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MakingClaims,MakingProblems,MakingMorality:

SpectorandKitsuse’sProvocation*

JosephSchneiderDrakeUniversityAugust1,2018

WhenMalcolmSpectorandJohnKitsuse(2000,p.1)wrote,asthefirstsentenceoftheir

1977book,ConstructingSocialProblems,“Thereisnoadequatedefinitionofsocialproblems

withinsociology,andthereisnotandneverhasbeenasociologyofsocialproblems,”itwasnot

hyperbolicbravado.Well,atleast,surely,nothyperbolic.Thegreatachievementofthatbook—

stilltodayinprint—inthefourdecadessincethenisthattheirproposedremedy,“a

theoreticallydefensible,methodologicallyspecifiable,andempiricallyresearchabledefinitionof

socialproblems”andabodyofrelatedresearchhaveemergedandestablishedthestudyof

socialproblemsasascholarlyrespectablesubfield(SpectorandKitsuse2000,p.27).

Conferencepapers,journalarticles,andbookshavedefinedthistrajectory;parsing,critiquing,

andconsideringtheirproposal(seeHolsteinandMiller1993;HolsteinandGubrium2008).

SomeofthesepapersinTheAmericanSociologistbeganatasessionatthe2017annual

meetingsofTheSocietyfortheStudyofSocialProblemsinMontreal,whichdrewtogether

bothlong-timeandnewadherentsandinterestedotherswhocontinuethatline(Michael

Adorjan,JoelBest,JimHolstein,PeterIbarra,DonileenLoseke,MalcolmSpector,andIwereon

thepanel;withStephenPfohlandDorothyPawluchintheaudience).Acollectionofpaperson

SpectorandKitsuse’sbookwaspublishedrecentlyintheItalianjournal,SocietàMutamento

*PublishedinTheAmericanSociologist,onlineversion090618,DOI:10.1007/s12108-018-9390-4.

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Politica.IuseasignificantportionofthebookintheundergraduatesocialproblemsclassI

teach.Itsdirectionsonhowtothinkaboutandstudysocialproblemscomeasrevelatoryto

mostofthestudents.Significantandvoluminousacademicpublishinginsociologyorganized

undertheterm“socialproblems”continues(e.g.,Trevino2018).JohnKitsusewouldbe

pleased,ifnotalsoslightlysurprised,couldheknowthishistory.

Suchsuccessmightseemtobegthequestionofwhatmoreneedstobewrittenabout

theconceptionofsocialproblemsSpectorandKitsuseoffered.Beyondthenewresearchbeing

donefromtheirideas,myaimhereistoreiteratesomeofthemostimportantandstill

provocativeelementsofthisparticularconstructionistargument—which,asagenre,perhaps

hasbeenalltoosuccessful(see,e.g.,Latour2003)—thatdrawtheattentionnotonlyofmy

undergraduatesbutgraduatestudents,professionalsociologists,andotherscholarsaswell.

Moreover,beyondthatprovocation,thereisplentyofworkfortheircritiqueofsocialproblems

sociologystilltodo(Schneider2018).InwhatfollowsIreviewsomeofwhatSpectorand

Kitsusethemselvescalled“radical”intheirargumentandthatcontinuestoofferintellectual

tractionandchallengeinthestudyofsocialproblemssociology.Iclosebysuggestingthattheir

versionofsocialconstruction,rathermodestinscopeandlesspolemicalanddebunkinginaim

thanmuchsuchwork,invitesamoreself-reflexiveplaceforthescholar,gesturingbeyonditself

and,perhaps,muchconventionalsociologyasaguideforamoreconfidentaswellashumble

argumentandanalysis(cf.Latour2005).

“SocialProblemsAreWhatPeopleThinkTheyAre”

SpectorcommentsinaninterviewfortheItalianjournalnamedabovethattheideathat

“socialproblemsarewhatpeoplethinktheyare”wasatthecenterofhisandKitsuse’searly

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studythatledtotheirbook.Inparticular,theirpuzzlewaswhythissimpleclaim,whichthey

notewasnotoriginalwiththem,seemedinpastworkalwaystohavebeencompromisedand

pushedtotheside,notonlybythen-popularfunctionalistorMarxistaccounts,whichoftentake

“whatpeoplethink”asderivative,butalsobytheso-calledvalueconflictwriters,whowere

mostlysympathetictotheclaim.Evengiventhissympathy,“whatpeoplethink”wasnotseen

tooffersufficientsociologicalgroundsforthestudyofsocialproblems.“Objective(and

undesirable)conditions,”thevalueconflictwritersinsisted,arealsoneeded.Acrossthework

SpectorandKitsusereview,fromtheearly“socialpathologists,”totheincreasinglymore

scientificsocialdisorganizationandfunctionalisttheorists;throughthesevalueconflictwriters

andevenincludingelementsofHowardBecker’s(1973)Outsiders,“whatpeoplethink”hadnot

itselfbeentakenassufficienttoestablishasociologyofsocialproblems.Kitsuse(1962)earlier

hadchallengedthatview,asSpectorremindsus,inapaperondeviance,buthiswasaquite

lonevoice.Later,theytogetherbegantodevelopwhatthelattercallsa“labelingtheoryof

socialproblems”thatwoulddojustthat.Nosociologistswritingonsocialproblemshaddone

thatbefore.Thatclaimremainstheguiding,sociologicallyprovocative,andstillvaluableinsight

oftheirwork.Butsimplybecausetheyassertedthatclaimandelaborateditinadetailed

argumentdoesn’tmeanithasbeenfullyembraced.Ithasremained“difficult,”evenforsome

whohavebeendrawntoit.

Thedefinitiontheyofferedastheoreticallydefensible,methodologicallyspecifiable,and

empiricallyresearchableisthatsocialproblemsare“theactivitiesofindividualsorgroups

makingassertionsofgrievancesandclaimswithrespecttosomeputativeconditions”(Spector

andKitsuse2000,75).Ashorterversionmightbe“claims-makingandrespondingactivities”or,

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asKitsusesometimeswouldsay,editingfurther,“definitionalactivities.”Thissimplestversion

strikesmeassomewhatresonantwithwhatMichelFoucault(1978,1979)calleddiscursive

practices.Thatisn’ttosayKitsuseandSpectordrewonFoucault’sworkorthattheirargument

needssuchareferencetodeserveourattention.1Rather,Iamstruckbyhowbothsetsofterms

drawtogetherlanguage,itsuse,andrelatedactionorbehaviorinaninescapableandpromising

analyticcombinationthatgrounds“socialconstruction”inlanguage-and-action,similar,I

believe,toBrunoLatour’s(2005)actor-networktheory,whichheinsists,afterall,isnot

sociologyinitsmostfamiliarform.

SpectorandKitsusetaketheratherhomelytheme,above,and,preservingthebasic

insight,addtwoorthreemorespecificrequirements.First,“whatpeoplethink”isofcoursenot

thepointandcannotprovideadequateempiricaldirectionforfindingasocialprobleminthe

world.Asidefromwhatpeoplemayormaynotthink,itiswhattheydo—and,especially,what

theysayandwhattheywrite—thatsociologistsofsocialproblemscanobserveanddescribe.

Theirsthenisalanguage-anddiscourse-centeredapproach.Butlanguageuseisnotitssole

focus.Inshort,claims-makingandrelatedactivitiesconstitutesocialproblemsasmoralaction,

justas“labeling”bringsintoviewthemoralmarkingthattheconceptdevianceannounces.

Theseareclaimsthatregistercomplaint,criticism,outrage,demandsthat“somethingbe

done.”2Inthisview,theevaluativemeaningsattributedby“people”or,asthe

ethnomethodologistsputit,“members,”aretheessenceofthematter;constitutiveofthe

phenomenaindexedbytheconceptssocialproblemsanddeviance.Thesephenomena,so

named,are“caused”byorexistintheworldinandbytheirveryobservablecollectiveenaction.

That“doing”constitutestheobjectofstudy.Thetheoreticalandphilosophicalgroundsforsuch

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thoughtcomeinpartfromthesymbolicinteractionisttraditionstheseauthorsshared,withan

unmistakableandquiteimportantethnomethodologicalflavor,contributedbyKitsuse,perhaps

fromhisearlierworkwithAaronCicourel(CicourelandKitsuse1963).Fromthesejoined

insightscamethenon-negotiableclaim:noclaims-making,nosocialproblems.Fullstop.Such

definitionalactivity,theyinsist,isallweneedinordertonamethephenomenona“social

problem.”3

WhatabouttheSociologist?Conditions?Context?SocialFactors?

Thesetheoreticalclaimsleadimmediatelytothequestion,“Whatabout‘whatthe

sociologistthinks’socialproblemsare?”Andofcourseitisnotthatwhatthesociologist

“thinks”isirrelevanttodecidingwhatwillbetakenasasocialproblem.Buttherequirementsin

thiscaseareasfollows:(1)such“thinking”mustbeguidedbyaconceptualizationortheory;(2)

thattheorycannotcontainjudgments—scientificorpopular—aboutconditions;and(3)the

sociologistcannotusetheirownpersonalmoralityorideologytoidentifyconditionsas

problems.ThefirstfourchaptersofSpectorandKitsuse’sbookdetailtheserequirementsinthe

critiqueofpastwork.Ireferreaderstothatdiscussion,whichremainsrelevanttosocial

problemsworkpublishedtoday.Althoughthedetailstheredistinguishthevariousarguments

considered,ourauthorsgroupvirtuallyallpriorsocialproblemswork,includingthatofthe

functionalistswiththeirmorecomplexsetofconceptsthatexaminesocietyasasystemwith

varioussubsystems,intowhattheycall“normative”theories.Thesetheyrejectaslargely

responsibleforthemuddlethatthendefinedsocialproblemstheory.Thatconclusionisthe

pointofdeparturefortheirownargument.

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Certainly,however,ourauthors’argumentitselfishardlymadewithoutattentionto

norms.Thatisapparentintheexplicitshouldsandshouldnotsthattheirtheoryboldlyspecifies

andthattheycallradical.Theirtheoryis—asarealltheories—anormativephenomenon.They

wouldnotdisputethat,giventheiraims.Surely,theycouldhavemadethatpointwithout

underminingthoseaims;buttheydidnot.Iwillhavemoretosayaboutthatlater.Theiruseof

“normative”todescribepasttheoryreflectsacentralrequirementoftheirown:whatsocial

problemsare,forthesociologist,cannotbeamatterofthemmakingevaluativejudgments

aboutmaterialconditionsinsociety.Itismostcentrally,then,notaquestionof“whatthe

sociologistthinks”aboutsuchconditionsasconditions.Anytheorythatanswersthisquestion

byrequiringajudgmentfromthesociologistaboutconditionsorcircumstancesas

undesirable—and,thus,a“problem”—fallsintotheirnormativecategoryandissetaside.That

isconsistentwithanyargumentthatinsists,astheirsdoes,thatsocialproblemsaretobe

definedassuchby“people”ratherthanby“experts”suchasthemselves.

Giventhehistoryofsocialproblemssociologyandthedisciplinarypoliticsof

sociologists—mostlyliberal,left,progressive,radical—thispositioncandiscourageinterestin

anduseofSpectorandKitsuse’sargument.Thatisn’ttosaytheirargumentis“conservative”

politically,butitdoesinsistonthepriorityofadisciplinarypoliticsofscienceinthestudyof

moralphenomena,which,arguably,isthelargerormoreinclusiveconceptualobjectof

interest.Whetherwenameit“objectivity,”“distance,”“neutrality,”oreven-handedness,

fairness,accuracy,andprecisionintermsoftheoreticallanguageandthecreationand

manipulationofevidenceordata(e.g.,Becker1967),thistooisnormative,butinasense

differentfromthatusedbyourauthors.Clearly,toavoidconfusionweneedtoask,“normative

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withregardtowhat,andinwhatandwhoseterms?”Ourauthorsusethesedisciplinarynorms

todistinguishtheirsociologicalstancefromthestanceorpositionofmembersorparticipants.4

Theuseofnormativelanguagetodefineundesirableconditionsintermsofvaluessuchas

equality,socialjustice,fairness,humanrights,andthelonglistofothertermsthatcharacterize

aliberal-leftpolitics,signifiesamember’slocation,notasociologist’s.Suchadefinitional

practice,whilelaudatoryinmyview,whentakenupasthesociologicalbasisfordefiningsocial

problemsis,inthatmove,indistinguishablefromothermembers’claims.Sociologistswho

makethismovethenbecomethemselvesparticipantsorclaims-makerstobestudied.

Theinsistencethatclaimsaresufficienttoprovidethesubjectmatterforatheoryof

socialproblemsledsomecolleaguesotherwisesympathetictothetheorytorejectwhatthey

calledSpectorandKitsuse’s(too)“strict”constructionistview.Surely,theyargued,social

contextcannotbeignored.Theyofferedanalternative,“contextual”constructionisminamove

tosavethecontribution(e.g.,Best1989,pp.245-46).Butwhattheradicalviewrejectedis

preciselysuchanotionas“context,”alongwith“objectiveconditions,”andanyotherversionof

“socialfactors,”asexplanationoressenceofsocialproblems(cf.Latour2005).Theparallel

threatforthelabelingargumentwasthenotionof“rulebreaking”andtheideathatdeviance

is,simply,afterall,transgressioncausedbytheseandothersocialandpsychological“factors.”

Butinourauthors’argument,suchconventionalexplanatoryresourcescannolongerbeatthe

sociologist’sdisposal.Instead,reflectingtheethnomethodologicalmove,theseandsimilar

termsbecomemembers’orpeople’sresourcesand,thus,thesociologist’stopicforstudy.

SpectorandKitsusedonotclaimthatsociologistsshouldgiveupcontextualand

structuralaccountsof,say,poverty,violence,rulebreaking,undesirableandofcoursedesirable

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conditionsofanysort.Andtheydonotsuggestthatsociologistsasexpertsonawidevarietyof

socialandculturalphenomenashouldavoidcreatingandsharingtheirknowledgeandresearch

resultsinsociety.ThisiswhatImeanbycallingtheirproposal“modest”initsscope,evenif

radicalinitscontent.But,comparedtoBecker’sproposalondeviance—whichheofferedasa

supplementtoexistingwork—ourauthors’openingsentence,quotedhereattheoutset,can

seemliketheproverbial“lineinthesand”forthestudyofsocialproblemsinsociology,whichI

thinktheyintended.Theyillustratethisfocusinthefirstpagesoftheirbook,distinguishinga

sociologicalstudyoforganizedcrime,ononehand,andastudyoforganizedcrimeasasocial

problem,ontheother(SpectorandKitsuse2000,pp.2-5).Theirobjectofstudyisnotorganized

crimeorcrime;orpoverty;orsexualassault;orenvironmentalpollution,andsoon.Theywrite

insteadatheoryofaparticularmoralphenomenon—claims-makingactivity—andhowtostudy

itsemergenceandmovement.

Whilecolleagueswhoseworkfocusesontheoriginsandmaintenanceoftheseand

otherfamiliarsociologicalphenomenamightfindsuchaconstructioniststudyinsightful,the

accountandthedatafromthoseprojectswouldbedifferent,alongwiththeaimsofthe

research,fromwhatSpectorandKitsusepropose.Butifyouarea“sociologistofsocial

problems,”theyare,quitepointedly,addressingyou.Thosewhowouldwanttoadd

explanatory“context”toclaims-makingalwayshaveseemedtometoofferanupdatedversion

ofthe“reasonablecompromise”positiontakenbythevalueconflictforebears;towit,the

insistencethatsocialproblemshavean“objective,”i.e.,condition-based,and“subjective”or

meaning-based,component.Ifpastisprologue,suchashiftlikelywouldtakeusbacktowhere

SpectorandKitsusebegan,withclaimsanddefinitions—“whatpeoplethink”—sacrificedtoa

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professionalideologynotallthatdifferentfromthosetheydismantled.Tocompromisehereis

toerasetheessentialandstillproductivecontributionthattheymade.

PutativeConditions,ViableClaims,andValuesasDiscourse

Havingseenwhathappenstosocialproblemstheorywhenoneis“reasonable”about

theplaceofsocialconditionsandcontextaseithercausalorconstitutive,Kitsusedrewonhis

ownpastargumentswithEdwinLemert’s(1951)societalreactiontheoryofdeviancetoaddthe

word“putative”totheirdefinitionofsocialproblems.Inpuzzlingoverwhatsuch“reactions,”

societalornot,mightbereactionstoinanargumentthatseemedalsotosaydevianceisa

matterofattribution,Kitsuse(1962)wroteof“imputations”ofdeviancetoclarifythepoint.

Perhapsanticipatingtheobfuscatinglinkbetweenconditionsanddefinitionsthatheand

Spectorwouldcritique,aswellasattemptingtoinoculatehimselfagainstthesortofmisstep

Becker(1973,p.21)wouldmakearoundthe“secretdeviant,”Kitsuserefusedto“be

reasonable”andsoaffirmedhisconvictionthatdevianceisamatterofimputation(regarding

Becker,seePollner1974).Arguably,itwasastrokeofgeniusaswellasanaffront(perhaps

calculated)toconventionalsociology(aswasethnomethodology;asisthelateLatour[e.g.,

2005]).

TheOxfordEnglishDictionarygivesus“putative”as“That[which]iscommonlybelieved

tobesuch;reputed,supposed;imagined;postulated,hypothetical.”5PrudenceRains(1975,3),

commentingonKitsuse’suseofimputation,callsit,andbyextension,putative,a“careful”way

totalkaboutsomethingtheexistenceofwhichoneisnotquitepreparedtoaffirmor,asshe

putit,“withoutcommitmenttoitsactuality.”Itisadestabilizingwordtoputintothe

mouths/handsofonewhocallsthemselvesascientist,evena“scientistlite.”Yet,theycould

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nothavefoundamorefittingtermwithwhichtobuildtheirnewandradicaldefinition:Claims-

makingandrespondingactivitieswithregardtosomeputativeconditions(SpectorandKitsuse

2000,75).Touseputativetomodify“conditions”—thefavoredsociologicalcandidatetosecure

thisprizedobject,socialproblems—ourauthorsannouncethattheywillremainagnosticnot

onlyastotherelevanceofthesephenomenatosocialproblems,buttotheirveryexistenceas

well(SpectorandKitsuse2000,p.76).

Forsomecolleagues,thiswasasteptoofar;readperhapsasaprincipledrefusalofthe

responsibilitiesoftheirprofessiontodescribecriticallyandknowdeeplythedetailsofthe

materialworldtheirdisciplinetakesasitsobjectofstudy.GivenboththeOED’suseoftheword

“imagined”andRains’useof“actuality,”itmayhaveappearedthatSpectorandKitsusewere

herequestioningtheveryexistenceofreality.And,fromLatour’s(1999)experienceinthe

sciencewars,someskepticscriticalofand/or(perhapsintentionally)misunderstandingthe

proffered(andmobile)meaningof“construction,”couldread“putative”hereasadenialofthe

veryfoundationsofscience,knowledge,aswellascommonsense,withwhichsociologyalways

mustmakesomeworkableconnection.

Butsuchareadingwouldbedifficulttosustain,giventheauthors’reiteratedandclear

statementoftheirproject’saims.Fromthebeginning,SpectorandKitsusestandon

commitmentstoconceptualclarity,methodologicalconsistency,andempiricalspecificityinthe

studyofsocialproblems;hardlyadenialofreality.Rather,thegeniusofputativeintheir

definitionisthatitallowsthemaveryparticularontologicalindifferencewithrespectnotto

whatexistsbutrathertowhattheirtheorywarrantsasrelevantdata;whichistosay,

definitionalactivities.AsPeterIbarraandKitsuse(1993)pointoutinalatepaper,reiterating

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thesourcetext,thoseconditionscanappearintheiranalysisonlyaselementsofmembers’

claims.Moreover,asRainsnotes,withputativetheyunderlinethispointostentatiously,to

ensurethatitcannotbemissed.

Consistentwiththeircommitmenttomembers’claims,SpectorandKitsuse’stheory

alsodirectstheconstructionisttoassessnotthevalidityofthoseclaimsbutrathertheir

“viability,”thatis,theirvitality,theirliveliness;theextenttowhichtheyaresustained,

repeated,carriedacrossthespacetimeunderstudy,inandbytheclaims-makingactivitiesof

participants.Astheyaskaboutclaims-makers,toillustrate,“canthey‘getawaywithit’?”Can

theclaimsbe“sustainedpolitically”(SpectorandKitsuse2000,p.71),or,even

ethnomethodologically?Thisisimportantbecauseitishardlytypicalofsocialconstructionist

argument.AsLatour(1999,2003,2005)hasrepeatedlynoted,theunfortunatelymorecommon

movehasbeentheironizinganddebunkingthatendsupsaying,paradoxically,“thisis(merely)

constructed;thatisreal!”Thesepoliticstypicallyseektocritiqueunjustsocialculturalpractices

as“constructed,”bydominanceandpower,juxtaposedtoahalcyonrealitydefinedbyequality

andfreedom.

Thequestionaboveharkenstoanepistemologicaloneaskedinsciencestudies,namely,

“Whatpracticesareusedtosecure‘certainknowledge’?”Thekindofanswersoughtisnotto

makereferencetoa“method,”but,rather,byaclosestudyofthesustainedinsitumaterial-

semioticexchangesbythosewhoseclaimsandrelatedactivitieskeepthosedefinitionsalive

(Haraway1997;cf.Latour1999,pp.24-79).Whilesocialproblemsclaims-makerscould,surely,

drawonthepresumptionsandresourcesofscientificargumentanddatainhopesofgreater

viability,SpectorandKitsusetreatthatasanempiricalmatter.Claimsframedand“grounded”

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inthesetermsmaywellbemoreviablethanthosenotsoframed,butthatistobedetermined

throughobservationandnotassumedbythesociologistinadvance.Thisleavesopenthe

possibilitythatcompletefabrications,evenlies,mightbeheldhigherandcarriedfartherthan,

tobesimplehere,“truths.”Ourauthorscouldnothaveknownhowtimelythatinsightwould

becomeinUSpoliticssomefortyyearslater.

Moreover,thisrequirementtofocusattentionontheviabilityofclaimsratherthantheir

validityreiteratestherepositioningofthesociologist/analystannouncedbythewordputative.

Itmakesamovetypicalofsociologicalexpertise—theadjudicationofthetruthvalueofclaims

madeaboutsocialcultrualconditions—besidethepoint.Theagnosticismrequiredofthe

sociologistrelativetoconditionshereextendstohowtheyaddressthecorematerialoftheir

analysis,theclaimsactuallymadebyparticipantsintheprocessbeingstudied—our“what

people‘think.’”Theexpertanalystnolongeraddressesafamiliarepistemologicalquestionthat

mayhavegroundedtheirownpriorprofessionalidentity—istheclaim“true”?—but,rather,is

askedinsteadtoaddressanotherthatmaystrikethemaslesssignificant:thedetailedrecording

anddescriptionthroughspacetimeofwords,phrases,andothersymbolsgivenmeaningby

participantsandtheactionstaken,arguably,intheirname.Surelystillempiricalandrealist,this

assignmentasksthesociologisttoprovideevidenceofhow,indetail,claimsemerge,are

maintained—ifinfacttheyare—change,and,perhaps,disappear,allcarriedbytheclaiming

andrespondingactivitiesofthoseinvolved.

Theirconstructionistargumentrequiresathirdshiftforthesociologistonanother

resourcecentraltomuchconventionalsocialproblemssociology:theuseofvaluestoexplain

behavior.Herethetypicalbehaviorinquestionisclaims-makingitself.SpectorandKitsuse

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refusetheargumentthatvaluescauseclaims-making.Althoughsocialscienceexplanationof

behaviorbyreferencetovalueshasalonghistory,ithasbeenadifficultonetosustainusing

empiricaldatasoastoavoidacircularargument.Thatis,itisoftensaid,forexample,that

peoplebehaveastheydobecausetheyholdcertainvalues;butthen,whenweturntosecure

howitisthatweknowthattheyholdsaidvalues,referencestotheirbehaviorasindicative

typicallyareofferedup.Asourauthorspointout,conventionalnotionssuchassocializationare

usedtotellastoryofhowwelearnvaluesthatthenpropelourconduct.Thechallengeof

courseishowitisthatthesociologistcangetatthosevaluesontheperson’s“inside”

independentofthebehaviorthattheyaresaidtocauseonthe“outside.”

Giventheirviewofsocialproblemsascollectiveachievementsofpeopleactingtogether

inrealtimeandplace,ourauthorsdrawonC.WrightMills’(1940)commentsonhow

sociologistsusethenotionofmotives.ReiteratingMills’critiqueofsociologists’attributionof

motivestothepeopletheystudy,andusingMills’terms,“vocabulariesofmotives”and“motive

mongering,”theyaskonwhatbasissimilarattributionsofvaluesmightbemadebysociologists

ofsocialproblems(andbeyond)tothepeoplestudied.Notsurprisingly,theyfindnoempirically

adequateanswer.Similartohowethnomethodologiststreatthesociologicalconceptofnorms

orrules,SpectorandKitsuse,likeMills—whocertainlywasnoethnomethodologist—propose

valuesasalinguisticresourcethatmembersspecificallyandexplicitlyuseintheirwritingand

speakingtocharacterizethemselves,others,situations,andobjects.

Ratherthancontinuingtousethistermasaproblematictechnicalandexplanatory

resource,whichbringsitsownproblems,SpectorandKitsuse(2000,pp.91-95)treat“values”

aswordsorphrasesusedbyclaims-makers,wittinglyandnot,to“ground”ordefendtheir

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claims,e.g.,“DonaldTrumpshouldbeimpeachedbecausehelies!”Theconsistencyhereis

apparent,bothintermsofstayingfocusedonwhatthosestudiedsayanddoasthedatafor

analysisandalsoinarefusaltocommentevaluativelyonthevaluelanguagemembersuse,

insteadmakingthatlanguageanditsusetopicforsocialproblemsanalysis.Andofcourse,there

isnomoremysteryinhowvaluesbecomepartofsociologicalanalysis,evenastheyareno

longerusedempiricallyasexplanationforwhatpeopledo.

SociologistasClaims-MakingMember

IftherequirementsI’venotedabovefortheconstructionistsociologistofsocial

problemsthatSpectorandKitsusesetforthwerenotprovocativeenough,theirbook,inaway

unusualforsociologyofthetime,and,arguablystilltoday,bringsthesocialscientistunder

analyticalscrutiny.Whilethesociologyofsciencewasalreadyanestablishedfield,itthencame

fromamostlyfunctionalistandstructuralperspective.Newworkinsciencestudieswas

beginningtoemergethatexaminednotthesocialstructures,“schools,”andrewardsystems

of—orfraud/deviancein—science,whichwerequestionstypicaloftheearlierapproach,but,

rather,howscientistscreate,challenge,change,andsustainscientificknowledgeintheir

mundanework(seeLynch2005).LatourandWoolgar’s(1986)pathbreakingethnographicstudy

ofscientistsatthebench—LaboratoryLife:TheSocialConstructionofScientificFacts—was

publishedin1979,twoyearsafterConstructingSocialProblems.

Therewasinthisinterdisciplinaryworkadistinctflavorofwhatissummarizedbythe

word“reflexivity,”atermcentraltoHaroldGarfinkel’s(1967)ethnomethodology.Whatthis

wordinvitesustoconsideralsowasbeingaddressedinaslightlydifferentwaybyfeminist,

postcolonial,andanti-racismcritiquesofhowknowledgenotonlyisalwayslocatedin

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history/culture/society—thefamiliarsociologyofknowledgeargument,butinsistedonamore

particularandfine-grainedexaminationofthe“How?”and“Who?”and“Forwhom?”thatare

alwayspartofmakingknowledge(e.g.,Clough1994,2000).The“post”workincultural

anthropologytowhich,forinstance,GeorgeStocking’s(1983)ObserversObserved:Essayson

EthnographicFieldwork,JamesCliffordandGeorgeMarcus’(1986)WritingCulture:ThePoetics

andPoliticsofEthnography,andMarcusandMichaelM.J.Fischer’s(1986)Anthropologyas

CulturalCritique:AnExperimentalMomentintheHumanSciencescontributedimportantly,

examinestheplaceandwritingpracticesoftheanthropologist“inthefield”and“inthetexts”

thatconstitutethepublishedknowledgeofculturalanthropology.Inthiswork,thenotionof

socialconstructionisrevisedandbecomesinclusiveand,arguably,closertoJacquesDerrida’s

(1976)deconstructioninitseffectinthatwebegintoseeclearlytheimportofthelatterfor

whatwedoasscienceand,byextension,allknowledgemaking.

WhileWoolgarandDorothyPawluch’s(1985)importantandappreciativecritique

chargedSpectorandKitsuseandmanyofuswhowrotefromtheirtheorywithontological

gerrymanderingandaselectiverelativism,thesignificanceofthefullcritiquetheyofferedgoes

farbeyondthatparticularcharge,whichdoesnotapplyonlytothesocialconstructionist

sociologyofsocialproblems.Buttheirmoreproximatecriticism,thatevenas“we”insistedon

theconstitutiveforceofclaims-makingandignored“objectiveconditions”andanexpert

knowledgeoftheworld“asitreallyis,”wenonethelessdrew,usuallyinpassing,onthelatter

tosecurethedefinitionalargumentwemade.ThismoveinSpectorandKitsuse—seeablein

theirreferencetotheconstancyofmarijuanaandtheconditionofchildren’stonsilsto

underlinethepowerofdefinition;andinmanysimilarexamplesinrelatedworkbyothers,

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includingBecker—performssomethingnotunliketheirowncritiqueofthevalueconflict

authors,whorequiredboth“subjective”and“objective”componentsofsocialproblems

(Becker1973,pp.20-21;Pollner1974;SpectorandKitsuse2000,pp.43-44,p.128;Woolgar

andPawluch1985,pp.216-217).WoolgarandPawluchofcoursedetailthisrecurring

contradictionfoundacrosstherathersubstantialbodyofworktheycite.Althoughseveralofus

respondedinvariationsofdefense,Isuspectwealsosawtheacuityoftheirinsight(Hazelrigg

1985,Pfohl1985;Schneider1985).

AndifIhadn’tseenitclearlybefore,theirpapermadecrystalclearwhatSpectorand

Kitsusethemselveshadinvited,eveniftheyhadnottakenthatstepthemselves:toturnonto

theirownargumentandpracticestheirexaminationofhowpriorsociologyofsocialproblems

argumentandpracticealsowerepursuedintheinterestsofviability.JustasSpectorand

Kitsusecriticallyexaminedhowtheirpredecessorsdefinedsocialproblemsanddeveloped

theoriesofthephenomenainquestion,WoolgarandPawluchinviteustomakethatverymove

forthesocialconstructionistargument,insocialproblemsandbeyond.Theycallitontological

gerrymandering,andIacceptthatcritique.ButIwouldpreferseeingit—contradictions

removed—asanontologicalandselectiveagnosticismwithregardtotheconditionsthatappear

inparticipants’claims.Itseemstomethiskindofagnosticismisaltogetherfamiliarinthe

historyofUSsociologyandwhatwasandperhapsstilliscalledits“mainstream”preferencefor

quantitativeandstructural/aggregateanalysis.Whilesurelylegitimateandprofessionally

respectablework,sustainedandfocusedattentiontothenatureofhumanexperience

expressedthroughnarrative,interviewdata,andobservationalrecordlargelyhavebeen

deemphasizedorignoredasamatterofresearchdesignand,ifImayputitthisway,“taste”in

17

muchsociology.ThisistoextendSpectorandKitsuse’sownreferencetoasociologyof

organizedcrimedistinctfromastudyofitasasocialproblemintheirterms.Thatthereisthen

aselectivityintheontologicalattentiontotheworldstudiedbyvariouskindsofsociology

strikesmeas,touseafamiliarterm,thenorm.Thequestionofanuntheorizedwritingofa

contradictionisofadifferent,lesserorderofsignificanceinthatitcanindeedberemedied.

ReadingWoolgarandPawluchAgain

Attheendoftheir1985paper,WoolgarandPawluchofferthreepossiblereadingsof

theircritique.Oneisthat,ineffect,ifyouwanttowriteaconstructionistargumentofsocial

problemsasithadbeendone,whichistosayflawedandcontradictory,thenwehaveshown

youhowtodoitbyshowingyouhowSpectorandKitsuseandanumberofotherauthorshave

engagedinaselectiverelativism.Ofcourse,theywouldnothaveexpectedthatreadingtobe

takenseriously.Second,theytellusthatwhiletheyhavepointedoutthesecontradictionsand

inconsistencies,“morecaution[can]beexercisedinattemptingempiricalstudiesinthe

definitionalperspective”(WoolgarandPawluch1985,p.224).ThatreadingiswhatIhavebeen

urginghereasbothpossibleandworthwhile,quitesurethatitwillsatisfyasmallersegmentof

thesociologicalcommunitytodaythantheinitialandcontradictoryformulations.Thatmaybe

duetotheboundaryitinsistsondrawingbetweenthesociologist’spersonalpolitical

commitmentsandtheirprofessionalidentityassociologists.Asnotedabove,thisboundary

prohibitsfactualclaimsabouttheso-called“conditions”longconsideredcentraltothecause

andconstitutionofsocialproblems,bothbythesociologist-as-member-of-society-with-their-

own-politicsorbythewarrantsdemandedbythetheoryitself.Iwouldguessthatalarge

segmentofprofessionalsociologistswritingaboutsocialproblemswouldnotbehappywiththe

18

requirementsofthesedisciplinarypolitics(seeSchneider2018).Beyondthatobjection,some

mayfeelthattheinsistencetofocusonlyonclaims-makingandrespondingactivities,as

detailedabove,andafine-grainedempiricaldescriptionofthedefinitionalprocesses,witha

narrativeabouttheseprocesses,offersnotenough“payoff,”intellectually,towarrantthework

required.Bothoftheselatterobjectionsarehardlyunusualintheworldsofprofessional

scholarship.Therearemanychoicesavailable,andmade,astowhatonemayignoreandtake

upinone’swork.Thiskindof“gerrymandering”israrelymentionedyeteverywheretobeseen.

WoolgarandPawluchofferathirdreadingthatIthinkhasnotbeentakenuportaken

seriouslybythoseofuswhohavewritteninthistraditionofsocialproblemstheory.Itreflects

moreexplicitlyWoolgar’saffection—atleastatthetime—foraradicallyrelativistargumenthe

wasmakinginthesciencestudiesworkthatheco-authoredwithLatourinLaboratoryLifebut

thenmoreclearlysoinhissole-authoredwork(see,e.g.,Woolgar1988).Unlikehiscolleague

Latour,WoolgardidnotdenigratethedeconstructiveargumentsfromDerrida’swritingin

literarystudies,whicharguablyresonateprovocativelywithhisownethnomethodological

insightsandinterests.Inbothtraditions,puttoosimply,thereisacommitmenttothenotion

thatthewholeofthesocialculturalworldisputtogether,maintained,andchangedinsituand

in“work”doneby,toresurrectoneofBecker’s(1986)homelybutinsightfulphrases,people

“doingthingstogether.”Clearly,thatnotionhasaconstructionistflavor.Mostofthesocial

problemstheoryreferencedhereandinWoolgarandPawluch’scritiquereflectsversionsof

symbolicinteractionistsociology,inwhichanassumptionofsharedmeaningextantinlanguage

useprovidesaterrainonwhichsociologicalargumentsaremadeabouthowrealityis

constructed.Clearly,suchaclaimhasalonghistoryinUSsociology.

19

Ethnomethodology,atleastinitsGarfinkel-influencedversion,opensattentiontohow

the“donetogether”inBecker’sphraseisapproximatedormade“goodenough”toenablea

“goingon”intheinterpersonalexchangesunderreview,whichalwaysaresubject,momentby

momenttobreakor“breach.”Thepoliticsofdeconstructionaimtouncoverhowthisalways

fragileorderofanytext—thoughtinclusively—isproducedbydeflectingattentionfromits

inevitablesupportingand“othered”background,whichismoreorlessskillfullykeptinthe

shadows.AproposSpectorandKitsuse’sargument,WoolgarandPawluch,ineffect,turnonthe

“backstagelights”toshowusthereferencestoconditionsthattheysaysecuretheselective

socialconstructionistclaimsinthiswork.

Allthatsaid,themoreinterestingpointtheymake,thethirdsuggestedreadingoftheir

critique,isaversionofWoolgar’sfullyreflexivecritiqueofhownotonlyscientificargumentis

madeandsustainedbuthowallarguments—including“ethno-theories”orwhatMelvinPollner

(1987)called“mundanereason”—arealwaysjerry-riggedaffairs.Heinsiststhat,ifcritically

examinedinenoughdetail,argumentsthataimtoexplainsomethingcannotbesustainedin

theirownterms;orthattheyrelyforthatsustenancenotonsomecompellingforceinternalto

theargumentsthemselves(e.g.,“method”)or“nature”speakingtothescientistinalanguage

onlytheyunderstand,butratherareduetothemostlyunspokenandtacitcollective

“agreement”ofthoseusingandmakingthemto“looktheotherway”ortosuspenddisbeliefin

theirimpossibility.Arguably,themostinterestingthinghereisthatthemattersWoolgarpoints

toinhisradicalcritiquearenot,asheandPawluchnote,“problemstobesolved.”Theyare,he

writes,“unavoidable.Theyarenotmeretechnicaldifficultiesinsocialproblemsarguments,but

pervasivefeaturesofallattemptstoexplainsocialphenomena”(WoolgarandPawluch1985,p.

20

224,emphasissupplied).Woolgar(1988)elsewheremakesitclearthatthelynchpinofthis

practiceofexplanationenactsanideologyofrepresentationitself.Inscience,including

sociology,responsetothisclaimoftentakestheformofagrumblinghesitance,claimsthat“it

doesn’tmatter”;impatientcallsto“getonwiththework,”andcriticismsof“losingtheobject”

and“thepoint”oftheresearchitself.

WhileIhavesympathyfortheseexpressionsandhaveofferedthemmyselfearlierinmy

work,itseemstomethatbynowinthediscipline,enrichedasithasbeenbyrelevantinsights

fromotherfields—andwith(evengrudging)respectforthewisdomofvarious“post”

critiques—weshouldbepreparedtothinkmoreseriouslyaboutthisthirdreadingratherthan

ignoringit.Ittakesusbeyondthemovesthattitletheircritiqueandurgesustogivemore

carefulattentionnotonlytotheveryconstitutionoftheobjectortopicofourstudy,butthe

waysthatwemaketheargumentsandexplanationsthatwedo;inordertobringtolight—orto

lighttoagreaterdegree—justhowwemakewhatwewouldhopeare“compelling”arguments.

Thisreflexiveconsiderationcouldmakethosearguments,thoseclaims,moreopenorporousto

examination;tohelpusnoticewhatwesilenceandbackground;andwhatweforegroundas

professionalclaims-makersdoingthesciencethatwedo(ifthatiswhatwecallwhatwedo).

Thisisnotto“weaken”science—evenasweknowthatscienceandtrutharenowunder

attackintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,andthatsuchquestioningmightseemtodothat.

Rather,followingLatour’s(1999,2003)familiarclaimnotedabove,“themoreconstructed,the

morereal,”thepointistoacknowledgetheput-togetherandrelativenatureofallclaimssuch

thattheverypracticesofthatmakingarethemselvesavailableforscrutiny.Allarguments,in

otherwords,arealwaysalreadyvariously“weak.”Toclaimotherwiseistoengageinapolitical

21

fantasy,extremeversionsofwhichare,sadly,alltooapparentintoday’sAmericaaroundwhat

iscalled,derisively,“fake”onthequestionofwhatareliespresentedastruth;andwhatare

not.Indeed,itisbeingabletoappreciatethe“notfake”as,nonetheless,alwaysconstructed,

withthedetailsofthatconstructingofferedforalltosee,thatoffersagroundonwhichtostep

inordertomoveelsewhere.Themomentwouldseemtocallnotforanembattled,defensive

stanceintheproductionofknowledgeandtreatmentofthenotionoftruthbut,rather,one

morefiercelyopentocritiqueandstudyofhowclaimsaremadeandsupportedbythosewho

makethemandbythosewhochallenge.Deconstructionandreflexivityarethemselvesnot

inherentlydestructive,butattheveryleast,suchchoicesinviteastrongdose,paradoxically,of

bothhumilityforallclaimsandclaimants,andgreaterconfidenceforussociologistsandother

scholarsinmakingtheclaimsthatwedo.Surely,theextraordinarysuccessofscienceinitslong

historymightbethoughtsufficienttoallowus,withoursistersandbrothersinthehumanities,

toacknowledgethattherearethenoguaranteesonhowone’swork—one’sclaims—willbe

received,inwhatevervenueatwhatevertimeitisoffered,whichofcourseispreciselywhatall

claims-makersface;witting,professional,andnot(cf.Haraway1997,pp.23-48).

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Endnotes

1DavidMatza(1969,p.103,p.116,p.176)inhisBecomingDeviant,whichsharesmany

theoreticalpointswiththeseauthors,doesciteFoucaultinthreefootnotes.

2Iunderstandthenotionof“relatedactivities,”relativetoclaimsanddefinitions,tobethose

thatarguablyanddemonstrablyareshapedwithandfromthemeaningsthattheclaimsand

definitions—thewords,mostsimply—usedbyparticipantsconvey.

3Whilethe“andrespondingactivities”iscentraltotheirconceptionofsocialproblems,the

initialclaims,whichmustberespondedtoandcarried,ornot,aresufficienttogarnerthe

attentionoftheresearcherusingthisargument.

4Suchapositionorlocationinthesociologicalstudyofwhathasbeencalledsocialproblems

seemsalwaystohavebeenapointofcontentioninUSsociology.Itiseasilyseenastoo

distance,toocool,tooremoved,toosafe,tooprofessional,andsoon;evenperhaps“too

conservative.”Thisisstillthecase.

5OxfordEnglishDictionary,online,consultedJune22,2018at:oed.com.cowles-

proxy.drake.edu/view/Entry/155203?redirectedFrom=Putative#eid.