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transcript
June 30, 2009
Defense Nuclear NonproliferationDefense Nuclear Nonproliferation’’ssNonproliferation Research and Development (NANonproliferation Research and Development (NA--22)22)
Program and R&D OverviewProgram and R&D Overview
Rhys Williams, Ph.D.Deputy Director
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 2
Mission & Vision/Objectives
Reduce the threat to national security posed by nuclear weapons proliferation/detonation or the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through the long-term development of new and novel technology
Mission:
Vision/Objectives:
Develop and demonstrate technologies for detecting the stages of a foreign nuclear weapons programDevelop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies to detect, report, locate, and identify worldwide nuclear detonations Conduct the highest quality, most innovative research and development
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 3
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)Ken Baker (Acting)
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)Ken Baker (Acting)
Global Threat Reduction(NA- 21)
Andrew Bieniawski
Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22)
T. Jan Cerveny
Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24)
Adam Scheinman
International Material Protection and Cooperation (NA-25)
David Huizenga
Fissile MaterialsDisposition (NA-26)
Ken Bromberg
Nuclear Risk Reduction(NA-23)
Trisha Dedik
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 4
Nonproliferation & Verification R&D
Office ofNuclear Detonation Detection
Randy BellDirector
Office of NonproliferationResearch & Development (NA-22)
T. Jan Cerveny, Ph.D.Assistant Deputy Administrator
Rhys Williams, Ph.D.Deputy
Office of Proliferation DetectionEd Watkins, Ph.D.
DirectorCOL Pete Duklis, U.S.A.
Deputy Director
Production of nuclear detonation detection systemsDetonation forensics supporting attribution
Detecting nuclear material production Detecting nuclear weapon and material smugglingDetecting weapon production and testingSafeguards R&D and alt rad sources
Marco Di Capua, Ph.D.Chief Scientist
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 5
Proliferation DetectionFY2009 $199.7M
(6 Feds, 3 Military, 8 M&Os, 2 Technical Support Contractors)
Directly tied to R&D mission for detecting foreign
• HEU production • Pu production • Movement of SNM• Violation of International
Safeguards
Drives long-term research agenda across USG for nuclear nonproliferation R&D
Signatures and Observables
10%
Broad Area Announcement
5%
Mission44%
Enabling Technologies
36%
Other5%
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 6
Proliferation Detection (PD)
Office of Proliferation Detection
Nonproliferation Mission AreasU-235 Production DetectionPu Production DetectionSNM Movement Detection/Radiation SensingDetection of Nuclear Weapons Production and TestingSafeguards and Alternate Radiation Sources
Nonproliferation Enabling TechnologiesAdvanced Materials (radiation detection focus)Simulation, Algorithms and ModelingNuclear Fuel Cycle Remote SensingTools, Techniques, Infrastructure and Demonstrations
Signatures & Observables Identify & characterize relevant proliferation signatures and observables in support of PD mission areas
Uranium gas centrifuge detection
Fuel cycle production signature collection
Neutron detection: gas-filled glass beads
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 7
Micro-Calorimetric Radiation Detectors
Technical Challenges: Fabrication for absorber arraysMultiplexed readout of large arrays Expanding to alpha and neutron spectroscopyRobust, low power refrigeration technology
World-record measurement to distinguish low-energy gamma
emissions of Pu and U for
SNM characterization (~25 eV @ 100 keV)
Example: Characterization of SNM
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 8
Radiochemistry
Automation
Advanced Laboratory Techniques:Radiochemistry Automation
Advanced Laboratory Techniques:Radiochemistry Automation
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 9
Stand-off Sensors: Hyperspectral Remote SensingStand-off Sensors: Hyperspectral Remote Sensing
♦ Data collection in relevant time frame and spectral range
♦ Selection of most effective instrument, sensing location, and image area.
♦Unique identification of effluents from complex real-world HSI images
QUAHSI - Quantifying Uranium Conversion Activities by Hyperspectral Imaging
Portable HyperspectralSensor
Gas detection image
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 10
Collectors / SamplingCollectors / Sampling
Particle Sampler Pod
Airborne Samplers
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Improved Accuracy of Pu AssayImproved Accuracy of Pu Assay
MWDXF experimental breadboard
0 5 10 15 200
10
20
30
40
50
Inte
nsity
(cou
nts)
Energy (keV)
Spectrum of 1 mL deposit of 10 ppm Y (100 second measurement)
Preliminary measurements of Y demonstrate the feasibility of measuring curium with a sub-ppm detection limit.
Challenge: Correct NDA signal for presence of Cm in spent fuel.Goal: Improve Cm/Pu ratio by a factor of 10 in a reprocessing sample.Approach: Monochromatic Wavelength Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (MWDXF)
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 12
Advanced Enrichment MonitoringAdvanced Enrichment Monitoring
Enrichment Monitor and UF6Static Gaseous Source Experimental Enrichment Results for UF6 Gas
R&D efforts focused on x-ray tube characterization and stabilization, optimization of notch filters, and background suppression of 186 keV peak.
Challenge: Gas centrifuge enrichment plant (GCEP) enrichment monitoringGoal: Improvements beyond existing Continuous Enrichment Monitor (CEMO)Approach: Quantitative enrichment measurements using x-ray generators
NaI
UF6gas
3.0%
3.1%
3.2%
3.3%
3.4%
3.5%
0 20 40 60 80
UF6 Pressure [torr]
Enrichment [%]
E(p)
Transmission measurement schematic
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 13
Novel Pin Diversion MethodNovel Pin Diversion MethodChallenge: Detect diversion of spent fuel from Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR)Goal: Exceed current IAEA detection threshold of 50% missing pinsApproach: Explore neutron and gamma measurements inside the guide tubes, with assemblies in spent fuel pond
PWR Fuel Assembly Example of a MCNP modeled assembly with Missing Pins (shown in blue)
Blue profile shows a 4.5% diversion case, while the pink profile shows the reference profile for a PWR spent fuel assembly
Monte Carlo simulations show that ratios of neutron and gamma measurements may be a useful indicator of partial defect. Experimental validation are needed. Operator acceptance is still an issue.
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 14
Uranyl Fluoride StudiesUranyl Fluoride Studies
UF6 Environmental EffectsUF6 + 2 H2O → UO2F2 + 4 HF
IrradiatedNon-irradiated
Analysis ProtocolsCollection
2071
6
2016
920
058
1929
7 1919
3
1832
6
1746
9
1660
9
1572
2
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
21000 20000 19000 18000 17000 16000
Arbitrary / Wavenumber (cm-1)
UO2F2 - xH2O (25C)
Spectral Analysis
Isotopic Analysis
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 15
Focus on Signatures from Operational FacilitiesFocus on Signatures from Operational Facilities
Measurements are being made in weapon-complex facilities
(LANL)
Measurements are being made in Reactor Fuel Fabrication
Facility (INL)
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 16
Example: Reactor Monitoring
Reactor Safeguards and Monitoring with Antineutrino Detectors
Date2/28/05 3/7/05 3/14/05 3/21/05 3/28/05
Rea
ctor
Pow
er (%
)
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Date2/28/05 3/7/05 3/14/05 3/21/05 3/28/05
Cou
nts
per d
ay0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Predicted count rate using reported reactor powerObserved count rate, 24 hour averageReported reactor power
Antineutrino detector located 25 m from reactor core can clearly track reactor state from outside containment
Plutonium Processing Detection
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
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Nuclear Detonation Detection (NDD)
Office of Nuclear Detonation Detection
Space-Based Systems
Surface & Atmospheric Burst Detection
High Altitude & Space Burst Detection
Ground-Based Systems
Seismic Detection Methods
Trace Radionuclide Detection Methods
Detonation Forensics
Prompt Signatures
Radionuclide Debris Analysis
GPS Constellation
Newest GPS Sensor Package Delivered
3D Seismic Simulation
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Space (GEO)
17%
Other5%Forensics
12%
Space (GPS)
43%
Ground21%
Space (cross-cutting)
7%
FY 2009 ($145.6M) (4 Feds, 2 Military, 4 M&Os, 2 Tech Contractors)
Bulk of program driven by product delivery schedule to meet interagency requirementsR&D crucial to enable design, production, and delivery of Nuclear Detonation Detection systems
Nuclear Detonation Detection
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 19
NUclear DETonation (NUDET) SignaturesNUclear DETonation (NUDET) Signatures
30 km30 km
100 km100 km
30 km30 km
100 km100 km
Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) Signatures
Space• Gamma-Ray• Neutron• X-ray
Transition-Region• Optical*• Gamma-Ray• Neutron
Low-Altitude• Optical• Electromagnetic Pulse• Radionuclide Debris• Infrasound
Sub-Surface• Seismic• Radionuclide Debris• Hydroacoustic• Infrasound
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 20
Combined X-ray Dosimeter (CXD)
EMP Sensor (BDV)
Processor (BDP)NAP - NDS
Analysis Payload (BDA)
Optical Transient Detectors
bhangmeters (BDY) Conventional & Enhanced
Sun Shield for BDY
Block 2F Satellite
Global Burst Detector (GBD)
GPS Instruments
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 21
Ground-Based NUDET Detection
Old Regime – Teleseismic
New Seismic Monitoring Challenge for Low Yield Events
New stations installed by DoD as funds and international agreements allow
Each new station requires about 3 years to select and install (DOE labs)
Station calibration requires 3–5 years of data gathering and mathematical analysis
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Computational Modeling
Coupling source term & propagation models Exceeding current computational capacity
Office of Nonproliferation Research & Development 23
Nuclear Detonation Detection – Forensics
Prompt & Debris weapons outputs
Modeling to understand source term & propagation– to guide/focus research– for pre-event planning (CONOPS development
& site sensors)– support to post-event evaluation, reconstruction
Collection & Measuring research– how to best collect and rapidly measure
quantities that add value to attribution– looking for significant advances in
radioisotopic measurements, not simplyslight improvements in traditionalradiochemistry practices (e.g., direct sampling bylaser ablation, high-resolution alpha-spec)
Evaluation– reconstruct pre-detonation device design
information – reconstruct pre-detonation material information
High fidelity model of an evolving nuclear fireball in an urban setting
Installed forensics sensors
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Bottom Line
• R&D/S&T focused on a specific missions
• Connection to user/operators is a given
• Seeking to solve the toughest technical problems
Advancing Nuclear Security CapabilityAdvancing Nuclear Security Capability