence needs. 44
Recently, the Soviet Union has concentrated on completing
new snips, and integrating them into its fleet. It has
tried to compensate for the lack of embarked long-range
fixed-wing aviation laircraft carriers) by SSBNs and ships
mounted by long range SSMs. 45 The Soviet units are furnished
with redundant combat systems and alternative operative
modes which ensure a high degree of reliability and
survivability. ·1heir merchant mg.rine is an armed forces
auxiliary, "Gightly integrated into the operations of the
navy. Hundreds of cargo ships and tankers are designed
and equipped to function immediately in the long-range
m 1.li tary ro.Le. 'l'heir roll-on, ro.il-off ships and large
44 i,lilc.n Vego, "E~st Europe~n Navy", Proceedink[, vo.L. ·110, no • .?, Harch 't984, pp. 44-48; SIP , n. '9, p. 87; IISS, n. '10, p. 15.
45 Darry i·l. Blechman and t;dward N. Luttwak, International Security Yearbook 193:5-84 ~London, 1934), pp. 150-51; Van Lut.1.elel·, n. 'tO, pp. ·110-12.
96
carriers can carry vehicles and equipment safely in their
hold, and disgorge the cargo by a stern ramp without benefit
of port facilities. Merchant ships have an advantage that
tney have greater freedom of access to ports t~·rlo navy
ships, and tl:n.l.s can purchase fresh water and other supplies
for naval use from ports where warships are denied visit~~ '.l'he efforts on the part of the Soviet Union at enhancing its
influence among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean have
stimulated further American build-up in the area. Its
multilateral efforts to place constraints on the United
States througn political, economic and strategic manoeuvres
have not been successful. Moreover, the SoViet navy still ~
laclcs favourable geography, significant sea-based aviation
and sustainability of most of its forces. 47 1heir force
procurement should not be confused witil ability to operate
in actual war against modern opposition. Soviet operations
against even smaller powers can also be met by the United
States by either extended dete1·rence or the rapid
upgradation of the threatened nations' military capability
by rapid air lift/ sea-lift of hi£#1 force multipliers.
1\mong the countries that do not belong to the
lnctio.n Oceo.n area geographically but have shown their
46 Cordier, n. 8, pp. 49-50.
47 'l'rJtten, n. 43, p.-· 621.
97
presence in the region for centuries, China figures prami-
nently. China• s diplanatic, military and economic
activities in the African littoral and Asian countries
bear ample evidence to its ability to project its inf~uence
far afield. China started an independent naval programme
in 1964 when Admiral Hsiao began to develop a respectable
inshore navy. It \~S divided into three fleets: the North
Sea Fleet fr~ Yalu to Shantung, the East Sea Fleet
facing Fonnosa and guarding Shan§:lai, and the South Sea
fleet fran Swatmt to Gulf of Tonkin and centred on qg
Canton. At present the Chinese navy is third in the
world in terms of personnel strength, but it is largely
a coastal defence force. Though it has considerable
number of submarines, destroyers, frigates, patrol crafts,
amphibious ships and auxillaries, they are technologically
backward and are based on two decades-old Soviet designs. 49
'l'ne1·e are indigenous efforts to develop SSBNs, but the system
is not yet at sea. However, the Chinese have been fairly
successful in producing missiles, electronic equipment
and sensors. It should also be remenbered that they have
sited land-based missiles in the mountains of 'fibet, and
lJ8 Clarl{ G. Reynolds, Conu"!"land of the Sea (London, '1976), p. 5'15.
49 Van Kuffeler, "Navies in 1933 : Non-NATO and Third ~.-lorld", NavT International, vol. "89, no.· 3, T1arch 1934, p. 15 ; G. Jacobs, "PLA: Navy : An Update", Asian Defence Journal, i'1ay '19:34, pp. 50-56.
98
their nuclear arsenal consists of intennediate and medium
range missiles of considerable megatonnage. 50 'lheir aspira
tion to long-range naval deployment is reflected by their
production of Jiansshu and ~ destroyers, replenishment
ships etc. Their submarines can operate as far south as
Halacca.
China maintains trade reLations with many littoral
countries in the Indian Ocean, and exchanges with them.
agricultural products like rice, rubber etc. It has had
a lot of influence in Tanzania and Zambia where a 1,050-
mile '11an- Zorn Railway \'Ja.S built in order to link the copper
mines of Zambia with Dar-es-Salaam port of Tanzania. The
naval facilities on this port \vere built by China as was
an airfield 80 miles vrest of Nzwenger. Apart from this
China gave substantial militar-y aid to Tanzania, such as
tanl<s, patrol boats, HiG-17 aircrafts etc. 51 Pakistan
too has some Chinese aircrafts and other equipment in its
arsenal. China's open support to Pakistan during the
Inde-~akistani war of 1965 made India apprehensive of its
intentions in the Indian subcontinent. After 1971 the
beginn.int of Chind.' s rapprochement with the United States
50 D. c. uaniel and H. \'1. Jencks, "Soviet Hili tary Confrontation with China", 'l'he J·ournal of East Asian Affairs (Seoul), vol. :;, no. 2, fall/vrinter 1933, p. 584.·
51 .K..aul, n. 39, pp. 1'16-77; Nartin .Bcti..Ley, . 11 '11anzania and China", A!'ric;m l\.l'.l~1irs (OxfQrd), vol. 74, no. 294, January 1975, pp. j§:SO. ·
99
brou@t a new configuration of forces into being v.hich,
.i'or a variety of reasons, are opposed to Soviet influence
in the area. Tl1ere has been grO\dng military contact
between China and the United States \llhich includes purported
US material assistance for Chinese monitoring of Soviet
ballistic missile defence, high level exchange between the
t'IITO defence hier·archies and an expanding Chinese shopping
list for modern US military hardwa1··e. In 1932, a
Congressional SubcQ1~ittee was required by the US Under
Secretary of ~tate for Security Assistance, James Buckley,
to lift the .legislative ban on foreign assistance to
China. 52 In return ~hina accepts the broad American
per-ception on tl1e containment of the Soviet Union.
For Japan the Indian Ocean constitutes the life
line for its oil imports. Apart from oil, it imports
rubber and tin frQn South East Asia, and iron ore, coal,
ZJ.nc, copper, and uranium from \'lest Australia, East
Africd, South Asia etc. Aft~r the oil embargo in 1973
japan developed a somewhat independent policy towards the
l.Jersian Gulf. It developed bilateral trade rel.ations \'lith
oil- ex!Jorting countries. Bilateral export agreements have
:..t.Lso t1een concluded wi tl1 Australia, the ASEAN countries
52 .J. S. 13reemer, 11 U. S.-Cl1inese Cooperation : 'l.he Naval Dimensionu, Proceedings, vol. ·1o~, no. 2,, February l';k)j, p. 71.
100
and even South Africa. 53 Japan opposed the moves on the
part of Indonesia and ~1,;.laysia in 1969 to extend their
terri toria.L ;·,aters to a 12-mile limit, and restricting
tanker traffic in order to prevent environmental problens
in the Nalacca Straits. The alternative to Halacca. are
Sunda Straits (south of Sumatra) and the Lanbok, further
south. But Sunda poses problems to the supertankers due
to its slmllow northern approaches, and the Lanbok
increases the distance by at least three days.54 The
I1alacca dispute, that arose due to Indonesia's archipelago
concept, aroused Jo.pan' s interest in the Kra canal, across
the n:trrow isthmus in southern Thailand. The Japanese
industrialists ·were, at one stage interested in preparing
so::1et~ing like a PaYl3ffia CanG.l which ;,·:Ould lessen the
distance from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea by
h~L~dreds .of miles. 55
Japan h8.s no military presence of any kind in
the Indian Ocean area, and wo1,1ld in any case be prevented
53 Braun, n. 'IL't, pp. 8l::I-<J1; Koji Nakamura, "Oil : Reassessr,1ent in Japan", Far Eastern Economic Review \ lionc l\one;), vol. 84, no. ·13, 1 April 1974, pp. 53-54.
54 Bezboru~, n. 3, p. 164.
55 '.'!.F. Libby, "Thailand's Kra Canal: Site for \·lorld's First Huclear Industrial Zone", Orbis (lJhiladelphia), vol. ·19, no. ·1, spring 19'/5, pp. 350-08. .
101
by its constitution from contemplating such projection of
power •. It has coordinated its policies with the West and
other allies in the South East Asia to ensure its security
as well as that of its shipment. 56 Its numerous trade
arrangements in South East Asia and West Asia take care of
its economic and transportation problems, though British
wi thdravJal from the Indian Ocean and that of the United
States from Korea made its security problEIDS more pressing.
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSFD) has
recently shown a trend towards gradual expansion of its
missions and capabilities •. The five-year construction
programme of the ~1SDF (1983-87) is to provide a force of
60 destroyers and frigates, 15 submarines, 6 fast attack
crafts and 33 mine countermeasure (!1CN) vessels. 57 They
t1ave a regular modernisation and replacenent progrannne,
and their shipyards work efficiently within a building
time-frame. The United States plays an important role in
Japcm':.:; weapons procurement process, as the Self Defence
Force prefers advanced \veapon system from the United States
whenever n ccmpar~:"tble indigenous systen is not available:
56 In recent times, the United .States has urged Japan to increase its defence spending and capabilities to contribute to tne combined defence of the Pacific and Indian Ocean seo.lanes. See US, Coneress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, US-Japan Relations, 97 Congress, sessio!l 2, 24 Narch ·1982, pp.- 465-SO.
57
102
a case is that of Harpoon missiles for the new submarines.58
Moreover, there is close alignment of the JMSDF capabilities
v,ri th those of the US Navy through certain joint wartime
operations.
Littoral Countries
The littoral countries of the Indian Ocean area
have to be viewed in the global strategic framework of
superpowers v~ich have increased their military presence in
the area and threaten to intervene for the cause of 'political
stability•. If stable political situation does not suit
them, they instigate instability and try to-change the
leadership which would accept their strategic framework.
Some countries in the Indian Ocean littoral acquiesce in
such 'strategic consensus• and play the role as dictated
by the big powers. On the other hand, there are countries
\vhich gained inctepenuence after the Second world War as a
result of sustained struggle over a long period. The
aspirations of people in those countries led to the desire
to play an independent role in international relations,
wnich is canmensuratc with their long-term socio-econanic
and ~olitical interests. They consider the military presence
58 J.F. Bouchard and D.J·. Hess, 11 '1'he .. Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense1;, Proceedings, l11ar·ch 1~4, p. 95.
103
of external powers in the Indian Ocean as a factor leading
to tension and rivalry among local countries too. The
concept of • power vacuum' was used by the big powers to
justify their military presence here, and also to undermine
the capacity of littoral countries to look after their own
interests. Outside presence in the Indian Ocean has turned
the area in-co an arc of crisis·, ranging fran South Africa
to the Indian subcontinent through East Africa, the Horn
of Africa, Arabian peninsula and southwest Asia. This has
serious implications for India's security interests. 'Ihe
role of same important littoral countries, from South Africa
to Aus-cralia, has to be seen in the litil t of two wrld
views, -chose of domination and of self-determination.
Australia had a Pacific-oriented posture for a
long time uue to "the presence of ·the B:ei tish Navy on the
\ale.stern side. The mineral v.real th. of \'lest Australia, its
industrial products, export of agricultural products and
import o.l oil fran the Persian Gulf were all protected by
the British Navy, until the latter• s decision to withdraw
from the Indian Ocean. Australia initially did not attach
much importance to the appearance of the Soviet ships in the
Indian Ocean; its External Affairs Hinister Gordon Freeth
asked his countr~nen not to panic at the sight of the
Soviet ships. HiG idea may have been to contain China with
the Soviet help in the light of Chou En· Lai 1 s desire to use
104
Australia as a gate\'Ja.Y to the south. 59 The Labour Govern
ment headed by Gough \'lhi tlam adopted an independent policy
and identified Australia with its Asian neighbours. It
reco~!ized the Communist regime in China, discontinued aid
to South Vietnam and Kampuchea, opposed' American build-up
in the Indian Ocean and identified itself strongly with the
UN declaration on the peace zone. rJialcolm Fraser' s
government reversed the policy after 1976, welcomed i:ile
American naval build-up including the expansion of Diego
Garcia, and removed Labour Party's restrictions on American
nuclear weapons-carrying units making calls on Australian
ports. Under Bob Havvke, AustrCJ.lia continues to consider
ANZUS as the lynch-pin of Australian defence policy. 60 The
mild anti-nuclear stand of Hawke dissolved after his
visit to the United States in 1 SB4. Aust1 alia has played
a very important role in the communications network for the
American SSBN deterrent force. The Battle-Barwick agreement
in 1963 provided for a VLF communications base in the
N ortb.- \'lest Cape \'lhere high frequency transmitters ties
this s~tion into the US defence satellite communications
59 BP.zboruah, n. 3, p. 3JO.'
60 T. D. Bridge, 111.J,.ustralian Defence under Hawke", Army Quarterly and Defence Journal ~Devonshire), vol. 114, no. 2, April 1984, p. 148; '1'. B. Millar~ 11 The Defense of Australia ", Daedalus ( Ca'1lbridge), vol. 114, no. 1 , vJinter 1935, pp. 2590-79.
105
systen. 'l'here is also a defence research station at Pine
Gap (Central Australia), and a naval base at Cockburn sound,
HIJrAS t· 1; .,..,,. 61 .'! Sl.r;~•
Australia has a well-balanced economic infra-
structure, industrial production base, and foreign trade
which is equivalent to 35 per cent of its GDP. The military
planners of Australia feel that it should develop a
considerable deterrent ca~ability to protect its sea lines
as well as to provide • viOrthvklile support to the US in its
world-wide peace-keeping activi ty•. 62 'fhe key elements of
deterrence are surveillance· and reconaissance (performed
by the airforce and navy together), sea control measures,
strategic strike capability with submarines and F-111
aircraf~1and the ability to deploy a1n support balanced
gr01..md forces in threatened areas. But the financial
climate in Australia has not been very bright "Vlhich led to
the cancellation of order for the aircraft carrier
Invincible from l:lri tain by Hawke's Lc:. bour Government. It
seems the Australian navy would be an all-helicopter force,
wi tl1 the ASW role of Seakinp; helicopters, operating from
61 Desmond Ball, 11 'l'o.rget Australia : i-'inpointing the \). s. Installadons ", 1-'acific Defence R~orter l Victoria) , vol. e, no. 3, September 1 1, p.· 26; Bezboruah, n. 3, p. 3J2.
62 David Leach, "Navy's Views of Australia' s·Defence Need.s ", Paci1'ic Defence Reporter, vol. 11, no. 2, August 1 ~4, p. 1?.
106
new Adelaide frigates. 63 'l'he ne\11 suhnarines built in Europe
will also be available by 19~, whereas the old Oberon
suhnarines have mounted new \>J"eapon systens. 'Ihe guided
missile destroyers, Perth class, are going to be modernized
with ne\·J sensors and ueapon systems including the capability
to fire Ilar[_)oon missiles. 64 Even if the fixed-wing elanents
of the fleet arm of the navy is disbanded, the modernization
of surface ships, ASW and MCM forces, sul:marines,. and the
fleet support duties of the airforce are going to provide
Australia a considerable strike capability in the Indian
Ocean.
South Africa's strategic importance lies in the
sealanes around the Cape, its strategic minerals, harbours,
airfields, and communications and industrial capacity. It
is considered that South Africa is the only loya~ ally of
the \vest in South of Sahara. Its raw materials and
facili tics are cruci<::.l to the \'Test in the event of war,
and their loss to the Soviet Union would be catastrophic. 65
63
64
65
Van Kuffeler, n. L:9, p. 152; P.L. Young, "The Royal Australian N3vy 11 , Navx International, vol. 89, no. 2, February ·1 ::£4, p. '91.
Go.Ldrick and Jones, n. 57, p. 65.'
1~. L. Dodd, 11 South African Navy", Nav~ International, vol. 89, no. 10, October 1984, p. 60 •
107
South Africa looks at Soviet presence in Angola as a threat,
and considers itself, along with Australia, as great defence
circle of the West. It has continued to stress that its
navy can no longer be relied upon to safeguard the Cape rcute;
and that it must be the responsibility of the Western powers. 66
The Western powers realise this, as Britain once called South
Africa the •southern Gibraltar•. Apprehending Soviet control
of the Cape route in the event of a clash, South Africa
proposed a treaty along the lines of NATO. Britain entered
the Sirnonstown agreanent in 1955 and supplied arms to expand
the South African military force. This 'gibralter of the •
southern hemisphere' is closely linked with the overall
American reconaissance system. Its communications station
scans Indian Ocean shipping as far as Bay of Bengal, !or the
Pentagon.
South Africa has developed a sound econcmic
infrastructure aP~ military force with the help of Western
powers. There is a strong opinion ~n the West that the UN
arms embargo against South Africa should not be followed by
' the Western countries as they have high stakes in that
country. 67 Apart from receiving arms supplies !rem the West
it has considerable naval construction and repair facilities -.A.
at Simonstown; the Dorbyl and Sandrock Austral Yards in
66 N.L. Dodd, "African/Navies South of Sahara", Proceedings, vol. 110, no. 3, March 1984, p. 57.
67 Dodd, n. 65, p. 6o9.
108
Durban build Corvettes and other crafts. The technological
standa1 d and manpower of South Africa's defence industries,
their dockyards in particular, is very higp resulting in
efficient maintenance of vessels imported from the
West. 68 South Africa is the only state in the sub-Saharan
region comparable to a medium sized European power. Apart
from improving its military potential, South Africa has
opted for aggressive defence ~1ich consists of cross-border
raids on guerrilla bases and campaigns of destabilisation
in nearby countries that support the rebels. 69 Apart frcm
maintaining old contacts 'VIi th Israel, South Africa has
developed relations with ti1e navies of Chile and Taiwan
too, serving the global US strategy.
'l'he arc bet\;reen South Africa and the Indian sub-
continent l1as beccme extre11ely volatile a:rxl conflict-ridden
in recent times. External powers have also increased their
military presence and lift capability in the area, leading
to increased tension. In spite of the changed policy of
the ls.Lamic regime wh1..ch led to stoppage of arms and
spares irom the West, the Iranian armed forces have stretched
the war with Iraq for five years. It \·las believed that,
with the stopping of anns purchases, depletion of indigenous
68 uodd, n. 66, p. 57.
69 VI. G. Thorn, 11Sub-Saharan Africa'· s Changing Military Environment", Armed Forces and, Society, vol. 11, no. 1, fa.LL ·1 ':£4, p. 48.
109
infrastructure and the expulsion of American maintenance
s-caff, trw sophisticated arms of Iran WOUld fall into
d~se. But on the contrary, the Iranian forces are hitting
lra.qi targets wi tt1 vengeance. 'lheir major units are
occasionally si@lted at sea and the long range Orion airc~afts
still make reguJ.ar sorties. 70 l"lOr'eover, Khomeini has threatened
to close dovm Persian Gulf if Iraq uses French Super Etendard
i'i0l1ter bombers; and Iran can do it by sowing the most
rudimentary minefields. In order to keep the sea-route
open t11e United States has obtained bases closer to the
Persian Guli, and also could use sane ports in energency:
those of Saudi Arabia (Jubail and Yanbo), Israel (Eilat),
Bo.hrain U·Iana"J.a), Oman (rvluscat) and Egypt ( Ras Banas). The
US Navy could also use South African ports of Simonstovm,
Dur·ban and Port Elizabeth, as well as the French base at
. '/1 Reun~on. 'l'he Saudi early v.rarning aircraft, Ai:TACS, as
'dell 00 joint exercises v1i th scme other countries are also
designed to play important role in the swift movement of
r·apid deployment iorces in the region.
L ran uncier the .3roh, with its sophisticated armed
torces ~1d 1irfield facilities, occupied an important position
70 rr;:; iddle Eastern, North African and South Asian Navies 11 ,
Proceedings, Barch 1934, p. 50.
71 cnandra Kumar, 11 The Indian Ocean : ·Arc of Crisis or Zone of Peace", International Affairs (London), vol. 60, no. 2, sprinG 1984, p. z38.
110
in the American military reconaissance operations. 'rhe Orion
.ceconaissance and AS~tl aircrafts \'lere given to the Shah for
serving this purpose. 'lhe role has since been transferred
to Pakistan and is backed by arrangffi1ents for the rapid
deployment of American troops. 72 .tJal-::istan does not have
an extensive infrastructure, but has a substantial ccmbat
experience due to ext~~sive participation in CENTO military
exercises in the past. Their efficient crew and manpower
have been sent to many West Asian countries to train their
airf'orces. Recently Pal\:istan has expanded its capabilities
with new Agosta subnarines frcm France, US Navy• s Gearing
Fram I destroyers, British guided missile destroyers, and
ennanced e.Lectronic warfare and anti-aircraft capabilities. 73
\'Ji th ~ ts ennanced strike power and offer of military
fa.cili ties to the \vest, 1:-'a1~istan plays an important role
in the 1\rnerican strategic consensus. The main crisis spots
in the 'arc of crisis• are East Africa, l:'ersian Gulf and
South Asia, which can disturb the general trade pattern in
the area or result in big power intervention.74
72
'73
74
Cr1icherov, 11. 6, p. -1124; Cecil Victor, "Sea Defence : Indocentric or Regional", Patriot, 15 1vtarcl1 19::15, p. 4.
Keith Jacobs, i•PakistaJ1' s Navy", t'roceedims, March 1 '::)<34, p. 54; see also, 11 .[-laKistan Defence ~rectory", Defence and Foreie;n Affairs (Washington, D.C.), vol. 1..?, no. 2, ;,•'ebr·uary ·i%5, pp • .2.9-..?0; New York Times, 6 February 1 951, p. '( 4.
Ibid.
111
In South-East Asia, the ASEAN bloc is a major force
to reclean with, ·chough it has made its mark only on the
diplomatic front. Communist victories in Vietnam, Kampuchea
and Laos have broug~t these countries together. It should
also be remanbe1·ed that the United States, Japan, Austra.lia,
Ne1·1 Ze.J.land, the EEC and Canada are their partners, and
have hie;h st.J.l<:es in tl1e abundant resources of rubber, tin,
vegetable oil, timber, sugar and petroleum from the ASEAN
countries. '/'j '1nou13h there is no formal military alliance
with the \'Test, tl1e ASEAN countries are regular recipients of
arms from NATO countries, provide facilities to then and
have been tal\.ing part in joint exercises. f'llili tarily,
Indonesia is an important pov1er in the region and has
recently expanded its capabilities 1·!1 th Type 202 sutmarines·
i rom '.'!est Ger;nany, Boeing 7 j7 maritime patrol aircrafts,
corvettes, frigates, fast a ttacl<: crafts and missile boats
etc. 76 l'houc11 i t.s no..vy is not big enough to patrol the
area, it guards one of tt1e most important trade routes,
the ~·1alacca ::Jtrai ts •.
India • .s lone coa.stline o.f over 6,000 kilometres
D.al·:es it V<tlnerable to -cl1reats from .seaside, especially clue
to the natnre of ti.1e medium where instruments of war can be
75 Asio. Ye:trbook 1983 (Hong Kong, 1%3), p. 96.
76 Goldrick and Jones, n. r:·7, p. 64.
112
stored v1i thout being detected easily. Indian scholar and
diplomat K.r-1. Panikkar had v~arnted four decades ago that
India's freedom was dependent on the freedom of the water
surface, "no industrial development, no commercial growth,
no stable political structure is possible for her unless
her shores are protected 11 •77 In the early days of India's
independence the importance of seapov1er was not given serious
consideration due to apparent tranquility and distance
from the main arena of big power rivalry. India's first
experience of nav.:1l \·.Jarfare was in 1965 when two Pakistani
destroyers I\haibar and ~ carried out a hit and run
bombardment of Dv1arlm, south of the Gulf of Kutch. The
Indian fleet continued its exercise in the Bay of Bengal,
ancl t1us tool" sane tune to reach its \V3.r station in the
78 Ar3.bL111 sea. The Indian navy took .Lessons from the 1965
war and adO[)ted a bolder strategy for future engagenents,
namely, destruction of the eneny' s rnari time forces, attack
on shore targets, blockade, and [)rotection of trade. In
the 1971 1VD.r, ever-y Indian ship 1·1as employed to achieve these
obj(~ctives, nnd India fou[j:lt a .full-scale naval v1ar for the
!'i rst tir:le. Towo.ros the end of the vmr the United States
tried to usc force by sending the Task Force-74 in order
77 K.~.;. Panikkar, India o.nd the Indian Ocean ,(Bombay, 1971), p. 85.
78 I\auj_, n. 39, p. 18.6.
113
to coerce India into stopp~ng its operations. Though
it \V3.S not successful in this strategy, the very use· of
gunboats nonetheless brings into focus the problem of big
power intervention in local conflicts. Geography has . placed the Indian Ocean and its hinterland in the logical
area of military deployment and forv.rard bases. The military
and no.val presence of the big powers and their-calculated
interference in the local matters have a hi~ly disruptive
efiect on tl1e development potential of the littoral
countries.
1he shared experience of imperialism has united
most of the countries in the region in a resolve to keep
out of international power politics and military participation.
The non-aliQ1.ed movement has given than a common platfonn to
cane togeti1er and develop collective self-reliance. This
sharec! concern fmmd its manifestation in the concept of a
' zone of peace' which counters the concept of 'power
vacuum' used by the ~·fest to provide an excuse for the
British to v1elccme American forces in the Indian Ocean,
and to dismember the territories of Hauri tius and Seychelles
by the creation of i:he BIOT. 'l'he non-;iligned conference,
and otJ.1er re:3iona1 and internatiOil3.l meetings have
repeatedly deplored the external naval build-up which is
an extension of neo-colonialism and intimidation-of Afro-
114
Asian countries. 'lhe Lusaka no~aligned conference of 1970
for the first time appealed for support for the declaration
of the Indian Ocean area as a zone of peace. 79 The first
formal shot was fired by Sri Lanka• s ambassador to the United
Nations, Shirley Amarsingrre, who requested the UN Secretary
General to put the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a
zone of peace on the agenda of the 26th session of the
General Assembly. 'l'he efforts of Sri Lanka and 'l'anzania
led to the passage of Resolution 2832 which stated that the
• Indicm ucean, within limits, together with airspace above
and the ocean-floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated
for all times a zone of peace•.80 The 27th session of
1 '::!72 -ct1rough Resolution 2992 decided to establish an ad hoc
commit·cee to study the implications of the earlier
resolution, and measures to be -caken in furtherance of
its objectives. The UN General Assembly n~s repeatedly
requesteu the li t·coral and hinterlanci states to consult
with a view -co convening a conference on the Indian Ocean,
and nas invited all states, especially big powers, to ce-
' •t "h •tt 81 O()ercn::e wl n -c e canml ee. .Since the early 1970s, the
79 11 First CommuniltUe 11 , neviev.,r of International Affairs \UC.L(;.t'ade), vol. 21, no. 4CJ1, 20 Se[Jtember 1~70, pp. 22, 33. -
80 Ku1,ar, n. 71, pp. 241-2.
(j 1 UN, General Assembly, Report of· tne Ad Hoc Comm1. ttee on the Indian Ocean, j8 session, Supplement No. 29, A/38/29, pp. 7-9 •.
115
membership of the corruni ttee has increased fran 23 to 47,
including many external rnari time users of the Indian
ucean.
~he efforts to convene the Con£erence on Zone of '
.b'eace at Colombo have repeatedly been foiled by the United
States and its allies. It raised the issues of armed
conflict amonG the. states of the region, establishnent of '
a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Indian Ocean territories, and
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, ~nich supposedly ~nper
any meaninc;l\.tl progress towards realisation of the Indian
Ocean as a zone of peacc.82 'l'he \'/estern menbers of the
committee led by tile Vni ted States insist that the situation
has changed after the Soviet invdsion of Afghanistan and
that, .tirst of all, there should be ag!'eement on the issue
of the ·v1i tndrawal uf its forces iran ·fuere. ' But it v1ould
not be correct to as::;wnc that the in-cere·sted parties opposed
the peace zone movement· only on. the above-~entioned issues.
'l'hey il:1d done so in 1')'/lf :::t'iso vhen a con11Ui ttee consisting of
Frank Barnaby, K. 0ubrahmanyam and .:3ham Safave (of the
I rani:':m Navy) prep.:1red a 'statement about great power ·,_
military pre:;ence in -che Indian Ocean, at the instance of
the UN Secretary General. 'l'he report included both :::' -~·.f::::.ce
82 '.layne I•Ierry, u.s. 1-1.1'!'irms Cornmi tment Zone of i.Jeace Ne1v Del i: USIS,. 193 •
116
surface ships and submarines, the use of staging facilities
and airfields, the naval use of bases, mooring buoys, and
communications and fuelling faci~ities. The experts were
highly critical of the Diego Garcia base, which was paving
the way for intensified anns rivalry in the future. 8 3 But
this report was replaced in its entirety by the General
Asse::toly in consultation \·Ti th V/illiam Epstein, \.bo prepared
a revised report. Ho\vever, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted
the earlier report, and suggested that the Committee be
transformed in~o a negotiation forum to consult with
permanent members of the UN Security Council, with a view
tuwaras lessening arms rivalry.
'l'he big powers nave tended to import the cold
'~r atmosphere in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee,
and have transfonned it into a forum 1or propaganda \·Jarfare
and l'olemics. A sepa.J:·ate call for denuclearization of the
region does not l1.old much relevance ':ben the aircraft
carriers stationed in the area carry iRmdreds of liG1t and
medium vreieht nuclear bombs, nuclear depth charges, anti-
submarine ,1nd an-ci-aircraft missiles etc. The United States
is replacing its older aircrafts and artillery \-ti th new
ones · h,J.ch :Jt·e nuc.Le:J.r certified, ana enh.tnce the nuclear
artillery poten~i:ll of ti1e marine corps and other units. 84
83 U1., General Assenbly, Doc. A/AC. 15<3/·l, 3 May 1974.·
84 B:~ner jee, n. 37, pp. 253-4.
117
Moreover, it is quite improbable to achieve international
security through denuclearization of a particular area.
Denuclearisation is 9art of ~1e wider question of nuclear
disarmrunent, \mereac the peace zone idea is re~ated to the
issue of rreventing super pov1er competition fran intensi
fying in the third I"JOrld area. 85 Conceptually the peace
zone idea includes the element of nuclear weapon--free zone.
Otherv.rise there vra.s no justification \iha tsoever in calling
upon outside powers not to deploy nucleaP-weapons in the
area.
·rr1e big powers increased their naval presence on
the plea of the freedo~ of nigh seas and condemned the
attempt to impose rnili tary restrictions \vithout their
consent. But it should be remer1bered that ~1e peace zone
propos2l does not in any \·JaY affect the peaceful uses of
the se;t, lilce fisllinc, l:tyin[3 of ripeline or submarine
cables, overfliglt ts etc. 'l'ne objection arises when the
bases and naval presence are used for ·the purpose of
intervention - and t11reatenin[j the no.tions in the Indian
Ocean o.rea. The preconditions like stOpLJage of anned
conflict · .. u!long the nations of the area are merely a pretext
to kL!l the r)eace zone proposal. In going beyond the
85 K.P. I'-Iishra, Quest for an International Order in the Indian Ocean tNe·l'! Delhi, ·1977) _, p. SJ2; K. S. SidhU, '~'ldL:n Ocean as a Zone of l!eace (New Delhi, ·1933), !J. 7o.
118
original framework of Resolution 2B32 (XXVI) vkl.ich declared
tl1e India.n Ocean as a zone of peace, i:he US and its allies
have signalled to ~1e regional powers in the area that the
validity of an argunwn.t depends upon the power of the
86 country concerned. Problems arise when some li ttora.l
states are manipulated by big po~o'ler machinations in order
to provide them b3.ses and other facilities on the plea that
limited super power presence is desirable. But they forget
that it wo~d legitDnise sDnilar efforts on the part of
other big powers, v-lhich prevent the littoral states fran
asserting tneir rights vis-a-vis [)O\.,rerful external countries.
Growinc; tension and conflict in the ree;ion is not in the
inter est of the ':rorld ccrnmuni ty because the sea lines of
commu::lication should remain open for transportation and trade.
Tl1.us,o.respons i ble behaviour on t11 e part of rna jor powers is an
important element in rcso.Lving differences in order to
tr:J.nsfonn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. 'lhe states
o£ the region should also mobilise public opinion for the
cduse, establish unity 3IIlong thenselves and co-operate in
evolvin~ a tool for implementation of the pe;:tce zone idea.
Only tncn tlley c::m develop collective self-reliance and
concentrate on their ecor..omic and social development.
eG Ashol~ Kapur, The Inuian Ocean : H.e[-)ional and International Power Politics l)Jew York, ·\ '.1£32}, p. 212.