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Tracking Ransomware End-to-endDanny Y. Huang

Maxwell Matthaios Aliapoulios, Vector Guo LiLuca Invernizzi, Elie Bursztein, Kylie McRoberts, Jonathan LevinKirill Levchenko, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy

Ransomware causes financial damages

Ransomware causes financial damages

Ransomware causes financial damages

Ransomware causes financial damages

How much ransomware revenue?

How to shut down ransomware?

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Spam, compromised websites, etc

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1b

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1bCerber: median ~$1,000

Locky: median ~$1,800

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

All your files are encrypted!

Send 0.5 bitcoins to the following address.

175mBiaNSSHAhoCbpv25y1rJYK4A7d7d1b

unique ransom wallet address

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Victim’s money

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

How typical ransomware works

1. Distribution

2. Infection

3. Victim pays bitcoins

4. Decryption

5. Criminal liquidates bitcoins

Exchange

Victim’s bitcoins

Ransom wallet address

Ransomware’s bitcoins

Victim’s money

Exchange

Ransomware’s money

Research questions

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- $16 million over two years, 20k unique payments

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Research questions

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- $16 million over two years, 20k unique payments

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% of revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% of affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

1

Overview of results

How to estimate the total ransom paid (or revenue)?

- 10 families, >$16 million over two years; 90% made by two families

How to identify chokepoints?

- 40% revenue of one ransomware sent to BTC-e

- 3% affiliates of one ransomware caused 50% infections

1

2

1 Blockchain Analysis

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

known victim

0.5

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

known victim

0.5

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

1.0

1.3

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

known victim

0.5

1.0

1.3

potential victim

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

artificial “victim”

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

artificial “victim”

0.001

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

artificial “victim”

0.001

Methodology: Follow the money

1. Identify known victims

2. Infer unknown victims

3. Estimate total ransom

4. Identify exchanges

Co-spending

artificial “victim”

0.001

1.0

1.3

potential victim

Total ransom received

USDper

month

Total ransom received$7.7m$1.8m

$69k$6.6m$100k

USDper

month

Fraction of revenue sent to exchanges

Potential liquidation at exchanges

$2.6 m

$24 k

2 Reverse Engineering Cerber’s C&C

Cerber’s outbound UDP traffic

Infected host

IP: x.y.z.1

IP: x.y.z.2

IP: x.y.z.3

IP: x.y.z.254

Cerber’s outbound UDP traffic

Infected host

IP: x.y.z.1

IP: x.y.z.2

IP: x.y.z.3

IP: x.y.z.254me

two-week data

victim IPvictim ID

affiliate ID...

Number of infected IP addr per affiliate

Affiliate ID

3% of affiliates caused 50% of infected IPs

Affiliate ID

3 Summary

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Key Methods

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Key Methods

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two years

Possible chokepoints: exchanges and affiliates

Key Methods Key Results

Summary

Tracked ransom payments for 10 ransomware families using co-spending wallet addr

Reverse engineered C&C protocol for Cerber ransomware

Estimated revenue: 10 families, >$16 million over two years

Possible chokepoints: exchanges and affiliates

Key Methods Key Results

Danny Y. Huang — Postdoc at Princeton — http://hdanny.org

4 Appendix

Ransom payments over time

Number of payments per day

Median ransom amount per day

(USD)

Potentially missing Locky’s ransom payments

Google resultsbinaries found

bitcoin payment