Global soft power and the adaptive state: Global soft power and the adaptive state: China’s...

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Global soft power andGlobal soft power andthe adaptive state:the adaptive state:

China’s differing pathways of adaptation to international norms

Titus C. ChenIIR-NCCU, Taiwan

October 2009

Human rights and rule of law: a natural pair?

Presupposed relations between liberal HR and rule of law Liberal HR as the moral purpose of rule of law Rule of law as the expression & guarantee of

liberal HR Adopted by academia & advocacy groups

They seem to be right…

And the graph seems to…

But China defies the pattern

Percentile Rank Governance Score

(0-100) (-2.5 to +2.5)

Voice and Accountability 2007 5.8 38.4 -1.7

Political Stability 2007 32.2 39.4 -0.33

Government Effectiveness 2007 61.1 37.2 0.15

Regulatory Quality 2007 45.6 36.9 -0.24

Rule of Law 2007 42.4 37.7 -0.45

Control of Corruption 2007 30.9 37.4 -0.66

Governance Indicator Year Income Average, Percentile

China’s two pathways of adaptation

Human rights: Adaptation through outward argumentation External pressure (1989) – prescriptive recognition

(2009) Prescriptive recognition as the result

Rule of law (good governance): Adaptation through inward, selective learning Prescriptive recognition (1997) – external engagement

(1998) Prescriptive recognition as the beginning

Explaining the China conundrum

What accounts for uneven socialization of global norms into China’s domestic practices?

What accounts for the variation of China’s adaptation strategies?

Constructivist IR theories of state socialization

Identity-based constructivism (Path I) Finnemore, Klotz, Wendt, Katzenstein, Zehfuss social construction of state identity—uncritically

internalizing the “social terms” of international society Socialization through identification

Rule-based constructivism (Path II) Risse, Sikkink, Reus-Smit, Hawkins, Brysk Behavioral change through conscious & contentious

engagement From institutional embedment to conceptual entrapment Socialization through argumentation

Constructivist IR theories: “bringing the domestic back in”

Endogenous constructivism (Path III) Legro, Beyers, Hooghe, Lewis, Checkel, Avedeyeva,

Sundstrom Previous socialization in domestic politics matters Conceptual and/or bureaucratic match Socialization by matching

Interpretive constructivism (Path IV) Lynch, Yanow, Blyth, Widmaier, Seabrooke Locally-generated diagnosis & prescription Actively seeking solutions compatible with prescription Socialization by learning

Observations

Path-dependent factor: Pre-socialization conditions @ t-1 influenced the state’s perception & coping strategy to socialization @ t

Process-generated factor: effects of engagement @ t bear upon later development @ t+1

Propositions

China’s adaptation to human rights pressure: Rule-based constructivism: socialization through

argumentation China’s adaptation to int’l rule of law movement

Interpretive constructivism: socialization by learning Endogenous constructivism: socialization by matching

Human rights pre-socialization conditions

A materialist & class-based understanding A nationalist understanding A state-centered understanding Unfamiliarity with human rights norms

Dismantling of the Cold War

Human rights pressures & denial

Began with post-Tiananmen pressures Initial perception: ideological & power struggle Initial coping strategy: denial through argumentation Initial agenda: anti-liberalization Changing modes of engagement:

t—Denial (1990-1995) t+1—Tactical concessions (1996-2009) t+2—Prescriptive recognition (2004-2009)

Human rightseffects of engagement (a)

1. Institutional embedment (i): Lessons learned from 1990 UNCHR A Marxist HR argument after 1991—the rights to

subsistence and development Specialized HR agencies & bureaucrats HR research institutes & programs Regular issuance of HR white papers after 1991 Changing int’l HR agenda:

Bangkok Declaration, Vienna Declaration, 1993

Human rightseffects of engagement (b)

1. Institutional embedment (ii): Enticement—invitation of bilateral HR dialogue, ‘95- Counterattack—Group of like-minded states, ‘96-’97 Major victory at UNCHR, ’97 Regularization of bilateral HR dialogue, ‘97- Ratification of HR conventions & protocols Active engagement in UN HR institutional reform

Engagement bred more engagement Engagement formed a “common life world”

UNCHR voting records, 1990-2004

21 1 1

22 2223

17 1718

1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2004

UNCHR voting records on China resolutions (1990-2004)

SPONSOR

PRO NO-ACTION

ANTI NO-ACTION

ABSTENTION

Ratification of HR conventions by year

0 0 0 0 0

f rati

ficati

Yearly Number

Ratification of HR conventions by period

P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7

Pre-1981 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2009

Periodic total

Human rightseffects of engagement (c)

2. Conceptual entrapment (i): Recognized the validity of universal HR norms, ‘95 Admitted HR violations after ‘95 Accepted Western democracies & IGOs as legitimate

interlocutors after ’95 Agreed to discuss specific HR cases after ‘97 Emphasized the fulfillment of int’l HR obligations

Human rightseffects of engagement (d)

2. Conceptual entrapment (ii): Prescriptive recognition:

Amendments of State Constitution, ‘04 Amendment of Party Constitution, ‘07 National HR Action Plan, ’09

Remained in rhetorical mode of engagement Symbolic declaration, not enforceable commitment Lack of bureaucratic support HR violations by central & local authorities

Initial agenda stands

Human rightsAdaptation, not liberalization—ESS cases

690725

456 467

349 561619

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

NUMBER OF ARREST

NUMBER OF INDICTMENT

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (a)

Resurgence of law & development movement in the 1990s

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (b)

China’s transitional political economy (i) Decentralization & deregulation in the ‘80s

Local & departmental protectionism Expanding but fragmented administration

Admin. rationalization in the ‘90s Adjusting central-local relationship Streamlining government structure Moving to a regulatory & service-oriented state

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (c)

Unintended results of rationalization Underfunded local gov. became predatory Understaffed local gov. perform poorly reg. power Unprofessional local gov. could not provide services Local gov disregarded state laws & central orders Rampant corruption, rising social discontent

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (d)

Self-generated diagnosis by central ruling elites Entrenchment in parochial interests Lack of a sense of legality Poor capacity of law enforcement and supervision

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (e)

Policy prescriptions by central ruling elites Urging “全局意识” since 1994 Promoting awareness of legality Promoting the idea of administration by law Promoting legal services (lawyers, legal aid) Formalization: “Administrating the state by law” written

into Party Constitution (‘97) and State Constitution (‘98) Interests in learning from Western legislation &

bureaucratic professional training Adaptation by strategic learning

Rule of lawpre-socialization conditions (f)

Reformist leadership of legal-judicial system Bureaucratic & professional interests MOJ promoted legality & legal services after 1994 Liberal scholarship in legal education SPC pushed for structural reform &

professionalization after 1999 NCPSC & its Legal Work Commission

Adaptation by professional/bureaucratic matching

Rule of lawadaptation through selective learning (a)

Began with prescriptive recognition Initial perception: domestic governance Initial coping strategy: selective learning Initial agenda: policy cohesion & admin.

rationalization Changing modes of engagement:

t—Prescriptive recognition (1994-1998) t+1—Selective learning (1998-2008) t+2— Reassessment ? (2008-)

Rule of law selective learning (b)

Sino-Western legal-judicial programs, ’97- Bilateral, intergovernmental cooperation

US Presidential Rule of Law Initiative EU-China Legal-Judicial Programme Canadian AID, GTZ

Cooperation with IOs & INGOs UNDP, World Bank, ADB Non-governmental donors (Ford, Carnegie) Legal professional organizations (ABA, TAF, IBJ) Academics (Yale, Cornell, Columbia, Temple)

Rule of law effects of engagement (b)

Institutional building Economic legislation Legal services (lawyers, legal aid) Criminal justice reform:

Procedural reform in death penalty—recentralization Lawyers’ Law Proposed reform in RETL—judicialization

Professionalization of legal workers Conceptual change

A large reservoir of reform proponents Judicial independence, rights awareness

Rule of lawEngagement by the US

Rule of lawEngagement by the EU

Rule of law Reassessment by the Party-state

Repression against public interest lawyers since 2005 New leadership in SPC since March 2008

“Three supremes” “Democratization” of judicial work

Reappearance of legal populism Rebound of death penalty: 1010 (‘06), 470 (‘07), to 1718

(‘08) Adaptation, not liberalization Disagreement of reformist judges, lawyers, &

scholars

Rule of law Reclamation of Party control

Rule of law Resurgence of legal populism

Conclusion: China’s capped socialization

Multiple pathways of state socialization The relevance of pre-socialization conditions The relevance of internal dynamics: admin.

rationalization and anti-liberalization

Global soft power and the adaptive state: Global soft power and the adaptive state: China’s...

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