Lecture 4 China & Geneva Conference

Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969)

Early Contact between CCP & Vietnamese Communists Ho Chi Minh’s activities in China: in the 1920s, Ho. often visited China; 1924, dispatched by the Comintern to

China to assist Mikhail Borodin, the Soviet agent working for Sun Yatsen & the Guomindang government in Guangzhou;

Late 1930 & early 1940, a member of CCP-led Eighth Route Army & stayed in Yan’an for several weeks.

Ho.’s activities in Vietnam Aug. 1945, Ho. led national uprising &

established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV);

1951, the founding of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP);

When the French returned to reestablish their control, Ho. moved to the mountainous areas to fight for independence.

CCP’s Support for Viet Minh Revolution

Sending Vietnamese members back to promote their motherland revolution;

Chinese communist guerrilla forces in Sino-Vietnamese border areas assisting the Viet Minh’s military operation;

Intermittent financial support from CCP’s Hong Kong Bureau Branch.

Reasons for CCP Offering Support to the Viet Minh

Promoting the PRC’s international reputation;

Enhancing China’s southern border security;

Shouldering the responsibility of promoting East Asian revolution.

Ho.’s Beijing & Moscow Trip

17-day-walk to China Guangxi border on Jan. 20, 1950 & arrived in Beijing on Jan. 30;

Feb. 3, Left Beijing for Moscow & arrived in Moscow one week later;

March 3, Returned to Beijing with Mao & Zhou.

Establishment of Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG)

April, 1950, Ho. Requested China’s support, including: dispatching military advisors, training Viet Minh troops and delivering ammunition & military equipment;

Early August, CMAP composed of 79 experienced PLA officers arrived in Vietnam.

Chen Geng & the Border Campaign

Strategy: “concentrate forces & destroy the enemy troops by separating them”;

“not to begin the campaign by directly attacking target town, but by attacking some of the enemy’s small strongholds & then eliminating the enemy’s reinforcements.”

By 13 Oct. 1950, about 3,000 French men were defeated, and the French were forced to give up the blockade line along the Vietnamese-Chinese border.

Setback in 1951 Late Dec. 1950 to June 1951, Viet Minh

troops initiated 3 major offensive campaigns, but suffered heavy casualties without making any significant strategic gains;

CMAG’s strategy: attacking French troops with medium- or small- scale mobile wars; leading the war into the enemy’s rear by breaking up the weak line in the enemy’s defensive system.

The Northwest Campaign

Under the instruction of CMAG’s tactics, the Northwest campaign began on 14 Oct. 1952. the Viet Minh’s troops annihilated 3 battalions & 11 companies, enhancing the Communists’ military position in the northwest.

International Background of Dien Bien Phu Campaign

Viet Minh: superior position on the battlefield;

China: the end of the Korean War, more attention to the southern security;

France: General Henri Navarre as commander in May 1953;

US: increasing military & financial support.

Navarre’s 3-year strategy

Dividing Indochina into northern & southern theatres along the 18th parallel & planned to eliminate Viet Minh guerrillas in southern & south central Vietnam by spring 1954, and then, by spring 1955, to concentrate the main formation of French forces to fight a decisive battle with the Communist forces in the Red River delta.

CMC’s strategy Avoiding making equal assaults of equal strength from

all directions; rather, adopting the strategy of separating & encircling the enemy, and annihilate them bit by bit;

Cutting off the enemy’s front by attacking in the middle; destroy the enemy’s underground defenses one section at a time by using concentrated artillery fire; consolidating your position immediately after seizing even a small portion of ground, thus continuously tightening the encirclement of the enemy; using snipers widely to restrict the enemy’s activities; using political propaganda against the enemy.

Guarding against the possibility of a French paratrooper landing at the rear of the Vietnamese.

Significance of Dien Bien Phu Victory

Greatly enhancing the Communist position at the forthcoming Geneva conference.

Conflicts between CMAG & Vietnamese Communists

CMAG: Poor quality of Viet Minh troops to realize some of strategic designs;

VC lacked “Bolshevik-style self-criticism” & unhappy with the Chinese criticism of their “shortcomings”;

VC: not satisfied with some of the CMAG’s suggestions, esp. land reforms & political indoctrination (nationalists)

Disagreement on Final Settlement of Indochina Issue:

VC: a solution leaving clear Communist domination not only in Vietnam but in Laos & Cambodia;

China: (supported by Soviet) a compromise by temporarily dividing Vietnam into two zones.

Beijing’s preparation for Geneva Conference Guideline: “active diplomacy” to break US

policy of political isolation an economic embargo against China;

Huang Hua practised press release & question-and-answer in accordance with international standards;

Zhou’s Moscow visit; Priceless antiques & furnishing shipped to

Geneva; Articulation of the “Five principles of

peaceful coexistence”

Korean issue & Indochina issue Reasons for the dissolution of the Korean

issue; Zhou’s positive move on Indochina issue:1) May 28, pressured Hanoi to release 858

French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu;2) Frequent meetings with Soviet & North

Vietnamese representatives (5,12,15,29 & 30 May & 2 June);

3) Private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (14, 20 and 27 May) & French Minister George Bidault (7 June).

Zhou’s active diplomacy Mendes-France government’s

condition: temporary partition of Vietnam and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission;

Zhou’s 3-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou, Guangxi, 3—5 July;

Zhou’s Moscow trip 10 July;

Experience from Geneva Conference Good will facilitates settlement/resolution of

complicated issue; Private contacts provided more

opportunities for participants to have further understanding, instead of formal speeches;

Seeking common ground and shelving disagreement for the time being to seek effective solutions;

When dealing with small & weak nations, more attention to their face, never hurting their national pride.

Experience from Geneva Conference “united front” policy proved effective even

in an “international struggle”: uniting the other countries and isolating USA;

International tension can be relaxed through non-military means;

“Open the door wider” would serve China’s interests better than political isolation.

Significance of Geneva Conference

Promoting China’s southern security (buffer zone);

Breaking China’s isolating status in the world;

Crucial role China played at the conference.