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Managerial Economics in a Global Economy, 5th Edition
byDominick Salvatore
Chapter 10Game Theory andStrategic Behavior
Strategic Behavior
Decisions that take into account the predicted reactions of rival firms Interdependence of outcomes
Game Theory Players Strategies Payoff matrix
Strategic Behavior
Types of Games Zero-sum games Nonzero-sum games
Nash Equilibrium Each player chooses a strategy that is
optimal given the strategy of the other player
A strategy is dominant if it is optimal regardless of what the other player does
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 3. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Regardless of what Firm B decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm A is to advertise. The dominant strategy for Firm A is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise, the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise.
Advertising Example 1
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
The dominant strategy for Firm A is to advertise and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to advertise.
Advertising Example 2
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?
If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 6. In this case, the optimal strategy is not to advertise.
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
The optimal strategy for Firm A depends on which strategy is chosen by Firms B. Firm A does not have a dominant strategy.
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise, the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?
If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise.
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (6, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
Advertising Example 2
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (4, 3) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (2, 5) (3, 2)
Firm B
Firm A
The dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. If Firm B chooses to advertise, then the optimal strategy for Firm A is to advertise. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to advertise.
A Normal Form Game
Strategy A B Cabc
Player 2
Pla
yer
1 12,11 11,12 14,13
11,10 10,11 12,12
10,15 10,13 13,14
Putting Yourself in your Rival’s Shoes
What should player 2 do? 2 has no dominant strategy! But 2 should reason that 1 will play “a”. Therefore 2 should choose “C”.
Strategy A B Cabc
Player 2
Pla
yer
1 12,11 11,12 14,13
11,10 10,11 12,12
10,15 10,13 13,14
The Outcome
This outcome is called a Nash equilibrium: “a” is player 1’s best response to “C”. “C” is player 2’s best response to “a”.
Strategy A B Cabc
Player 2
Pla
yer
1 12,11 11,12 14,13
11,10 10,11 12,12
10,15 10,13 13,14
The Market-Share Game in Normal Form
Strategy P=$10 P=$5 P = $1P=$10 .5, .5 .2, .8 .1, .9P=$5 .8, .2 .5, .5 .2, .8P=$1 .9, .1 .8, .2 .5, .5
Manager 2
Man
ager
1
No Equilibrium - Child’s play
Strategy Scissors Rock PaperScissors 0, 0 -1, 1 1, -1
Rock 1, -1 0, 0 -1, 1Paper -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0
Player 2
Player 1
Multiple Equilibria - Battle of the Sexes
Strategy Ballet BoxingBallet 4, 5 0 , 0Boxing 1, 1 5, 4
Him
Her
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Two suspects are arrested for armed robbery. They are immediately separated. If convicted, they will get a term of 10 years in prison. However, the evidence is not sufficient to convict them of more than the crime of possessing stolen goods, which carries a sentence of only 1 year.
The suspects are told the following: If you confess and your accomplice does not, you will go free. If you do not confess and your accomplice does, you will get 10 years in prison. If you both confess, you will both get 5 years in prison.
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Confess Don't ConfessConfess (5, 5) (0, 10)
Don't Confess (10, 0) (1, 1)
Individual B
Individual A
Payoff Matrix (negative values)
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Confess Don't ConfessConfess (5, 5) (0, 10)
Don't Confess (10, 0) (1, 1)
Individual B
Individual A
Dominant StrategyBoth Individuals Confess
(Nash Equilibrium)
Normal Form Game(Simultaneous Movers - Prisoner’s Dilemma)
Environment - Police station after a crime wave. Police have evidence on a minor crime. Police have insufficient evidence on major crime
Players - Bonnie and Clyde
Rules - no escape is possible
Strategies - Rat or not rat
Payoffs - No one rats: both get 3 years One rats and the other stays quiet: rat gets 1 year, Silent partner
gets 23 years Both rat: both get 16 years
The Normal Form of Prisoner’s Dilemma
Strategy Rat Don't RatRat
Don't Rat
Bonnie
Clyde16,16 1, 23
23,1 3,3
Resolving Bonnie & Clyde
If Bonnie Rats and Clyde doesn’t rat, then Bonnie gets 1 year Clyde rats, then Bonnie gets 16 years
If Bonnie doesn’t Rat and Clyde doesn’t rat, then Bonnie gets 3 years Clyde rats, then Bonnie gets 23 years
If Clyde Rats and Bonnie doesn’t rat, then Clyde gets 1 year Bonnie rats, then Clyde gets 16 years
If Clyde doesn’t Rat and Bonnie doesn’t rat, then Clyde gets 3 years Bonnie rats, then Clyde gets 23 years
Resolving Bonnie & Clyde
Bonnie has a dominant strategy - RatClyde has a dominant strategy - RatNash Equilibrium - set of strategies that
are “best responses” to each otherNash here is: {Rat; Rat}Payoffs here are: {16 years; 16 years}Best outcome is {Don’t Rat; Don’t Rat}
with payoffs of {3 yrs; 3 years}How do we get cooperation?Suppose each promised the other not to
rat?
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Low Price High PriceLow Price (2, 2) (5, 1)High Price (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Application: Price Competition
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Low Price High PriceLow Price (2, 2) (5, 1)High Price (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Application: Price Competition
Dominant Strategy: Low Price
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (2, 2) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Application: Nonprice Competition
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Application: Nonprice Competition
Dominant Strategy: Advertise
Advertise Don't AdvertiseAdvertise (2, 2) (5, 1)
Don't Advertise (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Cheat Don't CheatCheat (2, 2) (5, 1)
Don't Cheat (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Application: Cartel Cheating
Prisoners’ Dilemma
Cheat Don't CheatCheat (2, 2) (5, 1)
Don't Cheat (1, 5) (3, 3)
Firm B
Firm A
Application: Cartel Cheating
Dominant Strategy: Cheat
Extensions of Game Theory
Repeated Games Many consecutive moves and
countermoves by each playerTit-For-Tat Strategy
Do to your opponent what your opponent has just done to you
Extensions of Game Theory
Tit-For-Tat Strategy Stable set of players Small number of players Easy detection of cheating Stable demand and cost conditions Game repeated a large and
uncertain number of times
Extensions of Game Theory
Threat Strategies Credibility Reputation Commitment Example: Entry deterrence
Entry Deterrence
Enter Do Not EnterLow Price (4, -2) (6, 0)High Price (7, 2) (10, 0)
Firm B
Firm A
Enter Do Not EnterLow Price (4, -2) (6, 0)High Price (3, 2) (8, 0)
Firm B
Firm A
Credible Entry Deterrence
No Credible Entry Deterrence
Entry Deterrence
Enter Do Not EnterLow Price (4, -2) (6, 0)High Price (7, 2) (10, 0)
Firm B
Firm A
Enter Do Not EnterLow Price (4, -2) (6, 0)High Price (3, 2) (8, 0)
Firm B
Firm A
Credible Entry Deterrence
No Credible Entry Deterrence
International Competition
Produce Don't ProductProduce (-10, -10) (100, 0)
Don't Produce (0, 100) (0, 0)
Airbus
Boeing
Boeing Versus Airbus Industrie
Sequential Games
Sequence of moves by rivalsPayoffs depend on entire sequenceDecision trees
Decision nodes Branches (alternatives)
Solution by reverse induction From final decision to first decision
High-price, Low-priceStrategy Game
A
B
B
High Price
High Price
Low Price
Low Price
$100 $100
$130 $50
$180 $80
$150 $120
Firm A Firm B
High-price, Low-priceStrategy Game
A
B
B
High Price
High Price
Low Price
Low Price
$100 $100
$130 $50
$180 $80
$150 $120
Firm A Firm B
X
X
High-price, Low-priceStrategy Game
A
B
B
High Price
High Price
Low Price
Low Price
$100 $100
$130 $50
$180 $80
$150 $120
Firm A Firm B
X
XXSolution:Both firmschoose lowprice.
Airbus and Boeing
A
B
B
Jumbo Jet
Jumbo Jet
Sonic Cruiser
Sonic Cruiser
$50 $50
$120 $100
$0 $150
$0 $200
Airbus Boeing
Airbus and Boeing
A
B
B
Jumbo Jet
Jumbo Jet
Sonic Cruiser
Sonic Cruiser
$50 $50
$120 $100
$0 $150
$0 $200
Airbus Boeing
X
X
Airbus and Boeing
A
B
B
Jumbo Jet
Jumbo Jet
Sonic Cruiser
Sonic Cruiser
$50 $50
$120 $100
$0 $150
$0 $200
Airbus Boeing
X
XX
Solution:Airbus buildsA380 andBoeing buildsSonic Cruiser.
Integrating Case Study
A
B
B
A
A
A
A
60 70
100 50
40 60
75 70
70 50
90 40
80 50
60 30
Firm A Firm B