Introduction to the ZeroTrust Initiative

Post on 07-Apr-2017

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CTO, Wheel SystemsFounder of the ZeroTrust Initiative

PawełJakubDawidek<pjd@ZeroTrust.org><p.dawidek@wheelsystems.com><pjd@FreeBSD.org>

TheZeroTrustInitiativeThereisnoSecuritywithoutTransparency

TheZeroTrustInitiativeaimstoimproveoverallITsecurityby

removingforcedtrust

u weareforcedtotrustthevendors

Problems…

u weareforcedtotrustthevendorsu nosourcecodeforproprietaryproducts

Problems…

u weareforcedtotrustthevendorsu nosourcecodeforproprietaryproductsu noreproduciblebuildsforopen-source

Problems…

u weareforcedtotrustthevendorsu nosourcecodeforproprietaryproductsu noreproduciblebuildsforopen-sourceu trustedbuildenvironment?u securedistribution?u reproducibleinstalls?

Problems…

Whoisright?

„Ifitcannotbeveri:ied,itcannotbesecure”

Whyisthatimportant,exactly?

„Besuspiciousofcommercialencryptionsoftware,especiallyfromlargevendors.MyguessisthatmostencryptionproductsfromlargeUS

companieshaveNSA-friendlybackdoors,andmanyforeignonesprobablydoaswell.It'sprudenttoassumethatforeignproductsalsohaveforeign-

installedbackdoors.Closed-sourcesoftwareiseasierfortheNSAtobackdoorthanopen-sourcesoftware.”

BruceSchneier

Nosourcecode

„ThankstotherecentNSAleaks,peoplearemoreworriedthaneverthattheirsoftwaremighthavebackdoors.Ifyoudon'tbelievethatthesoftwarevendorcanresistabackdoorrequest,theonusisonyoutolookfora

backdoor.Whatyouwantissoftwaretransparency.”prof.EdwardW.Felten

Nosourcecode

u compilersu compilationoptionsu headersu librariesu timeu buildenvironmentsmetadatau Lilesystemmetadatainarchivesu signaturesu proLile-guidedoptimizations

Noreproduciblebuilds:different…

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

OpenSSH3.0.2(CVE-2002-0083)-privilegeescalationtoroot

- if (id < 0 || id > channels_alloc) {

+ if (id < 0 || id >= channels_alloc) {

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

cmpl $0x0,0x8(%ebp)

js 16

mov 0x4,%eax

cmp %eax,0x8(%ebp)

jle 30

mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax

mov %eax,0x4(%esp)

movl $0x4c,(%esp)

call 25

Assembly

cmpl $0x0,0x8(%ebp)

js 16

mov 0x4,%eax

cmp %eax,0x8(%ebp)

jl 30

mov 0x8(%ebp),%eax

mov %eax,0x4(%esp)

movl $0x4c,(%esp)

call 25

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

39 45 08 7e 1a 8b 45

Binary

39 45 08 7c 1a 8b 45

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

39 45 08 7e 1a 8b 45

Binary

39 45 08 7c 1a 8b 45

01111110 01111100

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u Howsmallcanabackdoorbe?

Noreproduciblebuilds

39 45 08 7e 1a 8b 45

Binary

39 45 08 7c 1a 8b 45

01111110 01111100

Asinglebit!

Source:MikePerry,SethSchoen

u HugeefforttoverifyTrueCryptu On-goingworkonreproduciblebuilds(Tor,Debian)u Moreawarenessamongdevelopersneededu ReLlectionsonTrustingTrust,1984KenThompsonu CounteringTrustingTrustthroughDiverseDouble-Compiling,DavidA.Wheeler

Noreproduciblebuilds

u Howcanyoufeelsecurewithoutit?

Completeend-to-endindependentveriLication

Development

Build

Distribution

Installation

Developmenttrusteddevelopmentenvironment

Build

Distribution

Installation

trustedbuildenvironmentreproduciblebuildstrustedsigningenvironment

signedsourcesignedbinariesbinarytransparency

secureinstallationofkeyssignaturesveriLicationreproducibleinstallation

u publiclyavailablealgorithmsu extensivepeerreviewu publiclyavailablecryptoanalysisresults

Cryptography

u secret,home-growncryptouncommon

Cryptography:theresult?

u secret,home-growncryptouncommonu thestrongestlinkinthechain

Cryptography:theresult?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoors

Whynottotrust?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoorsu peoplecanbecriminals

Whynottotrust?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoorsu peoplecanbecriminalsu peoplecanbebribed

Whynottotrust?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoorsu peoplecanbecriminalsu peoplecanbebribedu peoplecanbeintimidated

Whynottotrust?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoorsu peoplecanbecriminalsu peoplecanbebribedu peoplecanbeintimidatedu peoplecanbeincompetent

Whynottotrust?

u agenciescanaskorforceorganizationstoputbackdoorsu peoplecanbecriminalsu peoplecanbebribedu peoplecanbeintimidatedu peoplecanbeincompetentu people’scomputerscanbehacked

Whynottotrust?

u don’tdestroybusiness

TheSolution

u don’tdestroybusinessu proposealicenseforauditing/reportingpurpose

TheSolution

u don’tdestroybusinessu proposealicenseforauditing/reportingpurposeu encourageandpromotereproduciblebuilds

TheSolution

u don’tdestroybusinessu proposealicenseforauditing/reportingpurposeu encourageandpromotereproduciblebuildsu talktotoolchainvendors

TheSolution

u don’tdestroybusinessu proposealicenseforauditing/reportingpurposeu encourageandpromotereproduciblebuildsu talktotoolchainvendorsu talktoplatformvendorstomakeveriLicationpossible

TheSolution

u don’tdestroybusinessu proposealicenseforauditing/reportingpurposeu encourageandpromotereproduciblebuildsu talktotoolchainvendorsu talktoplatformvendorstomakeveriLicationpossibleu proposewaystoprotectIP

TheSolution

The Ultimate Goal

ZeroTrustasanaturalelementofsecurityhygiene

Thoughquestions/Commomconcerns

V:Wemakemoneybysellingoutsoftwareanddon’twanttodestroyourbusinessbygivingitawayforfree.

ZT:TheZTIdoesn’texpectyourcompanytostartgivingproductsforfree.ZTIwillproposealicensethatwillallowtoreleasethesourcecode,butonlyforauditingandreportingpurposes.

Commonconcerns

V:Wedon’twantourcompetitorstouseourcodewhichwewillreleaseasOpenSource.

ZT:WithZTIlicensethatwouldbeillegal.Yourcompetitorwillalsohavedisadvantage,becauseofnotreleasingthecode.

Commonconcerns

V:Ourcurrentcodeisamess.Wealsohavebinaryblobsfromothervendorsandnochancetogetthesourcecodeforthat.

ZT:Thendon’treleaseit.Wefullyunderstanditmightbetooexpensiveandtooriskytoreleasecurrentsourcecode.Butwhenyoustartbuildinganewproduct,doitaccordingtotheZTIideology.

Commonconcerns

V:Itwon’twork,nobodywillbeinterested,wearetoobigtotry.

ZT:Startinsmallsteps.ReleaseZeroTrustversionofyourproduct,withlimitedfunctionalityandseewhatthemarketwillchoose.

Commonconcerns

V:Howabout,toslowdownthecompetitors,wewillreleasethesourcecodesometimeafterreleasingthebinaries?

ZT:Badidea.Thismeanspeoplewhocare,willneedtowaitforyourproducttobecomepossibletoverify.

Commonconcerns

V:Openingthesourcecodesolvesnothing!Noonewilleverbeabletoauditmyentirecodeanyway!

ZT:That’spossible,ofcourse,butthat’snotcrucial.Peoplemaywanttoauditthecodeoncetheysuspectsomething.IndependentpartiesmayauditthecodeandIcanchoosewhototrust.Itismuchmoreriskytoputabackdoorintoaproductwithopensource.

Commonconcerns

V:Opensourcesoftwarelesssecure,becauseitiseasiertoLindsecuritybugs.

ZT:Yes,itiseasiertoLindbugs,but…

Commonconcerns

TimetoLindasecuritybug

Open Source

Closed Source

0m 12m 24m 36m 48m

Agencies Cybercriminals Whitehat community

Commonconcerns

TimethebugcanbeexploitedbyCybercriminals

Open Source

Closed Source

0m 12m 24m 36m 48m

Agencies Cybercriminals Whitehat community

Commonconcerns

12m

24m

12m<24m

TimethebugcanbeexploitedbyGovernmentAgencies

Open Source

Closed Source

0m 12m 24m 36m 48m

Agencies Cybercriminals Whitehat community

Commonconcerns

18m

36m

18m<36m

V:FormyproducttoworkeffectivelyIcannotdisclosethesourcecode.Forexamplespammerswillquicklylearnhowtobypassmyanti-spamsolution.

ZT:Sure,itisyourcall.ReleaseasmuchsourcecodeasyoucanandletyourcustomersdecideifthisexplanationconvincesthemormaybetheywillpreferZTalternative.Youmayalsodesignyoursoftwaresothatbinary-onlyfunctionalityisclosedinatightsandbox(lookoutforside-channelattacks).

Commonconcerns

V:HowcantheZTIideologybeappliedtocloudserviceproviders?

ZT:Wedon’tknowyet,buttarsnap,sync.com.

Commonconcerns

V:I’mavendorfromtheUSAandafterEdwardSnowdenleaksnobodytrustsmeanymore.WhatdoIdo?

ZT:Boy,dowehavegreatnewsforyou!JointheZTIandrebuildyourtrust!

Commonconcerns

u don’tblindlytrustthevendorsu havingsourcecodeisalwaysbetter,butbesurethesourcecodematchesthebinaries

u startlookingforZeroTrustproductsu supportvendorsthatapplyZTIeveniftheyprovidealternativeversionsoftheirproducts-showthemthatyoucare

u imagineyourwholeITinfrastructurebuildontopofZeroTrustproductsanditwillbeso!

Tosumup…

https://www.facebook.com/ZeroTrustInitiative