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Identity Economics and Social Norms at Zero Price
Fiona Wilkie
Advised by Professor Kirk Doran
This paper is a culmination of my research in behavioral economics for a Directed
Readings course under the direction of Professor Kirk Doran. Through my study of
behavioral economics, I found the most compelling aspects of the field to be the
research on behavior around free or “zero price”, and identity economics. I decided
to explore the connection between these two areas further by conducting an
experiment that measures the effect of visible observation on individuals’ behavior
at zero price.
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Introduction
In Dan Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational, he asserts that there are both
“monetary norms” and “social norms” that interact and can produce results that
differ from what we would typically expect from the perspective of traditional
economics.
The most relevant experiments described in Predictably Irrational, carried
out by Dan Ariely, Uri Gneezy and Ernan Haruvy, involved Starbursts sold at a price
of 1 cent and offered for free. Ariely, Gneezy, and Haruvy measured the demand for
Starbursts, and found that more people stopped by and took candies in the free
condition, but they took fewer candies on average, resulting in a decrease in total
demand. Ariely, Gneezy and Haruvy then repeated this experiment using Lindt
truffles and reducing the price from 10 cents, to 5 cents, to free.
Ariely comes to the conclusion that “what these results mean is that when
price is not a part of the exchange, we become less selfish maximizers and start
caring more about the welfare of others” (Ariely, 108). In this experiment I seek to
challenge Ariely’s argument that the reduction in total demand for starbursts when
the price was reduced from 1 cent to free is due to people starting to care more
about the welfare of others in the absence of monetary norms. I instead propose
that the reason people take fewer free candies is because of identity economics-‐
they are concerned about what others watching them will think of them, and they
want to avoid actions that conflict with their concept of self.
Background
My research was inspired by Ariely, Gneezy and Haruvy’s Lindt truffle
experiment as described in Ariely’s book, Predictably Irrational. I found their truffle
experiment to be fascinating, yet incomplete. Ariely presents the theory of social
norms as implying that “only when price is not a part of an exchange do we start
thinking about social consequences of our actions”. He decides to test this
hypothesis by performing an experiment at MIT in which Lindt truffles are offered
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to passing students at a price of 10 cents, then 5 cents, then 1 cent, and finally, free.
The results indicated that when the price dropped from 10 cents to 5 cents, demand
increased by about 240 percent. Similarly, when the price went from 5 cents to 1
cent, demand increased by about 400 percent. When they reduced the price from 1
cent to free, they found that total demand actually decreased by about 50 percent. In
their free condition, more people stopped for chocolate, but people took less
chocolate per person on average, violating the second law of demand and resulting
in a backward sloping demand curve.
The problems I find with this conclusion are twofold. First, I find it
interesting that Ariely concludes that “what these results mean is that the theory of
demand is a solid one-‐ except when we’re dealing with the price of zero” (Ariely,
112). This seems like a very bold conclusion to make based on one experiment, and I
immediately wondered whether this would hold true if the experiment were to be
repeated. The second and more important problem I find with the analysis of this
experiment’s results is that the experiment fails to take into account the presence of
an observer on people’s behavior at zero price. Ariely jumps to the conclusion that
at zero price, because price is not a part of the exchange, social norms enter the
exchange and cause people to consider the welfare of others. Therefore, people
“limit consumption to a level that does not place too much of a burden on the
available resource… when prices are zero and social norms are a part of the
equation, people look at the world as a communal good.” (Ariely, 112). I decided to
conduct an experiment that replicates Ariely et. al’s truffle experiment, but controls
for the presence of an observer at zero price.
My hypothesis, which offers an alternative explanation for what Ariely
proposes in Predictably Irrational, is that social norms at the price of zero may only
operate when other people are watching. This would suggest that we do not begin to
care more about others in the absence of monetary norms, but rather, we begin to
care about others perceiving us as conforming to the established social norms
surrounding “free”. On the other hand, maybe Dr. Ariely and his colleagues are right,
and people took less candies when they are free because “while the (free) product
was more attractive to people, it also made people think more about others, care
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about them, and sacrifice their own desires for the benefit of others” (Ariely, 109).
There is no doubt that social norms are at play in this situation, but from Ariely et.
al’s experiments, it is not apparent whether people would behave differently if they
did not think anyone was watching and “enforcing” those social norms. I intend to
perform this experiment to see if my proposed hypothesis regarding social norms
and the zero price effect is true. The results will either support Ariely’s theory as
described in Predictably Irrational, or suggest an alternative explanation of Ariely et
al.’s results.
Methods and Experiment Design
Experiment Structure
The experiment had 4 trials:
1. Truffles are 10 cents, an observer is at the booth watching
2. Truffles are 5 cents, an observer is at the booth watching
3. Truffles are free, an observer is at the booth watching
4. Truffles are free, no one is at the booth watching
In order to measure the effect of an observer on the number of people who take
free truffles and the average amount they take, I ran an experiment with 4 trials. The
experiment involved observing demand for truffles under 2 different monetary
conditions and 2 free conditions, one of which involved no observer.
For this experiment, I set up a table at the Hesburgh Library at Notre Dame. The
table had a sign that read “Chocolates 10 cents”, “Chocolates 5 cents”, or “Free
Chocolates”, according to each trial. I ran the trials in the order 1,2,3,4 on a weekday
evening, for 30 minutes each (2 hours total). The location and time of the
experiment was structured to ensure a steady flow of traffic past the booth, while
also keeping the table out of the way. It was important to place the table in a visible,
yet relatively secluded location so that for trial 4, I could truly measure the effect of
no observers. While a few people were sitting at tables nearby, they were not close
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enough or numerous enough to cause the participant to feel as if they were being
watched. A picture of the experiment set-‐up is included in Appendix B.
Confederates
For each trial, there was a confederate sitting in a strategic location across
from the table, measuring the amount of traffic that passed by the table. This
allowed me to measure the percentage of people who stopped at the booth across
the 4 trials, and account for any significant differences in traffic flow across the
trials. Traffic flow remained largely consistent across the 4 trials, so no adjustment
was needed.
For each trial, there were also 2 confederates watching from a distance to
count how many people stopped at the booth and how many truffles each individual
took. These confederates were sitting across the room from the table, seemingly
working on homework with a textbook out, but actually collecting data on the
people taking truffles. It was important to have observers here during every trial,
because I could account for any difference in how people count truffle taking from a
distance versus at close proximity. This enhances the accuracy of our measurements
in Trial 4, when no attendant was at the table, because the number of people who
took truffles was determined from a short distance (rather than by a person directly
behind the table), which may have affected the measurements. For trials 1-‐3, the
measurements of the confederates counting truffle-‐taking from a distance were
consistent with my measurements from directly behind the table, so no adjustment
was needed.
For trials 1-‐3, there was a confederate sitting directly behind the table,
observing participants. This confederate was responsible for counting the number
of truffles taken by each individual. This confederate made friendly conversation
with people who came up to the booth, but did not talk to people unless they
approached the table. When participants asked what the truffle sale or giveaway
was for, the confederate gave a vague but friendly answer that it was associated
with the Economics Club, and was not a fundraiser in any way, but just a way to
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brighten people’s day as finals week approached. Almost all participants happily
accepted this response and walked away smiling with their free or very cheap
truffles. Only one participant seemed suspicious of the response and asked the
confederate if it was really an experiment.
Truffles
I used identical Lindt Milk Chocolate truffles in every trial to avoid risks from
having different flavor combinations in each trial. Each truffle is worth 23 cents at a
bulk price, so the monetary conditions offered a significant discount from retail
value. I had the truffles laid out on the table in lines so that it was easier to count
how many each participant took. The truffles were replenished as needed by the
attendant at the booth during Trials 1-‐3. During trial 4, when truffles needed to be
replenished, a confederate would quickly place more truffles on the table and then
leave the area.
Limitations
A significant difficulty that I encountered during the experiment was the
difficulty of counting truffle taking from a distance. Even though I carefully planned
out how I would lay the truffles out on the table in organized rows, and trained the
confederates in how to observe participants taking truffles, unforeseen challenges
arose. Some participants grabbed handfuls of truffles hastily, disrupting the rows
and making it difficult to observe exactly how many truffles had been taken. The
confederates counting truffle taking during Trial 4, when there was no observer
behind the table, were not able to accurately record data on how many truffles each
individual took. I did not want to compromise the integrity of the data by instructing
the confederates to make their observations more obvious. This was an important
decision, because if participants had noticed that they were being watched, they
may have altered their behavior.
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The confederates were able to accurately record how many people stopped
by to take a truffle in Trial 4. I knew the total truffle count at the beginning of Trial 4,
so I was able to compute an accurate measurement for mean truffles taken per
person. For data analysis, I computed a two sample t-‐test assuming that the free
conditions (Trial 3 and Trial 4) had equal variances. Table 1 below shows the results
of the two-‐sample t-‐test based on the variance from Trial 3 (free with observer). I
also performed additional two sample t-‐tests using the variances from Trial 1 and
Trial 2 to demonstrate that even when I assume higher variances, the jump in mean
truffles taken per person from the observer condition in Trial 3 to the no observer
condition in Trial 4 is significant. The results from these additional T-‐Tests are
included in Appendix C. While it would be ideal to have exact data on the number of
truffles taken per participant in Trial 4, given the nature of the experiment and the
importance of the lack of a visible observer, it would have been extremely difficult to
accurately measure this without filming participants. Filming participants would
have increased the risk factor of the experiment.
Another limitation of the experiment is that many people did not have cash
with them to purchase truffles in the monetary condition. It is becoming more rare
for people to carry cash with them at all times due to the increasing prevalence and
use of credit and debit cards. Additionally, because the experiment was undertaken
on a college campus, some underclassmen may be used to paying for items with a
student ID card, decreasing the likelihood that they would be carrying cash. I had a
large bag of change available so that participants could buy any desired number of
truffles and receive exact change for their purchase. While having change available
helped, some people did not have any cash at all, which resulted in a small sample
size for Trials 1 and 2. During Trials 1 and 2, multiple people noted that they would
have purchased truffles if they had been carrying cash.
Results
The most important result is whether there is a difference in means between
the free condition with an observer and the free condition without an observer. I
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test for differences in the means of the distributions by calculating a two sample t-‐
test. My null hypothesis is that the difference in means is zero.
Null hypothesis: μ1 -‐ μ2 = 0
Alternative hypothesis: μ1 -‐ μ2 ≠ 0
Table 1: Differences in the Means of the Distributions for Free Truffles With and
Without a Visible Observer
Two Sample T-‐Test Trial 3 (Observer) Trial 4 (No Observer)
Mean Truffles Taken per Person 1.5 4.47
Standard Deviation 1.41 1.41
Variance 1.99 1.99
Observations (n) 95 94
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
Degrees of Freedom (df) 187
T-‐statistic -‐14.479
P-‐value 2.347*10-‐32
The results in Table 1 show that there is a statistically significant difference
in how many free truffles people take when there is a visible observer versus when
there is not. The p-‐value of 2.347*10-‐32 is extremely small. At a significance level of
.05, we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the means is
0. This confirms my hypothesis that social norms of being polite and considerate at
the price of zero may only operate when other people are watching. Contrary to
Ariely’s conclusion that we begin to care more about others in the absence of
monetary norms, my results support the idea that in the absence of monetary
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norms, we care about how others perceive our actions as conforming to the
established social norms surrounding “free”.
Table 2: Average Truffles Taken Per Person
Trial Description
Number of
People Who
Took Truffles
Average Truffles
Taken Per
Person
1 10 cents, observer 9 4.78
2 5 cents, observer 17 8
3 Free, observer 95 1.50
4 Free, no observer 94 4.47
Table 3: Total Demand for Truffles
Trial Description
Total Demand
for Truffles
Percent Increase
in Total Demand
1 10 cents, observer 43 ___
2 5 cents, observer 136 216%
3 Free, observer 143 5%
4 Free, no observer 420 194%
Tables 2 and 3 show demand for truffles in each trial. Table 2 displays the
number of people who took truffles during each trial and the average number of
truffles taken per person. About the same number of people stopped by the table in
each free condition, but when there was no observer, the average truffles taken per
person jumped from 1.5 to 4.47. Table 3 shows the total demand for truffles during
the 4 trials and the percent increase in demand between the trials. Demand
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increases dramatically as the price drops from 10 cents to 5 cents, but only slightly
increases when the price drops from 5 cents to free. This may be because when
monetary norms are eliminated, social norms at zero price in the presence of an
observer cause people to only take a polite number of truffles, so while the number
of people who stopped at the booth increased from 17 to 95, total demand only
increased by 5%.
As in Ariely et. al’s experiments, more people took candies on average in both
of the free conditions compared to both of the monetary conditions. However,
contrary to Ariely et. al’s results, my results show that when the price was reduced
from 5 cents to free, total demand increased.
Table 4: Percentage of Individuals Who Took a Truffle Compared to Total Traffic1
Trial Description Percentage
1 10 cents, observer 3.10%
2 5 cents, observer 5.92%
3 Free, observer 46.12%
4 Free, no observer 44.34%
Table 4 shows the percentage of individuals who took a truffle compared to
total traffic. There was a huge increase in the percentage of people who stopped by
the table to take truffles under the free condition. It is interesting that a slightly
smaller percentage of people stopped to take truffles in the free with no observer
condition. This could be explained by a number of factors, such as people being
1 “Total Traffic”: defined as the total number of people who passed by the table in the library lobby area during the time the experiment was live. These people passed through the lobby such that it is reasonable to assume that they saw the table.
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unsure if it was really okay to take the free truffles, or people not noticing the table
as much without someone sitting behind it.
The data from the truffle experiment allowed me to test both the law of
demand (my first concern with Ariely’s experiments) and the presence of an
observer at zero price (my second and more important concern with his
experiments). My results are inconsistent with Ariely’s claim that “the theory of
demand is a solid one-‐ except when we’re dealing with the price of zero” (Ariely,
112), because according to my results, total demand increased each time the price of
truffles were reduced. The remainder of the paper will focus on my finding that the
presence of an observer has a significant effect on people’s behavior at zero price.
Discussion
Ariely’s theory in Predictably Irrational states that at zero price, people are
socially conscious, and “once money is introduced into the exchange, you stop
thinking about what’s socially right or wrong”. My results confirm that including
money in the exchange causes people to maximize their own benefit in the
traditional economic sense, and people will take what they pay for. In other words,
people think that if they paid 25 cents for 5 truffles, they deserve those 5 truffles,
even if 5 cents per truffle is far below the retail price for a Lindt truffle. However, my
results also suggest that it is not just the introduction of monetary norms, but also
the absence of a visible observer, that may cause people to stop thinking about
what’s socially right or wrong. In order to explain these results, I will incorporate
many elements of identity economics, especially focusing on George Akerlof’s work
in this area.
In order to fully evaluate how social norms operate at zero price, one must
consider the huge body of work on identity economics, an important and emerging
field in behavioral economics. Identity economics experiments involve both real
monetary stakes and placing subjects in different social situations. George Akerlof, a
leading academic in behavioral economics, has several theories that may be at play
here, and could offer some explanation of the difference between my results and
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Ariely et. al’s results in our respective truffle experiments. This truffle experiment is
an example of how social context matters. By varying the social context in which the
free truffles were offered, we were able to observe that people’s behavior around
zero price changes significantly when they are being watched.
According to Ariely's theory, in terms of pricing strategy and rational choices,
zero is a different place altogether. Zero is also a different place when it comes to
social norms and how we identify with "free". If we paid for something, we feel like
we are entitled to more. If we did not, we are aware that we should be polite,
therefore if someone is watching, we will take fewer truffles. As George Akerlof
describes in Identity Economics, an older kid may enjoy a Merry-‐go-‐round secretly
but not in front of others, because he is aware that he is too old for it and should not
be enjoying it at his age (Akerlof, 11). That awareness of social norms diminishes
when we think no one is watching, and our utility function changes. When no one is
watching we get more utility from taking more free truffles.
The most relevant aspect of identity economics at play in this experiment is
the preservation of social image or reputation. People care very much about the
opinion others have of them, and this affects the identity utility associated with
certain actions. Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole describe how social pressure and
norms frequently influence people to perform good deeds and refrain from selfish
ones in order to appear honorable and avoid feelings of shame. The preservation of
one’s image as viewed by others can significantly effect economic outcomes, as
people may be motivated to make certain economic decisions because of how the
action will appear to others. For example, “charitable and nonprofit institutions
make ample use of donors’ desire to demonstrate their generosity and selflessness
(or at least the appearance thereof), with displays ranging from lapel pins and T-‐
shirts to plaques in opera houses or hospitals, and buildings named after large
contributors,” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Bénabou and Tirole also note that
anonymous donations are both extremely rare and widely considered to be very
admirable, indicating that the presence of a social signaling motive largely
influences giving behavior.
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Even without a significant chance for ongoing interactions with an individual,
“following a norm is also seen as a way to prove something important about
yourself to others” (Akerlof, 2010). In my truffle experiment, most participants had
a small chance for ongoing interactions with me, as most of the participants were
strangers walking through the Hesburgh library2. However, these participants still
took a polite 1.5 truffles each on average. A likely explanation based on identity
economics would be that this polite refusal to take more truffles was an attempt to
prove their observance of social norms to me, even though they would probably not
be interacting with me directly in the future.
In explaining the results from trial 4, where there was no direct obvious
observer at the truffle table, it is important to address another element of identity
utility-‐ the preservation of self-‐image. We have discussed the reasons why people
did not take more truffles in the “observer condition” in Trial 3, because the
presence of an observer introduced concern for social norms surrounding free items
and participants’ preservation of their social reputation according to those norms.
However, we also need to discuss the results from trial 4, in which individuals took
an average of 4.47 truffles. While this is a significant increase from the observer
condition, it is important to explain why people did not take even more than 4.47
truffles on average. Identity economics also offers an explanation for why
participants refused transactions that seemed to be in their best economic interest.
If there is no observer, and therefore seemingly no risk of harming one’s social
reputation (no direct social cost), and no monetary cost, why did participants not
take entire boxes full of Lindt truffles? Aside from the possible logistical difficulties
of carrying hundreds of truffles out of the library, utility maximization in this case
may also concern the preservation of self-‐image, and avoiding a discrepancy
between one’s actions and one’s self-‐perception of moral fortitude. The preservation
of self-‐image is defined as the need to maintain conformity between one’s actions
2 The only exception to this would be a small number of my friends that happened to be passing through the library lobby at the time of my experiment. While friends were unaware that my truffle booth was an experiment, they could reasonably assume ongoing future interactions with me were likely to occur.
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and feelings, and certain values, goals, or identities they seek to uphold (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006). It is likely that you might take several more truffles than you
would have if you knew someone was watching you, without feeling too guilty about
it. However, taking the whole box of truffles may cause dissonance between your
actions and your image of yourself as a moral and considerate person.
B. Douglas Bernheim’s paper A Theory of Conformity presents an interesting
lens through which to view the full picture of identity and social norms at zero price.
Individuals care about status as well as the utility derived directly from
consumption. Bernheim notes that “status is assumed to depend on public
perceptions about an individual’s predispositions rather than on the individual’s
actions... however, since predispositions are unobservable, actions signal
predispositions and therefore affect status” (Bernheim, 1994). In the case of the
truffle experiment, taking free truffles while someone is watching acts as a signal of
predispositions and therefore could theoretically affect status. Bernheim also finds
that individuals recognize that even small departures from social norms can
seriously affect their status. This is a relevant point in the context of my experiment,
because participants let a behavior that is seemingly inconsequential to social
status-‐ taking free truffles-‐ affect their economic decisions.
Conclusion
After conducting an experiment and a thorough review of possible
explanations of the results through the lens of identity economics, I conclude that
without market norms, social norms govern an exchange, but only when you are
aware that someone is watching. In the presence of an observer, people will take
fewer free items, as they are concerned about how they appear to others. The
concept of identity utility and the preservation of social image or reputation play a
large part in decisions people make at zero price.
An important point to make is that Ariely does not rule out the
“consequences of appearing greedy” as a factor influencing demand at zero price.
However, he places enormous emphasis on people thinking more about social
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justice and caring about others as a reason for people taking fewer candies on
average in a free condition compared to a monetary condition. There is no doubt
that social norms are at play in this situation, but from Ariely et. al’s experiments, it
is not apparent whether people would behave differently if they did not think
anyone was watching and “enforcing” those social norms. Surely, there are some
people who truly consider social justice and the benefits for others when it comes to
free items. However, my results show that on average, there is a statistically
significant difference in the mean demand for free truffles in the presence of an
observer versus without an observer. Most people are concerned about appearing
greedy, but are not concerned about actually being greedy if no one is looking.
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References
Akerlof, G. and R. Kranton, "Economics and Identity," Quarterly Journal of
Economics CVX (3), August 2000, pp. 715–753.
Akerlof, George A., and Rachel E. Kranton. Identity Economics: How Our Identities
Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-‐being. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. Print.
Ariely, Dan. Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New
York, NY: HarperCollins, 2008. Print.
Ariely, Dan, Uri Gneezy, and Ernan Haruvy (2008) ,"On the Discontinuity of Demand
Curves Around Zero: Charging More and Selling More", working paper.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. "American
Economic Review 96.5 (2006): 1652-‐678. Web.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. "A Theory of Conformity." Journal of Political Economy 102.5
(1994): n. pag. Web.
Shampanier, K., N. Mazar, and D. Ariely. "Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of
Free Products." Marketing Science 26.6 (2007): 742-‐57. Web.
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Appendix A-‐ Letter of Institutional Review Board Approval
Univer
sity o
f Notr
e Dam
e
NOTICE OF APPROVAL FOR HUMAN RESEARCH
DATE: April 20, 2015TO: Wilkie, Fiona, BBA
Doran, Kirk, PhDFROM: Mueller, Kate, Associate Director, Exempt ReviewPROTOCOL TITLE: Identity Economics, Social Norms and The Zero Price EffectFUNDING SOURCE: Internally FundedPROTOCOL NUMBER: 15-04-2488APPROVAL PERIOD: Approval Date: April 20, 2015 Expiration Date: March 31, 2016
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human subjects has reviewed the protocol entitled: Identity Economics, Social Norms and The Zero PriceEffect . The project has been approved for the procedures and subjects described in the protocol. This protocol must be reviewed for renewal on a yearly basis for as longas the research remains active. Should the protocol not be renewed before expiration, all activities must cease until the protocol has been re-reviewed.
If approval did not accompany a proposal when it was submitted to a sponsor, it is the PI's responsibility to provide the sponsor with the approval notice.
This approval is issued under University of Notre Dame's Federal Wide Assurance with the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP). If you have any questionsregarding your obligations under Committee's Assurance, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Please direct any questions about the IRB's actions on this project to:
Mueller, Kate
Office of Research Compliance
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Approval Period: April 20, 2015 through March 31, 2016
Review Type: Full Review
IRB Number: FWA 00002462 exp 5/28/2018
University of Notre Dame317 Main BuildingNotre Dame, IN
TEL: (574) 631-1461FAX: (574) 631-8441
Page: 1
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Appendix B-‐ Photo of Experiment Set-‐Up
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Appendix C-‐ Two Sample T-‐Tests with Different Variance Assumptions Table 5: Differences in the Means of the Distributions for Free Truffles With and
Without a Visible Observer
Assuming variance in Trial 4 is equal to variance in Trial 1
Two Sample T-‐Test Trial 3 (Observer) Trial 4 (No Observer)
Mean Truffles Taken per Person 1.5 4.47
Standard Deviation 6.67 6.67
Variance 44.489 44.489
Observations (n) 95 94
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
Degrees of Freedom (df) 187
T-‐statistic -‐3.061
P-‐value .00253
Table 6: Differences in the Means of the Distributions for Free Truffles With and
Without a Visible Observer
Assuming variance in Trial 4 is equal to variance in Trial 2
Two Sample T-‐Test Trial 3 (Observer) Trial 4 (No Observer)
Mean Truffles Taken per Person 1.5 4.47
Standard Deviation 4.086 4.086
Variance 16.695 16.695
Observations (n) 95 94
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
Degrees of Freedom (df) 187
T-‐statistic -‐4.996
P-‐value 1.336*10-‐6
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