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Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems
Effective Leadership in International Organizations
April 2015
© World Economic Forum2014 - All rights reserved.
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The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of the World Economic Forum.
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3Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Contents
5 Executive Summary
6 1. The Effective Leadership Project
6 a. Global Governance in the 21st Century
6 b. Why Focus on Leadership?
7 c. Constrained Leadership
7 d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?
8 e. Methods for Assessing Organizations
8 f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?
8 g. The Objectives of the Study
10 2. Emerging Good Practices
11 a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit
11 b. Managing Performance
11 c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards
12 d. Developing and Retaining Talent
12 e. Setting Strategic Priorities
13 f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders
13 g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively
14 3. Appendix: Leadership Practices
14 a. African Development Bank Group
19 b. Asian Development Bank
24 c. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
28 d. Inter-American Development Bank
32 e. International Monetary Fund
38 f. International Organization for Migration
42 g. United Nations Development Programme
45 h. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
50 i. World Bank Group
58 j. World Health Organization
60 k. World Trade Organization
66 References
4 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
Project Team
Ngaire Woods, Project Leader; Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, dean@bsg.ox.ac.uk Shubhra Saxena Kabra, Council Manager, Global Agenda Councils, World Economic Forum, shubhra.saxena@weforum.orgNina Hall, Fellow in Global Governance, Hertie School of Governance, Germany, hall@hertie-school.orgYulia Taranova, Researcher, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, yulia.taranova@politics.oxon.orgMiles Kellerman, Researcher, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, miles.kellerman@sjc.ox.ac.uk Hugo Batten, Associate, McKinsey & Company, Australia, hugo_batten@mackinsey.com
Members of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Chair; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Yale University, USARobert C. Orr, Vice-Chair; Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, United Nations, New YorkCyrus Ardalan, Vice-Chairman and Head, UK and EU Public Policy and Government Relations, Barclays, United KingdomAnn M. Florini, Professor, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, SingaporeDavid Kennedy, Director, Institute for Global Law and Policy, Harvard Law School, USAPascal Lamy, Chair (2012-2013); Honorary President, Notre Europe - Jacques Delors Institute, FranceJeffrey D. Lewis, Director, Economic Policy, Debt and Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, Washington DCLin Jianhai, Secretary, International Monetary Fund, Washington DCEmmanuel E. Mbi, First Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer, African Development Bank, TunisiaRiyad Abdulrahman Al Mubarak, Chairman, Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority, United Arab EmiratesArunma Oteh, Director-General, Securities and Exchange Commission, NigeriaKatharina Pistor, Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, USAQu Bo, Associate Professor and Deputy Director, China Foreign Affairs University, People’s Republic of ChinaGabriela I. Ramos Patiño, Chief-of-Staff and OECD G20 Sherpa, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ParisNasser Saidi, President, Saidi & Associates, United Arab EmiratesJan Sturesson, Global Leader, Government and Public Services and Partner, PwC, SwedenNgaire Woods, Vice-Chair (2012-2013); Dean, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Xue Lan, Dean, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, People’s Republic of ChinaYu Keping, Director and Professor, China Center for Global Governance and Development, People’s Republic of ChinaZhang Haibin, Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University, People’s Republic of China
Acknowledgements
The authors are particularly grateful to the World Economic Forum for providing inspiration and supporting this project, and the academic advisers, current and former officials who have helped along the way. Conversations with several leaders, who provided insights into the challenges faced by leaders of international organizations, were particularly inspiring, including those with Pascal Lamy, Gus Speth, Takehiko Nakao, Helen Clark, Suma Chakrabati and Donald Kaberuka.
Sincere thanks go to the many officials from the following organizations who answered questions: African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). The authors would like to thank the following current and former officials from these organizations: Bjorn Gillsater, Brian Gleeson, Kazu Sakai, Margret Thalwitz, Inge Kaul and Max Watson.
A number of academic experts generously offered their insights and feedback, which made this study possible: Michael Barnett (George Washington University), Sam Daws (University of Oxford), Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (University of Oxford), Michael Doyle (Columbia University), Tana Johnson (Duke University), Jérôme Elie (Graduate Institute), Martha Finnemore (George Washington University), Guy Goodwin-Gill (University of Oxford), Jane McAdam (University of New South Wales), Craig Murphy (University of Massachusetts, Boston), Catherine Weavers (University of Texas, Austin), and James Vreeland (Georgetown University).
Finally, the authors thank the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, and the Hertie School of Governance, Germany, for providing research support for this report.
5Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Executive Summary
Good leadership in international organizations is necessary, but not sufficient, for their success. Structures supporting leadership vary enormously across global agencies. This report highlights some of the best practices across 11 organizations that facilitate good leadership. It also underscores that international institutions could learn from each other’s practices across seven domains: (1) selecting and re-electing leadership on merit, (2) managing performance, (3) setting and evaluating ethical standards, (4) developing and retaining talent, (5) setting strategic priorities, (6) engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, and (7) evaluating independently and effectively.
6 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
1. The Effective Leadership Project
a. Global Governance in the 21st Century
Over the last two decades, the world has suffered from a global governance deficit. This deficit comprises a lack of the following:
– Adequate mechanisms to deal with issues of international peace and security
– Satisfactory mechanisms to anticipate and counter global economic shocks
– Effective instruments to ensure important global public goods, not least in critical areas such as climate change and public health
In the early 2000s, it was expected that the international community would embark on a comprehensive effort to overhaul the multilateral system, with renewed rules and institutions to address the challenges posed by evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances. These ambitions included reform of World Bank and IMF governance; creation of a new world environmental institution; and ongoing attempts at United Nations (UN) Security Council reform. Recent history suggests, however, that such a comprehensive overhaul will not take place anytime soon.
Almost every effort to significantly transform the mechanisms for international cooperation and coordination has failed. The floundering of the 2005 UN World Summit, the collapse of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round, the disappointing progress on climate change, and the non-fulfilment of early and indispensable G20 commitments all suggest that governments are not ready, or not willing, to close the growing governance gap, at least within the next few years.
In other words, no transformative overhaul of international institutions should be expected in the foreseeable future. In no way should the pertinent players give up on existing institutions; rather, the only realistic alternative seems to be incremental reform.1 Scarce political capital should be applied to improving the performance of multilateral institutions, as radical transformations of the existing overall framework cannot be counted on. Based on this notion, this project addresses one aspect where incremental reform seems not only necessary, but feasible: in the leadership of international organizations (IOs).
b. Why Focus on Leadership?
Effective leadership in international agencies is crucial: the world relies on these organizations to ease cooperation – whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained, mail is delivered to foreign countries, or citizens can fly safely to other countries.
To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identify and deliver on organizational goals without the constraint of undue influence, by individual members or other stakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined the leader’s role, let alone recruited or managed that person on the basis of particular knowledge, competence and experience required to effectively lead the organization. In addition, democratic election processes and strong accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that the interests of executive management are aligned with the organization.
While good leadership is not enough for successful international cooperation, it is necessary for effective governance. However, leadership performance in organizations is often buried behind arguments about which country should get “the top job”. The presumption is that, once appointed, leaders have their hands tied by member states, and will predominantly serve their patrons’ interests. Indeed, leaders’ performance is seldom rigorously tested or measured. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the institutional features needed to promote effective and accountable governance.
This project of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems has taken up the challenge. First, the project has identified ways in which leadership makes a positive difference in the performance of international agencies. Second, the research team has investigated a sample of IOs, drawing out best (and other) practices that either illustrate or indicate a lack of high-performing leadership.
The report’s seven sections cover the positive practices emerging in IOs that support good leadership. This introduction sets out the conception of leadership, as well as the study’s rationale, method and strategy.
7Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
c. Constrained Leadership
Leaders influence their agencies’ operational and strategic direction. They work with member states to identify priorities and set strategy, and translate this into operational goals, which in turn are monitored and evaluated as progress is made towards them. Leaders direct a bureaucracy and see that it has sufficient staffing, expertise and financing to carry out mandated tasks. They also must consult and work with other stakeholders. While their room for manoeuvring is limited (see Figure), their actions and behaviour are vital to their organizations’ success. Finally, organizations that depend on ad-hoc funding also constrain their leaders.
In addition, the Council and team sought to capture innovations in leadership across the organizational cases.
Not all of the important elements could be measured. In fact, it was difficult to find a metric to measure the degree to which leadership structures permit resistance against “capture” by a powerful state, private companies or vested interests; and this despite that many instances exist of undue influences undermining an organization’s performance (an organization’s leadership can play a key role in ensuring this does not happen, or at least that it is brought to the public’s attention). Some of this dimension of leadership is covered in the report’s reflections on ethical standards, setting strategic priorities (e.g. the proportion of core vs earmarked funds) and procedures for electing an administrator, director-general (DG) or managing director (MD). Future research could investigate other measures of organizational independence and impartiality, such as whether heads of organizations should chair council or governing body meetings, and how effectively they can shape decision-making in these meetings to guard against special interests. Studies could also examine if an organization’s leader is able to publish reports, policy positions or advice in the organization’s name, without prior approval of member states.2
Another important element of leadership is the “speed of renewal” and the capacity to adapt to changing external environments. This was very difficult to measure or compare across the 11 different organizations, given the variety of environments and issue areas. In the future, studies could look at the extent to which IO heads can (and do) initiate projects, pilots or discussions to address emerging issues, and the leeway they have to shape these. Finally, the authors believe leaders play an essential role in ensuring their organizations collaborate with others to deliver cooperation and other public goods. Future research, it is hoped, will identify ways to track governance in this area.
The report reflects on practices from a pilot group of international organizations. In some cases, good practice seems relatively straightforward. For example, for the selection of an organization’s head: do clear and publicly available terms of reference (TOR) exist for both the position and a high-quality, exhaustive search process? As for ethical leadership, are leaders required to sign and adhere to the organization’s ethical codes, and publicly declare any conflicts of interest and their financial assets? In some cases, good practices may vary enormously – for instance, in how leaders attract and retain a diverse staff.This study benchmarks current practices and does not rank organizations against each other, as significant differences in the structure, size, nature and scope of IOs make ranking problematic. However, some common principles and structures could strengthen leadership possibilities in all organizations.
Political
Leader
Governments members of IOs
Bureauc
ratic
IOs seni
or
managem
ent
Social andeconomic
forces
External
stakeholders
High performance in a leadership role has a major impact on an organization’s ability to deliver on tasks requested by its member states. An IO with weak operational planning, high staff turnover and vulnerability to special interests is unlikely to perform effectively. Not only do leadership governance and effectiveness need more attention in international organizations; a striking need also exists for more practice-focused comparisons across organizations so they can learn from each other.
An important caveat should be emphasized: improving leadership in IOs is just one part of improving their overall performance. Leaders are heavily constrained, relying on financing from the member states that select them. Some IO boards “monitor” their leadership and organizations’ architectures very closely, meeting weekly to discuss and provide regular input to operational business, while others may only convene several times a year. The enormous differences in the broader governance structures of IOs, which greatly influence their operations, are noted in this report.
d. How Are “Effective Leadership Structures” Measured?
Through extensive deliberations, the Council and project team have identified seven indicators of effective leadership structures:
1. Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit2. Managing performance 3. Setting and evaluating ethical standards4. Developing and retaining talent5. Setting strategic priorities6. Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders7. Evaluating independently and effectively
Figure: Types of Forces that Constrain Leadership
8 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
e. Methods for Assessing Organizations
The Council identified seven indicators contributing to effective leadership. The research team then determined questions for assessing IOs on each of the indicators and for using as the basis for studies of leadership practices in 11 organizations (see appendix): African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations were selected because they cover a broad range of issue areas (from health to migration and development), vary in size, and include regional and international bodies. However, the selection was not intended to be representative of all intergovernmental organizations, but rather to provide a basis for the pilot study of best practice in governance. Inclusion of other organizations in future studies is encouraged.
A research team initially conducted a desk-based study, looking for publicly available evidence of each indicator. Follow-up interviews with former and current senior officials of the organization, as well as key stakeholders and academic experts, were conducted. Their inputs were used to identify additional documentation of formal processes, and to identify relevant informal practices. Although the report is focused on the presence of formal processes (documented officially, wherever possible, when sufficient evidence is available), the differences between formal and informal processes have also been captured. The evidence included in the appendix is separated into two columns: “published rules”, based on official organizational documents; and “other factors”, which draw on a range of sources – including interviews with experts on the organization and staff – to gain more subjective insights into informal practice. Where possible, “decoupling” (when formal rules are in place but are not to be implemented in practice) is noted. While attempts were made to gather the most recent information for each organization, the study may not capture all organizational practices, as many of the organizations were undergoing significant reforms. A summary of good, formal leadership practices is shown in the Table.
The data for each question across the 11 organizations was analysed to identify variations in practice. The objective was not to derive an “ideal” best practice, although management and public administration studies were also consulted. The report is limited to practices in IOs from which other organizations could learn. Readers and organizations are invited to contribute input3 from practices and examples not discussed in this report.
f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?
An organization’s membership (represented on its board) and its senior management are collectively responsible for ensuring effective processes are in place. The membership or the board have responsibility for some criteria (election and re-election procedures for heads); other indicators fall under the scope of senior leadership (ethical codes, conflicts of interest), and some are shared (setting strategic priorities). In some organizations, a “grey zone” may exist, where it is not always clear who is responsible – the leader, senior management team, membership or board. By identifying these priority areas, organizations should be able to focus attention and clarify who will take the lead.
g. The Objectives of the Study
This study aims to inspire greater attention to leadership in international organizations, instigate learning across them and draw attention to good practice. Many organizations in this study are already engaged in reforming their governance mechanisms, strategic frameworks or other organizational processes. This study highlights leadership structures as one element that should be taken into account.It is planned to share results with relevant forums, bringing together boards and committees in the UN system, and across international financial institutions and development banks. Apparently, a number of these organizations are already sharing practices. It is hoped that the study will foster a more systematic comparison and identification of good practice, thus enabling more direct learning.
9Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Table: Good Leadership Practices among the 11 Selected Organizations
Indicators Examples of Formal Practice
ÎSelecting and re-electing leadership on merit
1. Organizations should search for candidates with specific, relevant competencies, and test these against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.
Criteria/TOR for leadership are published online Selection process updates are available onlinePassport blind selection of candidates is doneOther candidates are always considered in re-elections
Performance is given formal consideration in re-elections
ÎManaging performance
2. Organizations should have clear expectations of performance, which are transparent and consistent with their goals, and facilitate leadership accountability.
Leaders are expected to set performance expectations in inaugural speechBoards conduct regular individual performance appraisals
ÎSetting and evaluating ethical standards
3. Leadership should comply with clearly defined ethical standards.
Leaders are obliged to disclose financial assets and conflicts of interestLeaders are obliged to adhere to a published code of ethicsCompliance with the code of ethics is enforced
ÎDeveloping and retaining talent
4. Leadership should attract, retain and develop talent throughout the organization.
Leaders carry out regular global staff surveys Leaders ensure survey results are monitored and utilized
Leaders are obliged to participate in formal training programmes for their own professional development
ÎSetting strategic priorities
5. Leadership should have the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities due to changing circumstances.
Strategic documents include measurable objectives
ÎEngaging with a wide range of stakeholders
6. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with a wide range of stakeholders.
Meetings between stakeholder organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors occur on a regular, established basis
ÎEvaluating independently and effectively
7. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with internal and external evaluations.
Evaluation office reports directly to the board Management must respond to evaluations
Source: Authors
10 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
2. Emerging Good Practices
a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit
Many international organizations have no selection process that clearly searches for and tests candidates on relevant (and much-needed) leadership competencies in their domain. Often, leaders are selected in a political bargaining process. However, some changes are under way.
The review of leadership selection revealed four important practices, each of which is being used in at least one international agency: (1) the leadership role is clearly defined, (2) the competencies and experience needed to take up the role are clearly stated, (3) the role and competencies are openly advertised, and (4) the selection process is transparent and clear.
WHO, for example, set out a code of conduct in 2011 to ensure ethical and transparent nomination and election of leadership. It specifically notes that every candidate is expected to provide supporting evidence to match each of the published criteria for the Director General position. The executive board shortlists those candidates matching the criteria.4
In its selection process, the WTO actively seeks to reflect its membership’s diversity. An official WTO document (WT/L/509, published in 2002 and available online) invites nominations from across all regions and stipulates that, in the case of equally meritorious candidates for DG appointments, the diversity of WTO membership shall be taken into account.5 The document also gives the clear time frame for the process to start nine months before, and be completed 3 months prior to, the end of the incumbent’s term. The recent election of the WTO DG was a role model of transparency: all stages were well documented and exposed through a special page on the WTO website.
Although selecting its president remains non-exhaustive and without a clear formal process, the EBRD is introducing greater rigour at the vice-president (VP) level. For example, EBRD conducted an exhaustive review from over 850 applicants for the position of VP of banking operations (a post traditionally held by an American). The search was passport-blind, and included psychometric testing and multiple interviews.6
The IMF has been opening up its processes. In 2011, it published its first comprehensive terms of appointment for its Managing Director.7 In addition to its Articles of Agreement and By-Laws, which contain a standardized job description for executive directors, the IMF published complete terms of reference in the same year for the ethics advisor,8 ombudsperson9 and director of the Independent Evaluation Office.10 The IMF already instituted a rigorous process of candidate profiling in 2007, making available full job descriptions, and the desired qualities and experience of candidates. The executive board set out a timetable and invited nominations from executive directors for the post of MD, interviewing those that did apply.11 However, the IMF’s good formal practice is undermined by the informal convention that the organization’s European members, in consultation with the other members, ultimately select a European as MD.
In the WTO, all decisions, including selection of the DG, are made by consensus of all members. If a consensus cannot be reached in the appointed time, a provision allows for a vote by the General Council.12 In the 2012 DG selection process, WTO members officially nominated nine candidates, each of whom presented their vision for the WTO at a council meeting in January 2013. In the final two months of the process, the council chair consulted with members to build a consensus. The selection process concluded with a council meeting in May, where the decision to appoint the new DG was taken. Practices for re-election or reappointment are not particularly strong across organizations. Performance can be difficult to assess, as few international organizations have objectives for their leadership on this measure. WHO stands out in this regard. During the re-election of its DG in May 2012, the incumbent wrote a self-assessment that evaluated her first-term performance on the priorities she had set out; this was captured in a document and taken into account through the re-nomination process. The AfDB now considers a range of candidates alongside the incumbent for re-election, as does the EBRD, where Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected over the incumbent president in 2012.The more exhaustive, inclusive and meritocratic the process, the better the chance of not only the best candidate being chosen or reappointed, but also of full membership being engaged to hold that candidate accountable for performance.
11Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
b. Managing Performance
Governments expect that heads of international organizations, once appointed, will deliver on their mandated goals. However, individual states often have divergent views on organizational priorities and the role of leaders, and some states have greater influence over leadership selection and subsequent decision-making. It is thus critical that the membership and the leader agree together on performance expectations, particularly at the start of a new tenure. Furthermore, the leader’s responsibilities with respect to vision, goals and implementation need to be carefully differentiated from those of the board. Otherwise, lines of accountability and responsibility are blurred, and the board can no longer evaluate the leader’s performance without evaluating its own.13 Setting performance expectations can help prevent organizational capture (when the leader becomes the instrument of a few states) and enable performance management.
Despite the proliferation of results-based management, no organization in this study had an openly published formal procedure for setting performance expectations for the leader. However, all leaders were expected to report regularly to member states on overall organizational performance at board, council and other equivalent meetings.14
In some international organizations, incoming presidents or directors are expected to deliver a statement to the board or general council, setting out a vision and objectives for the organization during their tenure. Such a procedure, for example, took place at the WTO in 2009.15 In recent years, the president-elect of the AfDB also delivered a working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.16
If performance objectives are set, boards can conduct regular performance appraisals to give feedback on a leader’s successes and failures. Regular management of leaders’ performance is standard across the private and public sectors. A formal, annual process to evaluate chief executive officer performance exists in 80% of US non-profit boards and 96% of Standard and Poor’s 500 companies.17 However, very few international organizations have institutionalized annual performance appraisals of their leaders. One study found that none of the major international financial institutions conducted individual performance appraisals in 2008.18
More recently, some organizations have sought to address this deficit. Since 2009, the MD of the IMF has been evaluated annually by the board, based on agreed performance objectives. As part of the feedback, the MD also assesses the executive board’s performance. The framework is tailored by job position and based on the IMF’s annual performance review template. Annual salary adjustments for IMF management are linked to the consumer price index, and allow for performance-based merit increases.
In 2008, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, established Senior Managers’ Compacts for many senior UN officials. These compacts outline the roles of UN department heads, although they do not cover UNHCR or UNDP. Heads must report if they are spending their budgets according to programme objectives.19 In addition, they are reviewed on how well they promote gender diversity and follow geographic distribution requirements. The UN Secretariat’s Management Performance Board uses the compacts to assess senior UN leaders annually.20
c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards
In recent years, a number of heads of major international organizations have resigned because of questions about their ethical conduct. 21 Three sets of practices are associated with upholding ethical standards: (1) an ethics code; (2) a clear authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing it, and dealing with non-compliance; and (3) formal declarations of any conflicts of interest and financial assets of senior leaders.
Every international organization examined in this study obliges all staff and heads to adhere to a code of ethics. However, not all codes are public, and not all are formally enforced. The EBRD has a defined formal code of conduct (updated in 2012), which is overseen by a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the president. The World Bank Group has its Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, an ethics helpline, a code of conduct for staff (2003) and the Code of Conduct for Board Officials, which focuses on disclosure policies.22 With women’s accession at the Group, the documents have recently been refined to include sexual harassment. Meanwhile, the WTO’s code of core values is only circulated internally. All UN staff are obliged to follow its code of conduct, and many UN agencies, such as UNHCR, have set their own codes of conduct.23
Some organizations require disclosures of conflicts of interest and financial assets. Declarations are filed annually at the AfDB, which also has an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an office to investigate disclosures. This was a product of a joint anti-corruption task force (2006) of international financial institutions.24 In the UN system, all senior officers must file an annual financial disclosure statement with the UN ethics office.25 Those who do not are charged and may be penalized by the UN’s Department for Administration and Management.26 The UNDP administrator and the UNHCR high commissioner have voluntarily disclosed their financial assets publicly, and made them available online.27 However, these organizations are exceptions: most leaders do not publicly disclose their financial assets.
12 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
d. Developing and Retaining Talent
A core responsibility of leaders at IOs is to attract, develop and retain outstanding staff. Leaders can thus help to ensure their workforces have the capacity and diversity to deliver on the organization’s vision and strategy, while proactively addressing gaps in capability.28 This is a challenge for international organizations, where it is understood that particular countries should hold certain positions, and staff selection is seen as requiring a balance of national diversity and merit. At worst, leaders may face pressure from states to hire particular individuals for high-level posts.
IOs can attract, develop and retain talent in many ways – for example, through policies for fair and transparent staff selection, and by ensuring diversity of staff at all levels. However, when trying to study staff diversity in gender and nationality across the 11 organizations, it was difficult to get accurate, comparable data for all organizations. For this reason, the use of staff surveys, while a limited measure, was seen as evidence of senior managements’ interest in staff welfare. Such surveys, as well as staff liaison organizations, are used by some organizations to monitor staff progression and ensure that it is, and is perceived to be, based on merit. UNHCR conducts staff surveys every three years, and has done so since 2006. The agency has a committee dedicated to carrying out survey recommendations and developing action plans.29 The High Commissioner has tasked the Deputy High Commissioner with following up recommendations from this committee’s deliberations. Responses to UNHCR’s staff survey have guided human resources reform and resulted in changes to the agency’s postings and promotions procedures.30 UNDP’s annual global staff surveys are conducted by an external independent organization. The EBRD has recently reprioritized staff surveys, conducting them annually rather than every three years.31 As yet, none of the international organizations examined makes staff survey results available online.
Heads of organizations mentor, support and coach their staff. While few formal processes exist for this, evidence does show widespread informal practices in many organizations. For example, IOM’s director-general makes it a priority to open the training of new chiefs of mission, outlines the organization’s vision and invites open dialogue with staff. 32
Finally, leadership training that ensures the strengthening of necessary senior management skills is occurring in a few agencies. The IMF has recently progressed with leadership training programmes. Most leaders are supported with and trained in organizational rules by their executive office staff and/or their chief of staff when they arrive. For instance, UNHCR’s chief of staff provides informal on-the-job training in UN rules and protocols to new high commissioners. UNHCR’s Global Learning Centre in Budapest has consolidated the agency’s learning activities and programmes, and has a position dedicated to developing and delivering training programmes for senior management. Many organizations are prioritizing senior staff development. The EBRD, for example, has a learning and development
team that works closely with the evaluation department to design measures addressing current weaknesses in programme delivery.
e. Setting Strategic Priorities
Most organizations have a mission statement and strategic goals that identify the raison d’être and ultimate objectives. To deliver on these, the organizations’ heads must translate the overarching organizational mission into a clear, detailed and measurable operational plan, and evaluate progress on a regular basis. International organizations vary greatly in their ability to do this. Some organizations have very broad strategic documents, with weak strategic direction, no measurable objectives and no mechanism to evaluate progress. Others have developed more detailed and measurable strategies, with timelines and budgets. Board members most often work with executive leadership to set strategic frameworks and evaluate progress towards them. Yet, their input varies greatly – in some cases, member states may lead on formulating strategic goals (e.g. IOM’s 12-point plan), and in others, the executive director will take the lead (for instance, the UNDP).
UNHCR and UNDP are committed to producing well-developed strategic documents. UNHCR details objectives in its Global Strategic Priorities, and evaluates progress towards them in global annual reports and strategic reviews. The priorities set out operational, support and management goals, and include specific “impact indicators” to evaluate progress.33 The agency has also established the Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF), which “comprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the organization and relates them to the corresponding management policies and guidance”.34 It works at country, regional and global levels to clarify the lines of accountability, responsibilities and functions. In addition, UNHCR has Focus, a software that integrates its results-based management at country and international levels. UNDP has a series of regular strategic plans covering about four years, and reports in depth on how it will implement, finance, measure and review progress towards these goals.35
In recent years, the IMF produced the Global Policy Agenda, the MD’s vision of the institution’s strategic priorities and actions. It serves as the basis for the biannual International Monetary and Financial Committee ministerial meetings that review and set the IMF’s broad goals, which the executive board‘s work programme subsequently operationalizes. This helps the IMF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances. Similarly, with its president setting priorities, the EBRD has rapidly expanded lending to North African clients in need of greater assistance in their transition to democracy and free markets. The ADB’s 2008 report, Strategy2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020, provided a 12-year framework, with measurable organizational objectives, to guide the organization. A midterm review of the bank’s performance, presented at the board of governors’ annual meeting in 2013, found that 80% of ADB’s operations in 2008-2012 were conducted in the five core areas outlined in the original strategic agenda: infrastructure, environment, regional cooperation, financial sector development and education.
13Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
An international organization’s flexibility is also influenced by its funding model. Providing discretionary, or “earmarked”, funding can rapidly spur specific activities and innovations. Discretionary and other tied funds – from private institutions, other multilaterals or trust funds – may enable leaders to expand into new areas and adapt to changing circumstances when they are explicitly sought for this purpose. However, because discretionary funds are tied to specific tasks, leaders may have little flexibility to redeploy these funds with changing external circumstances. Organizations with a small core budget, and highly reliant on discretionary financing, would be expected to respond more directly to donor demands to ensure their survival.
Most organizations studied had a high percentage of funds earmarked for specific issues or projects, implying that leadership has less flexibility and discretion in setting priorities. Over 97% of IOM’s financing is from non-core contributions.36 However, the organization’s director-general has actively lobbied states for an increase in IOM’s core funding, and has also established an audit and oversight committee.37 Similar numbers are seen in other organizations: in 2012, only 2% of UNHCR’s financing came from the UN regular budget, and 98% percent was voluntary; for WHO, 76% of financing was voluntary.38
WHO, as part of its extensive programme reform, has launched the “Financing Dialogue” initiative, spearheaded by Director-General Margaret Chan. Among other things, it aims to ensure that member states and other funders commit to fully aligning fund allocation to the approved programme budget. Funders should make their contributions public to increase transparency, and ensure the predictability and flexibility of their funds.39
f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders
Every multilateral organization engages in some way with its members and a wider group of stakeholders, including beneficiaries, private-sector organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups. Some do this more effectively than others. The benefits from positive, well-structured engagement include better information, better-quality collaboration, heightened responsiveness, sharing responsibility, and better public understanding and cooperation with the agency. Most organizations have formal and informal mechanisms to engage with stakeholders – joint projects with NGOs and other multilateral organizations, discussions and dialogues at conferences, and structured forums to interact with leaders of academia and civil society. But as no established “most effective way” exists to conduct these engagements, the challenge is in measuring or attempting to report best practice. Evidence, however, points to the importance of regular, formal meetings between organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors. It becomes more difficult for civil society to have an impact when meetings are informal or irregular.
g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively
In recent years, most international organizations have recognized that independent evaluations can provide timely, useful and robust information on their work.40 The World Bank created the Operations Evaluation Unit in the 1970s under its president, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), and renamed it as the Independent Evaluation Group in 2001. The same year, the IMF created an evaluation group, which it has subsequently and independently audited on two occasions.41
Besides serving as external appraisals, evaluations are also another way to ensure that members are aware of the governance, effectiveness, impact and use of their funds. The independence of these evaluations is critical and important to maintain, as are the channels through which evaluators’ findings are considered.
At the IMF, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is independent from management and reports to the board. As indicated in the IEO’s terms of reference, the office engages with executive management, the board and staff when they “respond to relevant parts of the evaluation”.42
At the World Bank and EBRD, independent evaluation teams report directly to the board of directors. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bank conducted a client survey in 2012 to determine both whether the bank was meeting clients’ needs and how clients perceived its impact, as one of the ways of engaging with the organization. At EBRD, engagement is done through links with key people, i.e. the chief compliance officer reports directly to the president, as does the internal audit team. The vice-president for risk also sits on the executive committee.
The AfDB has recently tried to strengthen independent internal and external evaluations. The Quality Assurance and Results department has established a round-table review mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.
The ADB has internal and external reviews. The internal compliance review panel investigates alleged non-compliance by the bank in its operational policies and procedures. It does not, however, investigate borrowing countries, the executing agency or private-sector clients, unless they are relevant to non-compliance. Externally, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) regularly evaluates the institution and individual members, especially large donors such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and conducts regular assessments to ensure their money is being spent safely and effectively.
Some organizations have recently taken steps to make sure they follow best practice. The UNDP, for example, revised its evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the Evaluation Office’s independence and ensure that all evaluations have a response from management. The office’s head reports directly and independently to the executive board. The administrator, however, is briefed before an evaluation is presented to the board, and the administrator’s office prepares a management response to evaluations. The administrator has the right to reply to evaluations, and discusses follow-up actions with the board.
14Effective Leadership in International O
rganizations
3. Appendix: Leadership Pratices
a. African Development Bank (AfDB)
OrganizationThe AfDB is a regional development bank founded in 1963 to foster economic growth and regional integration on the continent. The group also consists of the African Development Fund and Nigerian Trust Fund.43 Governance Owned and financed by 79 member countries (54 African and 25 non-African),44 the bank is currently headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia, having temporarily moved there from its official headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. It has 37 field offices, 6 customized liaison offices, 2 regional resource centres, 56 departments, and an external representation office in Tokyo.
At the top of the AfDB’s organizational structure is the board of governors, which comprises ministers and high-level officials of economic, financial and development institutions from shareholder countries. The board of governors meets once a year and delegates day-to-day decision-making to a 20-member board of directors. The president, who is always an African and who is elected by the board of governors, chairs the board of directors.
Length of leadership mandateA renewable five-year term.
IncomeAs of December 2012, the AfDB’s cumulative authorized capital was $103 billion, while the subscribed capital stood at $100.2 billion (60% subscribed by regional members and 40% by non-regional members).
Number of staff2,068 regular staff, as of December 2012.
History of leadershipIn the early to mid 1990s, AfDB faced severe financial crises, compounded by major management problems. Distrust among shareholders, board, management and staff had weakened executive functions, procedures and controls, as well as policy and oversight functions. By the early 2000s, the AfDB fixed its balance sheet and regained its AAA credit rating via mechanisms for institutional reform. This strategic initiative has been reinvigorated under the current president.
Previous presidents were: Mamoun Beheiry (from Sudan, 1964-1970); Abdelwahab Labidi (Tunisia, 1970-1976); Kwame Donkor Fordwor (Ghana, 1976-1979); Godwin Gondwe (Malawi; caretaker capacity, 1979-1980); Willa Mung’Omba (Zambia, 1980-1985); Babacar N’diaye (Senegal, 1985-1995) and Omar Kabbaj (Morocco, 1995-2005).
The current president is Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda, 2005-to date).
Current trajectoryKaberuka, Rwanda’s finance minister in the decade following the genocide, has given the AfDB international prominence, and exponentially increased lending to the private sector, since taking over as president. Under his leadership, the bank has received more confidence from its shareholders, as evidenced by recent votes to increase its capital base and to replenish its resources. A growing number of African countries now see the bank as a lender and adviser of first choice, although it has fewer resources than the World Bank. The AfDB’s strategy, covered in At the Center of Africa’s Transformation: Strategy for 2013-2022,45 proposes a variety of reforms of leadership mechanisms. The next board session will take place in Abidjan in September 2014.
15Evaluation of O
rganizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indicator Published rules Other factors I. The leadership selection process searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.
1 Does the Multi-lateral Organization/International Organization (MO/IO) publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?
Neither terms of reference nor criteria for the president’s position are found openly published.
2 What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?
Full membership, but with different voting power. The founding Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank (1963) states that the board of governors elects the president “by a majority of the total voting power of the members, including a majority of the total voting power of the regional members”.46 Each AfDB member country, however, has an equal number of basic votes (625) in addition to the/a number of votes proportionate to its paid-in shares. The bank lists voting powers of each state in its annual reports in a transparent table based on subscriptions and contributions.47
3 Is there a time-bound, published and exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?
No. The establishing Agreement only states that it should be “a person of the highest competence in matters pertaining to the activities, management and administration of the Bank and shall be a national of a regional member state”.48
II. The leader has clear performance expectations, which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO’s overarching goals and which facilitate leadership accountability.
1 Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?
There is no official procedure for setting performance expectations. In practice, candidates outline the issues or themes they consider important, and the president-elect is expected to outline their working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.49
2 Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?
The current president has taken things further along with concrete steps in this direction: (a) the elaboration of the Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2012 (MTS) with the advice of a high-level panel of eminent people; and (b) the AfDB Ten-Year Strategy (TYS) for 2013-2022.50 In addition, the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 proposes to “transform the leadership statement into tangible actions that managers can enact with staff on an ongoing basis”, and that “each leader and manager will have clear people management goals in their annual objectives that link to these standards and goals”.51
16Effective Leadership in International O
rganizations
3 Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?
Yes. The establishing Agreement states “the Bank, its President, Vice-Presidents, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned”.52 This principle of impartiality is enforced through the Staff Integrity and Ethics Office (SIEO) and the Anti-Corruption Department that investigates allegations of prohibited practices and related staff misconduct.
4 Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?
Yes, equal for each staff member of the bank. There is an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an investigation office to look into the above. This was a product of a joint IFI anti-corruption task force (2006). The Bank also has a 1999 code of conduct for staff, as well as a 2007 code of conduct for executive directors.
III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance1 Is the leadership subjected to annual
performance appraisal?Not formally, but the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 proposes that in the near future the “leadership behaviours will be translated into specific behavioural requirements, and progress will be measured through management effectiveness and employee engagement indices and 360 feedback, and supported by development interventions.”53 Each VP now has to sign a “Performance Contract” annually with the president.
2 Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?
No evidence.
3 Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?
No official mechanisms established, but supplying “managers with coaches or mentors to provide confidential help to become more effective” is one of the initiatives of the new AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 (implementation began in the 3rd quarter of 2013).54
IV. Leadership re-election is based on transparent processes and metrics1 Are performance management criteria
considered by the full membership in the re-election process?
No evidence.
2 Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?
No evidence.
V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances1 Does the leader have the authority
to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?
Yes. Mainly through structural changes in the Bank. Due to the establishing Agreement the AfDB President determines the organizational structure, functions and responsibilities as well as the regional and country representation offices.55
17Evaluation of O
rganizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
2 Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?
Yes. For example, the Results Management Framework will monitor implementation of the new Strategy for 2013-2022 over the 3-year planning horizon reflected in the rolling plan and assess the development effectiveness of the institution.
3 What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?
The Fund has available resources entrusted to it under Article 8 of the founding Agreement (1963), which empowers the Fund to receive other resources including grants from State Participants, non-participating countries, and from any public or private body or bodies.56 There has been an increase in trust funds capital in 2010 – 73% compared to 2009 – that triggered a trust funds reform.57
As of 2012, the Bank mobilized a total of $127.7 million from donors to replenish the existing thematic ($130 million) and bilateral ($22.6 million) Trust Funds. By the end of 2012, the African Development Bank had made substantial progress under its Trust Fund Reform policy by moving away from tied bilateral funds to multi-donor Trust Funds most of which are thematic in nature (for example, South-South Cooperation Trust Fund with Brazil ($6 million) approved by the Board in March 2011).
VI. The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent through-out the organization1 Does the organization take staff
surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?
Yes. The first staff survey was conducted in 2007. In 2010 President Kaberuka committed to a regular corporate accountability exercise, involving both client survey and a staff survey.58 The most recent staff survey was completed in December 2013 with results expected to be published in February 2014.
There have been a number of staff surveys in the past and we are planning to institutionalize the process and include results (staff engagement survey) as part of our Results Measurement Framework – the fundamental benchmark against which we assess our own performance. One of the 2013-2022 Strategy59 goals is: to put focus on “performance priorities, talent management and succession planning”.60
2 Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?
No evidence.
18Effective Leadership in International O
rganizations
VII. MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholdersNo. According to the Framework for Enhanced Engagement with Civil Society Organizations (2012), the Bank has no mechanisms to ensure systematic CSOs engagement, but aims at strengthening and institutionalizing it.61 The document encourages the staff (management included) to engage with stakeholders.62 Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) administers Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) through which people adversely affected by a project financed by the AfDB can request the Bank to comply with its own policies and procedures.
VIII. MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluationsThe Bank has structures to deal with both internal/independent and external evaluations.63
For independent evaluations there is a Management Response and a Management Action Record (MAR) that is published and discussed with the Board. The MAR sets out time-bound actions the Bank will (or will not) take in response to Recommendations made by Independent Evaluators. Management and Evaluators then jointly track implementation of these Management Commitments. For external Evaluations (e.g. UK Multilateral Aid Review, Australian Multilateral Aid Review or MOPAN) the Bank prepares Management Responses (though not usually an MAR).Quality Assurance and Results Department has established a Roundtable Review Mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review the evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.
19Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
b. A
sian
Dev
elop
men
t Ban
k (A
DB
)
Org
aniz
atio
nFo
unde
d in
196
6 by
31
coun
tries
to s
uppo
rt ec
onom
ic g
row
th a
nd re
gion
al
inte
grat
ion
in A
sia,
the
AD
B n
ow h
as 6
7 m
embe
rs. I
t pro
vide
s lo
ans,
gra
nts,
te
chni
cal a
ssis
tanc
e an
d eq
uity
inve
stm
ents
to s
over
eign
s, c
entra
l ban
ks, n
on-
profi
t org
aniz
atio
ns a
nd p
rivat
e-se
ctor
clie
nts.
The
AD
B d
raw
s fro
m o
rdin
ary
capi
tal r
esou
rces
(OC
R) a
nd e
ight
spe
cial
fund
s, in
clud
ing
the
Asi
an D
evel
opm
ent
Fund
(AD
F).64
The
ban
k is
hea
dqua
rtere
d in
Man
ila, P
hilip
pine
s.
Gov
erna
nce
The
AD
B g
rant
s al
l pow
ers
to th
e bo
ard
of g
over
nors
, com
pose
d of
one
re
pres
enta
tive
of e
ach
mem
ber.
The
boar
d m
ay d
eleg
ate
any
or a
ll po
wer
s to
the
boar
d of
dire
ctor
s, e
xcep
t tho
se p
ower
s ex
clus
ivel
y re
serv
ed fo
r the
gov
erno
rs.65
Th
e bo
ard
of d
irect
ors
hand
les
day-
to-d
ay m
anag
emen
t in
prac
tice,
and
is
com
pose
d of
12
mem
bers
ele
cted
by
the
boar
d of
gov
erno
rs (e
ight
by
regi
onal
m
embe
rs a
nd fo
ur b
y no
n-re
gion
al m
embe
rs) f
or re
new
able
two-
year
term
s.66
Th
e ba
nk’s
pre
side
nt c
hairs
the
boar
d of
dire
ctor
s bu
t has
no
vote
, exc
ept i
n th
e ev
ent o
f an
equa
l div
isio
n, in
whi
ch c
ase
the
pres
iden
t has
the
deci
ding
vot
e.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Five
yea
rs; r
e-el
ecta
ble.
Inco
me
$9.4
billi
on in
app
rove
d O
CR
loan
s in
201
2. T
otal
sub
scrib
ed c
apita
l in
the
sam
e ye
ar w
as $
163.
129
billio
n, w
ith a
n op
erat
ing
inco
me
of $
464.
7 m
illion
.67
Num
ber
of s
taff
3,04
5.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pEv
ery
pres
iden
t has
bee
n Ja
pane
se. T
he p
ast p
resi
dent
s w
ere:
Tak
eshi
Wat
anab
e (1
966-
1972
), S
hiro
Inou
e (1
972-
1976
), Ta
roic
hi Y
oshi
da (1
976-
1981
), M
asau
Fu
jioka
(198
1-19
89),
Kim
imas
a Ta
rum
izu
(198
9-19
93),
Mits
uo S
ato
(199
3-19
99),
Tada
o C
hino
(199
9-20
05) a
nd H
aruh
iko
Kur
oda
(200
5-20
13).
The
curre
nt p
resi
dent
is T
akeh
iko
Nak
ao (2
013-
pres
ent).
The
elec
tion
of N
akao
, the
nin
th-c
onse
cutiv
e un
cont
este
d Ja
pane
se c
andi
date
in a
ro
w, h
as le
d m
any
to q
uest
ion
the
info
rmal
con
vent
ion
of J
apan
sel
ectin
g th
e A
DB
pr
esid
ent.68
For
exa
mpl
e, E
swar
Pra
sad,
Tol
ani S
enio
r Pro
fess
or o
f Tra
de P
olic
y,
Cor
nell
Uni
vers
ity, a
nd c
ontri
buto
r to
the
Asi
an D
evel
opm
ent B
ank
Inst
itute
69, t
old
the
Fina
ncia
l Tim
es: “
The
Chi
nese
hav
e lo
ng w
ante
d [c
ontro
l of]
the
AD
B.”
70 C
hina
ha
s no
t pub
licly
con
firm
ed th
is d
esire
. How
ever
, dur
ing
an a
ddre
ss a
t the
AD
B’s
20
14 A
stan
a co
nfer
ence
, Chi
nese
repr
esen
tativ
e Ji
wei
Lou
not
ed: “
Emer
ging
ec
onom
ies
in th
e re
gion
are
in a
pos
ition
to b
e A
DB
’s fi
nanc
ing
partn
ers,
but
th
eir v
oice
and
repr
esen
tatio
n ne
ed to
be
incr
ease
d th
roug
h th
e re
form
of A
DB
’s
gove
rnan
ce s
truct
ure
so a
s to
ena
ble
them
to u
nder
take
mor
e re
spon
sibi
litie
s fo
r A
DB
’s d
evel
opm
ent.”
71
Furth
er, m
any
see
Chi
na’s
pro
posa
l for
an
Asi
an In
frast
ruct
ure
Inve
stm
ent
Ban
k (A
IIB) a
s a
chal
leng
e to
wha
t is
perc
eive
d to
be
a Ja
pane
se-d
omin
ated
A
DB
.72 N
akao
has
pub
licly
wel
com
ed th
e ne
w b
ank.
73 H
owev
er, R
ober
t Orr,
US
A
mba
ssad
or to
the
AD
B, h
as n
oted
that
Chi
na m
ay b
e cr
eatin
g th
e A
IIB o
ut o
f fru
stra
tion,
due
to it
s in
abilit
y to
incr
ease
its
capi
tal c
ontri
butio
n (a
nd th
us v
otin
g po
wer
) in
the
exis
ting
inst
itutio
n.74
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryN
akao
rece
ntly
ple
dged
to a
ctiv
ely
expl
ore
optio
ns to
add
ress
the
bank
’s “
reso
urce
ch
alle
nge”
and
take
adv
anta
ge o
f opp
ortu
nitie
s to
co-
finan
ce w
ith b
ilate
ral a
nd
priv
ate-
sect
or s
ourc
es.75
Fur
ther
, at t
he 4
7th
Ann
ual M
eetin
g of
the
Boa
rd o
f G
over
nors
in 2
014,
Nak
ao a
nnou
nced
pla
ns to
com
bine
the
conc
essi
onal
AD
F an
d LI
BO
R-b
ased
OC
R. T
he m
erge
r of t
he fu
nds
aim
s to
incr
ease
AD
B’s
equ
ity b
ase
with
out i
ts h
avin
g to
requ
est a
dditi
onal
fund
s fro
m m
embe
rs.76
Ulti
mat
ely,
this
wou
ld
enha
nce
the
bank
’s c
apac
ity to
pro
vide
con
cess
iona
l fina
ncin
g fo
r dev
elop
men
t pr
ojec
ts.
20 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
Indi
cato
rP
ublis
hed
rule
sO
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
No
evid
ence
.
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
Form
ally
, ful
l mem
bers
hip.
(a) E
ach
Gov
erno
r can
nom
inat
e a
cand
idat
e. (b
) Eac
h m
embe
r cou
ntry
has
one
vot
e. T
he P
resi
dent
is
elec
ted
by a
sim
ple
maj
ority
of G
over
nors
repr
esen
ting
no le
ss th
an a
m
ajor
ity o
f tot
al v
otin
g po
wer
of a
ll m
embe
rs.77
Fur
ther
, the
Pre
side
nt
mus
t be
a na
tiona
l of a
regi
onal
mem
ber c
ount
ry (e
.g.,
ther
e ca
nnot
be
an A
mer
ican
Pre
side
nt).78
Muc
h lik
e th
e W
orld
Ban
k’s
tradi
tion
of s
elec
ting
an A
mer
ican
Pre
side
nt, t
he A
DB
is c
omm
only
un
ders
tood
to o
pera
te u
nder
the
info
rmal
co
nven
tion
that
the
Pre
side
nt is
sel
ecte
d by
Jap
an
(Yas
utom
o 19
93, 1
995;
Wan
199
5; K
ilby
2006
, 20
11; L
im &
Vre
elan
d 20
13).
Ever
y P
resi
dent
has
be
en J
apan
ese,
and
mos
t hav
e co
me
dire
ctly
from
th
e Fi
nanc
e M
inis
try o
f Jap
an.79
Lim
& V
reel
and
(201
3) w
rite
that
in a
dditi
on to
its
larg
e fo
rmal
vot
ing
pow
er, J
apan
“ex
erts
info
rmal
influ
ence
thro
ugh
its
de fa
cto
appo
intm
ent o
f the
AD
B p
resi
dent
.”80
AD
B
Dire
ctor
of S
trate
gy K
azu
Sak
ai s
trong
ly d
isag
reed
w
ith th
e no
tion
that
Jap
an ‘d
e fa
cto’
app
oint
s th
e P
resi
dent
. He
rem
inde
d vi
a in
terv
iew
that
eve
ry
regi
onal
mem
ber c
an p
ut fo
rwar
d a
cand
idat
e, a
nd
that
“no
oth
er c
andi
date
doe
s no
t mea
n th
ere
was
no
ele
ctio
n; th
ere
was
[stil
l] an
ele
ctio
n an
d vo
ting.
” N
umer
ous
acad
emic
s an
d ob
serv
ers
mai
ntai
n,
how
ever
, tha
t the
stro
ng in
form
al in
fluen
ce a
nd la
rge
mon
etar
y co
ntrib
utio
n of
Jap
an a
llow
s it
to p
ick
the
Pre
side
nt u
ncon
test
ed.81
But
as
Sak
ai c
orre
ctly
no
tes,
ther
e is
no
form
al e
vide
nce
that
wou
ld
confi
rm s
uch
an in
form
al a
rran
gem
ent,
asid
e fro
m
the
fact
that
ther
e ha
s ne
ver b
een
a no
n-Ja
pane
se
cand
idat
e pr
opos
ed b
y an
y m
embe
r.3
Is th
ere
a tim
e-bo
und,
pub
lishe
d,
exha
ustiv
e pr
oces
s fo
r lea
ders
hip
sele
ctio
n th
at w
eigh
s co
mpe
tenc
e ag
ains
t the
pub
lishe
d cr
iteria
?
No
evid
ence
.
21Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
II.
The
lead
er h
as c
lear p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
ac
coun
tabi
lity
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
Yes.
The
AD
B is
larg
ely
guid
ed b
y go
als
stat
ed in
its
‘Stra
tegy
2020
’82
repo
rt. T
o m
easu
re th
e B
ank’
s pe
rform
ance
, a ‘R
esul
ts F
ram
ewor
k’
appr
oved
by
the
Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
is a
lso
publ
ishe
d.83
The
Ban
k al
so
feat
ures
a ‘D
evel
opm
ent E
ffect
iven
ess
Rev
iew
,’84 a
n In
depe
nden
t Ev
alua
tion
Dep
artm
ent (
IED
)85, a
Com
plia
nce
Rev
iew
Pan
el (C
RP
)86, a
tra
nspa
renc
y po
licy87
, and
a n
ew V
ice-
Pre
side
nt fo
r Adm
inis
tratio
n an
d C
orpo
rate
Man
agem
ent.
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er tr
ansl
ates
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls o
f or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
Yes.
In O
ctob
er th
e cu
rrent
Pre
side
nt a
ddre
ssed
how
the
AD
B c
an
fulfi
l the
goa
ls o
f Stra
tegy
2020
in a
writ
ten
stat
emen
t sub
mitt
ed
to th
e 88
th m
eetin
g of
the
Wor
ld B
ank
Dev
elop
men
t Com
mitt
ee in
W
ashi
ngto
n D
.C.88
At t
he A
DB
’s 2
014
Ann
ual G
ener
al M
eetin
g of
the
Boa
rd o
f Gov
erno
rs in
Ast
ana,
Nak
ao o
utlin
ed te
n pr
iorit
y ac
tion
area
s to
fulfi
l the
goa
ls o
f Stra
tegy
2020
in li
ght o
f its
mid
-ter
m re
view
.89
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Ye
s. T
he 2
011
Cod
e of
Con
duct
requ
ires
the
Pre
side
nt a
nd D
irect
ors
to d
iscl
ose
any
such
con
flict
s to
the
AD
B E
thic
s C
omm
ittee
.90
Ther
e ar
e al
so g
uide
lines
for t
he a
void
ance
of c
onfli
cts
of in
tere
st in
in
depe
nden
t eva
luat
ions
91, a
nd a
ll st
aff i
nvol
ved
in le
ndin
g ac
tiviti
es a
re
requ
ired
to d
iscl
ose
such
inte
rest
s.
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?Ye
s. T
here
is a
n Et
hics
com
mitt
ee th
at h
as p
ublis
hed
rule
s on
gift
s an
d en
terta
inm
ent92
, acc
ess
durin
g in
vest
igat
ions
93, g
uide
lines
for
alle
gatio
ns o
f mis
cond
uct94
and
gen
eral
cod
e of
con
duct
for a
ll em
ploy
ees.
95
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
ersh
ip s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
No
evid
ence
.
2Is
rem
uner
atio
n or
ben
efits
tied
to
the
outc
omes
of t
he p
erfo
rman
ce
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e?
Sal
ary
incr
ease
s fo
r mos
t em
ploy
ees
are
tied
to p
erfo
rman
ce b
ut it
is
unc
lear
if th
is a
pplie
s to
the
Pre
side
nt. T
he P
resi
dent
’s e
xact
sal
ary
is n
ot a
vaila
ble
but t
he h
ighe
st s
alar
y ca
tego
ry (I
S10
) ran
ged
from
$2
57,8
00 –
$32
2,30
0 ac
cord
ing
to a
201
4 pr
opos
al.96
Exe
cutiv
e sa
larie
s re
mai
n an
exc
lusi
ve ri
ght o
f the
Boa
rd o
f Gov
erno
rs.
The
Com
mitt
ee o
n R
emun
erat
ion,
est
ablis
hed
via
Res
olut
ion
No.
66
(and
am
ende
d by
Res
olut
ions
15
5 an
d 17
5) u
nder
take
s an
ann
ual r
evie
w o
f the
P
resi
dent
and
Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s’ s
alar
ies.
It m
ay
subm
it a
prop
osal
to th
e B
oard
of G
over
nors
for
adju
stm
ents
to th
e B
oard
of D
irect
ors
ever
y ye
ar
and
the
Pre
side
nt e
very
oth
er y
ear.97
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
No
evid
ence
.
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent c
riter
ia
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p in
th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
No
evid
ence
.
22 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Ther
e ha
s ne
ver b
een
anot
her c
andi
date
put
forw
ard
in th
e ev
ent o
f an
elec
tion
or re
-ele
ctio
n.
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
Yes.
The
Pre
side
nt is
ent
rust
ed w
ith th
e au
thor
ity to
con
duct
the
‘bus
ines
s of
the
bank
.’98 H
owev
er, m
ajor
cha
nges
to s
trate
gic
prio
ritie
s (o
r con
tinua
tions
of e
xist
ing
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies)
requ
ire a
ppro
val b
y th
e B
oard
of D
irect
ors.
The
Pre
side
nt o
f the
AD
B is
wid
ely
unde
rsto
od
to e
xerc
ise
sign
ifica
nt p
erso
nal p
ower
with
in
the
orga
niza
tion.
99 O
ne fo
rmer
dire
ctor
-gen
eral
, sp
eaki
ng u
nder
con
ditio
n of
ano
nym
ity in
201
0, to
ld
Lim
and
Vre
elan
d (2
013)
: “th
e A
DB
is li
ke a
sta
te,
and
the
AD
B P
resi
dent
is li
ke it
s em
pero
r.”10
0 Thi
s in
terp
reta
tion
was
stro
ngly
con
test
ed, h
owev
er, b
y A
DB
Dire
ctor
of S
trate
gy K
azu
Sak
ai in
an
inte
rvie
w
cond
ucte
d fo
r thi
s re
port.
Sak
ai s
tress
ed th
at th
e A
DB
’s 1
2-m
embe
r Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s (e
lect
ed b
y th
e G
over
nors
) mus
t app
rove
all
maj
or d
ecis
ions
pr
opos
ed b
y th
e P
resi
dent
, and
that
the
abov
e qu
ote
is a
“co
mpl
ete
mis
repr
esen
tatio
n of
the
AD
B.”
101
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
Yes.
The
Pre
side
nt c
an p
ut fo
rwar
d a
stra
tegi
c ag
enda
and
take
ste
ps
to fu
lfil i
ts g
oals
, as
exem
plifi
ed b
y S
trate
gy20
20. F
urth
er, t
he A
DB
pu
blis
hes
a W
ork
Pro
gram
me
and
Bud
get F
ram
ewor
k th
at d
escr
ibes
ho
w th
e A
DB
will
impl
emen
t its
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies.
102
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
App
roxi
mat
ely
$4 b
illion
(28.
6%) o
f AD
B fu
ndin
g is
Spe
cial
Fun
d R
esou
rces
fund
ed b
y a
subs
et o
f ful
l mem
bers
hip.
103
The
larg
est s
peci
al in
itiat
ive
is th
e A
sian
D
evel
opm
ent F
und
(AD
F). T
he c
umul
ativ
e to
tal o
f th
e A
DF
is a
ppro
xim
atel
y $3
3 bi
llion.
The
Fun
d is
con
trolle
d to
a la
rge
exte
nt b
y a
subs
et o
f ful
l m
embe
rshi
p. B
ut a
t the
end
of e
ach
repl
enis
hmen
t ne
gotia
tion
proc
ess,
und
erta
ken
once
eve
ry fo
ur
year
s, th
e ag
reem
ent b
etw
een
AD
B m
anag
emen
t an
d A
DF
dono
rs is
put
into
a re
port
calle
d th
e ‘D
onor
s’ R
epor
t.’ T
his
‘Don
ors’
Rep
ort’
is th
en
subm
itted
to th
e B
oard
mem
bers
for a
ppro
val.
Thus
maj
or d
ecis
ions
rega
rdin
g th
e A
DF
(e.g
., re
plen
ishm
ents
) and
indi
vidu
al A
DF
proj
ects
are
ul
timat
ely
appr
oved
by
the
full
set o
f AD
B m
embe
rs
via
thei
r Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s re
pres
enta
tives
.104
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
The
AD
B c
ondu
cts
‘Sta
ff En
gage
men
t Sur
veys
’ eve
ry tw
o ye
ars.
105 I
n re
spon
se to
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys, A
DB
Man
agem
ent
take
ste
ps to
add
ress
sta
ff di
ssat
isfa
ctio
n at
bot
h th
e in
stitu
tiona
l and
de
partm
ent l
evel
.
23Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
No
Evid
ence
.
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
In 2
006
the
AD
B re
leas
ed a
gui
de o
n st
reng
then
ing
stak
ehol
der e
ngag
emen
t, fo
cusi
ng o
n th
e pa
rtici
patio
n of
a d
iver
se ra
nge
of s
take
hold
ers
in th
e si
x st
ages
of t
he A
DB
Pro
ject
Cyc
le: 1
. Cou
ntry
Pro
gram
min
g; 2
. P
roje
ct P
roce
ssin
g; 3
. Ope
ratio
nal P
lann
ing;
4. I
mpl
emen
tatio
n, M
onito
ring
and
Rep
ortin
g; 5
. Sel
f-Ev
alua
tion;
an
d 6.
Pos
t-Ev
alua
tion.
Whe
n re
view
ing
a po
licy,
stra
tegy
or c
ount
ry p
rogr
amm
e, th
e A
DB
aim
s to
con
sult
with
sta
keho
lder
s to
iden
tify
who
has
inte
rest
s in
a g
iven
act
ivity
; det
erm
ine
stak
ehol
der g
roup
inte
rest
s;
capi
taliz
e on
sta
keho
lder
’s e
xper
ienc
e an
d ex
perti
se; g
ain
stak
ehol
der c
onse
nsus
on
proj
ects
; and
max
imiz
e tra
nspa
renc
y.10
6
In th
e m
ost r
ecen
t sur
vey,
thre
e-qu
arte
rs o
f sta
keho
lder
s ag
ree
that
the
AD
B is
doi
ng e
noug
h to
reac
h ou
t and
bu
ild p
artn
ersh
ips
with
the
priv
ate
sect
or, b
ut o
f priv
ate
sect
or re
spon
dent
s, th
at n
umbe
r is
only
one
-thi
rd.10
7
VIII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
lead
ersh
ip th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
Inte
rnal
: The
Com
plia
nce
Rev
iew
Pan
el (C
RP
), an
inte
rnal
wat
chdo
g of
the
AD
B, i
nves
tigat
es a
llege
d no
ncom
plia
nce
by th
e ba
nk in
its
oper
atio
n po
licie
s an
d pr
oced
ures
that
has
cau
sed,
or i
s lik
ely
to c
ause
, di
rect
mat
eria
l har
m to
pro
ject
-affe
cted
peo
ple.
It d
oes
not,
how
ever
, inv
estig
ate
borro
win
g co
untri
es, t
he
exec
utin
g ag
ency
or p
rivat
e se
ctor
clie
nts
unle
ss re
leva
nt to
acc
usat
ions
of n
onco
mpl
ianc
e. C
ompl
aint
s ca
n be
file
d vi
a th
e ‘A
ccou
ntab
ility
Mec
hani
sm’ b
ut m
ust b
e ex
pres
sed
in w
ritin
g an
d se
nt to
the
Com
plai
nts
Rec
eivi
ng O
ffice
r (C
RO
). Th
ere
are
two
addi
tiona
l lev
els
of in
tern
al e
valu
atio
n in
the
orga
niza
tion.
The
firs
t is
self-
eval
uatio
n, c
ondu
cted
by
thos
e re
spon
sibl
e fo
r ind
ivid
ual c
ount
ry s
trate
gies
, pro
gram
mes
or p
roje
cts.
The
se
cond
is in
depe
nden
t eva
luat
ion
cond
ucte
d by
the
Inde
pend
ent E
valu
atio
n D
epar
tmen
t (IE
D),
a m
embe
r of
the
Eval
uatio
n C
oope
ratio
n G
roup
of t
he M
ultil
ater
al D
evel
opm
ent B
anks
(EC
G).
The
IED
ope
rate
s ac
cord
ing
to s
tand
ards
of i
nsul
atio
n fro
m e
xter
nal i
nflue
nce
and
the
avoi
danc
e of
con
flict
s of
inte
rest
. IED
man
ager
s an
d ev
alua
tors
exc
lude
them
selv
es, f
or e
xam
ple,
from
eva
luat
ing
any
proj
ect/
prog
ram
me/
activ
ity/e
ntity
that
they
w
orke
d on
.108
Exte
rnal
: Don
ors
eval
uate
per
form
ance
dur
ing
the
regu
lar r
ound
s of
cap
ital r
eple
nish
men
t. Fu
rther
, a s
ubse
t of
don
ors
crea
ted
the
Mul
tilat
eral
Org
anis
atio
n P
erfo
rman
ce A
sses
smen
t Net
wor
k (M
OPA
N),
whi
ch re
gula
rly
cond
ucts
eva
luat
ion
revi
ews
of in
stitu
tions
(suc
h as
the
AD
B) t
o w
hich
sai
d do
nors
con
tribu
te fu
nds.
109 A
m
embe
r of t
he A
DB
’s to
p m
anag
emen
t not
ed v
ia in
terv
iew
that
som
e in
divi
dual
don
or c
ount
ries
have
beg
un
to c
ondu
ct re
gula
r ass
essm
ents
, citi
ng th
e U
nite
d K
ingd
om a
nd A
ustra
lia a
s th
e m
ost n
otab
le c
ases
. “Th
ey
wan
t to
incr
ease
the
volu
me
of th
eir d
evel
opm
ent a
ssis
tanc
e bu
t wan
t to
cont
ain
thei
r [ow
n] a
dmin
istra
tive
budg
et. T
he s
olut
ion
is to
cha
nnel
thei
r fun
ds th
roug
h in
tern
atio
nal o
rgan
izat
ions
like
us
[AD
B].
But
in o
rder
to
do th
at th
ey w
ant t
o ev
alua
te th
e pe
rform
ance
of i
nter
natio
nal o
rgan
izat
ions
, and
they
wan
t to
put t
heir
mon
ey
in o
rgan
izat
ions
they
thin
k ar
e do
ing
a go
od jo
b… W
e ar
e re
gula
rly s
ubje
ct to
suc
h as
sess
men
ts.”
The
re is
al
so th
e In
tern
atio
nal A
id T
rans
pare
ncy
Initi
ativ
e (IA
TI),
of w
hich
the
AD
B b
ecom
e a
mem
ber i
n 20
13.11
0
24 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
c. E
urop
ean
Ban
k fo
r R
econ
stru
ctio
n an
d D
evel
opm
ent (
EB
RD
)
Org
aniz
atio
nA
mul
tilat
eral
dev
elop
men
t ban
k, th
e EB
RD
use
s in
vest
men
t as
a to
ol to
hel
p bu
ild m
arke
t eco
nom
ies
in th
e re
gion
of o
pera
tions
stre
tchi
ng fr
om c
entra
l Eur
ope
to c
entra
l Asi
a, a
nd th
e so
uthe
rn a
nd e
aste
rn M
edite
rran
ean.
Gov
erna
nce
The
EBR
D’s
pre
side
nt re
ports
to a
boa
rd o
f gov
erno
rs a
nd d
irect
s an
exe
cutiv
e co
mm
ittee
that
ove
rsee
s th
e im
porta
nt a
spec
ts o
f stra
tegy
, per
form
ance
and
fin
anci
al a
naly
sis.
Whi
le th
e bo
ard
of g
over
nors
repr
esen
ts d
onor
nat
ions
, it
dele
gate
s m
ost o
f its
aut
horit
y to
the
boar
d of
dire
ctor
s. T
he b
ank
is o
rgan
ized
in
to s
even
ope
ratio
nal g
roup
s in
clud
ing
bank
ing,
fina
nce,
risk
and
pol
icy,
am
ong
othe
rs.
The
boar
d of
gov
erno
rs a
lso
appo
ints
or r
eapp
oint
s th
e pr
esid
ent.
Mos
t oth
er
pow
ers
are
devo
lved
to th
e bo
ard
of d
irect
ors,
whi
ch o
vers
ees
the
oper
atio
ns o
f th
e pr
esid
ent a
nd th
e ex
ecut
ive
com
mitt
ee (m
ade
up o
f the
hea
ds o
f the
maj
or
inte
rnal
ope
ratio
nal g
roup
s).
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Four
yea
rs a
nd re
new
able
, with
no
limit
on th
e nu
mbe
r of t
erm
s a
pres
iden
t can
ho
ld. T
he v
ice-
pres
iden
t has
a fi
ve-y
ear t
erm
.
Inco
me
€9.1
billi
on in
inve
stm
ents
wer
e m
ade
in 2
011.
Num
ber
of s
taff
App
roxi
mat
ely
1,70
0 on
per
man
ent c
ontra
cts,
with
1,2
50 a
t the
Lon
don
head
quar
ters
and
400
in c
ount
ry o
ffice
s. A
sig
nific
ant n
umbe
r of a
dditi
onal
em
ploy
ees
are
on te
mpo
rary
con
tract
s.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pEB
RD
pre
side
nts
have
typi
cally
ser
ved
four
-yea
r ter
ms;
onl
y Je
an L
emie
rre h
as s
erve
d th
e fu
ll ei
ght-
year
dou
ble
term
. Pas
t pre
side
nts
incl
ude
Jacq
ues
Atta
li (1
991-
1993
), Ja
cque
s de
Lar
osiè
re (1
993-
1998
), H
orst
Köh
ler (
1998
-200
0), J
ean
Lem
ierre
(200
0-20
08) a
nd T
hom
as M
irow
(200
8-20
12).
The
curre
nt p
resi
dent
, Sir
Sum
a C
hakr
abar
ti, w
as e
lect
ed in
201
2.
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryA
ll le
ader
s pr
ior t
o S
ir S
uma
wer
e ei
ther
Fre
nch
or G
erm
an, a
nd h
ad b
anki
ng
back
grou
nds.
Sir
Sum
a re
pres
ents
a c
hang
e in
em
phas
is, g
iven
his
ext
ensi
ve
expe
rienc
e in
man
agin
g la
rge
publ
ic-s
ecto
r org
aniz
atio
ns. H
e ha
s in
trodu
ced
a w
ide-
rang
ing
refo
rm p
rogr
amm
e to
impr
ove
orga
niza
tiona
l effi
cien
cy a
nd d
eliv
ery,
incl
udin
g a
shift
to g
reat
er tr
ansp
aren
cy in
hiri
ng e
xecu
tive
man
agem
ent,
and
grea
ter e
mph
asis
on
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent o
f sen
ior l
eade
rshi
p.
25Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
Ther
e ar
e no
term
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r the
Pre
side
nt’s
role
. Em
ploy
men
t co
ntra
ct is
pub
lishe
d on
line
incl
udin
g sa
lary
, ter
ms
of d
ism
issa
l. Th
ere
are
term
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r the
Vic
e P
resi
dent
s.B
oard
of G
over
nors
, Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s an
d P
resi
dent
’s ro
le is
laid
out
‘B
asic
Doc
umen
ts o
f EB
RD
’ in
som
e de
tail,
but
ther
e is
no
deta
iled
disc
ussi
on o
f any
oth
er ro
les.
111
They
are
con
side
ring
writ
ing
term
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r the
Pre
side
nt’s
role
in fu
ture
. Thi
s m
ost l
ikel
y w
ould
be
draf
ted
by s
enio
r EB
RD
sta
ff m
embe
r. Th
e P
rinci
pals
wou
ld d
eleg
ate
this
role
to th
e B
oard
of
Dire
ctor
s w
hom
pre
dom
inan
tly s
erve
nat
iona
l in
tere
sts.
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
Form
ally
, the
Boa
rd o
f Gov
erno
rs h
as ro
unds
of m
ajor
ity v
otin
g to
el
imin
ate
cand
idat
es a
nd d
eter
min
e th
e P
resi
dent
for 4
-yea
r ter
ms
(and
re-a
ppoi
ntm
ent t
erm
s).11
2
Sir
Sum
a C
hakr
abar
ti is
the
first
non
-Fre
nch
or
Ger
man
Pre
side
nt o
f the
Ban
k. T
radi
tiona
lly F
ranc
e an
d G
erm
any
agre
ed o
n th
e ca
ndid
ate.
How
ever
, in
the
mos
t las
t ele
ctio
n th
ere
was
a c
ompe
titiv
e pr
oces
s as
the
‘gen
tlem
en’s
agr
eem
ent’
brok
e do
wn.
113
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
nce
agai
nst t
he p
ublis
hed
crite
ria?
Pre
side
nt s
elec
tion
rem
ains
non
-exh
aust
ive
and
with
out a
cle
ar fo
rmal
pr
oces
s.A
t the
Vic
e P
resi
dent
ial l
evel
gre
ater
rigo
r has
bee
n in
trodu
ced
to th
e le
ader
ship
pro
cess
. The
re is
a c
lear
form
al p
roce
ss fo
r VP
leve
l lea
ders
th
at w
as e
ffect
ivel
y te
sted
for V
P C
FO, V
P C
AO
, VP
Ris
k, a
nd V
P
Pol
icy
as w
ell a
s th
e G
ener
al C
ouns
el. F
or e
xam
ple,
an
exha
ustiv
e,
pass
port-
blin
d in
terv
iew
sea
rch
of o
ver 8
50 a
pplic
ants
was
con
duct
ed
for V
P o
f ban
king
ope
ratio
ns (a
role
trad
ition
ally
hel
d by
an
Am
eric
an)
in 2
012.
.114
In th
e la
st e
lect
ion
the
role
was
adv
ertis
ed to
sh
areh
olde
rs, s
ever
al c
andi
date
s w
rote
man
ifest
os
to v
oter
s ou
tlini
ng th
eir v
isio
n fo
r the
Ban
k, a
nd fo
ur
of th
e fiv
e ga
ve in
terv
iew
s to
the
Cen
tre fo
r Glo
bal
Dev
elop
men
t, fo
llow
ed b
y he
arin
gs w
ith th
e EB
RD
B
oard
115 T
his
was
the
mos
t pub
licly
tran
spar
ent
elec
tion
proc
ess.
How
ever
it is
not
a c
odifi
ed
proc
ess.
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
ac
coun
tabi
lity
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
No
publ
icly
ava
ilabl
e ev
iden
ce.
Sir
Sum
a C
hakr
abat
i mad
e hi
s go
als
clea
r thr
ough
hi
s el
ectio
n M
anife
sto
to s
hare
hold
ers.
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er
trans
late
s ov
erar
chin
g go
als
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
No
evid
ence
. Th
e pe
rform
ance
obj
ectiv
es fo
r the
Exe
cutiv
e M
anag
emen
t are
pub
lishe
d on
the
intra
net a
nd
effe
ctiv
ely
refle
ct th
e P
resi
dent
’s g
oals
(tak
en a
s a
sum
). Th
ese
perfo
rman
ce o
bjec
tives
are
then
ca
scad
ed d
own
to th
e re
st o
f the
org
aniz
atio
n.Th
e st
rate
gic
plan
ning
cyc
le d
oes
not l
ink
to th
e pr
esid
entia
l ele
ctio
n cy
cle.
The
Ban
k ha
s a
five
year
“C
apita
l, R
esou
rces
, Rev
iew
”, w
hich
it m
ust d
eliv
er
on. H
owev
er, a
n in
com
ing
Pre
side
nt h
as li
mite
d fle
xibi
lity
to re
set t
hese
goa
ls a
nd a
dapt
to c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s.
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?D
iscl
osur
es o
f con
flict
of i
nter
est a
re m
anda
ted
unde
r the
form
al C
ode
of C
ondu
ct.
The
EBR
D h
as a
n an
nual
dis
clos
ure,
whi
ch is
sc
rutin
ized
by
the
chie
f com
plia
nce
offic
er, a
nd
ther
e is
a p
roce
dure
for f
ollo
w-u
p an
d en
forc
emen
t.
26 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?EB
RD
has
a d
efine
d fo
rmal
Cod
e of
Con
duct
(whi
ch w
as u
pdat
ed in
20
12) o
vers
een
by a
Chi
ef C
ompl
ianc
e O
ffice
r who
repo
rts d
irect
ly to
th
e P
resi
dent
. Res
pons
ible
for r
eput
atio
nal r
isks
and
sta
ff m
isbe
havi
our
and
over
seei
ng th
e P
roje
ct C
ompl
ianc
e M
echa
nism
.116
EBR
D p
ract
ices
are
som
etim
es s
trict
er th
an th
e fo
rmal
Cod
e of
Con
duct
as
it ca
n be
pol
itica
lly
sens
itive
for s
enio
r sta
ff to
be
non-
exec
utiv
e m
embe
rs o
f Boa
rds
in th
e pr
ivat
e or
cha
rity
sect
or
(eve
n if
offic
ially
they
may
be
able
to d
o so
). III
.Th
e le
ader
has
a d
efine
d pe
rfor
man
ce m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me
and
rece
ives
ann
ual f
eedb
ack
on p
erfo
rman
ce1
Is th
e le
ader
ship
sub
ject
ed to
ann
ual
perfo
rman
ce a
ppra
isal
?D
etai
ls a
bout
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent a
re n
ot o
utlin
ed o
nlin
e or
pu
blic
ly.
Ther
e is
no
form
al a
ppra
isal
of t
he P
resi
dent
. Thi
s w
ould
be
diffi
cult
for t
he B
oard
of D
irect
ors
or
Prin
cipa
ls’ t
o ca
rry
out a
s th
ey d
o no
t hav
e su
ffici
ent
info
rmat
ion
on th
e P
resi
dent
’s ro
le.11
7 2
Is re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
Ann
ual r
epor
t dis
cuss
es ‘r
ewar
ds a
nd b
enefi
ts’ d
esig
ned
to e
ncou
rage
su
perio
r per
form
ance
, but
it is
not
cle
ar w
heth
er th
e po
licy
incl
udes
le
ader
ship
.118
The
Pre
side
nt m
ust h
ave
Boa
rd a
ppro
val f
or a
n in
crea
se in
sal
ary.
119
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
EBR
D h
as a
lear
ning
and
dev
elop
men
t tea
m w
ho w
ork
clos
ely
with
th
e Ev
alua
tion
Dep
artm
ent (
EvD
) tea
m to
des
ign
prog
ram
mes
that
ad
dres
s ex
istin
g w
eakn
esse
s in
pro
gram
me
deliv
ery.
The
y do
not
fo
cus
on th
e P
resi
dent
.
The
Pre
side
nt a
nd o
ther
sen
ior m
anag
emen
t hav
e co
achi
ng a
vaila
ble
on re
ques
t. M
any
seni
or s
taff
have
per
sona
l coa
ches
.
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent c
riter
ia
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p in
th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
The
re-a
ppoi
ntm
ent p
roce
ss is
sim
ilar t
o th
e ap
poin
tmen
t pro
cess
in
that
the
Boa
rd o
f Gov
erno
rs re
quire
a m
ajor
ity v
ote,
but
freq
uent
ly
info
rmal
neg
otia
tions
prio
r to
the
form
al v
ote
are
deci
sive
.
No
as th
ere
is n
ot a
form
al p
erfo
rman
ce a
ppra
isal
of
the
Pre
side
nt.
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
The
EBR
D c
onsi
dere
d a
full
rang
e of
can
dida
tes
for r
e-ap
poin
tmen
t in
the
last
ele
ctio
n. F
or e
xam
ple,
Sir
Sum
a C
hakr
abar
ti w
as s
elec
ted
over
th
e in
cum
bent
Pre
side
nt in
201
2, T
hom
as M
irow
.
How
ever
, the
re is
no
codi
fied
rule
that
oth
er
cand
idat
es m
ust b
e co
nsid
ered
in th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s. It
is li
kely
that
the
next
ele
ctio
n w
ill al
so b
e op
en a
nd c
onte
sted
. 120
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
The
Pre
side
nt h
as a
utho
rity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies.
For
exa
mpl
e,
in c
onju
nctio
n w
ith B
oard
of G
over
nors
/ Dire
ctor
s, P
resi
dent
has
ex
pand
ed le
ndin
g to
Nor
th A
frica
n cl
ient
s as
the
need
to a
ssis
t the
m in
tra
nsiti
onin
g to
dem
ocra
cy a
nd fr
ee-m
arke
ts h
as e
mer
ged.
Due
to th
e m
ism
atch
bet
wee
n st
rate
gic
plan
ning
an
d th
e el
ectio
n cy
cle
it is
ext
rem
ely
diffi
cult
for t
he
Pre
side
nt to
ada
pt th
e EB
RD
’s s
trate
gic
prio
ritie
s. It
ca
n oc
cur i
n re
actio
n to
a m
ajor
cris
is s
uch
as th
e A
rab
Spr
ing.
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
Yes.
The
Pre
side
nt c
arrie
s ou
t stru
ctur
al re
form
s to
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew s
trate
gic
prio
ritie
s an
d ev
olve
afte
r the
glo
bal
finan
cial
cris
is a
nd th
e co
ntin
uing
gre
at re
cess
ion.
For i
nsta
nce,
the
Pre
side
nt h
as d
evel
oped
a n
ew p
olic
y ro
le th
at th
e B
oard
app
rove
d as
wel
l as
a ne
w C
orpo
rate
Lea
ders
hip
Gro
up. I
n ad
ditio
n, th
e P
resi
dent
has
dev
elop
ed 1
2 in
tern
al ta
skfo
rces
to re
view
in
tern
al p
roce
sses
and
stru
ctur
es. A
new
pol
icy
oper
atio
nal g
roup
has
al
so b
een
crea
ted
to b
ette
r con
vey
the
EBR
D’s
pol
icy
expe
rtise
to
clie
nt c
ount
ries.
Ther
e is
no
budg
et fo
r spe
cial
initi
ativ
es.
Furth
erm
ore
the
Boa
rd c
ontro
l the
bud
get,
sala
ry
of s
taff
and
tota
l num
ber o
f fixe
d em
ploy
ees.
Thi
s m
akes
it e
xtre
mel
y di
fficu
lt fo
r the
Pre
side
nt to
mak
e st
rate
gic
chan
ges
with
exi
stin
g st
aff a
s th
e EB
RD
is
only
abl
e to
hire
sta
ff on
sho
rt-te
rm c
ontra
cts.
27Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
The
EBR
D fe
atur
es 1
7 S
peci
al F
unds
ear
mar
ked
by s
peci
fic p
roje
ct
type
and
/or g
eogr
aphi
c ar
ea a
nd fu
nded
by
subs
ets
of d
onor
s (to
tallin
g €8
27 m
illion
in 2
011,
equ
ival
ent t
o 9%
of t
he €
9.1
billio
n in
tota
l com
mitm
ents
). In
add
ition
to th
ese
fund
s, th
e EB
RD
runs
a
num
ber o
f bila
tera
l and
mul
tilat
eral
tech
nica
l ass
ista
nce
fund
s in
the
Sou
ther
n an
d M
edite
rran
ean
(SEM
ED) r
egio
n, to
tallin
g €2
.574
billi
on in
20
11.12
1
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
The
EB
RD
has
shi
fted
from
sur
veys
eve
ry 3
yea
rs to
ann
ually
.122
Thes
e su
rvey
s ha
ve b
een
used
.
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
No
evid
ence
. Th
e P
resi
dent
is n
ot fo
rmal
ly a
sses
sed
on th
is (o
r an
ythi
ng e
lse)
, how
ever
Sir
Sum
a C
hakr
abat
i has
de
dica
ted
time
to m
ento
ring
seni
or s
taff.
VI
I.M
O/IO
has
stru
ctur
es th
at e
ncou
rage
lead
ersh
ip to
eng
age
with
div
erse
ran
ge o
f sta
keho
lder
sTh
e EB
RD
has
a C
ivil
Soc
iety
Pro
gram
me
whe
re e
xecu
tive
man
ager
s sp
end
two
days
with
civ
il so
ciet
y gr
oups
to g
arne
r fee
dbac
k on
EB
RD
per
form
ance
. It a
lso
cond
ucts
a b
usin
ess
foru
m w
here
the
Pre
side
nt
and
Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s in
tera
ct w
ith b
usin
ess
lead
ers.
In 2
012
the
EBR
D s
igni
fican
tly e
nhan
ced
its c
ivil
soci
ety
initi
ativ
es. T
he E
BR
D M
inin
g O
pera
tions
Pol
icy
was
impl
emen
ted
that
yea
r in
cons
ulta
tion
with
mor
e th
an 1
,500
org
aniz
atio
ns in
clud
ing
min
ing
com
pani
es, c
ivil
soci
ety
grou
ps a
nd a
cade
mic
s. F
urth
er, P
hase
3
of th
e S
usta
inab
le E
nerg
y In
itiat
ive
(SEI
) was
laun
ched
, with
con
sulta
tive
mee
tings
in G
eorg
ia, K
azak
hsta
n,
Rus
sia,
Tur
key
and
Ukr
aine
. The
EB
RD
als
o re
view
ed it
s po
litic
al m
etho
dolo
gy in
201
2, h
oldi
ng w
orks
hops
in
Lond
on, S
tanf
ord,
Bel
grad
e, M
osco
w a
nd C
airo
. Acc
ordi
ng to
its
2013
pro
spec
tus,
the
EBR
D a
lso
plan
ned
on re
view
ing
thre
e po
licie
s la
st y
ear i
n co
nsul
tatio
n w
ith c
ivil
soci
ety
grou
ps a
nd a
wid
e va
riety
of o
ther
st
akeh
olde
rs: t
he 2
009
Pro
ject
Com
plai
nt M
echa
nism
Rul
es o
f Pro
cedu
re, t
he 2
008
Envi
ronm
enta
l and
Soc
ial
Pol
icy,
and
the
2011
Pub
lic In
form
atio
n P
olic
y.12
3 VI
II.M
O/IO
has
stru
ctur
es th
at e
ngag
e le
ader
ship
thor
ough
ly w
ith in
tern
al/e
xter
nal e
valu
atio
nsEB
RD
has
a d
efine
d Ev
alua
tion
Pol
icy
that
has
regu
larly
bee
n up
date
d si
nce
1992
(EB
RD
Eva
luat
ion
Pol
icy,
20
13).
EBR
D h
as a
n Ev
alua
tion
Dep
artm
ent (
EvD
) whi
ch re
ports
to a
Chi
ef E
valu
ator
whi
ch is
par
t of a
co
mpl
emen
tary
web
of i
nstru
men
ts –
e.g
. wor
k pr
ogra
mm
es a
nd b
udge
ts, r
esul
ts fr
amew
orks
, per
form
ance
sc
orec
ards
, etc
. The
eva
luat
ion
team
repo
rts d
irect
ly to
the
Boa
rd o
f Dire
ctor
s. In
add
ition
, the
Chi
ef
Com
plia
nce
Offi
cer r
epor
ts d
irect
ly to
the
Pre
side
nt, a
s do
es th
e in
tern
al a
udit
team
. The
Vic
e-P
resi
dent
for
Ris
k al
so s
its o
n th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Com
mitt
ee.
EBR
D a
lso
feat
ured
in th
e 20
06 M
ultil
ater
al D
evel
opm
ent B
ank
(MD
B) C
omm
on P
erfo
rman
ce A
sses
smen
t (C
OM
PAS
) rep
ort,
whe
re M
DB
s jo
intly
pub
lish
info
rmat
ion
on h
ow th
ey c
ondu
ct b
usin
ess
and
orga
nize
th
emse
lves
to e
nsur
e th
at th
eir o
pera
tions
are
gea
red
tow
ards
resu
lts.12
4
28 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
d. In
ter-
Am
eric
an D
evel
opm
ent B
ank
(IDB
)
Org
aniz
atio
n Fo
unde
d in
195
9 as
a p
artn
ersh
ip b
etw
een
Latin
Am
eric
an c
ount
ries
and
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
the
IDB
sup
ports
clie
nt g
over
nmen
ts, p
rivat
e en
titie
s an
d no
n-pr
ofit s
ecto
rs w
ith c
apita
l for
dev
elop
men
t ope
ratio
ns. T
he In
ter-
Am
eric
an
Dev
elop
men
t Ban
k G
roup
(IA
DB
) is
com
pose
d of
the
IDB
, the
Inte
r-A
mer
ican
In
vest
men
t Cor
pora
tion
(IIC
) and
the
Mul
tilat
eral
Inve
stm
ent F
und
(MIF
), th
e la
tter
bein
g ad
min
iste
red
by th
e ID
B. T
he g
roup
is h
eadq
uarte
red
in th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s (W
ashi
ngto
n D
C).
Gov
erna
nce
The
IAD
B is
hea
ded
by a
boa
rd o
f gov
erno
rs, w
hich
del
egat
es o
vers
ight
of b
ank
oper
atio
ns to
a b
oard
of e
xecu
tive
dire
ctor
s (re
pres
enta
tives
from
48
coun
tries
). Th
e m
anag
emen
t tea
m ru
ns d
ay-t
o-da
y op
erat
ions
. Ele
cted
by
the
boar
d of
go
vern
ors,
the
pres
iden
t cha
irs th
e m
eetin
gs o
f the
boa
rd o
f exe
cutiv
e di
rect
ors,
bu
t has
no
vote
.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Five
yea
rs; c
an b
e re
-ele
cted
.
Inco
me
$11.
4 bi
llion
in le
ndin
g w
as a
ppro
ved
in 2
012.
The
sub
scrib
ed c
apita
l to
the
IDB
, af
ter t
he n
inth
gen
eral
cap
ital i
ncre
ase,
will
amou
nt to
$17
0.9
billio
n.
Num
ber
of s
taff
Abo
ut 2
,000
.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
p Th
e th
ree
prio
r pre
side
nts
serv
ed s
ever
al te
rms:
Fel
ipe
Her
rera
(fro
m C
hile
, 196
0-19
71);
Ant
onio
Orti
z M
ena
(Mex
ico,
197
1-19
88) a
nd E
nriq
ue V
. Igl
esia
s (U
rugu
ay,
1988
-200
5).
The
curre
nt p
resi
dent
, Lui
s A
lber
to M
oren
o (C
olom
bia;
200
5-pr
esen
t), h
as a
lso
serv
ed m
ore
than
one
term
.
In th
e 19
70 e
lect
ions
, bot
h A
rgen
tina
and
Vene
zuel
a no
min
ated
diff
eren
t ca
ndid
ates
, but
on
27 N
ovem
ber,
Orti
z re
ceiv
ed th
e m
ajor
ity o
f vot
es. D
avid
M.
Ken
nedy
, US
sec
reta
ry o
f the
trea
sury
, rep
orte
d to
Pre
side
nt R
icha
rd N
ixon
that
the
elec
tion
had
been
“co
nten
tious
”.12
5
The
And
ean
Dev
elop
men
t Cor
pora
tion
(CA
F) fu
nded
mor
e La
tin A
mer
ican
in
frast
ruct
ure
proj
ects
in 2
012
than
the
IAD
B a
nd W
orld
Ban
k co
mbi
ned.
126
Acc
ordi
ng to
Hum
phre
y an
d M
icha
elow
a (2
013)
, the
attr
activ
enes
s of
CA
F vi
s-à-
vis
the
IAD
B is
its
fast
pro
cess
ing
times
and
low
soc
ieta
l and
env
ironm
enta
l sta
ndar
ds.
Suc
h ad
vant
ages
, the
aut
hors
arg
ue, a
re p
erha
ps m
ade
poss
ible
by
CA
F’s
lack
of
non-
regi
onal
mem
bers
.127
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryS
ince
Mor
eno
assu
med
the
pres
iden
cy in
Oct
ober
200
5, th
e ba
nk h
as u
nder
gone
a
maj
or re
shap
ing
of it
s or
gani
zatio
nal s
truct
ure,
and
has
est
ablis
hed
a re
form
age
nda
linke
d to
the
nint
h ge
nera
l inc
reas
e in
reso
urce
s m
anda
te.
29Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
sO
ther
fact
ors
I. Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
No.
The
Cha
irman
sub
mits
the
term
s of
the
cont
ract
for e
mpl
oym
ent
for t
he P
resi
dent
to th
e B
oard
of G
over
nors
in a
con
fiden
tial m
anne
r.128
Som
e ob
serv
ers
cele
brat
e th
e IA
DB
’s g
over
nanc
e st
ruct
ure,
arg
uing
that
it b
ette
r pre
serv
es th
e in
tere
sts
of re
gion
al m
embe
rs th
an o
ther
mul
tilat
eral
in
stitu
tions
. Nan
cy B
irdsa
ll (2
014)
, for
exa
mpl
e,
note
s th
at in
the
IAD
B re
gion
al m
embe
rs h
old
a m
ajor
ity o
f the
vot
ing
pow
er, w
here
as n
on-
borro
win
g m
embe
rs c
olle
ctiv
ely
hold
a m
ajor
ity in
th
e W
orld
Ban
k.12
9 Num
erou
s au
thor
s ha
ve w
arne
d,
how
ever
, tha
t vot
ing
wei
ght i
s an
insu
ffici
ent
mea
sure
of p
ower
and
influ
ence
with
in a
n or
gani
zatio
n (S
chot
ter 1
981;
Hos
li 19
96).13
0 Stra
nd
(200
3), e
mpl
oyin
g th
e Jo
hnst
on v
otin
g po
wer
inde
x,
calc
ulat
es th
e ac
tual
dis
tribu
tion
of v
otin
g po
wer
in
the
IAD
B b
ased
on
indi
vidu
al c
ount
ries’
vot
ing
pow
er w
ithin
coa
litio
n gr
oups
and
the
pow
er o
f the
co
aliti
on g
roup
itse
lf. A
ccor
ding
to th
is c
alcu
latio
n,
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
hold
s 80
% o
f vot
ing
pow
er w
ithin
th
e IA
DB
.131 F
urth
er, a
s B
irdsa
ll (2
014)
not
es h
erse
lf,
the
US
, via
its
de fa
cto
veto
pow
er, c
ontro
ls th
e se
lect
ion
of th
e IA
DB
’s E
xecu
tive
Vice
-Pre
side
nt
(EVP
). Th
is is
sig
nific
ant g
iven
that
the
EVP
cha
irs
the
Loan
Com
mitt
ee th
at m
ust a
ppro
ve a
ny p
roje
ct
befo
re it
reac
hes
the
Boa
rd o
f Gov
erno
rs fo
r fina
l ap
prov
al.13
2
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip e
lect
ion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
Full
mem
bers
hip.
(a) E
ach
Gov
erno
r can
nom
inat
e a
cand
idat
e. (b
) Ea
ch m
embe
r cou
ntry
has
equ
al a
mou
nt o
f vot
es (1
35) p
lus
one
vote
fo
r eac
h sh
are
of o
rdin
ary
capi
tal (
OC
) sto
ck o
f the
Ban
k. T
he m
ajor
ity
of to
tal v
otin
g po
wer
of m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s el
ects
the
Pre
side
nt,
incl
udin
g an
abs
olut
e m
ajor
ity o
f gov
erno
rs o
f reg
iona
l mem
bers
.133
Votin
g po
wer
am
ong
mem
ber c
ount
ries
of th
e ID
B is
as
follo
ws:
Lat
in
Am
eric
an a
nd th
e C
arib
bean
hav
e 50
.015
%, U
nite
d S
tate
s 30
.006
%,
Can
ada
4.00
1% a
nd th
e no
n-re
gion
al m
embe
rs 1
5.97
9%.
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p el
ectio
n th
at w
eigh
s co
mpe
tenc
e ag
ains
t the
pub
lishe
d cr
iteria
?
Yes.
The
com
preh
ensi
ve s
et o
f reg
ulat
ions
134 t
oget
her w
ith th
e ag
reem
ent e
stab
lishi
ng th
e B
ank13
5 is
publ
ishe
d on
line.
30 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es a
ccou
ntab
ility
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
The
IDB
has
a s
erie
s of
stra
tegi
es to
ach
ieve
its
inst
itutio
nal
man
date
s.13
6
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er tr
ansl
ates
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls o
f or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
It is
unc
lear
if th
ere
is a
spe
cific
, for
mal
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
Pre
side
nt
do s
o. H
owev
er, P
resi
dent
Lui
s M
oren
o di
d re
leas
e a
five-
year
pla
n tit
led
Bui
ldin
g O
ppor
tuni
ty fo
r the
Maj
ority
in 2
006
that
list
s a
num
ber
of s
peci
fic s
trate
gies
and
goa
ls fo
r the
200
7-20
12 p
erio
d.13
7
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Ye
s. A
ll ID
B e
mpl
oyee
s m
ust d
iscl
ose
confl
ict o
f int
eres
ts to
pre
vent
th
e si
tuat
ion
from
esc
alat
ing
into
an
alle
gatio
n of
Mis
cond
uct.13
8
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?Ye
s. A
ll ID
B e
mpl
oyee
s ad
here
to s
trict
eth
ical
sta
ndar
ds la
id o
ut in
th
e 20
12 C
ode
of E
thic
s an
d P
rofe
ssio
nal C
ondu
ct.13
9 The
Boa
rd o
f Ex
ecut
ive
Dire
ctor
s is
sub
ject
to it
s ow
n C
ode.
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
er s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
No
evid
ence
.
2Is
rem
uner
atio
n or
ben
efits
tied
to
the
outc
omes
of t
he p
erfo
rman
ce
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e?
No.
As
of D
ecem
ber 2
012,
the
Pre
side
nt h
as a
fixe
d sa
lary
of
$440
,798
(doe
s no
t inc
lude
Exe
cutiv
e A
llow
ance
of $
78,8
89).1 4
0
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
No
evid
ence
.
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent
crite
ria c
onsi
dere
d by
the
full
mem
bers
hip
in th
e re
-app
oint
men
t pr
oces
s?
No
evid
ence
.
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
No
evid
ence
.
31Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
The
Pre
side
nt m
akes
pro
posa
ls o
n th
e ge
nera
l pol
icy
of th
e B
ank
for
cons
ider
atio
n by
the
Boa
rd.
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
No
evid
ence
.
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
Of t
he 2
012
tota
l app
rova
ls, $
10.8
billi
on w
as fr
om th
e O
rdin
ary
Cap
ital (
OC
), $3
20 m
illion
from
the
Fund
for S
peci
al O
pera
tions
(FS
O)
(bef
ore
1965
was
cal
led
Soc
ial P
rogr
ess
Trus
t Fun
d).14
1 Con
tribu
tions
to
the
FSO
are
mad
e in
the
form
of n
on-n
egot
iabl
e, n
on-in
tere
st
bear
ing
dem
and
oblig
atio
ns in
lieu
of t
he im
med
iate
pay
men
t of a
ll or
an
y pa
rt of
a m
embe
r’s c
ontri
butio
ns q
uota
s.
The
Boa
rd a
lloca
tes
the
reso
urce
s.14
2 (S
teph
en D
. Kra
sner
writ
es th
at
for t
he F
SO
act
iviti
es v
otin
g, th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s ha
ve a
blo
ckin
g ve
to.)14
3
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
Wor
king
on
the
Hum
an C
apita
l Stra
tegy
(201
1),14
4 a b
road
con
sulta
tion
proc
ess
was
und
erta
ken
by M
anag
emen
t to
iden
tify
the
key
chal
leng
es
perc
eive
d by
sta
ff th
roug
h an
ele
ctro
nic
surv
ey s
ent o
ut to
500
em
ploy
ees.
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
No
evid
ence
.
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge m
anag
emen
t to
enga
ge w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
Mos
t im
porta
ntly
, civ
il so
ciet
y or
gani
zatio
ns (C
SO
s) m
ay a
lso
be e
ligib
le to
rece
ive
finan
cing
from
the
Ban
k.A
lso,
acc
ordi
ng to
the
Stra
tegy
for P
rom
otin
g C
itize
n P
artic
ipat
ion
in B
ank
Act
iviti
es (2
004)
,145 T
here
are
four
ar
eas
of B
ank
activ
ity in
whi
ch c
itize
n pa
rtici
patio
n ca
n be
sys
tem
atic
ally
inco
rpor
ated
: (i)
Ban
k in
put i
nto
the
shap
ing
of c
ount
ry d
evel
opm
ent p
olic
ies,
pla
ns a
nd a
gend
as; (
ii) se
ctor
stra
tegy
and
cou
ntry
stra
tegy
fo
rmul
atio
n, (i
ii) pr
ojec
t pre
para
tion
and
impl
emen
tatio
n, a
nd (i
v) e
valu
atio
n of
Ban
k ac
tiviti
es. T
here
are
ann
ual
CS
O m
eetin
gs a
nd C
SO
Con
sulti
ng G
roup
s fu
nctio
ning
thro
ugh
the
year
. VI
II.M
O/IO
has
stru
ctur
es th
at e
ngag
e ex
ecut
ive
man
agem
ent t
horo
ughl
y w
ith in
tern
al/e
xter
nal e
valu
atio
nsEv
alua
tion
at th
e ID
B is
a s
hare
d re
spon
sibi
lity
betw
een
man
agem
ent a
nd th
e O
ffice
of E
valu
atio
n an
d O
vers
ight
(OVE
). M
anag
emen
t foc
uses
on
proj
ect e
valu
atio
ns a
nd m
onito
ring
portf
olio
per
form
ance
. OVE
is in
depe
nden
t of
man
agem
ent a
nd a
nsw
ers
to th
e B
oard
of E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
s. It
s ac
tiviti
es in
clud
e en
surin
g th
at s
trate
gies
, po
licie
s an
d pr
ogra
mm
es c
ompl
y w
ith th
e ID
B’s
obj
ectiv
es a
nd m
anda
tes.
OVE
ove
rsee
s th
e B
ank’
s in
tern
al
mon
itorin
g m
echa
nism
s an
d co
nduc
ts e
x-po
st p
roje
ct e
valu
atio
ns.
OVE
has
org
aniz
atio
nal a
nd b
ehav
iour
al in
depe
nden
ce, a
nd is
free
from
ext
erna
l pre
ssur
e an
d co
nflic
ts
of in
tere
st a
ccor
ding
to th
e cr
iteria
est
ablis
hed
by th
e Ev
alua
tion
Coo
pera
tion
Gro
up o
f the
Mul
tilat
eral
D
evel
opm
ent B
anks
(EC
G),
of w
hich
the
IDB
is a
foun
ding
mem
ber.
32 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
e. In
tern
atio
nal M
onet
ary
Fund
(IM
F)
Org
aniz
atio
n Es
tabl
ishe
d af
ter t
he S
econ
d W
orld
War
as
part
of th
e in
tern
atio
nal e
cono
mic
in
frast
ruct
ure
agre
ed a
t Bre
tton
Woo
ds (U
nite
d S
tate
s), t
he IM
F is
com
mitt
ed to
pr
omot
ing
inte
rnat
iona
l mon
etar
y co
oper
atio
n an
d hi
gh le
vels
of e
mpl
oym
ent a
nd
inco
me,
as
wel
l as
faci
litat
ing
inte
rnat
iona
l tra
de.14
6
Gov
erna
nce
The
boar
d of
gov
erno
rs is
the
IMF’
s hi
ghes
t dec
isio
n-m
akin
g bo
dy. I
t con
sist
s of
one
gov
erno
r and
one
alte
rnat
e go
vern
or fo
r eac
h of
the
188
mem
ber
coun
tries
. The
gov
erno
rs, a
ppoi
nted
by
thei
r res
pect
ive
mem
ber c
ount
ries,
ar
e us
ually
min
iste
rs o
f fina
nce
or th
e he
ads
of th
eir c
ount
ries’
cen
tral b
ank.
Th
e bo
ard
reta
ins
the
right
to a
ppro
ve q
uota
incr
ease
s, th
e ad
mitt
ance
of n
ew
mem
bers
, com
puls
ory
with
draw
al o
f mem
bers
, and
am
endm
ents
to th
e A
rticl
es
of A
gree
men
t and
By-
Law
s. T
he b
oard
is a
dvis
ed b
y tw
o m
inis
teria
l com
mitt
ees:
th
e In
tern
atio
nal M
onet
ary
and
Fina
ncia
l Com
mitt
ee (I
MFC
) and
the
Dev
elop
men
t C
omm
ittee
.
The
exec
utiv
e bo
ard
cons
ists
of 2
4 ex
ecut
ive
dire
ctor
s re
pres
entin
g al
l 188
m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s, a
nd c
ondu
cts
the
IMF’
s bu
sine
ss. C
urre
ntly
, the
five
larg
est
quot
a co
ntrib
utor
s ap
poin
t the
ir ow
n ex
ecut
ive
dire
ctor
, and
the
othe
r cou
ntrie
s el
ect a
n ex
ecut
ive
dire
ctor
bas
ed o
n co
nstit
uenc
ies.
Und
er th
e qu
ota
and
gove
rnan
ce re
form
s, a
dopt
ed in
201
0 bu
t not
yet
in fo
rce,
all
24 e
xecu
tive
dire
ctor
s w
ould
be
elec
ted
by m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s, m
akin
g th
e IM
F th
e on
ly
inte
rnat
iona
l ins
titut
ion
with
an
all-e
lect
ed b
oard
.147
The
IMF
is le
d by
the
man
agin
g di
rect
or (M
D),
who
is th
e he
ad o
f sta
ff an
d ch
airm
an o
f the
exe
cutiv
e bo
ard.
The
MD
is a
ssis
ted
by a
firs
t dep
uty
man
agin
g di
rect
or a
nd th
ree
depu
ty m
anag
ing
dire
ctor
s. T
he m
anag
emen
t tea
m o
vers
ees
the
staf
f and
mai
ntai
ns h
igh-
leve
l con
tact
with
mem
ber c
ount
ries,
priv
ate-
sect
or
orga
niza
tions
, the
med
ia, c
ivil
soci
ety
orga
niza
tions
, thi
nk ta
nks,
aca
dem
ia a
nd
othe
r ins
titut
ions
.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
A re
new
able
five
-yea
r ter
m.
Tota
l quo
tas
$360
billi
on, a
s of
Mar
ch 2
013.
Num
ber
of s
taff
App
roxi
mat
ely
2,70
0.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pLe
ader
ship
recr
uitm
ent a
t the
IMF
and
Wor
ld B
ank
has
deal
t with
the
natio
nalit
y pr
inci
ple
– a
long
stan
ding
con
vent
ion
by w
hich
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
and
Euro
pe
divi
de m
anag
emen
t of t
he re
spec
tive
orga
niza
tions
. The
IMF’
s M
D is
sel
ecte
d by
its
exe
cutiv
e bo
ard,
whi
ch a
lso
appr
oves
the
MD
’s c
ontra
ct. A
gov
erno
r or a
n ex
ecut
ive
dire
ctor
may
nom
inat
e ca
ndid
ates
with
out r
egar
d to
thei
r nat
iona
lity,
al
thou
gh a
ll M
Ds
have
bee
n Eu
rope
an: C
amille
Gut
t (fro
m B
elgi
um, 1
946-
1951
); Iv
ar R
ooth
(Sw
eden
, 195
1-19
56);
Per
Jac
obss
on (S
wed
en, 1
956-
1963
); P
ierre
-Pau
l S
chw
eitz
er (F
ranc
e, 1
963-
1973
); H
. Joh
anne
s W
ittev
een
(Net
herla
nds,
197
3-19
78);
Jacq
ues
de L
aros
ière
(Fra
nce,
197
8-19
87);
Mic
hel C
amde
ssus
(Fra
nce,
198
7-20
00);
Hor
st K
öhle
r (G
erm
any,
200
0-20
04);
Rod
rigo
de R
ato
(Spa
in, 2
004-
2007
) an
d D
omin
ique
Stra
uss-
Kah
n (F
ranc
e, 2
007-
2011
).
The
IMF’
s cu
rrent
lead
er, C
hris
tine
Laga
rde
(Fra
nce,
201
1-pr
esen
t), is
als
o its
firs
t fe
mal
e M
D.
The
MD
pos
ition
has
bee
n ac
com
pani
ed b
y its
sha
re o
f con
trove
rsy.
In 2
000,
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
chal
leng
ed th
e G
erm
an n
omin
atio
n of
Cai
o K
och-
Wes
er, t
here
by
trigg
erin
g co
nflic
t: Ja
pan
and
deve
lopi
ng c
ount
ries
sign
alle
d th
at th
e co
nven
tion
was
to b
e ca
lled
into
que
stio
n (la
ck o
f tra
nspa
renc
y an
d de
lays
in a
ppoi
ntm
ent
have
bee
n cl
osel
y re
late
d to
the
conv
entio
n). L
ater
, in
2007
, Rod
rigo
de R
ato’
s re
sign
atio
n ha
lfway
thro
ugh
his
term
due
to p
erso
nal r
easo
ns s
hock
ed th
e or
gani
zatio
n. A
nd h
is s
ucce
ssor
, Dom
inqu
e S
traus
s-K
ahn,
resi
gned
in M
ay 2
011
afte
r bei
ng a
rrest
ed.
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryIt
is w
idel
y re
cogn
ized
tha
t, to
be
effe
ctiv
e, t
he I
MF
gove
rnan
ce s
truct
ure
mus
t re
pres
ent
the
inte
rest
s of
all
its m
embe
rs a
nd r
eflec
t th
e cu
rrent
wor
ld e
cono
my.
Th
is w
as s
een
in th
e 20
06 re
form
s, w
hich
incl
uded
wid
e-ra
ngin
g qu
ota
real
ignm
ents
(in
crea
sing
the
votin
g po
wer
of d
ynam
ic e
mer
ging
-mar
ket c
ount
ries,
con
sist
ent w
ith
thei
r gro
win
g re
lativ
e im
porta
nce
in th
e w
orld
eco
nom
y), a
sig
nific
ant i
ncre
ase
in b
asic
vo
tes
and
a ch
ange
in h
ow th
ey a
re d
eter
min
ed, t
o pr
otec
t the
vot
ing
pow
er o
f sm
all
and
low
-inco
me
coun
tries
.
33Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
rsP
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
Yes.
Ter
ms
of A
ppoi
ntm
ent f
or C
hris
tine
Laga
rde
wer
e pu
blis
hed
on
July
5, 2
011
in fo
rm o
f a p
ress
rele
ase.
148
The
Fund
’s A
rticl
es o
f Agr
eem
ent a
nd B
y-La
ws
offe
r sta
ndar
dize
d jo
b de
scrip
tion
for E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
s.14
9 The
re a
re a
lso
com
plet
e TO
Rs
for t
he e
thic
s ad
vise
r,150 t
he o
mbu
dspe
rson
,151 a
nd th
e In
depe
nden
t Ev
alua
tion
Offi
ce.15
2
Bef
ore
2007
ther
e w
as n
o st
atem
ent o
f the
qu
aliti
es, e
xper
tise
and
expe
rienc
e th
at c
andi
date
s sh
ould
hav
e. T
he p
roce
ss im
prov
emen
ts s
tarte
d w
ith th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd s
ettin
g ou
t a ti
met
able
and
in
vitin
g no
min
atio
ns fr
om E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
s fo
r the
po
st o
f MD
, and
inte
rvie
win
g th
ose
who
app
lied.
153
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
The
entir
e m
embe
rshi
p. A
ny IM
F m
embe
r, th
roug
h its
Gov
erno
r or
Exec
utiv
e D
irect
or, c
an n
omin
ate
a ca
ndid
ate
for t
he p
ost o
f Man
agin
g D
irect
or. A
ccor
ding
to th
e qu
ota
form
ula,
“th
e to
tal v
otes
of e
ach
mem
ber s
hall
be e
qual
to th
e su
m o
f its
bas
ic v
otes
and
its
quot
a-ba
sed
vote
s”.15
4 In
Dec
embe
r 201
0, th
e B
oard
of G
over
nors
app
rove
d a
quot
a an
d go
vern
ance
refo
rm th
at is
to s
hift
mor
e th
an 6
% o
f quo
ta
shar
es to
em
ergi
ng m
arke
t and
pro
tect
the
quot
a sh
ares
and
vot
ing
pow
er o
f the
poo
rest
mem
bers
.155
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
nce
agai
nst t
he p
ublis
hed
crite
ria?
Yes.
The
pro
cess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
is p
art o
f the
foun
ding
A
rticl
es o
f Agr
eem
ent o
f the
Inte
rnat
iona
l Mon
etar
y Fu
nd a
nd is
pu
blic
ally
ava
ilabl
e.15
6 The
pro
cedu
res
and
timet
able
for 2
011
sele
ctio
n of
the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or w
ere
publ
ishe
d th
roug
h a
serie
s of
pre
ss
rele
ases
.157
Ther
e is
a n
omin
atio
n pe
riod,
follo
wed
by
shor
tlist
ing
of c
andi
date
s (in
cas
e th
ere
are
mor
e th
an th
ree)
by
a m
ajor
ity o
f vot
es c
ast b
y th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd. O
nce
the
shor
tlist
is p
ublis
hed
24 E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
s in
terv
iew
eac
h ca
ndid
ate.
Th
e ca
ndid
ates
then
mak
e st
atem
ents
to th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd (w
hich
are
pub
lishe
d), f
ollo
win
g by
a Q
&A s
essi
on. T
he B
oard
then
mak
es th
e fin
al
sele
ctio
n tra
ditio
nally
bas
ed o
n co
nsen
sus
(alth
ough
a
maj
ority
of v
otes
cas
t is
form
ally
requ
ired)
. The
se
lect
ed c
andi
date
is n
otifi
ed a
nd a
nnou
nced
pu
blic
ly, i
nclu
ding
the
hirin
g co
ntra
ct.
II.
The
lead
er h
as c
lear p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
ac
coun
tabi
lity
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
Yes.
The
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
of m
anag
emen
t of t
he o
rgan
izat
ion
are
divi
ded
betw
een
the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or a
nd fo
ur D
eput
y M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
s (D
MD
s). E
ach
DM
D h
as a
pur
view
of c
ount
ries
and
subj
ect m
atte
rs fo
r w
hich
he/
she
is re
spon
sibl
e an
d ty
pica
lly o
vers
ees
the
inte
rnal
revi
ew
proc
ess
for e
ach
Boa
rd p
aper
and
cha
irs re
late
d B
oard
mee
tings
. In
addi
tion
to th
e co
untri
es a
nd s
ubje
cts
unde
r his
/her
pur
view
, the
Firs
t D
eput
y M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
is re
spon
sibl
e fo
r all
issu
es th
at a
re n
ot in
th
e pu
rvie
w o
f the
oth
er D
MD
s an
d as
sist
s th
e M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
in
the
com
preh
ensi
ve o
vers
ight
of t
he in
stitu
tion.
The
Boa
rd a
lso
sets
ob
ject
ives
for a
sses
sing
the
perfo
rman
ce o
f the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or
(and
DM
Ds)
, and
suc
h as
sess
men
t tak
es p
lace
ann
ually
.
Com
mitm
ents
are
som
etim
es m
ade
unof
ficia
lly a
nd
befo
re th
e se
lect
ion
is m
ade.
For
exa
mpl
e, J
acqu
es
de L
aros
ière
com
mitt
ed to
cha
ir th
e B
oard
mee
tings
pe
rson
ally
, and
he
kept
the
prom
ise.
158
34 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er tr
ansl
ates
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls o
f or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
Yes.
Alth
ough
it is
n’t i
n th
e te
rms
of a
ppoi
ntm
ent.
Man
agin
g D
irect
or
pres
ents
thei
r goa
ls a
nd v
isio
n to
the
inst
itutio
n’s
min
iste
rial p
olic
y ad
viso
ry c
omm
ittee
, the
IMFC
, tw
ice
a ye
ar in
the
Glo
bal P
olic
y A
gend
a.15
9 IM
FC d
iscu
sses
and
pro
vide
s its
vie
ws,
whi
ch a
re th
en
trans
late
d by
the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or in
to a
n op
erat
iona
lly p
oint
ed s
et
of p
ropo
sals
as
the
Sta
tem
ent o
n th
e W
ork
Pro
gram
of t
he E
xecu
tive
Boa
rd, w
hich
is d
iscu
ssed
and
end
orse
d by
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
.160
The
Wor
k P
rogr
am (t
wic
e a
year
) is
then
con
tinuo
usly
mon
itore
d by
the
MD
and
the
Boa
rd, a
nd re
vise
d in
ligh
t of d
evel
opm
ents
to e
nsur
e its
ef
fect
ive
impl
emen
tatio
n. T
he M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
and
the
man
agem
ent
team
ove
rsee
the
inst
itutio
n’s
Acc
ount
abilit
y Fr
amew
ork
to e
nsur
e th
at
seni
or m
anag
ers
(Dep
artm
ent H
eads
) mee
t the
stra
tegi
c go
als
set b
y th
e M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
.
The
regu
lar s
truct
ured
dis
cuss
ions
bet
wee
n de
partm
ent d
irect
ors
and
man
agem
ent f
ocus
on
key
depa
rtmen
tal o
bjec
tives
, inc
ludi
ng o
n bu
dget
an
d hu
man
reso
urce
prio
ritie
s. D
epar
tmen
tal
obje
ctiv
es fl
ow fr
om th
e an
nual
sta
tem
ent o
f M
anag
emen
t’s K
ey G
oals
, whi
ch is
der
ived
from
th
e M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
’s G
loba
l Pol
icy
Age
nda.
M
anag
emen
t hol
ds s
emi-a
nnua
l dis
cuss
ions
with
ea
ch D
irect
or to
dis
cuss
pro
gres
s m
ade
with
cur
rent
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s an
d to
revi
ew p
erfo
rman
ce
agai
nst b
udge
t and
peo
ple
man
agem
ent i
ndic
ator
s.
New
goa
ls a
nd ta
rget
s ar
e al
so d
iscu
ssed
for
the
perio
d ah
ead.
Thi
s pr
oces
s he
lps
impr
ove
depa
rtmen
tal a
lignm
ent t
o in
stitu
tiona
l prio
ritie
s an
d en
hanc
es c
olla
bora
tion
betw
een
depa
rtmen
ts b
y sp
ecify
ing
join
t obj
ectiv
es, w
hile
pro
mot
ing
mor
e ef
fect
ive
man
agem
ent o
f bud
gets
and
peo
ple.
161
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Ye
s. P
arag
raph
27
of th
e C
ode
of C
ondu
ct16
2 est
ablis
hed
the
prin
cipl
e th
at “
any
staf
f mem
ber w
ho c
onsi
ders
that
he
or s
he m
ight
be
in
a po
sitio
n of
act
ual o
r app
aren
t con
flict
of i
nter
est s
houl
d di
sclo
se
the
mat
ter”
to h
is o
r her
sup
ervi
sor o
r to
the
Com
plia
nce
Offi
cer.
Sub
mis
sion
of a
nnua
l fina
ncia
l cer
tifica
tion
form
is a
lso
part
of M
D’s
co
ntra
ct. T
he C
ode
of C
ondu
ct is
als
o co
nsid
ered
in th
e as
sign
men
t of
staf
f tas
ks, i
nclu
ding
that
a m
issi
on c
hief
/rev
iew
ed c
anno
t be
assi
gned
to
a c
ount
ry o
f whi
ch h
e/sh
e is
a n
atio
nal.
In a
dditi
on, t
he E
thic
s C
omm
ittee
of t
he E
xecu
tive
Boa
rd d
eals
with
any
pos
sibl
e co
nflic
ts o
f in
tere
st a
mon
g Ex
ecut
ive
Dire
ctor
s.
Acc
ordi
ng to
the
IEO
, the
Fun
d’s
gove
rnan
ce
fram
ewor
k is
not
wel
l des
igne
d to
iden
tify
actu
al
and
pote
ntia
l con
flict
s of
inte
rest
or e
thic
al p
robl
ems
of th
e M
D.16
3 Nam
ely,
ther
e is
no
“whi
stle
-blo
wer
” pr
otec
tion
for p
erso
ns w
ho re
port
mis
cond
uct,
and,
in
par
ticul
ar, t
here
is n
o m
echa
nism
for c
ompl
aint
s an
d co
ncer
ns a
bout
Exe
cutiv
e D
irect
ors,
the
MD
, and
oth
er s
enio
r offi
cers
that
gua
rant
ees
the
confi
dent
ialit
y of
the
sour
ce.
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?Ye
s. T
he c
urre
nt M
D is
sub
ject
to th
e st
aff C
ode
of C
ondu
ct u
nder
the
term
s of
the
lette
r of a
ppoi
ntm
ent.
Ther
e is
a B
oard
Eth
ics
Com
mitt
ee,
whi
ch is
sep
arat
e fro
m E
thic
s O
ffice
r.164
As
the
IEO
not
es, i
t is
not c
lear
who
wou
ld b
e in
a
posi
tion
to a
pply
this
Cod
e to
the
MD
, giv
en th
at
thos
e re
spon
sibl
e fo
r its
app
licat
ion
repo
rt to
the
MD
.165
35Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
ersh
ip s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
Yes.
The
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
con
duct
s a
dire
ct A
nnua
l Per
form
ance
R
evie
w o
f the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or (a
nd D
MD
s), d
urin
g w
hich
MD
pr
ovid
es fe
edba
ck o
n he
r ow
n as
sess
men
t and
that
of t
he B
oard
in
the
sam
e co
ntex
t.166
This
ann
ual e
xerc
ise,
intro
duce
d in
200
9, is
bas
ed o
n a
defin
ed
fram
ewor
k. E
ach
year
, bot
h th
e B
oard
and
the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or
spec
ify p
erfo
rman
ce o
bjec
tives
for e
ach
othe
r, ag
ains
t whi
ch a
n as
sess
men
t is
cond
ucte
d in
the
follo
win
g ye
ar. I
n co
nduc
ting
this
ex
erci
se, t
he B
oard
eac
h ye
ar a
ppoi
nts
a w
orki
ng g
roup
of fi
ve
Exec
utiv
e D
irect
ors
(with
geo
grap
hica
l rep
rese
ntat
ion)
to o
vers
ee th
e pr
oces
s. T
he p
roce
ss c
ompr
ises
sev
eral
iter
atio
ns a
nd in
volv
es a
ll Ex
ecut
ive
Dire
ctor
s.2
Is re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
Chr
istin
e La
gard
e’s
term
s of
app
oint
men
t ide
ntify
a fi
xed
sala
ry o
f $4
67,9
40 p
er a
nnum
, whi
ch is
adj
uste
d by
the
incr
ease
in c
onsu
mer
pr
ice
inde
x in
the
grea
ter W
ashi
ngto
n ar
ea.16
7
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
Yes.
IMF
orga
nize
s m
anag
eria
l cou
rses
; the
man
agem
ent t
eam
has
ac
cess
to th
em.
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent c
riter
ia
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p in
th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
Yes.
The
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
, in
cons
ulta
tion
with
the
entir
e m
embe
rshi
p,
dete
rmin
es w
heth
er to
re-a
ppoi
nt th
e M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
. In
doin
g so
, it
take
s an
acc
ount
of M
D’s
per
form
ance
.
Acc
ordi
ng to
IEO
, the
Boa
rd h
as th
us fa
r pla
yed
only
a p
ro fo
rma
role
in s
elec
ting
MD
s an
d re
new
ing
thei
r app
oint
men
ts, w
ith th
e ac
tual
dec
isio
n be
ing
mad
e by
a s
ubse
t of m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s’ a
utho
ritie
s th
roug
h an
opa
que
proc
ess.
168
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Yes.
In c
onsi
derin
g an
y re
-app
oint
men
t of t
he M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
, the
Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd, r
epre
sent
ing
the
mem
bers
hip,
con
side
rs a
ll op
tions
.A
ccor
ding
to IE
O, t
here
is n
o fo
rmal
pro
cess
for
sear
chin
g fo
r can
dida
tes.
The
con
vent
ion
that
the
gove
rnm
ents
of t
heir
coun
tries
of o
rigin
pro
pose
ca
ndid
ates
has
in th
e pa
st re
sulte
d in
som
e co
mpe
tent
pos
sibl
e ca
ndid
ates
not
bei
ng p
ut
forw
ard
for a
var
iety
of r
easo
ns in
clud
ing
dom
estic
po
litic
al fa
ctor
s or
lack
of e
nthu
sias
m b
y th
e na
tiona
l au
thor
ities
.169
36 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
Yes.
The
Man
agin
g D
irect
or p
rese
nts
her G
loba
l Pol
icy
Age
nda,
ou
tlini
ng th
e st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s of
the
inst
itutio
n, tw
ice
per y
ear t
o th
e m
inis
teria
l pol
icy
advi
sory
com
mitt
ee, t
he IM
FC, a
fter c
lose
co
nsul
tatio
n w
ith th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd. S
houl
d ci
rcum
stan
ces
war
rant
, th
e M
anag
ing
Dire
ctor
can
act
qui
ckly
to c
onsu
lt w
ith th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd o
n re
finin
g th
e st
rate
gy in
the
inte
rim p
erio
d.2
Doe
s th
e M
O/IO
hav
e pr
oces
ses
that
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies?
Yes.
The
Man
agin
g D
irect
or ro
utin
ely
cons
ults
with
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
on
all s
trate
gic
mat
ters
. In
addi
tion,
the
Man
agin
g D
irect
or o
ften
mee
ts w
ith s
enio
r pol
icy
mak
ers
durin
g he
r tra
vel t
o m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s an
d di
scus
ses
the
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
of th
e in
stitu
tion,
incl
udin
g em
ergi
ng is
sues
.170
The
EIO
sta
tes
that
ther
e ar
e al
so in
form
al p
ract
ices
th
at fa
cilit
ate
nego
tiatio
ns. E
.g.:
disc
ussi
ons
and
deci
sion
mak
ing
shift
out
of t
he B
oard
and
into
a
smal
ler g
roup
of p
olic
y m
aker
s w
ho a
re n
ot b
ound
by
vot
ing
arra
ngem
ents
or f
orm
al p
roce
dure
s; th
eir
dial
ogue
take
s pl
ace
thro
ugh
conf
eren
ce c
alls
and
pr
ivat
e m
eetin
gs w
here
offi
cial
min
utes
are
rare
ly
kept
.171
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
Sup
plem
enta
ry fi
nanc
ing
arra
ngem
ents
exi
st b
etw
een
the
IMF
and
a su
bset
of m
embe
rs. P
rimar
y am
ong
thes
e ar
e th
e N
ew A
rran
gem
ents
to
Bor
row
bet
wee
n th
e IM
F an
d 38
mem
ber c
ount
ries.
The
re is
som
e di
scre
tiona
ry b
udge
t on
tech
nica
l ass
ista
nce:
40%
($10
7 m
illion
, 46%
of
ext
erna
l fina
ncin
g ov
er 1
990-
2012
per
iod
is J
apan
ese)
of I
MF’
s bu
dget
dev
elop
men
t and
mor
e th
an 7
0% o
f fiel
d de
liver
y. S
ome
fund
s ar
e co
ntro
lled
by a
ll m
embe
rshi
p, fo
r exa
mpl
e th
e P
over
ty R
educ
tion
and
Gro
wth
Fac
ility
(PR
GF)
.
The
finan
cing
mad
e av
aila
ble
to th
e IM
F un
der s
uch
cred
it ar
rang
emen
ts a
re in
tend
ed to
be
avai
labl
e to
an
y m
embe
r cou
ntry
if n
eede
d.
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
The
re a
re p
erio
dic
IMF-
wid
e st
aff s
urve
ys o
n a
wid
e ra
nge
of
issu
es, w
ith th
e m
ost r
ecen
t con
duct
ed in
201
3. T
he m
anag
emen
t te
am s
hare
s its
resu
lts d
irect
ly w
ith a
ll th
e st
aff (
but d
oes
not p
ublic
ly
publ
ish
them
).
Ther
e is
an
inte
nse
follo
w-u
p w
ith s
taff,
incl
udin
g to
wn
hall
mee
tings
with
all
staf
f, an
d ac
tion
plan
s on
a w
ide
varie
ty o
f spe
cific
issu
es a
re d
evel
oped
, im
plem
ente
d, a
nd m
onito
red
clos
ely.
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
The
man
agem
ent t
eam
is a
sses
sed
on a
ll is
sues
. In
the
MD
’s s
elf-
asse
ssm
ent m
anag
emen
t of s
taff
is a
n im
porta
nt e
lem
ent.17
2
37Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
The
annu
al re
port
men
tions
IMF
coop
erat
ion
with
labo
ur g
roup
s (m
ostly
, tho
ugh
disc
ussi
ons)
, civ
il so
ciet
y or
gani
zatio
ns (t
hrou
gh c
onfe
renc
es, m
eetin
gs, s
emin
ars
and
fello
wsh
ip p
rogr
amm
e th
at c
ould
cou
nt a
s lim
ited
inst
itutio
naliz
atio
n), a
cade
mia
(aca
dem
ic fe
llow
ship
pro
gram
me)
, as
wel
l as
legi
slat
ors.
The
IMF
Man
agin
g D
irect
or a
nd th
e W
orld
Ban
k P
resi
dent
als
o ho
ld a
civ
il so
ciet
y or
gani
zatio
ns to
wn
hall
mee
ting
durin
g th
e A
nnua
l Mee
tings
.
Mor
e re
cent
ly, t
he IM
F ha
s in
crea
sed
its
enga
gem
ent w
ith la
bour
gro
ups.
Sin
ce 2
010,
co
llabo
ratio
n be
twee
n th
e IM
F an
d th
e In
tern
atio
nal
Labo
ur O
rgan
izat
ion
(ILO
) has
not
icea
bly
incr
ease
d,
with
gre
ater
focu
s on
soc
ial p
rote
ctio
n flo
ors,
na
tiona
l soc
ial d
ialo
gue,
and
rese
arch
on
jobs
an
d gr
owth
. The
IMF
enga
ges
with
the
ITU
C o
n a
regu
lar b
asis
, and
the
two
orga
niza
tions
hol
d an
nual
di
scus
sion
s w
ith re
pres
enta
tives
of n
atio
nal l
abou
r un
ions
. The
IMF
also
regu
larly
eng
ages
with
glo
bal
med
ia a
nd h
olds
regu
lar p
ress
brie
fings
on
coun
try
and
polic
y m
atte
rs.17
3
VIII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
the
lead
er th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
The
Inde
pend
ent E
valu
atio
n O
ffice
(IEO
) was
est
ablis
hed
in 2
001
to c
ondu
ct o
bjec
tive
eval
uatio
ns o
f Fun
d po
licie
s an
d ac
tiviti
es. U
nder
its
Term
s of
Ref
eren
ce, i
t is
fully
inde
pend
ent f
rom
the
Man
agem
ent o
f the
IMF
and
oper
ates
at a
rm’s
leng
th fr
om th
e B
oard
of E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
s. It
pub
lishe
s on
e re
port
a ye
ar o
n a
spec
ific
IMF
polic
y (ro
le o
f IM
F as
trus
ted
advi
ser,
inte
rnat
iona
l res
erve
s, re
sear
ch a
t the
IMF)
. As
indi
cate
d in
the
term
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r IEO
,174 i
t eng
ages
with
exe
cutiv
e m
anag
emen
t, th
e bo
ard
and
the
staf
f whe
n th
ey “
resp
ond
to
rele
vant
par
ts o
f the
eva
luat
ion”
.175
From
a m
ore
oper
atio
nal a
ngle
, the
Offi
ce o
f Int
erna
l Aud
it an
d In
spec
tion
inde
pend
ently
exa
min
es th
e ef
fect
iven
ess
of th
e ris
k m
anag
emen
t, co
ntro
l, an
d go
vern
ance
pro
cess
es o
f the
org
aniz
atio
n. E
ach
year
, OIA
co
nduc
ts a
udits
and
revi
ews,
whi
ch in
clud
e fin
anci
al a
udits
, inf
orm
atio
n te
chno
logy
aud
its, a
nd o
pera
tiona
l an
d ef
fect
iven
ess
audi
ts. O
IA m
ay a
lso
prov
ide
cons
ultin
g se
rvic
es, e
.g.,
help
iden
tify
cont
rols
for n
ew
proc
esse
s. T
he o
vera
ll pu
rpos
e is
to e
nsur
e th
at th
e IM
F op
erat
es in
line
with
bes
t int
erna
tiona
l pra
ctic
es.
The
IMF
also
con
duct
s re
gula
r and
ext
ensi
ve in
tern
al s
elf-
asse
ssm
ents
of i
ts w
ork.
The
re is
a c
ompr
ehen
sive
in
tern
al re
view
pro
cess
for a
ll IM
F do
cum
ents
, pol
icy
anal
ysis
, and
lend
ing
oper
atio
ns, w
hich
beg
ins
with
an
inte
rdep
artm
enta
l sta
ff re
view
. Man
agem
ent i
s re
spon
sibl
e fo
r the
fina
l cle
aran
ce o
f all
offic
ial d
ocum
ents
be
fore
issu
ance
to, a
nd c
onsi
dera
tion
by, t
he E
xecu
tive
Boa
rd. T
here
afte
r, m
ost d
ocum
ents
are
pub
lishe
d.
Exam
ples
of i
nter
nal s
elf-
asse
ssm
ent i
nclu
de e
x po
st a
sses
smen
ts/e
valu
atio
ns o
f fina
ncia
l pro
gram
mes
(for
ex
ampl
e, a
rece
nt a
sses
smen
t of t
he G
reec
e pr
ogra
mm
e).17
6
38 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
f. In
tern
atio
nal O
rgan
izat
ion
for
Mig
ratio
n (IO
M)
Org
aniz
atio
n IO
M w
orks
with
par
tner
s to
sup
port
stat
es in
mee
ting
the
grow
ing
oper
atio
nal
chal
leng
es o
f mig
ratio
n go
vern
ance
; adv
ance
und
erst
andi
ng o
f mig
ratio
n is
sues
; en
cour
age
soci
al a
nd e
cono
mic
dev
elop
men
t thr
ough
mig
ratio
n; a
nd u
phol
d th
e w
ell-b
eing
and
hum
an ri
ghts
of m
igra
nts.
IOM
has
a lo
ng-s
tand
ing,
ext
ensi
ve a
nd c
lose
ly c
oord
inat
ed w
orki
ng re
latio
nshi
p w
ith th
e U
N, a
t pol
icy
and
oper
atio
nal l
evel
s. A
t the
ope
ratio
nal l
evel
, IO
M c
hief
s of
mis
sion
par
ticip
ate
in h
uman
itaria
n co
untry
team
s an
d in
virt
ually
all
UN
cou
ntry
te
ams.
IOM
con
tribu
tes
to s
yste
m-w
ide
oper
atio
ns th
roug
h its
par
ticip
atio
n in
the
Inte
r-A
genc
y S
tand
ing
Com
mitt
ee (I
AS
C),
and
is a
n ac
tive
partn
er, l
ead
and
co-
lead
in s
ever
al c
lust
ers
in m
any
coun
tries
aro
und
the
wor
ld.
At t
he g
loba
l lev
el, t
he U
nite
d N
atio
ns H
igh
Com
mis
sion
er fo
r Ref
ugee
s an
d IO
M
are
the
cam
p co
ordi
natio
n an
d ca
mp
man
agem
ent c
o-cl
uste
r lea
d ag
enci
es.
At t
he p
olic
y le
vel,
IOM
was
cha
ir of
the
Glo
bal M
igra
tion
Gro
up in
the
seco
nd
sem
este
r of 2
013,
lead
ing
the
grou
p’s
prep
arat
ions
for t
he s
econ
d U
N H
igh-
Leve
l D
ialo
gue
on M
igra
tion
and
Dev
elop
men
t. Fr
om 2
011
to 2
013,
the
IOM
dire
ctor
-ge
nera
l (D
G) l
ed s
yste
m-w
ide
effo
rts to
sup
port
prev
entio
n of
sex
ual e
xplo
itatio
n an
d ab
use
(PS
EA) a
s th
e P
SEA
cha
mpi
on. I
nter
-inst
itutio
nal c
oope
ratio
n is
m
aint
aine
d by
IOM
’s h
eadq
uarte
rs; t
he p
erm
anen
t obs
erve
r in
New
Yor
k, th
roug
h on
goin
g lia
ison
with
the
UN
sec
reta
riat;
and
spec
ial l
iais
on m
issi
ons
in th
e fie
ld.
Twen
ty-s
ix U
N a
genc
ies
are
repr
esen
ted
in IO
M a
s O
bser
vers
.
Gov
erna
nce
The
IOM
Cou
ncil,
com
pris
ing
repr
esen
tativ
es o
f 157
mem
ber s
tate
s, d
eter
min
es,
exam
ines
and
revi
ews
polic
ies,
pro
gram
mes
and
act
iviti
es, a
nd re
view
s an
d ap
prov
es th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
budg
et, e
xpen
ditu
res
and
acco
unts
. As
the
high
est
auth
ority
, the
cou
ncil
revi
ews
the
repo
rts, a
nd a
ppro
ves
and
dire
cts
the
activ
ities
, of
its
subs
idia
ry b
odie
s. M
eetin
g re
gula
rly a
t its
ann
ual s
essi
on a
nd in
spe
cial
se
ssio
ns, t
he c
ounc
il m
ay a
dmit
non-
mem
ber s
tate
s up
on th
eir a
pplic
atio
n. It
may
al
so a
dmit
inte
rnat
iona
l org
aniz
atio
ns a
nd c
ivil
soci
ety
orga
niza
tions
to p
artic
ipat
e in
its
sess
ions
as
non-
votin
g ob
serv
ers.
Pre
para
tions
for c
ounc
il se
ssio
ns a
re
mad
e th
roug
h ot
her g
over
ning
bod
y st
ruct
ures
, inc
ludi
ng th
e st
andi
ng c
omm
ittee
on
pro
gram
mes
and
fina
nce
(SC
PF)
, inf
orm
al c
onsu
ltatio
ns a
nd w
orki
ng g
roup
s.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Five
yea
rs; r
enew
able
onc
e.
Inco
me
Refl
ectin
g IO
M’s
exp
ansi
on, t
he o
rgan
izat
ion’
s bu
dget
reac
hed
$1.3
billi
on in
201
3,
the
fifth
-con
secu
tive
year
of g
row
th.17
7
Num
ber
of s
taff
App
roxi
mat
ely
8,50
0 gl
obal
ly, w
ith m
ore
than
480
fiel
d lo
catio
ns.17
8
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pW
hen
sele
ctin
g th
e D
G, m
embe
r sta
tes
have
trad
ition
ally
ele
cted
the
cand
idat
e no
min
ated
by
IOM
’s la
rges
t don
or c
ount
ry, w
ith o
ne e
xcep
tion:
Bas
tiaan
Hav
eman
, N
ethe
rland
s (1
961-
1969
). IO
M’s
lead
ersh
ip c
ompr
ises
a d
eput
y di
rect
or-g
ener
al
(DD
G),
who
is a
lso
an e
lect
ed o
ffici
al.
Pas
t lea
ders
of I
OM
and
its
pred
eces
sor o
rgan
izat
ions
wer
e: H
ugh
Gib
son
(from
the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
195
2-19
54);
Har
old
Tittm
an (U
nite
d S
tate
s, 1
955-
1958
); M
arcu
s D
aly
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
195
8-19
61);
Bas
tiaan
Hav
eman
(Net
herla
nds,
196
1-19
69);
John
Th
omas
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
196
9-19
79);
Jam
es C
arlin
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
197
9-19
88) a
nd
Bru
nson
McK
inle
y (U
nite
d S
tate
s, 1
998-
2008
).
The
curre
nt le
ader
is W
illiam
Sw
ing
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
200
8-pr
esen
t).17
9
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryA
fter
taki
ng o
ffice
, S
win
g em
bark
ed o
n a
stru
ctur
al r
evie
w t
hat
cons
olid
ated
IOM
’s
field
stru
ctur
es a
nd e
nsur
ed g
reat
er c
oher
ence
at h
eadq
uarte
rs;18
0 inc
reas
ed th
e co
re
fund
ing;
181
and
stre
ngth
ened
inte
rnal
con
trols
by
esta
blis
hing
an
audi
t and
ove
rsig
ht
com
mitt
ee.
39Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
sO
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/ter
ms
of re
fere
nce
for t
he le
ader
onl
ine?
Yes.
The
IOM
Con
stitu
tion,
whi
ch is
ava
ilabl
e on
line,
out
lines
the
DG
’s
func
tions
. Acc
ount
able
to th
e C
ounc
il, th
e D
irect
or-G
ener
al fo
rmul
ates
pr
opos
als
rela
ted
to th
e ad
min
istra
tive
and
exec
utiv
e fu
nctio
ns o
f IO
M, i
n ac
cord
ance
with
the
Con
stitu
tion
and
Cou
ncil
polic
ies
and
deci
sion
s.
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
and
re-e
lect
ion
of th
e le
ader
?
Spe
cial
Cou
ncil
Ses
sion
s in
vite
all
votin
g M
embe
r Sta
tes
to p
artic
ipat
e in
the
elec
tion
proc
ess.
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
and
the
Dep
uty
Dire
ctor
-G
ener
al (D
DG
) are
ele
cted
by
a tw
o-th
irds
maj
ority
of a
ll pa
rtici
patin
g vo
ting
Mem
ber S
tate
s of
the
Cou
ncil.
182 T
he C
onst
itutio
n ou
tline
s th
e cr
iteria
for M
embe
r Sta
tes’
loss
of v
otin
g rig
hts.
A M
embe
r Sta
te
whi
ch is
in a
rrear
s in
the
paym
ent o
f its
fina
ncia
l con
tribu
tions
to th
e O
rgan
izat
ion
lose
s its
vot
ing
right
if th
e am
ount
of i
ts a
rrear
s eq
uals
or
exc
eeds
the
amou
nt o
f the
con
tribu
tions
due
in th
e pr
eced
ing
two
year
s.
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
ncie
s ag
ains
t the
pub
lishe
d cr
iteria
?
Yes.
The
pro
cess
of D
G a
nd D
DG
sel
ectio
n is
det
aile
d in
the
Con
stitu
tion,
whi
ch is
ava
ilabl
e on
line.
Add
ition
al e
lem
ents
for t
he
elec
tion
of th
e le
ader
ship
, ado
pted
by
the
Cou
ncil
on 3
0 N
ovem
ber
2007
, stip
ulat
e th
e re
quire
men
t tha
t the
nom
inat
ion
of c
andi
date
s be
pr
esen
ted
by M
embe
r Sta
tes
to th
e C
ounc
il C
hairp
erso
n no
late
r tha
n tw
o m
onth
s pr
ior t
o th
e el
ectio
ns.
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
the
IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
acc
ount
abilit
y1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
set
cle
ar
perfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns fo
r th
emse
lves
, whi
ch a
re tr
ansp
aren
t an
d co
nsis
tent
?
Yes.
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
’s a
ccep
tanc
e sp
eech
to th
e C
ounc
il up
on
elec
tion
outli
nes
the
over
arch
ing
prio
ritie
s fo
r the
man
date
ahe
ad. T
he
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
repo
rts b
iann
ually
--
to th
e C
ounc
il an
d to
the
SC
PF
-- o
n th
e pe
rform
ance
of t
he o
rgan
izat
ion
unde
r his
lead
ersh
ip. T
he
repo
rt sp
ecifi
es h
ow th
e w
ork
of th
e O
rgan
izat
ion
rela
tes
to e
ach
of
the
poin
ts o
f the
IOM
Stra
tegy
est
ablis
hed
by th
e C
ounc
il.
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er
trans
late
s ov
erar
chin
g go
als
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
Yes
– m
anda
ted
by th
e C
ounc
il, IO
M h
as p
roce
sses
that
est
ablis
h ac
tion
plan
s of
the
Org
aniz
atio
n’s
Stra
tegy
. The
Reg
iona
l Stra
tegi
es
are
oper
atio
nal t
ools
that
illu
stra
te h
ow th
e gl
obal
IOM
Stra
tegy
(1
2-P
oint
Stra
tegy
) is
impl
emen
ted
at th
e re
gion
al le
vel.
Two
coor
dina
ting
com
mitt
ees
for m
anag
emen
t coo
rdin
atio
n (M
CC
) and
po
licy
form
ulat
ion
(PFC
C) f
acilit
ate
cohe
renc
e, c
omm
unic
atio
n an
d co
oper
atio
n be
twee
n H
eadq
uarte
rs a
nd th
e Fi
eld
and
enha
nce
the
qual
ity o
f dec
isio
n-m
akin
g an
d co
mpl
ianc
e th
roug
hout
the
Org
aniz
atio
n. T
he S
enio
r Man
agem
ent T
eam
join
s fo
r a b
ienn
ial r
etre
at
to re
view
and
ope
ratio
naliz
e m
ulti-
annu
al o
rgan
izat
iona
l goa
ls w
ith
targ
ets.
In a
ltern
atin
g ye
ars,
the
DG
con
vene
s a
Glo
bal C
hief
s of
M
issi
on m
eetin
g, w
here
Fie
ld a
nd H
Q c
omm
unic
ate
and
cons
ult o
n ke
y in
stitu
tiona
l prio
ritie
s an
d ch
alle
nges
.
40 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Ye
s, th
e D
G, t
he D
DG
and
all
IOM
sta
ff ar
e re
quire
d to
dec
lare
any
co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t. Th
e C
onst
itutio
n st
ipul
ates
that
in th
e pe
rform
ance
of
thei
r dut
ies,
thes
e sh
all n
eith
er s
eek
nor r
ecei
ve in
stru
ctio
ns fr
om
an e
xter
nal a
utho
rity.
All
empl
oym
ent b
y IO
M is
sub
ject
to s
igna
ture
of
a d
ecla
ratio
n to
this
effe
ct. T
he E
thic
s an
d C
ondu
ct O
ffice
pro
vide
s ad
vice
on
requ
est f
or in
volv
emen
t in
any
activ
ity o
utsi
de IO
M th
at m
ay
invo
lve
a co
nflic
t of i
nter
est.
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?A
ll em
ploy
men
t in
IOM
is s
ubje
ct to
a s
igne
d co
mm
itmen
t to
adhe
re
to th
e IO
M S
tand
ard
of C
ondu
ct. A
ll IO
M s
taff
mem
bers
hav
e an
ob
ligat
ion
to re
port
any
alle
ged
viol
atio
ns to
the
Ethi
cs a
nd C
ondu
ct
Offi
ce, w
ho m
anag
es re
ferr
als
conc
erni
ng a
llega
tions
of m
isco
nduc
t an
d un
ethi
cal b
ehav
iour
. III
.Th
e le
ader
has
a d
efine
d pe
rfor
man
ce m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me
and
rece
ives
ann
ual f
eedb
ack
on p
erfo
rman
ce1
Is th
e le
ader
sub
ject
ed to
ann
ual
perfo
rman
ce a
ppra
isal
?Th
e D
G re
ports
regu
larly
to M
embe
r Sta
tes
and
give
s a
full
acco
unt
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
prog
ram
mat
ic a
nd fi
nanc
ial p
erfo
rman
ces
in
mee
tings
of t
he G
over
ning
Bod
ies.
2A
re re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
The
DG
’s re
mun
erat
ion
is d
eter
min
ed b
y th
e C
ounc
il, b
ased
on
the
UN
pa
y sc
ale
and
fixed
for t
he e
ntire
dur
atio
n of
his
man
date
. 183
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
Yes.
IOM
has
a s
taff
and
deve
lopm
ent p
rogr
amm
e w
hich
pro
vide
s co
achi
ng a
nd d
evel
opm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ties
to th
e D
G, D
DG
and
oth
er
staf
f mem
bers
.
IV.
Re-
elec
tion
of th
e le
ader
is b
ased
on
trans
pare
nt p
roce
sses
and
met
rics
1A
re p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t crit
eria
co
nsid
ered
by
the
full
mem
bers
hip
in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
The
perfo
rman
ce is
sub
ject
to th
e cr
iteria
est
ablis
hed
by e
ach
of th
e vo
ting
coun
tries
indi
vidu
ally
. Re-
elec
tion,
like
the
initi
al e
lect
ion,
is
dete
rmin
ed b
y M
embe
r Sta
tes
thro
ugh
an e
lect
ion
proc
ess.
2
Are
oth
er q
ualifi
ed c
andi
date
s co
nsid
ered
in th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
Yes.
Fol
low
ing
the
proc
ess,
all
nom
inat
ed c
andi
date
s ar
e co
nsid
ered
.
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
Yes.
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
put
s in
to a
ctio
n, v
aryi
ng th
e em
phas
is
as a
ppro
pria
te to
circ
umst
ance
s, th
e IO
M S
trate
gy e
stab
lishe
d by
M
embe
r Sta
tes.
Mor
eove
r, th
e IO
M C
onst
itutio
n re
ques
ts th
e D
G to
‘fo
rmul
ate
prop
osal
s fo
r app
ropr
iate
act
ion
by th
e C
ounc
il’, p
ropo
sals
th
at h
ave
incl
uded
new
stra
tegi
c im
pera
tives
. 184
2D
oes
the
IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies?
Yes,
the
DG
impl
emen
ts n
ew s
trate
gic
prio
ritie
s in
con
sulta
tion
with
in
IOM
, the
Org
aniz
atio
n’s
Mem
ber S
tate
s as
wel
l as
rele
vant
par
tner
s.
41Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
an
d co
ntro
lled
by a
sub
set o
f the
full
mem
bers
hip?
3% o
f IO
M’s
ann
ual b
udge
t com
es fr
om a
sses
sed
cont
ribut
ions
and
is
use
d to
cov
er th
e co
re s
truct
ure.
The
ope
ratio
nal p
art o
f the
bud
get
(97%
) is
prov
ided
by
Mem
ber S
tate
s an
d ot
her d
onor
s fo
r spe
cific
pr
ojec
ts th
at fa
ll un
der I
OM
’s m
anda
te a
nd s
trate
gy –
bot
h of
whi
ch
are
esta
blis
hed
thou
gh a
una
nim
ous
deci
sion
of t
he M
embe
r Sta
tes.
185
IOM
als
o m
anag
es s
peci
al fu
nds
who
se c
riter
ia a
nd p
roce
dure
s ar
e es
tabl
ishe
d by
the
full
mem
bers
hip.
The
se fu
nds
allo
w s
wift
resp
onse
s to
em
erge
ncie
s w
hile
wai
ting
for f
undi
ng to
be
clea
red
(Mig
ratio
n Em
erge
ncy
Fund
ing
Mec
hani
sm) o
r to
assi
st v
ulne
rabl
e m
igra
nts
who
wou
ld n
ot b
e el
igib
le u
nder
oth
er fu
ndin
g m
echa
nism
s (G
loba
l A
ssis
tanc
e Fu
nd fo
r Vic
tims
of T
raffi
ckin
g). I
n ad
ditio
n, th
e IO
M
Dev
elop
men
t Fun
d se
eds
inno
vativ
e pi
lot p
roje
cts.
Som
e re
spon
dent
s ha
ve n
oted
that
this
fund
ing
stru
ctur
e in
fluen
ces
IOM
’s a
ctiv
ities
. 186
For
inst
ance
on
e U
K D
FID
repo
rt, n
oted
that
as
IOM
is a
‘p
roje
ctis
ed o
rgan
isat
ion’
the
UK
‘onl
y se
ek[s
] to
influ
ence
[it]
on a
pro
ject
bas
is’.18
7
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
IOM
has
car
ried
out a
num
ber o
f sur
veys
, mos
t not
ably
the
“Glo
bal S
taff
Sat
isfa
ctio
n S
urve
y”. I
t is
also
car
ryin
g ou
t a re
view
of i
ts
orga
niza
tiona
l res
truct
urin
g w
hich
incl
udes
sur
veys
to s
taff
mem
bers
. IO
M a
lso
uses
org
aniz
atio
n-w
ide
an o
nlin
e st
aff e
valu
atio
n su
rvey
, as
one
of D
G’s
prio
ritie
s w
ill co
ntin
ue to
be
“sta
ff pr
ofes
sion
alis
m”.
In
addi
tion,
IOM
has
a s
mal
l tea
m fo
cusi
ng o
n ta
lent
man
agem
ent i
n th
e or
gani
zatio
n. T
he le
ader
ship
hol
ds re
gula
r con
sulta
tions
with
the
Sta
ff A
ssoc
iatio
n C
omm
ittee
. 2
Is th
e le
ader
ass
esse
d on
men
torin
g an
d co
achi
ng o
f sub
ordi
nate
sta
ff?Th
e D
G s
ets
prio
ritie
s fo
r coa
chin
g of
sta
ff. H
e ha
s be
en in
volv
ed w
ith
the
train
ing
of n
ew C
hief
s of
Mis
sion
by
artic
ulat
ing
IOM
’s v
isio
n an
d ho
lds
regu
lar o
pen
dial
ogue
s w
ith s
taff.
188
VII.
The
IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
Yes.
One
of D
G S
win
g’s
prio
ritie
s re
volv
es a
roun
d th
e th
eme
of “
partn
ersh
ips”
. IO
M is
a p
erm
anen
t obs
erve
r to
the
UN
and
a s
tand
ing
invi
tee
to IA
SC
mee
tings
. The
Org
aniz
atio
n is
a m
embe
r of t
he G
loba
l Mig
ratio
n G
roup
, th
e pr
inci
pal i
nter
-age
ncy
coor
dina
tion
mec
hani
sm o
n m
igra
tion,
and
wor
ks c
lose
ly w
ith th
e G
loba
l For
um fo
r M
igra
tion
and
Dev
elop
men
t (G
FMD
), in
clud
ing
thro
ugh
supp
ort t
o th
e G
roup
’s S
ecre
taria
t and
the
Foru
m’s
S
uppo
rt U
nit.
IOM
hol
ds re
gula
r con
sulta
tions
with
par
tner
NG
Os
and
host
s an
ann
ual g
loba
l civ
il so
ciet
y co
nsul
tatio
n in
HQ
. The
Org
aniz
atio
n pr
ovid
es s
ubst
antiv
e an
d lo
gist
ical
sup
port
to re
gion
al c
oope
ratio
n m
echa
nism
s on
mig
ratio
n in
volv
ing
a br
oad
rang
e of
sta
te a
nd n
on-s
tate
sta
keho
lder
s. In
rece
nt y
ears
, the
O
rgan
izat
ion
has
plac
ed g
reat
er e
mph
asis
on
outre
ach
to th
e pr
ivat
e se
ctor
. VI
II.Th
e IO
has
stru
ctur
es th
at e
ngag
e th
e le
ader
ship
thor
ough
ly w
ith in
tern
al/e
xter
nal e
valu
atio
nsYe
s, b
oth
exte
rnal
and
inte
rnal
. IO
M’s
Offi
ce o
f the
Insp
ecto
r Gen
eral
con
tribu
tes
to th
e ov
ersi
ght o
f the
O
rgan
izat
ion,
thro
ugh
its fu
nctio
ns o
f int
erna
l aud
it, e
valu
atio
n, ra
pid
asse
ssm
ent a
nd in
vest
igat
ion.
An
exte
rnal
aud
itor,
repo
rting
to th
e m
embe
rshi
p, c
arrie
s ou
t per
form
ance
aud
its a
nd e
xam
ines
the
annu
al
finan
cial
sta
tem
ents
of I
OM
, in
rela
tion
to a
ccep
ted
inte
rnat
iona
l aud
iting
sta
ndar
d. In
add
ition
to th
at, a
n A
udit
and
Ove
rsig
ht A
dvis
ory
Com
mitt
ee (A
OA
C),
esta
blis
hed
to in
crea
se th
e tra
nspa
renc
y an
d ac
coun
tabi
lity
of IO
M, i
s co
mpo
sed
of fi
ve m
embe
rs s
elec
ted
by M
embe
r Sta
tes
that
repo
rt an
nual
ly to
the
SC
PF.
Fin
ally
, ex
tern
al e
valu
atio
ns c
ondu
cted
on
the
requ
est o
f don
ors
are
liste
d on
the
web
site
and
ava
ilabl
e up
on
requ
est.18
9
42 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
e. U
nite
d N
atio
ns D
evel
opm
ent P
rogr
amm
e (U
ND
P)
Org
aniz
atio
nA
s th
e U
N’s
larg
est a
nd le
ad d
evel
opm
ent a
ctor
, the
UN
DP
’s m
issi
on is
to
assi
st c
ount
ries
to “
achi
eve
sust
aina
ble
hum
an d
evel
opm
ent”
. Its
four
cor
e ar
eas
are:
the
mille
nniu
m d
evel
opm
ent g
oals
and
pov
erty
redu
ctio
n; d
emoc
ratic
go
vern
ance
; env
ironm
ent a
nd e
nerg
y; a
nd c
risis
pre
vent
ion
and
reco
very
.190
Gov
erna
nce
The
UN
DP
has
an
exec
utiv
e bo
ard
of 3
6 st
ates
, whi
ch s
erve
on
a ro
tatin
g ba
sis
unde
r the
aut
horit
y of
the
Econ
omic
and
Soc
ial C
ounc
il (E
CO
SO
C).19
1 The
bo
ard
is re
spon
sibl
e fo
r pro
vidi
ng p
olic
y gu
idan
ce, m
onito
ring
perfo
rman
ce a
nd
deci
ding
on
adm
inis
trativ
e an
d fin
anci
al p
lans
.192 S
ince
200
1, th
e bo
ard
has
held
tw
o re
gula
r ses
sion
s an
d an
ann
ual s
essi
on e
ach
year
.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Four
yea
rs; c
an b
e re
new
ed tw
ice.
Inco
me
The
UN
DP
’s in
com
e fro
m a
ll co
ntrib
utio
ns w
as $
4.64
billi
on in
201
2.19
3
Num
ber
of s
taff
8,00
0.19
4
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pTh
e U
ND
P a
dmin
istra
tor w
as tr
aditi
onal
ly a
n A
mer
ican
, nom
inat
ed b
y th
e U
S
gove
rnm
ent a
nd re
com
men
ded
by th
e U
N s
ecre
tary
-gen
eral
(SG
) to
the
Gen
eral
A
ssem
bly.
Thi
s ch
ange
d in
199
9, w
hen
Mar
k M
allo
ch B
row
n (U
nite
d K
ingd
om)
beca
me
adm
inis
trato
r. Th
e su
bseq
uent
adm
inis
trato
r was
from
Tur
key,
and
the
curre
nt o
ne is
from
New
Zea
land
.
Pas
t lea
ders
of t
he U
ND
P w
ere:
Pau
l Hof
fman
(fro
m th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s, 1
966-
1972
); R
udol
ph P
eter
son
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
197
2-19
76);
Fran
k M
orse
(Uni
ted
Sta
tes,
197
6-19
86);
Willi
am D
rape
r (U
nite
d S
tate
s, 1
986-
1993
; Jam
es G
us
Spe
th (U
nite
d S
tate
s, 1
993-
1999
); G
eorg
e M
allo
ch B
row
n (U
nite
d K
ingd
om,
1999
-200
5) a
nd K
emal
Der
vis
(Tur
key,
200
5-20
09).
The
curre
nt le
ader
is H
elen
Cla
rk (N
ew Z
eala
nd, 2
009-
pres
ent).
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryIn
Apr
il 20
11, C
lark
laun
ched
an
“age
nda
for o
rgan
izat
iona
l cha
nge”
,195 s
eeki
ng to
en
hanc
e or
gani
zatio
nal e
ffect
iven
ess
by im
prov
ing
UN
DP
’s s
trate
gic
plan
ning
and
or
gani
zatio
nal p
erfo
rman
ce. C
lark
intro
duce
d th
e an
nual
bus
ines
s pl
an in
201
2,
whe
re o
rgan
izat
iona
l goa
ls “
casc
aded
” to
uni
t wor
k pl
ans
in o
rder
to s
treng
then
al
ignm
ent o
f act
ions
and
reso
urce
s.19
6 The
UN
DP
was
rank
ed in
the
top
10 o
f 72
orga
niza
tions
in th
e 20
12 A
id T
rans
pare
ncy
Inde
x.19
7
Cla
rk w
as re
-ele
cted
in A
pril
2013
for a
sec
ond
four
-yea
r ter
m, a
nd in
201
4 sh
e la
unch
ed a
ser
ies
of h
uman
reso
urce
refo
rms.
The
se in
clud
ed re
duci
ng s
taff
at
head
quar
ters
and
regi
onal
leve
ls b
y 10
%; r
ever
sing
the
staf
f dis
tribu
tion
ratio
so
that
60
% o
f em
ploy
ees
wou
ld b
e ba
sed
at re
gion
al a
nd c
ount
ry o
ffice
s, a
nd 4
0% a
t the
N
ew Y
ork
head
quar
ters
; and
inte
grat
ing
polic
y an
d su
ppor
t-pr
ogra
mm
e ef
forts
into
a
sing
le b
urea
u to
redu
ce s
taffi
ng c
osts
.198
43Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
rsP
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/ter
ms
of re
fere
nce
for t
he le
ader
onl
ine?
Ther
e ar
e no
pub
lical
ly a
cces
sibl
e te
rms
of re
fere
nce
onlin
e fo
r the
le
ader
ship
.199 U
ND
P’s
foun
ding
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y re
solu
tions
do
not
outli
ne th
e A
dmin
istra
tor’s
func
tions
. 2
Wha
t per
cent
age
of th
e m
embe
rshi
p is
invo
lved
in le
ader
ship
ele
ctio
n an
d re
-ele
ctio
n in
pra
ctic
e?
The
Adm
inis
trato
r is
offic
ially
app
oint
ed b
y th
e U
N S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
(S
G),
in c
olla
bora
tion
with
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
, and
then
con
firm
ed b
y th
e G
ener
al A
ssem
bly
for a
term
of f
our y
ears
.200 O
ffici
ally
all
mem
ber
stat
es o
f the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y ha
ve a
say
.
How
ever
, unt
il 19
99 th
e U
S P
resi
dent
pro
pose
d th
e U
ND
P A
dmin
istra
tor,
who
m th
e S
G th
en
reco
mm
ende
d to
the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y fo
r co
nfirm
atio
n.20
1 Kofi
Ann
an in
trodu
ced
a ne
w, m
ore
mer
it-ba
sed
and
open
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s. 2
02 T
he
larg
est d
onor
sta
tes
have
tend
ed to
hav
e th
e m
ost
influ
ence
on
the
SG
’s d
ecis
ion.
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for e
lect
ion
of
the
lead
er th
at w
eigh
s co
mpe
tenc
e ag
ains
t the
pub
lishe
d cr
iteria
?
Ther
e is
no
form
aliz
ed p
roce
ss o
ffici
ally
doc
umen
ted.
Ann
an’s
new
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s in
trodu
ced:
fo
rmat
ion
of s
peci
alis
t sea
rch
sele
ctio
n co
mm
ittee
s w
ho c
ondu
cted
rese
arch
and
inte
rvie
ws
and
reco
mm
ende
d a
cand
idat
e to
the
SG
. 203
Thi
s ca
ndid
ate
coul
d be
vet
oed
by th
e S
G a
nd h
ad
to g
ain
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y ap
prov
al. H
owev
er th
e S
G’s
sel
ectio
n co
mm
ittee
s w
ere
not f
orm
aliz
ed
and
ther
e ar
e no
form
al d
ocum
ents
out
linin
g th
is
proc
ess.
204 F
urth
erm
ore
the
sele
ctio
n pr
oces
s is
st
ill po
litic
ized
: can
dida
tes
mus
t be
reco
mm
ende
d by
a g
over
nmen
t and
gov
ernm
ents
can
vet
o th
e de
cisi
on.
IITh
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
acc
ount
abilit
y1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
set
cle
ar
perfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns fo
r th
emse
lves
, whi
ch a
re tr
ansp
aren
t an
d co
nsis
tent
?
UN
DP
pub
lishe
s th
e A
dmin
istra
tor’s
Ann
ual R
epor
t whi
ch o
utlin
es th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
perfo
rman
ce to
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
. How
ever
ther
e ar
e no
sep
arat
e, in
divi
dual
per
form
ance
sta
ndar
ds fo
r the
Adm
inis
trato
r.205
The
Ann
ual R
epor
t is
repo
rtedl
y w
idel
y re
ad b
y al
l st
aff t
o kn
ow th
e A
dmin
istra
tor’s
prio
ritie
s. 2
06
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er
trans
late
s ov
erar
chin
g go
als
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
UN
DP
has
set
spe
cific
, mea
sura
ble
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in S
trate
gic
Pla
ns s
uch
as th
e cu
rrent
201
4 –
2017
Stra
tegi
c P
lan.
207 U
ND
P h
as
also
exp
lain
ed h
ow th
eir s
trate
gic
goal
s w
ill be
impl
emen
ted
and
mea
sure
d in
det
ail.20
8
44 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?A
ll se
nior
offi
cers
in th
e U
N s
yste
m m
ust fi
le a
fina
ncia
l dis
clos
ure
stat
emen
t ann
ually
with
the
UN
eth
ics
offic
e.20
9 Cur
rent
Adm
inis
trato
r H
elen
Cla
rk h
as d
iscl
osed
her
fina
ncia
l ass
ets
publ
ical
ly.21
0 4
Is th
e le
ader
obl
iged
to a
dher
e to
a
publ
ishe
d co
de o
f eth
ics?
All
UN
sta
ff, in
clud
ing
the
Adm
inis
trato
r, ar
e ob
liged
to fo
llow
the
UN
C
ode
of C
ondu
ct.21
1
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
er s
ubje
cted
to a
n an
nual
pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
UN
DP
’s A
dmin
istra
tor i
s ac
coun
tabl
e to
the
UN
DP
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
.W
e fo
und
no e
vide
nce
(form
al o
r inf
orm
al) o
f an
indi
vidu
al p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me
or
appr
aisa
l for
the
Adm
inis
trato
r.2
Is re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
The
UN
Hum
an R
esou
rces
rule
s an
d re
gula
tions
on
rem
uner
atio
n se
ts a
cle
ar, fi
xed
pay
scal
e fo
r all
staf
f dep
endi
ng o
n th
eir r
ank.
The
A
dmin
istra
tor i
s pa
id a
t the
Und
er S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
pay
gra
de.21
2
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng
and
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ties
to
addr
ess
wea
knes
ses
over
tim
e?
UN
DP
has
an
exte
nsiv
e pr
ogra
mm
e fo
r lea
ders
hip
deve
lopm
ent a
nd
man
agem
ent s
kills
whi
ch o
ver 6
00 s
taff
parti
cipa
ted
in 2
012.
213
Sen
ior
lead
ersh
ip c
an a
ttend
Exe
cutiv
e Ed
ucat
ion
Pro
gram
mes
. IV
.Le
ader
ship
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess
is b
ased
on
trans
pare
nt p
roce
sses
and
met
rics
1A
re p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t crit
eria
co
nsid
ered
by
the
full
mem
bers
hip
in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Ther
e is
no
docu
men
tatio
n of
a fo
rmal
per
form
ance
app
rais
al o
f the
ca
ndid
ate.
All
Adm
inis
trato
rs w
ho h
ave
soug
ht a
sec
ond
term
hav
e be
en re
appo
inte
d by
the
UN
SG
, with
th
e B
oard
’s a
ppro
val.
Inte
rvie
wee
s cl
aim
ed th
at
ther
e ar
e in
form
al d
iscu
ssio
ns b
etw
een
the
SG
, ke
y do
nors
, oth
er p
oliti
cal g
roup
s su
ch a
s th
e G
7 an
d re
gion
al g
roup
s ov
er th
e A
dmin
istra
tor’s
pe
rform
ance
but
no
form
aliz
ed a
ppra
isal
pro
cess
. 214
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-a
ppoi
ntm
ent
proc
ess?
No
offic
ial e
vide
nce
of th
is.
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
The
Adm
inis
trato
r ope
rate
s un
der t
he p
olic
y gu
idan
ce o
f the
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
. 215
The
Adm
inis
trato
r can
pur
sue
new
initi
ativ
es b
ut m
ust g
et
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
’s a
ppro
val.21
6
The
Adm
inis
trato
r may
influ
ence
Boa
rd d
ecis
ions
an
d do
es n
ot a
lway
s ha
ve g
ain
form
al a
ppro
val
thro
ugh
a m
ajor
ity v
ote
to b
egin
wor
k in
new
are
as. 2
17
2D
oes
the
IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies?
UN
DP
has
a s
enio
r man
agem
ent c
omm
ittee
whi
ch d
iscu
sses
new
pr
iorit
ies
and
will
eval
uate
all
docu
men
ts b
efor
e th
ey g
o to
the
Exec
utiv
e C
omm
ittee
with
requ
este
d ac
tions
. 218
45Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
In 2
012,
ear
mar
ked
cont
ribut
ions
from
bila
tera
l ($1
.33
billio
n) a
nd
mul
tilat
eral
par
tner
s ($
1.53
billi
on) a
ccou
nted
for 2
2% o
f the
ove
rall
inco
me.
219 U
ND
P’s
cor
e re
sour
ces
are
disb
urse
d by
the
Gen
eral
A
ssem
bly
and
have
sta
gnat
ed in
rece
nt y
ears
: in
2012
they
wer
e 20
%
of it
s ov
eral
l fina
ncin
g.22
0
UN
DP
is re
porte
d to
‘act
ivel
y’ p
ursu
e ‘n
on-c
ore
finan
cing
by
pres
entin
g do
nors
with
pro
gram
mes
th
at a
ppea
l to
them
’.221 U
ND
P h
as a
lso
dive
rsifi
ed
its s
ourc
es o
f fina
ncin
g in
rece
nt y
ears
with
fin
anci
ng fr
om: o
ther
mul
tilat
eral
sou
rces
(suc
h as
the
Euro
pean
Com
mis
sion
and
the
Glo
bal
Envi
ronm
ent F
und)
and
priv
ate
finan
cing
(whi
ch
cons
titut
es a
lmos
t a th
ird o
f the
bud
get).
It h
as
gain
ed fi
nanc
ing
from
em
ergi
ng c
ount
ries
who
pay
di
rect
ly fo
r ser
vice
s pr
ovid
ed b
y U
ND
P.
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
UN
DP
con
duct
s an
nual
Glo
bal S
taff
Sur
veys
whi
ch a
re c
arrie
d ou
t by
an
exte
rnal
, ind
epen
dent
org
aniz
atio
n. In
add
ition
, UN
DP
has
pr
iorit
ized
sup
porti
ng s
taff
in it
s 20
14 –
201
7 S
trate
gic
Pla
n w
hich
st
ates
that
“U
ND
P w
ill lif
t its
peo
ple
man
agem
ent c
apab
ilitie
s w
ith
spee
dier
recr
uitm
ent a
nd in
itiat
ion
prog
ram
mes
that
sup
port
staf
f to
beco
me
effe
ctiv
e m
ore
quic
kly,
ens
ure
dive
rsity
, man
age
tale
nt a
nd
deliv
er b
ette
r suc
cess
ion
plan
ning
for k
ey p
osts
.” 22
2
2Is
exe
cutiv
e m
anag
emen
t ass
esse
d on
men
torin
g an
d co
achi
ng o
f su
bord
inat
e st
aff?
They
are
not
form
ally
exp
ecte
d to
do
this
.
VII.
The
IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
UN
DP
is m
anag
er o
f the
UN
Res
iden
t Coo
rdin
ator
Sys
tem
. In
this
role
it h
as to
coo
rdin
ate
and
faci
litat
e pr
ogra
mm
ing
and
com
mon
‘bus
ines
s op
erat
ions
’ of o
ther
UN
age
ncie
s at
cou
ntry
leve
l. Th
ey h
ave
prop
osed
ev
alua
ting
thei
r par
tner
ship
s w
ith p
artn
ers’
sat
isfa
ctio
n su
rvey
s w
ith U
ND
P.22
3
VIII.
The
IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
lead
ersh
ip th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
UN
DP
revi
sed
its e
valu
atio
n po
licy
in 2
011
to e
stab
lish
the
Eval
uatio
n O
ffice
’s in
depe
nden
ce a
nd e
nsur
e th
at
all e
valu
atio
ns h
ave
a m
anag
emen
t res
pons
e.22
4 Th
e he
ad o
f the
UN
DP
Eva
luat
ion
Offi
ce re
ports
dire
ctly
to
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
. The
Adm
inis
trato
r is
brie
fed
befo
re a
nd th
eir o
ffice
pre
pare
s a
man
agem
ent r
espo
nse
to
eval
uatio
ns. T
he A
dmin
istra
tor h
as th
e rig
ht o
f rep
ly to
eva
luat
ions
and
dis
cuss
es fo
llow
-up
actio
ns w
ith th
e B
oard
.
46 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
h. U
nite
d N
atio
ns H
igh
Com
mis
sion
er fo
r R
efug
ees
(UN
HC
R)
Org
aniz
atio
nU
NH
CR
’s c
ore
man
date
is th
e pr
otec
tion
of re
fuge
es. I
n re
cent
yea
rs, t
he a
genc
y ha
s al
so ta
ken
a ro
le in
hum
anita
rian
cris
es a
nd s
ituat
ions
invo
lvin
g in
tern
ally
di
spla
ced
pers
ons
(IDP
s).22
5
Gov
erna
nce
UN
HC
R is
a s
ubsi
diar
y bo
dy o
f the
UN
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y, e
stab
lishe
d un
der
Arti
cle
22 o
f the
UN
cha
rter.
The
high
com
mis
sion
er (H
C) a
cts
unde
r the
aut
horit
y of
and
repo
rts a
nnua
lly to
the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y. T
he U
NH
CR
sta
tute
aut
horiz
es
the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y an
d th
e Ec
onom
ic a
nd S
ocia
l Cou
ncil
(EC
OS
CO
) to
give
the
offic
e po
licy
guid
ance
.226 H
owev
er, U
NH
CR
’s p
rinci
pal e
xecu
tive
and
advi
sory
bod
y is
the
Exec
utiv
e C
omm
ittee
of t
he P
rogr
amm
e of
the
UN
HC
R (E
xCom
), co
mpr
ised
of
87
mem
ber s
tate
s as
of J
uly
2013
.227 E
xCom
is re
spon
sibl
e fo
r app
rovi
ng
UN
HC
R’s
bud
get a
nd p
rogr
amm
e, a
nd p
rovi
ding
gui
danc
e on
the
agen
cy’s
m
anag
emen
t and
prio
ritie
s.22
8
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
No
time
limit
has
been
sta
ted;
in th
e pa
st, H
Cs
have
ser
ved
up to
thre
e te
rms.
A
term
is c
omm
only
five
yea
rs (e
.g. S
adru
ddin
Aga
Kha
n w
as H
C fo
r 12
year
s).
Inco
me
UN
HC
R’s
ann
ual b
udge
t is
need
s-ba
sed,
and
in 2
012
was
$4.
3 bi
llion
(incl
udin
g su
pple
men
tary
pro
gram
mes
).229 H
owev
er, i
ts in
com
e is
typi
cally
far b
elow
the
budg
et: i
n 20
12, i
t rec
eive
d on
ly a
bout
$2.
3 bi
llion
in v
olun
tary
fund
ing.
230
Num
ber
of s
taff
Ove
r 6,8
00, w
ith m
ore
than
150
nat
iona
litie
s w
orki
ng a
t 259
offi
ces
in 1
18
coun
tries
.231
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pTh
e pa
st le
ader
s of
UN
HC
R w
ere:
Ger
rit J
an v
an H
euve
n G
oedh
art (
from
the
Net
herla
nds,
195
1-19
56);
Aug
uste
Lin
dt (S
witz
erla
nd, 1
956-
1960
); Fé
lix S
chny
der
(Sw
itzer
land
, 196
0-19
65);
Sad
rudd
in A
ga K
han
(Iran
, 196
5-19
77);
Pou
l Har
tling
(D
enm
ark,
197
8-19
85);
Jean
-Pie
rre H
ocké
(Sw
itzer
land
, 198
6-19
89);
Thor
vald
S
tolte
nber
g (N
orw
ay, 1
990-
1990
); S
adak
o O
gata
(Jap
an, 1
990-
2000
) and
Ruu
d Lu
bber
s (N
ethe
rland
s, 2
001-
2005
)
The
curre
nt H
C is
Ant
ónio
Gut
erre
s (P
ortu
gal,
2005
-pre
sent
).
UN
HC
R h
as h
ad s
ever
al h
igh-
profi
le le
ader
ship
sca
ndal
s. J
ean-
Pie
rre H
ocké
(1
986-
1989
) had
to re
sign
as
HC
afte
r he
and
his
wife
flew
firs
t cla
ss w
hile
don
ors
wer
e de
man
ding
gre
ater
bud
get r
estri
ctio
ns fo
r the
age
ncy.
232 H
C R
udd
Lubb
ers
(200
1-20
05) a
lso
dam
aged
UN
HC
R’s
repu
tatio
n w
hen
he w
as fo
rced
to re
sign
in
200
5 du
e to
alle
gatio
ns o
f sex
ual a
buse
.233 U
nite
d N
atio
ns S
G J
avie
r Per
ez d
e C
uélla
r nom
inat
ed V
irend
ra D
ayal
, the
chi
ef o
f his
ow
n ex
ecut
ive
offic
e an
d w
ho h
ad
prev
ious
ly w
orke
d at
UN
HC
R. T
he U
nite
d S
tate
s an
d ot
her m
ajor
don
ors
expr
esse
d co
ncer
n, a
rgui
ng th
ere
was
insu
ffici
ent c
onsu
ltatio
n, a
nd th
e S
G w
ithdr
ew D
ayal
’s
nom
inat
ion.
234
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryU
nder
Gut
erre
s’ le
ader
ship
, UN
HC
R h
as m
ade
prog
ress
on
inte
rnal
refo
rms.
235
The
HC
offi
ce h
as in
trodu
ced
resu
lts-b
ased
man
agem
ent,
a ne
w IT
sys
tem
and
an
eth
ics
offic
e. In
201
2, th
e H
C a
ppoi
nted
an
inde
pend
ent a
udit
and
over
sigh
t co
mm
ittee
to re
view
and
stre
ngth
en th
ese
func
tions
.236 U
NH
CR
has
als
o re
stru
ctur
ed a
nd re
duce
d st
aff c
osts
from
41%
of t
otal
exp
endi
ture
in 2
006
to 2
6%
at th
e be
ginn
ing
of 2
013.
237 G
uter
res
has
soug
ht a
gre
ater
role
in p
rote
ctin
g ID
Ps
and
peop
le d
ispl
aced
by
natu
ral d
isas
ters
. How
ever
, som
e do
nors
are
con
cern
ed
that
UN
HC
R is
exp
andi
ng b
eyon
d its
man
date
and
not
prio
ritiz
ing
prot
ectio
n of
re
fuge
es.23
8
Tow
ards
the
end
of 2
012,
UN
HC
R e
stab
lishe
d an
org
aniz
atio
n-w
ide
risk
man
agem
ent f
ram
ewor
k. In
this
pha
se, t
he w
ork
on e
nter
pris
e ris
k m
anag
emen
t (E
RM
) con
cent
rate
d on
dev
elop
ing
a dr
aft p
olic
y fra
mew
ork
and
impl
emen
tatio
n to
ols,
whi
ch h
ave
been
test
ed a
t hea
dqua
rters
and
in fo
ur fi
eld
oper
atio
ns
thro
ugho
ut 2
013.
A c
hief
risk
offi
cer r
epor
ts d
irect
ly to
the
depu
ty H
C. G
loba
l im
plem
enta
tion
of E
RM
will
cont
inue
thro
ugho
ut 2
014.
239
47Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
rsP
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors24
0 I.
The
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
proc
ess
sear
ches
and
test
s fo
r spe
cific
, rel
evan
t com
pete
ncie
s ag
ains
t cle
arly
defi
ned
crite
ria th
roug
h an
incl
usiv
e, e
xhau
stiv
e pr
oces
s1
Doe
s th
e IO
pub
lish
the
crite
ria/t
erm
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r the
lead
er o
nlin
e?Th
e co
re fu
nctio
ns o
f the
HC
(HC
) are
out
lined
in U
NH
CR
’s S
tatu
te, a
s ef
fect
ivel
y re
vise
d an
d ex
tend
ed th
roug
h su
cces
sive
GA
reso
lutio
ns.24
1 Th
e U
N S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
pro
pose
s th
e te
rms
of a
ppoi
ntm
ent w
hich
ar
e th
en b
y ap
prov
ed b
y th
e G
ener
al A
ssem
bly.
242 T
he H
C’s
func
tions
ar
e al
so d
escr
ibed
in U
NH
CR
’s m
anua
l (ch
apte
r II)
whi
ch is
ava
ilabl
e on
the
Intra
net a
nd a
cces
sibl
e to
per
man
ent m
issi
ons
and
UN
HC
R’s
pa
rtner
s.24
3
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
ele
ctio
n an
d re
-ele
ctio
n of
the
lead
er in
pra
ctic
e?
Acc
ordi
ng to
UN
HC
R’s
Sta
tute
, the
HC
is e
lect
ed b
y th
e U
N G
ener
al
Ass
embl
y on
the
reco
mm
enda
tion
of th
e U
N S
ecre
tary
Gen
eral
.244 T
he
Sec
reta
ry G
ener
al c
onsu
lts th
e fiv
e ge
ogra
phic
al g
roup
s of
the
Gen
eral
A
ssem
bly
and
mem
bers
of t
he S
ecur
ity C
ounc
il. 2
45
The
HC
has
ofte
n co
me
from
a s
igni
fican
t don
or
stat
e (th
e cu
rrent
HC
is a
n ex
cept
ion
to th
is).
Mea
nwhi
le, t
he p
ost o
f Dep
uty
HC
has
alm
ost
alw
ays
been
a U
S N
atio
nal.24
6 P
ower
ful d
onor
sta
tes
have
a s
trong
influ
ence
on
the
deci
sion
and
hav
e fre
quen
tly v
etoe
d po
tent
ial
cand
idat
es.24
7 The
re h
as o
nly
been
one
con
test
ed
elec
tion
for t
he H
C, w
hich
was
in 1
950
for t
he fi
rst
HC
.248
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for s
elec
tion
of
the
lead
er th
at w
eigh
s co
mpe
tenc
e ag
ains
t the
pub
lishe
d cr
iteria
?
No.
The
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s is
larg
ely
a pr
oces
s of
con
sulta
tions
be
twee
n th
e U
N S
G a
nd k
ey d
onor
sta
tes.
Th
e G
uter
res
elec
tion
was
repo
rtedl
y m
ore
trans
pare
nt th
an p
revi
ous
as it
‘inv
olve
d so
me
prio
r pu
blic
scr
utin
y of
the
cand
idat
es’ 24
9, d
onor
s st
ill ha
d a
larg
e in
put. 2
50
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
the
IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es a
ccou
ntab
ility
1D
oes
the
lead
er s
et c
lear
pe
rform
ance
exp
ecta
tions
for
them
selv
es, w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent
and
cons
iste
nt?
The
HC
set
s ou
t his
/her
obj
ectiv
es in
a n
umbe
r of U
NH
CR
repo
rts,
incl
udin
g th
e an
nual
Glo
bal R
epor
ts a
nd th
e G
loba
l Stra
tegi
c P
riorit
ies.
25
1
Thes
e ar
e or
gani
zatio
n-w
ide
goal
s, n
ot s
peci
fic to
the
HC
.2
Is th
ere
an e
xpec
tatio
n th
at th
e le
ader
tran
slat
es o
vera
rchi
ng g
oals
of
orga
niza
tion
into
a m
anag
eabl
e an
d cl
ear s
trate
gy?
In a
dditi
on to
the
Glo
bal S
trate
gic
Prio
ritie
s, U
NH
CR
has
est
ablis
hed
a G
loba
l Man
agem
ent A
ccou
ntab
ility
Fram
ewor
k (G
MA
F). T
he G
MA
F re
porte
dly
‘com
preh
ensi
vely
map
s ac
coun
tabi
litie
s, re
spon
sibi
litie
s an
d au
thor
ities
acr
oss
the
orga
niza
tion
and
rela
tes
them
to th
e co
rresp
ondi
ng m
anag
emen
t pol
icie
s an
d gu
idan
ce’.25
2
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?A
ll se
nior
offi
cers
in th
e U
N s
yste
m m
ust fi
le a
fina
ncia
l dis
clos
ure
stat
emen
t ann
ually
with
the
UN
eth
ics
offic
e.25
3 Gut
erre
s ha
s vo
lunt
arily
di
sclo
sed
this
pub
lical
ly.25
4
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?A
ll U
NH
CR
sta
ff in
clud
ing
the
seni
or m
anag
emen
t are
ask
ed to
sig
n th
e U
NH
CR
Cod
e of
Con
duct
.255
Sta
ff m
ay d
ecid
e no
t to
sign
the
code
of c
ondu
ct, i
n w
hich
cas
e th
ey a
re o
blig
ed to
exp
lain
thei
r dec
isio
n in
writ
ing.
256
48 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
er s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
Ther
e is
no
form
al p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t app
rais
al fo
r the
HC
. H
owev
er, t
he H
C re
ports
ann
ually
to th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Com
mitt
ee a
nd to
th
e Th
ird C
omm
ittee
of t
he G
ener
al A
ssem
bly,
and
in U
NH
CR
’s a
nnua
l re
ports
.257
The
Dep
uty
HC
and
the
Ass
ista
nt H
Cs
have
per
form
ance
ap
prai
sals
.258
The
offic
e w
as c
reat
ed w
ith a
hig
h de
gree
of
auto
nom
y an
d al
thou
gh th
e U
NS
G s
igns
the
cont
ract
app
oint
ing
the
HC
, the
UN
SG
doe
s no
t ha
ve a
role
in p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t. 25
9
2Is
rem
uner
atio
n or
ben
efits
tied
to
the
outc
omes
of t
he p
erfo
rman
ce
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e?
The
HC
has
a fi
xed
sala
ry a
nd s
tand
ard
entit
lem
ents
like
any
oth
er
UN
sta
ff m
embe
r. W
hen
on m
issi
on, h
e re
ceiv
es a
sta
ndar
d tra
vel
allo
wan
ce li
ke a
ll ot
her U
N s
taff.
260
The
UN
Hum
an R
esou
rces
rule
s an
d re
gula
tions
on
rem
uner
atio
n go
vern
the
HC
’s s
alar
y. 26
1
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng a
nd
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ty to
add
ress
w
eakn
esse
s ov
er ti
me?
Ther
e is
no
form
al o
r sta
ndar
d tra
inin
g pr
ogra
mm
e or
coa
chin
g fo
r the
H
C. T
he C
hef d
u C
abin
et p
rovi
des
info
rmal
on
the
job
train
ing
in U
N
rule
s an
d pr
otoc
ols
to n
ew H
Cs.
262 U
NH
CR
has
est
ablis
hed
a G
loba
l Le
arni
ng C
entre
(GLC
) in
Bud
apes
t to
cons
olid
ate
its le
arni
ng a
ctiv
ities
an
d pr
ogra
mm
es. I
t has
a p
ositi
on d
edic
ated
to d
evel
opin
g an
d de
liver
ing
train
ing
prog
ram
mes
for s
enio
r man
agem
ent b
ut th
is d
oes
not i
nclu
de th
e H
C, D
eput
y or
Ass
ista
nt H
Cs.
263
How
ever
, the
y ca
n as
k fo
r thi
s ad
ditio
nal t
rain
ing
if ne
eded
.
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent c
riter
ia
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p in
th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
If m
embe
r sta
tes
are
cont
ent w
ith th
e w
ork
of th
e H
C, t
he S
G w
ill no
min
ate
him
/her
for r
e-el
ectio
n by
the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y.26
4 The
re is
no
form
al a
ppra
isal
pro
cess
.2
Are
oth
er q
ualifi
ed c
andi
date
s co
nsid
ered
in th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
Trad
ition
ally
the
HC
is re
-ele
cted
by
the
GA
if s
/he
stan
ds. T
here
is n
o st
ated
tim
e lim
it; th
e H
C c
an s
tand
for a
third
man
date
.Th
e G
ener
al A
ssem
bly
rare
ly g
oes
to a
full
vote
as
the
HC
is n
orm
ally
reap
poin
ted
by c
onse
nsus
.265
Oth
er n
omin
ees
will
be p
ut fo
rwar
d on
ly if
ther
e is
no
t a c
onse
nsus
.V.
The
lead
er h
as th
e au
thor
ity a
nd m
echa
nism
s to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
The
UN
HC
R S
tatu
te s
tate
s th
at th
e H
C s
hall
follo
w ‘p
olic
y di
rect
ives
’ fro
m th
e G
ener
al A
ssem
bly
or E
CO
SO
C, a
nd th
at th
e of
fice
may
en
gage
in ‘s
uch
addi
tiona
l act
iviti
es’ a
s th
e G
ener
al A
ssem
bly
may
de
term
ine.
266
The
HC
can
acc
ept,
influ
ence
and
gen
erat
e po
licy
dire
ctiv
es in
the
Gen
eral
Ass
embl
y, E
CO
SO
C
and
ExC
om.26
7 The
HC
set
s U
NH
CR
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in c
onsu
ltatio
n w
ith s
enio
r man
agem
ent,
field
ope
ratio
ns, p
erso
ns o
f con
cern
, par
tner
s an
d m
embe
r sta
tes.
The
se p
riorit
ies
have
evo
lved
, as
refle
cted
in th
e S
trate
gic
Rev
iew
, for
inst
ance
U
NH
CR
has
dev
elop
ed a
n ‘a
ge, g
ende
r and
di
vers
ity’ a
ppro
ach
and
focu
sed
incr
ease
d at
tent
ion
on s
exua
l and
gen
der b
ased
vio
lenc
e in
ope
ratio
ns
and
on L
GB
TI p
erso
ns o
f con
cern
.268
49Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
2D
oes
the
IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies?
UN
HC
R h
as a
num
ber o
f mec
hani
sms,
incl
udin
g: it
s gl
obal
nee
ds
asse
ssm
ent (
whi
ch id
entifi
es it
s ne
eds-
base
d an
nual
bud
get,
base
d up
on c
onsu
ltatio
n w
ith p
erso
ns o
f con
cern
and
par
tner
s), t
he G
loba
l S
trate
gic
Prio
ritie
s, E
XCO
M c
oncl
usio
ns, t
he a
nnua
l HC
’s D
ialo
gues
on
Pro
tect
ion
Cha
lleng
es.26
9 3
Wha
t per
cent
age
of re
sour
ces
are
set
asid
e fo
r spe
cial
initi
ativ
es d
ecid
ed b
y an
d co
ntro
lled
by a
sub
set o
f the
full
mem
bers
hip?
UN
HC
R is
alm
ost c
ompl
etel
y vo
lunt
arily
fund
ed a
nd h
as a
ver
y sm
all
UN
regu
lar b
udge
t. 27
0 In
2012
, 98%
of f
undi
ng w
as v
olun
tary
and
onl
y 2%
cam
e fro
m U
N R
egul
ar B
udge
t (as
sess
ed c
ontri
butio
ns) t
o co
ver
adm
inis
trativ
e co
sts.
271 E
xCom
mus
t app
rove
UN
HC
R’s
bud
get,
and
even
sup
plem
enta
ry a
ppea
ls w
hich
are
issu
ed d
urin
g th
e ye
ar.
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
UN
HC
R c
ondu
cts
Glo
bal S
taff
Sur
veys
regu
larly
. Th
ese
wer
e fir
st a
dmin
iste
red
in 2
006
and
have
bec
ome
a re
gula
r bi
annu
al e
xerc
ise.
The
HC
has
task
ed th
e D
eput
y H
C w
ith fo
llow
ing-
up o
n re
com
men
datio
ns th
at c
ome
out o
f the
sta
ff su
rvey
. 272 A
ccor
ding
to T
urk
and
Eyst
er (2
010)
, re
spon
ses
from
the
surv
ey h
ave
guid
ed H
uman
R
esou
rces
refo
rm a
nd re
sulte
d in
cha
nges
to
UN
HC
R’s
pos
tings
and
pro
mot
ions
pro
cedu
res.
273
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
The
HC
is n
ot a
sses
sed
form
ally
on
the
men
torin
g or
coa
chin
g of
su
bord
inat
es.
How
ever
, the
role
mea
ns s
/he
info
rmal
ly m
ento
rs h
is/h
er te
am o
f se
nior
man
ager
s (2
0 bu
reau
hea
ds a
nd d
irect
ors
who
mee
t wee
kly
as
wel
l as
the
‘troi
ka’ o
f the
Dep
uty
HC
and
the
Ass
ista
nt H
Cs)
. 274
VII.
The
IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
The
HC
mee
ts re
gula
rly w
ith th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Com
mitt
ee. S
/he
has
also
est
ablis
hed
info
rmal
dia
logu
es w
ith
dono
rs w
ho g
ive
mor
e th
an $
20m
illion
, Reg
iona
l Gro
ups
and
refu
gee
host
ing
coun
tries
.In
add
ition
, the
HC
hol
ds: a
n an
nual
mee
ting
with
NG
Os,
regu
lar h
igh-
leve
l bila
tera
l mee
tings
with
key
hu
man
itaria
n ag
enci
es, a
nd a
dia
logu
e on
Pro
tect
ion
Cha
lleng
es. U
NH
CR
incl
udes
per
sons
of c
once
rn a
nd
partn
ers
in th
eir p
lann
ing
and
prio
rity
setti
ng.
VIII.
The
IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
lead
ersh
ip th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
The
Pol
icy
Dev
elop
men
t and
Eva
luat
ion
Sec
tion
is p
art o
f UN
HC
R’s
Exe
cutiv
e D
irect
ion
and
Man
agem
ent
Div
isio
n an
d re
ports
dire
ctly
to th
e H
C. T
here
are
a n
umbe
r of o
ther
ove
rsig
ht fu
nctio
ns w
hich
eng
age
seni
or
man
agem
ent w
ith e
valu
atio
ns a
nd fi
ndin
gs o
f oth
er o
vers
ight
mec
hani
sm.
50 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
i. W
orld
Ban
k G
roup
(WB
G)
Org
aniz
atio
nTh
e W
BG
con
sist
s of
five
inst
itutio
ns: I
nter
natio
nal B
ank
for R
econ
stru
ctio
n an
d D
evel
opm
ent (
IBR
D),27
5 Int
erna
tiona
l Dev
elop
men
t Ass
ocia
tion
(IDA
),276
Inte
rnat
iona
l Fin
ance
Cor
pora
tion
(IFC
),277 M
ultil
ater
al In
vest
men
t Gua
rant
ee
Age
ncy
(MIG
A),27
8 and
Inte
rnat
iona
l Cen
tre fo
r Set
tlem
ent o
f Inv
estm
ent D
ispu
tes
(ICS
ID).27
9 The
WB
G is
hea
dqua
rtere
d in
Was
hing
ton
DC
and
has
mor
e th
an 1
24
coun
try o
ffice
s.
Gov
erna
nce
Man
y of
the
bank
’s in
stitu
tiona
l fea
ture
s re
sem
ble
thos
e of
the
IMF.
Mem
ber
coun
tries
(188
) gov
ern
the
WB
G th
roug
h th
e bo
ard
of g
over
nors
and
boa
rd o
f ex
ecut
ive
dire
ctor
s.28
0 The
25
resi
dent
exe
cutiv
e di
rect
ors
(ED
s) a
re re
spon
sibl
e fo
r the
con
duct
of t
he b
ank’
s ge
nera
l ope
ratio
ns u
nder
del
egat
ed p
ower
s fro
m th
e bo
ard
of g
over
nors
.
Five
ED
s ar
e ap
poin
ted
by th
ose
mem
ber s
tate
s w
ith th
e la
rges
t sha
res
(Fra
nce,
G
erm
any,
Jap
an, U
nite
d K
ingd
om a
nd U
nite
d S
tate
s). T
he re
mai
ning
25
EDs
are
elec
ted
ever
y 2
year
s by
con
stitu
enci
es m
ade
up o
f the
rem
aini
ng m
embe
rs.
Sau
di A
rabi
a, C
hina
and
the
Rus
sian
Fed
erat
ion,
how
ever
, are
sin
gle-
mem
ber
chai
rs, m
eani
ng th
at th
ey e
xerc
ise
thei
r vot
es a
lone
rath
er th
an d
oing
so
in
cons
titue
ncie
s of
mul
tiple
mem
ber s
tate
s. T
he E
Ds
sele
ct th
e pr
esid
ent.
Jim
Yon
g K
im is
the
WB
G’s
12t
h pr
esid
ent a
nd is
cha
irman
of t
he b
oard
of E
Ds
(ele
cted
in
2012
).
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Five
yea
rs; c
an b
e re
new
ed tw
ice.
Inco
me
The
boar
d of
ED
s ap
prov
ed a
ppro
xim
atel
y $3
1.55
billi
on in
fina
ncia
l ass
ista
nce
in fi
scal
yea
r 201
3, w
ith $
40.8
4 bi
llion
pred
icte
d fo
r 201
4.28
1 The
201
3 to
tal
com
pris
ed $
15.2
billi
on in
IBR
D le
ndin
g an
d $1
6.3
billio
n in
IDA
sup
port,
with
an
adm
inis
trativ
e bu
dget
of a
ppro
xim
atel
y $1
.9 b
illion
for fi
scal
yea
r 201
4.28
2 In
2012
, Ji
m Y
ong
Kim
, the
new
pre
side
nt, a
nnou
nced
a th
ree-
year
pla
n to
dec
reas
e th
e ba
nk’s
bud
get b
y 8%
, or $
400
milli
on.28
3
Num
ber
of s
taff
Ove
r 9,0
00 e
mpl
oyee
s fro
m m
ore
than
168
cou
ntrie
s.28
4
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pA
n un
writ
ten
rule
exi
sts
that
the
US
pre
side
nt s
elec
ts th
e W
BG
pre
side
nt.28
5 Up
until
201
1, th
e ch
oice
of a
n A
mer
ican
as
pres
iden
t of t
he W
BG
was
not
ope
nly
chal
leng
ed b
y th
e pr
opos
al o
f a c
ompe
ting
cand
idat
e. In
that
yea
r, ho
wev
er, t
wo
non-
US
can
dida
tes
– Jo
se A
nton
io O
cam
po (C
olom
bia)
and
Ngo
zi O
konj
o-Iw
eala
(N
iger
ia) –
wer
e pu
t for
war
d.28
6 Jim
Yon
g K
im, a
n A
mer
ican
, won
the
nom
inat
ion.
The
follo
win
g w
ere
past
pre
side
nts
of th
e ba
nk: E
ugen
e M
eyer
(194
6-19
46),
John
J.
McC
loy
(194
7-19
49),
Euge
ne R
. Bla
ck, S
r. (1
949-
1963
), G
eorg
e W
oods
(196
3-19
68),
Rob
ert M
cNam
ara
(196
8-19
81),
Ald
en W
. Cla
usen
(198
1-19
86),
Bar
ber
Con
able
(198
6-19
91),
Lew
is T
. Pre
ston
(199
1-19
95),
Jam
es W
olfe
nsoh
n (1
995-
2005
), P
aul W
olfo
witz
(200
5-20
07) a
nd R
ober
t Zoe
llick
(200
7-20
12).
App
oint
ed p
resi
dent
in 2
012,
Kim
pro
pose
d a
num
ber o
f ins
titut
iona
l cha
nges
in
2013
afte
r a s
urve
y of
app
roxi
mat
ely
10,0
00 e
mpl
oyee
s re
veal
ed a
“cu
lture
of f
ear”
, “f
ear o
f ris
k” a
nd a
“te
rrib
le”
envi
ronm
ent f
or c
olla
bora
tion.
287 K
im’s
cha
nges
hav
e,
how
ever
, bee
n m
et w
ith c
ritic
ism
. The
dec
isio
n to
alte
r the
ban
k’s
orga
niza
tion,
for
exam
ple,
has
bee
n de
emed
unn
eces
sary
.288 H
iring
the
man
agem
ent c
onsu
lting
firm
M
cKin
sey
& C
ompa
ny fo
r the
rest
ruct
urin
g w
as a
lso
cont
rove
rsia
l, gi
ven
that
the
firm
had
des
igne
d th
e ex
istin
g st
ruct
ure
(and
all
prev
ious
stru
ctur
es s
ince
the
bank
’s
1972
reor
gani
zatio
n un
der P
resi
dent
McN
amar
a)28
9 , an
d ha
d co
mpe
ted
dire
ctly
with
th
e W
orld
Ban
k in
adv
isin
g go
vern
men
ts.29
0
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryTh
e W
orld
Ban
k’s
orga
niza
tiona
l ref
orm
s co
me
at a
tim
e of
incr
easi
ng c
ompe
titio
n fro
m o
ther
mul
tilat
eral
dev
elop
men
t ins
titut
ions
. A s
tudy
by
Hum
phre
y an
d M
icha
elow
a (2
013)
, for
exa
mpl
e, fo
und
that
, und
er c
erta
in m
acro
econ
omic
ci
rcum
stan
ces,
indi
vidu
al b
orro
wer
s in
Lat
in A
mer
ica
ofte
n pr
efer
to w
ork
with
the
IAD
B a
nd C
AF
due
to th
eir f
aste
r pro
cess
ing
times
and
less
bur
eauc
ratic
soc
ial a
nd
econ
omic
lend
ing
requ
irem
ents
.291 F
urth
erm
ore,
num
erou
s ob
serv
ers
see
the
New
D
evel
opm
ent B
ank,
com
pose
d of
Bra
zil,
the
Rus
sia
Fede
ratio
n, In
dia,
Chi
na a
nd
Sou
th A
frica
(BR
ICS
), as
a p
oten
tial c
ompe
titor
to th
e W
orld
Ban
k an
d th
e IM
F.29
2
51Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
sO
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
Yes.
Ter
ms
of a
ppoi
ntm
ents
wer
e re
cent
ly m
ade
publ
icly
ava
ilabl
e,
alth
ough
Bob
Zoe
llick’
s co
ntra
ct is
eas
ier t
o fin
d th
an D
r Kim
’s.29
3 Th
e fo
rced
resi
gnat
ion
of W
orld
Ban
k P
resi
dent
Pau
l W
olfo
witz
in 2
007
for v
iola
ting
cont
ract
ual c
laus
es
rela
ting
to e
thic
al a
nd g
over
ning
prin
cipl
es in
dica
tes
that
the
term
s of
refe
renc
e fo
r lea
ders
hip
sele
ctio
n ar
e ta
ken
serio
usly
and
are
enf
orce
able
.294
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip s
elec
tion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
All
mem
ber s
tate
s vo
te d
urin
g el
ectio
ns a
nd re
-ele
ctio
ns e
ither
al
one
(as
in th
e ca
se o
f Sau
di A
rabi
a, R
ussi
a an
d C
hina
) or v
ia th
eir
cons
titue
ncy
repr
esen
tativ
e.
In p
ract
ice,
mem
bers
app
rove
the
cand
idat
e pu
t fo
rth b
y th
e U
nite
d S
tate
s.29
5
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
nce
agai
nst t
he p
ublis
hed
crite
ria?
Yes.
Eac
h of
the
Wor
ld B
ank
Gro
up o
rgan
izat
ions
ope
rate
s ac
cord
ing
to p
roce
dure
s es
tabl
ishe
d by
its
Arti
cles
of A
gree
men
t, w
hich
incl
ude
term
s of
ser
vice
s fo
r the
Pre
side
nt.29
6
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
ac
coun
tabi
lity
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
Ther
e is
no
proc
edur
e fo
r tha
t. S
ome
set p
erso
nal s
tand
ards
dur
ing
inau
gura
l spe
eche
s or
pro
noun
cem
ents
at t
he B
oard
mee
tings
(see
th
e m
inut
es).29
7
Lead
ers
focu
s on
bro
ad s
trate
gic
poin
ts, b
ut th
ere
is n
o se
t of c
omm
itmen
ts.29
8 Rob
ert M
cNam
ara
and
Geo
rge
Woo
ds a
re th
ough
t to
be m
ost c
lear
on
thei
r per
form
ance
obj
ectiv
es.29
9 2
Is th
ere
an e
xpec
tatio
n th
at th
e le
ader
tran
slat
es o
vera
rchi
ng g
oals
of
orga
niza
tion
into
a m
anag
eabl
e an
d cl
ear s
trate
gy?
Onl
y th
roug
h su
bsec
tion
and
stra
tegi
c re
ports
. Im
porta
nt to
not
e th
at
expe
ctat
ions
com
e fro
m a
ver
y di
vers
e gr
oup
of s
take
hold
ers
(see
W
BG
Stra
tegy
for 2
030
appr
oved
in A
pril
2013
).300
The
deba
te is
als
o ab
out d
efini
ng e
xpec
tatio
ns
(diff
eren
t at d
iffer
ent t
imes
) and
wha
t lea
ders
hip
does
to u
nder
stan
d w
hy re
sults
don
’t m
eet t
hem
.301
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Ye
s. A
ll th
e m
id-le
vel e
mpl
oyee
s ha
ve to
dis
clos
e fin
anci
al in
vest
men
ts,
incl
udin
g th
e P
resi
dent
. A s
epar
ate
Cod
e of
Con
duct
for B
oard
O
ffici
als
sets
the
sam
e st
anda
rd.30
2
In p
ract
ice,
the
Ban
k’s
com
plia
nce
with
the
disc
losu
re p
rinci
ple
was
pro
ven
on th
e W
olfo
witz
’s
case
in 2
007.
The
Wor
ld B
ank
Boa
rd lo
st
confi
denc
e in
the
Pre
side
nt W
olfo
witz
afte
r a s
peci
al
inve
stig
ativ
e co
mm
ittee
foun
d he
had
vio
late
d hi
s co
ntra
ct b
y br
eaki
ng e
thic
al a
nd g
over
ning
rule
s in
arr
angi
ng a
pro
mot
ion
pack
age
for h
is p
artn
er
Sha
ha A
li R
aza.
Wol
fow
itz re
sign
ed b
efor
e hi
s te
rm
had
ende
d.30
3 4
Is th
e le
ader
obl
iged
to a
dher
e to
a
publ
ishe
d co
de o
f eth
ics?
Yes.
Cod
e of
eth
ics
equa
lly a
pplie
s to
eve
ry s
taff
mem
ber.
Ther
e is
an
Offi
ce o
f Eth
ics
and
Bus
ines
s C
ondu
ct, a
n et
hics
hel
plin
e, a
Cod
e of
C
ondu
ct fo
r Sta
ff (c
reat
ed in
200
3), a
s w
ell a
s a
Cod
e of
Con
duct
for
Boa
rd O
ffici
als.
It h
as b
een
rece
ntly
refin
ed to
incl
ude,
for e
xam
ple,
se
xual
har
assm
ent (
due
to a
cces
sion
of w
omen
at t
he W
BG
).304
52 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
ersh
ip s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
Yes,
but
not
to th
e sa
me
exte
nt a
s th
e re
gula
r sta
ff. T
he e
valu
atio
n of
the
orga
niza
tion
and
the
Pre
side
nt a
re o
ne a
nd th
e sa
me
if th
e P
resi
dent
is h
eld
resp
onsi
ble
for i
ts p
erfo
rman
ce. I
nter
nal E
valu
atio
n G
roup
(IEG
) “Ev
alua
tion
of th
e W
orld
Ban
k’s
Org
aniz
atio
nal
Effe
ctiv
enes
s”30
5 rep
ort p
ublis
hed
in A
pril
2012
incl
uded
asp
ects
of
lead
ersh
ip.
Ther
e ar
e in
form
al p
roce
sses
that
info
rm th
e m
anag
emen
t.306
2Is
rem
uner
atio
n or
ben
efits
tied
to
the
outc
omes
of t
he p
erfo
rman
ce
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e?
No,
var
iatio
n is
ver
y lim
ited.
Sal
arie
s fo
r top
man
agem
ent a
re d
iscl
osed
in
ann
ual r
epor
ts.30
7
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng
and
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ties
to
addr
ess
wea
knes
ses
over
tim
e?
Onl
y on
an
ad-h
oc b
asis
. D
r Kim
has
a p
erso
nal c
oach
nam
ed M
arsh
all
Gol
dsm
ith.30
8
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent c
riter
ia
cons
ider
ed b
y th
e fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p in
th
e re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s?
No
evid
ence
.Th
e tw
o B
retto
n W
oods
org
aniz
atio
ns –
IMF
and
Wor
ld B
ank
– sh
ow th
at re
-app
oint
men
t is
base
d on
two
crite
ria: (
1) w
heth
er th
e in
cum
bent
wis
hes
to
stay
; and
(2) t
he d
omin
ant p
oliti
cs.30
9
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Yes.
In
pra
ctic
e, c
ompe
ting
non-
Am
eric
an c
andi
date
s ha
ve n
ot b
een
cons
ider
ed u
ntil
the
2011
ele
ctio
n in
whi
ch tw
o no
n-U
S c
andi
date
s w
ere
put f
orth
for
elec
tion.
310
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
Yes,
the
Pre
side
nt c
an re
com
men
d sh
ifts
of s
trate
gy th
orou
gh
deliv
erin
g re
ports
for t
he D
evel
opm
ent C
omm
ittee
.311 T
he g
over
nors
ap
prov
e th
e pr
opos
als.
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
Unc
lear
. Am
ong
mec
hani
sms
that
par
tly fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
stra
tegi
es: r
epor
ts o
f the
Dev
elop
men
t Com
mitt
ee; a
gend
a an
d su
mm
arie
s of
mee
tings
; App
rais
al re
ports
(Int
erna
l Com
plet
ion
Rep
orts
(IC
R);
Pro
ject
Com
plet
ion
Rep
orts
(PC
R) e
tc.);
Inte
rnal
Ev
alua
tion
Gro
up (I
EG) r
epor
ts (t
he u
nit r
epor
ts to
the
Boa
rd o
f G
over
nors
, not
man
agem
ent o
f the
Ban
k); I
nter
natio
nal D
evel
opm
ent
Ass
ocia
tion
(IDA
) rep
orts
.
The
only
con
stra
ints
are
the
Arti
cles
of
Agr
eem
ent.31
2
53Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
Ther
e is
a ra
pid
grow
th in
“tru
st fu
nds”
, non
-dis
cret
iona
ry b
udge
t th
at is
bei
ng e
arm
arke
d.31
3 Ide
ally
, tru
st fu
nds
wou
ld b
e cl
osel
y lin
ked
to th
e W
orld
Ban
k’s
stra
tegy
, pro
cess
es a
nd o
vers
ight
. How
ever
, si
nce
trust
fund
s ad
d 25
% to
the
Ban
k’s
adm
inis
trativ
e bu
dget
, the
in
cent
ives
to a
lign
are
wea
k.
In a
dditi
on, t
he b
igge
st c
ontri
buto
rs in
201
2 ar
e U
S a
nd U
K ($
4,5b
n,
mor
e th
an o
ne th
ird o
f tot
al),
whi
ch in
crea
ses
risk
of c
aptu
re b
y th
ese
two
coun
tries
.
Trus
t fun
ds in
fluen
ce b
ehav
iour
s an
d pr
iorit
ies;
do
nors
wan
t thi
s. It
als
o di
stra
cts
othe
r res
ourc
es
(not
onl
y fin
anci
al, b
ut a
lso
hum
an re
sour
ces,
for
exam
ple)
. Als
o co
nsid
er R
eim
burs
able
Adv
isor
y S
ervi
ces
– w
hen
coun
tries
ask
for e
xtra
ser
vice
s (m
anag
emen
t, fo
r exa
mpl
e, R
AM
P p
rogr
amm
e w
here
for a
fee
the
Wor
ld B
ank
unde
rtake
s m
anag
emen
t of a
sset
s).31
4
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes.
The
re a
re: (
1) b
road
sta
ff su
rvey
s co
nduc
ted
ever
y 18
mon
ths
to re
veal
sta
ff sa
tisfa
ctio
n w
ith m
anag
ers,
(2) “
360
degr
ees”
exe
rcis
e w
here
one
sol
icits
inpu
ts o
f sub
ordi
nate
s an
d (3
) a m
echa
nism
of p
eer
revi
ew in
pla
ce to
mak
e re
com
men
datio
ns fo
r cor
rect
ion.
Jim
Yon
g K
im re
cent
ly c
ondu
cted
a s
urve
y of
its
10,0
00 e
mpl
oyee
s. It
reve
aled
a
“cul
ture
of f
ear,”
per
vasi
ve “
fear
of r
isk”
and
a “
terr
ible
” en
viro
nmen
t for
co
llabo
ratio
n.31
5
Sta
ff su
rvey
s ha
ve b
een
play
ing
a su
rpris
ingl
y la
rge
role
sin
ce K
im c
ame.
316
2Is
exe
cutiv
e m
anag
emen
t ass
esse
d on
men
torin
g an
d co
achi
ng o
f su
bord
inat
e st
aff?
No
evid
ence
. It
is “
not a
prio
rity
ques
tion”
.317
54 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
With
in it
s S
ocia
l Dev
elop
men
t Dep
artm
ent,
the
Par
ticip
atio
n an
d C
ivic
Eng
agem
ent G
roup
pro
mot
es th
e pa
rtici
patio
n of
peo
ple
and
thei
r org
aniz
atio
ns to
influ
ence
inst
itutio
ns, p
olic
ies
and
proc
esse
s fo
r equ
itabl
e an
d su
stai
nabl
e de
velo
pmen
t. Th
e gr
oup
assi
sts
Wor
ld B
ank
units
, clie
nt g
over
nmen
ts a
nd c
ivil
soci
ety
orga
niza
tions
. A C
ivil
Soc
iety
Pol
icy
Foru
m, o
rgan
ized
join
tly w
ith th
e W
orld
Ban
k, in
par
alle
l with
the
Ann
ual
and
Spr
ing
Mee
tings
of t
he IM
F an
d W
orld
Ban
k th
at c
over
s a
wid
e ra
nge
of to
pics
, inc
ludi
ng m
any
sugg
este
d by
CS
Os
them
selv
es. C
SO
con
sulta
tions
are
now
com
mon
pra
ctic
e (if
not
requ
ired)
as
part
of p
roje
ct
appr
aisa
l pro
cess
es, n
otifi
catio
n of
pro
cure
men
t bid
s, a
nd p
art o
f the
WD
R p
roce
ss (p
ublis
hing
ear
ly c
once
pt
note
s an
d in
itial
dra
fts fo
r pub
lic c
omm
ents
).Th
ere
are
also
stru
ctur
es in
pla
ce:
Glo
bal P
artn
ersh
ip fo
r Soc
ial A
ccou
ntab
ility,
a m
ulti-
dono
r tru
st fu
nd to
sup
port
CS
Os
that
wor
k in
soc
ial
acco
unta
bilit
yS
eats
in c
omm
ittee
s an
d W
B a
dvis
ory
boar
ds a
nd g
over
ning
bod
ies
(non
-vot
ing
seat
) for
WB
trus
t fun
ds
(ofte
n do
nor-
spec
ific)
Par
ticip
atio
n at
WB
Ann
ual m
eetin
gIn
volv
emen
ts o
n pr
ojec
ts, c
onsu
ltatio
ns
Dev
elop
men
t Gra
nt F
acilit
y (fi
nanc
e an
d P
artn
ersh
ips)
Exte
rnal
Indu
stry
Initi
ativ
e (E
II) w
hen
WB
act
s as
a tr
uste
e an
d ad
min
iste
rs m
oney
Thro
ugh
coun
try o
ffice
s –
dono
r mee
tings
and
cou
ntry
rela
tions
Th
roug
h pr
ojec
ts –
rela
tions
on
the
grou
nd
Sta
keho
lder
s su
rvey
ed b
y M
OPA
N in
201
2 ra
ted
the
Ban
k ad
equa
te in
coo
rdin
atin
g w
ith c
lient
s in
the
desi
gn o
f pro
ject
s, fo
r the
cla
rity
of it
s pr
oced
ures
, flex
ibilit
y, a
nd re
spon
sive
ness
to c
hang
es in
the
proj
ect
impl
emen
tatio
n co
ntex
t. In
thei
r writ
ten
com
men
ts, t
hey
note
d th
at th
e B
ank’
s pr
oced
ures
are
rigi
d an
d th
at
bure
aucr
atic
pro
cess
es o
ften
dela
y im
plem
enta
tion.
318
The
new
stra
tegy
pro
pose
s th
at th
e B
ank
will
focu
s on
cus
tom
ized
dev
elop
men
t sol
utio
ns a
nd a
lign
all i
ts a
ctiv
ities
with
the
two
goal
s: w
ork
mor
e in
pa
rtner
ship
with
oth
ers,
incl
udin
g th
e pr
ivat
e se
ctor
; an
d si
gnifi
cant
ly in
crea
se c
olla
bora
tion
acro
ss it
s ag
enci
es.31
9
VIII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
lead
ersh
ip th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
Inde
pend
ent E
valu
atio
n G
roup
’s (I
EG) s
trate
gic
goal
is to
influ
ence
the
Wor
ld B
ank
Gro
up’s
abi
lity
to a
chie
ve
deve
lopm
ent o
utco
mes
glo
bally
and
with
its
partn
er c
ount
ries.
It re
ports
dire
ctly
to th
e B
oard
s of
Exe
cutiv
e D
irect
ors,
whi
ch o
vers
ee IE
G’s
wor
k th
roug
h th
e C
omm
ittee
on
Dev
elop
men
t Effe
ctiv
enes
s. T
he IE
G
cond
ucte
d a
clie
nt s
urve
y in
201
2 to
det
erm
ine
whe
ther
the
Ban
k w
as m
eetin
g cl
ient
s’ n
eeds
and
how
they
pe
rcei
ve it
s im
pact
. The
sur
vey
findi
ngs
are
base
d on
iden
tical
sur
veys
car
ried
out a
mon
g th
ree
audi
ence
s:
Wor
ld B
ank
Gro
up B
oard
mem
bers
and
adv
iser
s, W
orld
Ban
k G
roup
sta
ff, a
nd e
xter
nal s
take
hold
ers
(aca
dem
ia, p
rivat
e co
mpa
nies
, non
gove
rnm
enta
l org
aniz
atio
ns, g
over
nmen
ts, i
nter
natio
nal o
rgan
izat
ions
, do
nor o
rgan
izat
ions
, and
med
ia).
The
Ban
k al
so fe
atur
es th
e D
evel
opm
ent I
mpa
ct E
valu
atio
n In
itiat
ive
(DIM
E),
whi
ch s
eeks
to in
crea
se th
e us
e of
impa
ct e
valu
atio
n (IE
) in
the
desi
gn a
nd im
plem
enta
tion
of b
ank
proj
ects
. D
IME
eval
uate
s pr
ogra
mm
es b
ased
on
IE s
tand
ards
, thu
s en
tailin
g an
add
ition
al in
tern
al e
valu
atio
n of
pe
rform
ance
.320
It is
goo
d th
at IE
G a
nd th
e B
ank
carr
y ou
t suc
h su
rvey
s, b
ut th
e B
ank
as a
glo
bal p
laye
r has
to
wei
gh c
ount
ry p
riorit
ies
with
glo
bal p
riorit
ies
and
natu
rally
they
don
’t m
atch
.321
55Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
j. W
orld
Hea
lth O
rgan
izat
ion
(WH
O)
Org
aniz
atio
nW
HO
, the
dire
ctin
g an
d co
ordi
natin
g au
thor
ity fo
r hea
lth w
ithin
the
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
sy
stem
, is
resp
onsi
ble
for p
rovi
ding
lead
ersh
ip o
n gl
obal
hea
lth m
atte
rs, s
hapi
ng
the
heal
th re
sear
ch a
gend
a an
d se
tting
nor
ms
and
stan
dard
s. H
eadq
uarte
red
in G
enev
a, S
witz
erla
nd, i
t has
six
regi
onal
offi
ces
(Bra
zzav
ille, t
he R
epub
lic o
f C
ongo
; Was
hing
ton
DC
, US
A; N
ew D
elhi
, Ind
ia; C
open
hage
n, D
enm
ark;
Cai
ro,
Egyp
t; an
d M
anila
, Phi
lippi
nes)
and
150
cou
ntry
offi
ces.
Gov
erna
nce
The
194
mem
ber c
ount
ries
gove
rn W
HO
, mee
ting
annu
ally
at t
he W
orld
Hea
lth
Ass
embl
y (W
HA
). Th
e as
sem
bly
appo
ints
the
dire
ctor
-gen
eral
(DG
), su
perv
ises
th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
finan
cial
pol
icie
s, a
nd re
view
s an
d ap
prov
es th
e pr
opos
ed
prog
ram
me
budg
et. T
he W
HA
is a
dvis
ed b
y th
e ex
ecut
ive
boar
d (3
4 m
embe
rs),
who
are
tech
nica
lly q
ualifi
ed in
the
heal
th fi
eld
and
are
elec
ted
for a
thre
e-ye
ar
term
.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Five
yea
rs.
Inco
me
The
prop
osed
bud
get f
or 2
014-
2015
is $
3.98
billi
on.
Num
ber
of s
taff
8,00
0, s
prea
d ov
er h
eadq
uarte
rs, r
egio
nal o
ffice
s an
d co
untri
es.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pP
ast d
irect
or-g
ener
als
wer
e: B
. Chi
shol
m (f
rom
Can
ada,
194
8-19
53);
M.G
. C
anda
u (B
razi
l, 19
53-1
973)
; H. M
ahle
r (D
enm
ark,
197
3-19
88);
H. N
akaj
ima
(Jap
an, 1
988-
1998
); G
.H. B
rund
tland
(Nor
way
, 199
8-20
03);
Lee
Jong
-woo
k (R
epub
lic o
f Kor
ea, 2
003-
2006
[die
d in
offi
ce])
and
And
ers
Nor
dströ
m (S
wed
en,
2006
-200
7 [a
ctin
g D
G, r
epla
cing
Lee
]).
Mar
gare
t Cha
n, th
e cu
rrent
DG
, was
app
oint
ed o
n 9
Nov
embe
r 200
6.
Ther
e ha
ve b
een
no o
utw
ard
scan
dals
rega
rdin
g an
y of
the
lead
ers.
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryU
nder
Cha
n’s
lead
ersh
ip, W
HO
has
und
erta
ken
maj
or fi
nanc
ial,
man
ager
ial a
nd
gove
rnan
ce-r
elat
ed re
form
, lay
ing
out i
ts p
roje
cted
tim
elin
e, in
term
edia
te c
heck
-in
poin
ts a
nd g
uide
lines
. Thi
s re
form
has
bee
n bo
th in
tern
al a
nd e
xter
nal-f
acin
g, th
e la
tter c
over
ing
WH
O’s
act
iviti
es w
ith e
xter
nal s
take
hold
ers,
incl
udin
g co
untri
es a
nd
non-
stat
e en
titie
s.
56 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
The
re is
no
evid
ence
of a
“te
rms
of re
fere
nce”
onl
ine
or in
any
pub
lic
reco
rd. H
owev
er, t
he W
orld
Hea
lth O
rgan
izat
ion
has
a de
taile
d,
thor
ough
pro
cess
of n
omin
atin
g an
d el
ectin
g th
e D
irect
or-G
ener
al,
the
deta
ils o
f whi
ch a
re o
n th
e w
ebsi
te, a
nd p
art o
f the
pub
lic re
cord
s.
This
pro
cess
incl
udes
the
step
s ne
cess
ary
for m
embe
r sta
tes
to
nom
inat
e an
app
ropr
iate
can
dida
te, d
etai
ls o
f the
qua
lifica
tions
nee
ded
to b
e a
cand
idat
e, s
peci
fic d
eadl
ines
and
inte
rvie
w g
uide
lines
.322
Ther
e is
a la
rge,
ong
oing
dis
cuss
ion
on th
e el
ectio
n of
the
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
, and
it h
as b
een
high
-leve
l ag
enda
item
in th
e 13
2nd
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
mee
ting
in 2
013.
The
cur
rent
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
has
bee
n a
stro
ng p
ropo
nent
of b
ringi
ng c
larit
y to
the
proc
ess
of s
elec
tion,
and
has
suc
ceed
ing
in m
akin
g ke
y ch
ange
s to
ens
ure
grea
ter t
rans
pare
ncy.
Th
e un
ique
asp
ect o
f WH
O is
that
all
the
Reg
iona
l D
irect
ors
(RD
s) a
re a
lso
elec
ted
by th
e m
embe
r st
ates
of t
he re
spec
tive
regi
on, a
s op
pose
d to
nom
inat
ed th
roug
h ot
her U
nite
d N
atio
ns
orga
niza
tions
2W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
the
mem
bers
hip
is in
volv
ed in
lead
ersh
ip e
lect
ion
and
re-e
lect
ion
in p
ract
ice?
The
Wor
ld H
ealth
Ass
embl
y (c
ompo
sed
of a
ll 19
4 co
untri
es) e
lect
s th
e D
irect
or-G
ener
al, o
n th
e re
com
men
datio
n of
the
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
(c
ompo
sed
of 3
4 m
embe
rs).
The
mem
bers
hip
of th
e Ex
ecut
ive
Boa
rd is
ske
wed
be
caus
e th
e w
eigh
ting
give
n to
diff
eren
t reg
ions
is
not
bas
ed o
n po
pula
tion,
but
rath
er o
n th
e nu
mbe
r of m
embe
r sta
tes
in th
at re
gion
. The
re
is a
lso
cons
ider
able
var
iabi
lity
in th
e co
nsul
tativ
e pr
oced
ures
by
regi
on. T
here
has
bee
n so
me
frust
ratio
n by
Lat
in A
mer
ica,
Afri
ca a
nd S
outh
Asi
a du
e to
a la
ck o
f Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
repr
esen
ting
thes
e re
gion
s, b
ut it
was
bec
ause
mos
t cou
ntrie
s no
t su
ppor
ting
thei
r bid
s.3
Is th
ere
a tim
e-bo
und,
pub
lishe
d,
exha
ustiv
e pr
oces
s fo
r lea
ders
hip
elec
tion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
nce
agai
nst t
he p
ublis
hed
crite
ria?
Yes,
the
abov
e-m
entio
ned
docu
men
ts li
st o
ut th
e ex
act p
roce
dure
s,
incl
udin
g a
time-
line
and
othe
r det
ails
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion.
It
lays
out
inst
ruct
ions
for c
andi
date
s to
pro
vide
sup
porti
ng e
vide
nce
to m
atch
eac
h of
the
publ
ishe
d cr
iteria
for t
he p
ost o
f the
Dire
ctor
-G
ener
al. T
here
are
als
o se
t gui
delin
es to
sub
mit
a cu
rric
ulum
vita
e an
d ot
her i
nstit
utio
naliz
ed p
roce
sses
.
Ther
e is
als
o an
exh
aust
ive
docu
men
t whi
ch la
ys
out a
cod
e of
con
duct
to p
rom
ote
ethi
cal p
ract
ices
an
d tra
nspa
renc
y th
roug
hout
the
nom
inat
ion/
elec
tion
proc
ess.
323
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es a
ccou
ntab
ility
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
The
Dire
ctor
Gen
eral
put
forth
a c
lear
list
of p
erso
nal e
xpec
tatio
ns fr
om
her t
enur
e w
hich
she
sha
red
publ
icly
at t
he s
tart
of h
er te
rm
2Is
ther
e an
exp
ecta
tion
that
the
lead
er tr
ansl
ates
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls o
f or
gani
zatio
n in
to a
man
agea
ble
and
clea
r stra
tegy
?
No
avai
labl
e in
form
atio
n
57Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?N
o in
form
atio
n av
aila
ble
publ
icly
Ever
y st
aff,
P5
and
abov
e (in
clud
ing
the
Dire
ctor
-G
ener
al) h
as to
dec
lare
con
flict
s of
inte
rest
ann
ually
. Th
is p
roce
ss is
con
duct
ed b
y th
e le
gal t
eam
in
tern
ally
, and
is v
ery
stric
t hav
ing
been
upd
ated
re
cent
ly. T
hese
dec
lara
tions
are
con
fiden
tial
in n
atur
e, b
ut th
e or
gani
zatio
n is
look
ing
into
pu
blis
hing
them
in th
e fu
ture
, bas
ed o
n th
e U
nite
d N
atio
ns m
odel
.4
Is th
e le
ader
obl
iged
to a
dher
e to
a
publ
ishe
d co
de o
f eth
ics?
Ther
e is
a c
ode
of c
ondu
ct a
nd e
xten
sive
rule
s an
d re
gula
tions
go
vern
ing
WH
O s
taff,
324 h
owev
er, t
here
is n
othi
ng s
peci
fical
ly d
etai
led
for s
enio
r lea
ders
hip.
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
er s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
Ther
e is
no
men
tion
of a
form
al p
erfo
rman
ce a
ppra
isal
on
the
publ
ic p
orta
l. H
owev
er, t
he c
urre
nt D
irect
or-G
ener
al p
ublis
hed
a se
lf-as
sess
men
t of h
er o
wn
perfo
rman
ce a
t the
cul
min
atio
n of
her
fir
st te
rm, w
here
all
her m
anda
tes
at th
e tim
e of
her
ele
ctio
n w
ere
com
pare
d to
her
ach
ieve
men
ts. A
lthou
gh, t
his
appr
aisa
l was
n’t
cond
ucte
d ob
ject
ivel
y, it
stil
l lay
s ou
t som
e pe
rform
ance
met
rics.
Ther
e is
a v
ery
robu
st p
erfo
rman
ce p
rogr
amm
e th
roug
hout
the
orga
niza
tion
at e
very
leve
l. M
OPA
N re
view
has
hig
hlig
hted
big
cha
nges
bei
ng
unde
rtake
n by
HR
to im
prov
e th
e pr
oces
s; h
owev
er,
ther
e is
no
form
al s
yste
m o
f app
rais
al o
f the
D
irect
or-G
ener
al. S
he h
as p
revi
ousl
y co
nduc
ted
her
pers
onal
per
form
ance
app
rais
al p
ublic
ly b
ut a
s it
is
a se
lf-ev
alua
tion,
it is
not
inhe
rent
ly u
n-bi
ased
.2
Is re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
A g
uide
for m
anag
ers
in a
pply
ing
WH
O p
erfo
rman
ce c
ompe
tenc
ies
has
been
issu
ed. A
pol
icy
on re
war
ds a
nd re
cogn
ition
will
be is
sued
sh
ortly
. Fur
ther
mor
e, a
gui
de to
hel
p su
perv
isor
s m
anag
e pe
rform
ance
is
in th
e fin
al s
tage
s of
dev
elop
men
t.325
WH
O o
pera
tes
at th
e sa
me
pay
scal
e as
the
rest
of
the
Uni
ted
Nat
ions
sys
tem
, par
ticul
arly
in li
ne
with
the
UN
DP.
In p
ract
ice,
WH
O p
artia
lly fo
llow
s a
mod
el o
f rem
uner
atio
n tie
d to
out
com
es o
f the
pe
rform
ance
man
agem
ent a
nd th
ere
are
som
e w
ithin
-gra
de p
ay in
crea
ses
for h
igh
perfo
rman
ce3
Is th
e le
ader
offe
red
coac
hing
and
de
velo
pmen
t opp
ortu
nity
to a
ddre
ss
wea
knes
ses
over
tim
e?
A g
loba
l eLe
arni
ng p
latfo
rm w
ill be
laun
ched
in S
epte
mbe
r thi
s ye
ar.
Pro
posa
ls fo
r the
dev
elop
men
t of a
man
agem
ent d
evel
opm
ent
prog
ram
me
are
curre
ntly
bei
ng e
valu
ated
.326
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
sel
ecte
d th
e G
loba
l Lea
ders
hip
Com
mitt
ee h
erse
lf an
d th
ere
is m
uch
mor
e fo
cus
on le
ader
ship
ski
lls a
nd m
anag
emen
t (e-
lear
ning
, gr
oup
lear
ning
and
men
tors
hip
prog
ram
mes
). Th
ere
is a
two
year
pro
gram
me
for s
enio
r man
agem
ent
incl
udin
g co
achi
ng, t
rain
ing
and
man
agem
ent s
kills
bu
t thi
s is
not
the
case
for t
he D
irect
or-G
ener
al.
58 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
IV.
Lead
ersh
ip re
-ele
ctio
n is
bas
ed o
n tra
nspa
rent
pro
cess
es a
nd m
etric
s1
Are
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent
crite
ria c
onsi
dere
d by
the
full
mem
bers
hip
in th
e re
-app
oint
men
t pr
oces
s?
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
pre
sent
ed h
er o
rigin
al p
riorit
ies
and
man
date
w
hen
she
was
sta
ndin
g up
for e
lect
ion
for h
er fi
rst t
erm
. At t
he re
-ap
poin
tmen
t for
her
sec
ond
term
, she
pre
sent
ed a
doc
umen
t with
a
self-
asse
ssm
ent o
f how
wel
l she
per
form
ed o
n th
ose
prio
ritie
s. T
his
was
take
n in
to a
ccou
nt th
roug
h th
e re
-nom
inat
ion
proc
ess.
327 Th
ese
wer
e no
t spe
cific
ally
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent,
but h
ow w
ell t
he
orga
niza
tion,
und
er h
er le
ader
ship
, tac
kled
the
maj
or c
halle
nges
.
It w
as g
ener
ally
laud
ed th
at th
e D
irect
or-G
ener
al
star
ted
the
proc
ess
of s
elf-
eval
uatio
n, b
ut th
is
shou
ld b
e ex
pand
ed to
the
regi
onal
-dire
ctor
s as
w
ell.
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
wan
ts to
cre
ate
an
inde
pend
ent e
valu
atio
n sy
stem
for h
er p
ositi
on a
t a
late
r sta
ge a
s w
ell.
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Ther
e is
opp
ortu
nity
to s
tand
up
agai
nst t
he in
cum
bent
Dire
ctor
-G
ener
al in
a re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s an
d ea
ch c
andi
date
is e
valu
ated
on
the
sam
e ob
ject
ive
scal
e as
is u
sed
for a
new
ele
ctio
n. T
here
hav
e be
en c
ases
of s
ittin
g R
egio
nal D
irect
ors
bein
g ch
alle
nged
by
othe
r qu
alifi
ed c
andi
date
s.
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
was
not
cha
lleng
ed a
t the
pr
evio
us re
-ele
ctio
n pr
oces
s si
nce
she
had
prov
ed
hers
elf t
o be
a s
trong
can
dida
te, t
he o
ppor
tuni
ty to
pu
t for
war
d ot
her c
andi
date
s ex
iste
d.
V.Th
e le
ader
has
the
auth
ority
and
mec
hani
sms
to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s1
Doe
s th
e le
ader
hav
e th
e au
thor
ity
to s
hift
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
ies
in li
ght o
f ex
tern
al c
hang
es?
Ther
e ar
e so
me
“cor
e fu
nctio
ns”
that
are
spe
cifie
d in
the
orga
niza
tion,
th
at h
ave
been
set
out
in th
e G
ener
al P
rogr
amm
e of
Wor
k an
d th
at
cove
r a 1
0 ye
ar p
erio
d (2
006–
2015
).328 T
hese
are
rela
tivel
y un
-ch
ange
able
sin
ce th
is h
as b
een
deci
ded
as lo
ng-t
erm
‘rai
son
d’êt
re’
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n. H
owev
er, t
he c
urre
nt D
G h
as s
peci
fied
her o
wn
prio
ritie
s st
emm
ing
from
thes
e co
re fu
nctio
ns, a
nd h
as a
sked
to b
e ev
alua
ted
on th
ese
spec
ific
prio
ritie
s. “
I wan
t my
lead
ersh
ip to
be
judg
ed b
y th
e im
pact
of o
ur w
ork
on th
e he
alth
of t
wo
popu
latio
ns:
wom
en a
nd th
e pe
ople
of A
frica
.” –
Mar
gare
t Cha
n329 T
here
is a
lso
a W
HO
refo
rm p
roce
ss b
eing
und
erta
ken,
of w
hich
a m
ajor
com
pone
nt
is im
prov
ed h
ealth
out
com
es, i
n lin
e w
ith th
e ag
reed
glo
bal h
ealth
pr
iorit
ies.
As
a st
rand
in th
e re
form
pro
cess
, WH
O is
wor
king
with
its
mem
ber s
tate
s to
set
prio
ritie
s fo
r its
wor
k in
ord
er to
focu
s its
ac
tiviti
es a
nd d
eliv
er m
ore
effe
ctiv
ely.
330 T
here
fore
, it c
an b
e sa
id
that
bot
h th
e le
ader
ship
and
the
mem
ber s
tate
s do
hav
e a
certa
in
disc
retio
n to
tailo
r the
cor
e fu
nctio
ns in
to s
trate
gic
prio
ritie
s ac
cord
ing
to c
urre
nt re
aliti
es a
nd n
atio
nal/i
nter
natio
nal p
riorit
ies.
Ther
e is
no
auth
ority
to c
hang
e th
e m
anda
te a
way
fro
m h
ealth
, for
exa
mpl
e to
topi
cs s
uch
as tr
ade
or
agric
ultu
re.
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
Yes,
ther
e is
a p
roce
ss to
faci
litat
e im
plem
enta
tion
of n
ew p
riorit
ies
as
disc
usse
d ab
ove.
Eve
ry D
G c
an p
riorit
ize
certa
in s
peci
fic s
trate
gies
/di
seas
es o
r asp
ects
dur
ing
thei
r ten
ure,
and
ther
e is
a p
roce
ss d
urin
g th
e W
orld
Hea
lth A
ssem
bly
whe
re m
embe
r-st
ates
can
hav
e in
put i
nto
the
stra
tegi
c pr
iorit
y se
tting
.331
Extra
-Ord
inar
y m
eetin
gs o
f the
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
ha
ve b
een
calle
d in
the
past
for c
hang
ing
stra
tegi
es.
59Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
76%
of W
HO
’s fu
nds
are
‘vol
unta
ry c
ontri
butio
ns’ w
ith m
ost o
f the
m
bein
g hi
ghly
spe
cifie
d as
to w
hich
dep
artm
ent o
r hea
lth in
terv
entio
n th
ey s
houl
d be
use
d fo
r. (h
ttp://
whq
libdo
c.w
ho.in
t/pb
/201
2-20
13/
PB
_201
2%E2
%80
%93
2013
_eng
)
The
Dire
ctor
Gen
eral
is tr
ying
to e
nsur
e a
fully
-fin
ance
d bu
dget
, thr
ough
the
Fina
ncin
g D
ialo
gue
Initi
ativ
e. C
urre
ntly
, som
e pa
rts o
f the
bud
get a
re
over
-fun
ded
and
som
e ar
e un
der-
fund
ed. A
ccor
ding
to
Ian
Sm
ith, E
xecu
tive
Dire
ctor
, Dire
ctor
Gen
eral
’s
Offi
ce, t
he c
ritic
al e
lem
ents
to a
fina
nced
bud
get i
s pr
edic
tabi
lity
and
alig
nmen
t. It
is e
ssen
tial t
hat w
e kn
ow h
ow m
uch
mon
ey w
e ha
ve, a
nd w
hen
we
will
rece
ive
it. A
dditi
onal
ly, i
t is
impo
rtant
that
the
reso
urce
s ar
e al
igne
d w
ith th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
wor
k,
with
the
regi
ons,
sta
ffing
and
act
iviti
es. T
he W
HO
is
dev
elop
ing
a po
rtal w
hich
will
be tr
ansp
aren
t, sh
owin
g al
l the
reso
urce
s, w
here
they
hav
e be
en
spen
t and
to w
hat t
hey
have
bee
n de
dica
ted
to.
This
is n
ot a
uni
que
idea
(UN
DP
has
a m
ulti-
dono
r tru
st fu
nd w
ebsi
te a
s an
exa
mpl
e), b
ut w
ill be
so
met
hing
new
for W
HO
.VI
.Th
e le
ader
is e
xpec
ted
to a
ttra
ct, r
etai
n an
d de
velo
p ta
lent th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes,
the
orga
niza
tion
cond
ucts
and
pub
lishe
s a
“sta
keho
lder
sur
vey”
w
hich
incl
udes
bot
h ex
tern
al s
take
hold
ers
and
inte
rnal
sta
ff. T
he
resu
lts a
re p
ublis
hed
in a
repo
rt, a
vaila
ble
on th
e w
ebsi
te. I
t see
ms
that
from
the
2012
sur
vey,
one
of t
he k
ey fi
ndin
gs w
as th
at “
21%
of
ext
erna
l and
25%
of i
nter
nal r
espo
nden
ts h
ave
doub
ts re
gard
ing
WH
O’s
abi
lity
to ta
ke th
e ne
cess
ary
mea
sure
s to
ens
ure
the
inde
pend
ence
of i
ts p
ublic
hea
lth e
xper
ts, s
imila
r pro
porti
ons
voic
ed
conc
erns
abo
ut W
HO
’s in
depe
nden
ce fr
om in
appr
opria
te in
dust
ry
influ
ence
.” T
he fu
ll re
port
with
the
surv
ey fi
ndin
gs is
als
o on
the
web
site
. (ht
tp://
ww
w.w
ho.in
t/ab
out/
who
_per
cept
ion_
surv
ey_2
012.
pdf)
Ther
e is
ano
ther
sur
vey
calle
d th
e “P
erce
ptio
n S
urve
y” th
at is
led
by th
e D
epar
tmen
t of
Com
mun
icat
ions
, led
by
an e
xter
nal a
genc
y. It
is
shar
ed w
idel
y in
tern
ally
and
wid
ely
disc
usse
d by
th
e A
ssis
tant
Dire
ctor
Gen
eral
s an
d th
e R
egio
nal
Dire
ctor
s.
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
This
is p
art o
f the
per
form
ance
man
agem
ent s
yste
m
(PM
DS
) and
is ta
ken
into
acc
ount
info
rmal
ly.
60 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge m
anag
emen
t to
enga
ge w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
WH
O is
fairl
y co
nser
vativ
e in
this
mat
ter.
Ther
e is
an
ong
oing
pro
cess
of r
efor
m fo
r eng
agin
g in
non
-st
ate
acto
rs. T
he c
ateg
orie
s of
eng
agem
ent a
re
the
follo
win
g: 1
) Gov
erna
nce
(whe
re s
take
hold
ers
can
enga
ge in
gov
erna
nce
mat
ters
of W
HO
), 2)
C
olla
bora
tion
(join
t wor
k-pl
an, p
roje
cts,
offi
cial
re
latio
ns w
ith N
GO
s et
c.),
3) C
onsu
ltatio
n (m
ore
ad-
hoc,
due
-dilig
ence
, con
flict
of i
nter
est,
deve
lopm
ent
of s
tand
ards
, sha
ring
of in
form
atio
n, e
xper
tise
and
know
-how
), 4)
Fin
ance
(non
-sta
te a
ctor
s ca
n m
ake
a co
ntrib
utio
n to
WH
O),
5) C
ontra
cts
give
n to
the
priv
ate
sect
or fo
r car
ryin
g ou
t spe
cific
pie
ces
of
wor
k.VI
II.M
O/IO
has
stru
ctur
es th
at e
ngag
e ex
ecut
ive
man
agem
ent t
horo
ughl
y w
ith in
tern
al/e
xter
nal e
valu
atio
nsW
HO
is c
omm
itted
to a
pro
gram
of r
egul
ar
eval
uatio
ns, m
aint
aini
ng in
depe
nden
ce, a
nd
enga
ging
in in
depe
nden
t eva
luat
ions
. the
Exe
cutiv
e B
oard
will
cond
uct a
nd e
valu
ate
thes
e fo
r the
WH
O.
61Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
62 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
k. W
orld
Tra
de O
rgan
izat
ion
(WTO
)
Org
aniz
atio
nR
epla
cing
the
Gen
eral
Agr
eem
ent o
n Ta
riffs
and
Tra
de, t
he W
TO is
the
mul
tilat
eral
fo
rum
for n
egot
iatin
g gl
obal
trad
e ag
reem
ents
and
ens
urin
g th
at th
e ru
les
of
inte
rnat
iona
l tra
de a
re c
orre
ctly
app
lied
and
enfo
rced
.332
Gov
erna
nce
The
WTO
des
crib
es it
self
as “
a ru
les-
base
d, m
embe
r-dr
iven
org
aniz
atio
n –
all
deci
sion
s ar
e m
ade
by M
embe
rs, a
nd th
e ru
les
are
the
outc
ome
of n
egot
iatio
ns
amon
g M
embe
rs”.
333 A
ll 16
0 m
embe
r cou
ntrie
s m
ay p
artic
ipat
e in
all
coun
cils
an
d co
mm
ittee
s, e
xcep
t the
dis
pute
set
tlem
ent p
roce
dure
s an
d th
e co
mm
ittee
s re
spon
sibl
e fo
r plu
rilat
eral
agr
eem
ents
. Whi
le W
TO a
gree
men
t for
esee
s th
e us
e of
vot
es w
hen
cons
ensu
s ca
nnot
be
reac
hed
in s
ever
al s
peci
fic s
ituat
ions
, co
nsen
sus
dom
inat
es th
e de
cisi
on-m
akin
g pr
oces
s. M
embe
rs m
ake
deci
sion
s re
late
d to
new
rule
s an
d th
eir i
mpl
emen
tatio
n, a
s w
ell a
s to
org
aniz
atio
nal m
atte
rs
such
as
the
budg
et a
nd a
ctiv
ities
of t
he s
ecre
taria
t, an
d on
the
appo
intm
ent o
f th
e di
rect
or-g
ener
al (D
G).33
4
The
Min
iste
rial C
onfe
renc
e, w
hich
mus
t mee
t at l
east
onc
e ev
ery
two
year
s, is
m
ost i
mpo
rtant
. The
con
fere
nce
can
take
dec
isio
ns o
n al
l mat
ters
und
er a
ny o
f th
e m
ultil
ater
al tr
ade
agre
emen
ts. T
he G
ener
al C
ounc
il m
eets
regu
larly
in G
enev
a to
car
ry o
ut W
TO fu
nctio
ns; i
t has
repr
esen
tativ
es fr
om a
ll m
embe
r gov
ernm
ents
, an
d ha
s th
e au
thor
ity to
act
on
beha
lf of
the
min
iste
rial c
onfe
renc
e. T
he W
TO
has
thre
e fu
rther
cou
ncils
and
ove
r 20
com
mitt
ees
rele
vant
to th
e va
rious
WTO
ag
reem
ents
and
the
secr
etar
iat’s
act
iviti
es; t
hrou
gh th
ese
grou
ps, m
embe
rs m
ake
deci
sion
s, m
onito
r pro
gres
s an
d ca
rry
out t
he o
rgan
izat
ion’
s da
y-to
-day
wor
k.
Alth
ough
not
a fo
rmal
par
t of t
he W
TO s
truct
ure,
a tr
ade
nego
tiatio
ns c
omm
ittee
, ch
aire
d by
the
DG
, was
est
ablis
hed
by m
embe
rs in
the
cont
ext o
f the
Doh
a R
ound
of t
rade
neg
otia
tions
. In
the
proc
ess
of n
egot
iatio
ns, W
TO m
embe
rs,
vario
us c
omm
ittee
cha
irs a
nd th
e D
G c
onve
ne a
rang
e of
diff
eren
t inf
orm
al
grou
ps a
nd p
roce
sses
, suc
h as
“G
reen
Roo
ms”
, whi
ch a
re c
ompr
ised
of
vario
us c
onfig
urat
ions
of m
embe
rs w
ith th
e ai
m o
f infl
uenc
ing
nego
tiatio
ns a
nd
build
ing
cons
ensu
s. T
his
can
then
faci
litat
e de
cisi
on-m
akin
g in
the
form
al W
TO
com
mitt
ees.
The
secr
etar
iat i
s he
aded
by
the
DG
and
pro
vide
s su
ppor
t to
WTO
mem
bers
on
all
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n’s
activ
ities
. As
only
mem
bers
mak
e de
cisi
ons,
the
secr
etar
iat h
as n
o de
cisi
on-m
akin
g po
wer
s w
ith re
gard
to th
e co
nten
t, co
mpl
etio
n
or im
plem
enta
tion
of W
TO a
gree
men
ts. T
he s
ecre
taria
t doe
s, h
owev
er, m
ake
inte
rnal
man
agem
ent d
ecis
ions
rele
vant
to im
plem
entin
g th
e w
ork
prog
ram
me
and
budg
et a
ppro
ved
by m
embe
rs.
Leng
th o
f lea
ders
hip
man
date
Four
yea
rs; c
an b
e re
new
ed o
nce.
Inco
me
Tota
l bud
get f
or 2
013
was
CH
F 19
7.2
milli
on.
Num
ber
of s
taff
In th
e se
cret
aria
t: 63
9, fr
om 7
7 co
untri
es (a
s of
Mar
ch 2
013)
.
His
tory
of l
eade
rshi
pTh
e W
TO le
ader
ship
app
oint
men
t pro
cess
is o
pen
and
com
petit
ive,
in th
at a
ny
mem
ber c
ount
ry c
an p
ut fo
rwar
d a
cand
idat
e. A
n un
ders
tand
ing
exis
ts a
mon
g co
untri
es th
at th
e po
sitio
n sh
ould
alte
rnat
e be
twee
n de
velo
ped
and
deve
lopi
ng
coun
try m
embe
rs.33
5
WTO
’s fi
rst D
G w
as P
eter
Sut
herla
nd (f
rom
Irel
and,
199
3-19
95).
Div
isio
n an
d de
adlo
ck a
risin
g fro
m th
e fa
ilure
of m
embe
rs to
reac
h co
nsen
sus
on a
new
D
G re
sulte
d in
the
shor
tene
d te
rm o
f Ren
ato
Rug
gier
o (It
aly,
199
5-19
98) a
nd a
te
rm-s
harin
g ag
reem
ent b
etw
een
Mik
e M
oore
(New
Zea
land
, 199
8/9-
2002
) and
S
upac
hai P
anitc
hpak
di (T
haila
nd, 2
002-
2005
). Th
e su
bseq
uent
two
DG
s w
ere
Pas
cal L
amy
(Fra
nce,
200
5-20
13; r
eapp
oint
ed in
200
9) a
nd R
ober
to A
zevê
do
(Bra
zil,
2013
-pre
sent
).
In 1
994-
1995
, the
Uni
ted
Sta
tes
resi
sted
Rug
gier
o’s
sele
ctio
n on
the
grou
nds
that
th
e ap
poin
tmen
t of a
n Ita
lian
wou
ld v
iola
te a
n in
form
al u
nder
stan
ding
that
Eur
opea
n D
Gs
shou
ld n
ot b
e fro
m o
ne o
f the
larg
e Eu
rope
an e
cono
mie
s. In
the
late
199
0s,
disc
ord
amon
g m
embe
rs re
sulte
d in
a d
ecis
ion
to s
plit
the
term
bet
wee
n tw
o D
Gs
– on
e fro
m a
dev
elop
ed a
nd th
e ot
her f
rom
a d
evel
opin
g co
untry
.
Cur
rent
traj
ecto
ryA
zevê
do’s
pos
ition
as
DG
sta
rted
on 1
Sep
tem
ber 2
013.
In 2
014,
he
inte
nds
to
unde
rtake
a c
ompr
ehen
sive
org
aniz
atio
nal r
evie
w, i
nclu
ding
on
gove
rnan
ce a
nd
stra
tegy
(but
ess
entia
lly o
n st
affin
g).
63Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
Indi
cato
r P
ublis
hed
rule
s O
ther
fact
ors
I.Th
e le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n pr
oces
s se
arch
es a
nd te
sts
for s
peci
fic, r
elev
ant c
ompe
tenc
ies
agai
nst c
lear
ly d
efine
d cr
iteria
thro
ugh
an in
clus
ive,
exh
aust
ive
proc
ess
1D
oes
the
MO
/IO p
ublis
h th
e cr
iteria
/te
rms
of re
fere
nce
for l
eade
rshi
p on
line?
Term
s of
refe
renc
e ar
e no
t ava
ilabl
e on
line.
How
ever
, the
role
of t
he
DG
is d
efine
d in
bro
ad te
rms
in W
TO le
gal t
exts
, whi
ch a
re a
vaila
ble
on th
e w
ebsi
te.33
6 A
200
2 G
ener
al C
ounc
il de
cisi
on in
200
2 (d
ocum
ent W
T/L/
509)
de
fines
requ
ired
qual
ifica
tions
for t
he jo
b.33
7
Term
s of
refe
renc
e ar
e pu
blis
hed
with
the
notic
e in
vitin
g ca
ndid
atur
es fo
r DG
, i.e
. with
“Va
canc
y N
otic
e”; t
his
is p
oste
d on
-line
.338
Inte
rest
ingl
y, th
e En
hanc
ed In
tegr
ated
Fra
mew
ork
(a W
TO-r
elat
ed o
rgan
izat
ion
for t
he d
eliv
ery
of
tech
nica
l ass
ista
nce
and
capa
city
bui
ldin
g to
de
velo
ping
cou
ntrie
s) h
as s
ever
al p
ublic
ly a
vaila
ble
TOR
s.2
Wha
t per
cent
age
of th
e m
embe
rshi
p is
invo
lved
in le
ader
ship
sel
ectio
n an
d re
-ele
ctio
n in
pra
ctic
e?
Dec
isio
ns –
incl
udin
g D
G s
elec
tion
– ar
e m
ade
by c
onse
nsus
of a
ll m
embe
rs. T
here
fore
, all
Mem
bers
can
be
invo
lved
in th
e le
ader
ship
ap
poin
tmen
t and
reap
poin
tmen
t pro
cess
.
The
degr
ee o
f inv
olve
men
t by
Mem
bers
var
ies
wid
ely
depe
ndin
g on
thei
r cap
aciti
es in
term
s of
hu
man
reso
urce
s an
d th
eir e
cono
mic
/pol
itica
l si
gnifi
canc
e in
the
syst
em. A
lthou
gh m
any
info
rmal
an
d fo
rmal
opp
ortu
nitie
s ex
ist,
the
degr
ee o
f en
gage
men
t and
influ
ence
var
ies.
Som
e gr
oups
, su
ch a
s th
e A
frica
n G
roup
, col
lect
ivel
y w
eigh
in fo
r pa
rticu
lar c
andi
date
s as
the
proc
ess
adva
nces
.339
3Is
ther
e a
time-
boun
d, p
ublis
hed,
ex
haus
tive
proc
ess
for l
eade
rshi
p se
lect
ion
that
wei
ghs
com
pete
nce
agai
nst t
he p
ublis
hed
crite
ria?
The
“200
2 de
cisi
on”
desc
ribes
in d
etai
l the
lead
ersh
ip a
ppoi
ntm
ent
proc
ess.
It la
ys o
ut a
cle
ar ti
mef
ram
e fo
r a p
roce
ss to
com
men
ce 9
m
onth
s be
fore
and
be
com
plet
ed 3
mon
ths
befo
re th
e ex
piry
of a
n in
cum
bent
’s te
rm. O
nly
mem
ber c
ount
ries
can
nom
inat
e ca
ndid
ates
, w
ho m
ust b
e th
eir o
wn
natio
nals
, and
nom
inat
ions
mus
t be
mad
e w
ithin
one
mon
th o
f the
sta
rt of
the
proc
ess.
Th
ere
is a
n ag
reed
des
crip
tion
of th
e re
quire
d qu
alifi
catio
ns fo
r the
po
st, w
ith “
the
desi
rabi
lity
of re
flect
ing
the
dive
rsity
of t
he W
TO’s
m
embe
rshi
p in
suc
cess
ive
appo
intm
ents
to th
e po
st”
also
list
ed a
s an
exp
licit
fact
or to
be
take
n in
to a
ccou
nt. C
andi
date
s pr
ovid
e C
Vs,
and
mee
t with
and
mak
e pr
esen
tatio
ns to
the
WTO
Gen
eral
Cou
ncil.
Th
en in
the
final
two
mon
ths
of th
e pr
oces
s th
e C
hair
of th
e C
ounc
il,
assi
sted
by
the
Cha
ir of
the
Dis
pute
Set
tlem
ent B
ody
and
Cha
ir of
the
Trad
e P
olic
y R
evie
w B
ody
as F
acilit
ator
s, c
onsu
lt w
ith m
embe
rs a
nd
seek
s to
bui
ld a
con
sens
us. T
here
is a
pro
visi
on fo
r the
Cou
ncil
to v
ote
if a
cons
ensu
s ca
nnot
be
reac
hed
in th
e ap
poin
ted
time.
340
In th
e re
cent
app
oint
men
t pro
cess
, WTO
mem
bers
offi
cial
ly n
omin
ated
9
cand
idat
es fo
r the
pos
t of t
he n
ew D
irect
or-G
ener
al fr
om 1
to 3
1 D
ecem
ber 2
012.
All
the
cand
idat
es m
ade
a pr
esen
tatio
n on
thei
r vi
sion
for t
he W
TO a
t a G
ener
al C
ounc
il m
eetin
g in
Jan
uary
201
3. T
he
appo
intm
ent p
roce
ss c
oncl
uded
with
a G
ener
al C
ounc
il m
eetin
g on
14
May
201
3, a
t whi
ch th
e re
com
men
datio
n to
app
oint
Rob
erto
Aze
vêdo
as
the
new
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
was
app
rove
d.
Dur
ing
the
two
mon
ths
of c
onse
nsus
bui
ldin
g un
derta
ken
by th
e C
hair
of th
e G
ener
al C
ounc
il,
the
trans
pare
ncy
and
oppo
rtuni
ties
for p
artic
ipat
ion
depe
nd o
n th
e sp
ecifi
c pr
oces
ses
purs
ued
by th
e C
hair.
The
pro
cess
and
crit
eria
by
whi
ch C
hairs
co
nclu
de th
at c
andi
date
s ar
e re
mov
ed fr
om th
e sh
ort-
list i
s no
t alw
ays
trans
pare
nt.34
1
64 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
II.Th
e le
ader
has
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns w
hich
are
tran
spar
ent a
nd c
onsi
sten
t with
MO
/IO’s
ove
rarc
hing
goa
ls a
nd w
hich
faci
litat
es le
ader
ship
ac
coun
tabi
lity
1D
o th
e le
ader
s se
t cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce
expe
ctat
ions
for t
hem
selv
es, w
hich
ar
e tra
nspa
rent
and
con
sist
ent?
No
offic
ial p
roce
dure
in p
lace
. Alth
ough
the
new
DG
gen
eral
ly d
eliv
ers
a st
atem
ent t
o ou
tline
his
vis
ion
and
goal
s, a
s w
ell a
s hi
s fo
rmal
ob
ligat
ions
, in
front
of t
he G
ener
al C
ounc
il, th
ere
is n
o pr
oces
s fo
r se
tting
cle
ar p
erfo
rman
ce e
xpec
tatio
ns o
r rev
iew
.
The
deba
tes
over
the
role
of t
he D
G a
nd th
e ap
poin
tees
’ sco
pe fo
r tak
ing
lead
ersh
ip c
ompl
icat
e th
e ab
ility
of th
e le
ader
to s
et c
lear
exp
ecta
tions
of
them
selv
es a
nd g
oals
. Man
y m
embe
rs a
re re
luct
ant
to s
ee th
e D
G ta
ke a
n ac
tion
or in
itiat
ive
that
is n
ot
sim
ply
the
impl
emen
tatio
n of
dec
isio
ns ta
ken
by th
e M
embe
rshi
p. G
iven
deb
ates
on
the
broa
der m
issi
on
and
purp
ose
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n lim
it th
e po
litic
al
scop
e fo
r the
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
to e
xplic
itly
lay
out a
cl
ear a
gend
a fo
r act
ion
or c
hang
e.34
2 2
Is th
ere
an e
xpec
tatio
n th
at th
e le
ader
tran
slat
es o
vera
rchi
ng g
oals
of
orga
niza
tion
into
a m
anag
eabl
e an
d cl
ear s
trate
gy?
Yes.
As
part
of th
e se
lect
ion
proc
ess,
all
cand
idat
es n
omin
ated
for
the
posi
tion
of D
irect
or-G
ener
al m
ake
a pr
esen
tatio
n of
thei
r vis
ion
for t
he W
TO a
t a G
ener
al C
ounc
il, a
nd a
gain
upo
n th
eir a
ppoi
ntm
ent.
For e
xam
ple,
Rob
erto
Aze
vêdo
gav
e hi
s vi
sion
spe
ech
to th
e G
ener
al
Cou
ncil
on 9
Sep
tem
ber.34
3 Thi
s is
als
o do
ne th
roug
h th
e an
nual
bu
dget
pro
posa
l to
mem
bers
.344
The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
is e
xpec
ted
to re
port
to
Mem
ber S
tate
s at
the
regu
lar G
ener
al C
ounc
il m
eetin
gs o
n pr
ogre
ss a
nd a
ctiv
ities
of t
he
Sec
reta
riat.
A fu
rther
inst
rum
ent i
s th
e el
abor
atio
n of
W
TO A
nnua
l Rep
ort,
supe
rvis
ed b
y th
e D
G, w
hich
su
mm
ariz
es th
e pr
ogra
mm
es a
nd a
ctiv
ities
of t
he
orga
niza
tion.
345
3Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
dis
clos
e co
nflic
ts o
f int
eres
t?Th
e di
sclo
sure
pol
icy
only
ava
ilabl
e in
tern
ally
. Ex
ecut
ive
man
agem
ent,
like
all s
taff
mem
bers
, are
ex
pect
ed to
abi
de b
y th
e co
de o
f cor
e va
lues
. The
S
taff
Rul
es a
lso
requ
ire th
at s
taff
seek
aut
horiz
atio
n fo
r out
side
act
iviti
es a
nd d
iscl
ose
any
pote
ntia
l fin
anci
al in
tere
sts.
346
4Is
the
lead
er o
blig
ed to
adh
ere
to a
pu
blis
hed
code
of e
thic
s?Ye
s. H
owev
er, t
he c
ode
of c
ore
ethi
cs is
onl
y ci
rcul
ated
inte
rnal
ly.
The
code
of c
ore
valu
es o
f the
WTO
Sec
reta
riat
exis
ts in
tern
ally
and
all
staf
f are
requ
ired
to s
ign
the
oath
of o
ffice
upo
n en
try in
to th
e or
gani
zatio
n.34
7 Th
e ne
wly
app
oint
ed D
G h
as s
igne
d th
e O
ath
of
Offi
ce. A
trai
ning
man
ual o
n W
TO c
ore
valu
es is
av
aila
ble
to a
ll st
aff.
III.
The
lead
er h
as a
defi
ned
perf
orm
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d re
ceiv
es a
nnua
l fee
dbac
k on
per
form
ance
1Is
the
lead
ersh
ip s
ubje
cted
to a
nnua
l pe
rform
ance
app
rais
al?
Not
at t
he le
vel o
f DG
. Dire
ctor
s, h
owev
er, a
re s
ubje
cted
.D
irect
ors’
per
form
ance
s ar
e as
sess
ed b
y th
e D
G
or re
spec
tive
DD
G th
roug
h th
e an
nual
per
form
ance
ev
alua
tion
repo
rt.34
8 The
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
pla
ns to
un
derta
ke a
n ob
ject
ive
casc
adin
g ex
erci
se s
tarti
ng
next
yea
r. 2
Is re
mun
erat
ion
or b
enefi
ts ti
ed to
th
e ou
tcom
es o
f the
per
form
ance
m
anag
emen
t pro
gram
me?
No
evid
ence
.W
hile
ther
e is
a P
erfo
rman
ce R
ewar
ds s
chem
e fo
r st
aff m
embe
rs, t
his
is n
ot a
pplic
able
to D
irect
ors,
D
eput
y D
irect
ors
Gen
eral
and
the
DG
.349
65Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3Is
the
lead
er o
ffere
d co
achi
ng
and
deve
lopm
ent o
ppor
tuni
ties
to
addr
ess
wea
knes
ses
over
tim
e?
Yes,
upo
n re
ques
t.350
Coa
chin
g an
d ex
ecut
ive
man
agem
ent s
essi
ons
by
exte
rnal
coa
ches
are
offe
red
to s
enio
r man
agem
ent
upon
requ
est.
Sen
ior E
xecu
tive
Ret
reat
s (fo
r D
G; D
DG
s an
d D
irect
ors)
hav
e be
en in
trodu
ced
to d
iscu
ss o
penl
y an
d co
llect
ivel
y th
e W
TO’s
pe
rform
ance
man
agem
ent p
rogr
amm
e an
d de
velo
pmen
t fee
dbac
k.35
1 IV
.Le
ader
ship
re-e
lect
ion
is b
ased
on
trans
pare
nt p
roce
sses
and
met
rics
1A
re p
erfo
rman
ce m
anag
emen
t crit
eria
co
nsid
ered
by
the
full
mem
bers
hip
in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
No
evid
ence
.
2A
re o
ther
qua
lified
can
dida
tes
cons
ider
ed in
the
re-e
lect
ion
proc
ess?
Yes,
if n
ew c
andi
date
s ar
e no
min
ated
. In
pra
ctic
e, a
t the
end
of t
he n
omin
atio
n pe
riod
in
2009
, Pas
cal L
amy
was
the
only
can
dida
te a
nd w
as
re-a
ppoi
nted
. V.
The
lead
er h
as th
e au
thor
ity a
nd m
echa
nism
s to s
hift
str
ateg
ic p
riorit
ies
to m
eet c
hang
ing
circ
umst
ance
s
66 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
1D
oes
the
lead
er h
ave
the
auth
ority
to
shi
ft st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s in
ligh
t of
exte
rnal
cha
nges
?
The
orga
niza
tion
is m
embe
r-dr
iven
. Hen
ce, i
t is
the
mem
bers
who
set
th
e st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s fo
r WTO
. Yet
the
DG
can
hav
e an
indi
rect
impa
ct
on M
embe
rs’ c
onsi
dera
tion
of th
e O
rgan
izat
ion’
s st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s.
For e
xam
ple,
form
er D
irect
or-G
ener
al, P
asca
l Lam
y, c
onve
ned
a pa
nel
on d
efini
ng th
e fu
ture
of t
rade
in A
pril
2012
. The
pan
el re
port
“The
Fu
ture
of T
rade
: The
Cha
lleng
es o
f Con
verg
ence
” w
as re
leas
ed in
Apr
il 20
13.35
2 At t
he s
tart
of th
e 20
08 c
risis
Lam
y in
itiat
ed a
mon
itorin
g of
pr
otec
tioni
sm, w
hich
was
sub
sequ
ently
val
idat
ed b
y th
e M
embe
rs;
he a
lso
conv
ened
an
expe
rt gr
oup
on tr
ade
finan
ce to
ass
ess
need
s in
the
mar
ket a
nd in
form
pot
entia
l act
ions
to e
ase
acce
ss to
trad
e fin
ance
.353
View
s on
the
desi
rabl
e sc
ope
for l
eade
rshi
p an
d in
depe
nden
t act
ion
by th
e D
irect
or-G
ener
al v
ary
amon
g M
embe
r Sta
tes
and
depe
ndin
g on
the
issu
e. G
iven
the
lega
lly-b
indi
ng n
atur
e of
WTO
ag
reem
ents
, and
thei
r eco
nom
ic s
igni
fican
ce, m
ost
Mem
bers
reso
lute
ly o
bjec
t to
the
notio
n th
at th
e D
G s
houl
d ha
ve a
ny d
ecis
ion-
mak
ing
auth
ority
with
re
spec
t to
nego
tiatio
n, fo
rmat
ion
or im
plem
enta
tion
of W
TO ru
les.
How
ever
, som
e ha
ve a
rgue
d th
at th
e W
TO D
G ‘s
role
sho
uld
be m
ore
clea
rly s
peci
fied
with
rega
rd to
the
nego
tiatio
n pr
oces
s –
enab
ling
for
inst
ance
the
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
to fo
rmal
ly p
ropo
se
and
push
for p
oliti
cal s
olut
ions
to p
robl
ems
or
brok
er d
eals
to b
ring
nego
tiatio
ns to
a c
lose
. In
prac
tice,
the
DG
is in
volv
ed a
ctiv
ely
in th
e pr
oces
s of
con
sens
us-b
uild
ing
thro
ugh
the
proc
ess
of
chai
ring
info
rmal
Gre
en R
oom
mee
tings
, min
i-m
inis
teria
l and
the
trade
neg
otia
tions
Com
mitt
ee.
Thes
e in
form
al p
ract
ices
mee
t with
var
ying
deg
rees
of
sat
isfa
ctio
n an
d ap
prov
al b
y M
embe
rs g
iven
the
subs
tant
ive
diffe
renc
es a
mon
g M
embe
rs o
n w
hat
kind
s of
agr
eem
ents
and
pro
visi
ons
shou
ld b
e pu
rsue
d, a
nd o
ver t
he o
bjec
tives
of t
he o
rgan
izat
ion
as a
who
le.
Dur
ing
his
tenu
re a
s D
irect
or-G
ener
al, P
asca
l La
my
prov
ided
stra
tegi
c le
ader
ship
to M
embe
rs
on th
e im
porta
nce
of A
id fo
r Tra
de, a
nd a
dvoc
ated
to
Mem
bers
the
impo
rtanc
e of
this
initi
ativ
e. T
he
achi
evem
ent o
f the
laun
ch o
f thi
s in
itiat
ive
is w
idel
y at
tribu
ted
to th
at D
irect
or-G
ener
al. S
imila
rly, i
n th
e fa
ce o
f the
mos
t rec
ent e
cono
mic
cris
is, t
he
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
app
rove
d an
initi
ativ
e by
the
Sec
reta
riat t
o m
onito
r inc
reas
es in
pro
tect
ioni
sm
amon
g M
embe
r Sta
tes.
Alth
ough
the
DG
did
not
fo
rmal
ly a
ppro
ach
the
Mem
bers
hip
for a
ppro
val o
f th
is a
ctio
n, m
ost M
embe
rs a
ppea
r to
conc
ur th
at
this
was
a u
sefu
l stra
tegi
c ef
fort
on th
e D
G’s
par
t.354
2D
oes
the
MO
/IO h
ave
proc
esse
s th
at fa
cilit
ate
impl
emen
tatio
n of
new
st
rate
gic
prio
ritie
s?
No
evid
ence
.
67Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
3W
hat p
erce
ntag
e of
reso
urce
s ar
e se
t as
ide
for s
peci
al in
itiat
ives
dec
ided
by
and
cont
rolle
d by
a s
ubse
t of t
he fu
ll m
embe
rshi
p?
No
earm
arke
d bu
dget
. The
WTO
der
ives
its
inco
me
from
Mem
bers
’ co
ntrib
utio
ns, w
hich
are
bas
ed o
n a
form
ula
that
take
s in
to a
ccou
nt
each
one
’s s
hare
of i
nter
natio
nal t
rade
. Mis
cella
neou
s in
com
e is
min
or
(con
tribu
tions
from
obs
erve
rs a
nd s
ales
).355
Som
e M
embe
rs d
o pr
ovid
e ex
tra b
udge
tary
re
sour
ces
to th
e W
TO S
ecre
taria
t and
to th
e En
hanc
ed In
tegr
ated
Fra
mew
ork
for c
apac
ity
build
ing
to d
evel
opin
g co
untri
es, s
ome
of w
hich
are
ea
rmar
ked
for s
peci
fic tr
aini
ng, t
echn
ical
ass
ista
nce,
or
Aid
for T
rade
act
iviti
es in
par
ticul
ar c
ount
ries.
356
VI.
The
lead
er is
exp
ecte
d to
att
ract
, ret
ain
and
deve
lop
tale
nt th
roug
h-ou
t the
org
aniz
atio
n1
Doe
s th
e or
gani
zatio
n ta
ke s
taff
surv
eys
to a
sses
s st
aff s
atis
fact
ion
and
perfo
rman
ce a
nd d
o le
ader
s ut
ilize
the
resu
lts o
f the
se s
urve
ys?
Yes,
ther
e ar
e re
gula
r rep
orts
on
staf
f sat
isfa
ctio
n.35
7
2Is
the
lead
er a
sses
sed
on m
ento
ring
and
coac
hing
of s
ubor
dina
te s
taff?
No
evid
ence
.
VII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
enc
oura
ge le
ader
ship
to e
ngag
e w
ith d
iver
se r
ange
of s
take
hold
ers
The
maj
or a
nnua
l out
reac
h ev
ent i
s th
e P
ublic
For
um, w
hich
attr
acts
abo
ut 1
,000
par
ticip
ants
. Dur
ing
pres
s br
iefin
gs, t
he D
irect
or-G
ener
al re
gula
rly p
rese
nts
rem
arks
. Bey
ond
annu
al e
vent
s, s
uch
as th
e pu
blic
foru
m
and
mee
tings
with
par
liam
enta
rians
, the
org
aniz
atio
n do
es n
ot h
ave
form
al m
echa
nism
s in
tend
ed to
ens
ure
regu
lar i
nter
actio
n w
ith s
take
hold
ers
from
indu
stry
, civ
il so
ciet
y or
par
liam
ents
. Rat
her t
hese
occ
ur th
roug
h pa
rtici
patio
n in
ad
hoc
mee
tings
and
con
fere
nces
arr
ange
d by
the
Sec
reta
riat o
r the
rele
vant
sta
keho
lder
s.35
8
Ther
e ar
e no
form
al m
echa
nism
s fo
r rec
urrin
g st
akeh
olde
r con
sulta
tions
with
the
DG
or a
ccre
dita
tion
for i
nput
in
to th
e w
ork
of th
e or
gani
zatio
n or
ong
oing
neg
otia
tions
. The
WTO
’s re
gula
r com
mitt
ees
are
open
onl
y to
M
embe
r Sta
tes,
alth
ough
sta
keho
lder
s ca
n no
w o
bser
ve s
elec
ted
parts
of d
ispu
te s
ettle
men
t pro
ceed
ings
.
The
WTO
Dire
ctor
-Gen
eral
inte
ract
s in
form
ally
with
th
e he
ads
of m
any
inte
rnat
iona
l org
aniz
atio
ns. T
he
WTO
is n
ot a
spe
cial
ized
UN
age
ncy.
How
ever
the
head
of t
he W
TO d
oes
parti
cipa
te in
the
UN
Chi
ef
Exec
utiv
e B
oard
mee
ting.
The
WTO
DG
par
ticip
ates
in
the
G20
pro
cess
, but
with
out a
cle
ar m
anda
te
from
Mem
ber S
tate
s. T
he p
revi
ous
DG
app
rove
d th
e S
ecre
taria
t’s p
ursu
it of
wor
k w
ith th
e O
ECD
, th
e W
HO
and
oth
er in
tern
atio
nal a
genc
ies
on jo
int
rese
arch
and
mon
itorin
g. T
he W
TO a
lso
purs
ues
join
t act
iviti
es w
ith o
rgan
izat
ions
suc
h as
WIP
O o
n th
e im
plem
enta
tion
of te
chni
cal a
ssis
tanc
e re
late
d to
its
agre
emen
ts.
Man
y W
TO C
omm
ittee
s in
clud
e IO
s am
ong
thei
r ob
serv
ers,
but
ther
e is
no
spec
ific
proc
ess
for
the
WTO
to e
ngag
e w
ith h
eads
of o
ther
IOs.
Thi
s no
rmal
ly o
ccur
s th
roug
h bi
late
ral m
eetin
gs in
volv
ing
the
DG
or o
ther
sen
ior W
TO s
taff.
VIII.
MO
/IO h
as s
truct
ures
that
eng
age
lead
ersh
ip th
orou
ghly
with
inte
rnal
/ext
erna
l eva
luat
ions
Det
aile
d ex
pend
iture
s ar
e gi
ven
in a
nnua
l rep
ort,
as w
ell a
s m
embe
rs’ c
ontri
butio
ns. I
nter
estin
gly,
WTO
has
an
inte
rnal
aud
it of
fice.
Thi
s au
dit’s
resu
lts a
re p
rese
nted
to th
e m
embe
rs a
nd p
ublis
hed
in th
e A
nnua
l Rep
ort.35
9 Th
e or
gani
zatio
n is
revi
ewed
by
exte
rnal
aud
itors
on
finan
ce a
nd h
uman
reso
urce
s m
atte
rs o
n a
regu
lar
basi
s, w
hose
aud
it re
ports
are
sub
mitt
ed to
the
Com
mitt
ee o
f Bud
get,
Fina
nce
and
Adm
inis
tratio
n fo
r rev
iew
.360
68 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
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70 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
Endnotes
1. Jupille, Mattli and Snidal (2013).
2. This occurs in the OECD. Source: email correspondence with an OECD senior official, 17 June 2014.
3. Please send your input to Shubhra Saxena Kabra, World Economic Forum at Shubhra.SaxenaKabra@weforum.org
4. See: http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf.
5. See: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm.
6. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI.
7. The terms of appointment were published in a press release on 5 July 2011. See: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm.
8. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm.
9. See: http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm.
10. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?mappingid=y3p1dhO74YQ%3d&img=i6nZpr3iSlU%3d.
11. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.
12. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.
13. Martinez-Diaz (2009).
14. Unlike the private sector, remuneration and benefits in international organizations are, in most cases, not tied to performance management indicators. Instead, such organizations set fixed salaries for all staff, including their leadership. Those within the UN system – and even some outside it, such as IOM – follow a standardized pay scale. Although benefits may vary, they are generally determined by the cost of living in the respective locations of headquarters (e.g. New York, Geneva, Washington DC) rather than by a leader’s performance.
15. For example, Pascal Lamy in 2009. See: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_29apr09_e.htm.
16. For example, Donald Kaberuka’s statement in 2005. See: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/.
17. Martinez-Diaz (2008), p. 388.
18. Martinez-Diaz (2008) looked at the following: IMF, World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IDB and EBRD.
19. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].
20. MOPAN (2012).
21. For instance, Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, resigned in 2007 over an alleged conflict of interest in respect to employment.
22. See: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf.
23. UN (2013). See: http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardsE.pdf [accessed 6 September 2014].
24. AfDB also has a code of conduct for staff (1999), and one for leaders (2007).
25. UN (2006). See: http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml [accessed 18 September 2014].
26. UN (2008). See: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcena.doc.htm [accessed 18 September 2014].
27. The list of 2012 disclosures is available from: http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml.
28. See also: New Zealand State Services Commission (2012). Leadership Success Profile. Wellington: State Services Commission.
29. Interview with the senior staff development officer, 26 July 2013.
71Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
30. UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360-degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. This was in response to staff criticism that promotions were “not based on skills and suitability”, but on “seniority and influence of sponsors” (UK Department for International Development [DFID], Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). For more on the survey, see: Turk and Eyster (2010).
31. EBRD (2012). Annual report [online]. See: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.
32. Interview with senior IOM official, 31 July 2013.
33. UNHCR (2013a).
34. Turk and Eyster (2010), p. 170; UNHCR (2013b).
35. UNDP (2011). Budget Estimates, 11.
36. In 2012, IOM’s total revenue was $1.2 billion, and only 0.7% or $9 million was unearmarked. See: IOM (2013). IOM Financial Report for the Year Ended 31 December 2012. Geneva: IOM.
37. Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 Sept 2013.
38. This consisted of: 20% unrestricted, 32% broadly earmarked (i.e. at the regional, subregional or thematic level) and 47% tightly earmarked (country or sector). Source: UNHCR (2012).
39. See: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2013/key_principles_WHO_financing_dialogue.pdf.
40. MOPAN (2013), Annual Report 2012. See: http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_Annual_Report_2012.pdf.
41. See: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/Origins.aspx.
42. For an example of the response in 2008, see: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf.
43. For the Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, 2011 edition, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf.
44. This number increased with the creation of South Sudan in 2011. It will increase again, to 80, once the processing of Luxembourg’s application for membership is complete.
45. For the 2013-2022 strategy, see: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB_Strategy_for_2013%E2%80%932022_-_At_the_Center_of_Africa%E2%80%99s_Transformation.pdf
46 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf
47 See p.180 of the Annual Report 2012: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Annual%20Report%202012.pdf
48 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf
49 For example, see Kaberuka’s statement 2005: http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/
50 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf)
51 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf
52 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf
53 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf
72 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
54 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf
55 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf
56 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Legal-Documents/Agreement%20Establishing%20the%20ADB%20final%202011.pdf
57 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Corporate-Procurement/Departmental_Annual_Reports/AfDB%20TFAR%202010%20Final.pdf
58 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-president-declares-2010-successful-but-momentous-year-at-annual-meetings-opening-ceremony-8143/
59 AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20People%20Strategy%20for%202013-2017.pdf
60 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/AfDB%20Strategy%20for%202013–2022%20-%20At%20the%20Center%20of%20Africa’s%20Transformation.pdf
61 Framework for enhanced engagement with civil society organizations 2012 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf
62 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Framework%20for%20Enhanced%20Engagement%20with%20Civil%20Society%20Organizations.pdf
63 MOPAN evaluation of AfDB 2012 http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012.pdf; http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_AfDB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf ; http://www.ausaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/afdb-assessment.pdf
64 The other funds are the Technical Assistance Special Fund, Japan Special Fund, Pakistan Earthquake Fund, Regional Cooperation and Integration Fund, Climate Change Fund and Asia Pacific Disaster Response Fund, as well as grant co-financing activities. The ADB also manages a number of trust funds, including the Japan Scholarship Program and Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. ADB Financial Profile 2013, Asian Development Bank, 2013, p. 27-33. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-financial-profile-2013.pdf.
65 Those powers reserved for the board of governors include the following: – Admit new members and determine the conditions of their admission – Increase or decrease the bank’s authorized capital stock – Suspend a member – Decide appeals from interpretations or applications of this agreement given by the board of directors – Authorize the conclusion of general agreements for cooperation with other international organizations – Elect the bank’s director and president – Determine the remuneration of the directors and their alternates, and the salary and other terms of the president’s
service contract – Approve the general balance sheet and the bank’s profit-and-loss statement, following review of the auditor’s
report – Determine the reserves and the distribution of the bank’s net profits – Amend this agreement – Decide to terminate the bank’s operations and distribute its assets – Exercise such other powers as are expressly assigned to the board of governors in this agreement
Source: Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 28. See: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/1965/charter.pdf.
66 Ibid; on term limits: Article 30 (3).
67 Asian Development Bank Financial Profile 2013, p. 6-8.
73Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
68 Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank: Time for new leadership”. Embassy, 13 March 2013. See: http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; Sinclair, J. “Asian Development Bank presidency: looking beyond Japan”. Guardian, 22 April 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Bernes, T. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. CIGI Papers, No. 13, February 2013. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation. See: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf.
69 For Eswar Prasad’s ADB publications, see: http://www.adbi.org/viewcontact.php?contactid=2091§ionID=217.
70 Sender, H. “Bankers fear Chinese push to head ADB”. Financial Times, 28 February 2013. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0df9d2c8-81d9-11e2-ae78-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.
71 Jiwei, L. “China’s Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Kazakhstan, Astana. 2014. Asian Development Bank; see: http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/annualmeeting/2014/gov/PRC_47th_AM_GS-17.pdf.
72 Anderlini, J. “China Expands Plans for World Bank Rival”. Financial Times, 24 June 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1012282-fba4-11e3-aa19-00144feab7de.html#axzz3GKKD6HtZ ; Smith, G. “China aims to break U.S. hold in Asia with rival to World Bank”. Fortune, 25 June 2014. See: http://fortune.com/2014/06/25/china-aims-to-break-u-s-hold-in-asia-with-rival-to-world-bank/.
73 Pilling, D. “Japan head of ADB welcomes rival Chinese fund”. Financial Times, 29 May 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66a56628-e581-11e3-a7f5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz362W8CKl7.
74 Wilson, E., Rowley, A. and Gilmore, S. “New Chinese-led development bank seen as threat to ADB.” Emerging Markets, 3 May 2014. See: http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3337351/New-Chinese-led-development-bank-seen-as-threat-to-ADB.html. The difficulty of China increasing its quota was also confirmed in an interview by Kazu Sakai, ADB Director of Strategy and Policy. Sakai noted that such a change would be politically difficult, given the United States’ interest in preventing an increase in Chinese influence within the institution, and especially vis-à-vis Japan with whom it has a close relationship.
75 Nakao, T. “Closing Statement at the 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors”. 46th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Manila, 5 May 2013.
76 Nakao, T. “Opening Address”. 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank. Astana, 4 May 2014. See: http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches.
77 Ownership as of 2012: Japan (15.6%), United States (15.6%), China (6.4%), India (6.3%), Australia (5.8%), Remaining 62 members (50.3%). Annual Report 2012. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/adb-annual-report-2012.pdf
78 The election of the most recent President has brought this trend under intense scrutiny. See: John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank: Time for New Leadership.” Embassy [Ottawa] 3 Mar. 2013. Web. http://www.embassynews.ca/opinion/2013/03/12/asian-development-bank-time-for-new-leadership/43434; John Sinclair. “Asian Development Bank Presidency: Looking beyond Japan.” Guardian [London] 22 Apr. 2013. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/apr/22/asian-development-bank-japan-president; Thomas Bernes. Strengthening International Financial Institutions to Promote Effective International Cooperation. Working paper no. 13. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013. CIGI Papers. Web. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/CIGI_Paper_13.pdf
79 Yasutomo, Dennis. “Japan and the Asian Development Bank: Multilateral Aid Policy in Transition.” Japan’s Foreign Aid. Ed. Bruce Koppel and Robert Orr. Westview, 1993, p. 318.
80 Ibid, p. 44.
81 Lim & Vreeland (2013).
82 STRATEGY2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Strategy2020-print.pdf
74 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
83 ADB Results Framework. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2008/r166-08.pdf
84 2012 Development Effectiveness Review. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/defr-2012.pdf
85 Link to Annual Evaluation Reviews: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/resources/1222
86 Link to Reports: http://compliance.adb.org/dir0035p.nsf/alldocs/BDAO-7Y65HQ?OpenDocument&expandable=4
87 Public Communications Policy: Disclosure and Exchange of Information. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pcp-2011.pdf
88 Nakao, Takehiko. “Address to 88th Meeting of the Development Committee.” 88th Meeting of the Development Committee of the World Bank. Washington, DC. 12 Oct. 2013. Web. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/16/000442464_20131016104728/Rendered/PDF/818700BR0State0C00Box379845B000Copy.pdf
89 Takehiko Nakao. “Opening Address.” 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors. Astana. 4 May 2014. Web. http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/reforming-adb-strengthen-operations-ground-and-better-service-region?ref=annual-meeting/2014/speeches
90 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila. Asian Development Bank (June 2011): http://www.adb.org/documents/code-conduct
91 INDEPENDENT EVALUATION AT ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GUIDELINES TO AVOID CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Conflict-of-Interest-18December2012.pdf
92 Guidelines for Gifts and Entertainment. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Gifts-Entertainment.pdf
93 GUIDELINES ON ACCESS DURING INVESTIGATIONS TO RECORDS, EMAILS AND DOCUMENTS. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Access-during-investigations.pdf
94 Guidelines on Form and Content of Allegations. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2008. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines-Form-Content-Allegations.pdf
95 Code of Conduct. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2011. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/code-of-conduct.pdf
96 Annual Review of Salary and Benefits for International Staff, National Staff, and Administrative Staff. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2013. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/salary-benefits-review-2013.pdf, p. 5
97 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy.
98 Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1966, Chapter VI, Article 34, Point 5.
99 Daniel Yew Mao Lim and James Vreeland. “Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council.” World Politics 65.1 (2013), p. 44.
100 Ibid.
101 The former director-general speaking to Lim & Vreeland in 2010, however, noted that if projects don’t acquire Japanese support, they do not proceed to the Board in the first place (Ibid, p. 44).
102 Work Program and Budget Framework 2013-2015. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/work-program-budget-framework-2013-2015_0.pdf
103 Funds and Resources. Asian Development Bank (2013): http://www.adb.org/site/funds/main
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104 Interview with ADB Director of Policy and Strategy
105 Olivier Serrat. Engaging Staff in the Workplace. Rep. Asian Development Bank, Oct. 2010. Web. http://adbdev.org/sites/default/files/publications/27586/file/engaging-staff-workplace.pdf
106 Strengthening Participation for Development Results. Rep. Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012. Web. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/strengthening-participation-development-results.pdf, p. 20-30.
107 ADB Perceptions Survey (2013), p. 7.
108 Independent Evaluation website: http://www.adb.org/site/evaluation/attributes-independence
109 See, for example, a recent assessment of the ADB: Assessment of the Asian Development Bank. Rep. MOPAN, 2013. Web. http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/Main_findings-_ADB_2013_assessment.pdf
110 International Aid Transparency Initiative. Asian Development Bank Becomes IATI Signatory. N.p., 30 Jan. 2013. Web. http://www.aidtransparency.net/timeline/asian-development-bank-becomes-iati-signatory;
111 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml
112 Basic Documents of EBRD, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/institutional/basicdocs.shtml
113 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014
114 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrI
115 http://www.cgdev.org/blog/cgd-europe-asks-who-should-be-ebrds-next-president
116 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf
117 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014
118 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf
119 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014
120 Interview with Senior EBRD Officials, May 2 2014
121 EBRD Financial Report 2011 (pp. 72-76): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/fr11e.pdf.
122 EBRD annual report 2012, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf.
123 “The EBRD and Civil Society in 2012/2013.” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (May 2013): http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/factsheets/csoE.pdf
124 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/about/compas06.pdf
125 Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Walker) to President Nixon. US Department of State Archives (12 December 1970). See: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d43.
126 Mander, B. “Mutual aid works for Latin America”. Financial Times, 24 September 2012. See: http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/c1628ce2-03a3-11e2-bad2-00144feabdc0.pdf.
127 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.
128 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132
129 Nancy Birdsall. “The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank: Fit for the 21st Century?” Center for Global Development no. 039 (April 2014).
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130 A. Schotter (1981). “The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.” Power, Voting, and Voting Power (ed. M.j. Holler). Physica-Verlad, Wurzburg; M.O. Hosli (1996). “Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34(2): 255-273.
131 Jonathan Strand (2003). “Measure voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American development bank.” Economics of Governance (4): 19-36.
132 Birdsall (2014), p. 7.
133 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080
134 Regulations for the Election of the President of the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=753132
135 Agreement establishing the Bank: http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=555080
136 Institutions for Growth and Social Welfare (March 2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36399223
137 Building Opportunity for the Majority (2007). Inter-American Development Bank (Washington D.C.): http://www.iadb.org/news/docs/BuildingOpp.pdf
138 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737
139 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37198737
140 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856
141 Annual Report (2012): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37614856
142 Proposal for allocation of FSO resources (2013-2014): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37360465
143 Krasner, Stephen D. Power Structures and Regional Development Banks. International Organization, Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring, 1981: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706477
144 Human Capital Strategy (2011): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36290863
145 Strategy for Promoting Citizens Participation in Bank Activities (2004): http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=483088
146 See: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
147 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington DC.
148 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm
149 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main6.pdf
150 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm
151 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm
152 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm
153 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf
154 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm
155 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2012/eng/pdf/ar12_eng.pdf
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156 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm
157 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
158 Interview with a former IMF official, June 2013, Oxford
159 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/101213b.pdf
160 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/112513.pdf
161 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
162 http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm
163 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main4.pdf
164 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main3.pdf
165 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main4.pdf
166 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main6.pdf
167 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
168 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main3.pdf
169 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf
170 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
171 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_main3.pdf
172 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
173 Interview with a current IMF official, October 2013, Washington, DC
174 http://www.imf.org/external/np/eval/2005/111805.htm
175 See example of the response in 2008: http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008CG_management.pdf
176 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1364.htm177 IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures, available at: http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/About-IOM/docs/facts_figures_
en.pdf; and IOM. 2012. Financial Report: 18.
178 IOM. 2012. Human Resources Report, Annex. Geneva: IOM; and IOM. 2013. Facts and Figures. Geneva: IOM.
179 Reinalda, B. 2011. “Secretaries-General of International Organizations and their Career Development: An Analysis of Nine Humanitarian IGOs”. In Paper for the World Conference on Humanitarian Studies, 2-5 June, at Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA.
180 IOM. 2009. Review of the Organisation Structure of IOM. Geneva: IOM.
181 Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 September 2013. Swing made performance management and ownership of the organization by member states top priorities. He has put strong emphasis on proper use of the performance appraisal system, which is currently being updated to account for organizational changes of the past five years. The DG has also established good measures to ensure that HR policy responds to the organization’s needs; implemented a mandatory rotation process; revamped staff regulations to harmonize conditions of service; taken a zero-tolerance approach to fraud, corruption and unethical behaviour; and taken steps to ensure good gender distribution. (DFID. Working Paper on IOM, 17).
182 See IOM Constitution. 1989. Article 18 (1).
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183 The DG is paid at the salary rate of an Assistant Secretary General. Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013 and Interview with senior IOM officials, September 2 2013.
184 IOM 1989. Constitution, Article 18(2).
185 See also IOM Organizational Structure, http://www.iom.int/cms/about-iom/organizational-chart accessed 4 August 2014.
186 See for example: F. Georgi, 2011. For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and its Global Migration Management. In The Politics of International Migration Management. M. Geiger and A. Pecoud. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 45 - 72.
187 DFID, Multilateral Review 2011. Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK aid through multilateral organizations, March 2011, DFID: London: 1987.
188 Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013.
189 For a listing of IOM’s evaluations see: http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/organizational-structure/evaluation/external-evaluations.html
190 The four core areas are detailed in the UNDP strategic plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating global progress on human development. The UNDP also manages the UN’s “resident coordinator” system to ensure in-country coordination between UN agencies, and publishes an annual report on human development. These are reformulated in the most recent strategic plan, and three areas of work are highlighted: inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience; and sustainable development pathways. See: UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 20.
191 For more on the selection of board members, see: UNDP. Information note about the Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPs, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive_board/information_noteontheexecutiveboard [accessed 19 September 2014].
192 UN. 1994. General Assembly Resolution 48/162, Article 22. New York: UN.
193 The UNDP’s expenditure was $4.53 billion for development activities (provisional for 2012). UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 25.
194 See: http://www.undp.ro/undp/human-resources/ [accessed 19 September 2014]; and UNDP. Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017. New York: UNDP, 5.
195 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results: UNDP, 3.
196 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. New York: UNDP, 24.
197 Ibid.
198 Rogers, K. “UNDP cuts HQ staff, creates new lower-level jobs”. Devex, 3 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-cuts-hq-staff-creates-new-lower-level-jobs-83612 [accessed 14 July 2014]; and Santamaria, C. “UNDP to establish crisis response unit”. Devex, 16 June 2014. See: https://www.devex.com/news/undp-to-establish-crisis-response-unit-83693 [accessed 14 July 2014].
199 The researchers were unable to find these online and no interview participants were aware of one. However, the MOPAN review 2012 UNDP is rated well for ‘key documents available to the public’ MI 1.3. As 77% of survey respondents rate it as adequate or above in transparency.
200 This policy was established in 1958 for UNDP’s predecessor – the Special Fund - and continues to apply for the Administrator. See: General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York. GA Resolution 2029 (XX) Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a United Nations Development Programme. It was subsequently outlined in UN General Assembly. 2005. ‘Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments: confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme’ Note by the Secretary General, A/59/240, 3 May 2005.
201 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
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202 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
203 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013.
204 Interview with former senior UNDP staff member, 7 August 2013.
205 Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo 2009. “Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design.” Review of International Organizations 4(4): 403. MOPAN donors at headquarters were asked about the extent to which ‘senior management demonstrates leadership on results management. More than 70% rated UNDP as adequate or above on this indicator’. MOPAN, UNDP Report, MOPAN, 2012: 21.
206 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
207 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.
208 UNDP, 2011, Budget estimates: p.11.
209 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.
210 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013.
211 UN. 2013. Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. UN: New York. Available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/transparency/overview.html UNDP also has an Ethics office (established in 2007), which creates UNDP’s ethics policy and coordinates with UN ethics committee.
212 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.
213 UNDP. 2013. Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York: 24.
214 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013; Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 28 August; Email correspondence with UNDP senior staff member, Feb 27, 2014.
215 General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York, article 21. This Resolution stipulated the conditions for UNDP’s predecessor, the Special Fund, which the UNDP inherited. These were: ‘The Special Fund shall be administered by a Managing Director under the policy guidance of the Governing Council. The Managing Director shall have the over-all responsibility for the operations of the Fund, with sole authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects submitted by Governments’. For more on the Board’s functions see: UN General Assembly. 1994. Resolution 48/162, Article 3. New York: United Nations.
216 As stipulated by the Resolution: ‘projects shall be undertaken only at the request of a government or group of governments eligible to participate in the Special Fund’. General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, Article 31, 1958, New York. The resolution stipulates other tasks such as: ‘the managing director shall establish and maintain close and continuing working relationships with the specialized agencies concerned with those fields of activity in which the Special Fund will operate, and with the International Atomic Agency…’. The Managing director shall be responsible for the evaluation of project requests…and authorized to contract the services off other agencies. The Managing Director shall make appropriate arrangements to follow the execution of projects. The Managing Director shall report to the Governing Council on the status of projects and the financial position of the projects and programmes’.
217 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
218 Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 7 August 2013.
219 The percentage of earmarked contributions were calculated from the UNDP Cumulative Review as follows. Total contributions: 4.64 (regular and other resources) + 1.33 (bilateral earmarked) + 1.53 (multilateral earmarked) + 0.93 (programme contributions) = 8.43 billion; Total earmarked: 1.53 + 1.33 = 1.88 billion and Percentage Earmarked = 1.88/8.43 or 22%. UNDP. 2013. UNDP Cumulative Review. UNDP: New York, p.25.
220 The UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017 highlights declining core financing as a one of UNDP’s top challenges. See: UNDP. 2014. ‘Changing the World, UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017’, UNDP: 8. For a clear overview of UNDP’s
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financing sources see Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.
221 Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. ‘UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization’. Future United Nations Development System, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.
222 UNDP. Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017. UNDP, New York.
223 UNDP. 2011. UNDP Institutional Budget Estimates for 2012 – 2013. Executive Board of the UNDP, UNFPA and the UNOPS: New York: 24 – 27.
224 MOPAN. 2012. Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results, UNDP. Xiii.
225 As part of a broader humanitarian response, UNHCR is typically the cluster lead for protection, shelter and camp management/camp coordination in IDP situations. UNHCR’s total “population of concern” (including refugees and internally displaced persons) is 35.8 million. UNHCR. 2013. Displacement – The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012. Geneva: UNHCR, 3.
226 UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950, Annex, UNHCR Statute.
227 UNHCR holds annual plenary meetings with ExCom and regular meetings with its standing committee throughout the year. For information on UNHCR, ExCom members and how to apply, see: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html [accessed 19 September 2014]. With its membership growing rapidly, ExCom has become increasingly unwieldy as a governing committee (interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013).
228 UNHCR’s ExCom also submits an annual report to the third committee. Although it was created by ECOSCO, it functions like a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. See Betts, A., Loescher, G. and Milner, J. 2012. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Second Edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 108-109.
229 UNHCR. 2013. Global Report 2012. Geneva: UNHCR.
230 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.
231 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. “Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 22:2, 159–172.
232 Loescher, G. 2002. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
233 BBC News. 2005. “Lubbers quits over UN sex claims”. 20 February 2005. See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4282333.stm [accessed 19 September 2014].
234 Goodwin-Gill, G. 1991. “Developments”. In International Journal of Refugee Law, 3, 120.
235 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198.
236 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. Geneva: UNHCR.
237 Ibid. The new Global Service Centre based in Budapest, Hungary has centralized administration and support functions at a reduced cost, compared with having these staffed in Geneva.
238 DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review. London: DFID, 198. Note that some donors are supportive of UNHCR taking a more expansionist role in humanitarian coordination and natural disasters.
239 Email correspondence with the UNHCR executive office, 11 November 2013.
240 Main sources: Interview with Jane McAdam, 24 July 2013; Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013 and Email Correspondence, 20 May 2014; Interview with UNHCR Personnel Administration, Payroll and Performance Management, Human Resources (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Senior Staff Development Officer (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
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241 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter II, Functions of the High Commissioner, paragraphs 8 – 12.
242 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, Article 13. The UN Secretary General has a contract with the High Commissioner which outlines his salary and other job details. Telephone interview with Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. However the HC is elected by the General Assembly and, in principle, should not be subject to authority or direction by the SG. Email correspondence with International Refugee Law Expert, 19 May 2014.
243 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013. Also note that UNHCR does make much of its policy and other terms of reference available online. They do have a draft of new terms of reference for Assistant High Commissioner (protection) on the website as this was a newly created post (2005).
244 For more detail on this see G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.
245 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, paragraph 13.
246 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
247 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
248 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013. The Secretary General on this occasion engaged in extensive consultations with Member states and as no single candidate emerged he submitted two candidates to member states. See: G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. “United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?” International Journal of Refugee Law (3): 121-4.
249 NGOs argued that candidates should be interviewed and their biographies and answers were made public. Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
250 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013.
251 For details on the Global Strategic Priorities see: UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2014 - 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/4ec230e916.html
252 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 22, 2: 170.
253 UN. 2006. Secretary General’s Bulletin ‘Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements’, ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml accessed 1 August 2013.
254 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml accessed 5 August 2013. UNHCR established an independent Ethics Office in 2008 which reports directly to the HC. Its functions are to: provide confidential advice to staff and senior management on ethical issues (e.g. conflicts of interest; gifts; use of UN assets); promote a culture of integrity and accountability; raise awareness and develop standards and education of ethics issues; administer the financial disclosure programme; implement the policy on the protection of staff from retaliation. Executive Office of the United Nations High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee. 2009. Report on the Ethics Office, EC/60/CRP.21, 24 August 2009.
255 UNHCR, 2004. Code of Conduct, 1.
256 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.
257 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. The Global Trends Report details the numbers of ‘persons of concern’ including refugees, IDPs, stateless and other displaced peoples. Note that evaluating UNHCR and the High Commissioner’s performance solely on these numbers is problematic as they are affected by factors beyond UNHCR’s control.
258 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
259 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
260 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. Note that UNHCR develops its own independent guidelines based on these. Interview with UNHCR Human Resources Official, Budapest, 26 July 2013.
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261 UN salary and allowance details are available at http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm accessed 5 August 2013.
262 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
263 Through the GLC, UNHCR hopes to ‘measure more systematically the impact of learning on staff to ensure that approaches used add real value’ and are adjusted to remain relevant (Turk and Eyster, 2010: 171). UNHCR have a Senior Staff Development Officer, Head, Management, Leadership & Communications based in Budapest. They develop and convene a leadership programme for senior staff (such as heads of missions). The role of the Senior Staff Development Officer is to ‘support the work of the management/leadership and external relations Unit, with a primary responsibility for the conceptualization, design, development and delivery of management and leadership related learning programmes for various levels of management. S/he is accountable for pro-actively supporting the learning culture in UNHCR by aligning effective learning with institutional goals’. See UNHCR, Job Description, Senior Staff Development Officer (Management and Leadership), 2012 available online. They provide training up D1 level Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.
264 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.
265 Telephone Interview with UNHCR 30 July 2013.
266 The High Commissioner’s functions are outlined in the UNHCR Statute, Chapter II, paragraphs 6 – 12. The Statute also states that ‘The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies’ and that he ‘shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council…’ UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Paragraph 11.
267 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.
268 These shifts are captured in: UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.
269 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013.
270 Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
271 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.
272 UNHCR established a committee to develop action plans and carry-out survey recommendations in 2011. Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.
273 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 22, 2: 159 – 172.
Staff surveys, according to DFID’s working paper, found that staff are dissatisfied with promotions and postings as it is felt that promotions are ‘not based on skills and suitability’ but ‘seniority and influence of sponsors’ (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). To increase staff confidence in the transparency and fairness of recruitment and promotion UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360 degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). This suggests senior management are responding to staff surveys.
274 Telephone interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
275 IBRD articles of agreement; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20049557~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.
276 IDA articles of agreement and by-laws; see: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:21353441~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html.
277 IFC articles of agreement; see: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/Articles+of+Agreement/.
278 MIGA convention; see: http://www.miga.org/documents/miga_convention_november_2010.pdf.
83Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
279 ICSID convention; see: https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
280 WB organization chart; see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf.
281 World Bank projects and operations; see: http://www.worldbank.org/projects.
282 World Bank. Annual Report 2013; see: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16091/9780821399378.pdf?sequence=1, p. 6.
283 Thorton, P. “World Bank Revamp”. Guardian, 18 November 2013. See: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/08/world-bank-job-cuts-jim-yong-kim.
284 World Bank. Annual Report 2012; see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf.
285 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
286 Rushe, D. “World Bank candidate Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says job will go to Jim Yong Kim”. Guardian, 16 April 2012. See: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/16/world-bank-president-jim-kim.
287 Lowrey, A. “World Bank, Rooted in Bureaucracy, Proposes a Sweeping Reorganization”. The New York Times, 6 October 2013. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=0.
288 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.
289 World Bank Archives. “Robert Strange McNamara”. See: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html.
290 Harding, R. “World Bank: Man on a mission”. Financial Times, 7 April 2014. See: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4.
291 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. “Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences”. In World Development, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.
292 Farnsworth, E. “The BRICS Try to Bank”. U.S. News & World Report, 18 July 2014. See: http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/07/18/brics-development-bank-could-challenge-world-bank-and-imf.
293 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/PresContConfCopy.pdf
294 Steven Weisman. “Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank.” The New York Times (May 18th, 2007): http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all
295 Kahler, Miles. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Institute for International Economics; Washington, DC 2001
296 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
297 Minutes of the WBG Board meetings http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64256109&piPK=64818889&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=51146024
298 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
299 World Bank Archives. The Presidency of Robert McNamara: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html;.
300 WBG Strategy for 2030 approved in April 2013 http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-goals2013.pdf
301 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
302 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf
84 Effective Leadership in International Organizations
303 See Steven R. Weisman, ‘Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank’ New York Times, May 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
304 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHICS/Resources/ethics_code_2013-Mar13-CRA.pdf.
305 IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s organizational effectiveness http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/matrix_eval.pdf
306 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
307 WBG Annual Report 2012 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf
308 Harding, “World Bank: Man on a mission,” Financial Times.
309 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
310 See Note xii.
311 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html
312 Interview with a former official, July 2014
313 IEG evaluation of trust funds (2011): http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/tf_eval.pdf
314 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
315 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=4&
316 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
317 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
318 MOPAN Annual Report 2012 on the World Bank http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012_1.pdf http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf.
319 World Bank Group Strategy, attached for the October 12, 2013 meeting of the Development Committee: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html.
320 World Bank. DIME: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,contentMDK:23422972~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3998212,00.html
321 Interview with a former official, July 2014
322 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdfhttp://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB132/B132_R14-en.pdf
323 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf
324 http://www.who.int/employment/staff_regulations_rules/EN_staff_regulations_and_staff_rules.pdf
325 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5
326 http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA66/A66_4-en.pdf - page 5
327 http://www.who.int/dg/Report_card_cover_28_06.pdf
328 http://www.who.int/about/role/en/index.html, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/GPW_eng.pdf
85Evaluation of Organizational Structures that Enable Effective Leadership
329 http://www.who.int/about/agenda/en/index.html
330 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html
331 http://www.who.int/about/who_reform/programme_priority/en/index.html
332 Van Grasstek, C. 2013. The History and Future of the World Trade Organization, Part V. See: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/historywto_14_e.pdf.
333 “Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
334 World Trade Organization (WTO). “WTO legal texts”. See: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.
335 Kahler, M. 2001. Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
336 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm
337 http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/509.doc
338 Interview with former WTO official, July 2014
339 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
340 http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf.
341 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
342 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
343 https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/gc_09sep13_e.htm
344 WTO Annual Report 2012: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf
345 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
346 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
347 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
348 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
349 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
350 Interview with a former WTO official, July 2014
351 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
352 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dft_panel_e/future_of_trade_report_e.pdf
353 Interview with a former WTO official, July 2014
354 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
355 WTO Annual Report 2013: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_chap8_e.pdf
356 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
357 Interview with a former WTO official, July 2014
358 Interview with Carolyne Deere, July 2014
359 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep13_e.pdf
360 Interview with a current WTO official, November 2013
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