Post on 05-Apr-2018
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Laila Utari Ratna PuspitaFakultas Teknik Mesin dan Dirgantara
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In structures, only about 10% of failures are dueto a statistical variation in either the applied
load or the member resistance. The remainderare due to human error or abuse
Human errors are estimatedto have caused 62% of all
hazardous materialsaccidents in US
This index assesses thepotential for pipeline
failure caused by errorscommitted by the pipeline
personnel in designing,building, operating, ormaintaining a pipeline.
Human error can logically
impact any of the previousprobability-of-failureindexes-active corrosion,
for example, could indicatean error
in corrosion control
activities
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Relative Risk Score
Leak Impact Factor
Index Sum
Third PartyDamage
Corrosion DesignIncorrectOperation
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Hazard
identification
MOP potential
Safety systems
Material selection
Checks
Inspection
Materials
Joining
Backfill
Handling
Coating
Procedures
SCADA/Communications
Drug-testing
Safety programs
Surveys
Training
Mechanical errorpreventers
Documentation
Schedule
Procedures
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Structural failure can be defined (in asimplified way) as the point at which
the material changes shape under stressand does not return to its originalshape when the stress is removed
The most readily available measure ofa pipelines strength will normally be
the documented Maximum OperatingPressure or MOP
MOP is determined from stresscalculations, with internal pressurenormally causing the largest stresses
in the wall of the pipe. Material stresslimits are theoretical values,confirmed (or at least evidenced) bytesting, that predict the point at whichthe material will fail when subjected tohigh stress.
*0f 30 (design weighting)
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0 pts
Where routine, normal operations could allow the system toreach MOP
Routine
5 ptsWhere overpressure can occur through a combination of
procedural errors or omissions, and failure safety devicesUnlikely
10 pts
Where overpressure is theoretically possible, but only
through an extremely unlikely chain of events
Extremely
unlikely
12 pts
Where the pressure source cannot, under any conceivablechain of events, overpressure the pipeline
Impossible
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0 pts No safety device present
3 pts On site, one level only
6 pts On site, two or more levels
1 pt Remote, observation only
-2 pts Non-owned, active witnessing
-3 pts Non-owned, no involvement
10 pts Safety systems not needed
*0f 30 (design weighting)
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The evaluator should look for evidence that proper materialswere identified and specified with due consideration to allstresses reasonably expected
Documents should show that the corrosion potential, includingincompatible material problems and welding-related problems,was considered in the design
Here, the evaluator determines if design calculations anddecisions were checked at key points during the design process.Two points are awarded for sections whose design process wascarefully monitored and checked
*0f 30 (design weighting)
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If inspection is a complete unknown, 0 points can be awarded0-10 pts
An on-site material handler should be taking reasonable steps to ensure thatthe right material is indeed being installed in the right location
0-2 pts
100% inspection of all joints by industry-accepted practices warrants 2 pointsin this example
0-2 pts
Knowledge and practice of good backfill/support techniques duringconstruction warrants 2 points
0-2 pts
The evaluator should award 2 points when he sees evidence of good materialshandling practices and storage techniques during and prior to construction
0-2 pts
This variable examines field-applied coatings and provides an additionalevaluation opportunity for precoated components
0-2 pts
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C1. Procedures (7 pts)
C2. SCADA/communications (3 pts)
C3. Drug testing (2 pts)
C4. Safety programs (2 pts)
C5. Surveys/maps/records (5 pts)
C6. Training (10 pts)
C7. Mechanical error preventers (6 pts)
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Mainline valve checks and maintenance
Safety device inspection and calibrationPipeline shutdown or startup
Pump/compressor operations
Product movement changes
Right-of-way maintenanceInstrument maintenance
Safety device testing
Management of change
Patrol
Surveys
Corrosion control
Control center actions
Lock-out and equipment isolation
Emergency response
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Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) refers to the transmission ofpipeline operational data (such as pressures, flows, temperatures, and productcompositions) at sufficient points along the pipeline to allow monitoring of theline from a single location
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1. Monitoring of all critical activities and conditions
2.Reliability of SCADA system
3. Enforced protocol requiring real-time communicationsbetween field operations and control room; two sourcesinvolved in critical activities; an adequate real-time
communications system(s) is assumed
4. Interlocks or logic constraints that prevent incorrectoperations; critical operations are linked to pressure,flow, temperature, etc.; indications that are set aspermissives before the action can occur
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Level 1 No SCADA system exists or is not used in a manner thatpromotes human error reduction.
Level 2
Some critical activities are monitored; field actions areinformally coordinated through a control room; system is atleast 80% operational.
Level 3
Most critical activities are monitored; field actions are usuallycoordinated through a control room; system uptime exceeds95%.
Level 4
All critical activities are monitored; all field actions arecoordinated through a control room; SCADA system
reliability (measured in uptime) exceeds 99.9%.
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Written companystatement of safety
philosophy
Safety program designedwith high level of employeeparticipation--evidence of
high participation is found
Strong safety performancerecord (recent history)
Good attention tohousekeeping
Signs, slogans, etc., to showan environment tuned tosafety
Full-time safety personnel.
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The scoring of surveys/maps/records can be based on such aspects such as :
Comprehensiveness-
Amount of the systems covered by maps and records
Detail
Level of detail shown (depth, landmarks, pipe specification, leakhistory, etc.)
Clarity
Ease of reading
Timeliness of update
Schedule to update
Document management system
Ensuring version control and ready access to information
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4 pts Three-way valves with dualinstrumentation
2 ptsLock-out devices
2 pts Key-lock sequence programs
2 ptsComputer permissives
1 pt Highlighting of criticalinstruments
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D1. Documentation
The evaluator should check for a formal program ofretaining all paperwork or database dealing with all aspectsof maintenance exists
0-2
pts D2. Schedule
A formal schedule for routine maintenance based onoperating history
0-3
pts D3. Procedures
The evaluator should verify that written procedures dealingwith repairs and routine maintenance are readily available
0-10pts
Modern maintenance practices often revolve around concepts of Predictive
Preventive Maintenance (PPM) programs. The evaluator may wish to judge thestrength of the maintenance program based on the following items :
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