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Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
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Nation states, ideological power and globalisation:can geographers catch the boat?
Martin Jones *, Rhys Jones
Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, University of Wales, Aberystwyth SY23 3DB, UK
Received 13 February 2003; received in revised form 26 November 2003
Abstract
After a period of considerable and sustained hegemony, many commentators have argued that contemporary processes of
globalisation are acting as a challenge to nation state sovereignty. The paper argues that geographers need to focus on the ways in
which the nation state continues to act, albeit in a modified manner, within the era of globalisation. This might help to position
geography within globalisation debates, which––according to Dicken [Geographers and �globalization’: (yet) another missed boat?
forthcoming, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 2004]––we have not been centrally involved in. Drawing on the
work of Michael Mann, we focus on a neglected dimension of state power––namely, its ideological form––as a means of exploring
how the nation state is being differentially re-engineered under globalisation. Using Mann’s classification of forms of ideological
organisation, we deploy three vignettes in order to demonstrate the evolving nature of ideological power within the contemporary
UK State.
� 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Nation state; State power; Ideological power; Globalisation; UK
Jo
00
do
The evidence shows unequivocally that geographers
are marginal––at best––to the wider globalization
debate. Geography is like the small child in the
school playground who always gets missed out
when the big children are picking teams. Nobodyseems to want to choose us. So, we have a serious
case of �missing geographers’ on our hands . . .[and] globalization could turn out to be yet another
one of geography’s �missed boats’. Indeed, the hi-
story of our discipline is replete with cases where
what would seem to be geography’s �natural’ terri-tory has been invaded and taken over by other dis-
ciplines, often in ways that grossly distort �thegeographical view’ (Dicken, 2004, p. 5; see also
Angel, 2002, p. 254).
*Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: msj@aber.ac.uk (M. Jones), raj@aber.ac.uk (R.
nes).
16-7185/$ - see front matter � 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
i:10.1016/j.geoforum.2003.12.002
1. Introduction
There has been much academic debate, in recent
years, concerning the functional and territorial restruc-
turing that is affecting the contemporary state. Scholarshave argued that the nation state’s prime position as the
shaper of economic and political processes, and the
anchor for cultural identities is increasingly being chal-
lenged by organisations and processes lying within and
beyond its boundaries (e.g. Brenner et al., 2003;
Fukuyama, 1992; Horsman and Marshall, 1994; Jessop,
1999; Keating, 2001; Mann, 1997; Murphy, 1996).
Jessop’s (1994, 2002) now-familiar work on the reorga-nisation of the state has been influential as a way of
conceptualising the character of some of these changes.
Focusing on the de-statisation of the political system,
reflected most clearly in the shift from government to
governance; the internationalisation of policy commu-
nities and networks; and the denationalisation of the
state––as evidenced in the sedimentation of new organ-
isations of governance, with their societal effects, atdifferent spatial scales––Jessop’s work has contributed
much to our understanding of the contemporary state.
Academic attention has also focused on the forces that
410 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
are allegedly eroding the state’s hegemony. Key here has
been the various accounts of the impacts of globalisa-
tion on the nation state (e.g. Amin, 2002a; Brenner,
1999; Kelly, 1999; Ohmae, 1996; Panitch, 1996; Ruggie,1993; Sassen, 2003; Scott, 2001; Shaw, 1997; Yeung,
1998). Globalisation––which equates to: the increasing
importance of financial markets; the centrality of
knowledge as a factor of production; the international-
isation and �transnationalisation of technology’; the rise
of transnational corporations; an intensification of cul-
tural flows; and the rise of �transnational economic
diplomacy’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994)––has been viewedas the main challenge to the functional and territorial
integrity of the nation state. Significantly, the fact that
globalisation relates to ‘‘not merely the geographical
extension of economic activity across national bound-
aries but also the functional integration of such inter-
nationally dispersed activities (Dicken, 1998, p. 5,
emphasis added), implies that globalisation is leading to,
and is associated with, �new global geographies’ (Aminand Thrift, 1997). Globalisation is redefining the role of
the nation state as regulatory animateur of cultural,
economic, social and political life and in doing so is
challenging the established territorial geographies of the
Westphalian sovereign national state system.
Admittedly, accounts of the impacts of globalisation
on the nation state have varied. So-called �booster’academic accounts argue that globalisation is driven byan economic logic that brings about an end-state of a
single global market (see Dicken et al., 1997). Within
these explanations, it is contended that transnational
networks of production, trade and finance are ultimately
leading to the denationalisation of economic space.
Consequently, an �end of geography’ thesis (O’Brien,
1992) exists because ‘‘traditional nation states have be-
come unnatural, even impossible business units in aglobal economy’’ (Ohmae, 1996, p. 5). Globalisation is
associated with a �borderless world’ where national
governments are relegated to transmission belts for
global capital (Ohmae, 1996; also Horsman and Mar-
shall, 1994; Strange, 1996). Political praxis has sup-
ported this position. In the words of the British Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, ‘‘what is called globalisation is
changing the nature of the nation state as power be-comes more diffuse and borders more porous’’ (quoted
in Dicken et al., 1997, p. 159).
Others have been keen to offer a healthier prognosis
for the nation state. Taking issue with the arguments
made for economic globalisation, �hypercritics’ (Dicken
et al., 1997) or �sceptics’ (Held et al., 1999)––such as
Hirst and Thompson (1996)––question the significance
of contemporary globalisation, along with its impact onthe nation state. Using evidence of world flows of trade,
investment and labour, Hirst and Thompson claim that
because levels of economic interdependence remain
stable, no significant changes have occurred since the
19th century and it is wrong to suggest that the con-
temporary period has witnessed the formation of a
particularly integrated economy. Globalisation is, in
their terms, a �myth’; the nation state remains a regu-lator of cross-border activity and it is foolish to suggest
a scenario whereby the ‘‘glue holding traditional nation
states together, at least in economic terms, has begun to
dissolve’’ (Ohmae, 1996, p. 79). For Hirst and Thomp-
son (1996) globalisation is a politically convenient
rational for practising neoliberal economic strategies––a
claim developed by others (see Fox-Piven, 1995; Harvey,
2000; Swyngedouw, 2000).These two extreme positions (booster and sceptic) are
currently being re-assessed. In this respect, it has been
suggested that Hirst and Thompson do not give any
sense of the trends underway over the past 25 years in
economic, political, social and cultural life (Amin, 1997).
By focusing purely on a quantitative (economic) evalu-
ation of change, there is no consideration of qualitative
dimensions to globalisation, especially its impacts on theterritorial nexus of the nation state (Amin and Thrift,
1997; Anderson and Goodman, 1995; Anderson, 1995,
1996). Dicken (1998), who suggests that Hirst and
Thompson ultimately confuse the concept of globalisa-
tion with internationalisation, shares similar thoughts.
Commenting on both the booster and sceptic position,
Dicken argues that globalisation has to be seen as a
complex set of interrelated processes that are leading toa qualitative reorganisation of the geo-economy (also
Dicken, 2004; Dicken et al., 1997; also Scholte, 2000).
Here, the nation state is presented as �permeable’ to the
processes of globalisation––it has �political complexion’
and the strategic capacity to filter the various driving
forces (Dicken, 1998). The state enacts a series of policy
mixes that influence the ways in which economies
operate within a globalised world. In a similar vein,Yeung (1998, p. 292) challenges the �borderless world’
discourse on the grounds that it plays down the ‘‘intri-
cate and multiple relationships between capital, the state
and space’’. For Yeung, there is an enduring importance
for national boundaries because capital is still embedded
in distinct national-social and/or institutional structures.
For these authors, the nation state remains engaged in
mediating both domestic and transnational economicactivity through offering different �regulatory surfaces’
(also Jessop, 1999).
This paper tries to shape and steer these important
agendas by suggesting ways in which geographers can
contribute to globalisation debates––thereby addressing
Dicken’s (2004) recent concern that we could be missing
the (globalisation) boat? We argue that geographers
need to focus on the ways in which the nation statecontinues to act, albeit in a modified manner, within the
era of globalisation. We do not claim, in this respect,
that the nation state is unaffected by the processes of
globalisation. Instead, our concern is with how the na-
1 We find it interesting to note that although Mann’s current work
tends to cover the transcendent nature of global ideologies, particu-
larly the connections between economic power relations, military
power relations and ethno-nationalism and anti-imperialism, one of
Mann’s forthcoming books is a volume III on the sources of social
power and globalisation––titled Globalizations (see Mann, 2003). The
intention to write this was clearly stated in the preface to Mann’s 1993
volume II on the sources of social power, where he promises an
account of ‘‘the twentieth century (perhaps the whole century, by the
time I finish)’’ (Mann, 1993a, p. ix). We would like to thank one of the
referees for drawing our attention to this important point.
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 411
tion state is adapting to the challenge of globalisation
‘‘rather than being tidily removed to clear the ground
for new politics’’ (Anderson and Goodman, 1995, p. 25).
On this front, we suggest that contemporary workconcerned with finding a balanced position between
�booster’ and �sceptic’ interpretations might wish to ex-
plore the multifaceted dimensions to, and mechanisms
of, state power under globalisation (cf. Hobson, 1998;
Mann, 1997). With the exception of Taylor’s (1994,
1995) work on the shifting character of the nation state
as a �power container’, relatively little attention has been
directed towards the selective reshuffling of the differentdimensions to state power. This sentiment is expressed
in the following observation, although we would suggest
that this gives little indication as to how, as human
geographers, we can begin to explicate the contours of
these phenomena.
Globalization . . . is making it increasingly neces-sary to differentiate between the various activities
or potential activities of states; the unbundling of
territoriality is often highly selective, and we need
to think of the state and its sovereignty in the plural
rather than the singular (Anderson, 1996, p. 135).
Although much work has been undertaken on the
economic, military and political powers of the nation
state under globalisation (cf. Dicken, 2004; Gill and
Law, 1988; Held et al., 1999; Hudson, 2000; Jessop,
1995; McGrew and Lewis, 1992; Weiss, 1998; Yeung,
1998), little research is being conducted on the role of
ideological dimensions to state power. We address this
lacuna in the paper by concentrating on the contribu-tions made by Mann (1986). We do so for two reasons.
Firstly, Mann has systematically elaborated on the
various aspects of social and state power––ideological,
economic, military and political––in research under-
taken over the last 20 years. As such, Mann’s work can
enable us to highlight the way in which globalisation
affects these different sources of state power, in different
ways. Secondly––and as we discuss below––Mann’scontribution to ideology, amongst other things, revolves
around the ways in which ideological power is multi-
dimensional and, especially with regard to globalisation,
is bound up with the ongoing processes of state action
and formation (Mann, 1997; see also Clegg, 1989). We
further contend that Mann’s focus on ideological power
as a constituent element of state power, and more
importantly the distinction made between transcendentand immanent forms of ideological organisation (see
Section 2), provides a useful framework through which
to explore the re-configuring of nation state territoriality
under globalisation. Historically, the nation state, of
course, cannot depend purely on territorial forces of
control: it has always employed ideological patterns of
dominance (see Jones, 2000; Kirby, 1993; Murphy, 1996;
Poulantzas, 1978). Our point is that the globalisation
debate offers an opportunity for exploring the mecha-
nisms in through which the nation state’s ideological
power is being qualitatively re-engineered during thecontemporary period. Uncovering this could be where
geographers can make a difference and catch the glob-
alisation boat.
Section 2 discusses this further by drawing on Mann’s
(1986) notion of power networks as methodological
tools for analysing the shifting functions of national
governments. Although Mann has made interventions in
the globalisation debate––focusing on its geographicallyuneven impacts (Mann, 1993b, 1997) and on the shifting
character of economic and military power relations
(Mann, 2001, 2002)––there appears to be a missing
methodological link between this contemporary think-
ing and Mann’s previous theoretical writings on the
sources of social power between antiquity and high-
modernity (Mann, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1993a). 1 Likewise,
although Mann’s work has been used in historicalgeography to examine the formation of the state and the
practices through which techniques of power are exer-
cised (Jones, 1999; Ogborn, 1992), with the exception of
Weiss’s (1998) work on comparative economic devel-
opment, its application to the contemporary era has
been somewhat limited. One of the aims of the paper,
then, is to show the relevance of Mann’s historical work
on the sources of social power to contemporary debatesconcerning processes of globalisation. To provide the
empirical basis for our argument that ideological power
remains an increasingly important facet of the nation
state’s role in globalisation, Section 3 provides three
short vignettes on the contemporary UK state to dem-
onstrate the relevance of this perspective. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2. Globalisation and the neglected dimension of state
power
Hobson’s excellent review of approaches to the statewithin the context of internationalisation and glo-
balisation clearly places the work of Mann within a
neo-Weberian perspective (Hobson, 1998). Weber’s
412 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
contention that the state should be viewed as a ‘‘human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given ter-
ritory’’ (Gerth and Mills, 1970, p. 78) has been builtupon by Mann. He has elaborated on key criteria that
illustrate the organisational significance of states. Mann
(1984) (see also Giddens, 1985) maintains that states
incorporate
• firstly, a set of institutions and their related person-
nel,
• secondly, a degree of centrality with political deci-sions emanating from this centre point,
• thirdly, a defined boundary that demarcates the terri-
torial limits of the state,
• fourthly, a monopoly of coercive power and law-
making ability.
Indeed, it is Mann’s emphasis on the importance of
territory for all states––in a material and ideologicalsense––that has marked his work out as being of especial
importance to geographers (see Jones, 1999; Ogborn,
1992).
Building on this neo-Weberian legacy, Mann has fa-
mously argued that we need to conceive of social power
as something that exists in an interrelated, multifaceted
and plural form (Mann, 1986, pp. 1–2; cf. Giddens,
1987; Hall, 1996; Runciman, 1989). The four differenttypes of power identified by Mann as being the �foursources of social power’ are economic, military, political
and ideological power. According to Mann, economic
power is based on an individual or a group’s ability to
order the processes whereby a society’s subsistence
needs are extracted from the resources of the territory
that it inhabits. It is by controlling the means of suste-
nance within a given society that an individual or, groupof individuals, are able to maintain a hold on its source
of economic power. Military power is a relatively
straightforward concept, since it derives directly from an
individual or a group’s ability to order the means of
defence and offence within a particular place. It may
also offer the means by which a ruling class may coerce
their subjects into adhering to norms of ideological,
economic and political control within the same society.Political power, according to Mann, derives from the
ability of individuals, groups or institutions to order
aspects of organisation in a territorial manner within a
given society. Finally and critically given the aims of the
paper, Mann emphasises the key role of ideological
power in shaping socio-spatial relations. Ideological
power may derive from an individual’s ability to main-
tain a monopoly of categories of meaning or, in otherwords, the process whereby ideological meaning is
placed upon concepts and categories within a society.
Ideological power is also based on an individual or
group’s ability to shape norms of action or, in effect,
norms concerning the way in which individuals should
act towards each other within a society; or it may derive
from an ability to mould the nature of ritual or aesthetic
practices within a given society. It is the ability to shapeor mould these elements that confers ideological power
on a particular group or individual (Mann, 1986, pp.
22–28).
Along with Mann, we wish to emphasise that the four
constituent sources or networks of social power should
not be viewed as ones that exist independently of one
another: they are not necessarily mutually exclusive and
are, in fact, often combined in complex ways (Clegg,1989; Hobson, 1998). This has two major implications
for any study of the ideological power of the state under
globalisation. First, since all forms of power are impli-
cated one with another, it is often difficult to tease out
the ideological element of the power networks incor-
porated within individual nation states. In other words,
the boundaries between the various networks of power
are often blurred. This raises significant problems in anyattempt to distinguish the nature of the ideological
power of the state vis-�a-vis its networks of military,
political and economic power. Second, and more
broadly, any attempt to interrogate the sources of
ideological power of a given state in isolation may be
viewed as one that is conceptually flawed, since the
process of abstraction that this entails is inimical to the
interrelated nature of power networks within any givensocio-spatial context. We fully accept the validity of
such criticisms and concur that the ideological power of
the state under globalisation is closely linked to its re-
lated sources of economic, military and political power
(see Harvey, 2003). Our aim in this paper, however, is to
emphasise a particularly neglected aspect of studies of
state power under globalisation, namely that of the
ideological power of the state and its organisationalmatrices. As such, the act of abstracting the ideological
context of state power is worthwhile. It has the potential
to highlight fruitful and possibly novel lines of empirical
enquiry within the broader arena of research that is
concerned with exploring the changes occurring to the
contemporary state under the processes of globalisation.
We wish to further argue that such an approach is
warranted since there is an inherent danger that thecrucial significance of ideological power to the territorial
and functional capacity of nation states is being ignored
within studies of contemporary political economy. This
derives, at least in part, from a failure to recognise the
fact that ideological organisation may take one of two
different forms––transcendent and immanent (Mann,
1986, pp. 23–24). Crucially, we would argue that there
has been a tendency, with regard to globalisation, tofocus almost exclusively on the transcendent forms that
ideological organisation may take. Here, attention is
directed towards a type of ideological organisation,
which ‘‘transcends the existing institutions of ideologi-
2 In making this point we recognise that the concept of ideology is a
contested term––frequently interchanged with notions of discourse and
hegemony (see Eagleton, 1991; Fairclough, 1995; Jessop, 1990; Purvis
and Hunt, 1993)––and make the following distinction. We take
discourse as a set of interrelated concepts that act as a matrix through
which to understand the social world, whereas ideology is the means
through which dominant social groups (or classes) present ideas in a
certain manner in order to sustain privileged power relationships.
Hegemony, in turn, is interpreted as the material practices that
generate and help to sustain ideologies––i.e. the structural and
strategic contexts within which meanings, understandings and actions
develop (see Fairclough, 2000).
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 413
cal, economic, military and political power and gener-
ates a �sacred’ form of authority . . . set apart from and
above more secular authority structures’’ (Mann, 1986,
p. 23). One of the examples Mann uses in order toillustrate this form of transcendent ideological organi-
sation is that associated with the religion of Christianity
(Mann, 1986, pp. 301–340; see also Mann, 2002). Here,
Mann argues that Christianity throughout much of the
later Roman period existed as a set of ideas that ex-
tended throughout the Roman Empire in both a social
and spatial context. In many ways, also, they came to
cut across and challenge the dominant power structuresthat existed within the Empire. Of course, one can draw
close parallels here between the relationship that existed
between early forms of Christianity and the Roman
Empire, and lay interpretations of the relationship that
exists between nation states and the transcendent ide-
ologies of globalisation. In a similar manner to the
erosion of the Roman Empire’s traditional power
structures by a sociospatially transcendent Christianideology, global �boosters’ would have us believe that
nation states in the contemporary world are unable to
structure their political economies due to a prevailing
global ideology of free trade, economic liberalism, a
�rationalist episteme’ (Scholte, 2000, p. 91), and Anglo-
American culture.
We can, perhaps, view booster interpretations of the
dynamics of globalisation as ones that portray contem-porary political and economic relationships as consist-
ing of the interplay between a footloose and aspatial
ideology of globalisation, on the one hand, and a more
territorially rooted nation state, on the other. In effect,
there is a danger that the whole notion of ideological
power can be viewed as the antithesis of a state power,
delineated by territorial boundaries. Swyngedouw’s
(2000) contribution to this arena of research, however,sounds a note of caution against embracing such a
viewpoint. Emphasising the discursive shift that has
taken place in much of the academic literature and
political rhetoric during the 1980s, he contends that the
‘‘propagation of this globalisation ideology (sic) has
become like an act of faith’’ (Swyngedouw, 2000, p. 66).
Crucially, it is the leaders of contemporary nation states
who are often implicated in the processes through whichthese ideologies are produced and sustained. These
global ideologies, in turn, feed back into the ideologies
and discourses promoted within individual nation states:
national politicians use globalisation to support a range
of policies that seek to promote restrictions on social
expenditure, the advantages of flexible labour markets,
and the reduction of environmental and social forms of
regulation (Harvey, 2000). As such, this perspectivedraws our attention to the key role played by forms of
ideological organisation both at a putative global scale,
and at the scale of the nation state, as well as the com-
plex interplay between the two.
In this respect, we would argue that �booster’ con-ceptions of the processes occurring within contemporary
globalisation are flawed since they fail to recognise the
existence of a second, immanent, form of ideologicalorganisation that is closely linked to existing social
groups and power structures. Mann’s understanding of
ideological power is particularly instructive, in this re-
gard, precisely due to his recognition of the existence of
this second form of ideological organisation. He argues
that ‘‘immanent ideology is less dramatically autono-
mous in its impact, for it largely strengthens what is
there’’ (Mann, 1986, p. 23). Though we would questionthe static and unchanging interpretation of immanent
ideological organisation that appears in the above
quotation, we would concur that immanent forms of
ideological organisation have the potential to legitimise
and sustain the relationships of political, economic and
military power that already exist within a given society.
Indeed, in many ways, this mirrors Thompson’s under-
standing of the concept of ideology as something thathelps to sustain relations of domination (1984, p. 4; see,
however, Eagleton, 1991, pp. 6–7). 2 Once again, Mann
(1986, p. 297) delves into ancient history in order to
illustrate his understanding of this concept. Focusing his
attention again on the Roman Empire, Mann argues
that much of what preserved its external form and
internal structure for the long period of its military,
political and economic dominance was a concomitantideological power. This drew the imperial elite into a
common infrastructure based mainly on literacy and
Hellenistic rationalism.
The above discussion raises the obvious question
concerning the various ways in which immanent ideo-
logical power is transmitted to a state’s population. A
precursor to this should appreciate that uses of the term
�state power’ can give the false impression of an organ-isational form that exerts power in and of itself, when
Jessop has famously argued that the state does not
possess any power of its own.
The state as such has no power––it is merely an
institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institu-
tional capacities and liabilities which mediate that
power; the power of the state is the power of the
414 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
forces acting in and through the state (Jessop,
1990, p. 269, emphasis added).
Given this emphasis on agency and mediation, it is
important to consider the significance of communication
as a way of ensuring that political elites can transmitconceptions of ideological power to their population.
Mann argues for a position that acknowledges
�organizational materialism’: ideologies are at-
tempts to grapple with real social problems, but
they are diffused through specific media of commu-
nication and their characteristics may transform
ideological messages, so conferring ideological
power autonomy. Thus the particularities of ideo-logical power organization should be our object
of study (Mann, 1993a, p. 36).
Immanent ideological power can be transmitted
through a variety of techniques, ranging from prescrip-
tive rules and coercion through to more normative dis-
courses that can encourage particular forms of social
action and/or identity. The more prescriptive rules relate
to Mann’s (1986) ideas regarding �distributive power’
and Clegg’s (1989, 1990) notion of �circuits of power’ or,in other words, fields and circuits of strategic agency.
The organisation of a state’s ideological power through
normative discourses reflects the attempts made by a
state elite to encourage different types of social practice
and is based more on state propaganda contained within
official state communications, state education systems,
social and cultural events, and direct control of the
media. We have to be careful here, of course, ofimplying instrumentalism on the part of the state and its
various projects. Clegg argues that when studying the
co-existence of power networks, ‘‘the temporarily sta-
bilised outcomes may be practices historically encoun-
tered in their fixity and facticity which no one
necessarily �intended’ in any relevant way’’ (Clegg, 1989,
p. 204). State action within the frameworks of social
practice and discursive practice can have intended andunintended consequences.
Significantly the concept of immanent ideological
organisation reveals much about the territorial charac-
ter of the contemporary nation state. Crucially, we ar-
gue that immanent ideological power can be viewed as a
form of ideological power that can be closely linked to
the pre-existing social groups and power structures of
the contemporary nation state. In effect, immanentideological power can be seen to play a significant role
in the reproduction, though, we would argue, not the
unchanging preservation, of the socio-spatial relation-
ships and territorial power structures of the state. Fur-
thermore, the notion of immanent ideological power
enables us to view the role of ideological power in
structuring the relationship between the nation state
and the dynamics of globalisation in a different way.
Rather than seeing ideological power solely as some-
thing that seeks to undermine the territorial integrity
of the nation state, the notion of an immanent ideo-logical power, grounded in pre-existing territorial power
structures, allows us to interrogate the various forms
of ideological power, which enable the contemporary
nation state to be sustained. The state is, therefore,
not a defenceless organisation suffering at the hands
of a globally produced set of orthodoxies and norms.
Effectively, notions of immanent ideological power
necessitate the need to explore the manifold ways inwhich the contemporary nation state is a set of insti-
tutions in and through which ideological meanings, and
their associated power relationships, are produced,
communicated and consumed.
3. Nation states and the three sources of ideological power
In this section we outline three vignettes that illus-
trate the various contexts in which ideological power is
produced, communicated and consumed within indi-
vidual nation states. Moreover, in so doing we seek to
emphasise the continued––though modified––roleplayed by the nation state in structuring discourses,
meanings and orthodoxies in the contemporary world,
even in the face of the allegedly remorseless ideological
capacities of globally based institutions and organisa-
tions. The three vignettes have been chosen since they
reflect Mann’s (1986, pp. 22–23) threefold classification
of the ways in which ideological power may be struc-
tured and communicated. Briefly, ideological power canbe based upon:
• the ascription of concepts or categories of meaning
within a given place or society,
• the denoting of norms within a given place or society,
ones which provide guidance on the ways in which
individuals and groups should act,
• aesthetic and ritual practices which help to convey asense of power within society.
These three sources of ideological power will struc-
ture the arguments made in this section. To illustrate
these arguments, we will be drawing on leading-edge
political developments underway in the UK in recent
years within the context of globalisation and neoliber-
alism. Crucially, the role of the UK state in definingcategories of meaning will be discussed with respect to
the notion of scales of action, or in other words, the
ability of nation states to determine the appropriate
spatial scales over which political, socio-economic and
cultural activity should take place. The influence of the
nation state in determining norms of action will be
illustrated through a brief discussion of the role of
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 415
individual states (though often in co-operation one with
each other) in promoting new forms of social paternal-
ism. Discussion here centres on contemporary ideologies
of welfare reform, whereby the unemployed are in-structed how to behave in order to receive welfare
entitlement. Thirdly, we will discuss one of the clearest
indications of the continuing significance of individual
nation states in promoting their own sources of ideo-
logical power, namely their ability to sponsor certain
aesthetic and ritual practices. We will illustrate this
theme by discussing the notion of efforts to re-brand
civic nationalism in the UK.
3.1. Categories of meaning: scales of action
One way of considering Mann’s (1986) notion of
ideological power as a category of meaning is to thinkabout the ways in which socio-economic activity is
governed through spatial scales of action. In this re-
spect, we would argue that nation states are maintaining
their strategic capacity to establish institutional param-
eters associated with managing particular problems.
Since the late 1960s, the time at which international-
isation is said to have given way to globalisation
(Dicken, 1998, 2004), the state has played a key role inreshaping the socio-economic environment in and
through which its intervention takes place. This is pre-
sented to interest groups as an attempt to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of the state’s use of resources,
linked to which is an imperative to secure political
legitimacy for state intervention (Offe, 1985). This pro-
cess not only involves the production of new spatial
scales of state intervention to manage economic life: it isultimately associated with providing new sites for state
(ideological) power, which is indicative of the nation
state’s ability to ‘‘monopolize a claim to meaning’’
(Mann, 1986, p. 22).
Such concerns can be demonstrated with reference to
the development of the �region’ as a key scale of regu-
lation and governance across Europe in recent years (see
Keating, 1998; Keating et al., 2003; MacLeod, 2001). Inrecent �new regionalist’ academic accounts, there is an
emerging orthodoxy that suggests a high-road to eco-
nomic growth based on a movement from national
government and interventionist policy-making towards
reflexive sub-national structures of governance involving
the state, economic actors, and civil society stakeholders
(cf. Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Hirst, 1997; Storper,
1997). Since the mid-1940s, of course, the nation stateand the national scale have been pivotal to economic
policy. This was deemed necessary for post-war recon-
struction and also a means of preventing a repetition of
the economic slump that occurred during the 1930s.
Accordingly, a Fordist–Keynesian institutional com-
promise for capitalism was anchored around the nation
state as an imagined political and economic community.
Nationally co-ordinated economic development, in the
form of labour market and regional policy, endeavoured
to temporarily stabilise and internalise the contradic-
tions and crisis tendencies of capitalism (Parsons, 1988).The period 1945–1975 represented a �long-boom’ of
economic growth, characterised by low unemployment
rates and relative social prosperity.
Under (especially economic) globalisation, national
scales of action are deemed to have become an �obstacle’to economic success (Ohmae, 1996, 2002). Drawing
empirical inspiration from growth regions such as Baden
W€urrtemberg (Germany) and Emilia-Romagna (Italy),the regional scale is claimed to represent an indispens-
able element in the �supply architecture’ for learning and
innovation, deemed essential for establishing economic
competitiveness in an era of globalisation (Storper,
1997). In substantive terms, the �new regionalism’
(Keating, 1998) argues that an economic deficit can be
addressed by harnessing a network of support structures
that help to collectivise economic interests (Cooke andMorgan, 1998). The regional scale is also viewed as key
for reducing a democratic deficit and promoting a plural
society based on ‘‘participatory politics, active citizen-
ship [and] civic pride’’ (Amin, 1999, p. 373).
The impact of this thinking is evident in recent
political praxis in the United Kingdom. For a number of
years UK policymakers have shown an explicit interest
in developments occurring in the successful Europeanregions. As part of a comprehensive UK-wide devolu-
tion agenda, alongside elected Assemblies for Wales,
Northern Ireland and London, and a parliament for
Scotland, the Labour government has established Re-
gional Development Agencies (RDAs) to enable the
English regions ‘‘to punch their weight in the global
market place’’ (DETR, 1997, p. 1, emphasis added). In
step with the new regionalist orthodoxy, RDAs areintegral elements of a package deemed capable of
learning and innovating to establish a competitive
advantage for economic growth in the global arena.
This �new regional policy’ (DTLR, 2002) is laden with
an ideology of providing institutional parameters for
economic success that is being communicated through
national-level policy documents, parliamentary debates
and political discussion, and the actions of the nineRDAs within their respective English regions (including
London)––being legitimised in this last instance by
boards drawing representation from the business sector
and the social partners. The Labour Party is envious of
territorial developments that have occurred elsewhere in
Europe (see DETR, 2000): the regional scale is seen to
provide the right atmosphere for both business and civil
society stakeholders, in tandem creating strong part-nerships as the basis for a �decent’ society. This is clearlyevident in the following persuasive quotation from a
recent White Paper on the future of English regional
governance, which makes ideological links between
416 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
modernisation, economic prosperity, and regional levels
of representation.
For decades the needs and aspirations of the Eng-
lish regions were at best neglected and at worst ig-
nored. The laissez-faire and �Whitehall knows
best’ approaches of the past created both a widen-
ing regional economic decline and regional demo-
cratic deficit. By 1997 we had all but abandoned
regional policy and had one of the most centralised
systems of government in the western world. Rightfrom the word go, this Government has taken a dif-
ferent approach, aiming to bring pride and prosper-
ity back to all our regions . . . This White Paper
carries forward that regional renaissance and puts
the regions firmly at the heart of our policies to
build a modern and more prosperous society. By
devolving power and revitalising the regions we
bring decision-making closer to the people andmake government more efficient, more effective
and more accountable. Empowering our regions
does not mean the break-up of England, just as
devolution has not meant the break-up of the
UK. It makes our nation stronger and more dy-
namic . . . This is radical agenda to take us forward
fully into the 21st century, where centralisation is a
thing of the past. It responds to the desires many re-gions are already expressing and sets up a frame-
work which can take other regions forward if they
wish. Better Government, less bureaucracy and
more democracy, and enhancing regional prosper-
ity: proposals from a Government confident that
it is people within our regions who know what is
best for their region (Prescott and Byers, quoted
in DTLR, 2002: foreword).
By contrast, experience is suggesting pressing con-
tradictions that, we argue, illustrate the thinness of this
initiative (also Benneworth, 2001; Robson et al., 2000).
At a basic policy level, RDAs are heavily steered by
political fiat and central government dictate and theylack regional discretion. Although RDAs have a remit
to influence the nature of economic, social and physical
regeneration within their various territories, they control
less than 5% of the money entering into their regional
space and they are, in effect, subcontractors for central
government (national) programmes (Morgan, 2002). 3
Because of this, in contrast to the rhetoric of rational-
ising landscapes of economic governance––created
3 It also has to be recognised that Government Offices for the
Regions (Whitehall’s administrative presence within the English
regions) are being positioned as leading players in regional develop-
ment (see DTLR, 2002), which is set to create further tensions between
central government and the RDAs/future elected regional assemblies
(Musson et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2004).
through numerous rounds of state intervention since the
early 1980s––critics suggest that RDAs are adding to the
complexity of doing regional economic regeneration
(Jones, 2001). They have, in effect, been established in aregional space occupied by a number of existing insti-
tutions: they are contributing to a congested set of re-
gional agendas (in political terms) and arenas (in
institutional terms).
More crucially, at the deeper ideological level, and
again drawing influence from European developments,
RDAs are driven by an economic imperative that as-
sumes a strong regional tier corresponds with an ability tosecure competitive advantage (cf. DTLR, 2002). This is
somewhat misleading if it implies a direct relationship
between economic dynamism and the regional scale,
without first examining the processes in and through
which successful regions are constituted, and the role that
regions play in regulating the economy. Moreover, re-
search has demonstrated that regionalism is not a nec-
essary prerequisite for economic success and democraticrenewal (compare Bolton and Roland, 1997; Keating
et al., 2003; Rodr�ıguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Since RDAs
have been operational they have been virtually powerless
to affect the economic fortunes of their regions and since
1997 the economic disparities between the top and bot-
tom performing UK regions has increased by over 25%
(see Adams and Robinson, 2002). Additionally, because
RDAs generally follow an existing model of state-definedterritoriality––established during the 1930s to manage
economic restructuring––in most cases their territories
and sponsored institutional arrangements (such as Re-
gional Chambers) are limited for practising an active re-
gional citizenship (compare Jones and MacLeod, 2004;
ODPM, 2002; Tomaney and Mawson, 2002). In short,
does this form of devolution possess the necessary terri-
torial strategic capacity to make a real difference withinthe English regions? And will the directly elected regional
assemblies for the three northern English regions, whose
future depends on a regional referendum (see Prescott,
2003), deliver the goods?
We would go as far as to suggest that this form of
regional economic governance represents a re-scaling of
state power first and foremost through the mechanisms
of ideological power. This example is not too dissimilarfrom the experiences of implementing regional economic
development elsewhere in Europe (see Rodr�ıguez-Poseand Gill, 2003). In this light, this project represents a
political appropriation of (regional) knowledge to be
used to provide economic legitimacy and England’s �newregionalism’ is a political strategy, formed through
complex ideological power networks, aimed at re-scal-
ing, instead of resolving, a longstanding economic anddemocratic deficit (Jones and MacLeod, 1999; Jones,
2001). This has evolved through the creation of a
vibrant regional �development industry’ involving
academics, politicians, the media, and management
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 417
consultants where localities-specific knowledge or �arte-facts’ is traded and translated through time to construct
a best practice model for doing economic development
(Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). In the English case,economic regionalisation is certainly a �category of
meaning’ with questionable substance. And for some,
the �new regionalism’ can even be interpreted as the
nation state obfuscating its economic management role
through a smoke screen of scalar ideological tricks using
the mirror of globalisation as justification (Lovering,
1999). Should this experiment fail, the nation state can
blame those represented at the regional scale for eco-nomic failure by scripting the shortcomings of regional
development as a failure of the devolved structures of
governance––hence our (long-run) sceptical remarks on
moves towards elected regional assemblies.
3.2. Social norms and co-operation: the new paternalism
Since the middle of the 20th century, the welfare state
has dominated Britain’s political landscape. Following
the social and economic problems created by industri-
alisation and urbanisation in the late-Victorian era, a
series of Royal Committees in the 1930s recommended
an end to the �five giants’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance,Squalor and Idleness. Extending some of the themes
discussed above, national social policy went hand in
hand with national economic development. The much
quoted Beveridge Report proposed a national plan for
social insurance based on ‘‘Giving in return for contri-
butions benefit up to subsistence level, as of right and
without means test, so that individuals may build freely
upon it’’ (Beveridge, 1942, p. 7, emphasis added). Aspart of its national social policy, from the mid-1940s
Britain exercised a one nation political strategy based
on, amongst other policies, a national guarantee of �fullemployment’. Legislation such as the 1944 Employment
White Paper certainly epitomised the role of the (wel-
fare) state in social reproduction: it provided the
mechanisms through which the unemployed could claim
benefit as a universal right and a national entitlement.Of course, the subsequent development of the welfare
state into the areas of health, housing, education and
employment was financed by national economic success
associated with the Fordist long-boom.
During the last 20 years, set firmly within the context
of economic globalisation, the UK along with other na-
tion states has sought to address the fiscal problems
associated with economic restructuring, declining growthrates, and spiralling public expenditure by restructuring
the welfare state and its underpinning philosophical
norms (compare Beck, 2000; Giddens, 2000; Jessop,
2002). According to the timely analysis offered by the
Commission on Social Justice––charged with thinking
the unthinkable with respect to the future of the British
welfare state during the 1990s:
As far as social security was concerned, the welfare
state was passive when people were economically
active––either earning a living themselves or relying
on the family breadwinner while they brought upchildren. It became active only when people were
passive, unable for one reason or another to partici-
pate in employment . . . This model of welfare is
clearly not adequate today. Too many people are
not in employment, andwork for toomany no longer
guarantees income security. Because the conditions
that gave birth to the post-war welfare state no long-
er exist, the post-war assumptions about the welfarestate must also change (Commission on Social Jus-
tice, 1994, pp. 221–222, emphasis original).
As the above quotation indicates, welfare state
restructuring entails the displacement of passive regula-tion with active forms of regulation. Recent policy ini-
tiatives in advanced capitalist societies have been
preoccupied with advocating responsibility and self-suf-
ficiency for the unemployed. The ideology of work is now
being used to re-configure the rights to welfare benefit for
those that refuse to contribute to the labour market. This
is effectively resulting in the restructuring of universal
rights and needs-based entitlements to welfare, whichwere characteristic of the post-war commitment to full
employment and social rights for all citizens. The lan-
guage of �workfare’––welfare +work––is now dominant
in the political vocabulary as means of securing a new
relationship between the state and its subjects and, in the
process, supposedly promoting a new form of competi-
tiveness and efficiency in the labour market (Lødemel
and Trickey, 2001; Peck, 2001). Workfare is basedaround reductions in eligibility, forms of compulsion,
and increased monitoring of welfare recipients. Firmly
linked to supply side intervention, it seeks to make the
unemployed �employable’ and job-ready through various
job search training and education mechanisms. Work-
fare is, therefore, ideologically centred on the principles
of reciprocity and the reassertion of the work ethic over
state-fostered (passive) income support. In contrast withtraditional (welfarist) social policy, a �new paternalism’ is
said to exist, whereby a social contract is reinforced with
strict behavioural requirements and motivational engi-
neering to increase participations in paid formal
employment (Mead, 1997).
The new paternalism is clearly evident in Britain,
drawing heavily on the welfare state restructuring
practices of North America. Since the 1960s, US stategovernments have been allowed to experiment with
mandatory work and training programmes to reduce
the welfare caseload. After the 1988 Federal Family
Support Act, state governments were required to pro-
vide mandatory work or training activities for welfare
recipients as the condition of receiving benefits. This was
intensified under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
418 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which block-
granted welfare payments to the state level without
universal entitlements and a safety net, and also estab-
lished strict time limits for the receipt of benefits (seePeck, 2001).
Drawing on this North American experience, the
arrival of the �new paternalism’ in the UK is more re-
cent. The universal nature of the welfare state remained
intact until the advent of the 1996 Jobseekers Allow-
ance, which required a formal contract between the
jobseeker and the state (Employment Service) as a
condition for the receipt of benefits. With the arrival ofthe New Labour administration in 1997, elements of
workfare––presented as �welfare-to-work’––have been
clearly evident in the various New Deal programmes
(see Peck, 1999). These require participation in a series
of �options’ in return for welfare benefits. Priority is
given to immediate placement in the labour market,
termed �work-first’, so as to embed the work ethic at the
earliest opportunity and, more importantly, to instil alifelong philosophy of employability.
There is considerable scope for considering the series
of attacks on the welfare state in North America and
Britain during the 1980s and 1990s as a form of ideo-
logical power achieved through norms situated within
place or society, and providing moral guidance for
individual and group action (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim,
2000). At one level, welfare-to-work is an ideologicalmovement aimed at restructuring the moral codes
through which individual and group action is under-
stood in relation to paid formal work as the route for
securing citizenship. The new paternalism can be
understood as ‘‘an effort to control the lifestyle of the
poor. For this reason, some might argue that it is a
throwback to a less enlightened past. But in important
respects it is novel’’ (Mead, 1997, p. 6, emphasis added).The new paternalism represents an ideological power
venture based around telling the poor how to behave. In
the US, the workfare discourse is achieving a similar
status to doctrines of religion. All political parties are
using it and, to paraphrase Stuart Hall (1988, p. 47), it is
entering into struggle and winning space ‘‘in civil society
itself’’. Moreover, to be considered a citizen requires
social inclusion in the labour market (Lister, 1998). Thissaid, there is no little evidence that workfare secures
permanent employment. Despite an increasingly decen-
tralised system of policy formulation and delivery,
supply-side reforms to work-welfare regimes are––at
best––only ever short-term and spatially selective strat-
egies (see Jones, 1997) for reducing unemployment and
benefit dependency in some places (Lødemel and Tric-
key, 2001; National Audit Office, 2002; Peck, 2001;Turok and Edge, 1999). Ideological thickness, a term
that can be used to capture the increasingly hegemonic
nature of this initiative, appears to be associated with
policy thinness.
The example of welfare reform is also indicative of the
role played by globalisation in creating the space for
transnational ideological networks that, at first, appear to
be sociospatially transcendent but are, in fact, immanentand rooted in already existing territorial power struc-
tures. Workfare began in the buoyant labour markets of
North America, especially those located in southern
states (such as California and Oklahoma), and then
spread across the US based on the appropriation of an
isolated number of so-called success stories (Peck, 2001).
This was, in turn, claimed to be a national success and its
ideological basis was transplanted to UK through ideo-logical �circuits of power’ (Clegg, 1989) involving state-
sponsored think-tanks and political advisors, who played
a crucial role in mediating policy-transfer (Peck and
Theodore, 2001). This process is heavily laden with
ideological power and represents moral codes that spe-
cific nations and their localities should follow under
globalisation, with calls for radical welfare state restruc-
turing and the promotion of structural competitiveness(see especially OECD, 1999). This is further evidence of
the ability of the nation state to retain, and even intensify,
the networks of ideological control––often in (ideologi-
cal) collaboration with other nation states.
3.3. Aesthetic and ritual practices: re-branding a British
civic nationalism
A further illustration of the nation state as a site in
the production of ideological power within the context
of globalisation appears in the context of the territorial
and group ideologies that it promotes. We think here,
especially, of the critical importance of nationalism asan ideology, and more specifically, as a common set of
aesthetic and ritual practices (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Bil-
lig, 1995), that are promoted by all states. Practices such
as military conscription (Mann, 1995), compulsory
education (Gellner, 1983), the erection of flags (Billig,
1995) and monuments (Johnson, 1995) in prominent
places, can all be viewed as part of the state’s effort to
�educate’ its citizens, through aesthetics and rituals,regarding their role as members of the wider political
and cultural community of the nation (see also Breuilly,
1993; Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1995). As a result of these
processes and institutions, states ‘‘now [loom] over the
lives of their subjects, taxing and conscripting them,
attempting to mobilise their enthusiasm for its goals’’
(Mann, 1995, pp. 47–48). The price paid for this support
has been the incorporation of the �people’ into thepolitical citizenship of the state, girded by the commu-
nity of the �nation’. In this way, such civic nationalisms
clearly illustrate the �softer’ mechanisms through which
the ideological power of the modern state is organised.
The development of the UK nation state during the
period post-1945 illustrates the ways in which ideologi-
cal power has been deployed to structure group identi-
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 419
ties in the form of British civic nationalism. This was
achieved in and through the development of �national’institutions and organisations (Hutton, 1995, p. 43; also
Osmond, 1985). According to Davies (1999, p. 876),these comprised, amongst other things, ‘‘Seapower,
Empire, the Protestant Ascendancy, . . . the Mother of
Parliaments’’, the monarchy, the sporting tradition, . . .the British economy and British law’. It was institutions
such as these that helped to justify and sustain a wide-
spread sense of British civic nationalism throughout
much of the modern period. Many political commen-
tators, such as Hutton (1995, p. 2), now argue, however,that the ‘‘sense of belonging to a successful [British]
national project has all but disappeared’’ (see also
Davies, 1999; Marr, 1999; Nairn, 2000; Redwood,
1998). Significantly, the forces of globalisation have
been viewed as key reasons for the erosion of senses of
Britishness. Leading authors, for instance, note the sig-
nificant role played by multiculturalism, European legal
and monetary mechanisms and world cultures in callinginto question notions of Britishness (see Amin, 2002b;
Davies, 1999; Marr, 2000). Global forces mean that
‘‘many aspects of life in the United Kingdom [are] being
transformed out of all recognition’’ (Davies, 1999,
p. 878), thus leading to considerable national anomie for
the inhabitants of the UK.
We contend, in this respect, that it is perhaps pre-
mature to ascribe the �death of Britain’ (Marr, 2000)––atleast in its role of reproducing the ideologies of civic
nationalism––to the processes of globalisation. The UK
state still plays a crucial role in structuring the ideo-
logical symbols and rituals promoted within its territory,
albeit in fundamentally modified ways. Perhaps most
instructive here is the notion of �Cool Britannia’, used as
a way of responding to ‘‘multiplying crises of [national]
confidence’’ (Davies, 1999, p. 868). Promoted by theLabour Party in the first year of its mandate, and re-
flected in the new-found friendship between Tony Blair
and popular music through Oasis’ Gallagher Brothers,
this notion advocates the existence of a progressive,
forward-looking and youthful United Kingdom (Harris,
2003). 4 In effect, the whole purpose was, as many
political commentators in the late 1990s noted, to �re-brand Britain’. In the era of New Labour, Britain toowas to have a �new look’ where �designer cool [would
out] cricket and warm beer’ (The Observer, 1997). There
was a need, it was argued by Gordon Brown, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, for ‘‘Britain to reinvent
itself and rediscover a new self-confidence’’ (quoted in
The Guardian, 1997).
4 It is also important to recognise the role of the media within
advanced capitalism––depicted by the relationship between New
Labour and the tabloid press at this time––communicating ideological
power within political and civil society (see Thompson, 2000).
By abandoning more staid and traditional visions of
Britishness, Cool Britannia represented a shift in the
form of the ritual symbols of British nationalism.
Importantly, this was carried out largely as a reaction tothe potentially pernicious impacts of the processes of
globalisation. Tony Blair’s famous speech on the nature
of Britishness helps to illustrate this point.
We are living through a period of unprecedented
change . . . In this new world, it has become
increasingly fashionable to predict the end of the
nation-state . . . [A] world where supra-nationalorganisations like the EU and the WTO play an
increasingly important role is a world where ques-
tions are inevitably going to arise about the contin-
uing significance of national identity. What is the
answer to such a challenge? Not to retreat into
the past or cling to the status quo . . . but to redis-
cover from first principles what it is that makes us
British and to develop that identity in a way in tunewith the modern world (Blair, 2000, pp. 1–2).
Similarly, Gordon Brown argued that (quoted in The
Guardian, 1997):
For all the changes wrought by globalisation, na-tional identity is still a vital force . . . only by under-
standing our Britishness and the very things that
bind our country together will we be able to meet
the challenges of the future.
Here, the whole effort to re-brand Britain during the
early years of the New Labour government is clearlylinked to the need for Britain to react to the challenges
of globalisation and the emergence of what Habermas
calls an emerging �post-national constellation’, within
which our national and cultural identities are being
radically remade (Habermas, 2001). A British national
identity was still deemed vital for the UK during this
period, but significantly, what becomes clear from the
above quotations and associated political commentary(especially Marr, 2000) and academic analysis (see
Coddington and Perryman, 1998) is that this was to be a
revitalised national identity, drawing on a new set of
traditions and different aesthetic symbols and rituals. At
the risk of caricaturing this shift in emphasis, it was a
case of out with the welfare state, Parliament and Brit-
ain’s military might (before 2003), and in with the rock
group Oasis and the fashion designer, Alexander Mac-Queen.
Key to this attempt to promote new symbols of
Britishness in recent years has, of course, been the ill-
fated Millennium Dome and its linked projects. Viewed
as a means of capturing the �best of Britain’ and �all thatwas good about ‘‘Cool Britannia’’’ (The Guard-
ian, 2000)––by concretising the representation of a
420 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
forward-looking British identity within a single space––
the Dome has played a key role in the efforts of the
contemporary UK state to re-brand itself within the
context of globalisation and the changing nature of na-tional identities. Following on from other successful
national exhibitions such as the Great Exhibition of 1851
and the Festival of Britain of 1951––both crucial events
in cementing an imperialist British national identity
(Porter, 1994)––individuals such as Michael Heseltine, a
Commissioner charged with the responsibility of assess-
ing the need for a Millennium Festival under the previ-
ous Conservative government, argued that:
It is right in the conduct of the nation’s affairs every
so often for nations to make a great statement of
confidence, of great commitment to their own pride
in the past and their optimism for the future. There
could be no more obvious moment to do that than
on the anniversary of the Millennium itself (Dep-
CMS, 2000a, p. 2).
The idea of a celebration of British national identity,
with the Dome as its centrepiece, was seized upon by the
Labour government as a means of furthering its efforts
to re-brand Britain. One commentator, for instance,
argued that Tony Blair himself viewed the Dome as a
way of demonstrating a new ‘‘national pride [in a] young
country, big, bold, regenerative, entertaining, informa-tive and �on message’’’ (The Observer, 2000, p. 45). In-
deed, the official brochure of the Millennium Experience
held within the Dome, helps to reinforce this message.
The introduction, ascribed to Her Majesty the Queen,
states that:
The great national exhibition housed in the Dome
on the Meridian Line at Greenwich is a demon-stration of our confidence and commitment to the
future. Within the largest enclosed space on earth
are many examples of this country’s inventiveness
and imagination [and] provides a focus for the
nation’s celebrations at an important moment in
our history (DepCMS, 2000b, p. 5).
With its various displays, which seek to characterisethe hybrid, multicultural, and innovative nature of the
British state and people, along with its overall sense of
grandeur and aesthetic eclecticism, the Dome demon-
strates the strenuous efforts being made to sell a new and
vibrant UK state to the world. The comments made by
the Labour Minister with responsibility for the Dome
help to illustrate this issue:
Three years on from the Dome’s conception, it is
clear that the impact of the Dome is being felt far
beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It is already
a national asset for UK Plc and a major source of
wealth creation. The Dome presents an opportunity
for the UK to demonstrate that it continues to lead
the world in both traditional and cutting edge
fields––it showcases the work of our manufacturingindustries alongside the creative industries. It pro-
vides the opportunity for the tourism industry to
highlight both our rich cultural heritage and more
contemporary attractions (Falconer Lord, 2000,
pp. 4–5).
Despite the predictions of hyper-globalisers, there-
fore, the ability to define meanings and orthodoxies,symbols and rituals still lies very much within the pur-
view of individual states, such as the UK. Crucially,
however, these rituals and symbols have been funda-
mentally modified, at least in part as a result of the
processes of globalisation. The examples discussed
above demonstrate some of the ways in which the UK
state is attempting to redefine and adapt––through or-
ganisational projects such as the Dome––the more tra-ditional institutions, symbols and rituals of British
nationalism into forms of identity and ideological power
far more attuned to the needs of economic globalisation.
Rather than emphasising a civic nationalism based on
the importance of discovery, tradition and history, the
notion of �Cool Britannia’ symbolises an enthusiastic,
educated, successful and trendy UK, a state that should,
perhaps, be viewed as a location worthy of inwardinvestment within the global neoliberal market place. In
this regard, the fact that the idea of �Cool Britannia’ wasplaced on the political back burner during the early 21st
century––especially after the failure of the Millennium
Exhibition was perceived as a ‘‘politicised exemplar of
the country’s failings’’ (The Observer, 1996) and the
Millennium Dome became home to financial problems
and much critical publicity (House of Commons,2000)––are not the only issues to focus on. Though they
may not have succeeded in creating a long-lasting set of
new and revitalised rituals and aesthetic symbols of
Britishness fit for the new millennium––perhaps given
their dependence on informal, rather than prescriptive
means of ideological organisation––they still represent
significant, if perhaps still-born, efforts to rearticulate
the ideological basis of British nationalism. As such,they illustrate the changing role of the UK State in
helping to shape the form of civic nationalism within its
borders; often with unintended consequences.
4. Concluding comments
Space is not a scientific object removed from ideol-ogy or politics; it has always been political and stra-
tegic . . . Space is political and ideological. It is a
product literally filled with ideologies (Lefebvre,
1977, p. 341).
M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424 421
Over the last decade or so the term globalisation has
generated considerable debate within the social and
political sciences. According to Kelly (1999, p. 379) the
discourses of globalisation have become the ‘‘newmantra for our times’’. This sentiment is echoed by
Walters, who suggests ‘‘just as postmodernism was the
concept of the 1980s, globalization may be . . . a key idea
by which we understand the transition of human society
into the third millennium’’ (1995, p. 1). After a period of
considerable and sustained hegemony, many commen-
tators have argued that contemporary processes of
globalisation are acting as a challenge to nation statesovereignty. Our paper has argued for the need to focus
on the ways in which the nation state continues to act,
albeit in a modified manner, within the era of globali-
sation. It has outlined some under developed themes in
studies of the nation state under globalisation and in
doing so has highlighted the important contributions
that geographers can make to globalisation studies––so
we do not miss that boat, which Dicken (2004) hasimportantly drawn our attention to.
We have argued that much may be gained by exam-
ining on the multifaceted nature of state power, as
outlined by Mann (1986, 1993a). Specifically, we have
focused on a neglected dimension of state power––
namely, its ideological form––as a means of exploring
how the nation state is being differentially re-engineered
under globalisation. We suggested that the notion ofideological power might be seen as a useful tool for
demonstrating the continued––though modified role––
of the UK nation state within contemporary political
economy. Using Mann’s classification of forms of
ideological organisation, we deployed three short vign-
ettes in order to demonstrate the evolving nature of
ideological power within the contemporary UK state.
This task has been undertaken by drawing on Mann’sdistinction between transcendent and immanent ideo-
logical organisation. In the contexts of defining scales of
meaning and norms of action, as well as in the pro-
duction of nationalisms through reference to ritual
symbols and practices, we sought to demonstrate the
crucial significance of ideological power to the contem-
porary UK state.
In doing this, however, we believe it is not enoughmerely to argue that ideological power is still being
exercised by the UK state. More crucial, in this regard,
are the manifold mechanisms in and which the ideo-
logical power is being altered and revised through forms
of mediation and communication. We have explored the
ways in which the capitalist state continues to act by
encouraging particular forms of social action and/or
identity. By using the three vignettes, it is interesting tonote the state’s ability to embed itself within the activi-
ties and networks of civil society. This is clearly evident
in the example of welfare-to-work, with it ability to
prescript a �new paternalism’ through partnership-based
local state action, and role of the �new regionalism’ in
transmitting ideologies of supply-side competitiveness
through associational governance. By contrast, Cool
Britannia, which attempted to provide a non-prescrip-tive and almost atmospheric focus for social identity,
struggled to secure legitimation for its informal ideo-
logical actions and we can perhaps attribute some of
demise to this weakness. Hobson’s (1998, p. 292) com-
ments on state power being ‘‘maximized or enhanced
when the state co-operates with, and embeds itself
within, society’’ are important here, as are Mann’s
(1986) thoughts on the �organic state’ and Evans’ (1995)writing on �embedded autonomy’ of the state––in the
latter two cases, the maintenance of consent through
civil society is important for sustaining forms of state
power.
In offering some brief insights into how the ideolog-
ical power of the UK state is being �transformed’ in the
contemporary period, there is considerable scope to
extend empirical research on such themes and toundertake comparative national-level studies. Firstly, in
relation to empirical concerns, an area that we have not
touched on, but is seriously in need of in-depth research
under globalisation, is the role of nation state restruc-
turing through the digital realm (see Kobrin, 1998;
Lessig, 1999). Secondly, with their various path depen-
dencies––in terms of the ideological bases of their poli-
cies, institutions and group ideologies––other nationalcontexts offer the possibility for potentially fruitful
comparative studies of the changing ideological power
of the state under globalisation. It is only by developing
our understanding of the impacts of globalisation on the
different aspects of state power––and only by analysing
this in a variety of states––that we will be able to
establish the interrelations between different forms of
contemporary state power. In other words, a compre-hensive understanding of the relationship between state
power and the dynamics of globalisation will only be
achieved when we grasp the interrelated and possibly
mutually dependent nature of the constituent aspects of
state power, along with the differential impacts of
globalisation on them in various states. In undertaking
this research, we agree that an important future task is
‘‘to establish degrees of relative causality: to what extentis the nation state being transformed, to what extent is it
declining––or even perhaps still growing’’ (Mann, 1997,
p. 474)?
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Andy Leyshon and the
anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version
of this paper. Martin Jones would also like to thank the
University of Wales Aberystwyth for funding two
small grants (between 1998 and 2004)––�The New
422 M. Jones, R. Jones / Geoforum 35 (2004) 409–424
Regionalism: Building the Regional Development
Agencies’ and �English Regional Questions: Devolution,
Territory, Civil Society, Identity’––which has informed
arguments developed here.
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