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Dead in the Water: Indo-Pak Conflict in the Indus River Valley
Kristy Throndson
GOVT 451
Professor Karber
Source: “Wular Lake,” Indian Tourist Guide <http://indiantouristguide.in/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/03/wular_lake2.jpg> (Accessed 5 December 2012)
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Introduction
The Indus River runs through the valley like blood through veins. For
thousands of years, its life-‐giving waters sustained and unified the people of the
Indian subcontinent. Even when the subcontinent was split in the partition of
British India, bitter rivals Pakistan and India were brought together in a treaty of
cooperation in order to share the waters of the Indus. Their agreement was based
not on mutual friendship and political agreement, but rather on the begrudging
understanding that the only way they could have access to the river was through
partnership. The peace created by the treaty has lasted an astounding fifty years.
However, the stability of this treaty will soon be put to the test. The combination of
population growth, industrialization, and climate change has depleted the flow of
the Indus River and will continue to do so until the river runs dry. When the waters
that were the foundation of Indo-‐Pak cooperation begin to dry up, the pillars of their
peace agreement will crumble. Diplomacy will fail and the two states will go to war
over the last of the remaining waters. Unless a dramatic change is made to increase
the efficiency of water use in the Indus River Valley, the water running through the
valley will be replaced by the blood of its people.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the source of conflict in the Indus
River Valley and present a military balance of the two potential combatants: India
and Pakistan. The paper will examine the past, present, and future of the Indus
River Valley beginning with its partition in 1947, continuing with an exploration of
the treaty that brokered the sharing of its water, and proceeding with an
investigation of how water scarcity in the valley could ignite future conflict. Finally,
the paper will assess the military forces of India and Pakistan in order to develop an
understanding of how operations could proceed in the event of the outbreak of
“water wars” in the Indus River Valley.
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Source: Naveed Tajammal,“The Indus Accord 1960,” <http://pakpotpourri.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/the-‐indus-‐accord-‐1960/> (Accessed 4 December 2012)
The Division of the Indus River Valley
The end of British colonial rule necessitated the partitioning of the Indian
subcontinent. Although Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the Boundary Commission,
drew the border in only seventy-‐two days, his partition sparked a conflict that
would last decades.1 The Indo-‐Pak border divided not only lands and peoples, but
also water resources. After the official
partition on August 15, 1947, the Indus River
Valley was split between the two countries,
dividing a major water source that had
historically been under the management of a
single government. As shown in Figure 1,
Pakistan gained control of the larger portion of
Indus River Valley and greater length of the
Indus and its tributaries. However, India
acquired upper riparian status.
In the eyes of the Pakistani government,
India’s command of the upper Indus River
system threatened the security of Pakistan’s
water supply. Pakistani leaders feared that India would cut off the flow of water -‐
particularly at essential irrigation headworks at Madhopur on the Ravi River and
Ferozpur on the Sutlej River -‐ and turn West Punjab into an unproductive desert.2
With no historical precedent or formal treaty to guide future water-‐sharing,
India and Pakistan came to a “standstill agreement” in which the new countries
pledged to maintain the status quo water flow until March 31, 1948 in order to
1 Dennis Kux, India-‐Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006) 2 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms (New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)
Figure 1: The Indo-Pak Partition
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allow enough time to develop a permanent solution.3 However, the deadline passed
without an accepted settlement, and on April 1st, India suspended the water flow to
Pakistan. In the minds of many Pakistani, this action confirmed their suspicion that
India was bent on sabotaging the success of the new nation. India returned the flow
to Pakistan eighteen days later, but not before a mutual distrust was created that
would hinder cooperation between the two states for years to come.
Despite their feelings of suspicion, India and Pakistan both understood that their
survival depended on their successful negotiation of the Indus River disagreement.
There was an unspoken understanding between the two states that although each
would have preferred to have the resource for itself, it would rather cooperate with
its rival than lose the water source outright.
A Tenuous Peace: The Indus Waters Treaty
In 1951, India and Pakistan were embroiled in intractable conflict. The two
nations were on the brink of war over Kashmir, and the Indus River dispute
remained unsolved. David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Commission
and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission saw the conflict over the Indus as an
opportunity for cooperation rather than collision. After a visit to the Indus River
Valley he wrote the following in his journal:
One way to reduce hostility . . . would be to concentrate on other important
issues where cooperation was possible….Accordingly, I proposed that India and
Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus
Basin river system.4
3 Daanish Mustafa “Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin,” United States Institute of Peace (November 2010), <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo19414/SR261-‐HydropoliticsinPakistansIndusBasin.pdf> (Accessed 1 December 2012) p. 4 4 Niranjan Gulhati, The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, (Allied Publishers: Bombay; Allied Publishers, 1973). p. 93
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Lilienthal suggested that the World Bank act as moderator, and it accepted the
position in order to support economic development in the region. The World Bank
instituted a new strategy for brokering the deal, insisting that India and Pakistan put
aside political prejudices and focus instead on the functional aspects of the dispute.5
Rather than allocate water based on historical rights and political claims, engineers
were tasked to find the most practical way to divide the waters so that the river
system would yield the water necessary to both countries to sustain their
agricultural production.
After eight years of proposals and negotiations, the conflict was ripe for
settlement. Neither party wanted to give up their claims on the waters, but they
feared that their use of the river would be suspended if they refused. The Indus
Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960 and ratified by Indian President
Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Pakistani Field Marshal Ayub Khan on December 27th and
28th of the same year.6 Shortly after, the United States, Australia, Germany, United
Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand pledged to contribute $900 to the Indus Basin
Development Fund to cover the expense of constructing new canals agreed upon in
the Indus Waters Treaty. 7
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) delineates Pakistan and India’s water-‐
sharing rights and privileges in the Indus River Valley and specifies mechanisms for
future conflict resolution. To Pakistan, it allocates control of the western rivers –
the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – and to India, the eastern rivers up to the Pakistani
border – the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi.8 The IWT limits India’s ability to store
substantial amounts of water from the three western rivers rewarded to Pakistan.
5 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms op. cit. p. 60
6 Ibid., 66 7 Ibid., 66 8 Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (Majority Staff Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report 112-‐10; Washington, DC 112th Congress, 1st Session, February 2011) p. 10
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However, the treaty also acknowledges the legitimate limited use of water for
irrigation and electricity generation in the Indian territory of the rivers allocated to
Pakistan.9 Foreseeing that this ambiguity may cause disputes, the IWT set up a
commission to adjudicate arguments. The Permanent Indus Commission is
designed to increase transparency between the riparians and to manage differences
of opinion before they escalate into collision. Indian and Pakistani members sit on
the commission and meet regularly to discuss the development of the river system,
exchange data, and negotiate dispute settlements. This institution facilitates
cooperation by promoting interdependence, increasing accountability, and reducing
the incentive to cheat. However, Indo-‐Pakistani cooperation in the Indus River
Valley has not been without its challenges. The following section will examine three
cases in which the IWT conflict resolution mechanisms have been put to the test.
Testing the Waters: Challenges to the Indus Water Treaty
Although continual access to the water resources of the Indus motivated
India and Pakistan to cooperate in the Indus River Valley, the temptation to
monopolize the waters occasionally motivated India to pursue projects that pushed
the boundaries of the treaty. When technical disagreements occur, they are
classified into one of three groups and handled accordingly. Those categorized as
questions are brought before the Permanent Indus Commission and examined by
Indian and Pakistani commissioners. If a discord cannot be mediated by the
Permanent Indus Commission, it is labeled as a difference and sent to a neutral
expert who issues an independent decision. If the neutral expert determines that
the disagreement is especially severe, it is treated as a dispute and brought before a
Court of Arbitration. 10 The descriptions of the following challenges demonstrate
9 Daanish Mustafa “Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin,” op. cit 10 “Indus Waters Treaty,” World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-‐1105737253588/IWT_Article_IX.pdf> (Accessed 3 December 2012), article IX
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that cooperation based on a shared dependence on the Indus River can withstand
petty technical disagreements as long as the necessary water continues to flow.
Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage and Storage Project
The Indo-‐Pak conflict over the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage and
Storage Project began in 1986 and remains unresolved to this day. India began
construction on a barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of Wullar Lake in 1985
to regulate the flow from the lake. The source of the difference of opinion is
apparent in its title. While India claimed that the barrage would be used solely for
the purpose of maintaining the necessary water flow for navigation between Sopore
and Baramula, Pakistan was concerned about its potential to be used for storage or
even as a geo-‐strategic weapon.11 The issue was brought before the Permanent
Indus Commission in 1986. Although an agreement was not reached, India pledged
to stop construction of the barrage until the two states could come to a bilateral
consensus.12 A series of talks have been held between representatives of each
country, but each has resulted in a failure to resolve the conflict. Today the Tubul
Navigation Project/Wullar Project has yet to be settled, and the dispute remains a
point of contention between Indians and Pakistanis.
Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project
The Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project created a dispute that threatened
to break down the Indo-‐Pak cooperation established by the Indus Waters Treaty. In
1992, Indian engineers developed plans to build a dam on the Chenab River in the
Doda district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.13 Although the IWT awarded
rights of the Chenab River to Pakistan, the treaty allowed for India’s use of the river
for the generation of hydroelectric power. As is mandated by the IWT, India 11 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms op. cit. p. 159 12 Ibid., p. 165 13 Rajesh Sinha, “Two Neighbors and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 41. No 7 (2006) p. 606-‐608
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presented its construction plans to Pakistan, and at first, Pakistan did not raise any
major objections.14 However, as technical changes were made to the design of the
dam increasing its hydroelectric capacity, disagreements arose. India and Pakistan
held a series of bilateral talks, but they could not come to a mutually acceptable
consensus. It seemed that without third party involvement, the conflict was likely to
become intractable.
Pakistani opposition to the Baglihar Dam project was founded in their belief
that it would compromise their share of the flow of the Indus River system and
create water shortages in Pakistan. Their main technical objections were the
designs of the dam’s storage, power intake tunnels, and spillways, which they
claimed violated the regulations laid out in Annexure D of the Indus Waters Treaty
of generation of hydroelectric power on the western rivers.15 The Pakistanis
believed that the 144.5 meter height of the dam allowed for an unnecessary amount
of storage and the gated spillways and low power intake tunnels gave India the
ability to manipulate the flow of the Chenab River. They argued that the combined
effect would allow India to either flood or starve Pakistan at its discretion.
Additionally, the Pakistanis were worried that if they compromised on the Baglihar
project, it would set a precedent of appeasement that the Indians would abuse in the
future, further siphoning off the precious waters of the Indus. Therefore, in 2005,
Pakistan invoked the arbitration clause of the IWT for the first time when leaders
petitioned the World Bank to assign an expert to issue an impartial decision.16 The
World Bank agreed, labeling the disagreement as a difference and selecting Swiss
engineer Raymond Lafitte to write a compromise. Lafitte’s final decision, released
14 Robert Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro, “Spotlight on Indus River Diplomacy: India Pakistan and the Baglihar Dam Dispute” Asia-‐Pacific Center for Security Studies (May 2006) < http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/IndusRiverDiplomacy.Wirsing.Jasparro.pdf> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 15 Rajesh Sinha, “Two Neighbors and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,” op. cit. 16 Tapan R. Mohanty and Adil Hasan Khan, “Dam of Division: Understanding the Baglihar Dispute,” Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 40, No. 29 (2005), p. 3155-‐3158
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Source: “Disputed dam sparks Indo-‐Pak race” The Telegraph., (16 April 2008) <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080416/jsp/nation/story_9144828.jsp> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 1 http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590 1http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C08%5C23%5Cstory_23-‐8-‐2012_pg5_13
on February 17, 2007, included only minor modifications to the design of the dam.
Although both sides had to make compromises, India and Pakistan pledged to
uphold the decision. As long as both sides still received enough of the flow to
support their people, it was less costly to compromise than to risk extended conflict.
However, the Baglihar dam remains a point of contention in Pakistan, as many
believe that it deprives farmers of their rightful supply of water.
Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Project
One of the most recent challenges to the stability of the Indus Waters Treaty
is the construction of a dam on the Kishanganga River (known in Pakistan as the
Neelum River), the largest tributary of the Jhelum. Both countries have plans to
harness the power of the river’s waters to supply
electricity and irrigation.17 However, the river can
only feasibly support one major hydroelectric
project. The Pakistanis began construction on the
Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam in 2002, and in 2007 signed a
$1.5 billion contract with Chinese companies
China’s Gezhouba Water and Power Company and
China National Machinery and Equipment Import
and Export Corporation to construct the
project.18 The building race began in 2007 with
that start of construction on India’s Kishanganga
Hydroelectric Project. Although the Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam is the larger of the two
projects (generating three times the electricity of the Kishanganga Dam), the
Kishanganga upper riparian position (demonstrated in Figure 2) allowed it to
17 Sury Amurthy, “Disputed dam sparks Indo-‐Pak race” The Telegraph., (16 April 2008) <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080416/jsp/nation/story_9144828.jsp> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 18 “Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam,” International Rivers, < http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590> (Accessed 3 December 2012)
Figure 2: Kishanganga and Neelum Projects
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reducte the flow of the river of up to 21 percent, significantly decreasing the
productivity of the Pakistani dam.19
Pakistan contends that India’s diversion of the Kishanganga River violates
the Indus Waters Treaty. In 2010, Pakistan brought its complaints to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague.20 Members of the Court of Arbitration visited the
sites of the Kishanganga and Neelum-‐Jhelum dams in June of 2011 and finished their
deliberation in October 2012. The court is expected to release their decision within
the next four months.
Despite challenges from both sides, the Indus Waters Treaty has maintained
a tenuous peace in the Indus River Valley for over fifty years, withstanding multiple
disputes as well as the Indo-‐Pak wars of 1965, 1971, and 1991. Many contend that
the design of the treaty, especially the Permanent Indus Commission and the system
of dispute settlement, is responsible for the prevention of conflict in the river valley.
Although the Indus Waters Treaty has been instrumental in the mitigation of water
disputes over the last fifty years, it was not the cause of the lasting stability. Rather,
the key to the prevention of armed conflict in the Indus River Valley lies in simple
supply and demand economics. As long as both India and Pakistan have the supply
of water to meet the personal, agricultural, and industrial demands of its population,
there is no incentive to engage in a costly conflict to obtain control of additional
water sources. Because the Indus River System has provided India and Pakistan
with a sufficient amount of water to meet the needs of their populations up to this
point, the two states have been willing to cooperate and compromise. However,
future climate change and increasing development will reduce the supply of water
while inflating the demand. This will result in an environment of water scarcity that 19 Zeeshan Javaid, “Kishanganga Hydropower Project : Face-‐off between Pak, India to continue till 31st at PCA,” Daily Times. (23 August 2012) <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C08%5C23%5Cstory_23-‐8-‐2012_pg5_13> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 20 “Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam,” International Rivers, < http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590> (Accessed 3 December 2012) op cit.
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will threaten the vitality of the states and encourage competition rather than
cooperation. The following section examines the changing environmental and
developmental conditions that will create water scarcity in the Indus River Valley,
eroding the basis for interstate cooperation.
Changing Circumstances
As the global use of water grows at more than double the rate of the world
population, water scarcity is predicted to become a widespread problem by the year
2050. Nowhere will this be more apparent than in the Indus River Basin. The
combined effect of rapid population growth, industrialization, lifestyle adjustments,
and climate change are predicted to raise water scarcity to critical levels in the near
future.
Population Growth
By 2050, the Indian population is expected to expand from 1,224,614 to
1,692,008 and the Pakistani population from 173,593 to 274,875.21 Such a dramatic
increase will put a strain on the existing supply of water, increasing the demand for
water-‐intensive foods. The water needed for irrigation will increase by 68.5 trillion
liters, and farmers will be forced to deplete groundwater resources in order to
produce enough food to meet demand. This will result in the depletion of
groundwater resources by 50-‐75% by 2050.22 India and Pakistan will therefore be
forced to rely more heavily on surface waters such as the Indus River and its
tributaries.
21 “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision,” United Nations <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 22 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. (2009). <http://www.grailresearch.com/pdf/ContenPodsPdf/Water-‐The_India_Story.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012)
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Industrialization
Although Pakistan and India are still largely agricultural societies, the recent
trend has been towards industrialization. The manufacturing sector has been
growing steadily (about 8-‐9%) in both countries and is projected to continue to
expand.23 The success of India and Pakistan’s factories is dependent upon electricity
provided by hydroelectric power. In India, industrial water consumption is
expected to quadruple its 2000 levels by 2050.24 However, because Indian and
Pakistani companies often do little to prevent pollution, billions of liters of
wastewater are produced every day, depleting the supply of available freshwater.
Lifestyle Changes
Increased industrialization and development are predicted to have positive
effects on the salaries of the average Indian and Pakistani citizen. By 2050, per
capita GDP is projected to rise from its current $1,489 to $41,700 in India and from
$1,194 to $7,900 in Pakistan.25 Assumedly, this will alter citizens’ preferences and
allow them to demand more water-‐intensive products such as chicken, milk, and
cotton. Overall, per capita domestic water consumption is projected to double from
89 liters per day to 167.26
As has been demonstrated above, the forces of population growth,
industrialization, and changes in domestic consumption will all increase the demand
for fresh water. The following subsection will explore the trend in future freshwater
supply.
23 “Pakistan Growth and Export Competitiveness” World Bank. (25 April 2006) < http://www-‐wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/05/23/000012009_20060523095241/Rendered/PDF/354991PK0rev0pdf.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 24 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. op cit. 25 “GDP per capita,” The World Bank. < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 26 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. op cit.
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Climate Change
The Indus River and its tributaries are fed by some of nature’s largest “water
towers”: the Himalayan mountains. Water melts off of the snow and glaciers in the
Himalayas and runs into Pakistan and India where it supplies water to the Indus
River Valley irrigation system. The rising temperature caused by global warming
have caused the Tibetan glaciers to melt quickly. While this will increase the flow of
the rivers in the short run, by 2065 the flow of the river will be consistently and
considerably reduced.27 Some have predicted that by the end of the century, the
Indus River could be running at only half of its current levels.28 This reduction will
have serious consequences for agriculture in the region. It is estimated that the
number of people that can be fed by the agricultural output of the Indus River will
decrease by around 26 million.29 David Grey, World Bank senior water advisor,
commented on effects of climate change on the Indus River saying,
“…we all have very nasty fears that the flows of the Indus could be severely,
severely affected by glacier melt as a consequence of climate change…Now
what does that mean to a population that lives in a desert [where], without the
river, there would be no life? I don’t know the answer to that question, but we
need to be concerned about that. Deeply, deeply concerned.”
Ticking Time Bomb: The Grounds for Conflict
The waters of the Indus River are essential for the survival of India and
Pakistan. The Indus River and its tributaries support the economic vitality and
strategic defense of the nations and therefore must be protected at all costs. In the
27 Walter W. Immerzeel, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers,” Science Vol. 328 No. 1382 (2010) <http://1004378.liweb1.pinshosting.net/wp-‐content/uploads/2011/05/Immerzeel_Science_11June2010.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 28 Fred Pearce, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water – the Defining Crisis of the Twenty-‐First Century (Boston, MA; Beacon Press, 2006)
29 Walter W. Immerzeel, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers” op cit
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absence of water scarcity, the lease costly way for Pakistan and India to ensure that
they received their fair share of the flow was to cooperate and join in the Indus
Waters Treaty. However, in a situation of scarcity, the best way to protect national
interests may be to enter into conflict. The following sections examine how the
Indus River represents a national security concern.
Economic Dependence
India and Pakistan are dependent on the Indus River as a source of both
electricity and food. In India, 11.9% of power is generated by water and in Pakistan,
this number is 29.4%.30 Any abatement of this power supply would exacerbate
existing power shortages and slow economic production. In a situation of scarcity,
each nation will be concerned primarily with meeting its own energy needs
regardless of the effect on its neighbor.
Despite the recent move towards industrialization, India and Pakistan remain
primarily agricultural societies. Of the total amount of renewable water resources
withdrawn in India and Pakistan each year, 92-‐97% is used for agriculture.31 In
Pakistan, the Indus River system irrigation network covers 83% of cultivated land,
irrigates up to 90% of the country’s crops, and contributes nearly one-‐fourth of its
GDP.32 While a disruption in the flow of the Indus River would be detrimental to
either country, Pakistan is in a uniquely vulnerable position because the Indus River
is its single main source of freshwater. Whereas India could fall back on its
groundwater supplies or its access to the Ganges River system, Pakistan must rely
on the uninterrupted flow of the Indus for its economic survival.
30 “Electricity production from hydroelectric sources,” The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.HYRO.ZS/countries?display=default> (Accessed 5 December 2012) 31 “Annual freshwater withdrawals,” The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.FWTL.K3> (Accessed 5 December 2012) 32 Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, op sit. 6
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Strategic Value
Not only is the Indus River system valuable for its contribution to the
economy, but it could also be converted into a powerful defensive or offensive
weapon of war. Whoever gains control of the river can choose to either flood their
enemy’s territory or cut off their water supply completely. Additionally, the dams
could be used as defensive trenches in the event of a conventional attack. Either
way, it is clear that the maintenance of control of at least part of the Indus River is
essential for national security.
India and Pakistan are on the brink of crisis. The Indus Waters Treaty was
written under the assumption that when judiciously allocated, there would always
be enough water to fulfill both countries’ needs. The stability of the treaty depends
on that unwritten clause. However, with the increasing demand and decreasing
supply of water in the Indus River Valley, it is only a matter of time before there is a
shortage. When this occurs, the incentive to protect the economic vitality and
essential security of one’s nation will overcome the desire to cooperate. The
Permanent Indus Commission will become irrelevant as the countries compete
openly to capture any remaining water resources. As the upper riparian, India will
have the strategic advantage, presenting an inherent threat to Pakistan’s water
security. This threat alone may be enough for Pakistan to launch a preventative
offensive against India before it uses its hydroelectric dams to strangulate Pakistan
into submission. A Pakistani offensive would trigger an Indian retaliation, and
armed conflict would begin.
Military Balance
This section of the paper will analyze the military capabilities of India and
Pakistan in order to predict operations and outcome in the event of an Indo-‐Pak
conflict.
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Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 -‐ 248, 272-‐275
Defense Budget
Table 1: Indian and Pakistani Finances 2010-11
India Pakistan
2010 2011 2010 2011
GDP ($US) 1,640,000,000,000 1,890,000,000,000 173,000,000,000 202,000,000,000
GDP per capita 1,394 1,591 936 1,079
Growth 10.09% 7.84% 3.76% 2.56%
Inflation 12.00% 10.60% 11.70% 13.90%
Defense Budget ($US) 29,700,000,000 31,900,000,000 4,470,000,000 5,160,000,000
India’s impressive GDP growth rate of 10.09% in 2010 and 7.84% in 2011
insulated the country from the global financial crisis and provided it with additional
tax revenues to spend on defense.33 In its quest to achieve great-‐power status, India
has recently focused on the modernization of its military, resulting in an increase in
its capital expenditures.34 Although the Pakistani defense budget is about a sixth of
that of India (as can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1), Pakistan too is working
towards the modernization of its military, particularly its air force. Although they
have less to spend on defense, it would be unwise to discount the Pakistani military.
Figure 3
33 The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 34 Ibid., p. 217
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Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 -‐ 248, 272-‐275
Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 -‐ 248, 272-‐275
Army
Table 2
The Indian army is significantly larger and better equipped than the
Pakistani army. India boasts the third-‐largest army in the world and, as shown in
Table 2, more than doubles the manpower of the Pakistani army. However, the size
of the Indian army can make it unwieldy. The sluggish response to the December
13, 2001 terrorist attack displayed the army’s incapability to perform an efficient
mobilization.35 Conversely, the Pakistani army can mobilize faster due to its smaller
35 Ibid., 243
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
2010
2011
2010
2011
India
Pakistan
2010-11 Defense Budgets (in US$ billions)
India Pakistan Active Manpower 1,129,900 550,000 Reserve Manpower 960,000
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Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics
Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics
size and closer proximity to the border. Therefore, Pakistan may have the
advantage in a limited ground attack. However, once successfully deployed and
engaged in conventional warfare, the Indian superiority in artillery and armored
fighting vehicles (as can be seen in Figures 4 and 5) will give its army the advantage.
Despite their lack of medium artillery and modern tanks, the Indian troops would
easily overwhelm the Pakistani army.
Navy
Table 3
The naval balance is tipped decisively in
favor of India. Indian naval forces
outnumber the Pakistani in surface
combatants and submarines. As shown
in Table 3, the Pakistan Navy has neither
an aircraft carrier nor any destroyers.
The India Navy does not typically view the Pakistan Navy as a threat and spends
most of the time maintaining a presence in the South China Sea to balance Chinese
Naval Force Type India Pakistan Air Craft Carrier 1 0 Destroyers 10 0 Frigates 10 10 Corvettes 6 0 SSN 1 0 SSK 14 5 SSI 0 3
Figure 4 Figure 5
19
Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics
influence. However, in the event of warfare, the India Navy would likely focus on
blockading the Sea Lines of Communications to Pakistan. In return, Pakistan’s
submarines would target India’s carrier battle group, necessitating a precautionary
combat vessel escort at all times. Despite the minor setbacks of submarine attacks,
India decisively dominates the naval balance.
Air Force
Table 4
India Pakistan Fighter Aircraft 762 393 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Aircraft 3 10 Electronic Intelligence Aircraft 0 2 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft 2 3 Aerial Refueling Tanker 6 3 Transport Aircraft 217 34 Training Aircraft 212 139
Both the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces are in the process of modernization.
After the effectiveness of its air defense were called into question after the US attack
on Osama Bin Laden’s compound, Pakistan made an effort to update its air force by
improving its precision strike and ISTAR capabilities.36 The India Air Force is in
desperate need of maintenance as nearly 500 of its planes are out of commission.
However, its modernization plans have been postponed by the delay in its
procurement program.
If the two forces were to come into contact, the India Air Force would have
the advantage. Although the Pakistan Air Force is well-‐trained and organized, the
numbers are stacked against it. The PAF could provide sufficient cover for ground
units, but would not be able to defend its airspace against Indian forces when their 36 : The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics p. 272
20
fixed-‐wing aircraft are outnumbered two to one and rotary-‐wing aircraft
outmatched thirty to one. Again, the military balance is in favor of India.
Nuclear Weapons – The Great Equalizer
If India and Pakistan were to engage in strictly conventional warfare, it is
clear that India would prevail. Having quantitative (if not always qualitative)
advantages on land, in the air, and at sea, Indian forces would easily overwhelm
Pakistan. However, both states’ possession of nuclear weapons changes the rules of
the game. India is estimated to have stockpiled up to one hundred nuclear
warheads and ten nuclear capable missiles with ranges from 700 to 3,000 km. India
currently has the capability to deliver the warheads to Pakistan via warship and
nuclear-‐capable aircraft and is planning to complete its nuclear triad with nuclear
ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant by the end of this year.37 India has declared
a nuclear doctrine of “no first use” and pledges only to use its nuclear capacity in
retaliation.
Pakistan is estimated to have between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads with
ranges of up to 3,000 km.38 The Pakistanis have developed two nuclear delivery
systems: warheads aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-‐to-‐
surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Although Pakistan does not have
an official nuclear doctrine, high-‐level officials have disclosed that Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal is meant to deter aggression, prevent escalation, and achieve strategic
deterrence in South Asia.39 The development of nuclear capability has been
Pakistan’s way of countering India’s conventional superiority. Therefore, when
37 The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics p. 243 38 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance” Arms Control Association < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> (Accessed 6 December 2012) 39 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (13 January 2011), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155624.pdf> (Accessed 6 December 2012)
21
considering potential conflict in the Indus River Basin, Pakistan’s use of nuclear
weapons to deter Indian conventional territorial advances cannot be ruled out.
Operations
Although operations following the spark of conflict in the Indus River Valley
could develop any number of ways, this paper will base its predictions on the
preceding military assessment and historical precedents set by past Indo-‐Pak
military encounters.
It is the year 2065, and water scarcity has hit the Indus River Valley. Two
years earlier, when the region had been experiencing water stress, India withdrew
from the Indus Waters Treaty, stating that it was no longer in its national interest to
share the Indus River and its tributaries. Soon afterwards, India began construction
on large storage dams on the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers to trap the already
thin flow of water coming into Pakistan. Pakistan appealed to the World Bank, but
there was nothing that they could do. Pakistan knew that if India finished the dams,
it would completely cut off one of Pakistan’s last sources of freshwater. Therefore,
Pakistan plans a surprise offensive in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The terrain
there makes it hard to seal the borders, and Pakistan’s small, highly mobile forces
will easily penetrate Indian territory. The Pakistan army deploys two units of
ground forces covered by fighter aircraft. The units succeed in bombing two of the
three dams and return to Pakistan to regroup.
After learning of the attack, India has a decision to make. While it must
retaliate against the invasion of its territory, it does not want to cause so much
destruction as to trigger Pakistani use of nuclear weapons. India decides to send
destroyers to blockade the Pakistani coast and launches air raids against military
camps in Kashmir while it deploys its army to the border. This has little effect as
Pakistan as its military bases are armored to resist air attack and Pakistanis utilize
overland routes to China to resist the effects of the blockade. Meanwhile, Pakistan
22
continues to send ground forces into Jammu and Kashmir to wreck havock on Indian
irrigation systems, and the Indus River runs red with blood. Indian leaders become
frustrated and plan a full scale conventional attack on Lahore. India launches a
combined ground and air assault on the Pakistani border, and the Pakistani army
and air force are quickly overwhelmed. The Indian Army gains ground. The
Pakistan army retreats, but superior Indian artillery and armored vehicles have
caused heavily casualties. Pakistani leadership feels trapped knowing their
conventional forces cannot keep the Indian military from taking Lahore. The only
way they can balance the playing field and protect their national security is through
the use of nuclear weapons. However, strategists are not willing to commit to the
destruction of a full nuclear attack and opt instead for a nuclear airburst over Sirsa
air force base in Haryana. India heeds the demonstration and retreats, but the
conflict incites a cold war and nuclear arms race between the two nations.
Conclusion
The Indus River has held together Indo-‐Pak relations since the partition in
1947. Without the incentive to cooperate on the sharing of the waters, relations will
break down, and they will view each other not as partners, but as rivals. The lands
once used for agriculture will become fertile pastures for extremism and hardening
hatreds. The asymmetric military balance makes the situation especially precarious
as any perceived threat to Pakistan’s security could trigger a nuclear response. In
order to avoid escalating tensions, it is essential that India and Pakistan take
measures to conserve the resource that links them. The future of Indo-‐Pak
cooperation in the Indus River Valley depends on it.
23
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