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FOUNDATION FOR MIDDLE EAST AND BALKAN STUDIES (OBV)
Y. T. U. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Proceedings of the International Conference on
THE NEW IRAQ
March 22nd, 2005
stanbul
Edited By
FUAT AKSU - NURN ATEOLU GNEY
Joint Conference Series N. 3
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THE NEW IRAQ
March 22nd, 2005
AUDITORIUM
YTU Auditorium / Yldz Campus
Yldz- Beikta
Edited by
FUAT AKSU - NURN ATEOLU GNEY
Joint Conference Series No. 3
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBV)
Y. T. U. Department of Political Science and International Relations
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Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBV). Texts are as originally
submitted.
Copyright
Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBV)
Citation
Fuat Aksu and Nurin Ateolu Gney (Eds.), Proceedings of the InternationalConference on the New Iraq, March 22nd, 2005, stanbul. stanbul: OBV, 2005.
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Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies (OBV)
Yldz Technical University
Department of Political Science and International Relations
THE NEW IRAQ
March 22nd, 2005
AUDITORIUM
YTU Auditorium / Yldz Campus
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viii
THE NEW IRAQ
March 22nd, 2005
Programme
Welcome Addresses and Opening Remarks10.00-10.10
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nurin Ateolu Gney
(DPSIR / YTU)
10.10-10.20
Ambassador Gner ztek
(Chairman of OBV)
I. SESSION
Chairperson
zdem Sanberk
(R. Ambassador, Turkey)
10.30-12.30
11.30-11.45 Coffee Break
11.45-12.30 Discussions
II. SESSION
Chairperson
Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirii
(Boazii University, Turkey)
14.00-15.30
15.30-15.45 Coffee Break
15.45-17.00 Discussions
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I. SESSION
10.30-12.30
Chairperson
zdem Sanberk
(R. Ambassador, Turkey)
The Main Features of the Permanent Constitution
Dr. Ghazi Faisal Mehdi
(Dean of the College of Law Al-Nahrain University /Iraq)
Ethnic, Secterial and Tribal Heritage, Facing Democracy in New Iraq
Prof. Dr. Adel Abdulsalam (Syria)
The Need to Include the Arab Sunnite in the Current Political Process inIraq
Oraib Al-Rantawi
(General Director of Al Quds Centre for Political Studies /Jordan)
Propositions for Creating an Inclusive Political System in Iraq
Dr. Dina S. Shehata
(Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies / Egypt)
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II. SESSION
14.00-17.00
Chairperson
Prof. Dr. Kemal Kirii
(Boazii University, Turkey)
Future of International Relations After Irak War
Prof. Dr. Alexander Nikitin
(Center for Political and International Studies/RF)
Turkey and Iraq: Challenges of TransitionAssist. Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunk
(DPSIR METU / Turkey)
Politics and Iraq: To the Constitutional Election and Beyond
Associate Prof. Dr. Thomas S. Mowle
(Director, Center for the Study of Defense Policy United States Air Force Academy /USA)
Iranian Foreign Policy Towards Iraq 2003-2005
Dr. Kamran Taremi
(Tehran University/ Iran)
The Identity of Kirkuk
Prof. Dr. Mahir Nakip
(Erciyes University / Turkey)
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CONTRIBUTORS
Prof. Dr. Alexander Nikitin;(Center for Political and International Studies/RF)
Prof. Dr. Adel Abdulsalam;(Syria)
Oraib Al-Rantawi; (General Director of Al Quds Centre for Political Studies /
Jordan)
Dr. Dina S. Shehata; (Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies / Egypt)
Prof. Dr. Alexander Nikitin;(Center for Political and International Studies/ RF)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunk;(DPSIR METU / Turkey)
Associate Prof. Dr. Thomas S. Mowle;(Director, Center for the Study of Defense
Policy United States Air Force Academy / USA)
Dr. Kamran Taremi;(Tehran University/ Iran)
Prof. Dr. Mahir Nakip;(Erciyes University / Turkey)
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTORS ............................................................................................XIPREFACE............................................................................................................ 1WELCOMING REMARKS.................................................................................3
Nurin ATEOLU GNEY............................................................. 3
OPENNING REMARK......................................................................................5
Gner ZTEK................................................................................... 5
DAM ANAYASANIN TEMEL HATLARI......................................................9
Ghazi Faisal MEHDI........................................................................ 9
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACINGDEMOCRACY IN NEW IRAQ ........................................................................ 15
Adel ABDULSALAM....................................................................... 15
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN THECURRENT POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ ................................................ 29
Oraib AL-RANTAWI ....................................................................... 29
PROPOSITIONS FOR CREATING AN INCLUSIVE POLITICALSYSTEM IN IRAQ............................................................................................43
Dina S. SHEHATA .......................................................................... 43
TURKEY AND IRAQ: CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION ........................... 51
Meliha BENLI ALTUNIIK............................................................. 51
POLITICS AND IRAQ: TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTION AND BEYOND.................................................................................................59
Thomas S. MOWLE......................................................................... 59
IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ 2003-2005 ........................ 97
Kamran TAREMI ............................................................................ 97
THE IDENTITY OF KIRKUK .......................................................................105
Mahir NAKIP................................................................................ 105
DISCUSSIONS.................................................................................................115
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
PREFACE
The Foundation of Middle East and Balkan Studies with the
Department of Political Science and International Relations organized a
conference under the title of New Iraq on 22 March 2005.
The participants who are all experts in their fields have come together
at this very important conference, so as to discuss the future of Iraq.We considered the contributions of the conference participants highly
valuable in terms of providing an insight to the current problems of todays
Iraq. For this reason, the conference papers are being decided to be published
in the format of proceedings. By this way, we hoped to encourage further
discussions in the field of international relations.
We would like to thanks to all the individuals involved in the
preparations of the conference.
Fuat Aksu - Nurin Ateolu Gney
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
WELCOMING REMARKS
Nurin ATEOLU GNEY*
Distinguished Guests
It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all on behalf of the
Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Yldz
Technical University.
Today, we will be discussing the future of Iraq. Since the Iraqi elections
of January 2005, the countrys political development and the role of the
coalition forces inevitably entered a new phase. Now, that the elections are
behind questions remain over whether they will pave way for security and
democracy in the future or cause even more instability and conflict in Iraq. At
the New Iraq conference today, the distinguished participants who are all
experts in their fields are expected to (i) discuss the various factors that can worsen the current situation in Iraq and (ii) come up with policy
recommendations that could be help.
The current problems of Iraq (like; new Iraqi constitution, the future
status of Kirkuk, the legitimacy question, the problem of equal representation,
economic reconstruction of the country and such.) that are ahead of Iraqi
* Assoc. Prof. Dr.; Department of Political Science and International Relations-YTU.
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Nurin ATEOLU GNEY
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Transitional Assembly quite serious and challenging. Unless these problems are
carefully tackled, the damage they would cause would be beyond repair.
Nearly, two years after the end of the Saddams regime, the security
situation in Iraq is not solved yet. The country still continues to be a place of
widespread criminality, violence and instability. The on-going insurgencies in
Iraq had become the major obstacle on the way rebuilding the country and
moving towards peace and stability.
So, the Iraq story that was hoped to end with the overthrown of
Saddam regime in 2003 is not over yet. On the contrary, there seems to be
along way to go.
A stable and secure Iraq surely serves at everyones interest in the
region and even beyond.
And, I hope that this meeting will produce some insight and solutions
to the problems of new Iraq.
Lastly, I would like to thank to our students and the members of
Political Science and International Relations Club, for their efforts and
contributions in the realization of this conference.
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
OPENNING REMARK
Gner ZTEK*
Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Participants,
Ladies and GentlemenIt is a pleasure for me to welcome you all to the Conference on New
Iraq which is jointly organized by the Foundation for Middle-East and Balkan
Studies and the Yldz Technical University. Today we shall discuss different
issues relating to this important area on the basis of first hand information and
valuable commentaries which will be provided by our distinguished
participants.
Regardless of various threats and violence perpetrated by the terrorists,
the holding of the general elections in Iraq on the 30th January 2005 and the
relatively strong participation around 60 % are important achievements. The
fact that the Iraqis of all ethnics groups and religious sects were able to cast
their votes freely to the candidates of more than 100 parties ranging from
monarchists to communists constitutes a significant example of democracy for
* Ambassador, Director of Foundation for Middle East and Balkan Studies-OBV
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Gner ZTEK
6
the region. Securing a quota of 30 % for women in the future Parliament is
another meaningful feature of these elections.
The election shows the will of Iraqi people to take control of their own
destinies and their strong belief in democracy. Although the security situation is
the most pressing issue in the country, the determination of the people is a
victory over the forces of terror and anarchy.
The boycott of the elections by the majority of the Sunnis is a serious
shortcoming. This fact increased the representation of one segment of
population. So giving way to their over representation in the Transitional
Assembly.
Our earnest hope is that the Iraqi Sunni guerrillas dissociates
themselves from the foreign terrorists led by Al-Qaeda operating in Iraq and
they defend their aspirations and interests in a non violent way within the rules
of democracy. In my opinion, the Transitional Assembly has 3 basic and
delicate questions to deal with. The first is the place of the religion in the new
regime whether Iraq will be a theocratic state like Iran or an Islamist state with
a reference to the basic elements of Islam with non-religious leaders or simply a
secular state.
The second point is whether Iraq will be an unitary or federal or
confederal state and the level of the autonomy accorded to the federated states.
Let me remind that the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq are utmost
importance for the countries of the region Developments leading to the
dismemberment of Iraq undermining the already existing delicate balance of
power can produce unpredictable dangerous consequences for the security and
the stability of the region.
The third point is the status of Kirkuk. Kirkuk where the Turkmen
came to establish themselves in the XIth Century is a multi-ethnic province
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OPENNING REMARKS
7
where almost all the segments of populations traditionally have coexisted. All
the population groups in Kirkuk have vested interest in the Provinces future.
No single community should be allowed to establish control or domination
over the others. Kirkuk should be, as in the past, the collective property of the
entire Iraq. The property and resettlement claims need to be fully addressed
according to the established mechanisms. Until then the fait accompli or
Manipulations aiming at moving of hundreds, of thousands of new settlers
should be stopped. The future status of Kirkuk should be determined within
the context of the new constitution also taking into consideration the vast
petroleum reserves which belongs to the entire Iraqi population.
Next step in the transitional process will be the drafting of the new
Iraqi constitution and the referendum. Transitional Administrative Law set 15
August 2005 as the deadline for the preparation of the new constitution, under
normal circumstances constitutional Referendum is to be held by October 15,
2005. Subsequently General Elections will be renewed no later than 15
December 2005 after which transitional arrangements and sovereignty will be
transferred to the elected Iraqi Legislative and the Government.
Preparation of the constitution requires a true effort for national
reconciliation. The groups in the Assembly have to move beyond the ethnic
and sectarian interests and uphold the interests of the whole nation. To this endcertain measures can be taken such as selection of a respectable Sunni Arab for
one of the high state posts, like the Vice-President, inclusion of Sunni figures in
the new government, substantial participation of Sunni experts in the drafting
process of the constitution, gradual reintegration of the civil servants and
officers who had not committed crimes during Saddam regime.
Equal attention must be given to ensure the protection of the rights
and interest of the Turkmen as well as the other groups.
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Gner ZTEK
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The consolidation of a stable and democratic state in Iraq can srve as a
model for the region to broaden democratic developments the momentum of
January elections is already felt in the region. The developments in Palestine,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and in the Gulf Countries are precursory signs
for a change for better.
The failure in Iraq will not only produce a major setback for
democratic system but no doubt will give way to the destabilization of the
whole region by strengthening the terrorist groups and increasing their prestige.
Then, Iraq will become global center of terror and radical Islam as well as a
secure base for their subversive activities. This is why all the countries should
help Iraq to overcome the difficulties it is encountering in the development of
democratic process and the establishment and strengthening of the key national
institutions as the national army, police, political parties, civil societies.
Turkey has historical, cultural, economic and commercial links with
Iraq. It is maintaining close relations with all segments of the Iraqi people,
supporting the steps taken by Iraq establishing a democratic regime reassuring
its national unity and territorial integrity.
I am certain that this day in Istanbul will bring forth fruitful discussions
and will lead to concrete results.
With these thoughts in mind, I would like to wish you all every success
in your deliberations.
Thank you for your attention.
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
DAM ANAYASANIN TEMEL HATLARI*
Ghazi Faisal MEHDI**
Szlerimize balarken, lkemiz sorunlarnn ele alnmas ve yaadmz
krizin doal ve doru bir mecrada almas iin deerli katklarn eksik etmeyen
Ortadou ve Balkan Aratrmalar Kurumu'na, Yldz Teknik niversitesine ve
siz sayn akademisyenlere teekkr ediyoruz.
Dostlar! Hepinizin tank olduu gibi lkemizdeki seimler son derece
ar artlar altnda yaplmtr. Ancak mevcut standartlar gz nne alndnda
gayet baarl getii sylenebilir. Geici hkmeti kurma ve daim anayasann
taslan hazrlama grevini omuzlarna alacak ulusal meclis bu seimler
neticesinde ortaya kmtr.
Hazrlanacak olan daim anayasa, Irak halknn tarih misyonunun, det
ve geleneklerinin; ahlak deerlerinin ve siyasi olgunluunun ak bir ifadesiolmaldr. Mstakbel anayasamz, Irakllarn inand ve savunduu hukuk
nosyonunun somut ifadesi olarak znde u temel nitelikleri ierebilmelidir:
*The presentation is in Arabic and simultaneously translated from Arabic to Turkish. We would
like to thank to Mr. A. Sait Aykut for his valuable contribution for translation the paper fromArabic to Turkish.
Konuma Arapa yaplm ve simultane olarak Trkeye evirilmitir. Konferansn Arapa-Trke simultane evirisine katklar ve Arapa metnin Trkeye evrilmesindeki yardmlar iinSayn A. Sait Aykuta itenlikle teekkr ederiz.
**Dr.; Dean of the College of Law Al-Nahrain University /Iraq
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Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
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1- Anayasa Irak'n toprak ve ulus btnln korumal, federasyon
deil niter devlet modeline sadk kalnarak yerinden ynetim
(desantralizasyon; el-l merkeziyye) ilkesiyle idare edilen bir devlet olduunu
vurgulamaldr. nk federasyon esasna dayal bir devletin ana unsurlar
lkemizde henz teekkl etmemitir. Maalesef u an gei dnemini yaayan
Irak idaresi, Krt kardelerimize hak ettiklerinden daha fazla yetkiler
bahetmitir. stelik Krdistan mntkasn, federal sistemi esas alan devletlerde
dahi bir benzeri bulunmayan salahiyet ve ayrcalklarla donatarak federal bir
blge saymtr. Bu yetki ve ayrcalklarn, somut ihtiyalar karlamak iin deil;
sabk rejimin amansz zulmnden tr Krt kardelerimizin iinde biriken
korku ve endieleri datmak amacyla verildiini sanyoruz. Fakat
unutulmamaldr ki gemite yaanan ikence ortamnn kurbanlar yalnz
Krtler deil tm Irakllardr. nk sabk rejim, ya dorudan silah dayayarak ya
da -eitli sulamalar vesilesiyle- dolayl yollar kullanp alt milyon Irakly
katletmitir! Bu ldrlenler sadece Krt deildi; Araplar, Arap olmayanlar,
Mslmanlar, gayrimslimler, Snnler ve ler Her mezhep ve her etnik
gruptan kurban verildi o dnemde. Akas, Irakn gneyinde insann kann
donduran toplu mezar grntleri, Halepe katliamndan daha vahiyanedir. Bu
mezarlarda birok insan diri diri gmlmtr! Byle ar ikence ve katliamlara
maruz kaldklar ve hla karanlk gemiin meum glgesi altnda endieyle
kvrandklar iin gneydeki lerin de hak etmedikleri kadar geni idar yetki ve
ayrcalklarla donatlmalar m gerekecektir?
Federal idare sisteminin bilimsel temellere dayanmas ve gerek
ihtiyalara cevap vermesi gerekir; yoksa szm ona bir takm mevhum
korkularn tetiklemesiyle ba tac edilecek bir sistem deildir federalizm. Biz,
federalizmin terk edilmesi gerektiini ve en st seviyede aklc esaslara bal bir
yerinden ynetim fikrini savunuyoruz. Ancak bu yolla tm gcn bakentte
toplanmasnn nne geebilir; yerel idare yetkilerinin tamamen vatandalara
verilmesini salayabiliriz.
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THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION
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2- Eski rejimin kyle i bitmedi; gemite ei benzeri grlmemi
hdiseler yaand. nk rk, ar milliyeti ve etnik temele dayal ayrlk
hareketlerin kendini temize karma giriimi ba gsterdi; stelik bu hareketler
baz evreler tarafndan hararetle desteklendi. Ayrca yeni idarede eitli grev
ve makamlar ok tehlikeli bir kriter olan karlkl paylam esasna gre
datld. imdi bize den grev, kin ve nefrete yol aan bu durumun ortadan
kaldrlp iyi vatandalk lsnn tm vatan sathna hkim klnmasdr.
Grev ve makamlar sadece kabiliyet ve yeterlik esasna gre datlmal, baka
trl bir deerlendirmeye itibar edilmemelidir. Daha geici hkmeti kurma
aamasndayken u grev Arabn, bu makam Krdn, u bakanlk lerin
teki Snnlerin dememeliyiz. Akas, bu ve benzeri ifadeler, kurulmakta
olan yeni devletin temeline kibrit suyu dkmek anlamna gelmektedir.
3- Bilindii gibi Irakta eitli rka, dine, etnik gruba ve mezhebe
mensup topluluklar; ksaca azmsanamayacak sayda aznlklar bulunmaktadr.
Anayasann amac, bu grup ve topluluklarn hepsine eit haklar tanmaktr. Bu
eitlik hibir gerekeyle delinmemelidir. Vatandalarmz, devlet dairelerinde
mensup olduklar etnik kken veya din grup vs.ye gre deil Irak vatandal
esasna gre muamele grmelidir. Irak halknn ezici ounluu Mslman
olduundan; anayasa, yeni yasa tekliflerinde slm temel kaynak kabul etmeli,
ayrca slm, devletin resm dini olarak deklare edilmelidir. Ancak bu durum
Mslman olmayan vatandalar etkilememelidir; nk onlar her eyden nce
Irak vatandadrlar.
4- Irakllar, son 35 yl boyunca modern zamanlarda ei benzeri
grlmemi bir istibdat ve zulm dnemi yaadlar. Kardeler! kendi halknn
drtte birini hunharca katleden; diri diri gmen ve z vatandalarn en ar
ikencelerden geiren bir rejim duydunuz mu? Bu gerekler gne gibi aktr ve
hibir gerekeyle gizlenemez ama zm yeme deil bacy dvme peinde
koan bo tenkitiler bu aclar hi zikretmiyor. O hlde yeni Anayasa,
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Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
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gerekirse en sert nlemleri alarak bireylerin haklarn en st dzeyde korumal,
hrriyetlerini garanti etmelidir. Anayasa eyada aslolan mbahlktr ilkesini
tanmaldr. Daha ak bir ekilde ifade etmek gerekirse vatanda tm hak ve
zgrlkleri sonuna kadar kullanmal, ancak kamu yararnn korunmas sz
konusu olduunda -gerektii kadar ve izgiyi amadan- kstlamalar yaplmal ve
bu durum yasalarla belirtilmelidir.
Fakat yasalarn ve zgrlklerin kt zerinde yazlm olmas yeterli
deildir ve asl sadra ifa olamaz! Daha da nemli olan, bu hak ve zgrlkleri
daima garanti edecek artlarn oluturulmasdr. Akas, hkmet veya
hkmete mensup hi bir yetkili, kanunen bildirilmi zgrlk ve haklara
tecavz etmemelidir.
5- Sabk rejim, yetkilerin tmn bir kiinin yani devlet bakannnelinde toplamt. Devlet bakan, yasama organnn ta kendisiydi, onun iradesi
kanundu. Ayrca, yrtme organna da tamamen hkimdi. Siyaset biliminde
oka bahsi geen bir mtearifeden; yani gler ayrl ilkesinden bahsetmek
anlamszd sabk rejimde. Devletin tm organlar bakann parmak iaretlerine
bakyordu; kendi atad grevliler ise sadece piyondular, kuklaydlar.
Irakllar bu karanlk sayfalar sonsuza dek kapatmak iin karar verdiler.
imdi gler ayrl ilkesini benimseyen; yetkilerin tek bir odakta toplanmayp
en geni kapsamda datlmasn esas alan ve tm renkleriyle totaliter eilimlerin
nn kesen demokratik bir sistemin olumasn sabrszlkla bekliyorlar.
Dolaysyla, yeni anayasa gler ayrl prensibini mutlaka yanstmal. Ancak
sz konusu ayrm, her trl kayttan uzak olmamaldr; yasama, yrtme ve yarg
diye tanmladmz bu g arasnda karlkl koordinasyon ve denetimi
salayabilecek idar iskeletin ina edilmesi gerekmektedir. Daha ak bir ifadeyle,
yasama gc, yrtme gcn denetleyip gerektiinde ona verdii garanti ve
gveni geri ekerek onu istifaya zorlayabilmelidir. Yarg gc ise, yasama
gcn denetleyip onun kard hukuk metinleri inceledikten sonra znde
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THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION
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anayasaya aykr den yasa ve kararnameleri iptal edebilmelidir. Yarg gc ayn
zamanda yrtme gcnn tm ilerini denetleme hakkna da sahip olmaldr.
Bylece kendi bana, babo davranma diye nitelendirilecek
hukuksuzluklarn nne geilir; yasaya uygunluk ilkesi en st dzeyde
korunur ve devlet hem fiilen hem de teorik olarak kanun devleti hline gelir.
6- Irakllar, zlm ve ikencenin brakt izleri silebilmi deillerdir. Bu
tedirginlik, sabk hukuk ihlallerinin tekrar yaanmamas iin gerekli olan aralar
talep etme hakkn onlara vermektedir. Yar dorudan demokrasinin*
semenlere verdii idar ara ve prosedrler sayesinde; birey hukukunun devlet
karsnda korunmas, gerektiinde halkn referanduma gidebilmesi, itiraz
edebilmesi, teklif sunabilmesi; ksaca vatandan gerek otoriteye sahip olmas
salanmtr. Ayrca devlet bakann grevden alma ve parlamentoyu feshetme
gibi yetkiler de halka verilmitir. O halde yeni anayasann bu aralarn tmne
veya bir ksmna sahip kmas gerekmektedir; gler ayrl prensibine ancak
byle riayet edilebilir.
Bu saydklarmz daim anayasann ana hatlarn zetlemektedir. Sizin
deerli gr ve gzlemlerinize az. Saduyu ve iyiniyet esaslar erevesinde
sizden gelecek her trl neri bizi ancak memnun eder. Bizi dinlediiniz iin
teekkr eder, yaamnz insan toplumlarnn eriebilecei en yksek refah,
huzur ve gven ortam iinde srdrmenizi yce Allahtan niyaz ederiz.
Selam ve dua ile.
Allahn rahmeti ve esenlii hepinizi kuatsn.
*Metindeki Arapa ifade; ed-Dimuqrtyye ibhil-Mbairedir. Bu terim, half-direct
democracy teriminin Arapaya evrisidir; Trkeye yar dolaysz demokrasi veya yardorudan demokrasi gibi karlklarla evrilebilir. Bilindii gibi baz uzmanlar sviredekikantonal sistemi, temsil demokrasi (indirect democracy) veya eski Yunan sitelerinde uygulandsanlan dorudan demokrasi (direct democracy) kavramlar altna sokmayarak half-direct
democracy tanm altnda ele almaktadrlar. nternette konuyla ilgili verimli bir tartma iin bkz.http://www.ddleague-usa.net/halfDD.htm (evirenin notu)
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Ghazi Faisal MEHDI
14
The Main Features of the Permanent Constitution
After the successful elections in Iraq and the selection of the people
deputies, the main task of the assembly is writing a draft of the permanent
constitution by 15.8.2005. This constitution should express the hopes of the
Iraqis and their ambitions. It should unite them and guide them to the right way
As far as we are concerned, the permanent constitution should bear the
following features:
1. It should emphasize the unity of Iraq and adopt pluralism and
democracy as its essential approach. It should follow the procedure of
distributing the authorities on the basis of administrative decentralization in its
utmost degree in a way which guarantee the participation of all the citizens in
administrating their affairs.
2. The constitution should recognize the rights and public freedom for
all the citizens. It should not permit its restriction but only on the ground of a
certain interest and within the law limits.
3. The constitution should include the separation of the three powers
and establish a monitoring system on the constitutionality of laws and other
legislations. It should not consider the sovereignty act as an exception on theprinciple of legitimacy.
4. The constitution should implement effective means to monitor the
acts of the executive power and enable the national assembly and the citizen to
stop the assault against the rights and public freedom as well as the trespassing
on the provisions of law.
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE,
FACING DEMOCRACY IN NEW IRAQ
Adel ABDULSALAM*
The post-Saddam Iraq situated on the utmost north eastern borders of
the Arab World, but in the heart of the oil-gas producing Asian countries, with
its very old complicated history harbours one of the Middle Eastern mosaic
nations, composed of ethnically, linguistically, spiritually and culturally mixed
diverse population. The collapse of the Saddam regime on 14.4.2003 has not
led yet, after about two years, neither to democracy nor to stability and order. It
is impossible to understand the recent and future situation in Iraq without
taking the complicated structure and nature of this nation in account.
De facto domestic composition structure of the Iraqi nation
The main peculiarity of the population of Iraq is the complicateddiversity, and variety. The Iraqis are composed of more than five ethnic native,
and indigenous groups (Arabs 80 % of the population, Kurds 15 %,
Turkmenians 3-4 % and 1-2 % for, Assyrians, Chaldeans and others). From
earliest times, Mesopotamia has attracted many waves of emigrants from
* Prof. Dr.; Syria
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflectviews of the Syrian official point of view.
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various parts of the Old World, especially from central Arabia during the
seventh century A. D. and later, and from Persia (later Iran) in the Islamic
period and in recent decades. Last remnants of very few Armenian families
live in Mosul and Baghdad, and rests of Circassian emigrants still live in some
villages in the vicinity of Zakho and north of Kirkuk. Hence, Arabs and Kurds
are the main ethnic bulks in Iraq.
Representatives of these different ethnic groups follow different
religions, many confessions and sects, which complicate the structure of the
Iraqi population more and more. The main religions are Islam 95 % , with two
major Islamic confessions, and several small sects, and Christianity 4 % with
many Christian confessions.
The Islamic sects in Iraq are:The Shii Muslims (2/3 of the whole Muslims in Iraq ). Followers of
the this sect are mainly Arabs, small groups of Kurds, Turkmenians and
Iranians. Who live in the south eastern and southern regions. They also form
more than 70 percent of the population of the capital Baghdad, settled mainly
in the poor quarter known as "As-Sadr City, ex- Saddam City", and al-
Kazimiyah quarter.
On the contrary to the common belief, that the Shi is form a
consolidated political unity, they can be divided in post-Saddam Iraq into three
major political groups:
1- the national Iraqi Shiis, who look for a democratic, national united,
free country.
2- the pro-Iranian Iraqi Arab Shiis, who wish to see Iraq as an
extension of Iran and its Islamic revolution. Or at least as theocratic state with
Shii majority.
3- the Shiis , who look for a secular-democratic and national Iraq.
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are Sunni-Shii Arab and Kurdish tribes, as well as mixtures of sectarian and
tribal groups among the small tribes and sects.
Members of any tribe, sub-tribe, or extended families and members of
the above mentioned ethnic and sectarian groups can be considered as
fanatically enthusiastic. Their fanatical behavior reflexes the Arabic proverb:
Me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousin against the stranger, in all
cases: fair or unfair.
It is well known that all ethnic, sectarian and tribal Iraqi groups, and
others outside the ruling group suffered from the reign of terror of Saddams
regime and his equally sadistic collaborators, backed by Arab Sunnis and his
clan members. The Saddamists showed no mercy to their native people, even to
their own relatives and members of their own tribes, who dared to criticizetheir idol ruler and his assistants, and their arbitrary policy
All these above mentioned complicated problems and very sensitive
issues, face Iraqi politicians and legislators, who are going to lay foundations of
a new constitution for a new democratic state. Not to mention economic, social
problems, and destructive local and regional results of wars made by the former
regime against Iraq's neighbor states, even against domestic local Iraqi people.
Democracy in Iraq, is it possible?
Democracy in Iraq cannot be a copy of any imported democracy. It
must be suitable for a typical oriental nation with special social peculiarities. A
Democracy, which should take all the above mentioned considerations and
their confusions and obscurities in account. Legislators and members of
committees, who are going to lay foundations for a new democratic
constitution of Iraq, have to devote particular attention to huge and
innumerable difficulties and issues, and have to find agreeable solutions,
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ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY INNEW IRAQ
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acceptable by the majority of the Iraqi people, who will go to any referendum
ballot box.
Iraqis today are liberated from fear and frightening, they feel free on
their land, in spite of the terror, liberation actions, and slaughtering of innocent
persons exercised daily by suicidal attackers and merciless kidnapers, on the
pretence of resistance against U.S.A and U.K. troops, to liberate Iraq from
occupation foreign forces.
The different Iraqi groups in post-elections Iraq, must struggle for a
Democratic, united, multi-national and independent new Iraq, far from
looking for foreign help or assistance. The Iraqi Identity of every citizen,
regardless of his race, religion, sect, tribe, family and region, is the collective
security for a new united, and acceptable democratic state.
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But the question is, can the Iraqis forgive and forget?
Can the peaceful coexistence replace hatred, antipathy, and revenge?
Tow big question, the time and the future can answer them. Some
events show positive tendencies, concerning tolerance. But there are alsonegative tendencies, which express fears and distrust.
The Shiis celebrated last month Ashura day, the anniversary of
Husains martyrdom at Kerbela in Iraq, likewise the Mandaean Sabians, who
celebrated last week (18.3.2005) their Five white days of Creation after
decades of prevention and prohibition. Tolerant attitudes of non Shii groups to
such demonstrations of identities, can liberate all followers of different Iraqi
population groups from their traditional types of fanaticism, especially racial,
religious and sectarian fanaticism. In accordance with that, the same can be said
concerning anniversaries of Kurds, Turkmenians, Christians and all other
communities and nationalities of Iraq.
There are also discussions and negotiations about appointment of a
Kurd as president, and a Shii as minister president. Such ideas were taboo in
Iraq, and are still taboo in the Arab World.
On the other hand, the Sunni Arabs in the post- Saddam Iraq, lost
their power, and they will, practically, remain marginal in the future, in spite ofnominating one of them for the states president post, and despite of soothing
statements and guaranties, that Sunni Arabs, will participate with others in the
government, and will have their share in the power according to their number
of representatives in the National Assembly.
Nevertheless the Sunni Arabs, and relatively high percentage of the
Iraqis are very anxious of efforts made by fanatic, even moderate Shii parties,
to establish a theocratic state in Iraq. Similar to the Iranian type. Such state is,
and will be rejected from all Sunnis overall the world, and from all Arab
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ETHNIC, SECTERIAL AND TRIBAL HERITAGE, FACING DEMOCRACY INNEW IRAQ
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countries as well the Christian world. Such step will exaggerate terrorism, and
will lead to very sever tensions, and even to a possible civil sectarian war in the
region.
On the other hand, initial significant steps towards democracy have
been already made. First of all was the abolition of the "one-party's rule", and
the permission to establish, officially and freely, several political parties. The
second step was the elections of January 2005. The third step on the way is to
lay foundations of a new democratic constitution, followed by general elections
of a permanent National Assembly, and a new republican united democratic
government.
Belonging to a democratic homeland, and to be a member of a native
and united national state, makes the Iraqis feel free, and aware, even proud oftheir identities, without any kind of suppression, or persecution. But realizing
such hopes and expectations requires time and patience, accompanied by
mental, social, behavioral national and public consciousness, and first of all:
needs the mutual understanding and agreement among the political parties and
public blocks, without foreign interventions.
The Kurdish question
Political observers speak about splitting Iraq into several small states. in
accordance with the main ethnic, religious and sectarian groups. There are
different suggestions and expectations concerning dividing the country into
three states (Kurdish in Iraqi Kurdistan, Arab Sunni in Central and Eastern
Iraq, and Arab Shii state in southern Iraq), or into five cantons. Such projects
of mini states are a kind of mine fields in the heart of the eastern flank of the
changing Middle East. The old-new dispute about the ownership of Kirkuk is
only one of the recent problems. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the
Kurdish question, and look at the demands of Kurds to establish a federal, self-
ruled territory in Iraqi Kurdistan, inside a national democratic new Iraq.
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As it is well known, the Kurds suffered from devastating results of
their revolts for independence, against British, then against the Arab regimes in
Baghdad, before Saddam and during his regime. They paid for their revolt in
the 1980s between 150000-200000 dead. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait led to
the loss of Kurdistan in 1991; hence, Kurdish self-rule in Kurdistan under U.S.
and British protection became de facto situation until the fall of Saddam. The
Kurds are indigenous and very old nation, still live in their homeland, in Turkey
(20 %), Iraq (15 %), Iran (8 %) and Syria (6 %), as well as Armenia (1,7 %) of
the population of these countries. The estimations of Kurds today are between
20-35 millions.
Naturally, Kurds in Iraq prefer to have their own free state. But the de
facto distribution of them in five sovereign and independent countries, which
have common borders with Iraq, makes it very difficult, even it is impossible
realizing such dream and intention. It is more reasonable for the Iraqi Kurds, at
least in the present time, to cooperate with the Arabs and Turkmenians to build
a new democratic Iraq, which guaranties all national, cultural and political rights
and identities of every citizen, with special privileges for Kurds concerning a
self-rule federation or confederation, within a democratic, united and national
Iraq. Every nationality of the three main nationalities of Kirkuk claims the city
as his own city. The Arabs and Turkmenians are afraid of subjunction of it to
Kurdistan. The Kirkuk crisis can cause sever clashes between Kurds and the
other nationalities.
Such conclusion will institute separate system of administration for
Iraqi Kurdistan, with facilities for the development of Kurdish culture. A
sovereign Kurdish state is not acceptable, not only in Iraq, but in the neighbor
countries, like Turkey, Iran and Syria.
However, and in spite of all problems, and complicated circumstances
of this transitional period of Iraq, we must take the geographical factor added
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to the political, economical, social, human and historical issues, as well as the
main backgrounds considered by state policy makers, in account.
Generally speaking, most of the decision-makers, neglect intentionally
or inattentively a very important factor, which helps to create harmonious
society, in spit of its diversity and variety. This factor is The Physical
Geographic Environment and Space. Any reasonable person with private
racial, religious, regional, cultural and socio-economical identities and
backgrounds, can have mutual understanding and normal coexistence with
other people, who has different identities, if he lives with them in the same
geographical region, and share with them the same environment. Iraq consists
of two major geographical regions (The mountains and the low-lands), divided
into several smaller sub-regions, inside imposed political odd boundaries, drawn
by foreign powers after the First World War. Despite these borders, these
regions complete each other; accordingly, it will not be very difficult to build a
peaceful and democratic state for all groups of the Iraqi people, with the good
wills, and sincere true intentions.
To avoid dividing the country, and prevent a civil war in Iraq, tolerance
and forbearance against fanaticism, racialism, sectarianism and tribalism are, the
main fundamentals for a new Democratic United National Iraq. It is impossible
to have a neutral ruling regime in Iraq, accordingly there is no other way exceptto become a Democratic State, if the Iraqis are earnest and serious to build a
real Democratic United National country.
The Strategic Role of new Iraq in the Great Middle East
Our expectations of the strategic importance of a new democratic,
non-arbitrary Iraq, will be mere estimations, because we are still unable to draw
a clear and semi acceptable total conception about post-elections state of Iraq.
Nevertheless, stable geographical fundaments of Iraq are still effective in the
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strategy of the Middle East. The main constant fundaments of the geo-strategy
of the region are:
1) The geographical site and location of the land,2)
The demographic weight, and
3) The economical importance of the region as main producer and exporterof energy (oil and gas), with important agricultural and natural resources
background, and skillful peasants and workers.
Iraq enjoys a significant geographical location in the eastern wing of
the Middle East. It is located in the center of four vast land-masses, namely:
The Iranian highlands in the east, The Arabian Peninsula in the south, Turkey
in the north, Syria and Eastern Mediterranean countries in the west.
These land-masses are inhabited by more than 275 300 000 souls (est.
2004), distributed in 14 states as follows:
Turkey 70 000 000Iran 66 000 000Syria 18 000 000Lebanon 4 500 000Palestine and (Israel) 10 000 000
Jordan 5 000 000Saudi Arabia 22 000 000
Yemen 19 000 000Oman 2 500 000United Arab Emirates 3 500 000Qatar 610 000Bahrain 700 000Kuwait 2 500 000Iraq 23 800 000 (est. 2005)
These numbers reveal the demographic important position of Iraq as
the third populous country in the Eastern Middle East (without Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which are considered members of the Great-new-middle East).
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Taking oil, gas, existing and projected or in construction pipelines in
the whole region as the most important basis of the economy of these countriesin account, Iraq enjoys a significant geographical and economical location, as a
central land between oil fields and energy sources, in the Middle East and the
Caspian Sea basin.
This strategic position will be supported and strengthened, by a
democratic united national state, with good, peaceful and equal mutual relations
with neighbor states, and mutual economic partnership to them and to the
world, as it is expected by the optimists. Consequently, new Iraq as a member
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26
of the Middle Eastern (eastern wing) community will enjoy a very significant
economic, political and cultural position, in the visible future.
Conclusion
I think, Iraq will possess, in spite of all recent and possible difficultiesand criticism, a Parliamentarian and Democratic institutional state,. The
elections of January 2005 were the entrance to a new constitutional period,
which will lead to the general elections of the Iraqi National Assembly, with
representatives of political parties as well as independent members, without
restrictions.
Fulfillment such steps needs, as it is mentioned, time, patience and
persistence. Some steps can be also postponed in consideration of attitudes of
political groups, or feelings of wide circles of the population. The gaps between
the elapsed non-democratic times, and the expected new Iraq are still waiting to
fill. Every change and reform lives now a transitory period. All steps to
democracy must be prepared by long discussions in the mass media and public,
in order to avoid any kind of rejection caused by hastiness. An example of such
cases is the hasty decision to select Saturday as second official weekly holyday,
without any public preparation. Consequently demonstrations broke up in
Baghdad and other cities. In comparison with this, the abolition of Friday in
turkey, as the official weekly holiday and its substitution by Sunday in 1935 was
made after 6 years of preparations.
Nevertheless, obstacles on the way to Democracy in Iraq are still
threatening every change and reform step. Historical tensions between Sunnis
and Shiis, as well as the tensions between Arabs and Kurds are still a part of
Iraqi life and politics. Not to mention tribal, social, regional tensions, which
effect the whole recent transitional situation of ex-Saddams Iraq.
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Last but not least, the Iraqi issue is only one folder of the changing
Great Middle East issues, and must be discussed as a part of the whole
question. And we must remember that Saddam's Iraq was a military force
threatening its neighbours, and it can be a threatening exporter of non grata
democracy to them in the future!!!
Damascus- Marj As-Sultan, 20.3.2005
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE ARAB SUNNITE IN
THE CURRENT POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAQ
Oraib AL-RANTAWI*
The recent Iraqi parliamentary elections may in all standards be viewed
as a significant terminal along the path of Iraq and Iraqis departure from their
current crisis. These elections -which were carried out on their due date, the
end of January, 2005, and in which 60 per cent of Iraqis took part, regardless
of the prevailing security anarchy and terrorist threats -released a new
dynamism in Iraqi political life and one which is at once both difficult to stop,
or retract from its attainments.
From the perspective of many observers, the Iraqi elections have both
general and particular signs which we would like to touch upon briefly. Perhaps
their most significant aspect are that they have clearly reflected the longing ofIraqis to rid themselves from the existing security chaos and the raging acts of
violence and terrorism; highlighted their yearning to build a new Iraq -
pluralistic, democratic, sovereign and independent; and reflected their desire to
administer their own affairs by themselves by virtue of a democratic process
and elected institutions. These general signs are not rendered less significant by
the fact that the elections took place under candid US occupation of Iraq
* General Director of Al Quds Centre for Political Studies /Jordan.
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despite the said occupations disguise under the name ofAllied forcesorMulti-
national forces.
The particular signs of the Iraqi elections are expressed in terms of the
heavy turnout of Shii Arabs and Kurds and the almost total boycott of it by
Sunni Arabs. The Shii Arabs have been a people of cause in an election
campaign in which they have found their historical opportunity to rectify the
defects of their participation and representation, in the Iraqi state institutions.
The said defects date back to more than 80 years in Iraqs modern history. In
fact, it may be said that Shii leaders -who had learnt their lesson well from the
elections on 1922 which they had boycotted during the British Mandate would
not have lost an opportunity which had not made itself available to them, for
over 14 centuries.
The Kurds, who had suffered from marginalization, ethnic cleansing
and collective punishment during the preceding Ba'thist regime, have succeeded
over more than a decade of time in establishing a home-rule regime enjoying a
high degree of independence. They have also succeeded within the sequence of
the preparative efforts for the war on Iraq, in the opposition conferences and
subsequently in the Provisional Ruling Council, and the State Provisional
Administrative Law in seizing recognition of most Iraqi parties of this
achievement; and consecrate it as a de facto in Iraqi political life as a preliminarystep to its subsequent consecration in the provisions of the Iraqi states
permanent constitution which is due to be indorsed before the end of the
current year 2005.
The Kurds would not have lost the opportunity to streamline their
achievements afforded to them by the recent election and put them into proper
use. Hence their heavy participation in the said elections wherein they attained
second position after the Shii list and in a manner enabling them to consecrate
their achievements on the ground in the northern region; and to effect
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condensed representation in the federal/central organization of government
thereby enabling themselves to secure delimitation of Kurdistans boarders by
regaining, or incorporating, oil -rich Kirkuk and acquiring an acceptable share
of the fortune, in addition to securing the mobilization of their Paishmarga
forces in the ranks of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi security forces in accordance
with Kurdish terms and regulations.
Boycotting these elections by the majority of Sunni Arabs has casted
shadows of anxiety and fear from the consequences of deepening indigenous
divisions in Iraq. It is true that the elections were quite satisfactory in terms of
their terms and legal legitimacy; and it is equally true that they are lacking within
the province of their political quorum.
To the Sunni Arabs, and unlike the Kurds and Shii Arabs, the elections were the harbinger of the beginning of a phase of emaciation and retreat.
Appealing to ballot boxes, the logic of the majority / minority aspect of things
and representation based on numbers and percentages of the total population
were bound to lead the Sunnis to relinquishing positions of authority and
influence which they have been used to exercise mastery over for decades now.
It is the Sunnis or most them al least- who have not yet recovered from the
shock of war, the fall and the collapse of the Ba'thist regime.
The US decision to dissolve the Baath party , disband the army and
security organizations and dismantling state departments has led to throwing
thousands of Iraqis into the streets leaving them prey to hunger, poverty and
unemployment. Anarchy and security chaos have given reign to act of vendetta,
settlements of scores, thefts and lootings which have not limit themselves to
state establishments alone but included persons and families mostly from
among the Sunnites.
Sunni Arabs -unlike their Shii counterparts who enjoy the patronage of
theirMarjaiah(Religious Authority) regardless of their factions and trends, and
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the Iraqi Kurds whose representation is nearly limited to two principal parties -
found themselves in the wake of the downfall of Saddam Husseins regime in a
state of straying. Their representation is disputed among several forces, parties
and authorities; and in their name, tens of factions and scattered groups, some
of whom are imported as it were from neighboring countries, speak.
What contributed to the consecration of this state of dispersion among
the Sunnis was the confluence between the campaign to eliminate the principal
figures of the previous regime and that of uprooting the Baath party. In the
course of its implementation, the latter campaign touched thousands of Iraqis
who had found themselves once forced to join the Baath party
One may argue that one of the main reasons for this state of Iraqi
Sunni dispersion and fragmentation has in fact been on account of thedictatorial and totalitarian attitude embodied by the ex-Baath regime. Such an
attitude undermined the internal political, and partisanship life and destroyed
civil society establishments. Consequently, and after four decades of totalitarian
rule, Iraqis were left with two establishments, namely the religious and tribal.
And no one survived the process of organized methodical destruction of
political life and civil society organizations except the Kurds in their safe haven
north of Iraq. There, the two principal Kurdish secular parties managed to
safeguard their existence and accumulated influence which enabled the Kurdishmovement to play a significant role in the wake of the collapse of the Baath
regime, the process of power transfer and the process currently in progress in
Iraq.
Unlike the Shii sect wherein the religious authorities and Ulema and
their institutions playa political, cultural and social role, and even an economic
role too, in the life of Shii adherents, the Sunnis do not go along with the
theory of the religious authority, Al-Marja, or the Muqalid (follower) nor do
they grant their Ulema such a role. The Sunni Ulema body was established
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after the fall of Baghdad. This stands vis a vis the Shi'i Hawzatwhose activities
date back to hundreds of years. The influence of the said Sunni Ulema Body
remains limited while the impact of the Shii religious authority has had a
significant effect before, during and after the elections.
An observer of the political changes witnessed by the Sunni Arab
community in Iraq during the two years that followed the downfall of the
Baath regime is bound to notice that the representation of the said Sunni Arab
community is divided among the following forces and main groups:
The Senior Muslim Ulema Body enjoys a great moral weight. It is onsuch an account that this Body has been able to interfere in many a crisis
(the hostages crisis for example) and contribute towards finding
settlements and solution to them. By virtue of its being based on theinfluence of a network of Muslim clerics, mosques prayer -leaders and
protagonists, this Body maintains the ability to bear influence on certain
armed factions in Iraq.
The Iraqi Islamic party. This party has sprung from the womb of theMuslim Brotherhood League in Iraq and is considered an extension of it. It
is a political party with influence bases in the Sunni areas of Iraq. It has
taken part in the political process in its various pre-election stages. It found
itself forced to boycott the elections under pressure from Sunni Arab
public opinion whose majority favored the boycott.
The Baath party and the remaining bodies of the regime and its party andsecurity organizations. The party managed to pull itself together, gather up
its ranks and impose its influence in a number of living quarters and areas
in the wake of enrolling itself in violence such as liquidations and
assassinations that targeted army and security personnel as well as senior
Iraqi officials.
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The Jihadi Fundamentalist Movement. This body is an extension and adiverse form of the Wahhabi sect. It was founded during the life time of
the Baath regime which had kept a blind eye to its increasing activities, if
not encouraging it. This came in the wake of the second Gulf War wherein
the regime felt the need for counter-balancing the increasing influence of
Shi'i currents particularly after the 1991 uprising. Such a counterbalance
took the form of encouragement given to Sunni fundamentalist currents to
work in Iraq. The Movement is the incubator of all Jihadi organizations
including those of AI-Qaida, the Zarqawi group, Islamic Protagonists,
Sunni Protagonists and other organizations working now in Iraq. The
movement is further involved in carrying out terrorist and violent acts
against Iraqis and Americans, without distinction between military and civil
persons, and targets Shii and Christians.
Tribal Leaders. They enjoy considerable influence within the tribalstructure in certain Iraqi areas particularly in Mosul and Anbar where heavy
Sunni concentration exists.
Nationalist, Secular and Liberal Personalities and Parties. These elementshave regained their role and presence after the fall of the Ba'ath regime.
However, the recent elections demonstrated the weak influence of these
elements that succeed in gaining very few votes and seats in the IraqiNational Assembly.
Tens of organizations and movements both armed and political that sprangin various locations and areas in Iraq. They number more than a hundred
and operate within Sunni communities claiming to be representatives of,
and spokesmen for, the said communities.
Such multitude of parties, organizations and authorities (Marjiat) is not
peculiar to Sunni Arabs alone. They are present in the various demographic
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constituents of Iraq. However, the absence of central currents and forces, or an
influential Marjaiah in respect of the Sunni Arab, has contributed to the
dispersion and weakened their effective role.
Us practices, both civil and military, have made difficult the emergence
of a more moderate and influential Sunni current. Under the slogan of
uprooting the Baath, thousands of Iraqis were driven to hunger and destitute
and subsequently into the arms of resistance and terrorist movements. And
under the slogan of combating terrorism the lives and integrity of thousands
of Iraqis have been tampered with. These elements have not found their way to
political participation. Consequently, they have chosen the path of combating
occupation, and at times sought refuge in involving themselves in undertaking
retaliatory and vendetta acts.
With acts of resistance, violence and terror concentrating in the
predominantly Sunni Arab areas, media coverage spoke of the Sunni
Triangle, or The Death and Resistance Triangle to consecrate the reality of
the detachment of this group from the current political process.
Regional Repercussions
The Shii landslide victory in the recent Iraqi elections, and the
concomitant marginalization of the Sunni Arabs, together with the dwarfing of
the latter's role within the equation of the Iraqi internal forces equation, have
given rise to apprehensions from repercussions that might touch the stability
situation, civil peace and the balances of historical forces in a number of
countries in the region. Apprehensions have also arisen from the (probable)
consequences of Iraq turning itself into a bridge for increased Iranian influence
which might extend from the Gulf oil sources to the Israeli borders.
In reality, such apprehensions would not have surfaced, in such a
degree of force and hotness, if the Arab regimes had succeeded in remedying
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the problem of minorities existing in all, or most, Arab countries and
communities. The failure of the Arab democratic reform agenda, and the
absolutism of family and dictatorial regimes, has kept the fire kindling under
the ashes of civil divisions in the Arab communities.
What contributed to the increase and the seriousness of the said
apprehensions has been Irans refusal, or that of its conservative and
revolutionary currents at least, to abandon the theory of exporting the
revolution. In fact, Iran has always announced candidly its readiness to play
the role of the center which would give help and sustenance to all Shii in the
surrounding countries. The said theory is the very one that has been tested in
Lebanon first and in post -occupation Iraq later.
Jordan has already warned against the danger of the emergence of aShii Crescent which would confuse the issues and historical balances in the
region. In so doing, Jordan has pointed to the Iranian meddling in Iraqi internal
affairs and the possibility of the corning to power in Baghdad of a pro-Iranian
current. Jordan, to be sure, was not attempting to stand against the Iraqi Shii
majority's right of participation in the elections and forming, or taking part in, a
new government.
In Bahrain, on the other hand, leaders of the Shii majority received the
tidings and results of the Iraqi elections with considerable satisfaction. Shii
movements in the tiny Kingdom began to revive actively in order to
consolidate their presence and political participation. They have also begun to
declare publicly ally their close ties with Shii Marjiat in both Iran and Iraq, and
to echo their confidence in that the changes in Iraq in this respect are hound to
usher subsequent changes which would extend to Bahrain.
Oil-rich Saudi Arabia, moreover, has never in its history witnessed
revival of the Shii movement and demands in its Eastern Region in particular.
Nor have Saudi Shii ever seen before the degree of recognition of their own
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peculiarity with which they have been confronted. News of their representation
in the national dialogue, and on local government election lists, as well as their
demands are strongly spreading on the Internet and in Saudi towns and cities.
In Lebanon, however, the attitudes of the two main Shii currents,
namely Hizbullah and Amal Movement, have been characterized by clear
pragmatism. Although neither of them hides its feeling of enmity to the USA,
where the matter concerns Syria and Lebanon none of them has criticized the
implicit alliance between the USA and the Shi'i currents in Iraq.
Now if the slogan of resistance and enmity vis a vis the greatest devil
happens to be Hizbullah s mean for keeping its weapon and safeguarding its
immense influence in Lebanon, Hizbullah will not mind ignoring the alliance of
the Shii in Iraq with the USA so long as this alliance remain the means thatwould enable them to attain power.
These are undoubtedly significant developments with deep conflicting
indications and signs some of which are positive and consequently call for hope
and optimism, and the others are negative demanding caution and causes
anxiety.
The positive indications are the awakening of minorities in the Arab
world and their active endeavor to practice their own political, civil and cultural
rights on equal footing with the reminder of the citizens. The Shiis of Iraq,
Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and those of other countries in the same
region, are the citizens of these said countries with whatever consequent rights
and duties ensue from such citizenship. And as ethnic minorities -in certain of
these countries they are not they have cultural, religious and civil rights which
are due to be regained.
The cause for anxiety in the existing Iraqi and regional scene emanates
from the aggravation of foreign intervention in the affairs of this region; and
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from the probability that certain Arab states and communities might be
transformed into arenas for the settlement of international and regional
accounts, and field for waging confrontations and wars by proxy among
regional states and international centers. Lebanon had paid an expensive bill for
this game in the past. It is not improbable that Iraq might pay similar costs for
the same game in the future, particularly in the event of the US Iranian conflict
aggravating against the background of Tehran's nuclear program.
A cause for anxiety also comes from the fears to return back to the
policy of alliances and pivots in the region. The united front between Syria and
Iran which was announced a few weeks ago is destined -if the confrontation
between the USA, on one side, and Syria and Iran, on the other side, were to
aggravate -to be transformed into a Shii Crescent, or Arc of Crises
particularly if the friends and allies of Tehran managed to hold the reins of
power in Iraq. It would be a front that would extend from Tehran to south
Lebanon via Baghdad and Damascus with supporting pockets in the Gulf. This
proposed political front finds a cultural and ethnic incubator to itself basically
expressed in terms of the Shi'i majority of the population of the said Arc's
countries including the regime of the Alawit minority of Syria which is bound
by religious ties with the Shii sect.
A Road Map for Iraq The International community has no choice but to look for a
successful strategy for Iraq. This is so because the consequences of failure will
bring about very serious repercussions not only with respect to Iraq alone but
also with respect to the region as a whole. The repercussions of failure may
indeed extend to what is further than that, i.e. touching international peace and
security.
I believe that the calls for exit strategy for the USA from the
Quagmire of Iraq, are irresponsible and only take into account the direct and
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immediate interest of the USA, particularly the endeavor to minimize the
volume of human losses and military expenditure. We must bear in mind that
the USA has been the party that decided to wage war against Iraq its decision
did not spring from the womb of international legitimacy and Security Council
decisions. The Bush Doctrine of unilateralism and preemptive and preventive
wars has been the ideological framework of the war on Iraq. The
transformations which have come to characterize the attitude of the US
administration in the US Presidents second term of office do not excuse
Washington from its huge responsibilities vis a vis Iraq and the entire region.
I presume that a Road Map for Iraq must take the following
elements into consideration:
Iraq must remain unified. The division of Iraq, in its known constituentelements and their extensions to, and connections with, the neighbouring
countries, both Arab and regional, does not only increase the probabilities
of the outbreak of civil strife in it, but may well lead to its Balkanization
too. The division of Iraq, moreover, would sound the alarm in more than
one neighboring Arab or regional capital, particularly those of countries
that have ethnic and sectarian pluralism. It would also undermine the
efforts of minorities to demand their rights and increase the stubbornness
and obstinacy of majorities. Furthermore, it would provide many popularlyisolated regimes with a justification to tighten their repressive grip on their
peoples under the pretext of defending the unity of their respective
countries. Opposite all this, a united, democratic and politically pluralistic
Iraq can alone offer an impellent and inspiring model to other countries
and communities to venture into the throng of democracy, pluralism,
federalism and decentralization.
The reconstruction of Iraqi state organizations must be expedited,particularly the military services, and security ones. Expediting the ways to
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reconstruct Iraqs economy must also be undertaken. All this constitutes a
short cut to control the prevailing anarchy and security chaos; isolate
extremist currents and dry up their human resources; and combat
terrorism. This must be accomplished in accordance with concentrated
time-tables, and with considerable transparency.
The building of the institutions of the new Iraqi state, both civil andmilitary, is considered a preface for the evacuation of US and multinational
forces in accordance with an agreed -upon time table thereby allowing the
Iraqis to see a light at the end of the tunnel; assuring the Iraqi people that
occupation is not perennial in Iraq; expediting and revitalizing power
transfer, building institutions and effecting reconstruction; and ensuring a
wider participation by the Iraqis in determining their fate and future.
And if post-Saddam Iraq has transcended the probabilities of a return tototalitarian dictatorship, efforts must be made to work together to
circumvent its falling prey to a religious totalitarianism that may be shaded
by an autocratic majority that does not take notice of the rich diversity
and plurality of the Iraqi community. Iraqs permanent constitution, due to
be compiled and voted upon, shall provide the opportunity ensuring that
the rights of all Iraqis are maintained and safeguarded. Maintained and
safeguarded also would be the bases for constituting constitutional powers,their balances and terms of reference in a manner that prevents one group
from dominating another. It is from this point that emphasis must be laid
on the significance of Arab Sunni participation in formulating the
constitution despite the absence of their appropriate representation in the
National Assembly in consequence of their boycotting the elections.
And from here too springs the need to activate the dynamics ofparticipation in the Iraqi political order; and to contain the Arab Sunnis in
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the said dynamics. At this juncture, the following elements of the required
containment process must be observed:
1. The General mood of Arab Sunnis has undergone change after the
elections. Large sections of them, including members of the Muslim Ulema
Body, the Islamic party and national, liberal and tribal personalities, in addition
to a wide section of old Bathisthave come to realize the volume of the mistake
involved in their boycotting the elections. Consequently, they have entered into
preliminary dialogues with certain Iraqi forces. Accordingly, there are some
encouraging signs to the effect that the year-end elections may witness a more
earnest Sunni Arab participation.
2. Sunni Arab must participate in the ongoing process through influential
forces and persons irrespective of their ideological and political orientationsand the nature of their attitude to the US presence in Iraq. This is not on
account of the fact that the Sunni Arab majority in three Iraqi governorates,
namely Al-Anbar, Mosul and Salah Al-Din, has, by virtue of the State
Provisional Administrative Law, the power of veto over the constitution, but
on account of the fact that endorsement of the constitution must be
concordant; enjoying the backing of a tangible Iraqi majority; distant from any
form of pressure or corrosion; and away from any exclusion or exception.
3. Differentiation must be made between terrorist factions taking the
Arab Sunni milieu as a vital sphere for their influence and operations and the
majority of Iraqi Sunni Arabs. And the remaining Sunni Arab forces in Iraq
must be neutralized and won over; and consequently they must not be deemed
guilty for the misdeed of extremist elements.
4. Differentiation must also be made between Iraqi resistance to US
occupation and organized blind terrorism. Certain Iraqi forces and factions
believe in the option of resisting occupation. They are concerned with the
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future of Iraq. Dialogue with them is not only possible but a must in order that
the extremist, fundamentalist and terrorist force may be isolated.
5. Such measures may contribute to dismantling the boycott front that
has hitherto included the greatest Sunni Arab majority. Such measures may also
contribute to isolating the impact of the extremist and fundamentalist forces.
Without the said measures, a quarter of the Iraqi population would be left prey
to the said forces, as had happened during the last two years during which
period the US forces did not always succeed in distinguishing between the
constituents of the political specter of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs on the one hand
and the various armed groups operating in Sunni midst.
6. There are regional roles which may be undertaken by several Arab and
Islamic states for encouraging Iraqi Sunni Arabs to participate (in the politicalprocess); instituting dialogues with them; prompting them to form their party
and political frameworks; and rescuing them from the claws of the more
extreme forces. It is in this area that countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia can
offer their contributions.
7. It is incumbent upon the international community to open channels of
communication and dialogue with representatives of the Sunni Arabs, including
ex-Bathists whose hands are not stained with blood of Iraqis, and some
resistance organizations from outside the squadrons of fundamentalist and
terrorist movements. We have witnessed such channels in operation but they
were mostly involved in releasing hostages, or ensuring the settlement of a
transient affair. Such dialogue and communications and their topics need to be
institutionalized to serve the aim of involving Sunni Arabs, and containing
them, in a single democratic process for the sake of the future of peace and
security in Iraq.
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The New Iraq
March 22nd, 2005 stanbul
PROPOSITIONS FOR CREATING AN INCLUSIVE
POLITICAL SYSTEM IN IRAQ
Dina S. SHEHATA
1. The fall of the Saddam Regime and the Problem of Sunnimarginalization and representation
The collapse of the Baath regime on April 9, 2003 had a devastating
impact on the Arab Sunni population of Iraq. The Arab Sunni population was
the most privileged segment of the population under the rule of Saddam
Hussein. Arab Sunnis constituted the principle base of support for the Baath
party and depended heavily on state institutions as a primary source of
employment. The fall of the regime, the dismantling of the Baath party, and the
dissolution of the military and the security apparatus and of most state
ministries created serious problems for the future of Iraq and especially for thefuture of the Sunni Arab population of Iraq the most important of these being:
- A widespread feeling of marginalization and exclusion: Sunni
Arabs have experienced an overwhelming feeling of marginalization in the
post-Saddam Iraq. They fear the emergence of Shiite dominated Iraq in which
the Sunni Arabs occupy a marginal position. They also feel that they are being
blamed by Shiites and Kurds for the perils of the Saddam Era.
Dr.; Researcher, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies / Egypt.
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Dina S. SHEHATA
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- Unemployment: unemployment levels are said to the highest among
Sunni Arabs. Some have estimated a 70% unemployment rate among the Sunni
Arab population of Iraq. Sunni Arabs were the most dependent among Iraqis
on state employment. Most of those affected by the decision to dissolve the
military and the security and bureaucratic apparatus have been Sunnis.
Especially problematic has been the fate of hundred of thousands of armed
trained Iraqis who have defected during the course of the invasion or who been
fired by Paul Bremmer.
- A problem of political representation: The fall of the Saddam
regime and the systematic policy to dismantle the Baath party left the Sunni
Arab population of Iraq without political representation. Furthermore, the
Saddam regime has systemically purged any form of political opposition inside
Iraq. This left the Sunni Arabs at a considerable disadvantage vis--vis the
Kurds and Shiite population of Iraq both of whom have been able to develop
effective political movements both within and outside Iraq over the past two
decades.
All of these factors help explain the growth of violent resistance among
the Sunni Arab population of Iraq. There is wide spread agreement that the
resistance in Iraq is mostly an Arab Sunni Phenomena. It consists primarily
from former personnel from the security and political apparatus but also fromSunnis who resent the occupation and fear its consequences on the position of
Sunni Arabs in a Post-Saddam Iraq. The resistance also includes some non-
Iraqi fighters who came from abroad. These fighters ar