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GAP Berlin
Jürgen Müller, Günes Orak, Evgeni Petkov and Stefan Schulz
Restructuring of the Value Chain of the European Ground Handling
Market after the EU market liberalization
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Contents
1. Introduction
2. The European Council Directive 96/67/EC
3. Theoretical Background and Propositions
4. The Ground Handling Market at 6 European Hubs
5. Impact on horizontal and vertical Market Structure,
and on Prices and Quality,
6. Restructuring he German Ground Handling Market
7. Conclusion
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1. Introduction• Definition Ground Handling
Source: Fraport AG
Source: Fraport AG
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1. Introduction
GHS are divided in 5 Categories:
- Ramp handling
- Baggage handling
- Fright/mail handling
- Fuel oil handling
- Passenger handling
1. IntroductionThese five activities can be performed by the airlines
themselves (self-handling), by a third party, or a mixture of the two. The third party handlers can be airports, specialized
ground handling companies or another airline, which serves as such.
The global market for GHS was estimated to have a size of about 32bn € , about 5 to 8 percent of the airline ticket, (Templin, 2007).
Due to the size and importance of the market, the effectiveness of these services, their organization, and by whom they are performed, is a significant issue for all the stakeholders in the GH industry
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1. Introduction
Questions arising after the liberalization of the market:
• How did the market structure and the organization of the value
chain change? Vertically? Horizontaly?
• I.e. the move from an artificial to a competitively organized
value chain
• How did prices and quality change?
• Who benefited and who lost from the changes?
• What lessons for other markets?
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2. The European Council Directive 96/97/EC
Source: SH&E Study
3. Theoretical Background and Propositions
Value Chain of GH:Airport
↓Handler
↓
Airline
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3. Theoretical Background and Propositions
Before the implementation of the Directive, we found artificial market structures, mainly based on legal monopolies. Namely :– monopoly of forward integrated airport – monopoly of backward integrated national airline ( on
the bases of special league exceptions) and – duopoly or oligopoly of independent ground handlers
and self-handling airlines– We want to analyze how this changes and what are the
reasons for the better organizational arrangement
3. Theoretical Background and Propositions
Summary of the theoretical predictions:
We would expect to find high degree of vertical integration on hub airports,
but a lower degree of vertical integration on spoke airports
•Question: Is this what we observe in real life?
Although strong vertcal control, in other words self handling or joint ventures are implied by the TCE theory, this is not the case in practice. Independent handlers or subsidiries of airlines and airports tend to dominate the GHS market.
3. Theoretical Background and Propositions
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4. GHS at the Major European Airports
We look at the GHS market after the liberalization on the sixlargest airports in Europe:
• London Heathrow (LHR)
• Paris Charles de Gaulle (CDG)
• Frankfurt (FRA)
• Amsterdam Schiphol (AMS)
• Madrid Barajas (MAD)
• Rome Fiumicino (FCO)
4. GHS at the Major European Airports
Airport LHR CDG FRA AMS MAD FCO
PAX (2004) 67.3 51.3 51.1 42.5 38.7 28.1
Ex-ante situation
8 airlines doing self- and 3rd party GH
Duopoly of airport and Air France
Monopoly of FRAPORT
KLM doing self- and 3rd party GH
Monopoly of Iberia
Monoply of the airport
Total # of handlers (ramp)
11 5 2 5 5 3
Airport doing GH
no yes yes no no yes
Self-handling airlines
7 1 0 2 4 2
Independent handlers
4 3 1 3 0 0 source: Templin 2006
22/04/23 Source: Templin,2006 14
4. GHS at the Major European Airports
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4. GHS at the Major European Airports
What explains these different market shares?Mainly licencing policies
It seems that nstitutional Barriers to competition differ, eventhough we start with one directive, due to national interpretation and vested intersts (airports, uninons vc airlines :
Capacity constraints are used as a motive for limiting 3rd party handlers on all airports. This was supposed to change with a revision ofthe Directive, first envisaged in 2006, which was canceled due to strong opposition from airports and unions, especially from Germany.
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5. Impact on Prices and Quality, Winners and Losers
In 2002 SH&E conducted a study on prices and quality onbehalf of the EU.An increase in prices was reported only from Brussels andManchester.Largest decreases were reported from Lyon, Lisbon andAthens – up to 50%.Reports on quality were ambiguous, however we canconclude that quality stayed more or less the same.
This indicates there must have benn productivity reserves and a lowwering of factor costs
22/04/23 Source: Templin, 2006 17
5. Impact on Prices and Quality, Winners and Losers
Price reductions, changes in quality an no of competitors on the 6 hubs: does market structure matter?
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5. Impact on Prices and Quality, Winners and Losers
Airlines (and their customers )were the winners of the liberalization, because of reduced GH charges.
Unfortunately, the gains were probably not large enough to be noticed by the passengers, due to the fact that GHS costs are only 4-8% of total flight costs, more on short haul LCC.
Expectedly, the former monopolists lost significant marketshares and profits, eventhough we have fewf igures.
Another winner were the independent handling companies,which gained market shares after the market oppened.
So the value added chain changed, but final results still have to emerge
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5. Impact on Prices and Quality, Winners and Losers
Due to the labor intensity of Ground Handling, employeeswere among the main losers of the market opening.
Independent handlers were reported to pay up to 30% lowerwages, and require a much higher flexibility to meet the airports changing requirements during the day.
in order to compete with them, the airports also try to reduce wages and to increase the flexibility of labor.
We are now studying this issue in detail.
5. The need for greater labor flexibility
Evidence on changes in flexibility- Stuttgart 2004:
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5. What lessons for other markets?
Questions arising after the liberalization of the market:
• How did the market structure and the organization of the value chain change?
• Vertically? Some changes, but restricted by licence process
• Horizontaly? Much more by the strengthening of the independent operators
• I.e. the move from an artificial to a competitively organized value chain is
apparent, but still strongly depandent on licencing
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Before the Directive airports were monopolists in Ground HandlingAfter the implementation of the Directive in 1997 there have been changes, but the market seems to be less open than other European markets
Regulators try to protect airports and their employees from competition
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
• The market for the airside services, such as ramp handling, is still quite protected [this includes luggage handling and mail, refuelling and other ramp services such as push out, etc]
• The market for the landside services such as check in, and
all the associated services like station and crew support is less strictly regulated, also cleaning, maintenance, bus transfer, catering etc
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Market entry in Germany is controlled through institutional barriers like:
• the criteria for the selection of service providers or self handlers that we also have observed in the other countries,
• the administrative rules set down by the regional state regulator for the airport user council involved in the selection procedure
• The maximum number of service providers allowed for each service (usually not more than 2) The expected revision of the service directive in 2007 would have allowed to increase this number to 3 or 4
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Major feature of the German market:
Airports stay in the business, but through GH subsidiaries which provied for greater labor flexibility and lower wages.
Large differences across airports, why? Hamburg, Hannover und Düsseldorf were early movers in creating own subsidiaries and could pay lower wages there
Cologne and Frankfurt continue with their current organizational arrangement in which GHS are fully integrated within the core airport organisation, but have also increased productivity
Munich ist late to restructuring
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Why seperate subsidiaries?
The European Commission requires subsidiaries for cost transparency – no cross subsidisation
German airports are doing it mainly in order to move out of the inflexible and expensive old labor contracts
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Differences between the “old“ and “new“ employees:
- “old” paid as public service employees- “new” paid similar to logistics or cleaning sector
employees- difference also in retirement provisions
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Evidence on changes in flexibility- Stuttgart 2004:
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Evidence on changes in flexibility- Stuttgart 2005:
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
New entrants in Germany:
International service providers like Acciona, Swissport, Avia Partner, Securicor, or Menziees and local service providers like Losch
Airports created AHS, a service company owned by several airports active in landslide services like check-in, in order to achieve scale and multi station economies like those specialized companies achieve
6. Transformation of GH in Germany
Questions about the development of GH in Germany:
Is it just a question of who can pay lower wages and be more flexible?
What will happen if the market opens completely?When will the airports be able to move completely out of the old labor contracts and will they then abandon the subsidiaries?Why do airports want to stay in that business?
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7. Conclusion
Entry barriers still exist
Prices fell
Quality stayed more or less the same
Airlines and independent handlers won
Former monopolists and employees lost
Effects on reorganization of the value chain not so clear because of significant technnical barriers to entry remain, we see only small reorganization
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7. Conclusion
Directive had varied success in the different countries, since some important barriers to entry still exist, mostly due to capacity constraints and the short license period
Transformation of GH in Germany is slower and has different patterns than in other countries
Labor costs and labor organization seem to be crucial for success and survival in that business
Strong opposition to further opening of the market, mostly from labor unions
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Thank you for your attention!