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8/11/2019 Michael McDermott (1988). a Russellian Account of Belief Sentences
1/18
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A Russellian Account of Belief SentencesAuthor(s): Michael McDermottSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 151 (Apr., 1988), pp. 141-157Published by: on behalf of the and theOxford University Press Scots Philosophical Association
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2/18
The
hilosophicaluarterly
ol. 8 No.
151
ISSN 0031-8094
2.00
Vol.
38
No. 151
April
988
A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT
OF
BELIEF
SENTENCES
BY
MICHAEL
MCDERMOTT
I
Russell's
paradigm
was:
(1)
Othello
believes hatDesdemona
oves Cassio.
He saw
this1 s a relation etween our
hings
three
people
and
loving.
Not
only
do
the names Desdemona' and 'Cassio' have
purely
eferential
occurrence
n
the
content-sentence,
o
also does the
predicate
loves';
it
refers
o
loving.
The
4-place
belief-relation
ppealed
o
here
will
uffice or he
construal
of certain
ther
elief-ascriptions,
ut
not
many.
(2)
Othellobelieves
hat
Desdemona s
fair.
This doesnot ayofanyfour hingshat hefirstelieves hesecondbears
the
third o
the
fourth. o
follow
Russell,
we must see it as a
3-place
relation
etween
Othello,
Desdemona
and
fairness.
In
general,
we
need a
distinct elief-relationor
each distinct
orm f
content-sentence.
o be
precise,
et us
call a 'sentence
orm'what
you get
when
you
replace
ach name
nd
predicate
na sentence
y
variable.
hen
for ach
n-place
entence
orm
e need n+
-place
belief-relation,
hich
we
shall
write s
'B' followed
y
thesentence
orm
n
square
brackets.
his
is
to be thoughtf as a logically nstructuredredicate ymbol.
The sentence
orm
f Desdemona
is
fair',
or
xample,
s
'x
is
F',
or
better,
x
has
F'.
The
corresponding
-place
belief-relation
s
B[x
has
F]'.
The Russellian
nalysis
f
(2)
is:
1
B.
Russell,
The
Problems
f
Philosophy
London,
1912),
ch.
12.
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3/18
142
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
(3)
B[x
has
F]
(Othello,
Desdemona,
fairness),
whichwe can read
as
Othello
believes
that Desdemona has fairness .
Similarly,
(4)
Ralph
believes hatOrtcutts a
spy,
says
that
Ralph,
Ortcutt nd
spyhood
tand
n
this ame relation:
(5)
B[x
has
F]
(Ralph,
Ortcutt,
pyhood).
A
sentence
ormwill n
general
ontain
uantifiers
nd
truth-functional
connectives,s well as individual nd
predicate
ariables.The sentence
form f Someone
s
fair',
or
nstance,
s
(Ex)
(x
has
F)',
with
ust
theone
free
variable
F'.
The
corresponding
elief-relation
s
2-place;
this is
'B[(Ex) (x
has
F)]',
the
relation f
believing-to-be-instantiated.
(6)
B[(Ex) (x
has
F)]
(Ralph, pyhood),
says
that
Ralph
stands
o
spyhood
n
this
relation.
The English entence
(7)
Ralph
believes
hat
omeone
s a
spy
is
commonly
elt o be
ambiguous,
nd
it is
a
virtue f the
Russellian
account
hat t
provides
wo
eparate
onstruals.
irst,
s a
simple
-place
predication
i.e.
(6)
above.
Second,
as the existential
uantification
f a
3-place predication:
(8)
(Ey)
B[x
has
F]
(Ralph,y, spyhood).
If
6)
is
true,
Ralph
believes
hat
here re
spies.
f
8)
is
true,
Ralph
tands
to
some
particular,
ut
unnamed,
ndividual
n
the relation
f
believing-
that-he-is-a-spy.
6)
and
(8)
involve distinct
elief-relations,
nd
are
logicallyndependent.
However,
6)
will
normally
e true
f
(8)
is,
given
minimal
ationality
n
Ralph's
part.)
There s commonlyelt o be
a
similarmbiguity
bout
belief-ascriptions
with
a
definite
escription
n
the
content-sentence,
nd
the
Russellian
account
handles hem
n
the same
way.
Take:
(9)
Ralph
believes
hat he
man n the
brown
hat s a
spy.
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4/18
A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF
BELIEF
SENTENCES
143
This
may
be construed s:
(10)
B[x
has
F]
(Ralph,
the
man n
the
brown
hat,
spyhood)
or
as:
(11)
B[the
thing
whichhas
F
has
G]
(Ralph,
man-in-brown-hat-
hood,
spyhood).
The
terms f the belief-relation
n
(10)
are two men and
spyhood.
he
terms
of the differentelief-relation
n
(11)
are
Ralph
and two hoods.
Given
that he
man
n
the
brownhat s
Ortcutt,
4)
is
equivalent
o
(10),
but ndependentf (11).
Geach2
objected
o Russell's
multiplicity
f
belief-relations.
here are
infinitely any
entence
orms,
nd hence
nfinitely any
distinct elief-
relations.
But how could
anyone
come
to
master
our
psychological
vocabulary,
f t
contains
nfinitely
any
distinct
redicates?
The
difficulty
ay
be
overcome
y
a
slightly
eeper
analysis.
As a first
step,
we
can make the
sentence orm
tself term f the belief-relation.
Instead
of
construing
1),
for
instance,
s
a
4-place
relationbetween
Othello,Desdemona, ovingndCassio,wemay onstruetas a (different)
relation etween
hesefour
hings
nd
the
sentence orm
Rxy.
This leaves
us stillwith
nfinitely any
elief-relations,
f
varying
dicity,
ut there s
now
no morebar to unified
mastery
hanwith he
variable
dicity
f true
of'.
Adopting
arski's
trick,
we can
reduce
them ll to a
single
3-place
belief-relation,
etween a
believer,
sentence
form,
nd
a
sequence.
Alternatively,
e could make belief
relation etween
believer nd a
proposition,
nderstood s the ordered
pair
of
a sentenceform nd a
sequence.Eitherway, here s a singlebelief-relation.
The
availability
f
such
strategies
nswersGeach's
objection.
Having
seen
this,however,
propose
o
revert o the evel
of
Russell's
multiplicity
of
unanalysed
elief-relations.
Geach3
lso
disliked ussell's dea thatwe couldbe related
o
things
ike
loving
nd
spyhood
that
s,
to universals. o
meet
his
worry,
e need to
get
clear
on
just
what kind
of
universals he
objects
of belief
might
be
-
classes,
ttributes,
r what?What s
loving?
What
s this
hing
alled
spyhood?
I
suggest
hat
we take
hint
rom ur talkof
dispositions.
he
objects
f
some
dispositions
re universals.
f
you
are
allergic
o a certain
hemical,
2
P.
Geach,
Mental
Acts
London, 1957),
?
13.
3
bid.
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5/18
144
MICHAEL McDERMOTT
say,
that
s not a relation o the
instances
f the chemical-
neither o
particular
nstances
f
t,
nor to the
big,
scatteredndividual
he
nstances
jointly
omprise.
or
there
may
be
no instances.
ndeed,
theymay
have
decidednot to makeanyof the chemical ecausehey new, n theoretical
grounds,
hat
people
were
allergic
o
it.
What
kind of
universals
re the
objects
of
dispositions?
ot classes.
There
might
e
two
chemicals
whichhave never
been
manufactured,
o
that he class of instances f each is the null
class,
and
yetyou only
be
allergic
o one.
Or
if
all red
things appened
o be hard
things,
nd
vice
versa,
you
could still e
allergic
o red
things
without
eing
llergic
o
hard
things,
s
long
as there ould e hard
things
which
were
not red. But
not
attributes,
ither.
f
you
are
allergic
o
water,
ou
are
allergic
o
H20,
even
though
water' nd 'H20' are not
ogically
quivalent.
he universals e
need are
kinds. he
identity
ondition orkinds s
not
simply
oextension,
and not
ogical quivalence;
t s coextension
y
aw
of nature. hat is
the
required dentity
ondition or he
objects
f
dispositions.
f
you
are
allergic
to
F's,
that s because there s a law
of
nature
onnecting ou
with 's.
If
t
is also a law
of
nature hat
ll F's are
G's
andvice
versa,
hen here s
a
lawof
nature
onnecting
ou
with
G's,
in
the same
way you
are
allergic
o G's.
My
answer
o
Geach, now,
s that ince talk f
relations
etween
eople
and universals ccurs nquiterespectable arts fscience, here an be no
harm
n
construing
elief-ascriptions
s
relating
eople
to universals f the
same
kind,
.e. kinds.
pyhood
s
a
kind,
1-place
kind;
oving
s a
2-place
kind.
Incidentally,
n this
view
oving
does notexist
only
f
instantiated.
You
can
be
allergic
o
oving,
r
stand
n
belief-relationso
it,
even
f
there
is none
actually oing
on
in
yourvicinity
or
anywhere.)
It
might
e
objected
hat
kinds,
o
construed,
on'tdo as
the
objects
f
belief,
ecause
you
can
believe,
or
nstance,
hat
yourglass
containswater
without elieving hat t containsH20, even thoughwater'and 'H20'
refer o the same
kind.The
objection
verlooks
he
ambiguity
f
(12)
S believes
his
glass
contains
H20.
'H20'
is a definite
escription:
t
means
something
ike the
compound
f
hydrogen
nd
oxygen
n
the ratio
2:1
by
volume'.
f
(12)
is construed s
relating
to
H20,
i.e. to
water,
t is indeed
equivalent
o:
(13)
S believes
his
glass
contains
water.
But there
s also
a construal f
(12)
on which t relatesS to
hydrogen,
oxygen
nd
a certain
ort f chemical
ompounding.
nd
you
can stand
n
a belief-relation
o
water
without
tanding
n
a belief-relationo all these
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6/18
A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF
BELIEF
SENTENCES
145
other
hings.
he Russellian
ccount
f
12)
and
(13)
does not
mply
hat
(12)
mustbe true
f
13)
is.
To
summarise,
hen,
here
s
what shall call the
Russellian
ccount f
the ogicalform fbelief-ascriptions:
(i)
predicates
n
content-sentenceserve s names of
kinds;
(ii)
names,
whether
f
individuals
r
kinds,
are
purely
referential;
hey
occupy ositions
ccessible o
quantifiers,
nd
obey
he
standard
rinciples
of
instantiation,
eneralisation,
ubstitutivity
f
dentity,
nd so on.
II
Now
the
question
s,
Is this defensible ccount f
the
ogical
form f
thebelief
scriptions
e
actually
make?'The answer, think,s:
Partly,
ut
not
entirely.'
First,
plenty
of commonsense
psychological eneralisations
ontain
quantification
nto ontent-sentences
quantification
verboth
ndividuals
and kinds.For
example,
(14)
Ralph
knows
veryone's
usiness.
Or, to spell tout,
(15) (x) (B) (If
x
is
a
B
then
Ralph
believes hat
x
is
a
B).
Since
positions ccupied by
bound variables re
purely
referential,
he
open
sentence
Ralph
believes hat
x
is a B' is
clearly
Russellian.
Second,
plenty
f
unquantified
elief-ascriptions
an be
obtained
by
instantiationrom uch
generalisations.
or
example,
(16)
If
Ortcutt
s
a
spy,
hen
Ralph
believes hat
Ortcutt
s
a
spy.
This is
naturally
nderstood s an instance
of
(15),
which means that
'Ralph
believes hatOrtcutts a
spy'
s Russellian the
occurrences f
both
'Ortcutt' nd
spy'
n
the content-sentencere
purely
eferential.
Thirdly,
however,
here are
other
belief-ascriptions
hich are not
Russellian,
ither ecause
they
ontainnames
believed
by
the
ascriber o
be vacuous;for xample,
(17)
Pierrebelieves hatSanta Claus
will
come,
or because
they
ontain
on-vacuous
amesnot ntended
o be
subject
o
substitutivity
f
identity;
or
xample,
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7/18
146
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
(18)
Tom believes hatCicero denouncedCatiline.
So we
cannot laimthat ll the
belief-ascriptions
f
commonsense alk
about hemind re Russellian. ut theres still n interestingeaker laim
which would
iketo defend:
ll
psychologicallyerspicuous
elief-ascriptions
are Russellian.
I shall
say
that a
belief-ascription
s
psychologically
perspicuous
f
it contains
nothing
which makes no
contribution
o the
explanation
f behaviour.
he claim
to
be defended s
that
only
purely
referentialccurrences
f names make
any
contribution
o
psychological
explanation.
Considerfirst
17).
This
might
e
offered s
part
of an
explanation
f
Pierre's
behaviour
t
Christmas-time
his
putting
p
a
stocking,
ay.
The
full
xplanation
ouldbe
something
ike:
(19)
Pierre
believes
hatSanta Claus
will
come.
Pierre
elieves
hat
f
Santa Claus
comes,
he
will
get
present
if
he
puts
up
a
stocking.
Pierre
wants
present.
This
provides
n
explanation
n
virtue
of the
following
ommonsense
psychologicaleneralisation:
(20)
(x)
(p)
(G)
(A) (If
x
believes
hat
p
and
x
believes hat
if
p
then
he
will
get
G
if
he does
A)
and
x
wants
G,
then
x
does
A).
That is to
say,
19)
and
(20)
jointlymply:
(21) Pierreputs up a stocking.
But now
imagine
psychology
f Pierre
n
which
very
ccurrence f
'Santa
Claus'
in content-sentences
s
replaced y
ome
arbitrary
ew
name,
say
Bernard
J.
Ortcutt'.
he
new
explanation
f
Pierre'sbehaviour
s:
(19')
Pierre
believes
hatOrtcutt ill
come.
Pierre
believes hat
f
Ortcutt
omes,
he
will
get
a
present
f
he putsup a stocking.
Pierre
wants
present.
Now
I
submit
hat his
s
ust
as
good
n
explanation
f
Pierre's ehaviour s
(19). (19')
and
(19)
yield xactly
he
same
predictions
f
behaviour,
nd
in
virtue
f the same
covering
eneralisation
20);
hence we have
as
much
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8/18
A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF
BELIEF SENTENCES
147
reason,
by argument
o the
best
explanation',
o
accept
19')
as
(19).
It
might
e
objected
hat
19')
is not
a
good
explanation
ecause,
unlike
(19),
it
does not
form
art
f a
systematicxplanation
f
a
range
f
Pierre's
behaviour. or example, ierre'sbeliefs, escribed s beliefs boutSanta
Claus,
explain
certainutterances
f
the
words Pere
Noel';
but such
utterances ould
be
inexplicable
f
we
described is
beliefs
s
being
bout
Bernard
.
Ortcutt.
I
reply
hat
he
ascription
f Santa
Claus
beliefs an
only xplain
hese
utterances
f
they
nclude he belief
hat
anta Claus is called
Pere
Noel'.
But
the
parallel
Ortcutt
sychology
f
Pierrewill
n
that ase
say
that
ierre
believes
Ortcutt
s called Pere
Noel',
and hence
provide precisely
arallel
explanation
f
the utterances
n
question.
Ifthe Ortcuttxplanationf Pierre'sbehaviour s justas good,whydo
we
all
in
fact
refer
o
say
that
he
expects
anta Claus? The
reason,
take
it4,
s
thatwe would
express
eliefs
ike
Pierre's,
f
we
had
them,
y using
the words
Santa Claus'.
But
this
fact
bout us can
play
no
part
n
the
explanation
f Pierre's
ehaviour.
t is not
a
weakness
of
our Ortcutt
psychology
f
Pierre hat
t fails o
convey
hisfact.
Using
Santa
Claus'
in
the
ascription
f a
single
belief,
s
in
(17),
may
also
convey
hat
Pierrehas certain
urther
eliefswhichwe
would
express
by using Santa Claus' - thethings everyone nows boutSantaClaus.
But whenwe
explicitly
scribe
hese additional
eliefs,
s
in
(19),
at
that
stage
Santa
Claus' servesno
purpose
hat Ortcutt'will not.
The
function
f a
vacuousname
ike Santa Claus'
in
a full
sychological
explanation
s
to
signpost
certainconnectionsetween the
subject's
individual eliefs
and
desires).
This
linking
ill
be
accomplished
s
long
as
the
same
name
is
repeated
n
the content-sentences
f
the
separate
belief-ascriptions:
t does
not matter
what
name
is used.
Indeed a more
perspicuous ay oaccomplishhe inkingsby usingnonameatall,but a
bound variable. Given
a full
psychological
xplanation
which
uses a
vacuous
name,
more
perspicuous
xplanation
an
always
e
obtained
s
follows:
ake the content-sentences
f all
the
subject's
belief-ascriptions,
and
replace
ll
occurrences
fthevacuousname
by
variable;
onjoin,
nd
existentially uantify;
use
the result as the content-sentence f a
replacement
elief-ascription.
hus
Pierre,
or
xample,
s said
to
believe
4
Following
.
Stich,
From olk
Psychology
o
Cognitive
cience
Cambridge,
Mass.,
1983),
ch.5. I thinkhis s a goodaccount f de dicto'belief-ascriptions.tich,however,roposest
as an account f
all
belief-ascriptions
he does not
believe
n
anything
ike the
de re/de icto
ambiguity.
e would
say, pparently,
hat
ven:
Tom believes
youryacht
s
bigger
han t
is,
is to be
given
he same kindof
analysis
i.e.
as
(roughly):
Tom is
in
a believe tate
ike
he
one
which
would
ypically
ause me o
say
Your
yacht
is
bigger
han t is'.
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9/18
148
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
that heres
someone ho will
come,
who
will
eave a
present
f
there's
stocking,
ho is called
Pere
Noel',
and so
on. This Russellianbelief-
ascription rovides parallel,
but
perspicuous,
xplanation
f
Pierre's
behaviour.
I
should
perhaps point
out
that the
argument
ust
given
for the
eliminationf vacuous
names does not
pply
o
purely
eferentialames.
Consider he Russellian
elief-ascription:
(22)
Tom believes hatFido is
dangerous.
This
might
explain
Tom's
avoiding
Fido,
in
virtue
of
some such
commonsense
sychological eneralisation
s:
(23)
People
avoid
dogs they
elieveto be
dangerous.
Or,
spelt
out:
(24)
(x) (y)
(if
x
believes
hat
y
is
dangerous,
hen
x
avoids
y).
For (24) implies:
(25)
If Tom
believes
that Fido is
dangerous,
hen Tom
avoids
Fido.
A
psychology
f Tom which
replaced
all
occurrences
f
this
purely
referentialFido'
in
thecontent-sentencesf
belief-ascriptions,
y
Rover',
say,
would
be no
good
at
all;
(24)
does not
mply:
(26)
If
Tom believes
thatRover s
dangerous,
hen
Tom
avoids
Fido.
Where
a
purely
eferential ame
occurs n
a
content-sentence,
e can
describe causal relationsbetween
the belief and
the
object
in
the
environment hich
the name refers o. That is to
say,
the connection
betweenthe belief
and the
object
of belief can
be subsumed
under
a
covering eneralisation.
ut
there
re
no
causal relations etween eliefs
about Santa Claus and the actual
Santa
Claus.
That is
why
Santa Claus'
can be
eliminated
rom
he content-sentences
f
belief-ascriptions
ithout
loss,
whereas
Fido'
cannot.
If
we
now consider
non-vacuous ames
n
belief-ascriptions
orwhich
substitutivity
f
identity
ails,
the
argument
or their
mperspicuity
s
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A RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF BELIEF
SENTENCES
149
basically
he same.
f
we
mean
18)
in
such a
way
that
t is not
equivalent
to:
(27) Tom believes hatTullydenouncedCatiline,
then
we cannot
hope
to subsumethe connection
etween
18)
and
the
actual
Cicero under
a
covering eneralisation.
or
example,
f
we
try
o
explain
18)
by saying
hatTom
was
present
t the
denunciation,
ppealing
to a
covering
eneralisation
ike:
(28) (x)
(y) (If
Tom is
present
when
x
denounces
y,
then Tom
comes to believethat
x
denounced
y),
we
explain
27)
as much
as
(18).
With
Cicero'
not
purely
eferential,
18)
can
still onnect
p
with ther
belief-ascriptions
ith
similar
non-purely
eferential
ccurrences,
or
example:
(29)
Tom believes hatCicero
was
called
Cicero';
Tom
believes
that
Cicero was not called
Tully';
and so
on.
But
these
onnections ill
all
be
preserved
f
we
just
say
(30)
Tom
believes
here s someonewho denounced
Catiline,
was
called
Cicero',
was
not called
Tully',
and so
on,
-
as
in
the Santa
Claus case.
If
we
wish to assert
18)
without lso
asserting
27),
it
is
because we
think hat Cicero' is the moreappropriate ame to use in expressing
belief
ikeTom's.
But
whenwe
spell
out the
features fTom's
total elief-
state
which make
'Cicero'
specially apt,
no
non-purely-referential
occurrences
re needed. We
can
just
say,
for
xample,
30),
or
perhaps:
(31)
Tom believes hatCicero
i.e.
Tully]
denounced
Catiline,
was
called
Cicero',
was
not called
Tully',
and
so on.
There is also a Russellian nterpretationf (18), which allows the
connection
etween
the belief and its
object
to be subsumed under
covering eneralisations.
18)
is
thus
ambiguous.
Cicero'
may
be
purely
referential,
r
it
may
convey
that that name is
specially
pt
for the
expression
f Tom's
belief.
t
seems
to me that
he terms de
re'
and de
dicto'
nicely capture
these two
interpretations.
n the Russellian
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150
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
interpretation,
18)
tellsus
something
bout
the man
Cicero;
on the
other
it tells us
something
bout the name 'Cicero'.
(In
contrast o
(18),
ascriptions
ike
17)
and
(19)
have
only
de dicto
nterpretation.)
Let me remindyou,however, hat the ambiguityf (9) (or of (7)),
discussed
arlier,
s not
de re/de icto
mbiguity.
oth he
nterpretations
given
or
9)
saw
t as
being
of the Russellian
ogical
form,
hich s to
say,
de
re: forboth
10)
and
(11)
relate
Tom
to
the
respective bjects
of
his
beliefs,
nderwhatever
escription.
Our de re/de icto
distinctions thus
not
the same as
the
ordinary
transparent/opaque
istinction,
hich
hinges solely
on whether
ingular
terms
ccupy urely
eferential
osition;
9)
is
transparent
n one
of
these
de re
construals,
paque
on
the
other
for
f
a
speaker
means
11)
when
he
asserts
9),
he
may
till
deny
4)).
De dicto
scriptions,
owever,
re
always
opaque.
And
opaque ascriptionsontainingnly
roper
ames
no
definite
descriptions)
re
always
e
dicto.
There is a
widespread
elief5
hat he belief-
and
desire-)
ascriptions
which
occur
n
psychological
xplanations
re
typically
paque.
Consider:
(32) Oedipus
wants o
marry
ocasta.
This may erve o explain:
(33) Oedipus
courts
Jocasta,
but,
t is
held,
only
f
32)
is construed s
opaque,
i.e. de
dicto.
t
is
held,
apparently,
hatthere s some commonsense
sychological eneralisation
which
mplies
32)
=
(33),
with
32)
de dicto. wish had some dea
what
this
generalisation
ould be.
It
is,
of
course,
a
generalisation
f
commonsensesychologyhatmengenerallyourt hewomen heywant o
marry,
.e.:
(34) (x) (y) (If
x
wants
o
marry
,
then
x
courts
y).
But,
because of the
quantification
nto the
content-sentence,
his
only
implies
32)
=
(33)
if
32)
is
construed e
re.
The
view
criticise ere
s
supported y
a
popular
ccount
f the truth
conditions f dereascriptions.t is held that he de dicto eading f 32) is
'psychologically
tronger'
han the
de re
one
-
it
tells us more about the
character f the mental auses of behaviour'.
n a de
dicto
onstrual,
32)
tells
us
how
Oedipus 'represents
o
himself' he
object
of his
desire.
5
E.g. J.
Fodor,
Methodological
olipsism
onsidered s a
research
trategy
n
cognitive
psychology',
he
Behavioral
nd Brain
Sciences
(1980),
pp.
63-109.
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A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNTOF BELIEF
SENTENCES
151
Whereas n the
de re
onstrual
32)
tellsus
merely
hat
ocasta
s the
object
of his
desire
under ome
escription'
we are
not told
whichone.
A
sort
of causal
requirement
s often
ncorporated
nto this
popular
account. tmaybe said,for nstance,hat 32) is truede reonly fOedipus
wantsto
marry
ocasta
under a
representation
hose
occurrence
n
this
mental tate
s
a
direct
r
ndirect
onsequence
fhis
perception
f
Jocasta.
Whether
r not
it includes such a
causal
requirement,
he
popular
account
mplies
hat e
re
scriptions
re
psychologically
ninformative.
or
example,
t makes
t normal
for
subjects
o
have
blatantlyontradictory
beliefs nd
desires.
Howeverwell
based in
perception
s
Oedipus's
use of
'Jocasta',
o
also is
his use of
my
mother'.
ince he
certainly
esiresde
dicto
ot
o
marry
is
mother,
t
would
follow
n such
views
hat:
(35)
Oedipus
wantsnot o
marry ocasta,
is as
truede
re s
(32).
Since he
certainly
elieves e dicto
hatJocasta
s
not
his
mother,
twould
imilarly
ollow hat
he
believes
e re hat
ocasta
s not
Jocasta.
t is
hardto
see how
a
psychology
ncluding
scriptions
ike
these
could
explain
ehaviour.
here
are
no
psychological
eneralisations
elling
us how men
behave
towardswomen
hey
elieve o be
non-self-identical.
And however sychologyaysmen behave towardswomentheywant to
marry,
t
says hey
ehave
n
different
ays
owards omen
hey
want
not o
marry.
I
would
urge,
however,
differentccount
f
the truth
onditions f de
re belief- nd
desire-ascriptions
a functionalist
ccount,
pplied directly
to
de
re
scriptions.sychological
erms
et
heir
meaning
rom
heir ole n
a folk
heory.
he
2-place
relational erm
wants-to-marry',
or
nstance,
refers o
that ctual
psychological
elation
which
omes
nearest
and
near
enough)to realising he role accordedto wanting-to-marryn the folk
theory. edipus's
relation o
Jocasta
ountsas
wanting-to-marry
f,
and
only
f,
t
has the
right
inds
f causes and effects. n this
ccount,
airs
like
32)
and
(35)
cannot othbe true.
Whichone is
true
s
determined
y
the over-all
djustment
f
psychological
heory
o behavioural
acts:
given
Oedipus's
behaviour
owards
ocasta,
which
ystem
f belief-
nd desire-
ascriptions
onforms
est to our
background sychological
eneralisations?
During
the
courtship hase,
the
answer
ppears
to
be
(32).
On thisdirect unctionalistccount, here s no reason o believe hat e
re
ascriptions
re
necessarily
ninformative,
r thatwe need
opaque
or de
dicto
scriptions
n
psychological
xplanation.
Let me summarise.
urely
eferential
ccurrences f names
n
content-
sentences re
psychologically
erspicuous
ecause
they
nable
the causal
links
between
belief
and the
objects
of
belief
to be subsumed
under
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152
MICHAEL McDERMOTT
covering eneralisations.
on-purely-referential
ccurrences
f
names,
on
the other
hand,
play
no essential
ole in
psychological
xplanation.
heir
elimination,
n favour f
existentially
uantified
ariables,
s
thus
to be
commendedngrounds fpsychologicalerspicuity.his is inaddition,f
course,
to
the obvious
virtues f adherence
o standard
uantificational
logic.
The
belief-ascriptions
f
a decent
cientific
sychology
an
be,
and
therefore
hould
be,
always
f the
Russellian
ogical
form.
III
Next
I
want to
argue
thatthe
psychological
erspicuity
f
our
belief-
ascriptions
an be increased
ypursuing
he
process
of
eliminating
ames
even further;ertain ncreases n the explanatory owerof psychology
require
the
replacement
f
purely
referential
ames
by
existentially
quantified
ariables.
The role
n
psychological
xplanation
f
purely
eferentialames
n
the
content-sentences
f
belief-ascriptions,
e
saw,
is to enable the causal
links between
belief and the
objects
of
belief to
be
subsumed under
covering
generalisations.
ow,
psychological eneralisations
bout
the
connections etween
belief and the
environmental
bjects
of belief
are
always iable to be falsified y failures f recognition. alph,we may
sweepingly
ay,
lways
omes to believe
that omeone
s a
spy,
f he
sees
him
acting
n
a certain
uspicious
manner:
(36) (x) (If
Ralph
sees
x
acting
n a
suspicious
manner,
hen
Ralph
comes
to
believe hat
x
is a
spy).
But this
must be understood
s
subject
to
possible
counterexamples
n
cases whereRalphfails orecogniseheperson nquestion.fRalphsees
Ortcutt
cting
n a
suspicious
manner,
ut
does notrealise
hat t s Ortcutt
he is
seeing,
his
firm
elief
n
Ortcutt's
oyalty
ill
naturally
e
unaffected.
Similarly,
o
generalisations
bout
how
Ralph
behaves
owards
eople
he
believes o
be
loyal
will
predict
is
behaviour owards
rtcutt n occasions
when
Ralph
fails o
recognise
im.
It
might
be
objected
that we
can
get
generalisations
hich are not
vulnerable
o
counterexamples
f this
kind
by simply
ncluding mong
he
subject'sbeliefshis beliefs bout
the
identity
f
the
person
n
question.
Can't we
say:
(37)
(x) (If Ralph
sees
x
acting
n a
suspicious
manner,
nd
Ralph
believes
hat
x
is
x,
then
Ralph
comes
to
believe
that
x is
a
spy)?
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A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF
BELIEF SENTENCES
153
No,
this
s
absurd;
Ralph's
failure o
recognise
rtcutt
as
not due
to
any
doubts bout Ortcutt's
elf-identity.
ur talk bout failures nd successes
of
recognition
oes often ook ike the attributionf
dentity
eliefs,
ut
believe his ppearance o be misleading.
f
mydogmistakes ouforme,
might ay
He
thinks
ou
are me'.
But this s
notto
ascribe belief
hatwe
are
one.
I
would
not
say
He thinks am
you',
or 'He thinks
ou
are
identical o me'.
Let us
agree,
hen,
hat
generalisations
bout the connections
etween
belief
nd its
environmental
bjects
are
always
iable
to
counterexamples
through
ailureto
recognise
the
object
of belief. Since such
failure
sometimes
appens,
we would
ike an
explanation
f t. Since it is
always
possible,
we would
ike
an
explanation
f successful
ecognition,
oo.
What
I want o argue s that psychologyhichproperlyxplains uccessful r
unsuccessful
ecognition
f an
object
will not
ascribebeliefs
ontaining
name of that
object.
Suppose Ralph
shareshis
secrets
with
Ortcutt,
elieving
im
o be
loyal.
Our initial
xplanation
s:
(38)
Ralph
believes
hatOrtcutts
loyal;
(39) (x)
(If
Ralph
believes
that
x
is
loyal,
hen
Ralph
shares his
secretswithx);
hence:
(40)
Ralph
shareshis secrets
with
Ortcutt.
But
sometimes
alph
fails o
recognise
Ortcutt,
nd refuseshis
requests
for
information. orse
still,
Ralph
sometimes
mistakes he
disguised
IvanovforOrtcutt,nd shareshis secretswith vanov.Why?
Perhaps
Ralph
recognises
Ortcutt
y
his visual
appearance.
Usually
Ortcutt
resents ppearance
A,
and then
Ralph
shares his
secretswith
Ortcutt.When Ortcutt oes not
present
ppearance
A,
Ralph
does not
sharehis secretswithOrtcutt.When vanov
resents
ppearance
A,
Ralph
shareshis secrets
with
vanov.What
this
means,
submit,
s that
he real
object
of
Ralph's
behaviour
s not
Ortcutt,
ut
appearance
A.
What
tands
in
need of
psychologicalxplanation
s
not
40)
but:
(41)
Ralph
shares his secrets
with
nyone
who
presents ppear-
ance
A.
If
Ralph
hares
his
secretswithOrtcutt n a
particular
ccasion,
hat s
not
something
which needs
any
further
sychologicalxplanation.
t is
just
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15/18
154
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
because of
the
(non-psychological)
act that
Ortcutt
s
the
person
presentingppearance
A on that
occasion.
The same conclusionwould seem
to followwhatever
haracteristics
Ralphuses to identifyrtcutt;hepsychologicalartof an explanationf
his behaviour eeds
to
be an
explanation
f his
behaviour owards
nyone
who
possesses
hose haracteristics.
ut
now,
f
what
needs to be
explained
is
not
something
bout
Ortcutt
n
particular,
ow can
beliefs boutOrtcutt
in
particular layanypart
n
the
explanation?
ou
might ry
aying
hat:
(42)
Ralph
believes
hatOrtcutts
the
onlyperson
of
appearance
A,
and is
loyal,
-that's the
explanation
f (41). But,I submit,
ou
would
get
an
equally
plausible
xplanation
f
you
substituted
ny
ther amefor
Ortcutt',
ven
vacuous name.
f
Ralph
believed hat
anta Claus was the
onlyperson
of
appearance
A,
and was
loyal,
would not thatstill
ead
him
to share
his
secretswith
eople
of
appearance
A?
What
makes
Ralph
behave hat
way
s
not thathe stands
n
any
belief-relationo
Ortcutt r to
Santa
Claus,
but
just
that:
(43) Ralphbelievesthere s someonewho is theonlypersonof
appearance
A,
and who is
loyal.
If
42)
explains alph's
behaviour owards
eople
presenting
ppearance
A,
(43)
provides precisely
arallel
xplanation.
(38)
related
Ralph
to a
man;
(43)
relateshim to an
appearance,
.e.
a
kind.
'Appearance
A'
is short
or n
expression
hichweuse to
pick
out
a
certain
appearance.
(43)
does not
imply
that
Ralph
picks
out
that
appearancenthe ameway.)The covering eneralisationeededtogetus
from
43)
to
(41)
-
or
from
42)
to
(41)
-
is a
generalisation
ver
appearances,
ot
men:
(44)
(F)
(If
Ralph
believes hat
here s someonewho
is the
only
person
of
appearance
,
and who s
loyal,
hen
Ralph
shares
his
secretswith
nyone
f
appearance
).
As
long
as we
uncriticallyccept
thatwhatneeds
explaining
s
(40),
then
Ortcutt s an
appropriate
object
of belief. There
is a
plausible
generalisation
oncerning
eliefs
bout
people
to
get
us from
38)
to
(40),
namely
39).
But
when we
appreciate
hat the real
object
of
Ralph's
behaviours
not
manbut
an
appearance,
e need
correspondingly
o
take
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16/18
A
RUSSELLIAN
ACCOUNT OF
BELIEF
SENTENCES
155
the
appearance
s the
object
f
belief,
nd
quantify
ver
ppearances
n
the
relevant
overing
eneralisation.
The
argument
eems to be
quite
general.
he
psychologicalart
of the
explanationfRalph'stotal nteraction ithOrtcutt eed nevermention
Ortcutt.
f
you
have an
explanation
which does ascribe
beliefs
about
Ortcutt,
hen ake
ll
the content-sentences
ontaining
Ortcutt',
eplace
t
by
a variable
hroughout,
onjoin
nd
existentially
uantify;
hat
s
the
only
belief
you
need ascribe to
Ralph.
You
will still
get
a
precisely arallel
explanation.
Given
that we can
explain
behaviour
without
eferring
o
particular
eople
in the
content-sentencesf
belief-ascriptions,
onsider-
ationsof
economy
nd
perspicuityay
we
should
o so.
The course
urged
here for
purely
eferential
ames s the same as that
urged arlier or acuousnames.But the cases are notentirelyarallel.n
eliminating
acuous names we lose
nothing,
rom he
point
of view of
psychologicalxplanation.
ut
in
eliminating
urely
eferentialames the
theoretical
ainmay
e at
a
practical
ost.
n
practice,
ailure f
recognition
is
fairly
are;
that
s
to
say,
we can
usually
make
successful
redictions
using
generalisations
ike
39),
and
particularscriptions
ike
38).
Whereas
to
apply
a
generalisation
ike
(44)
to
predictRalph's
behaviour owards
Ortcutt,
we would
have to
specify
he characteristics
y
which
Ralph
recognisedOrtcutt,nd knowthatOrtcuttwas actually hepersonwith
those
characteristics.
n
practice, system
f
psychological
xplanation
ascribing
eliefs boutnamed
ndividualss
pretty
fficient.ut the
deeper
explanations,
nown
r
unknown,
ill not ascribe uch beliefs.
I
have talked
n
this section
of the
replacement
f
names,
ut
the
argument
pplies
lso to definite
escriptions
n
purely
eferential
osition.
If
reference
o Ortcutt
y way
of Ortcutt'will
disappear
n
the
deepest
psychological
xplanations,
he same
goes
forreference
o
Ortcutt
y way
of the man n thebrownhat' (as in (10); not tobe confusedwith 11)).
I
have
argued
for a
redescription
f
subjects'
beliefswhich
replaces
reference o individuals
by
reference o
kinds. But elimination f
individual-names
s
in
general
neither
ufficientor
necessary
or
he kind
of
explanatoryains
we
have
been
talking
bout.
First,
eliefs
bout
named
individuals,
uch as
Ortcutt,
ay
e
plausibly
edescribeds beliefs bout
kind of whichthat
ndividuals the
only
member-
n
this case
the kind
named
by
the
verb
to
ortcutt'.
nstead
of
(38)
we would have:
(45)
Ralph
believes
hat
here s
someonewho
s
the
only
rtcutter,
and
who is
loyal.
But
this
way
of
eliminating
ames
of individuals
ermits
no better
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17/18
156
MICHAEL
McDERMOTT
explanation
f
Ralph's
behaviour.
he
problem
ust
becomes,
how
does
he
recognise
rtcutting?
Second,
the reasons we
have
been
looking
t for
the elimination
f
purelyreferential ames also apply to certainkind-names.We can
recognise
r fail o
recognise
inds,
s
well as
individuals,
nd
can some-
times
explain
hese successes and failures.
uppose
we
know
how
Tom
recognises
ogs,
or
xample.
I
don'tmeanhowhe
recognises
ido as
Fido,
but
how he
recognises
ido
as a
dog-how
he
recognises
oghood.)
We
know,
that
s,
that his behaviour owards
dogs
can
be
more
accurately
described s behaviour owards
hings
which
ossess
certain
haracteristics
-
the
characteristics
hich,
s
we
might
put
it,
he believes
ust
dogs
possess.
Then a
more
perspicuous
xplanation
f
thebehaviour ill
scribe
beliefs
only
about these characteristics,ot about
doghood.
Just
as
references
o
Ortcutt
n the content-sentencesf
Ralph's
beliefswere
replaced
by
an existential
uantifier
ver
men,
o will
dog'
in
the content-
sentences
f
Tom's
beliefsbe
replacedby
an
existential
uantifier
ver
kinds.
Rather han
aying
om believes
here's
dog
on the
tucker-box,
our
deeper psychology
ill
say
he
believes
here s a
kind
of animal
with
such-and-such
eatures,
nd one of
them
s on
the tucker-box.
But
now
he
followingifficulty
onfrontss.
If
all referenceso
objects
f
belief-whetherndividualsrkinds are tobe eliminatedromhe ontent-
sentences f
a
decent
sychology,
hat
an
go
in
these ontent-sentences?
The
answer s
that ur
argument
oes
not
require
he elimination
f
all
reference o individuals
r
kinds,
ut
only
f
reference
o individuals nd
kindswhich re
recognised y
means
of
something
lse,
n
psychologically
explicable ays.
A
subject
may ecognise ogs
by
heir
hape,
olour
tc.And
he
may
detect
hapes
nd colours
successfully
r
unsuccessfully)
ygetting
visual
timuli.
ut there s
nothing y
means
of
whichhe detects
is
visual
stimuli.o the rgumentoes not top sascribingeliefs bout hem.Sucha
belief-ascription
a Russellian
elief-ascription
relates he believer
o
a
stimulus ind.ttherefore
mplies
he xistence f
hat
ind. utof ourse
you
can believe hat
stimulation
f
a
given
indwill
hortly
ccur
or even s
occurring,
erhaps
withouthat
articular
timulus vent
xisting.
do
not
claim hatwe have
ncorrigible
nowledge
four
stimuli.)
Similarly,
n
the
output
ide,
we
can
sometimes
xplain
ow
we
recognise,
orfail
o
recognise,
hekinds owhich
ur
wn ctions
elong.
A
man
may
ake
himselfobemakingjokebecausehebelieves hat isutteringertain ords
constitutes
he
making
f a
joke;
and
perhaps
sychology
ould
explain
he
utterancef hewords s the ntended ffect
f ertain
muscle
movements,
r
nerve
irings;
ut,
f
hese re
psychologically
asic
ctions,
he
rgument
an
allow
reference
o such kinds
f
thing
n
thecontent-sentences
f
a
decent
psychology.
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A
RUSSELLIAN ACCOUNT OF BELIEF
SENTENCES 157
My
conclusion
s
that eferences
o
any
hings
nd kinds
xcept
kinds f
psychological
nput
and
output
re
theoretically
uperfluous.
magine
a
catalogue
of
Ralph's
beliefs
which
contains
references
n
the
content-
sentences o Ortcutt,oghood,oking nd the ike;suppose tsufficiently
comprehensive
o
fullyxplain
is
uccessfulnd unsuccessful
ecognition
f
these
hings
it ncludes isbeliefs bout he onnectionetween rtcuttnd
certain
isual
timuli,
or
xample;
hen more
erspicuous sychology
anbe
obtained
y
eplacing
ll
referring
xpressions,xcept
hose
eferring
o
nput
and
output
kinds,
y existentially
ound variables. his more
economical
belief
scription
ill
xplain
what tands
n need
of
psychological
xplanation,
namely,
he
behaviouralelations etween
nput
nd
output
it
s
rrelevant
o
psychology
hat
given
kind
of
nput
s
caused
on
this
occasion
by
vanov
ratherhan
Ortcutt,
rthat
Ralph's
output
onstitutes
gaffe
atherhan
joke).
What
Ralph
really
elieves s a
fully
amsified
heory
f his
environ-
ment,
with
he observational'
erms
f
he
heory eferring
o his own
nputs
and
outputs.
And this
s a
Russellian
elief-ascription:
t
says
that
Ralph
stands
n
a certain
sychological
elationo thekindsmentioned.6'7
Universityf
ydney
6
I
defend his
position
n
Narrow
ontent',
ustralasian
ournal
f
Philosophy
4
(1986).
7I
am
grateful
o M. Devitt nd
S. Stich
for
helpful
riticism.