IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution Klaus Scherer, Benoit Bediou Swiss Center...

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IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution

Klaus Scherer, Benoit Bediou

Swiss Center for Affective Sciences

Motivation

Context ESF-ECRP Grant (IP2): Emotion regulation in conflict and conflict resolution

AimSubjective perception of (in)justice and its role in conflict and conflict resolution

Study 1Investigate the impact of entitlement on emotions and behavior in social interactions, focusing on negotiation

Literature review

Perspectives

Literature review

Perspectives

1. Justice / Fairness

2. Entitlement

3. Negotiation

1. Justice / Fairness

2. Entitlement

3. Negotiation

Literature review

Perspectives

31. Background & Aim

2. Paradigm & Design

3. Results & Discussion

1. Background & Aim

2. Paradigm & Design

3. Results & Discussion

Injustice as expectation violation

« People experience injustice when there is a discrepancy between what they expect based on salient or appropriate normative distribution rule and what they obtain” (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982).

Values & Norms in distributive justice

Different values & norms (distributive justice)e.g. equality, equity, need (Deutsch 1975)

Inter-individual differencese.g. egalitarian, meritocratic, libertarian (Frohlich et al. 2004; Cappelen et al. 2007)

Dicator Game with joint production

Frohlich et al 2004

Equity (41%)

Equality (26%)

Selfish (19%)

Productiv

Effort?Effort?Effort?Effort?

Productiv

Values & Norms in distributive justice

Intra-individual variabilitye.g. Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido WP2010

Self-serving biases e.g. Messick & Sentis 1979

Bargaining impassese.g. Thompson & Loewenstein 1992

Summary of previous findings

Context Framing as Buyer/Seller (Hoffman et al. 1994) Initial Ownership (Leliveld et al. 1998)

Entitlement Earning the position (Guth & Thietz 1986; Hoffman et

al. 1994, 1996; Schotter et al 1996; Schurter & Wilson 2007)

Earning the pie (Ruffle, 1998; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon 2008)

Dicator Game with joint production

Frohlich et al 2004

Equity (41%)

Equality (26%)

Selfish (19%)

Productiv

Effort?Effort?Effort?Effort?

Productiv

Paradigm & Design

Production: mental calculation (effort + skills) Distribution: negotiation (Ultimatum Game)

20 CHF

Player A Player B

Production screen

4 + 8 + 2 + 9

20 CHF

Player A Player B

Production screen

4 + 8 + 2 + 9

20 CHF

Distribution – Proposer screen

PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTIONX CHF 20-X CHF

20 CHF

Distribution – Responder screen

PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION7 CHF 13 CHF

Accept

7/13Reject

Paradigm & Design

2 x 4 design Production: better, worse (than other player) Distribution: proposer; equity, equality, unfair

Measures Decisions: P’s offers and R’s decisions R’s judgments of satisfaction (and fairness)

Experiment design & predictions

DISTRIBUTION

PRODUCTION

Room A Room B

Proposer – % Offered%

% PRODUCED by Responder

Proposer – % Offered%

% PRODUCED by Responder

R=0.35; p<0.01

Equity? Equality?

Proposer – % OfferedO

PRODUCED by Responder (% total)

Equality

Selfish

Proposer – % Kept

% PRODUCED by Proposer

Equality

Equality? Equity?Selfish

Equality rule?

<50% >50%

% Produced

Equality

Equity rule?

*Equit

% Produced

<50% >50%

Responder – Accept decision (188 obs)

<50% >50%

Offer: F(2,181)=109.88, p<0.001

% Produced

Responder – Satisfaction (N=27)

Offer: F(2,16)=67.79, p<0.001Production * Offer: F(2,32)=15.83,

p<0.001

<50% >50%% Produced

Responder – Fairness (N=12)Fair

<50% >50%% Produced

Fairness vs Satisfaction (72 obs)

Fairness

Conclusion

Individuals perceive and apply fairness norms flexibly depending on the context

Selfish bias due to biased entitlement/expectations? Low production => equality

Own effort > Other productivity High production => equity with generous adjustment

to avoid rejection Own productivity > other effort?

Strategic use of perspective taking to adapt offers to conflicting entitlement/expectations

Literature review

Perspectives

31. Background & Aim

2. Feedback & Discussion

1. Background & Aim

2. Feedback & Discussion

Social Regulation of Emotion?

Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996

1. Impact of norms violations on emotions?

1. Impact of norms violations on emotions? Injustice as expectation violation

e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008

2. Prediction error signal in the ACC?

1. Impact of norms violations on emotions? Injustice as expectation violation

e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008

2. Prediction error signal in the ACC? Impact of third-party ADR (e.g. mediation, arbitrage)

e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010

3. Can we modify expectationemotionbehavior?

Changing expectations in the UG

Study 1 shows that people’s norms are flexible Study 2 will seek to modify people’s norms 2 phases:

1. Induction

a) Production (quiz)

b) Distribution (3rd-party UG - responder)

2. Measure

c) Production (quiz)

d) Distribution (2nd-party UG - proposer)

PRODUCTION

DISTRIBUTION (Responder)

Accept/Reject + fairness

ratings

X3 low prod / X3 high prodNo Arb. (group IV)

2 (intra Low/High prod) * 4 (inter NoArb., Arb.Egalitarian, Arb.Meritocratic, Arb.Control)

PRODUCTION

DISTRIBUTION (proposer)

Offer+ self fairness

ratings

X1 low prod / X1 high prod

X3 low prod/X3 high prodEgalitarian (group I)

Meritocratic (group II)+CONTROL (group III)?

PRODUCTION

DISTRIBUTION (Responder)

Accept/Reject + fairness

ratings

X1 low prod/X1 high prod

PRODUCTION

DISTRIBUTION (Proposer)

Offer+ self fairness

ratings

BASELINE. Offers made by 2nd party (proposer)

INDUCTION. Offers made by neutral 3rd partyINDUCTION. Offers made by neutral 3rd party

1 MEASURE. Offers made by neutral 3rd partyMEASURE. Offers made by neutral 3rd party

Room A Room B

The arbitration

Control condition: Two of the participants will be randomly chosen and brought to another room to generate the offers[In fact, they will make ratings (emotions + fairness) of pre-determined offers]

Options:

Other task? e.g. fake arbitration

Non social? e.g. a computer will randomly generate a proposal

No arbitration? e.g. use baseline (offers made by 2nd party) as control

Other idea?e.g. 3rd party Dictator, passive viewing?

The arbitrator

Third party: [One of the participants] is observing the production phase and will make a proposal to both agents about the [A fair?] division of the pie. You can Accept or Reject his offer and you will also rate their fairness of his offers. […] will be paid according to your ratings, so he has an incentive to make fair offers.

Options:

Give him a form of power? (expertise? Legitimacy? Other types of power?) e.g : An highly skilled and experienced arbitrator or mediator

Give him a « norm compliance » function? e.g. [Player XXX] will ensure optimun fairness

Give him a personnal goal? e.g. the arbitrator’s goal is to ensure that both of you are satisfied

Give him a name and/or a face? : e.g. Picture or (fake) webcam recording…

Different (participant) arbitrator in each round? (greater social influence)

Predictions

Arbitration (attribution) R’s Fairness/Satisfaction should be higher for (unfair) offers made by 3rd parties vs 2nd parties?(e.g. Blount 1995)

Conformity with primed norm Participant should follow the norm of the arbitrator(e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010) Effects should be greater arbitrator’s whose

proposals are rated high on fairness P’s ratings of self-fairness should be greater if

conformed with abitrator’s norm,

Predictions

Arbitration (attribution) R’s Fairness/Satisfaction should be higher for (unfair) offers made by 3rd parties vs 2nd parties?(e.g. Blount 1995)

Conformity with primed norm Participant should follow the norm of the arbitrator(e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010) Effects should be greater arbitrator’s whose

proposals are rated high on fairness P’s ratings of self-fairness should be greater if

conformed with abitrator’s norm,

Social modulation of appraisalSocial modulation of appraisal

Methodological considerations

1. Type of third party? One of the participants? Power? Legitimacy? Expert or peer? Same or different in each round? Other ideas: passive viewer, dictator?

2. Type of induction task(induction, priming, anchoring, conformity?)

Control arbitration condition?e.g. random norm, social or computer, nonexpert?

No arbitration? (anchoring, reference) Other idea: participants could be passively

observing UG rounds in which one or different P’s would (in)consistently use the same norm while their emotions would be recorded?

3. Other questions and suggestions Induction phase: Participant always Responder? Test phase: Participant always Proposer? Better (e.g. continuous) DV than R’s A/R decision? Playing for a group? Inclusion/Exclusion? Repeat interaction with same player? 3rd party could emphasize value vs norm? Games on aggression?

IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution Klaus Scherer, Benoit Bediou Swiss Center...

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