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DemocraticBreakdownandSurvivalinLatinAmerica,19452005
ScottMainwaring,UniversityofNotreDame
AníbalPérez‐Liñán,UniversityofPittsburgh
Whydodemocraciessurviveorbreakdown?Inthispaper,wereturntothisclassicquestion with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. Ourargumentdeviatesfromthequantitativeliteratureandagoodpartofthequalitativeliterature on democratic survival and breakdown. We argue that structuralvariables such as the level of development and inequalities have not shapedprospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings insome of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival ofcompetitiveregimes. Instead,wefocusontheregionalpoliticalenvironmentandonactors’normativepreferencesaboutdemocracyanddictatorshipandtheirpolicyradicalismormoderation.Wearguethat1)ahigherlevelofdevelopmentdidnotincreasethelikelihoodofdemocraticsurvivalinLatinAmericaoverthislongtime;2)ifactorshaveanormativepreferencefordemocracy,itismorelikelytosurvive;and3)policymoderationfacilitatesdemocraticsurvival.Paper for the conference, “Guillermo O’Donnell and the Study of Democracy,”BuenosAires,March26‐27, 2012. Weare grateful toMaríaVictoriaDeNegri forassistanceinpreparingthispaper.
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Whydodemocraciessurviveorbreakdown?Inthispaper,wereturntothis
classicquestionwithanempiricalfocusonLatinAmericafrom1945to2005.We
pursueanewresearchstrategytoaddressthisquestion.Followingarichand
extensivequalitativeliterature,weunderstandregimedynamicsintermsof
concretehistoricactors.Thesurvivalorfallofcompetitiveregimesdependson
whatpoliticalleaders,politicalparties,militaries,andotherkeyactorsdo.These
actionsareshapedbutnotdeterminedbystructuralforcesandculturalpatterns.
Butthisqualitativeliteraturehasfacedlimitationsinbroadlytestingargumentsand
theoriesbecauseofthedifficultyofscalingupfromcasestudies.Followinganother
richandextensivequantitativeliteratureonpoliticalregimes,therefore,the
analysisinthispaperisprimarilyquantitativesothatwecangetsomepreliminary
assessmentaboutthegeneralizabilityofsomeofthekeyideasfoundinsomeofthe
qualitativeliterature.
Wearguethatthelevelofdevelopmenthasnotdirectlyshapedprospectsfor
democraticsurvivalinLatinAmerica.Nor,contrarytofindingsinsomeofthe
literature,haseconomicperformanceaffectedthesurvivalofcompetitiveregimes.
Instead,wefocusontheregionalpoliticalenvironmentandonactors’normative
preferencesaboutdemocracyandtheirpolicyradicalismormoderation.Weargue
thatdemocraciesaremorelikelytosurvivewhenpoliticalactorshaveastrong
normativepreferencefordemocracyandwhentheyembracepolicymoderation.
Theevidencealsoshowsthatdemocraticregimesarestrongerwhentheregional
environmentfacilitatestheproliferationofthosevaluesdomestically.
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OurpaperbuildsonthreeimportantinsightsbyGuillermoO’Donnell.First,
in1973,O’DonnellpublishedhisfamousModernizationandBureaucratic
Authoritarianism,whichcriticizedmodernizationtheoryforpositingtoolineara
relationshipbetweenthelevelofdevelopmentandpoliticalregimes.Foralonger
timespanandbroadersetofLatinAmericancountries,wereplicateO’Donnell’s
argumentthatthelevelofdevelopmenthasnothadastraightforwardimpactonthe
survivalofcompetitiveregimesinLatinAmerica.
Second,inModernizationandBureaucraticAuthoritarianismaswellas
severalotherworkshepublishedinthe1970sandearly1980s,O’Donnellargued
thatthe“threat”thatthepopularsectormobilizationposedtodominantelites
(especiallycapitalists)wasanimportanttriggerindemocraticbreakdownsinLatin
America(O’Donnell1978a).Webuildarelatedargumentbyclaimingthatactors’
policymoderationorradicalismhasanimportantimpactonthesurvivalor
breakdownofcompetitiveregimes.
Afterfocusingondemocraticbreakdownsearlyinhiscareer,inthe1980s
O’Donnellwroteontransitionstodemocracy,culminatinginthefamousworkhe
wrotewithPhilippeSchmitter(1986).Thisworkemphasizedtheroleofpolitical
elites,theircommitments,andtheirstrategicchoices.Inthe“Introductiontothe
LatinAmericanCases,”intheTransitionsvolume,O’Donnellfirstlaidoutsome
dauntingobstaclestostabledemocracyintheregion.But,andthisisthethird
insightuponwhichwedraw,hethenarguedthat
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Myhopesarerootedinasubtle,butpotentiallypowerful,factor.Itconsists ofthefactthattoday,inmostLatinAmericancountries…therehasemerged anewelement.Largelyasaconsequenceofthepainfullearninginducedby thefailuresofthose(authoritarian)regimesandtheirunprecedented repressionandviolence,mostpoliticalandculturalforcesofanyweightnow attributehighintrinsicvaluetotheachievementandconsolidationof politicaldemocracy.Thisisindeedanovelty.(O’Donnell1986:15) OtherscholarsincludingBerman(1998),Lamounier(1980),Ollier(2009),
andWeffort(1984)havealsosuggestedthatactors’attitudesaboutdemocracyand
dictatorshipareimportantinexplainingdemocraticsurvivalandbreakdown.
BuildingonO’Donnell’sinsightandonrelatedwork,wearguethatwhetheractors
normatively(i.e.,intrinsically)valuedemocracyasapoliticalregimehasan
importantimpactonitsprospectsforsurvival.Wetestthisargumentinanewway.
Inthispaper,weprovideanexplanationforthestabilityorbreakdownof
competitiveregimesfrom1945to2005.1DuringthiserathetwentyLatin
Americancountriescollectivelyexperienced644yearsundercompetitivesystems.
Forsimplicityandtoavoidrepetitionweoccasionallyrefertothosecasesas
“democratic”butourstudyincludessemi‐democraticcasesaswell(weclarifythis
distinctioninthenextsection).These644regime‐yearssuffered26breakdowns.
Ouranalysisexploreswhy(andwhen)competitiveregimesbrokedownor,
conversely,whatfactorsfavoredtheirsurvival.
1Althoughwecoderegimesinatrichotomousmanner,inthispaperwefocusonthebreakdownofcompetitiveregimes(democraciesandsemi‐democracies)intoauthoritarianismratherthanonerosionsfromdemocracytosemi‐democracy.
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ClassifyingPoliticalRegimesinLatinAmerica,19452010
WeclassifypoliticalregimesinLatinAmericausingasimpletrichotomous
scalethatwedevelopedwithDanielBrinks(Mainwaringetal.2001,2007):
democratic,semi‐democratic,andauthoritarian.Inthispaper,welumptogether
democraticandsemi‐democraticregimesintoabroadercategoryof“competitive
regimes.”
Ourclassificationofpoliticalregimesbeginswithadefinitionofdemocracy
thatrevolvesaroundfourdimensions.First,theheadofgovernmentandthe
legislaturemustbechosenthroughopenandfaircompetitiveelections.2Elections
mustofferthepossibilityofalternationinpowerevenif,asoccurredfordecadesin
Japan,noactualalternationoccursforanextendedtime.
Second,todaythefranchisemustincludethegreatmajorityoftheadult
population.Thismeanssomethingapproximatinguniversaladultsuffragefor
citizensinthecontemporaryperiod.
Third,democraciesmustprotectpoliticalandcivilrightssuchasfreedomof
thepress,freedomofspeech,freedomtoorganize,therighttohabeascorpus,etc.
Evenifthegovernmentischoseninfreeandfairelectionswithabroadsuffrage,in
theabsenceofaneffectiveguaranteeofcivilandpoliticalrights,itisnotdemocratic
asthatwordisunderstoodinthemodernworld.Aliberalcomponent—the
protectionofindividualliberties—isanecessaryelementofcontemporary
democracy.
2Theelectionoftheheadofgovernmentisindirectinallparliamentarysystemsandinpresidentialsystemsthathaveelectoralcolleges.
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Fourth,theelectedauthoritiesmustexerciserealgoverningpower,as
opposedtoasituationinwhichelectedofficialsareovershadowedbythemilitaryor
byanon‐electedshadowfigure(J.S.Valenzuela1992).Ifelectionsarefreeandfair
butproduceagovernmentthatcannotcontrolmajorpolicyarenasbecausethe
militaryorsomeotherforcedoes,thenthegovernmentisnotademocracy.
Basedonthesefourdimensions,weclassifygovernmentsascompetitive
(democraticorsemi‐democratic)orauthoritarianusingasimpleaggregationrule:
Whengovernmentscommitnosignificantviolationsofanyofthefourcriteria,we
codethemasdemocratic.Iftheyincurinpartialbutnotflagrantviolationstoanyof
thoseprincipleswetreatthemassemi‐democratic.Theyrankasauthoritarianif
theypresentoneormoreflagrantviolationsofthoseprinciples.Inotherterms,we
employtheminimumscoreofthefourdimensionstodeterminetheoveralllevelof
democracy(full,partial,ornone).
WavesofDemocratizationinLatinAmerica,19452010
Usingthisclassificationofpoliticalregimes,Figure1showstheevolutionof
democratizationinLatinAmericasince1945.Thefiguredocumentsanabrupt
declineinthenumberofcompetitiveregimesinthemid‐1960s,whichpartly
motivatedO’Donnell’searlyworkonbureaucratic‐authoritarianism,andthe
extraordinarysurgeinthenumberofcompetitiveregimesafter1978,which
motivatedhisworkontransitionsfromauthoritarianrule.
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Figure1.EvolutionofPoliticalRegimesinLatinAmerica,1945‐2010
Animportanttransformationunderpinsthehistoricalcyclesdepictedin
Figure1.Competitiveregimeswerebrittleuntil1978buttheybecameresilient
afterwards.AvastmajorityofLatinAmericancountriesexperiencedatleastone
periodofdemocracyorsemi‐democracybeforethe1970sbutmanysuchregimes
collapsedshortlyaftertheirestablishment.Startingin1978,however,thenewly
establisheddemocraciessurvivedimportantchallengesandthecumulativenumber
ofcompetitiveregimesincreasedasnewtransitionstookplace.By2005,the
cumulativetrendhadstabilized,andeighteenofthetwentycountriesintheregion
enjoyedcompetitivepolitics.Thistransformationoccurredprimarilybecausethe
breakdownrateofcompetitiveregimes(i.e.,thenumberofbreakdownsdividedby
thenumberofyearsofcompetitive)plummetedfrom9.3%in1945‐77to0.8%in
1978‐2005(thethirdwaveofdemocratization).
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Class,Modernization,andStrategicContingentActionApproachestothe
SurvivalandBreakdownofCompetitiveRegimes
Inthissection,asawayofhighlightingwhatisdistinctiveinouranalysis,we
brieflyoutlineclass,modernization,andstrategiccontingentactionapproachesto
understandingthesurvivalandbreakdownofcompetitiveregimesandsignalhow
webuildonanddivergefromtheseapproaches.Inourapproach,democracies
breakdownwhenpowerfulactorsmobilizeagainstthemandoverpowerthe
regime’ssupporters.Theysurvivewhentheconstellationofforcesthatsupport
democracyismorepowerfulthanthosethatmobilizeagainstthem.
Althoughclassapproaches,strategicactorapproaches,andourapproachto
politicalregimesagreeonthisbroadformulationaboutwhydemocraciessurviveor
breakdown,inotherwaystheydiverge.Classapproachesassumeatight
relationshipbetweenactors’structuralpositionandtheirpreferenceaboutthe
politicalregime.Inthisperspective,someclassesstronglytendtobepro‐
democratic;othersstronglytendtobepro‐authoritarian.
Forexample,Boix(2003)positedthatwhendemocracyisfeasible,the
workingclasswillalwayspreferitbecausedemocracydistributesincometothe
poor.Conversely,whenastableauthoritarianregimeisfeasible,thewealthywill
alwayspreferit,exceptperhapsunderconditionsofhighcapitalmobility,which
attenuatesthecosttothewealthyoftoleratingdemocracy.Likewise,Rueschemeyer,
Stephens,andStephens(1992)arguedthattheworkingclassconsistentlyprefers
democracyandthedominantclassesopposeit,againbasedontheassumptionthat
democracydistributesincometothepoor.
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Incontrast,strategicactorapproachessuchasLinz(1978b)andO’Donnell
andSchmitter(1986),andours,whichbuildsonthestrategicactorapproaches,
assumethatclasspositionhasaweakerinfluenceonwhetheractorssupport
democracyorauthoritarianism.Tothelimitedextenttowhichsocialclasses
overcomecollectiveactionproblemsandconstitutecoherentactors,theirdecisions
tosupportdemocracyordictatorshiparehistoricallycontingent(Bellin2000;R.
Collier1999).Specificsocialclassesdonotalwayspreferdemocracyor
dictatorship,butrathersupportaregimeoritsalternativedependingonthe
advantagesanddisadvantagestheregimeoffersatagivenmomentinhistory.For
example,incontrasttothepredictionofclassapproachestodemocracy,the
ArgentineunionmovementsupportedtheauthoritarianregimeofJuanPerón
(1946‐55)becauseofthematerial,organizational,andsymbolic/culturalbenefits
PerónbestowedonArgentineworkers.Until1983,theArgentinelabormovement
opposedrightwingdictatorshipsbutworkedtounderminesemi‐democratic
regimesnotassociatedwithPerónandeveninitiallyembracedthemilitary
dictatorshipofJuanCarlosOnganía,whichoverthrewthesemi‐democraticregime
headedbyArturoIllia(1963‐66).
Anytheorythatinfersactors’preferencesaboutthepoliticalregimefrom
theirclassposition(e.g.,aslocallandowners,transnationalcapitalists,orindustrial
workers)reducesimportantempiricalquestions—if,how,andtowhatextent
structuralforcesdriveactors’orientationstowardsdemocracy—toaconvenientbut
oftenmisleadingtheoreticalassumption.Classapproachesneglecttheformationof
actors’regimepreferencesinagivenhistoricalcontext.
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Ourtheoreticalapproachalsostandsincontrasttomodernizationtheory,
whichwasfamouslyformulatedbyLipset(1959,1960:27‐63).Modernization
theoryclaimsthatmoreeconomicallydevelopedcountriesaremorelikelytobe
democratic.Manyauthorshavedemonstratedthathigherlevelsofdevelopmentare
stronglyassociatedwithagreaterlikelihoodofdemocracy.Recentworkhasalso
convincinglydemonstratedthatthelikelihoodofdemocraticbreakdowns
diminishesathigherpercapitaincome(Epsteinetal.2006;Przeworskietal.2000).
However,theseeminglyrobustassociationbetweenincomeanddemocracydoes
notholdforLatinAmericaforthelengthyperiodfrom1945until2005.As
O’Donnell(1973)noted,thelevelofdevelopmentdoesnotpredictsurvivalorbreak
downofcompetitiveregimesforLatinAmerica(seealsoMainwaringandPérez‐
Liñán2005).Duringthisperiod,competitiveregimeswereasvulnerableto
breakdownatahigherlevelofdevelopmentasatlowerlevels.Competitivepolitical
regimeshaveoftensurvivedatrelativelylowlevelsofdevelopment,andasthe
experienceofLatinAmericasince1978shows,theyhavealsooftensurviveddespite
highinequality.
Wedonotclaimthatmodernizationtheoryisempiricallywrongingeneral,
butratherthattherelationshipbetweenthelevelofdevelopmentanddemocracyis
farfromdeterminateuntilahighlevelofdevelopmentmakesbreakdowns
extremelyunlikely.Modernizationtheorytypicallyneglectstheroleofconcrete
historicalactorsinfavorofmacrolevelquantitativeworkontheimpactofthelevel
ofdevelopmentonthepoliticalregime;mostvariantsofmodernizationtheoryare
actorless.Thefactthatthefindingsofmodernizationtheoryhavenotheldupfor
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LatinAmericaraisesquestionsaboutwhythisisthecase.Onefruitfulwayof
addressingthisquestionistolookatthepoliticalactorsthatendeavortoestablish,
preserve,oroverthrowdemocracy.
Ifweacceptthepremisethatpoliticalactorsdeterminewhetherregimes
surviveorfall,thenitnecessarilyfollowsthatstructuralfactorsincludingthelevel
ofdevelopmentdonotoperatedirectlyonthestabilityofcompetitiveregimes.
Structuralfactorsmayinsteadinfluencetheformationofpoliticalactorsandthe
preferencesandstrategicchoicesofthesepoliticalactors.
Ourunderstandingofthebreakdownorsurvivalofcompetitiveregimes
drawsoncontingentactionapproachessuchasLinz(1978b),O’Donnelland
Schmitter(1986),andPrzeworski(1986,1991).Liketheseearlierscholars,we
emphasizethestrategicinteractionsamongdifferentactors.However,our
approachdiffersintwowaysinrelationtothesecontingentactionapproaches.
First,theseworksfocusedontheregimecoalitionsthatsupportedoropposedthe
incumbentdemocracyordictatorshipwithoutanalyzingtheactorsthat
underpinnedthoseregimecoalitions.Incontrast,specifichistoricactorssuch
presidentsandorganizationssuchaspoliticalparties,laborunions,owners’
associations,andthemilitaryformthecoreofourapproach.These(mainly
organizational)actorsunderpintheregimecoalitions.Thisisadifferenceinthe
unitofanalysis,notatheoreticalconflict.
Second,O’DonnellandSchmitterunderscoredtheindeterminatenatureof
actors’regimepreferencesinsituationsofhighuncertainty.Ourperspectivesits
betweentheirsandthatofBerman(1998),whoarguedthatorganizationalinterests
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andidentities(andinherlexicon,theirprogrammaticpreferences),andtherefore
howpartiespositionthemselvesinbattlesoverpoliticalregimes,tendtobevery
stableovertime.WeshareBerman’sviewthateveninmomentsoffluxandhigh
uncertainty,actors’identities—inouranalysis,specificallytheirpolicyradicalism
andtheirnormativeattitudesaboutthepoliticalregime—shapetheirbehavior.In
otherwords,weemphasizetheconstrainingeffectsoforganizationalactorsand
institutions.However,weshareO’DonnellandSchmitter’sviewthatatmomentsof
deepcrisisandpossibleregimechange,actors’positionsareconsiderablymore
subjecttochangethanisordinarilythecase.Wealsostronglysharetheirview
perspectivethatleadershaverealchoicesthatsometimesdeterminewhether
politicalregimessurviveorfallandthatoutcomesareindeterminate(seealsoLinz
1978bandStepan1978).
Insum,wedonotdenytheroleofstructuralforces(thelevelofeconomic
development,patternsofdependence,classstructures,socialinequality)inthe
constitutionofpoliticalregimes.Buttheeffectofsuchvariablesiscontingentand
diffuse;itultimatelymanifestsitselfintheorganizationofpoliticalactors,inthe
relativedistributionoftheirpoliticalresources,andinthenormativeregime
preferencesandpolicymoderation/radicalismoftheseactors.Anyexplanationof
democraticstabilitythatomitsanindependentassessmentofpoliticalactors’values
andorientationsmayoverestimatetherelevanceofstructuralforcessuchasthe
levelofeconomicdevelopmentorincomeinequality.
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Actors’PolicyRadicalismandNormativePreferencesforDemocracy
Becausethesurvivalorbreakdownofdemocraciesdependsonconcrete
historicalactors,wefocusonhowactors’preferencesandattitudesaffectregime
survival.Incontrasttostructuraltheories,wearguethattwoproximatecauses
affectwhethercompetitiveregimesremaininpowerorfall:whetheractorshave
radicalpolicypreferencesandwhethertheyhaveanormativepreferencefor
democracy.
Actorsdeveloppolicypreferencesthatrunfrommoderatetoradical.Some
actorsalsodevelopwhatwecallanormativepreferencefordemocracy.Policy
radicalismandnormativepreferencesaboutthepoliticalregimearekey,reasonably
specific,andmeasurablecomponentsofactors’politicalidentities.Actorsform
thesepolicypreferencesandtheirnormativepreferencesabouttheregimeinan
interactivehistoricalcontext.Thesepreferencesarenothistoricallyfixed,butas
Berman(1998)argued,theyusuallytendtobefairlystable.
Actorsareradicalwhentheirpolicygoalsarelocatedtowardonepoleofthe
policyspectrum(e.g.,towardtheleftorrightifthepolicyspaceisone‐dimensional)
andtheyexpressanurgencytoachievethosegoals(incountrieswheretheydonot
representthestatusquo)oranintransigentdefenseofthesepositions(wherethese
positionsrepresentthestatusquo).Asdefinedhere,radicalpolicypreferences
neednotbeontheextremeleftorextremeright,buttheymustbefarenoughfrom
thepreferencesofotherrelevantactorstocreatepolarization.Theyareintense
preferences;radicalactorsareunwillingtobargainortowaitinordertoachieve
theirpolicygoals.
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Wehypothesizethatthepresenceofpowerfulradicalactorswillmakeit
moredifficulttosustaincompetitiveregimes.Thelevelofradicalizationandthe
poweroftheradicalplayersaffecthowthreatenedentrenchedactorsfeelbythe
establishmentormaintenanceofdemocraticpolitics.Toprotecttheirinterestsin
casesofconsiderableradicalization,eitheronthepartofthegovernmentandits
alliesorofoppositionactors,somepowerfulactorsaremorelikelytotrytosubvert
acompetitiveregimeorblockitsemergence.
Thisargumentalsoappliestothegovernmentitself.Whereactorsfearthata
competitiveregimecanleadtotheirdestructionortomajorlossesbecausethe
governmenthasaradicalagenda—whetherthisagendaistransformativeor
reactionary—thecostsoftoleratingtheexistingregimeincrease.Theseactors’
willingnesstoabidebydemocraticrulesofthegameislikelytodiminish,andthe
regime’slikelihoodofsurvivaldecreases.Conversely,wheremostpowerfulactors
believethatacompetitiveregimeisunlikelytoimposemajorpermanentlosses,
theyarefarmorelikelytoacceptdemocraticpolitics.Whereuncertaintyaboutthe
consequencesofcompetitiveregimesisgreatandtheperceivedcostsofplaying
competitivepoliticsmightbehighbecauseofradicalactors,thelikelihoodthatsuch
regimescansurvivediminishes(Bermeo1997;Figueiredo1993;Levine1973).
Anormativepreferencefordemocracymeansthatanactorvaluesdemocracy
intrinsically,i.e.,aboveanypolicyoutcomes.Theactorhasanideological
commitmenttodemocracyasthebestkindofpoliticalregime.Itisexpressedinthe
willingnessofpoliticalactorstoincurpolicycostsinordertodefendthecompetitive
regime.Manyscholarshaveclaimedthatdemocracyhasintrinsicvalue(Dahl1971:
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17‐32;Dahl1989;Lamounier1981;Przeworski1999;O’Donnell2010;Weffort
1984,1989).Ifscholarsbelievethatdemocracyhasinherentvalue,politicalleaders
andotheractorscanalsovaluedemocracyonintrinsicgrounds.Anormative
preferencefordemocracyisdifferentfromsituationaloropportunisticbehaviorin
whichanactor’ssupportfortheregimeiscontingentonpolicyresults.
Whencandidatesacknowledgetheirdefeatinanelectioninsteadof
challengingtheadverseresults,theysignalcommitmenttotheprinciplesofthe
democraticregime.Whengovernmentleadersacceptacongressionaldefeatonan
importantissue,eveniftheycouldmanipulateproceduralrulestoimposetheir
preferredlegislation,theysignalcommitmenttoexistingprocedures.Thesesignals
arecredibletoothersbecausetheyarecostly.Suchbehaviorsareconsistentwith
whatMaxWebercalled“valuerationality.”
Wehypothesizethatastrongnormativepreferencefordemocracyamong
politicalforceswillmakecompetitiveregimesmoreresilient.Strongnormative
preferencesfordemocracylimithowactorspursuetheirpolicygoals.Ifactorsvalue
theregimeonintrinsicgrounds,theyaremorewillingtoendurepoliciesthathurt
theirinterestsbecausetheyperceivethemaslegitimatebindingdecisions.
Conversely,theymaybewillingtorejectbeneficialpoliciesbecausetheyarenot
adoptedbyalegitimateregime.
Ouremphasisonactors’normativeattitudestowarddemocracydrawson
multipletraditionsinpoliticalscienceandsociology.Lipset(1959)underscoredthe
importanceoflegitimacyforthesurvivalofdemocracy.Linz’s(1978a,1978b)
distinctionsbetweentheloyal,semi‐loyal,anddisloyaloppositionsrevolvearound
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differencesinattitudestowardtheregime.Inhiswork,thesedifferencesin
attitudestowardtheregimehaveanimportantimpactonactors’behaviorand
thereforeonregimedynamicsandoutcomes.Severalotherworkshavealso
underscoredtheeffectofactors’attitudestowarddemocracyanddictatorshipon
regimeoutcomes(Berman1998;Dahl1971:124‐188;O’Donnell1986:15‐18;Ollier
2009;Stepan1971:153‐187;Walker1990;Weffort1984).
Althoughmanyworkshavestakedaclaimabouttheimportanceofactors’
normativeregimepreferences,empiricallydemonstratingthispointisdifficultfora
largesetofcountriesoveralongperiodoftime.Nopreviousquantitativeanalysis
hasundertakensuchanendeavorbecauseofproblemsofconceptualization,
measurement,datagathering,andendogeneity.
CodingRadicalismandPreferencesforDemocracy
Oneofthecriticalchallengeswefacedintestingourhypotheseswasdata
collectionandmeasurement.Fromtheoutset,itwasclearthatweneededa
combinationofquantitativetestingtoexaminethegeneralizabilityofargumentsfor
twentycountriesoveralongperiodoftimeandofqualitativecasestudiestoprobe
thecausalmechanismsinadeeperway.Thechallengeforthequantitativework
wasfiguringoutawaytodeterminethemostimportantactorsinthetwenty
countriesandcodetheirpolicyradicalismandtheirnormativeregimepreferences.
Weengagedateamofnineteenresearchassistantstodothiswork.They
undertookextensiveresearchtopreparelengthycountryreportsthatfollowed
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detailedcodingrules.3Theresearchteamidentifiedmajorbooksandarticles
dealingwiththepoliticalhistoryofthecountry,andthereportsdescribedthemain
politicalactorsduringeachpresidentialadministrationbetween1944and2010.
Oneresearcher(occasionallytwoorthree)coveredeachofthetwentycountries
understudy(someresearcherscodedmorethanonecountry).Thereports
identifiedaparsimonioussetofactors(usually3to7peradministration)thatwere
mostprominentinthehistoriographyofeachperiod.Actorswereincludedinthe
listiftheywereindividuals,organizations,ormovementsthatcontrolledenough
politicalresourcestoexercisestronginfluenceinthecompetitionforpower.
Together,thereportsdiscussed1,459politicalactorsforover290administrations.
Thepresidentwasalmostalwaysidentifiedasapowerfulactor(withtheexception
ofafewpuppetpresidents).Politicalparties,tradeunions,businessassociations,
themilitary,mediaorganizations,andsocialmovementswerealsocommonly
amongthemostimportantactors.
Researchersfolloweddetailedcodingrulestodetectinstancesofradicalism
andnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.Thisteamdidnotcodethetrichotomous
regimescaletoavoidcontaminationbetweenthecodingofthedependentandthe
independentvariablesinourstudy.
Theresearcherscodedpoliticalactorsasradicalwhentheymetanyofthe
followingconditions:(1)theactorexpressedanuncompromisingpreferenceto
achieveleftistorrightistpolicypositionsintheshortrunortopreserveextreme
3Thereportswereonaverage83singlespacedpages,andthemeannumberofreferencesusedtogeneratethereportwas46.
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positionswheretheywerealreadyinplace;or(2)expressedwillingnesstosubvert
thelawinordertoachievesomepolicygoals.Thegovernmentwasalsocodedas
radicalif(3)itimplementedpolarizingpoliciesthatdeliberatelyimposed
substantialcoststootheractors(e.g.,expropriationswithoutcompensation;labor‐
repressiveregulationstoincreaselaborsupply).Non‐governmentalactorswere
codedasradicalif(4)theyundertookviolentactsaimedatimposingorpreventing
significantpolicychange.Ifactorsweredividedorambiguousaboutthose
positions,theywerecodedas“somewhat”radical;otherwisetheywerecodedasnot
radical.
Mostpoliticalactorspaylipservicetodemocracy,sotheresearchteam
primarilydocumentedtheabsenceofanormativepreferencefordemocracy.Actors
werecodedasnotholdingapreferencefordemocracyiftheydisplayedatleastone
ofthefollowingcharacteristics:(1)expressedambivalenceorquestioned
“bourgeois”,“liberal”,or“formal”democracy;(2)expressedhostilitytoward
democraticinstitutions(parties,legislatures,courts,electoralbodies)insteadof
challengingtheirdecisions;(3)questionedthevalidityofdemocraticprocedures
whentheyproducedunfavorableresults;(4)claimedtobethesolerepresentatives
ofthepeople;(5)questionedthelegitimacyofanyoppositionoutsidean
encompassingnationalmovement;or(6)consistentlydismissedpeaceful
opponentsasenemiesofthepeopleorthecountry.
Governmentofficialswerealsocodedaslackinganormativepreferencefor
democracywhenthey(7)introducedprogramsofpartisanindoctrinationintothe
publicschoolsystemorthemilitary,andwhenthey(8)manipulatedinstitutional
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rulesfrequentlyinordertogainpoliticaladvantage.Non‐governmentalactorswere
treatedaslackingstrongpreferencesfordemocracywhenthey(9)expressed
willingnesstosubverttheconstitution;or(10)acceptedtheuseoffraud,political
exclusions,orviolenceforpoliticalpurposes.
Politicalactorswerecodedashavingastrongnormativepreferencefor
democracyiftheydidnotmanifestanyofthetenhostileorientations;as"fairly
strongbutnotentirelyconsistent”intheirnormativesupportiftheyexhibited
ambiguityinanyofthesetenindicators;andaslackinganormativepreferencefor
democracyiftheydecisivelymetanyofthecriteria.
Theserulesprovidedacommonprotocoltogeneratecomparable
informationfortwentycountriesoveralonghistoricalperiod.Theyareconstructed
sothatthecodingofbothvariablesisconceptuallyindependentofthecodingforthe
politicalregime;actors’positionsonpolicyradicalismandnormativepreferencefor
democracydonotintrinsicallyaffectaregime’sclassification.Theyarealso
intendedtoscreenoutinstrumental,insinceredeploymentofdemocraticdiscourse.
Thecodingrulesarebasedonbehaviorsanddiscoursethatareobservableand
documentableratherthanstrictlysubjectiveevaluations.Theindicatorsusedto
coderadicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracydonoteliminatetheneed
forhistoricaljudgmentsaboutactors’preferences,buttheyputthejudgmentsona
firmerground.
Weaggregatedtheinformationinasimpleway.Actorsweregivenascoreof
1(radical),0.5(somewhatradical),and0(notradical);andof1(aconsistentand
strongnormativepreferencefordemocracy),0.5(afairlystrongbutnotentirely
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consistentpreference),and0(inconsistent,ambivalent,orhostileviewsabout
liberaldemocracyonintrinsicgrounds).Wethenestimatedtheaveragevalueof
bothofthevariablesforeverycountry‐year.Thus,ourvariableradicalismcanbe
roughlyinterpretedastheproportionofpowerfulpoliticalactorswithradicalpolicy
preferences,andourvariablenormativepreferencefordemocracycanberoughly
interpretedastheproportionofactorswithanormativecommitmenttodemocracy
ineachcountrybetween1945and2010.
Figure2depictsthehistoricalevolutionofthemeansforthetwovariables
fortheLatinAmericancountries.Thetoppanelsummarizesthescoresforcountry‐
yearsundercompetitiveregimes(thefocusofthispaper).Thebottompanel,
presentedforcomparison,summarizestheinformationforauthoritariancases.
Amongcompetitiveregimes,radicalismshowedasustained—althoughbynomeans
monotonic—declineduringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Bycontrast,
normativesupportfordemocracytendedtoincreaseovertime.Thegapbetween
thetwoseriesstabilizedbythemid‐2000s.Noequivalenttrendisvisibleamongthe
authoritariancases.
20
Figure2.EvolutionofRadicalismandNormativeSupportforDemocracy,1945‐2010
AcarefulreadingofthetoppanelinFigure2hintsattherelevanceofpolicy
radicalismandnormativeregimepreferencesfordemocraticsurvival.In1977,
seventeenofthetwentycountriesinLatinAmericahaddictatorships;only
Colombia,CostaRica,andVenezuelaenjoyedcompetitiveregimes.Aroundthis
pointintime,theseriesforthecompetitiveregimesdisplaysthelowestlevelsof
radicalismandthehighestlevelsofnormativedemocraticcommitmentforthe
wholeperiod.Thispatternsuggeststhatinahostileinternationalenvironment,
21
competitiveregimessurvivedonlyincountrieswherepoliticalactorswere
consistentlymoderateandweddedtoademocraticimaginary.
ComparisonofthetwopanelsinFigure2alsounderscoresanimportantself‐
reinforcingmechanism.Powerfulactorsincompetitiveregimesdisplayonaverage
lowerlevelsofradicalismandhigherlevelsofnormativepreferencefordemocracy
thanactorsinauthoritariansystems.Thisdifferenceishardlysurprising,notonly
becauseoftheselectioneffectsdescribedinthepreviousparagraph,butalso
becausepoliticalregimesemploystatecapacitytoprotecttheirvaluesandsuppress
potentialthreats.Whileauthoritariansystemsmaysimplyrepressmostformsof
dissent,competitiveregimesmayregulatetheactivitiesofradicalgroupsandinvest
significantresourcesinpoliciesintendedtopromotedemocraticvalues.Asaresult,
thenatureoftheincumbentregimeoftenreinforcestheorientationofdominant
politicalactors.
AlternativeExplanationsofDemocraticSurvivalandBreakdown
Theoriesofdemocraticstabilityandbreakdownhaveaddressedalarge
numberofalternativeexplanations.Accordingly,inadditiontoourmain
independentvariables,weconsiderthreetheoreticalclustersofexplanatory
variables:structuralfactors(economicdevelopment,classstructures,dependence
onprimaryexports)andeconomicperformance,institutionaldesign(partysystem
fragmentation,presidentialpowers),andinternationalconditions(thelevelof
democracyintherestoftheregion,USpoliciestowardsLatinAmerica).
22
LevelofDevelopment.Oneofthemostconsistentfindingsinthe
democratizationliteraturehasbeenthatthelevelofmodernizationhasamajor
impactonthelikelihoodofdemocracy(Diamond1992;Lipset1959;Przeworskiet
al.2000;Rueschemeyer,Stephens,andStephens1992).Inthispaper,we
emphasizeanargumentmadebyO’DonnellinModernizationandAuthoritarianism
(1973):modernizationdoesnotnecessarilyincreasethelikelihoodthatcompetitive
politicalregimeswillsurvive(seealsoLipset,SeongandTorres1993;Mainwaring
andPérez‐Liñán2003).WemeasurethelevelofdevelopmentusingpercapitaGDP
inthousandsof2000USdollars(basedonWorldDevelopmentIndicatorsandPenn
WorldTables)andemployaquadraticspecificationtocapturenon‐lineareffects.
ClassStructure.Diamond(1992),Lipset(1959),Moore(1966),and
Rueschemeyeretal.(1992),amongothers,seetheprospectsfordemocracyas
restingsignificantlyonthenatureoftheclassstructure.Rueschemeyeretal.argued
that“(C)apitalistdevelopmentisassociatedwithdemocracybecauseittransforms
theclassstructure,strengtheningtheworkingandmiddleclassesandweakening
thelandedupperclass”(p.7).Weusethepercentageoflaborforcein
manufacturingasagrossindicatorofthenumericalleverageoftheworkingclass.
ThesizeofdifferentclassesshouldberelevanttotestingRueschemeyeretal.’s
arguments;indeed,theyexplicitlyarguedthatclasssizeisanimportant
determinantofdemocracy(p.59).
ResourceDependence.Becauseseveralscholarshavearguedthat
countriesthatdependonnaturalresourcessuchasoilarelikelytoexperience
viciouscyclesdetrimentaltodemocracy(Karl1997;Ross2001),weincludea
23
dichotomousmeasureofnaturalresourcedependence,codedas1ifexportsofoil
andmineralstypicallyrepresentedmorethan10percentofthegrossnational
income—inBolivia,Chile,andVenezueladuring1945‐2005,andinEcuadorsince
1973(computedfromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators).
EconomicPerformance.Severalscholars(Diamond1999:77‐93;Diamond
andLinz1989:44‐46;Gasiorowski1995;Geddes1999;HaggardandKaufman
1995;Lipsetetal.1993;Przeworskietal.2000)havearguedthatcompetitive
regimesaremorelikelytobreakdowniftheireconomicperformanceispoor.We
usedchangeinpercapitaincome(i.e.,therateofeconomicgrowth,basedonour
percapitaGDPfigures)toassessoveralleconomicperformance.
PartySystemFragmentation.Anextensiveliteraturehasemphasizedthe
roleofinstitutionaldesignincreatingstableconditionsfordemocracy.Onesuch
argumenthascenteredonthenatureofpresidentialregimes.Linz(1994),
Mainwaring(1993),andStepanandSkach(1994)arguedthatpresidentialregimes
withfragmentedpartysystemsaremorepronetobreakdown.Theyclaimedthat
whenpresidentshadminoritysupportincongress,impassesbetweenthepresident
andcongressweremorecommon,sometimesleadingtodemocraticbreakdown.
Cheibub(2002)challengedthisanalysis,arguingthatthereisnosignificant
relationshipbetweenpartysystemfragmentationanddemocraticsurvivalin
presidentialsystems.Thedebateabouttheimpactofpartysystemfragmentationon
democraticstabilityinpresidentialregimesisnotrelevantforexplainingtransitions
fromauthoritarianism,butitmighthelpexplainthestabilityofdemocraticand
semi‐democraticregimes.Wecreatedadichotomousvariablecodedas1ifthe
24
effectivenumberofpartiesinthelower(oronly)chamberwasequalorgreaterthan
3.0inagivenyear.4Weemployadichotomousindicatorfortheoreticalreasonsand
becauseofmissingdataontheprecisenumberofpartiesforEcuadorinthe1950s
andPeruinthemid‐1940s.
PresidentialPowers.ShugartandCarey(1992)arguedthat
presidentialismfunctionsmoreeffectivelywithweakerconstitutionalpresidential
powers.Ahighconcentrationofpowerinpresidentialhandsencouragesthe
ExecutiveBranchtoby‐passCongressandpromotesinstitutionaltensionsinthe
regime.Inordertoassessthisargument,weemployShugartandCarey’s(1992)
measureofpresidentialpowers.
RegionalPoliticalEnvironment.Untilthe1990s,researchonpolitical
regimesfocusedheavilyondomesticfactors(foranexception,seeWhitehead
1986).Sincethe1990s,however,scholarshavepaidmoreattentiontointernational
factorsinregimechangeandstability(Brown2000;Gleditsch2002;Levitskyand
Way2010;Pevehouse2005;Whitehead1986,1996).Afavorableinternational
environmentmightenhancechancesfordemocracy,whileanunpropitious
environmentmightworkagainstdemocracy.Toexplorethispossibility,we
includedavariable(Region)toassesstheimpactofLatinAmerica’sregional
politicalcontextonthelikelihoodofregimedurabilityandchange.Wemeasuredthe
regionalpoliticalenvironmentastheproportionofdemocraticcountriesinthe
regioneveryyear,excludingthecountryinquestion.Thecodingforthis
4Theformulafortheeffectivenumberofpartiesis1/sum(p2),wherepistheproportionofseatsobtainedbyeachparty(LaaksoandTaagepera1979).
25
independentvariablewasbasedonourtrichotomousmeasureofdemocracy(with
semi‐democraticcountriescountingashalf).Thevaluescantheoreticallyrange
fromzero,ifnoneoftheother19countriesintheregionweredemocraticinagiven
year,to1iftheother19countriesweredemocraticinthatyear.
USForeignPolicy.AsahegemonicpowerintheAmericas,theUScanaffect
thelikelihoodoftransitionstocompetitiveregimesandofregimebreakdowns.We
createdacontinuousscaletoassesstheorientationofUSadministrationstowards
democracyinLatinAmerica.Usinghistoricalsources,weansweredeight
dichotomousquestionsaboutUSpolicymakers.Fourcapturedpoliciesand
attitudesharmfultodemocracy,5whilefourothersaddressedbehaviorsintendedto
supportdemocracyinLatinAmerica.6Thefirstsetofquestionswascoded‐1when
theanswerwasaffirmative,andthesecondsetwascoded+1whentheanswerwas
affirmative.Theresultingscoresforeachadministration(from‐4to4)werere‐
scaledtocreateacontinuousindexcalledUSPolicy,rangingbetween0and1(where
1indicatesmaximumsupportfordemocracy).
5WhetherUSleaders(1)supportedcoupsorarmedrebellionsagainstcompetitiveregimes;(2)limitedthesovereignty(andhencedemocracy)ofLatinAmericancountriesthroughmilitaryinterventions;(3)clearlysupportedauthoritarianregimes;or(4)expressedtheviewthatLatinAmericancountriescouldnotbedemocraciesbecauseofculturaldispositions.6WhetherUSleaders:(1)expressedapreferencefordemocracyevenwhenthereweretradeoffswithUSeconomicorsecurityinterests;(2)promotedthedemocratizationofauthoritarianregimesormadeeffortstobolsterdemocraciesunderthreat;(3)criticizedauthoritarianregimesthatwerenotleftist;and(4)practicedapolicyofnon‐recognitionwhenamilitarycoupoverthrewacompetitiveregime.
26
EstimationandResults
Weestimatedtheriskofdemocraticbreakdownusingadiscrete‐time
survivalmodel.Thedependentvariableisadichotomousindicatorcodedas1for
yearsifthecompetitiveregimebrokedownandwasreplacedbyanauthoritarian
systemand0ifitsurvivedthatyear.Accordingly,apositivecoefficientinthe
regressionresultssignalsagreaterlikelihoodthatacompetitiveregimewould
breakdowngivenahighervalueforagivenindependentvariable.Inadditionto
ourmainindependentvariables,RadicalismandPreferencefordemocracy,the
equationincludeseightpredictorsreflectingthethreeclustersofvariables
describedintheprevioussection(structuralfactorsandeconomicperformance,
institutionaldesign,andinternationalpoliticalconditions).
FollowingCarterandSignorino(2010)wealsocontrolledforduration‐
dependenceusingacubictransformationoftheregime’sage(measuredinyears).
Thisfactorisrelevantforeconometricaswellasforsubstantivereasons.Rustow
(1970)arguedthatfollowingaregimetransition,the“habituation”phaseiscritical
toestablishthelong‐termsurvivaloftheregime.Thecubictransformationofage
allowsustoassesswhetherthehazardratefordemocracieschangesovertimeand
whethertheytruly“consolidate”inthelongrun.
27
Table1.SurvivalModelsforCompetitiveRegimes,1945‐2005
Model1.1 Model1.2 Estimate (s.e.) Estimate (s.e.)Radicalism 3.047 * (1.140)PreferenceforDemocracy ‐3.686 * (1.534)PercapitaGDP(t‐1) ‐1.071 (0.568) ‐0.043 (0.670)PercapitaGDP^2 0.133 (0.078) 0.040 (0.091)Growth,t‐1 4.990 (6.203) 2.663 (6.185)Industriallaborforce,t‐1 ‐0.011 (0.035) 0.026 (0.039)Oilandmineralexports ‐0.673 (0.676) ‐0.884 (0.669)Multipartism,t 0.102 (0.462) ‐0.325 (0.519)Presidentialpowers ‐0.216 * (0.074) ‐0.228 * (0.090)Region,t‐1 ‐4.307 * (1.502) ‐4.901 * (1.929)USpolicy,t ‐0.795 (0.768) ‐0.256 (0.865)Ageoftheregime 0.049 (0.127) 0.328 * (0.158)Ageofregime^2 ‐0.002 (0.007) ‐0.015 (0.009)Ageofregime^3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)Constant 3.667 * (1.801) ‐0.055 (2.279)N(regime‐years) 644 644 Pseudo‐R 0.16 0.31 Entriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients(*significantatthe.05level).
Table1presentslogisticregressionsurvivalestimates.Model1.1isprovided
forreference,anditexcludesourmainindependentvariablessothatwecanverify
whetherstructuralandeconomicperformancevariablesaffectdemocraticsurvival
beforeweaddthevariablesforradicalismandnormativepreferencefordemocracy.
Onlytwocontrolvariablespresentsignificanteffects:amoredemocraticregional
environmentconsiderablyreducestheriskofdemocraticbreakdown,while—
againsttheoreticalexpectations—greaterpresidentialpowersalsotendtoreduce
28
theriskofinstability.7ConsistentwithO’Donnell’sModernizationandBureaucratic
Authoritarianism,percapitaincomehadnoimpactonthesurvivalprospectsof
competitiveregimesinLatinAmericafrom1945to2005.Noneoftheother
structuralvariableshasadirectimpactondemocraticsurvival.Multipartismand
USPolicyexerciseinfluenceintheexpecteddirection,buttheircoefficientsarealso
statisticallyinsignificant.Therateofeconomicgrowthdidnotaffectthelikelihood
ofregimesurvival;manycompetitiveregimessurvivedinthethirdwavedespite
abysmaleconomicperformance,andbefore1978,somebrokedowndespite
respectableeconomicperformance.
ThesefindingsremainconsistentinModel1.2,whichincludesourmeasures
ofradicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.FourresultsinModel1.2
deservecomment.First,actors’policyradicalismhasabigimpactonthecapacity
ofcompetitiveregimestosurvive.Radicalactorsraisethestakeofcompetitive
politics.Ifradicalactorswinstatepower,theycanimposeveryhighcostsonother
actors,makingittemptingfortheloserstoresorttocoupsasawayofpreventing
majorandextremelydifficult‐to‐reversecosts.Forexample,theradicalpoliciesof
SalvadorAllende’sgovernmentinChile(1970‐73)andofthefarleftpushedthe
dominantfactionoftheChristianDemocrats,theConservatives,andthemilitary
towardsupportingthe1973coup.Theyfearedthattheconsequencesofallowing
7Atleastinpart,thisresultmaybeanartifactofhistoricaltiming:trendsinconstitutionallawdroveconstitution‐makerstowritemoreexplicitpowersfortheexecutivebranchinrecentdecades.Thus,therewasacoincidencebetweenthewaveofdemocratizationandthepowersofthepresidentestablishedinthenewcharters.
29
thePopularUnitygovernmenttoremaininpowermightbedisastrous.8Although
thisspecificexampleinvokesthefearthatleftistradicalismcreatedduringthe
heightoftheColdWar,thesamelogicappliestorightistradicalism.Conversely,the
SocialistParty’smoderationafterthereestablishmentofdemocracyin1990madeit
easierforthedemocraticregimetosurvive.
ThisfindingisconsistentwithO’Donnell’swork(1973)onthelevelofthreat
asanimpetustodemocraticbreakdowns,withSantos’s(1986)analysisofthe
impactofradicalismonthedemocraticbreakdowninBrazilin1964,andwith
Berman’sanalysis(1998)oftheimpactofsocialdemocraticparties’radicalismor
moderationontheirbehaviorandindirectlyondemocraticsurvivalorbreakdown
inSwedenandGermanyinthe1930s.
Second,ifactorshaveanormativepreferencefordemocracy,competitive
regimesarefarmorelikelytosurvive.Althoughthisfindingishardlysurprising,it
indicatesthatO’Donnell(1986:15‐18)wasprescienttoarguethatactors’normative
preferencescouldgoalongwaytowardoffsettingmanyliabilities,includingahigh
levelofinequality,lackofademocraticcultureinmostLatinAmericancountries,
andsevereeconomicchallenges.Linz(1978b)emphasizedasimilarideawithhis
notionofdemocraticlegitimacy;legitimacyenablesaregimetooffsetperformance
problems.
Argentinaisanexampleofhowactors’normativepreferencefordemocracy
canmakeapositivedifferenceforregimesurvival.Fromthelate1920suntil1976,
8ThisisreminiscentofPrzeworski’sargument(1986)thatthecostofdemocracyiswillingnesstorespectcapitalists’bottomlineinterests.
30
fewactorsinArgentinavalueddemocracyonnormativegrounds.Earlierworks
includingDahl(1971:129‐140),O’Donnell(1973,1978b),Potter(1981),Rouquié
(1982a,1982b),Smith(1978),Viola(1982),andWaisman(1987,1989)agreedon
thispoint.AsRouquié(1982b:341,380)noted,“Allpoliticalforcespreferred
winningovertheadversaryinpowertosafeguardingtheinstitutions.”9
Competitiveregimesneverenjoyedthesteadfastsupportofpowerfulactors,sothey
werehighlyvulnerabletobreakdown.In1930,theConservatives,theSocialists,the
military,andevenpartsofhisownpartyconspiredagainstPresidentYrigoyen.
From1946until1973,bothofthemainpoliticalparties(theRadicalsand
Peronists)andthepowerfullaborunionswerequicktodefectfromthedemocratic
coalition.In1955,theRadicalssupportedasuccessfulcoupagainstPerón,and
fromthenuntil1969theybackedhisproscription.In1966,thePeronistsandlabor
unionssupportedacoupagainstaRadicalpresidentinthehopethattheywouldbe
abletoregainstatepowerbyendingtheelectoralproscriptionagainstPerón.
Duringthosedecades,powerfulactorstoleratedcompetitivepoliticsonlyifit
broughtdesirablepolicyresults.
After1976,thekeyactorsaccepteddemocraticcompetitionasthelegitimate
routetowinningpoliticaloffice.Thisreorientationtowardanormativepreference
fordemocracyallowedtheregimetosurvivedespitesevereeconomiccrisesinthe
9Inaconvergingopinion,Portantiero(1987:281‐282)wrotethat“BothRadicalisminitsYrigoyenfactionandevenmoresoPeronismdidnotseethemselvesaspartsofasystem,butratherasatotalitythatexpressedthenationandthepeople.ThelearningofloyalcompetitionbetweengovernmentandoppositionwasneverseriouslyundertakeninArgentina.”SeealsoDahl(1971:130‐140);GómezandViola(1984).
31
1980sandin2001‐02,hyperinflationinthe1989‐91period,asteeprisein
inequalities,andonaveragebadeconomicperformancefrom1983until2003.
Whentherewereseriousthreatstodemocracyinthelate1980s,theunionsandthe
mainpartiesmobilizedtoprotectit.Laborenduredverynegativeeconomic
conditions,butitnevermobilizedonbehalfofacoup.
Toillustratethehugesubstantiveeffectofpolicymoderationandnormative
preferencesfordemocracyonregimesurvival,considerthefollowingestimates.
Holdingallothervariablesattheirmeans,acompetitiveregimeinwhichallactors
areradicalandinwhichnoonehasanormativepreferencefordemocracywouldbe
expectedtolastforaboutayear.Ifallactorsabandontheirradicalpositions,the
expecteddurationoftheregimewouldincreasetosixyears.Andif,inaddition,all
actorsembraceanormativecommitmenttodemocracy,thepredictedlifetimefor
theregimewouldbemorethan200years.10
Third,amoredemocraticregionalpoliticalenvironmentconsiderably
reducestheprobabilitythatcompetitiveregimeswillbreakdown.Thisresult
mesheswiththerobustliteraturethathasemergedoverthelast25yearson
internationalinfluencesondemocratization.Amoredemocraticregionalpolitical
environmentfostersthediffusionofidealsaboutwhatispossibleanddesirablein
politics,anditledtotheestablishmentoflegalnormsintheOrganizationof
AmericanStatesintendedtosafeguardcompetitiveregimes.Theendofthecivil
war,thepeaceagreementof1992,andtheestablishmentofacompetitivepolitical
10Thepredictedprobabilitiesofbreakdownforthethreeconfigurationsare.796,.156,and.005,respectively.EstimatesarebasedonModel1.2,treatinginsignificantcoefficientsaszero.
32
regimeinElSalvadorhelpedinspiresimilardevelopmentsinGuatemalaafewyears
later.Conversely,beforethethirdwave,someauthoritarianregimesservedas
inspirationsforcoupsandauthoritarianpopulistselsewhereintheregion.For
example,theestablishmentinBrazilin1964ofamilitaryregimethatpromotedthe
“economicmiracle”from1967to1974,andthemilitary’sabilitytoquicklydefeat
therevolutionaryleftandcontainthebroaderlefthelpedfuelconfidencein
SouthernConemilitariesandrightistsaboutthepotentialthatthearmedforcesin
theircountriescouldalsogovernsuccessfully.
Insum,theresultsinTable1indicatethatdemocraticsurvivalismostly
drivenby(theabsenceof)radicalpolicypreferences,bystrongnormative
preferencesfordemocracy,andabyfavorableregionalpoliticalcontext(reflectedin
thepresenceofotherdemocraticcountriesintheregion,butnotnecessarilyinUS
policies).Theregressionresultsareopentoanobviousconcernofendogeneity:ifa
competitiveregimeisincrisis,itcouldpushsomeactorstowardmoreradicalpolicy
positionsordepressnormativepreferencestowarddemocracy.Spatialconstraints
preventafulleconometrictreatmentofthisproblemhere,butanexaminationof
historicalcasesshowsmanyexamplesinwhichactors'policyradicalismandtheir
normativepreferenceshelpexplaintheregimeoutcomes,andinwhichtheregime
outcomeisclearlyhistoricallysubsequentto,andhencecannotexplain,actors'
positions.Theeffectofnormativeregimepreferencesandpolicyradicalismcannot
simplystemfromreversecausation.
Finally,Table1alsounderscoresthatstructuralfactorshadnodirect
consequencesfordemocraticstabilityinLatinAmerica.Structuralpredictorsfailto
33
achieveconventionallevelsofsignificanceeveninmodel1.1excludingthemore
proximatecausesofregimebreakdowntappedbyourvariablesforpolicy
radicalismandnormativepreferencesfordemocracy.O’Donnell(1973)wasrightto
beskepticalabouttheimpactofmodernizationonthesurvivalofcompetitive
regimesinLatinAmerica.Thefindingforabroadersampleofcountriesthathigher
percapitaincomelowersthelikelihoodofdemocraticbreakdown(Epsteinetal.
2006;Przeworskietal.2000)doesnotholdforLatinAmerica.11
Model1.2alsosuggeststhatthebaselinehazardchangesovertime,butthe
resultsworkagainsttheideaofconsolidation:thecoefficientforageispositiveand
significant,revealingaprogressiveincreaseintheriskofbreakdown.Thiseffectis
non‐linear:althougheveryadditionalyearelapsedincreasesthelevelofrisk,this
happensatadecliningrate.Beyondyear10,theeffectofregimeageonthehazard
rateisinsignificantatthe.05level.
Conclusions
Inthispaper,wehaveintroducedanovelstrategyforthestudyofregime
breakdownandsurvival,namely,theuseofanactor‐basedapproachonalarge
enoughscalethatitispossibletodoquantitativeanalysis.Previousquantitative
approachestothestudyofdemocraticsurvivaldidnotindicatewhothekeyactors
are,andtheydidnottestpropositionsaboutregimesurvivalandbreakdownbased
ontheobservedpropertiesofrealpoliticalactors.Mostvariantsofmodernization
11ThemarginaleffectofpercapitaGDPinModel1.2,givenbythefirstderivativeofthequadraticfunction[i.e.,0.08(GDP)–0.04]isinsignificantforthewholeincomerangeobservedinthesample.
34
theorydonotexplicitlyspecifyactorsorcausalmechanisms,sothereasonsforthe
linkagebetweenahigherlevelofdevelopmentandagreaterprobabilityof
democracyisnotclear.Boix(2003)andAcemogluandRobinson(2006)assume
thatthepoor,middleclass,andrichdeterminethenatureofpoliticalregimes,but
theydonotestablishthatthesebroadincomecategoriesareactuallycapableof
overcomingcollectiveactionproblemsandbecomingpoliticalactors.Inglehartand
Welzel’sculturaltheory(2005:149‐300)arguesthatmasspoliticalculture
determinespoliticalregimes,butitdoesnotclearlyenoughspecifywhotheactors
areandwhatthecausalmechanismsarebywhichmasspoliticalcultureinfluences
actualpoliticalactors.Becausebattlesaboutpoliticalregimesinvolvespecific
actorswhosepreferencesabouttheregimearenoteasilypredictableonthebasisof
thestructuralorculturalvariables,westronglyadvocatehistorically‐grounded,
actor‐basedapproachestostudyingregimes.
Asopposedtothis“actorless”traditioninthestudyofpoliticalregimes,
anotherlineagethatincludestheiconicworksondemocraticbreakdownsbyLinz
(1978b)andontransitionsfromauthoritarianrulebyO’DonnellandSchmitter
(1986),aswellasmanyrichqualitativecasestudies(Figueiredo1993;Levine1973;
Stepan1971;A.Valenzuela1978)hasfocusedoncoalitionsofactorsoronconcrete
historicactors.Thebestworkinthistraditionhasgreatlyenrichedour
understandingofwhydemocraciesemergeandstabilizeorbreakdown,andour
corehypothesesflowoutofthispreviousqualitativework.However,the
generalizabilityofthefindingsfromthistraditionhasbeenuncertainbecauseofthe
limitednumberofobservations.Ourapproachbuildsoninsightsfromthose
35
qualitativestudiesbut,forthefirsttime,extendsanactorbasedapproachtoabroad
rangeofcountriesoveralongperiodoftime.
Weemphasizethreesubstantivefindings,whichexpandGuillermo
O’Donnell’sseminalcontributions.First,thelevelofdevelopmentdidnotaffectthe
likelihoodofbreakdownofcompetitiveregimesinLatinAmericaduringthelong
timespanfrom1945to2005.ThisnullresultgenerallyconfirmsGuillermo
O’Donnell’sprescientanalysisinModernizationandBureaucraticAuthoritarianism.
Second,actors’policyradicalismmakesitmoredifficulttosustain
competitivepoliticalregimes.Whenmanyradicalforcescompeteforpolitical
power,thechancesthatsomeactorswillfindthecostoftoleratingdemocratic
politicstoohighincreases.Radicalthreatsencouragedefectionfromcompetitive
regimes.Conversely,pervasivepolicymoderationlowersthestakeofdemocratic
politics.
Third,alongwithDahl(1971),Linz(1978b),O’Donnell(1986:15‐18),Ollier
(2009),Walker(1990),andWeffort(1984),webelievethatactors’normative
attitudesaboutthepoliticalregimehavealargeimpactonwhethercompetitive
regimesendureorbreakdown.Someactorsintrinsicallyvaluedemocracyfarmore
thanotheractors.Democracycanwithstandseverecrisesandprotractedbad
performanceifmostactorsarenormativelycommittedtotheregime.Conversely,it
ishighlyvulnerabletobreakdownifthemostpowerfulactorsareindifferenttothe
intrinsicvalueofliberaldemocracy.Thesenormativepreferencesabouttheregime
arenotreducibletoactors’structuralpositionortobroadsocietalculturalpatterns.
36
Measuringactors’policyradicalismandnormativepreferencesaboutthe
politicalregimeisahugechallenge,anditwouldbefatuoustoclaimthatwehave
fullysolvedallofthedifficulties.However,ifpolicyradicalismandactors’
normativepreferencesaboutthepoliticalregimearehighlyimportantvariablesthat
arenotreducibletostructuralfactorsorbroadsocietalculturalpatterns,associal
scientists,weshouldstrivetoincorporatethemintoouranalyses,bothqualitative
andquantitative.Previousscholarshavedonesoqualitatively;webelieveitis
importanttoalsostudytheseissuesquantitatively.
37
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