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University of Arkansas, FayettevilleScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
12-2015
On the Evolutionary Origins of Religious BeliefRobert Duane HowardUniversity of Arkansas, Fayetteville
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OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBelief
Athesissubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof
MasterofArtsinPhilosophyby
RobertHowardUniversityofArkansas
BachelorofArtsinPoliticalScience,2013
December2015UniversityofArkansas
ThisthesisisapprovedforrecommendationtotheGraduateCouncil._____________________________________________ProfessorEricFunkhouserThesisDirector_____________________________________________ _______________________________________________ProfessorEdMinar ProfessorThomasSenorCommitteeMember CommitteeMember
Abstract Religiousbeliefisabyproductofevolutionarilydesignedcognitivemechanisms.
Theubiquityofreligiousbeliefandexperienceacrosshumanculturesisexplainedbyour
commonhumanpsychology;ourdomain-specificcognitivemechanismsgiverise,
collectively,tothephenomenonofbyproductreligiousbelief/experience.Inthisthesis,I
willexaminewhatIcallreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms,andIwillarguethat
byproductrawgod-beliefsaredevelopedbyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs.Theserefined
god-beliefsareco-optedbyevolutionaryprocessesandareculturaladaptations.My
conceptionof“religiousbelief”intermsofrawandrefinedgod-beliefsallowsa
disambiguationoftheterm“religion,”anditcontributestotheongoingdebatebetween
byproducttheoristsandadaptationistsbyclarifyingthatrawgod-beliefsarebiological
byproductswhilerefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptations.
©2015byBobbyHowardAllRightsReserved
Acknowledgments
IextendmythankstotheUniversityofArkansasPhilosophyDepartment,without
whichmyMaster’sdegreeandthesiswouldhavebeenimpossible.Thisdepartmenthas
mademygraduateexperiencewonderful.
Further,I’dliketoextendspecialthankstoDr.EricFunkhouser,whoseexpertise
andexcellenceinadvisinghelpedthisthesistobecomethebestversionofitself.I’dliketo
thankDr.EdMinarandDr.TomSenorfortheirserviceonmythesiscommittee.
Dedication
OntheEvolutionaryOriginsofReligiousBeliefisdedicatedtomymomanddad,John
andBeckyHoward.
TableofContents1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..1
2. TheMechanisms…………………………………………………………………………………….6
A. FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind…………………………………………………………..12
B. PromiscuousTeleology…………………………………………………………………...……..17
C. Anthropomorphism………………………………………………………………………………..19
D. AgencyDetection……………………………………………………………………………………23
E. Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………………29
3. CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs…………………………………………………………30
A. VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory………………………………………………………35
B. Group-LevelSelection……………………………………………………………………………41
C. AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis………………………………………………………………48
C-1. CostorInvestment?................................................................................................................49
C-2. Health&WellBeing………………………………………………………………………………..53
C-3. GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior…………………………………………………….58
C-4. ReligionasCostly……………………………………………………………………………………62
4. Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………….66
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………...75
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1.Introduction
Religiousbeliefhasbeenasubiquitousaphenomenonasanyotherinhuman
history.Nearlyeveryhumanculturehashadatitscoreasetofbeliefsandassumptions
thatcouldbedeemedreligious.Humansocietiesbuildworldviewsandinterpretive
frameworks,andthroughouthistorywehaveappealednearlyuniversallyinour
storytellingtostuffthatisnotnatural.By“stuffthatisnotnatural,”Imeananythingthat
doesnotfitintoaphilosophicallynaturalisticphysicormetaphysic.Forinstance,trees
havespirits,thecosmoshasacreator,myancestorsaretryingtocommunicatewithme,
inanimatestuffisanthropomorphized,theEarthisrestingonagiant,deifiedturtle,andso
on.Nearlyeveryexpressionofhumanityhasfeaturedasapartofitsworldviewsomenon-
naturalisticreligiousstorythatdoessignificantexplanatorywork(Boyer,2001).
Wehaveknownofthepervasivenessofreligiousbeliefandpracticeinhuman
cultureforalongtime,andforalongtimereligiousbeliefwasimmuneto“explainingaway”
andacademicinquiry(Bloom,2007).However,relativelyrecentadvancesinthefieldsof
empiricalpsychology,cognitivescience,andevolutionarypsychologyhavegivenriseto
excitingresearchprogramswhosegoalitistoexplainwhyreligiousbeliefissouniversal.
Itisimportanttoclarify:whenIsay“religiousbelief,”IdonotreferexclusivelytoWestern
conceptionsofthedivineortotheexpansivesystematictheologiesofthevarious
establishedandorganizedreligions.Thosethingsarecertainlyincludedunderthe
umbrellaofthisinquiry,butIalsoincludebeliefsaboutancestralspirits,the
anthropomorphizingoftheelementsintheenvironmentaroundus,afterlifebeliefs,beliefs
associatedwithreligiousrituals,conceptslikeKarma,etc.Forourpurposes,let’scallany
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suchreligiousbeliefagod-belief.Itistheoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs,ingeneral,thatIwill
investigateinthisinquiry.
Theseresearchprogramstaketwomainapproachesintheirendeavorstoexplain
theoriginsofsuchgod-beliefs.Thefirstapproachtoexplainingthenaturaloriginsofthese
beliefsisthe“Adaptationist”approach,whichpostulatesthatgod-beliefsareadvantageous
biological(orcultural)adaptationsthatconfersomedegreeofreproductivefitnessto
believingindividuals(orsocieties).Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplained
bythesurvivalbenefitthesebeliefsconfertotheirrespectivesubjects.Thatis,the
evolutionary“winners”ofhistorywereofthereligioussort.Thesecondapproachto
explainingthenaturaloriginsofgod-beliefsisthe“Byproduct”approach,whichdraws
heavilyfromcognitivescienceandfromthecognitivescienceofreligion(CSR).The
Byproductviewisaptlytermeda“byproduct”viewofreligiousbelief,becauseitpositsthat
god-beliefsarethenatural,structuralbyproductsofbrainsliketheoneswehappentohave.
Underthisview,theubiquityofgod-beliefsisexplainedbythefunctioningofourcognitive
structuresindomainsforwhichtheywerenotevolutionarilyselected;structural
byproductsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Literally,byproductgod-beliefsarebyproduct
beliefs,ratherthanbyproductbiologicalstructures.Wewillexplorethedetailsofthese
accountslateron.
Mostcontemporaryresearchpitstheseapproachesagainstoneanotheras
alternativehypotheses,butIthinkthereisroomforeachcamptocomplementtheother.
Indeed,Iwillarguethatthetruthoftheevolutionaryoriginsofourgod-beliefsliesina
fusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistapproaches.Thedebatebetweenbyproduct
theoristsandadaptationistsconcerningtheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcanberesolvedbya
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disambiguationoftheterm“religion.”“Religion”isacomplicatedamalgamofrawgod-
beliefsandrefinedgod-beliefs(muchmoreonthislater).ItisclearthatbothByproduct
theoristsandAdaptationistsmakecrucialcontributionsinunderstandingtheevolutionary
originsofgod-beliefs,morebroadlyconstrued,somyaccounttakesa“both-and”approach.
Iwillfavortheworkofcognitivescientistsofreligion,whichaccountsforboththe
genesisofthesegod-beliefsandsomeoftheircontentinawaythattheAdaptationist
accountscannot(ordonot,presently).Iwilladvocatefora“byproduct”orbiological
spandrel1viewoftheoriginsofsuchbeliefs,butIwillalsocontendthatthesebeliefs,at
somepointinevolutionaryhistory,cametolendsurvivalfitnesstotheirbelievers.So,the
workbeingdonebyevolutionarypsychologistsinthisarea,farfrombeingwrongor
misguided,isextremelyvaluable;ithelpsustoexplainthingsliketheevolutionand
transmissionofgod-beliefsacrossculturesandacrosstime,theadaptivevalueofsuch
beliefs,andhowcertainspandrelorbyproductbeliefsmighthavebeenco-optedbynatural
selectionandmadesalientfactorsinculturalandbiologicalevolution.Withaviewlike
mine,god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemachinery,buttheyaredynamicand
adaptivelyusefulbyproducts.
Myprimarycontentionisthefollowing:thecognitivestructuresstudiedinthefield
ofCSRprovideuswithbyproductrawgod-beliefs,anditisbythehoningforcesofcultural
evolution,culturallearningandtransmission,andhumanexperience(and,perhaps,
1Theterm“spandrel”isanarchitecturaltermco-optedbyGouldandLewontin(1979)intheirlikeningofcertainbiologicaltraitstostructuralbyproducts.Aspandrelisastructuralbyproductofanarchitecturalarch—thespandrelofanarchservesnorealarchitecturalpurpose.Wecanconceiveofbiological“spandrels,”then,asbeingtheselected(butnotselected-for)byproductsofselected-forbiologicalstructures.Strictlyspeaking,god-beliefsarenotbyproductbiologicalstructures.Theyarebyproductbeliefs.Shortly,wewillspecifytheconditionsforabelief’sbeingabyproduct.
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revelation)thatourevolutionarilyancientrawgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoourmore
evolutionarilyrecent(and“cultural”)refinedgod-beliefs.2Theserawgod-beliefsaremost
properlyunderstoodasthecognitivefoundationsofthevariousrefinedgod-beliefs;raw
god-beliefsarethebyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsare
theresultofculturalevolutionaryprocesses(atboththeorganismic-groupandcultural
levels).Mybyproductclaimisstrong:ourcognitiveprocessesprovideuswith“religious”
notionsoftheworld,asabyproductofthenaturalfunctioningofourbrains.Byvirtueof
thesortsofcognitivemechanismswepossess,wenaturallyconceiveoftheworld
“religiously,”anditactuallytakesintellectualwork,socialization,oreducationtoconceive
oftheworldcontrarytothesebyproductreligiousbiasesandtendencies.Itisourcommon
humanpsychologythatexplainstheubiquityofreligiousbeliefsacrossthehuman
experience.Theobserveddifferencesinrefinedreligiousbeliefsacrosscultures,then,
ultimatelyamounttoaccidentsofenvironment,culturalhistory,religiousstorytelling,and
evolutionaryhistory.
Ausefulwayofunderstandingtheraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionisintermsof
DanielKahneman’s(2011)System1/System2conceptualizationofhumanpsychology.In
fact,thedistinctionImakebetweenthetwotypesofgod-beliefsisverymuchinthespiritof
Kahneman’swork.AccordingtoKahneman,thehumanmindoperatesontwodifferent
levels.System1isthoughttobecomposedofthosecognitiveprocessesandmental
activitiesthatareunconscious,automatic,fast,serial,efficient,associationist,
evolutionarilyancient,etc.System2,however,isthoughttobecomposedofthose2Therewillbemuchmoreonthislater,butrawgod-beliefsincludethingslikethefolkpsychologicalbeliefsandintuitiveteleologicalnotionsdeliveredtousbyourcognitivemechanisms,whilerefinedgod-beliefsincludemoredeveloped,theologicallyinvolvedbeliefsystems(liketheism,orBuddhism).
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cognitiveprocessesandmentalactivitiesthatareconscious,deliberate,slow,rule-
following,resource-demanding,rational,relativelyevolutionarilynew,etc.Eachofthese
systemsdescribesaverydifferentkindofmind,andtheactivitiesofthetwotypesof
processesworkingintandemareconstitutiveoftherangeofourhumanpsychology.To
whateverextentarawgod-beliefisformedbyunconsciousSystem1processes,weshould
callit“automatic”or“unconsciouslydelivered.”Towhateverextentarefinedgod-beliefis
formedbyconsciousSystem2processes,weshouldcallit“deliberate.”Itismyhopethat
thisinvocationoftheSystem1/System2conceptualizationofthemindwillproveusefulas
weproceed.Indeed,conceivingofrawgod-beliefsasthenaturalbyproductsofSystem1
processes(i.e.,rawgod-beliefsas“automatic”)goesalongwaytowardexplainingthe
pervasivenessofgod-beliefsacrosshumanexperience.
Twofurtherpointsshouldbequicklymadebeforewecontinuethispaper.First,the
theorizinginthefieldsofCSRandevolutionarypsychologyhastendedtooutpacethe
experimentalcapabilitiesofbothempiricalpsychologistsandcognitivescientists.Iwilltry
toavoidconjectureandtosticktoinformationonwhichthefieldhasreachedsomethingof
aconsensus.AsImentionedearlier,CSRisanemergingfield,andmanyofitsideassimply
cannotbetestedyet.Moreover,itisdifficulttoknowwhichofthetheoriesinCSRandin
evolutionarypsychologyareeveninprincipletestable,andwhichoneswillonlyeverbe
conjecturalexplanatorystories.Inconsideringevolutionaryaccounts,Ioftenfindmyself
musing,“Ithinkthisparticularadaptationiststoryisneat,buttowhatextentisitentirely
madeup?”Iwillbracketthe“just-sostory”objectionssothattheconversationcantake
place,butadaptationiststoriesshouldbereceivedwithagrainofsalt.
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Thesecondpointthatneedstobemadeisthatindiscussingthesedomain-specific
RGCMs,themechanismsareoftenreferredtoaspromiscuousorasmalfunctioning.Itis
importanttonotethatthereisaheavycommitmentinthefieldsofevolutionary
psychologyandCSRtothefalsityofgod-beliefs,tothenotionthatsuchbeliefsaremistaken
fictions.However,asshouldbeclear,howgod-beliefsareformeddoesnotnecessarily
speaktothetruthorfalsityofsuchbeliefs.Theprocessbywhichreligiousbeliefsare
formed,however,doesspeaktotheirjustification.Thislineofresearchraiseschallenging
andinterestingproblemsfortheism,problemsthatthetheistneedstoaddress.3Forthe
reader’ssake,Iwantedtospotlightthebiasesatworkinthesefieldsandtheimplicationsof
thelanguagethatisfrequentlyused.
2.TheMechanisms
Thecognitivescienceofreligionappealstoanarrayofcognitivefacultiesthat,asa
whole,isresponsibleforourexperienceoftheworldaroundus.Thesecognitivefaculties
arehighlyspecializedsystemsthatperformdomain-specifictasks.Ifthebrainwerean
automanufacturingplant,thenourcognitivemechanismswouldbetheparticularsteps
alongthewaytobuildingacar.Somedobodywork,someworkinelectrical,somerunthe
transmission,etc.Themechanismsareexpertsatwhattheydo,andthepresenceofeach
oneisbestexplainedbytheadaptiveadvantagethatitsproperfunctioningconferredto3Thetheistmightbeginbyaskingsuchquestionsas:IsitpossiblethatsomeoftheRGCMs,intheirgenerationofgod-beliefs,arenotoperatingoutsideofthedomainforwhichtheywereoriginallydesigned?IsitpossiblethattheseRGCMsweredesignedbyGod,orthattheevolutionaryprocessesresponsiblefortheseRGCMsaredirectedbyGod?MightGodhavebeeninvolveddirectlyintheformationofourcognitivestructuresthroughoutourevolutionaryhistory(oratcertaincrucialmomentsinourevolutionaryhistory)?DoesanevolutionarystoryliketheoneIwillproceedtotellinthisthesisactuallyunderminethejustificationofthetheist’sbeliefs?
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ourancestors.So,theevolutionarypsychologist’sviewofthebrainisthatitisamassof
highlyspecializedtask-performersthatwasbuiltbytheselectivepressuresofevolutionary
history(Pinker,1997;Lyons,2001).
Assuch,CSRseekstoexplainthephenomenonofgod-beliefsinthehuman
experiencebyappealingtothesecognitivemechanisms.I,alongwithotherbyproduct
theoristslikePascalBoyer(2001)andScottAtran(2002),rejectanystoryaboutthe
originsofgod-beliefsthatappealstoasinglecognitivemechanism,religionmodule,or
religiongeneinordertoexplainthegenesisandpervasivenessofgod-beliefs;suchastory
wouldbefartoosimple,anditwouldbeinadequatetothetaskofexplainingthevastrange
ofvaryinggod-beliefsinthehumanexperience.4Mytheoryisthatthereisasuiteof
cognitivemechanismsthatisresponsibleforthegenerationofourbyproductrawgod-
beliefs.Anystorythatseekstoexplaintheoriginsofreligiousbeliefbyappealingtoasingle,
unifiedcognitivesystemisprobablydescribing,withverybroadbrushstrokes,thesuiteof
mechanismsIwillexamineinthefirstpartofthispaper.Let’scallthissuiteofmechanisms
ourReligion-GeneratingCognitiveMechanisms(RGCMs).
AccordingtotheByproductview,theseRGCMsperformdomain-specific,
evolutionarilyselected-forcognitivefunctions(Cosmides&Tooby,2001),andthe
4ThestatusofsomethinglikeAlvinPlantinga’s(2000)“divinesense”isworthconsidering,here.Thetheistmightjustcallmyreligion-generatingcognitivesuitea“divinesense”—however,thissuiteofcognitivemechanismsisresponsibleformorereligiousbeliefsthanjustWesterntheism.ItisproblematicforPlantingathatthe“divinesense,”ifitreallyisjustthereligion-generatingcognitivesuite,leadssometoformreligiousbeliefsthatarecontrarytotraditionaltheisticbeliefsaboutGod.Ofcourse,thetheistmightjustsaythatthe“divinesense”issomethingdifferentthanthesetofcognitivemechanismsIwillexamine.ButevenifPlantinga’s“divinesense”istakenbythetheisttobeasufficientexplanationforWesterntheologicalbeliefs,thereremainsawholehostofothernon-Western,non-theologicalgod-beliefsthatstandinneedofexplanation.And,presumably,thatiswhereaccountslikeminewouldcomein.
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byproductsoftheproperfunctioningoftheseRGCMsarerawgod-beliefs;again,such
byproductbeliefsareselected,butnotselectedfor.Wewilloperatewithaveryspecific
definitionoftheterm“byproduct”;forourpurposes,abyproductbeliefisanybeliefthat
emergesasabyproduct(orspandrel)ofproperlyfunctioningcognitivemechanisms
performingtheirfunctioninanimproperdomain5.Wewillsaythatacognitivemechanism
isproperlyfunctioningwhen,andonlywhen,themechanismisappliedinthedomain(s)
forwhichitwasdesignedbyevolutionaryprocesses(i.e.,isfunctioningintheparticular
waythat,inourevolutionarypast,yieldedsurvivalbenefittoourancestors).Again,a
byproductbeliefisjustabeliefthatariseswhenacognitivemechanismisappliedinan
unintendeddomain.Wewillconsiderparadigmexamplesofbyproductbeliefslater
(“intuitivetheism,”“hypersensitiveagency-detection,”etc.).AnRGCMisresponsiblefor
producingbyproductbeliefstowhateverextentitoperatesoutsideofthedomainforwhich
theRGCMwasoriginallydesignedbyevolutionarypressures.
If,however,theoriginofagivengod-beliefcanbeexplainedexclusivelybyreference
toevolutionarypressuresoccurringatthebiologicallevel,theproblemsfacedinour
evolutionarypast,andtheadaptiveadvantagesthebeliefconferstoitsbeliever,thenthe
god-beliefoughtnottobeconsideredabyproduct,butratheranadaptation.Rawgod-
beliefsarethebyproductbeliefsofcognitivemechanisms,anditisonlyafterthese
byproductbeliefsundergosignificantdevelopmentintorefinedgod-beliefsthattheycome
tolendadaptiveadvantagetotheirrespectivebelievers(seeSection3).Typically,
byproductsarenotthoughtofintermsofadaptivevalue—thatis,theyareregardedas
purelystructuralbyproducts,orastheadaptivelyneutralconsequencesofselected-for5By“improperdomain,”Imeanthosedomainsforwhichthecognitivemechanismswerenotselectedbyevolutionarypressures.
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biologicalstructures.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-beliefsdivergesfromstandard
Byproductaccountsofreligiousbeliefinmyclaimthatgod-beliefs,whileinitially
byproducts,aredevelopedbyevolutionaryprocesses(attheculturalandgrouplevels)into
systematicworldviews;itisafterthisdevelopmentthatgod-beliefsconfersignificant
adaptiveadvantagetotheirbelievers.Imaintainthatmyaccountisabyproductaccountof
theoriginsofreligiousbeliefs,becausegod-beliefsattheirbiologicaloriginsarebyproducts,
becausebyproductrawgod-beliefspersistintothepresent,andbecausewecandistinguish
byproductrawgod-beliefsfromtheirgroupadaptationcounterparts,refinedgod-beliefs.
Myviewiscontrarytotheviewsofhard-lineevolutionarypsychologistsand
biologists,whoseektoexplainthephenomenonofreligiousbeliefstrictlybyappealto
evolutionarypressuresatthebiologicallevel.Theirpuritanicaladaptationistapproach
wandersintomurkywaters.Itisunclearwhattheirclaim—thatreligiousbeliefsare
selectedfor—entails,asitisunclearhowabeliefcouldbeselectedforatabiologicallevel.
Thequestionmustbeasked:inevolutionbynaturalselection,what,exactly,arethebasic
unitsofselection?Genesthataffectthesurvivabilityandtheabilityofanorganismto
reproducearethefodderofevolutionaryprocesses.Genesareselected,whichmeansthat
neuralprocesses,psychologicalstructures,andperhapsevenbelief-formingtendencies
maybeselectedfor;however,theclaimthatthereligiousbeliefsthemselvesareselectedfor
(i.e.,religiousbeliefsasbiologicaladaptations)isdubious.Itseemstheonlywaytoget
suchaclaimoffofthegroundwouldbetopositthatthecontentsofourreligiousbeliefs
themselves(aswellasotherofourbeliefs)arepackagedneatlyintoourgenesor
psychology.Butweshouldstayawayfromsuchfull-boreinnatenessclaims.
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Anotherdifficultyfacedbyadaptationistsinexplainingtheoriginsofreligiousbelief
isthesheercomplexityofreligioussystems.Religiousbeliefandreligioussystemsarethe
confluenceofmultipleelements(supernaturalagentbeliefs,music,ritualpractice,
formalism,emotionallychargedsymbolsandexperiences,morality,societalstructureand
organization,etc.),andeachoftheseelementshasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistory
independentofthephenomenonofhumanreligion,morebroadlyconstrued(Sosis,2009).
Inlightofthevastlydifferentevolutionaryoriginsofitsconstituentparts,“religion”does
notseemtobethesortofthingthatcouldbeselectedfor,astheadaptationistcontendsitis.
Certainly,atsomepointinhistorythesedifferentelementsofreligionbegantogiveriseto
religiousbeliefsandsystems,butthisfactultimatelylendsitselftothebyproduct
perspectiveforwhichIargue.If“religion”justisalloftheseotherselected-forfaculties
operatingintandeminsomeevolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenweshould
saythatreligiousbeliefisabyproduct.
Duetothesedifficultiesthatfacetheadaptationistapproach,Iproposemy
byproductstorytoaccountfortheoriginsofgod-beliefs—theyarethenaturaloutputsof
thefunctioningofourcognitivemechanismsinevolutionarilyunintendeddomains.These
variouscognitivemechanismsarethemselvestheproductsofevolutionbynatural
selection—theywereselectedforbyvirtueofthefactthattheirfunctioningintheproper
domainconferredgreatadaptiveadvantagetoourancestors.(Successfulfolkpsychology
andtheoryofmind,agencyattribution,teleologicalnotions,etc.,areclearlytoourbenefit,
andcanbeeasilyconceivedofasadaptations.Moreonthisshortly.)Ourrawgod-beliefs
arethenaturalbyproductsofthesecognitivesystems.InSectionThreeofthispaper,I
discussingreaterdetailhowmybyproductaccountdivergesfrommoretraditional
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byproductstories6—religionasweknowittodaycanhardlybeconsideredtobethemere
byproductofourcognitivemechanisms.
Iconcedetotheadaptationistssomeofthegroundtheyoriginallyclaimed:itis
clearthatreligiousbelief(initsrefinedforms)confersadaptiveadvantagetothe
individualsandsocietiesthatadheretosaidreligiousbelief.Butbecausenotalladaptively
advantageoustraitsarenecessarilyadaptations(Sosis,2009),thefactalonethatrefined
god-beliefsconferadaptiveadvantagetoindividualsandsocietiesisinsufficienttowarrant
theirclassificationasadaptations.Atsomepointinourevolutionaryhistory,our
byproductgod-beliefsweredevelopedintoreligiousstoriesandexplanations,andthese
culturalideas/beliefsbecameunitsofselection(attheculturalandgrouplevels)byvirtue
oftheirinfluenceonthewaywe(asindividualsandsocieties)liveourlives.Throughthe
processesofmulti-levelselection,religiousbeliefbecameawinningevolutionarystrategy
andselectablegrouptrait.Iappealtothemechanicsofmemetransmission,multilevel
selectiontheory,andculturalevolutiontoexplainthetransitionfromrawgod-beliefsto
refinedgod-beliefs.Myaccountoftheoriginsofgod-belief,then,isafusionofthe
AdaptationistandByproductapproaches.
6Byproducttheorists(Gould&Lewontin,1979)typicallyholdthatbyproductsaretheinevitablestructuralbyproductsofothertraits,andthattheytendtobeadaptivelyneutral.Iagreethatbyproductgod-beliefsaretheinevitablybyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,butIaddtotheirstorythatourbyproductgod-beliefsare,atsomepoint,developedintorefinedgod-beliefs.Further,byproductsaretypicallyviewedasstaticstructuralinevitabilities,butIconceiveofrawgod-beliefsasbeingdynamicbyproductsthatareaccessibletotherestofourpsychology(becausetheyarebeliefs).Inthisway,byproductbeliefsaffect—andareaffectedby—ourdeliberatebelief-formationprocessesandtheoutputsoftheseprocesses.Unlikethespandrelsofevolutionarybiology,byproductgod-beliefsarenot“structures.”Thespandrelsofevolutionarypsychologyareprocessesandbeliefs.
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IndividualRGCMsonlytellapartofthestory.TheentiresuiteofRGCMsprovidesus
withacumulativefoundationfortheformationofgod-beliefs.Itisthesuiteofthese
mechanismsworkingintandemwithourbelief-formationprocessesthatexplainsour
consciousassenttogod-beliefs.So,IwillnotconsiderindividualRGCMsandtheir
respectivecognitivebiasesinisolation;rather,Iwillapproachtheissuewithanenlarged
scopethatconsidersthebroadercognitivesuitetobetheoriginforagivengod-belief.Now,
letusmoveontotheRGCMsthemselves,innoparticularorderofimportance.Notethat
therewillbesignificantconceptualoverlapbetweenthesedifferentmechanisms.Bythat,I
meanthatitisdifficulttotellwhereonemechanism’sdomainstartsandtheotherstops,as
thesemechanisms’purviewsaresoconceptuallyrelated.
A.FolkPsychology&TheoryofMind
ThefirstRGCMwewillexamineisthecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhatsome
havetermedourintuitive“folkpsychology.”Thissystem’soutputsrendertousour
“theoryofmind”—ourbeliefsabouttheminds,beliefs,intentions,andgoalsofthebeings
aroundus.Both(1)theevolutionarilyintendeddomainofourintuitivefolkpsychology
and(2)thismechanism’spurportedtendencytoformfolkpsychologicalbeliefsregarding
thingsoutsideofitsintendeddomainarerelevanttoourunderstandingtherelationship
betweenthisRGCMandtheoriginofcertaingod-beliefs.
Ofcourse,a“theoryofmind”issupposedtoformbeliefsregardingactualminds.
However,ourfolkpsychologicalsystemsseemtooftenjumptheboundariesofthedomain
forwhichtheywereselected(people,animals,beingsinthenaturalworld,etc.)andapply
ourtheoryofmindtothingsnotinthatdomain(thingsthatdonotactuallypossessminds,
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beingsthatdonotactuallyexist,mereconcepts,etc.).Folkpsychologicalmechanismsare
responsibleforbyproductrawgod-beliefswhentheoryofmindisappliedtothingsthatare
notintheintendeddomainoffolkpsychology;forinstance,wesometimesattribute
personalitiestothingsliketrees,stars,mountains,andsoon.Ourfolkpsychological
mechanismwasselected-forbynaturalprocessesbecauseofthesurvivalbenefitsit
conferredtoourancestorsbyitsproperfunctioning;itisapparentthatitistoorganisms’
adaptiveadvantagetobeabletotrackthementalstatesandintentionsofthebeings
inhabitingtheworldaroundthem.
Theclaimthatsuchgod-beliefs(beliefsaboutthementalstatesoftrees,stars,non-
existentbeings,andsoon)arebyproductsofourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdepends
ontheassumptionthatourfolkpsychologicalmechanismsdonotconferadaptive
advantagetobelieversintheattributionofmentalstatestothingsweconsidertobenon-
membersofthemechanism’sintendeddomain.Ifthefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdo
(anddid,inourevolutionarypast)conferadaptiveadvantagetothebelieverintheir
attributionofmentalstatestothingsofthatsort,thengod-beliefsoughtnottobe
consideredbyproducts.Theclaimthattheautomaticattributionofmentalstatesto
inanimatethingsintheworldaroundusmightbeadaptivelyadvantageousissuspect.On
theotherhand,itisclearhowtheabilityto“mindread”thebeingsaround(beingsthat
actuallyhavebeliefs,goals,andintentions)wouldbetoourevolutionaryadvantage.
Theoryofmindisalsoactiveinourexplanationsoftheeventsweexperienceinthe
worldaroundus,anditplaysacentralroleintheinterpretationandpredictionofthe
behaviorofotherminds.PsychologistJesseBering(2006)saysthefollowingaboutour
folkpsychologicalsystemsandtheirroleinexplainingeventsandpredictingbehaviors:
14
Consider,forinstance,thatonedayallhumanbeingsbecamehard-coresolipsists…Imagine,say,thateveryonewasstruckdownwithautismorotherwiselostthecapacitytothinkaboutotherminds,whatwouldhappenthen?I’dventurethatchurchattendancewouldreachanall-timelownextSunday.HerethenisonekeyingredientforbeliefinGodorspirits:aninnatedispositiontoseeothersnotjustasambulantobjectsorbrain-deadsacksofmeat,butasthinking,feelingbeingsthat,justlikeoneself,arecausalagentswhodothingsintentionally…Inthecaseofpeopleordeities,weappealtoothermindstoexplainandpredictbehaviors,tounderstandwhyothersdowhattheydo.7
Beringpositstheoryofmindasakeyingredientforformingbeliefsaboutgodsorspirits
(god-beliefs),andhetiesitdirectlytotheformationoforganizedreligion.Itshouldnotbe
surprisingthataninabilitytoreasonaboutotherminds,ingeneral,wouldleadtoan
inabilitytoreasonaboutnon-naturalminds.Theclaimisthatweusethesamefolk
psychologicalmechanismsinreasoningaboutthemindsofGodandnon-physicalbeings,in
general,aswedoinourreasoningaboutthemindsofphysicalandnaturalpersons.In
reasoningaboutnon-actual,non-physicalminds,ourintuitivefolkpsychologieshave
activated—asabyproductofproperlyfunctioningtheoryofmind—thesetofinferences
andexpectationstypicallyreservedforactual,physicalmindsandhaveappliedthissetof
inferencesandexpectationstonon-actual,non-physicalminds.Theguardrailsofthe
intendeddomainhavebeenjumped.
Justasourintuitivefolkpsychologyhelpsustoexplaintheeventsthatweassociate
withactualbeingsbyappealingtotheirgoals,intentions,desires,etc.,amalfunctioningfolk
psychologymayhelpustoexplaineventsintheworldbyappealingtothegoals,intentions,
desires,etc.,ofeither(1)somethingthatdoesnotactuallyexistor(2)somethingthatdoes
exist,butthatisonlyimproperlythoughttopossessthegoals,beliefs,anddesires
associatedwithmindedness.Ultimately,suchamisapplicationofamechanism’sproper7Bering,2006,pg.147.
15
functiontosomeimproperdomaincouldhelpexplainthepervasivenessofgod-beliefs
pertainingtothegoals,intentions,anddesiresofthegods,spirits,God,ourancestors,etc.,
thatarecommonlybelievedin.Inthisway,folkpsychologicalsystemsactasanRGCM.
Bering(2006)citeshis“PrincessAlice”experiments,inwhichhetestedforthepoint
inhumandevelopmentatwhichachildcouldrecognizeintentioninexternaleventsaswell
asagency,ratherthanmerelyagency.ThesePrincessAliceexperimentsaresupposedto
showtheabilityinchildrentoruninferencesfromthepresenceofanunseenprincessand
theoccurrenceofotherwiseunexplainedeventstotheconclusionthattheseunexplained
eventsareperformedforareasonbytheunseenprincess.8Thechildrenaretoldthatthe
princessiscommunicatingwiththem,butitisnotuntilacertaincapacityisdeveloped—
second-orderreasoning(“EventXmeansPrincessAlicewantsmetodoYforsomereason
Z”)—thatthechildrencaninterprettheunexplainedeventsintermsofthespecificgoals
andintentionsthattheysubsequentlyattributetoPrincessAlice.So,itisnotuntilwereach
acertainpointofcognitivesophistication—accordingtoBering,aroundsevenyearsold—
thatweareabletoapplytheoryofmindtonon-physicalagentsinordertoevaluatethe
intentionofnon-physicalagentsinthevariousphenomenawehaveexperienced.Oncethis
pointofcognitivesophisticationisreached,itseemsgod-beliefsasexplanatoryhypotheses
foreventsareanaturaloutputofourcognitivemachinery—wenaturallyexplaineventsin8OnethingtonoteregardingBering’sPrincessAliceexperimentsisthatBeringexplicitlytoldthekidsinhisexperimentsthataspirit—PrincessAlice—wasgoingtobepresentintheroom,andthatshewouldhelpthemperformcertaintasks.So,itisnotasifthekidswereautomaticallypositingdisembodiedagentsastheexplanationsofvariousphenomena—thechildrenwereovertlyprimedtoreferencePrincessAliceinexplainingvariouseventsfromthestart.Intheroom,lightswouldturnonoroff,pictureframeswouldfallormove,etc.,cuedbytheexperimenters.ThechildrenweretaskedwithdiscerningwhatPrincessAlicemeantbytheseevents,inrelationtodifferentproblemsthechildrenweregiventosolve.ThechildrentookthevariouseventstobeassistanceandinputfromPrincessAlice.
16
termsofthegoals,desires,andintentionsof“gods.”God-beliefsasreasonedexplanations
forvariousphenomenaseemtobematurationallynatural,atleastincaseslikethePrincess
Aliceexperiments,inwhichtheexistenceofanunseenbeingisassumedfromthestart.
Clearly,arobustfolkpsychologyandtheoryofmind—bywhichwecanmake
judgmentsabouttheminds,intentions,andfeelingsofothers—isanecessaryconditionfor
theoriginofcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(god-beliefsregardingdisembodiedagentsand
theirintentionsforcertainevents).Thatwecanformbeliefsaboutthemindsofnon-
physicalentities(realorfictitious)isabyproductofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM,because
theobjectsoffolkpsychologicalgod-beliefsarenotmembersoftheevolutionarilyintended
domainofthefolkpsychologicalRGCM.ThefolkpsychologicalRGCMaccountsforaspecific
rangeofgod-beliefs—thatrangeofgod-beliefsthatincludesbeliefsaboutthementalstates
ofinanimateobjectsinourenvironment,explanatoryhypothesesregardingspecificevents
andtheintentionsoftheagent(s)believedtoberesponsibleforthoseevents,etc.
Thecognitivemechanismsrequiredforinteractingwithpersonsinthenatural
worldandattributingtothemtheresponsibilityfortheeventsweexperiencearethevery
samecognitivemechanismsresponsiblefortheformationofcertaingod-beliefs.Theseraw
god-beliefs,however,findtheirorigininthemisapplicationoffolkpsychological
mechanismstoanimproperdomain.Inshort,Ihavedescribedthisparticularcognitive
systemasitworksinitsproperdomain(i.e.,thedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthat
haveminds),andIhaveproposedthatourfolkpsychologysometimesdoesoperateoutside
ofitsproperdomain(i.e.,outsideofthedomainofthingsinthenaturalworldthatdohave
minds).Whethertheobjectsofhumangod-beliefsarefictitiousorinanimate,thesebeliefs
aretheproductsofthesystemsinourbrainsthattracktheintentionsofactualphysical
17
agentsandminds.Thus,humanfolkpsychologicalmechanismsareprimecandidatesfor
beingconsideredRGCMs;theirgod-beliefoutputsaretobeconsideredbyproductsto
whateverextenttheyaredeliveredtousbythemisapplicationoffolkpsychological
systemstoimproperdomains.
B.PromiscuousTeleology
ThenextRGCMwewillconsideristhecognitivesystemresponsibleforwhathas
beentermed“intuitivetheism.”DeborahKelemenhascoinedthephrase“promiscuous
teleology”(Kelemen,2004)inreferencetothismechanismandthebiaseswithwhichit
providesus.Kelemensaysthefollowingabouttheteleologicalintuitionssheandher
colleagueshaveobservedatworkinchildren:
…Whenaskedtoidentifyunanswerablequestions,American4-and5-year-oldsdifferfromadultsbyfindingthequestion“what’sthisfor?”appropriatenotonlytoartifactsandbodyparts,butalsotowholelivingthingslikelions(“togointhezoo”)andnonlivingnaturalkindslikeclouds(“forraining”).Additionally,whenaskedwhethertheyagreethat,forexample,rainingisreallyjustwhatacloud“does”ratherthanwhatitis“madefor,”preschoolersdemur,endorsingtheviewthatnaturalentitiesare“madeforsomething”andthatiswhytheyarehere.9
Initially,onthebasisofobservingagents’object-directedbehavior,childrenunderstandobjectsasmeanstoagents’goals,thenasembodimentsofagents’goals(thus“for”specificpurposesinateleologicalsense),and,subsequently—asaresultofagrowingunderstandingofartifactsandthecreativeabilitiesofagents—asintentionallycausedbyagents’goals.Abiastoexplain,plusahumanpredilectionforintentionalexplanation,maythenbewhatleadschildren,intheabsenceofknowledge,toageneralized,defaultviewofentitiesasintentionallycausedbysomeoneforapurpose.10
9Kelemen,2004,pg.295.10Kelemen,2004,pg.296.
18
ThesamefindingshavebeendocumentedinKelemen’sstudieswithBritishchildren,which
shetakestohavesufficientlycontrolledforthe“relativelypronouncedculturalreligiosity”
oftheUnitedStates.
Thesefindingsindicategoodevidencefortheclaimthatchildrenare“intuitive
theists”—thatchildreninterpretnaturalphenomenaashavingbeenintentionallydesigned
byaGod.Putanotherway,childrenintuitivelyholdtogod-beliefsregardingtheperceived
designandorderoftheworldaroundthem.Shelistssomecapacitiesthatshetakestobe
prerequisitetosuch“intuitivetheism”:thecapacitytomaintainamentalrepresentationof
agod,despiteitsintangibility;theabilitytoattributetothatspecialagentmentalstates
thatdistinguishitfrommorecommonplaceagents;andtheabilitytoattributedesign
intentionstoagentsandtounderstandanobject’spurposeasderivingfromsuch
intentions.AlloftheseabilitiesarefoundtobepresentinthesubjectsofKelemen’s
experiments.Sheinsiststhatthedetailsregardingchildren’s“emotionalormetaphysical
commitments”areirrelevant;rather,whatisimportantiswhetherchildren“makesenseof
theworldinamannersuperficiallyapproximatingadulttheism,”awayofinterpretingthe
worldthatmaybedevelopedorhonedbyagivenreligiousculturebutthatfindsitsorigins
primarilyin“cognitivepredispositionsandartifactknowledge.”
Thisstudyoftheintuitivetheismofchildrenisimportant,becauseitshedslight
ontothecognitivemachinery,biases,andexplanatoryinferencesatworkinthehuman
mindpriortomuchculturalorenvironmentalindoctrination.So,thephenomenonof
intuitivetheisminveryyoungchildrenlendssupporttotheideathateventhroughoutour
adultlives,itismostnaturalforushumanstoappealtoteleologicalreasoningand
explanationinmakingsenseoftheworldaroundus.Wenaturallyunderstandagentsto
19
havedesignintentions,andweseethingsinourenvironmentasderivativesofthose
intentions.Wehavetolearntodootherwise.
Thecognitivesystemsresponsibleforchildren’sinherentpredispositionsto
interprettheworldaroundthemintermsofpurpose,design,andagencyintentionislikely
activeinthedeliveranceofmanyofourrawgod-beliefs.“Intuitivetheism”isthesumof
suchastrongteleologicalbiasashasbeendocumentedbyKelemen;oftheperceptionofan
ordered,designed,and“artifact”world;oftheintuitionthatitisagentswhoare
responsibleforwhatweperceivetobedesignedandmeaningful;andoftheinnatehuman
drivetopursueexplanation.Towhateverextentthesystemresponsibleforrecognizing
artifacts,intention,anddesignoverlayssuchteleologicalnotionsontoanaturallyformed,
inanimate,andnon-designedworld,ourteleology-trackingRGCMisoperatingoutsideofits
intendeddomain;inasmuchasthenaturalworldfallsoutsideoftheproperdomainofthis
RGCM,teleologicalbeliefsaboutthe“purpose”and“design”ofthenaturalworldarerightly
consideredbyproductrawgod-beliefs.
C.Anthropomorphism
Thecognitiveprocessesassociatedwithanthropomorphismareournextareaof
examination.AnthropologistStewartGuthrie,whowasamongthefirsttoconceiveof
agencyandagencydetectionascentraltoacognitivetheoryofreligion(Westh,2013),
developedatheoryofanthropomorphismtoexplainreligion(Guthrie,1993).11According
toGuthrie(1993),religionjustisanthropomorphism(whereanthropomorphismisthe
ascriptionofhuman-likecharacteristicstonon-humanentitiesorobjects).Dueto11DavidHume(1779)alsodiscussedtheroleofanthropomorphisminhisDialoguesConcerningNaturalReligion.
20
evolutionarypressuresandtheprimacyofourabilitytorecognizeotherhumanagentsin
theenvironmentaroundus,anoveractivetendencytoanthropomorphizetheworld
aroundushasbeenworkedintoourhumanpsychologybynaturalselection(Guthrie,
2002).Itwouldhavebeenbetterforourancestors,Guthriewrote,towronglyperceivea
bear-likeboulderasarealthreat,ratherthantoperceiveaboulder-likebearasabigrock.
Theadaptivepayoffofhypersensitivitytothepresenceofpredators,oragentsin
general,shouldbeapparent:wereonetomistakearealthreatforanon-threat,thelossto
theindividualwouldbepotentiallycatastrophic,butwereonetomistakeanon-threatfora
threat,thelosstotheindividualwouldbemarginal.Theideaisthatovertime,evolution
wouldfavorthoseindividualswhoseabilitiestodetectpredatorsweresohonedastogive
themfalsepositivereports,overthoseindividualswhoseabilitieswerenotsimilarlyhoned.
Thosewithrelativelyclumsyabilitiestodetectpredatorswouldlosestakeinthegenepool,
relativetothosewhocouldsurvive,reproducemore,andtakealargershareofthe
population.Thus,itisthoughtthatourtendencytohyper-sensitivelyanthropomorphize
evolvedovertimetoyieldagooddealoffalsepositives.
Asthemisperceptionofbear-likequalitiesinaboulderisnot,strictlyspeaking,
anthropomorphism,somethingneedstobesaidhereabouttherelationshipinevolutionary
historybetweenanorganism’shypersensitivitytoanimismanditstendencyto
anthropomorphize.Later,Imentionthepossibilitythatanimacy-detectionisan
evolutionaryprecursortoagency-detection—ahypersensitivitytoanimacylikelywould
haveprecededthedevelopmentofeffectiveagency-detectiondevices.Here,Guthrieis
explainingwhyatendencyto“anthropomorphize”mighthavebeenworkedintoour
psychology,andheappealstothemisperceptionofanimacyinordertodoso.Ibelievehe
21
usestheterm“anthropomorphism”ratherlooselyasanumbrellaterm,suchthat
anthropomorphismincludesthedetectionofmereanimacy.WesthsummarizesGuthrie’s
position:
Soeveniftheperceptualstrategyofanthropomorphismgeneratesmassiveover-detection,ithashadadaptivevaluenevertheless,asthepriceoffalsepositivesismuchlowerthanthepriceofmissingimportantcues.Perfectparanoiaisperfectawareness.12
Anthropomorphismasatheoryfortheoriginsofreligiousbeliefcoversawidearray
ofagencyattribution(Westh,2009):theperceptionoffacesinclouds(Guthrie,1993),the
perceptionofhumanshapesinRorschachinkblots(Guthrie,1980),themistakingof
mailboxesforhumans(Guthrie,1980),talkingabouttablesashavinglegsandgenesas
beingselfish(Guthrie,2002),andsoon.Theprocessesandmechanismsof
anthropomorphismarealsothoughttoberesponsibleforourperceptionofnatural
disastersasdivinepunishment(Guthrie,1980)andourinclinationstowardperceiving
intelligentdesigninnature(Guthrie,1993).Inlightofcontemporaryresearchinthearea
(agencydetection,intuitivetheism,etc.),Ithinkitisperfectlyreasonabletobeskepticalof
theideathatanthropomorphismandthemechanismsassociatedwithitarealone
responsibleforsuchabroadarrayofdifferenttypesofgod-beliefs.Manygod-beliefsare
muchmorethan—ormerelyofadifferentkindthan—thesortsofbeliefsweformabout
facesinthecloudsorourmistakingofbouldersforbearsatadistance.Manyofourgod-
beliefsaremoreinferentiallyinvolvedandmoreconceptuallycomplicatedthanthemere
misperceptionofhumancharacteristicsinnon-humansornon-agents.Instead,Ibelieve
thatindescribingasingleprocessofanthropomorphizing,Guthriewasplowingtheground
12Westh,2009,pg2.
22
fortheresearchbeingdonetodayonthemultiplicityofdomain-specificcognitive
mechanismsthatareinfactresponsibleforeachofthesortsofgod-beliefsandphenomena
thathesoughttoexplain
Alongthislineofthought,Westh(2009)hascontendedthattheterm
anthropomorphismisanumbrellaterm,butthatitdoesnotadequatelyexplaincertainvery
specificphenomena:
Thereisnoconvincingargumentthat,forexample,seeingfacesinthecloudsorhumanshapesinRorschachinkblotssomehowinvolvestheattributionofagencyormind.Therefore,itwouldseemthatBoyerandGuthrieareinfacttalkingaboutdifferentthings.TheagencydetectionofBoyerandBarrettisaveryspecificpsychologicalmechanism.Bycontrast,theanthropomorphismofGuthrieisanumbrellatermthatcertainlycoversthepsychologicalmechanismofagencydetection,butonlyasoneamongmanyotherphenomena.13
Theexactboundariesanddomainsofthesedifferentmechanismsare,atthispoint,unclear.
Theprocessofanthropomorphismisprobablybestunderstoodasanadequateexplanation
forcertainkindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,perceptualbeliefsaboutstufflikefacesintheclouds,
facesinRorschachinkblots,abiastoprojecthumancharacteristicstoinanimateobjectsin
theworldaroundus,etc.),butasonlyacourse-grained,inadequateexplanationforother
kindsofgod-beliefs(e.g.,activelyseeingintentionandpurposeinevents,theattributionof
agencyandintentiontoinanimateobjects,theformationofbeliefsaboutancestralspirits,
etc.).
Despitetheexplanatorylimitsofanthropomorphism,though,itdoesseemtobean
importantfactorinexplainingtheoriginsofgod-beliefs.Perhaps,forinstance,beliefsabout
thepersonalitiesofmountainsortreesfindtheiroriginsinachancearrangementof
featuresonagivenmountainortreethatisvaguelyreminiscentofahumanface;ourfacial13Westh,2009,pg.4.
23
recognitionsystemskickin,andweproceedtoanthropomorphizetheinanimateobjects
aroundus.Agenerationlater,themountainortreemightbeconsideredadeity.Sucha
storyisreasonable.Towhateverextenttheprocessesofanthropomorphismareappliedto
improperdomains—thatis,toanythingthatisnotactuallyahuman—theresultisa
byproductbelief.
D.AgencyDetection
AgencydetectionisournextRGCM.AnthropologistPascalBoyer(2001)has
claimedthathumanssufferfroma“hypertrophyofsocialcognition.”PsychologistJustin
Barrett(2004)haspositedthatwepossess“hypersensitiveagencydetectiondevices.”
Barrettdescribestheagencydetectiondevice:
WhenHADDperceivesanobjectviolatingtheintuitiveassumptionsforthemovementofordinaryphysicalobjects(suchasmovingonnon-inertialpaths,changingdirectioninexplicably,orlaunchingitselffromastandstill)andtheobjectseemstobemovinginagoal-directedmanner,HADDdetectsagency.14
TheseHADDshyperactivelyattributeagencytothestuffinourenvironment,andasaresult
theseattributionsareoftenwrong.Attherecognitionofagent-likebehavior—an
otherwiseinexplicablechangeindirection,stop-and-gomovement,etc.—theagency
detectiondeviceflagsanobject(agentornot)asanagent.Anykindofbehavioror
movementthatmightbeperceivedasgoal-directedorastheproductofmindednessis
enoughtoactivateHADD,andtheendresultistheunconsciouspresentationofnon-agents
asagentsandtheconsciousformationoffalsebeliefsregardingtheagencyofwhatare
actuallynon-agents.
14Barrett,2004,chapter3.
24
BloomrecountstheexperimentsconductedbyHeiderandSimmelinthemiddleof
thetwentiethcentury:
HeiderandSimmel(1944)…madeasimplemovieinwhichgeometricalfigures—circles,squares,triangles—movedincertainsystematicways,designed,basedonthepsychologists’intuitions,totellatale.Whenshownthismovie,peopleinstinctivelydescribethefiguresasiftheywerespecificpeople(bullies,victims,heroes)whohavegoalsanddesires…15
BloomgoesontomentionsubsequentresearchperformedbyhimselfandVeres(1999),in
whichitwasfoundthat“youcangetmuchthesameeffectwithmovingdots,aswellasin
movieswherethe‘characters’arenotsingleobjectsatall,butmovinggroups,suchas
swarmsoftinysquares.”Thegeneralideaisthatattheperceptionofanobjectorevent
thatwedeemtohavebeendesignedorordered,orattheperceptionofsomethingthat
seemstobehaveaswewouldexpectanagenttobehave,ourbrainsareapttoascribe
agency(ordesign,oragencyintention)tothatobjectofourperception.
IthinkitisworthinvestigatingtheimplicationsoftheexperimentsrunbyHeider
andSimmel,andthenlaterbyBloomandVeres.Inonesense,theagencydetectorsofthe
participantsinthestudiesgotitwrong:clearly,dotsandfigures,althoughtheybehavelike
agents,areonlyimproperlyattributedgoals,desires,andpersonality.However,inanother
sense,theagencydetectorsoftheparticipantsinthestudiesgotitright:thedotsand
shapeswere,indeed,designedandprogrammedintentionallybyanothermind(ascientist’s
mind)toactinwaysthatwouldgiveoffairsofagency.Itshouldnotbesurprisingthat
peoplereadilyrecognizedtheintentionofanothermindintheperceptionofanactually
createdartifact—beitatool,anexperimentalprogram,oranythingelse—thatisbehaving
inintentionalways.So,Ithinkitisappropriatetoask:towhatextentweretheagency15Bloom,2007,pg.149.
25
detectorsactuallyactingoutsideoftheirintendeddomainsintheseexperiments?Arenot
therecognitionofagencyintentionandtheawarenessofcreatedartifactsnotcriticaltasks
ofanagencydetectionmechanism?Itisclear,however,thattheagencydetectionsystem
wasnotselected-forsoastotrackdotsonacomputerscreen;so,whiletheagency
detectionmodulecorrectly(inasense)perceivedagencyandagentintentioninthedotson
thescreen,wearejustifiedinsayingthatitdidsoonlyasabyproductoftheagency-
detectionmodule’sproperfunctioning(i.e.,itsevolutionarilyintendedpurposeof
perceivingagencyintrueagents,ratherthanindotsonacomputerscreen).
Bloom(2007)says,“Wearehypersensitivetosignsofhumanagency,somuchso
thatweseeintentionwhereallthatreallyexistsisartificeoraccident.”Theproposed
cognitivemechanismthatleadsustoascribeagencytothingsthatveryclearlyarenot
agents(likegeometricalfiguresordots)isprobablyfoundationaltoourunderstandingthe
originsofmostkindsofgod-beliefs.ImportanttorememberatthispointisBering’s(2006)
workontheattributionofagentintentiontoevents(thePrincessAliceexperiments).Given
thiscombinationofcognitivebiases—thebiastoattributeagencytotheobjectsinour
environment,togetherwiththebiastoascribeagencyintentiontotheeventswe
experience—wecanbegintoseehowthehumanexperiencelendsitselftotheformationof
god-beliefs.Itshouldperhapsbenosurprisethatsuchgod-beliefsoverlayourexperienceof
theworldinthewaythattheydo,ifwegrantthattheseagency-detectionandintention-
attributionbiasesaresopervasive.
PsychologistScottAtransaysaboutourhypersensitive,“trip-wire”agency
attribution:
Theconceptofsupernaturalagentisculturallyderivedfrominnatecognitiveschema—“mentalmodules”—fortherecognitionandinterpretationofagents,such
26
aspeopleandanimals.Inparticular,suchconceptsaretriggeredbyanagent-detectionmodule.Thisisasortofinnatereleasingmechanism,whoseproper(naturallyselected)domainencompassesanimateobjectsbutwhoseactualdomain(ofstimulithatmimictheproperdomain)extendstomovingdotsoncomputerscreens,voicesinthewind,facesintheclouds,andsmokefromaburningbuilding…16
Hecontinues:
Soulsandspirits,whichderivemuchoftheirinductiveforcefromanalogytothedissociatedthoughtsofdreamsandthedisembodiedmovementsofshadows,arenear-universalcandidatesforreligiouselaboration.Thisisbecausesouls,spirits,dreams,andshadowshavemanypsychologicallyco-occurringthematicassociations(e.g.,immaterialityandunworldlieness,nightanddeath).Theyalsosystematicallymanipulateinnate,modularizedexpectationsaboutfolkmechanics,folkbiology,andfolkpsychology.17
So,byAtran’sestimation,agencydetectionisrelevanttotheRGCMhypothesiswhenagency
detectionoperatesoutsideofitsnaturaldomain(thatdomainfullofobjectsthatare
actuallyagents).
Boyer’s(2001)theorythatsuchgod-beliefshaveasortofincreasedstayingpoweris
relatedtoAtran’sideasaboutthewayourconceptsofthenon-naturalmanipulateour
innateandmodularizedfolk-mechanics,folk-biology,andfolk-psychology.Boyer’sideais
thatourgod-beliefshaveviolatedcertainessentialexpectationswehaveabouttheworld,
expectationsdeliveredtousbyourlearned“conceptualtemplates.”God-beliefsare
counterintuitive,totherightdegree.Forinstance,theconceptualtemplatefortheconcept
“person”probablyincludestheconstituentconceptofan“embodiedbeing.”Itistotally
natural—or,inlinewithourconceptualtemplates—forustoconceiveofapersonas
havingabody,becausehavingabodyisconstituentofbeingaperson.However,manygod-
beliefsregardingpersonsviolatethatcentralexpectation;spirits,souls,anddeitiesare16Atran,2002,pg.266.17Ibid.,pg.266.
27
oftenconceivedofaspersonshavingnobody.Toputitsimply,Boyerpositsthatsuch
supernaturalconcepts,wheninviolationofourconceptualtemplates,arememorableand
demandingofattention.Itisimportantthatthesupernaturalconceptsviolatecorepartsof
ourconceptualtemplates,buttheymustconformtotheconceptualtemplateclosely
enoughthatthesupernaturalconceptdoesnotdevolveintoconceptualabsurdity.The
conceptofapersonwithoutabodyissolid;theconceptofapersonwithnobodyormind,
butthatisactuallyaplace,isbasicallymeaningless.AccordingtoBoyer,storiesthat
includesuchcounterintuitive,supernaturalconceptsaredisproportionatelyeasierto
remember,areeasiertotell,andarethereforeprimecandidatesforculturaltransmission.
Thesekindsofbeliefsarerenderedtousintuitivelyduetoadegreeofconceptualsimilarity
betweenthemandourother,moreordinarybeliefs.Wewilltalkmoreaboutthislater.
Inexplanationofwhytheagencydetectionsystemsooftenoperatesoutsideofits
intendeddomain,Atransays:
Allsupernaturalagentconceptstriggerournaturallyselectedagency-detectionsystem,whichistrip-wiredtorespondtofragmentaryinformation,incitingperceptionoffigureslurkingintheshadowsandemotionsofdreadorawe.Mistakinganonagentforanagentwoulddolittleharm,butfailingtodetectanagent,especiallyhumanoranimalpredator,couldwellprovefatal;it’sbettertobesafethansorry.Theevolutionaryimperativetorapidlydetectandreacttorapaciousagentsencouragestheemergenceofmalevolentdeitiesineveryculture,justasthecountervailingevolutionaryimperativetoattachtocaregiversfavorstheapparitionofbenevolentdeities.18
Atrandescribestheadaptiveadvantageofanagencydetectiondevicethatregistersfalse
positives:itissimplybetterthatwehavea“trip-wire”mechanismthatsometimes
mistakesasound,movement,orinanimateobjectforanagent(friendorfoe)thathas
intentionsdirectedtowardus,ratherthantohaveamechanismwithahigheractivation18Atran,2002,pg.267.
28
thresholdthatfailstodetectactualagentsinourenvironment.Atrantheorizesthatover
time,thelatterwaswinnowedfromthegenepooltotheadvantageoftheformer.Asa
result,wedoirrationalthingslikeformbeliefsaboutspiritswhenwehearbumpsinthe
night,orweperceivephantoms“lurkingintheshadows.”Ourbrainsgivethesethings
agency,quiteoutsideofourcontrol.Thus,withourtrip-wireagencydetector,muchofthe
worldaroundusispresentedtousautomaticallythroughthefilterofagencydetection.
Westh(2009)saysthefollowingregardingtheevolutionaryoriginsofagency
detectiondevicesinourcognitivemachinery:
StewartGuthrie,bypositingastrongcontinuitybetweenanimismandanthropomorphism,gavethecognitivemechanismsunderlyinggodconceptsanextremelydeepevolutionaryhistory.Animism,inthisview,evolvedfirstasamechanismofpredatorevasion;astheevolutionarypressureofhumansocialgroupsintensified,anthropomorphismdevelopedasacognitivestrategy.ThemechanismofhyperactiveagencydetectionpositedbyBoyerandBarrettsharesmoreorlessthesameevolutionarynarrative.19
IbelieveWesth’sconclusionsareright.Itseemsreasonablethatanoverlysensitiveagency
detectiondevicewasbestowedtousthroughtheprocessesofnaturalselectionasnew,
uniquelyhumanevolutionarypressuresemerged.Itseemsreasonabletobelievethatthis
HADD’sevolutionarypredecessorwasasimplermechanismdesignedfordetecting
animacy,morebroadlyconstrued.Thishighlyattunedmechanismwouldhavedeliveredto
ourancestorsfalse-positivedetectionsoffoes,predators,etc.,andthiswouldhavebeento
ourancestors’benefitintheirancientenvironments.Itcertainlyseemstobethecasethat
suchanagencydetectiondeviceasHADDactshyper-sensitivelytoattributeagencyto
inanimateobjects.Suchhypersensitivity,bothinourevolutionarypastandcontemporarily,
helpstoyieldthepanoplyofgod-beliefsthatcharacterizeshumanculturesandworldviews.19Westh,2009,pg.18.
29
Whethertheobjectsofourgod-beliefsarerealorimagined—gods,spirits,
anthropomorphizednaturalobjects,etc.—theagencydetectionRGCMissurelyactiveinthe
formationofthesegod-beliefs.
E.Conclusions
Imentionedtowardthebeginningofthisthesisthatitisdifficulttodetermine
where,exactly,onecognitivemechanismendsandwherethenextbegins.Youcan
probablyseethatbynow.ThemechanismsIhavediscussedsofar—intuitivefolk
psychologyandtheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,andagency
detection—seemtohavevastareasofconceptualoverlap.Forinstance,oneprobably
cannotmeaningfullytalkaboutourbiastoattributeagencyandagencyintentiontothe
worldarounduswithoutalsotalkingaboutintuitivefolkpsychology(whichisreallyjust
theabilitytoformbeliefsaboutothers,pertainingtotheiragency).Oneprobablycannot
talkmeaningfullyaboutpromiscuousteleologyandagencyintentionwithoutsome
content-richtheoryofmindorartifacttheory.Itisdifficulttosaytheextenttowhichthese
differentmechanismsarerelated;Ibelieveitisfairtosay,though,thateachofthem
performsdistinctfunctions,andthatthesedifferentfunctionsarewhyeachofthemhas
attracteditsownsetofresearchers.
TheseRGCMsleadustoexperienceandconceiveoftheworldinacertainway:in
termsofbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Rawgod-beliefsaredeliveredtousasbyproductsof
theunconsciousprocessesofourreligion-generatingcognitivemechanisms—the
mechanismsresponsiblefortheoryofmind,promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,
andagencydetection.Withtheserawgod-beliefsasourstartingpoints,webuildour
30
inferentialbeliefsystems(ourrefinedgod-beliefs).Itisthisnaturalwayofexperiencingthe
world—throughthefilterofourRGCMsandrawgod-beliefs—thatultimatelyexplainsthe
ubiquityofreligiousworldviewsandsystems.Indeed,itisthestrongByproductclaimthat
wenaturallyexperiencetheworldinthisway—coloredbytheautomaticprocessesthat
yieldintuitivetheism/promiscuousteleology,anthropomorphism,hypersensitiveagency-
detection,andourascriptionofmentalstatestotheworldaroundus.Byvirtueofthekind
ofcognitivestructuresourbrainshave,itisnotnaturaltoconceiveoftheworldcontraryto
theserawgod-beliefs.Thesebyproductrawgod-beliefsarenotadaptations,becausethey
contributenoadaptivebenefittospeakof.Rather,theyarebyproductsofmechanismsthat
areadaptations—mechanismsthatapplytheoryofmind,notionsofteleology,andnotions
ofagencyinevolutionarilyintendeddomains.
Inthenextsectionofthispaper,Iwillexaminehowgod-beliefsare“pickedup,”
developed,andtransmittedbyhumancultures.TheybeginasbyproductsofRGCMsand
areeventuallydevelopedbysocietiesintheaimtohaveexplanatorystoriestotell.
Learning,evolutionaryforcesoperatingattheculturallevel,andcontingenthistorical
events(andperhapsrevelation)areallactiveinthedevelopmentofrawgod-beliefsinto
refinedgod-beliefs.Iwillexaminewhytheserefinedgod-beliefsareselected-forby
evolutionaryprocessesatthegroupandculturallevels,andIwillconsiderthesortsof
adaptivebenefitstheyconfertotheirrespectivebelievers.
3.CulturalEvolutionandGod-Beliefs
Sofar,Ihaveproposedthatthehumanbrainpossessescertainreligiongenerating
cognitivemechanisms.Thesemechanismsconstituteareligion-generatingsuite,the
31
processesofwhichgiverisetothenaturalhumantendencytoformbyproductgod-beliefs.
Ourpropensitiestoconceiveoftheworldinteleologicalterms,tohyper-sensitivelyproject
agencyandagentintentionintotheworldaroundus,andtoprocesstheworldthroughthe
filterofourintuitivefolkpsychologicalmechanismsdosomeseriousexplanatoryworkin
theareaof“religion.”Itistheserawgod-beliefsthatareeventuallydevelopedintoour
refinedgod-beliefs.
Mybyproductstoryfortheoriginoftheserawgod-beliefsleavesmuchinneedof
explanation.Ihavearguedthattheserawgod-beliefsarebyproducts,ratherthan
adaptations;thebyproductswereselected,ratherthanselected-for.Rawgod-beliefsstill
characterizehumanpsychologytoday—theanthropomorphizingofinanimateobjects,the
intuitivedesign/causalhypothesestowhichweintuitivelyhold,thehypersensitive
attributionofagencytotheenvironment,etc.—but“religion”isafarmoreinteresting
phenomenonthanwhatIhavedescribedsofar.Anaccountofthesebyproductbeliefs
hardlyservesasanexplanationfortherichlandscapeofreligiousworldviewsthat
characterizesthehumanexperience.Thereisclearlymoretoreligiousbeliefasweknowit
todaythanthemerebyproductgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyourcognitiveprocesses.
Refinedgod-beliefsarefarmoreevolutionarilyconsequentialthanrawgod-beliefs,
andassuchtheyhaveplayedaformativeroleinthedevelopmentofhumansocietiesand
culture.AsIwillargueinthecomingpages,itisrefinedgod-beliefs(ratherthanrawgod-
beliefs)thathaveconferredadaptiveadvantagetotheindividualsandgroupsthathave
possessedsuchbeliefsthroughoutrecentevolutionaryhistory.Religionisawinning
evolutionarystrategy.Howdothebyproductrawgod-beliefsdeliveredtousbyour
cognitivesystemsbecomemoredevelopedandsystematic?Howdotheycometoorganize
32
entirecultures?Whydoweassenttothem,andwhydotheypersist?Therawgod-beliefs
areourstartingpoint,butitishumannaturetotellstoriesandtopursueexplanation
beyondtheintuitionsdeliveredbyourcognitivemechanisms.Thesestoriesand
explanationstaketheformofculturallytransmittedcreationmyths,systematictheologies,
folklores,etc.Withourrefinedgod-beliefs,wetellrich,complicated,andfancifultales.
Thissectionofthepaperwilldiscussthedevelopmentofreligionasagroupand
culturaladaptation,anditwilluserecentresearchinevolutionarybiologyandgroup
selectiontheorytoshowhowreligionitselfconfersadaptiveadvantage.Iwillarguethat
religion—atthegrouplevel—isadaptivelyadvantageous,andthatthesurvivalbenefits
grantedbyrefinedgod-beliefshelptoexplainwhygod-beliefsaresocommontohumanity.I
willalsoexaminethenaturalprocessesbywhichreligiousbeliefs,concepts,andideashave
becomesoubiquitousandvariedthroughouthumanexperience.
PsychologistsBarrettandKeil(1996)haveframedthedifferencesbetweenwhatI
havecalledourrawandrefinedgod-beliefsinontologicalterms.Theyspecificallyaddress
theintuitiveanthropomorphizingofthetheisticconceptofGod,andtheypresent
experimentalfindingsthatsuggestweactuallyhavetwodifferentsetsofreligiousbeliefsat
workregardingGod.20Onesetisourintuitive,anthropomorphizedsetofbeliefsaboutGod,
andtheotherisournon-intuitive,“theologicallycorrect”setofbeliefsaboutGod.Thetwo
setsareincommensurable,becausetheypertaintodifferentontologicalcategoriesof
existence—theontologyofthingsinthenaturalworld,andtheontologyofGod:
Ifthesereligions,whichhavehadaprofoundimpactonWesterntheologicalconcepts,attributetoGodavastlydifferenttypeofexistencethanourown,howdo
20BarrettandKeilfocusexclusivelyonadistinctionbetweenthetheist’s“theologicallycorrect”and“anthropomorphized”conceptsofGod,whileIhavepresentedadistinctionbetweenrawandrefinedgod-beliefs,ingeneral.
33
wecrossthisontologicalgapandunderstandGod...IfGodisrevealedthroughnaturalisticmeansandinnaturalisticterms,howthendowemakesenseofthisrevelation?Howdoweincorporatenaturalfeaturesintoourrepresentationofanonnaturalentity?Ananalogousproblemmightbetoconsiderwhatitwouldbeliketobeabat(Nagel,1974).Theotherstateofbeingissodifferentthatthetaskseemsimpossible.21
Theyposethequestion:ifGod,accordingtoone’stheology,isofadifferentontological
categorythanhumankind—i.e.,spaceless,timeless,unbound,etc.—howcouldhumankind
possiblyaccuratelyconceiveofGod?IfGodwererightlyconceivedofasbeingofadifferent
ontologicalcategorythanus,anyattempttoanthropomorphizeGodwouldradically
misrepresentHimorHer(orWhatever).Iwouldposeafurtherquestion:Howcouldour
“theologicallycorrect”god-beliefspossiblyhavedevelopednaturallyiftheirobjects(God,
gods,spirits,etc.)are,atrockbottom,ofadifferentontologicalcategoryfromusandfrom
anythingelseweexperience?
BarrettandKeil(1996)offermoreonthesetwodifferentbeliefsetsthatrun
simultaneously,butincompatibly:
Despitetheologicaldescriptions,peopleseemtoincorporateanthropomorphicandnaturalisticcharacterizationsintotheirintuitiveGodconcepts…PerhapsconceptionsofGodmustbeanthropomorphic,evenwhiletheologicalbeliefsmaintainotherwise.Itmaybethatthe“theologicalGod”isradicallydifferentfromthe“intuitiveGod”normallydescribedineverydaydiscourse.EvenindividualswhoexplicitlyendorsethetheologicalversionofGodmightnonethelessimplicitlyembraceaverydifferentversioninmostoftheirdailythoughts.22Psychologistshavelongassumedthatanthropomorphiclanguagereflectsunderlyingcognitiveanthropomorphism.FreudinitiatedthislineofthoughtmostdramaticallywiththesuggestionthatGodconceptsareprojectionsofone’sfatherandthatthestartofreligionisthe“humanizationofnature.”23
21BarrettandKeil,1996,pg.220.22Barrett&Keil,1996,pg.223.23Ibid.,pg.221.
34
TheyprovidedatasuggestingthatwhenpressedtotalkaboutGod,peopletendto
anthropomorphizeHim(toputHisactionsintospatial,temporal,andsequentialterms,
restrictHimtoonlyhavingoneconversationatatime,etc.),regardlessofhavingavowedto
“theologicallycorrect”doctrinalbeliefsaboutHisdivineattributes(existenceoutsideof
time,omnipresence,etc.):
…subjectsdouseanthropomorphicconceptsofGodinunderstandingstorieseventhoughtheymayprofessatheologicalpositionthatrejectsanthropomorphicconstraintsonGodandGod’sactivities.ItappearsthatpeoplehaveatleasttwoparallelGodconceptsthatareusedindifferentcontexts,andtheseconceptsmaybefundamentallyincompatible.24Perhapsstoriesinvolvinganatemporalandomnipotentagentcreateprocessingdifficulties,andanefficientwaytodealwiththeproblemistouseasimplerGodconcepttounderstandstories.25
Allofthisgoestohighlightthedistinctionbetweentheintuitivegod-beliefsdeliveredto
individualsbytheircognitivemechanismsandthemorereflectivegod-beliefsthatare
developedbysocietiesandculturesthroughculturalevolutionandlearning(andinthe
theist’scase,revelation).
Theideaisthatourintuitivegod-beliefsarecognitivelyeasiertograsp.Theyare
morenatural.Inparticular,thebeliefsonemightprofessinthedomainoftheologyare
quiteunnaturalandcognitivelycounterintuitive—somuchsothatwhenundercognitive
load(aswhenaskedtorecounttalesaboutGod),ourcognitivesystemstendtoshirk
theologicalconceptionsofGodformoreintuitive,anthropomorphicconceptionsofGod
(Barrett&Keil,1996).BarrettandKeilwereconcernedwiththe“ontologicalgap”between
ourintuitive,anthropomorphicbeliefsaboutGodandourmorecounterintuitive,
24Ibid.,pg.240.25Ibid.,pg.243.
35
theologicalbeliefsaboutGod.Therestofthissectioninquiresintotheriseofsuchan
“ontologicalgap.”Although,perhapsourparticularsubjectmattercallsforare-
appropriationoftheirlanguage;let’scallthedistancebetweenourrawgod-beliefsandour
refinedgod-beliefsa“cognitivegap.”Theformerareevolutionarilyolderandcognitively
easier,whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandmorecognitivelydifficult.Theformer
arethenaturalbyproductsofourcognitivemechanisms,whilethelatterarethe
counterintuitiveoutputsofgenerationsofstorytelling,culturalselection,andhuman
reasoning.
Wenowturntoexaminingthedevelopment,transmission,andadaptivevalueof
refinedgod-beliefsandreligioussystems.
A.VirusesoftheMind&MemeTheory
“Virus”isaloadedterm.Butitisatermthat,asusedbelow,iswellsuitedforits
intendeduse.Someevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologistshavelikened
thespreadofreligiousworldviewstothespreadofviruses.Tosome,the“virus”ofreligion
isdetrimentaltohumansociety;toothers,thenegativeconnotationsassociatedwiththe
word“virus”arenotnecessarilyappliedtoreligion.Hereisaclearsummaryofthe“virus
view”fromevolutionarybiologistRobertTrivers(2011):
Whatsomehaveisametaphor.Religionisaviralmeme;thatis,itisnotanactualvirus,whichcaneasilybringapopulationtoitsknees,butratheritismerelyathoughtsystemthathappenstopropagateasifitwereavirus,tothedetrimentofthosewiththebeliefsystem.Despiteitsnegativeeffects,itapparentlygeneratesinsufficientselectionpressuretosuppressthespreadofthisnon-coevolvingnonorganism.26
26Trivers,2011,pg.278.
36
Oneofthebiggestproponentsofthe“virusview”ofreligionisevolutionarybiologist
RichardDawkins(2003).Dawkinsdevelopedawayofthinkingabout“unitsofculture”—
thestuffthatgetstransmittedfromonegenerationofasocietytothenext—thatlikens
suchunitsofculturetopathogens.Dawkins’spointwasthatunitsofculturelikereligious
beliefs“infect”themindsoftheindividualstowhomtheyaretransmitted,andthat
religiousbeliefsareparticularlysuccessfulviruses.Dawkins(1976)cashedouthistheory
inthelanguageof“memes.”His“virus”positionasideforthemoment,Dawkins’sworkon
memesisextremelyhelpfulformypurposes.Boyer(2001)explainsDawkins’smeme
theory:
[Dawkins]summarizedallthisbydescribingcultureasapopulationofmemes,whicharejust“copy-me”programs,likegenes.Genesproduceorganismsthatbehaveinsuchawaythatthegenesarereplicated—otherwisethegenesinquestionwouldnotbearound.Memesareunitsofculture:notions,values,stories,etc.thatgetpeopletospeakoractincertainwaysthatmakeotherpeoplestoreareplicatedversionofthesementalunits.27Inthisaccount,familiarreligiousconceptsandassociatedbeliefs,norms,emotions,arejustbetter-replicatingmemesthanothers,inthesensethattheircopy-meinstructionsworkbetter.28Ifyouwillrecall,Boyer(2001)laidoutsomenecessaryconditionsforthesuccessful
culturaltransmissionofa“godconcept.”Heproposedamodelofsuccessfultransmission
thatrequiredthe“godconcept”toviolatecertainconceptualexpectationstoan
appropriatedegree.Forinstance,theconceptslike“god”and“spirit”aretransmittedso
well,becausetheyfitnicelyintotheconceptualtemplatewehavefortheconcept“person,”
withtheexceptionofahandfulofcounterintuitiveviolations(likenothavingabody,being
atemporal,beingabletopassthroughthings,etc.).Thesecounterintuitive“god”and“spirit”27Boyer,2001,pg.35.28Ibid.,pg.37.
37
conceptsarestrangeandmemorable,buttheyalignwiththe“person”conceptclosely
enoughthattheyarenotrenderedunintelligibleinourconceivingofthem.So,these
conceptsarecounterintuitivetotheappropriatedegree,andourstoriesinvolvingthese
conceptsare,asaresult,culturallytransmittedinadisproportionatelysuccessfulway.
(Someofthishelpsustounderstandwhygod-beliefspersist,despitetheexplanatory
alternativeswehaveathand—theyareconsistent,tojusttherightdegree,withour
intuitiveexpectationsoftheworldaroundusandwithourconceptualtemplates.Moreon
“persistence”later.)
BoyertakesDawkins’smemetheoryandexpoundsonit.Boyer’sworkrepresents
thebeginningsofourabilitytounderstandhowourrefinedgod-beliefsmighthaveevolved
fromourrawgod-beliefs:
Culturalmemesundergomutation,recombinationandselectioninsidetheindividualmindeverybitasmuchandasoftenas…duringtransmissionbetweenminds.Wedonotjusttransmittheinformationwereceived.Weprocessitanduseittocreatenewinformation,someofwhichwedocommunicatetootherpeople.29
Ourreligiousconcepts,evenaftercountlessgenerationsofculturaltransmissions,bear
significantresemblancetooneanotherandtoourmoreprimitivegod-beliefs.Our
conceptualtemplates(whicharethebasicbuildingblocksforourunderstandingofthe
world)arefundamentallyunchangedbytheprocessesofevolution;thisservestopreserve
certaincrucialbitsoftheinformationthatwetransmitculturallyovertime.Italsohelpsto
explainwhyourgod-beliefssharesomuchincommon,cross-culturally.Memetheory,then,
workswellinhelpingtoshowhowculturallytransmittedbeliefs—likevariousgod-
beliefs—mayevolveovertimeintotherichvarietyofbeliefsweseeintheworld;and,with
29Boyer,2001,pg.39.
38
Boyer’sadditions,memetransmissiontheoryservesasausefulexplanationofthedifferent
culturalthemesthataresharedincommonbymanypeoplegroups.Theprocessofmeme
transmission,then,isonemechanismthataccountsforthespreading,transformation,and
persistenceofreligiousconceptsandgod-beliefsoverevolutionarytime.Itistheselection
ofideas.
Intheculturaltransmissionofourgod-beliefsovertime,wedowitnessimportant
changesinthecontentofthosetransmittedbeliefs.Butourcognitivemachinerykeepsus
honest.PeoplelikeBoyercontendthattheseconceptualtemplatesanchorus,inan
importantsense,tothecross-generationallypreservedbitsofthesebeliefs(prevailing
themesandvalues,commondenominatorsacrossreligiousstories,etc.).Someofthese
cross-generationallypreservedtemplatesarepresumablysharedbyall,byvirtueofour
sharedevolutionaryhistories,whilesomeofthemarerelativetospecificculturesand
societies,byvirtueoftheiruniqueevolutionaryhistories.Thishelpsusanswerthe
question:whatarethemechanicsofthedevelopmentofrefinedgod-beliefsfromrawgod-
beliefs?Atthispointwecanonlyspeculate,butIthinkBoyer’sandDawkins’sworkmakes
itreasonableforustosupposethatourrefinedgod-beliefsaretheresultofalonglineof
culturallytransmittedreligiousbeliefsthathavebeenpassed,withsignificantoverall
variation,fromonegenerationofourspeciestothenext.
Thestorywouldneedtobesomethinglikethis:We(humans)beganwiththe
intuitivebyproductgod-beliefsprovidedtousbyourcognitivemechanisms.Atsomepoint,
ourancestorsbegantotellexplanatory,religiousstories.Thesestorieswouldhave
providedanswersandexplanationsforunexplainedphenomena,wouldhaveexplainedour
ancestors’placeintheworld,wouldhaveprovidedthemwithasenseofmeaning,and
39
wouldhaveunifiedvariouscultures.Thesestorieswereadaptive,specifictothe
environmentinhabitedbyagivenpeoplegroupandspecifictothecontingenthistorical
eventswithwhichagivenpeoplegroupwasrequiredtoreconciletheirexistence.Aswe
learnedaboutourenvironment,aboutourselves,andaboutthevariousgodsthatwe
believedin,thesereligiousstorieswouldhavemorphedovertime.Thevariationinthe
contentofmemesoverevolutionaryhistoryprovidedfodderfortheprocessesand
pressuresofnaturalselectionandadaptation,buttheconstancyofourconceptual
templatesacrosstimeandcultureskeptourgod-beliefsand“godconcepts,”toanimportant
degree,anchoredtotheiroriginalcopies.Asaresultofthislongprocess,weareleftwith
thegod-beliefspossessedbybelieverstoday,theworldover.Eachcultureholdsitsown
uniqueevolutionaryhistory,inevitablyprovidinguswiththediverselandscapeofreligious
storiesandworldviewsthatwefindinmoderntimes.
Therearevariousconventionstowhichwemightappealtohelpexplainthe
formation,development,andspreadofreligiousbeliefsacrosstime.Forinstance,societies
throughouttimehavetransmitteduniquecreationmythsandfolklores,andtheyhavetold
storiestotransmitnotonlythesemyths,butalsothehistoryofthegivensociety.
Accordingtomyaccount,primitiveversionsofthesemythsandfolkloreswouldhavebeen
heavilyinformedbyrawgod-beliefs,bythereligiousnotionsnaturallydeliveredtothemby
theircognitiveprocesses.Indeed,primitiveculturestoldstoriesabouttheirhistoriesthat
werelacedwithreligiousconcepts,non-naturalevents,anddivinecharacters,totheextent
thatinmanycasesitisdifficulttodeterminefactualhistoryfrommeremyth.Early
societiessawtheirhistoriesinlightofthesereligiousnarratives.Associetiesgrew,spread,
madeconquest,andestablishedtradewithotherpartsoftheworld(orregion),their
40
storiesspread.Withtheriseofmoreadvanced(andwritten)language,religiousideas
wouldhavebecomemoreeffectivelycommunicable.Withtheriseofreligiousinstitutions
andcentersoflearning,religiousconceptsandstorieswouldhavebeensolidified,
canonized,andpreservedforlatergenerations.Withtheriseofreligiouskingdomsand
states—ortheirmoreprimitivecounterparts—religiousbeliefandparticipationwould
havebecomeasourceofgroupidentity,andparticipationinthereligiousidentityofa
societymayhavebeencompulsory(ensuringthespreadofreligiousideas).
Thisisallconjectural,butwecanprobablyonlytellthesketchofanevolutionary
storyintryingtoaccountforaphenomenonthatissoancientandvariedas“religion.”
Throughoutevolutionaryhistory,therewouldhavebeenanextraordinarynumberof
evolutionaryeventsandpressures.However,Ihavesetouttoexplainthemechanismsat
workineachstageofthatprocess,soastoshowthatsuchanadmittedlyvaguestoryis
plausible.ForreasonsIwilldiscussshortly,Irejectoutofhandthelanguageusedby
Dawkinsinhischaracterizationofreligiousbeliefasa“virusofthemind”—aparasitic
maladaptationthatexiststothedetrimentofbelievingindividualsandcultures.Asifthe
pervasivepresenceofreligiousbeliefsinthehumanexperiencewerenotenough
evidence30,thereisanenormousbodyofresearchandliteraturethathighlightsthe
adaptivebenefitsofgod-beliefs(moreonthis,shortly).
30Granted,manyharmfulvirusesarepervasive,andthismightseemtoserveasacounterexampletowhatIjustsaid.However,biologicalvirusesinnaturehaveintereststhatareservedbytheharmthatiscausedtotheirhosts;biologicalvirusescanexisttoourdetriment,anditistotheiradaptiveadvantagetodoso.Cultural“viruses,”ontheotherhand,aregivenlifebytheirhost(thebeliever)duetothebenefitsthatareconferredtothebeliever.Weshouldexpectthat,overtime,maladaptivecultural“viruses”wouldbeselectedagainst,andthatourpsychologieswouldbesoconstitutedbyevolutionarypressuresastopropagatebeneficialviruses.
41
B.Group-LevelSelection
BiologistandanthropologistDavidSloanWilsonhasdonesignificantworktoshow
thatreligion—asamoralsystemthatfacilitatesspecificgroupbehaviors—isaproductof
whathecalls“multilevelselection”(Wilson,2003).Herejectstheideathatthe
phenomenonofreligionasweknowittodayistheresultofevolutionbynaturalselection
operatingstrictlyatthegeneticlevel.Instead,headvocatesforagroup-levelselection
modelinorderexplainvarioussocieties’religiousworldviews:
Amiddlegroundisbecomingestablishedinwhichgroupsareacknowledgedtoevolveintoadaptiveunits,butonlyifspecialconditionsaremet.Ironically,inhumangroupsitisoftenreligionthatprovidesthespecialconditions.Religionreturnstocenterstage,notasatheologicalexplanationofpurposeandorder,butasitselfaproductofevolutionthatenablesgroupstofunctionasadaptiveunits—atleasttoadegree.31
Inhiswork,Wilsonadvocatesforthereturnofgroupselectionasaviablewayofthinking
aboutthedevelopmentofcultures,societies,andorganisms.Herecountsthefalling-outof
thisparticularviewamongevolutionarybiologistsinthelatterhalfofthetwentieth
century:
Althoughmanysocialscientiststaketheorganismicconceptofsocietyforgranted,evolutionarybiologistsinthe1960srejectedgroupselectionsostronglythatitbecamehereticaltothinkof“societyasanorganism”…forhumansoranyotherspecies…Theillusionofadaptationatthegrouplevelcanbeexplainedintermsofindividualsincreasingthefitnessoftheirgenesinthebodiesofothers,reciprocalexchange,orevenmoreself-servingbenefitssuchasdownrightdeceptionandexploitation.32
Wilson,though,takesissuewiththishardlineevolutionarybiologicalapproach.
31Wilson,2003,pg.6.32Ibid.,pg.12.
42
Thegroupselectiondynamicentersinwhenweconsiderthatmuchofreligious
belief—andthebehaviorthatresultsfromit—isstrictlysocial.Religiousbeliefsdetermine
howindividualmembersofacommunityoughttotreatoneanother,howtheyoughtto
regardthemselves,andhowtheyoughttotreatthoseoutsideoftheircommunity.
Religiousbeliefhaspracticalimplicationsintheareasofmorality,publichealthand
hygiene,andthestructuringofsociety.Whenthetraitunderconsiderationisanon-social
behaviorthataltersthefitnessoftheindividualalone,itisnotappropriatethatwe
considerthattraittobeaproductofgroup-levelselection.Butwhenthetraitunder
considerationisasocialbehavior(pertainingtogroupmorality,health,structure,etc.),
thentheindividual’sfitnessisnotproperlyconsideredinisolation;thetraitsoftheothers
inits“trait-group”mustbeconsidered.Forsocialbehaviors,thefunctioningofthesocial
groupasawholemustbeconsidered.Wilsonpositsthisintimaterelationbetweentraits
andgroupsinhismultilevelselectiontheory.33Alongthesedimensions,groupsare
consideredorganismsintheirownright,completewithgrouptraitsthatareupfor
selection.
Becausereligiousbeliefstendtofacilitatethemoralsystemsandorderofagiven
society,thereligiousbeliefsofgroupsasawhole—beliefsthatleadtosocialandpro-social
behaviors—areupforselectionatthegrouplevel.Totheextentthatsuchreligiousbeliefs
positivelyaffecthowthegroupfunctions,positivelycontributetothesurvivalofthegroup
relativetoothergroups,andfacilitatethetransmissionofreligiousbeliefsthrough
biologicalreproductionorthroughculturalreproduction(i.e.,theconversion/assimilation
ofotherpopulations),thereligiousbeliefsareproperlyregardedassuccessfulstrategies
33Ibid.,pg.15.
43
fortheirrespectivegroups.Towhateverextentreligionfacilitatesgreatergroupcohesion
andthereproductivesuccessofthegroup’sindividuals,agroup’sreligionisappropriately
conceivedofasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy.Boththegenesandthebeliefsofthe
groupsthatemployrefinedgod-beliefsasadaptivelyadvantageousstrategiesshouldbe
expectedtobefavoredinfuturegenerations.Groupsthatutilizeeffectivereligiousbelief
systemsasculturaladaptationsareexpectedtosucceeddisproportionatelywell.The
culturaltraitsofthesegroupsareselected,andthegroupsbecomesuccessfuladaptive
units.Whenthishappens,accordingtoWilson,asocietyorgroupbecomesa“higher-level
organisminitsownright.”34Aslongasweconceiveofreligionasaphenomenonthat
successfullyfacilitatesgroupbenefit,religionshouldbeconsideredanadaptationdesigned
bytheforcesofculturalevolutionandgroup-levelselection.
Wilsongoestobatagainstthetoo-narrowexplanationsofreligiousbelief
conventionallytakenbyevolutionarybiologistsandpsychologists.Hethinksthestoryis
morecomplicated,andthatsomeevolutionarystoriesdonotleaveroomforlearning,
development,andsoforth:
[What]wemustunderstandfromanevolutionaryperspectiveisthatmoralsystemsincludeanopen-endedculturaldimensioninadditiontoaninnatepsychologicaldimension.Ourgeneticallyevolvedmindsmakeitpossibletohaveamoralsystem,butthespecificcontentsofmoralsystemscanchangewithingroupsandvarywidelyamonggroups,withimportantconsequencesforsurvivalandreproduction.35
[Thealgorithmofevolutionarypsychologistsisasfollows:]Foranyparticularfeatureofhumanbehaviorandpsychology,trytounderstanditasageneticallyevolvedadaptationtoafeatureoftheancestralenvironment.Thentrytoimaginethepsychologicalmechanismasaspecializedmodule…Mycomplaintisnotthatthe[described]algorithmiswrongbutthatitispartial,seemingtoexcludethe
34Ibid.,pg.17.35Ibid.,pg.28.
44
possibilityoflearning,development,culture,andotheraspectsofhumanmentalityasopen-endedprocesses.36
WhatWilsoncallsforisamodelofourpsychologythatallowsfor“open-endedprocesses.”
BorrowingfromPlotkin(1994),hearguesthatweoughttounderstandourcognitive
processesas“Darwinmachines,”asevolvedsystemsthataccommodateevolutionwithin
theirownstructures.HeciteshumanrationalthoughtasanexampleofaDarwinmachine,
asitgeneratesandprocessesnovelrepresentationsinternally.Religionasweknowit
today,Wilsonargues,isnotaphenomenonforwhichourancientenvironmentsand
evolvedcognitivemechanisms(and,therefore,genes)arefullyresponsible.Rather,
modernmanifestationsofreligion(refinedgod-beliefs)areevolutionarilyrecent
developmentsthatcomeinresponsetoevolutionarilyrecentenvironmentsandselection
pressures—andthisdevelopmentofreligionislargelycultural,ratherthangenetic.
Religiousbeliefsareproperlyconceivedofastheoutputsofour“Darwinmachine”rational
belief-formationprocesses.Theevolutionofculturalbeliefsystems,then,isnotoccurring
atthelevelofourgenesorcognitivemechanisms,butratheratthelevelofcultural
knowledge.37
Wilson’sviewsaresummarized,withanemphasisontherolethatgroupselection
playsintheemergenceof“organismicgroups”:
Organismicgroupsdonotautomaticallyevolvebutrequireaprocessofgroupselection.Groupselectioncanbeapotentevolutionaryforce,despiteitswidespreadrejectionduringtheageofindividualism…Moralsystemshaveaninnatepsychologicaldimensionbutalsoanopen-endeddimensionthatallowshumanhistorytobeseenasafast-pacedevolutionaryprocesswithculturalratherthangeneticmechanismsofinheritance.38
36Ibid.,pg.29-30.37Wilson,2003,pg.31,35.38Ibid.,pg.36-37.
45
Moralsystemsincludebothaninnatepsychologicalcomponentandanopen-endedculturalcomponentthatenablesgroupstoadapttotheirrecentenvironments.Beliefinsupernaturalagentsandotherelementsthatareassociatedspecificallywithreligioncanplayanimportantroleinthestructureandfunctionofmoralcommunities.39
JustasWilsonconcedesthatthedevelopmentofmoralsystems(andreligions,inasmuch
asreligionsfacilitatemoralsystems)isduetobothan“innatepsychologicalcomponent”
andan“open-endedculturalcomponent,”weshouldgrantthattheemergenceofgroupsas
adaptiveunitslikelyincorporatesasimilarcombinationof“innatestuff”and“open-ended”
stuff.Weprobablydohaveadaptivelyadvantageousinnatetendenciesthatleadus,as
individuals,toformintosocialgroupswithotherindividuals,quiteindependentfrom
religioussystemsorbeliefs.Forexample,kin-selectionandreciprocalaltruism
mechanismsprobablyserveasthecognitivefoundationforgroup-orientation,whilethe
cultural-leveladaptationofreligion(i.e.,religionasafacilitatorofmorality)hasonly
reinforcedourpropensitytobuildsocietiesandliveourlivesingroups.Wilson’spoints
contributewonderfullytoourunderstandingofreligioussystemsasgroupadaptations
designedtosolveevolutionarilyrecentproblems.Thereisnoneedforan“either/or”
approachtoallofthis;inaccountingforwhyhumansaresocialcreatures,itisprobable
thatevolutionarybiologistsandevolutionarypsychologiststellanimportantpartofthe
story(adaptationistexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitofkin-selectionandreciprocal
altruismmechanismsatthelevelofindividuals),whilethesocialscientistsandWilsontell
theremainderofthestory(multi-levelselectionexplanationsthatexplorethebenefitof
religionatthelevelofsocieties).
39Ibid.,pg.44.
46
Boyer(2009)provideshisowntakeonculturalevolution,inspiredbytheworkof
culturalanthropologists:
…whatweobserveasculturalrepresentationsandpracticesarevariants(ofculturaltraits),foundinroughlysimilarformsinaparticularplaceorgroupbecausetheyhaveresistedchangeanddistortionthroughinnumerableprocessesofacquisition,storage,inference,andcommunication.40
TheyrecounttheworkofBoydandRicherson(1985):
…thespreadofspecificvariantsofculturalrepresentations(suchasaparticularreligiousbelieforconceptrepresentedbyahumanmind)isseenaspartlyanalogoustothespreadofallelesinagenepool.Inparticular,thetoolsofpopulationgeneticscanbeappliedtothespreadofculturaltraitsandallowustopredicttheirspread,givensuchparametersastheinitialprevalenceofatrait,thelikelihoodoftransmission,andvariousbiases.41
ThisismuchlikeWilson’sproposal.AlsodiscussedistheworkofDanSperber(2000),in
whichtheculturaltransmissionofbeliefsispresentedinan“epidemiologicalmodel.”In
suchamodel,theprocessofbelieftransmissionishighly“entropic”—thatis,the
communicationofbeliefsproducesalargenumberofdifferentrepresentationsinalarge
numberofdifferentminds.Thatthereissomecommonalityamongthesedifferent
representationsdemandsexplanation,andtheexplanationisfoundinthefactthatpeoples’
“inferencesareguidedbytacitprinciplesthathappentobeidenticalinallnormalminds”
(Boyer&Bergstrom,2008).ThissoundsakintoAtran’s(2002)accountof“evolutionary
landscapes”andBoyer’s(2001)theoryaboutconceptualtemplatesandrelatedautomatic
inferencesystems.Allinall,thesebodiesofwork(alongwithmemetheory)providea
compellingcaseforthepositionthatculturalevolutionexplainsthetransmissionand
developmentofourvariousrefinedgod-beliefs.40Boyer,2009,pg.290.41Boyd&Richerson,1985,pg.113.
47
Notallreligionsarecreatedequal.Thistruthgivesstrengthtoa“multilevel
selection”hypothesislikeWilson’s.Somereligiousbeliefslendtotheirrespectiveculture
greatadaptiveadvantage,andotherreligiousbeliefsdonot—itisthisdisparitythatgives
theprocessesofselectionattheculturallevelsomethingtoworkwith.Inadditiontothe
memetheorypresentedbyDawkinsandBoyer(whichhelpsustounderstandhow
religiousbeliefschangeconceptuallyacrosstimeviaculturaltransmissionandviathe
variousmechanismsinplacethataffecthowwellweretaincertaintypesofbeliefs),
Wilson’s“multi-levelselection”takeonreligiousbeliefsgoesalongwaytowardaccounting
forthevastlydiversebodiesofgod-beliefsthatweobserveacrosshumanculturesacross
time.
Assuch,Ibelievethatwecanreasonablyconcludethatthediversityofgod-beliefsin
humanexperienceislargelyexplainedby:
1. Thebyproductrawgod-beliefsprovidedbyourRGCMs,
2. Theprocessesofculturalevolutionandmultilevelselection,andtheadaptive
advantageconferredtoaculturalgroupbyitsrespectiverefinedgod-beliefs
(thisincludesmemetheoryandthedifferentratesofsuccessof“copyme”
programsintheculturaltransmissionofgod-beliefs),and
3. Themanifoldofhumanexperience(i.e.,acrosstime,peoplehaveexperienced
theworldinradicallydifferentenvironmentsandwithradicallydifferent
historicalcontingencies).
Eachoftheseisacrucialfactorinunderstandingtheorigin,development,anddiversityof
ourgod-beliefs.
48
C.AdaptiveCost/BenefitAnalysis
Onewaytoproceedinconsideringthenotionthatourvariousgod-beliefsmaybe
adaptations(eitherculturalorbiological)istoperformacost/benefitanalysisofsorts.We
needtoweighthecostsofreligionagainstthebenefitstodetermineifwecanplausibly
believethatreligioussystemsmighthaveconferredadaptivebenefittotheirrespective
adherents.Fortunately,thebodyofresearchinthisparticularareaisrich.Withafew
exceptions,theliteratureindicatesthatwehavegoodreasonforbelievingthatreligious
beliefsandsystemsareadaptationsatthegrouplevel,andthatrefinedgod-beliefsalso
conferadaptivebenefitstoindividualbelievers.Beforeweproceedintothedetails,itwill
beusefultokeepinmindthatourgod-beliefsareoperatingattwodifferentlevels—the
intuitivelevelandthereflectivelevel.AtthereflectivelevelarewhatIhavetermedour
refinedgod-beliefs;thesearethemoresophisticated,inferential,andsociallyoriented
beliefs.AttheintuitivelevelarewhatIhavetermedourrawgod-beliefs;thesearethe
byproductsofournormalcognitiveprocesses.Wehaveconceivedoftheserawgod-beliefs
asthebarefoundationsfortheconstructionofrefinedgod-beliefs.Betweenthesetwo
levels,thereisa“cognitivegap”;theformerareevolutionarilyancientandcognitivelyeasy,
whilethelatterareevolutionarilyrecentandtendtobemuchmorecognitivelydifficult.
Thesetwo“levels”warrantdifferentempiricalapproaches.Anthropologistsand
socialscientistsofreligionhavemadethesocietal-levelrefinedgod-beliefsthetargetof
theirwork,whileevolutionarypsychologistsandcognitivescientistsofreligionhave
targetedthecognitive-level,rawgod-beliefswiththeirwork.Sincethesocialreligious
beliefsareevolutionarilyrecent(recent,thatis,relativetotheevolutionarilyancient
intuitionsofferedtousbyourRGCMs),thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisrelevantto
49
understandingtheiradaptivebenefit.Sincethecognitivereligiousbeliefsare
evolutionarilyancient,thestudyofmodernreligioussystemsisquiteirrelevantto
understandingtheunderlyingcognitivemechanisms(unlessweareconsideringhowour
rawgod-beliefsmighthavegivenrisetoourrefinedgod-beliefs);thepsychologicalstudyof
therelevantcognitivemechanisms,though,doesgiveusvaluableinsightintohowourraw
god-beliefsmayhavehelpedustosurviveancientenvironments.Bothapproaches—the
cognitiveandtheanthropological—ultimatelyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses.
So,Inowofficiallypropose:“Refinedgod-beliefsareadaptivelyadvantageous,both
forindividualorganismsandforgroups.”42Thenextpartofthepaperwillserveto
examinethisproposition.Bynomeanswillthissectionbeacomprehensiveexaminationof
theadaptivecostsandbenefitsofreligion.Rather,Iwillhitthemaintalkingpointsofthose
whoadvocateforthefitness-enhancingnatureofourgod-beliefs.Iwilldomybesttoavoid
evolutionary“just-so”stories—convenient,adhocexplanatoryhypothesesthatoftencome
underfirefromthecriticsofevolutionarytheory—andwillinsteadsticktothetaskof
showingthereasonabilityofbelievingthatreligiousbeliefsarefitness-conferring
adaptations.
C-1.Cost,orInvestment? Onthefaceofthings,god-beliefsasweknowthemtoday—systematizedworldviews
withvaluesandgoalsthatareseeminglyopposedtohumans’adaptiveadvantage—seem
incrediblymaladaptive.Manyreligioussystemsestablishmoralboundariesintheareasof
procreation,bodilydefense,andtheaccumulationofpersonalresources,andthisseemsto
beasure-firestrategyforevolutionaryfailure.Yet,herewearetoday,withentirelistsof
42Inallcases,refinedgod-beliefsaretransmittedculturally.
50
thoushallnot’sthatplacerestrictionsonthingslikeextra-maritalsex,violence,and
materialabundance.Atfirstglance,thisseemsanunwiseevolutionarystrategy.Afterall,
inthenaturalworldthewinnersarethosewhocanreproducesuccessfully(relativeto
others),killtheirenemies,andnotstarvetodeath.
Thatconsidered,ifwearetoproposethatgod-beliefsareadaptations,ratherthan
maladaptations,wemustcontendthatthebenefitstoreligiousbelieversoutweighthe
apparentcosts.BoyerandBergstrom(2008)havedonejustthat,attackingtheapparent
costshead-on:
Astrikingcharacteristicofmostreligiousthoughtandbehavioristhattheydonotseemtoconferanydirectfitnessadvantageonthepractitioners.So,fromanevolutionaryviewpoint,mostreligiousphenomenamightseemtobeeithermaladaptiveoradaptivelyneutral.43However,evolutionarybiologyalsodocumentsspecificwaysinwhichfitnesscostscanbecomeadaptive.Thisisparticularlysointhecaseofsignaling,anareaofintenseworkinrecentevolutionarybiology…Signalingrequiresthecoevolutionofsenderandreceivercapacities…biologistshavefocusedespeciallyoncostlysignals,whicharereliablebecausetheyaredifficulttofakeandtherebyprovidedirectindicesofthefitnessqualitiestheyaresupposedtoadvertise.44
BoyerandBergstromhaveproposedthat,whilereligioniswhattheycalla“costlysignal,”
thesuccessfulperformanceofsuchacostlysignalactuallyleadstogreateradaptivebenefit
atsomelaterpoint,asa“delayedreward.”Theypointout,“Cooperationoftenrequiresthat
peoplesacrificeanimmediatebenefitforadelayedreward.”So,theirnotionofreligious
beliefasacostlysignalonlyworksifweunderstandreligiousbeliefinthecontextofintra-
grouprelationships.Theirconceptionofreligiousbeliefsascostlysignalshelpsusto
43Boyer&Bergstrom,2008,pg.115.44Ibid.,pg.115.
51
understandtheadaptivebenefitsofreligionintermsoftheadaptivebenefitsofgroup
membership,relations,andcooperation.
BoyerandBergstrom(2008)discussthecostsandbenefitsoftheperformanceof
suchcostlysignals:
Inamoregeneralway,religiousthoughtandbehaviorwouldseemtomobilizecognitiveresourcesawayfromsurvivalandreproduction,beingfocusedonnonphysicalimaginedagency.Assumingthatreligiousactivityiscostly,doesitprovidesignals?Toalargeextentitdoes,giventhatmostactivityofthiskindisbothpublicandformalized,sothatpeople’scommitmentstothelocalritualsystemareobservablebyall(Sosis2003).Onthebasisofacomparativestudyofsmallcommunities,Sosisshowedthatcostisindeedanimportantfactor.Religiousgroupsthatrequireagreaterinvestmentincostlyritualstendtoremainmorecohesive…45
Iftheirstoryiscorrect,itindicatesthatgroup-membershipandtheadaptivebenefits
thereofaremoreadvantageoustotheindividualthanaretheindividual’sabilitiesto
cognizeaboutnon-religiousthings(likesurvivalandreproduction).Theydonotsayitso
boldly,buttheproposalisessentiallysomethinglike:thepreciousresourcesspenton
religiousthoughtandritualareadropinthebucketcomparedtotheresourcesgainedby
groupidentity,intra-grouptrust,reciprocatedaltruism,sharedresources,etc.Atthevery
least,thecostsareeventuallyoutweighed.So,perhapssuchcostlyreligioussignalsare
bestregardednotasbeingadaptivelybeneficialorcostly,butasbeingadaptiveinvestments.
Religioussignalingisanespeciallyeffectivemechanismforcommunicatinggroup
identification,becauseareligioussignaltendstobeabindingsignal.Inonesense,religious
signalsare“binding”justinthattheytendtobecostly.Costlyreligioussignalstieoneto
one’sreligiouscommunityinimportantways—significantresources,time,andenergyare
spentinparticipatinginagroup’sreligiousidentity;costlysignalsarehardertofakethan45Ibid.,pg.116.
52
inexpensivesignals.46Wecanregardreligioussignalstobe“binding”inanothersense
whenweunderstandwhat,exactly,isbeingcommunicatedbythesignalerinhisorher
participationinagivenreligiouspractice.Signalingone’saffiliationwithaparticular
religionisnotlikewearinganamebadge—itcommunicatessomuchmorethanjustassent
toaparticularreligiousworldviewandadesiretoreapthebenefitsofgroupmembership.
Religioussignalingcommunicatessharedvalues,sharedpriorities,one’sintentionto
belongtothegroup,one’sintentiontomakesacrificesforthegroup,one’sintentionto
treattheotherindividualsofthegroupasofone’s“in-group,”etc.So,signalingreligious
affiliationis“binding”inthesensethatitallowsotherstoexpectcertainthingsofthe
signaler.
Signalingreligiousaffiliationis“binding”inonefinalaspect:religiousbeliefholdsa
privilegedplaceinpeoples’livesandinsociety.One’sreligiousbeliefsencompassthe
individual;asociety’sreligiousbeliefsactasguidingprinciples,corevalues,andsocial
norms.Signalsbasedonnon-religiousideologycouldverywellbeusedtocommunicate
groupidentity;itseemsreligioussignaling,however,enjoysauniqueabilityto
communicatetoothersthewaythatoneseesoneselfandone’srelationshiptotheworld,to
thedivine,andtootherpeople.Truly,religioussignalingisdifficult(andrisky)tofake,asit
46“Inexpensivesignals,”intherealmofreligiousbelief,mightincludethingslikeverbalcommitment,mereprofessionofabelief,etc.“Costly”religioussignalsincludethingslikeparticipationincommunityritual,spendingvaluableresourcesandtimedemonstratingone’sdevotiontoareligioussystem,denyingone’sdesiresandinterestsincommitmenttoareligioussystemthaturgespro-socialoraltruisticbehavior,etc.Itisthese“costly”signalsthatmakereligiousidentificationhardtofake.Sure,anyonecancommitverballytoabeliefsystem.Theideaisthatone’saccesstogroupmembershipwouldbecontingentonone’swillingnesstospendtheresourcesonthesesignals.“Costly”signalsarehardtofake,asreligionstendtobedemanding.Thecostsofbeing“foundout”mightincludeostracismorthewithholdingofthebenefitsofgroupmembership.(Orthingslikebeingstonedtodeath,orbeingburntatthestake.)
53
signalscoremetaphysicalcommitments.Groupsthatsignalgod-beliefsinreligiousritualor
inreligiousorganizationenjoyanaddedbenefitofbeingpronouncedlytight-knit
(Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)—thishelpstoexplainwhyreligionandthesignalingof
religiousaffiliationwerefavoredoveralternativekindsofsociety-organizingbeliefsystems
andthesignalingassociatedwiththem.
God-beliefsmightalsobeappropriatelyconceivedofasasocialgatekeeper.Ifthe
abilitytosuccessfullysignalareligiousworldviewiswhatconferstoyouthecrucial
benefitsofbelongingtothelargergroup,thenthosebenefitsarenotconferredifthesignal
isnotsent.Religiousandritualadherencemight,inaliteralsense,beatickettothe
adaptivebenefitsofgroupmembership—bothinourevolutionarypastandinthepresent.
Itmightbeworthclarifyingthatthe“rituals”thatserveascostlysignalsmaybeas
“primitive”asthingslikeinitiationrites,oras“modern”asthingslikechurchattendance.
Nomatterwhereoneisalongthespectrumofculturalreligiouspractices,theideaisthat
suchasignalisinitiallycostly,buttheneventuallyyieldsareturn.Allofthisisnottosay
thattherearenot,infact,costsassociatedwithourgod-beliefs(particularly,ourrefined
god-beliefs).Rather,itisjusttheclaimthatthebenefitsofsuchbeliefs—thebenefits
associatedwithgroupmembershipandinclusion—cometofaroutweightheinitialcosts
bothofbelievingacertainwayandsignalingthosebeliefs.
C-2.Health&WellBeing Anotherapproachindeterminingtheadaptivebenefitofreligionandgod-beliefsis
inthedirectpsychologicalstudyofmodernreligiousadherents.Whateverbenefitorcost
canbefoundinthestudyofmodernreligiosityisusefulforus,inasmuchasthesecosts
andbenefitstellusaboutthecostsandbenefitsofthereligioussystemsofourevolutionary
54
past.Towhateverextentpresentdayreligiousbeliefsarelikethebeliefsofourancestors,
suchpsychologicalstudiesmaycontributetoansweringthequestionofwhetherornot
religionisanadaptation.PsychologistKennethPargament(2002)hasconductedresearch
inthisarea.Heliststheconditionsunderwhichreligiousbeliefsconferwell-beingorharm
totheiradherents:
Someformsofreligionaremorehelpfulthanothers.Areligionthatisinternalized,intrinsicallymotivated,andbuiltonabeliefinagreatermeaninginlife,asecurerelationshipwithGod,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothershaspositiveimplicationsforwell-being.Conversely,areligionthatisimposed,unexamined,andreflectiveofatenuousrelationshipwithGodandtheworldbodespoorlyforwell-being,atleastintheshortterm.47
PargamentfocusedhisresearchonthemodernAmericanreligiouslandscape,butIbelieve
hisfindingsalsogiveusstructureforunderstandingtheadaptivecostsandbenefitsof
othernon-Westernornon-modernreligions.
TherearecertainkeythemesinPargament’sfindingsthatcanserveascriteriafor
evaluatingtheadaptiveadvantageordisadvantageofreligiousworldviewsthatlookquite
differentfromWesterntheism.Suchcriteriaincludethesuccessfulinternalizationof
religiousbeliefs,theintrinsicmotivationofone’sreligiouspractices/behavior,asenseof
greatermeaningasderivedfromone’sreligiousbeliefs,asenseofspiritualsecurityas
conferredbyone’sreligiousbeliefs,andasenseofspiritualconnectednesswithothers.It
isupforempiricalresearchtodecidethis,butIwouldimaginethatevenabsentaliteral
conceptof“God,”ifagivenreligion,spiritualworldview,orculturalpracticemeetsthe
benefit-conferringstructureoutlinedbyPargament,wemightreasonablyexpectitto
conferthesamewell-beingandbenefitsthattheparticularreligionsPargamentstudieddid
47Pargament,2002,pg.177.
55
infactconfer.Giventhis,itisnotbeliefin“God,”perse,thatconferssuchbenefits;rather,
thepsychologicalbenefitsareproductsofthestructureofthereligion.Inprinciple,such
benefitscouldbehadwithastrictlysecularworldview,wereitasecularworldview
structuredsoastofacilitatethecommonthemesstudiedbyPargament.
Pargamentalsodrewconclusionsaboutwhichtypesofpeoplemostbenefitfromthe
typesofreligionhestudied:
Noteveryoneexperiencesthesamebenefitsfromreligion.Religiousnessismorehelpfultomoresociallymarginalizedgroups(e.g.,olderpeople,AfricanAmericans,women,poorpeople)andtothosewhoaremorereligiouslycommitted.Religiousbeliefsandpracticesappeartobeespeciallyvaluableinmorestressfulsituations…thatpushpeopletothelimitsoftheirownpersonalandsocialresources.SomeevidencealsosuggeststhatreligionisparticularlyhelpfultoRomanCatholicsdealingwithcontrollablelifestressorsandtoProtestantscopingwithuncontrollablelifeevents.48
Pargamentsummarizesthatthe“efficacyofreligiondependsonthedegreetowhichitis
wellintegratedintopeoples’lives.”Individualswhomostbenefitfromtheirreligionare
oneswhoareapartofasocialenvironmentthatencouragestheirfaith.Alsobenefitingare
thosewhoarebestabletoblendtheir“religiousbeliefs,practices,andmotivations
harmoniouslywitheachother.”Conversely,individualswhodidnotfitthose
descriptions—individualswhosereligiousidentityisnotsupported,whosereligionisunfit
fortheirproblems,andwhosebeliefsandpractices“lackcoherencewitheachother”—
receivedharm.Individualswhowereunabletofullyintegratetheirreligiousbeliefs
actuallysufferedintheirwell-being.
Pargament(2002)mentionsmarginalizedgroupsasthosepeoplewhobenefit
particularlywellfromreligion(becausereligiousbeliefsareembeddedmoredeeplyinto48Ibid.,pg.178.
56
theirculture)andstressfulsituationsasthoseeventsthatbestelicitparticularbenefitfrom
religiousbeliefs(becausefaithisaneffectivecopingmechanisminresponsetoevents
outsideofone’scontrol).Ashasalreadybeenmentioned,whatneedstobeempirically
studiediswhetherornotnon-religiousworldviewsconferpsychologicalwell-beingtotheir
adherents,ifthebenefit-conferringconditionsofthesereligiousbeliefsystems
(Pargament’sinternalization,intrinsicmotivation,coherence,etc.)aremetbythenon-
religiousworldviews.Itisunclearhowsalientafactorreligionitselfisinthese
psychologicalstudies—themoresalientfactorscouldbethesocialandpsychological
factorswehavediscussed.
OnewaytointerpretPargament’sfindingsisthatthepsychologicalwell-beingwas
notconferredbythereligiousbeliefsatall,butbytheabilityofanindividualtointernalize
theirchosenworldview,beapartofasupportivecommunity,comeupwithacoherent
worldview,etc.Onemightcontendthatitisnotreligiousbeliefitselfthatconfersadaptive
benefit,butratherthepsychologicalabilitytocopewiththeworldviewsprovidedbysuch
religiousbeliefs.Afterall,someofPargament’smostimportantfindingsdetailhowitisthe
peoplewhohavenotfullyintegratedreligionintotheirlivesthataremorepsychologically
atrisk.Anyhow,allofthataside,Pargamentwouldprobablyinsistthatthemostfitness-
enhancingreligionsaretheonesthatproducebelieverswhocanmeetthosecriteriafor
receivingpsychologicalbenefits;ifareligioncanfacilitatethepsychologicalwell-beingof
itsadherents,itisproperlyregardedasfitness-conferring.Thereligionsthatcannot
facilitatethosethingsactuallydopsychologicalharmtoadherents(i.e.,leadtheir
lukewarmadherentsintoresource-demandingcognitivedissonance).Theindividuals
57
withinsuccessfulreligionswhodonotmeetthevariousstandards(internalization,
intrinsicmotivation,etc.)alsosuffercostsaccordingly.
Thereisalsoanimportantrelationshipbetweenreligionandbehaviorsthatare
conducivetophysicalhealth.BiologistRobertTrivers(2011)discussesthisrelationship.
Herecognizesthatreligionsoftenencouragehealthybehavior,andhereferencesthe
effectsofreligiousbeliefonimprovedimmunefunction.Triversalsocitesthepositive
effectofmusiconimmunefunction.Medicineandmusicbothprovideplacebobenefitsto
some,andbothwere“originallyembedded”withinreligion.49However,manyofthehealth
benefitsofreligiousbeliefandaffiliationmightbeduetothebenefitsofpositivebeliefand
groupmembership,ingeneral,andnottoreligiousbelief,inparticular.But,insofaras
religiousbelieffacilitatesanindividual’spositivebeliefandmembershipinasupportive
group—i.e.,insofarasreligiousbeliefconferstothebelievertheadvantagesthatcomewith
thosethings—thenreligiousbeliefisrightlyconsideredtobeincrediblybeneficial.Trivers
alsodiscussesthepositiveimmuneeffectsofdisclosingtrauma,andhecontendsthat
religiousdisciplineslikeconfessionalsandprivateprayersmayeachfacilitatethis
benefit.50
Thesethingstakentogether,astrongcasecanbemadeforthepositiveeffectsof
religiononphysicalandpsychologicalhealth.Overthecourseofculturalevolution,we
wouldexpectthereligionsandculturalpracticesthatfacilitatepsychologicalandphysical
well-beingtobesuccessfulrelativetobeliefsystemsthatdonot.Aswehaveseen,one
issueofcontentionishowsalientafactorreligiousbeliefitselfactuallyis;itispossiblethat
themoreefficaciousfactorsarethingslikepositivebeliefandsupportivegroup49Trivers,2011,pg.279.50Ibid.,pg.287.
58
membership,ingeneral.Regardless,inasmuchasreligionfacilitatesbeneficialthingslike
positivebeliefandsupportivegroupmembership,religioncanitselfbeappropriately
construedasanadaptivelyadvantageousstrategy.
C-3.GroupCohesion&Pro-SocialBehavior
PsychologistsAraNorenzayanandAzimShariff(2008)discusstheadaptive
advantagesofreligiousbeliefs,relativetothedevelopmentoflarge-scalesocietiesandpro-
socialbehavior:
Religiousprosociality,thus,mayhavesoftenedthelimitationsthatkinship-basedand…reciprocity-basedaltruismplaceongroupsize.Inthisway,theculturalspreadofreligiousprosocialitymayhavefacilitatedtheriseofstable,large,cooperativecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelatedindividuals.51Thecognitiveawarenessofgodsislikelytoheightenprosocialreputationalconcernsamongbelievers,justascognitiveawarenessofhumanwatchersdoesamongbelieversandnonbelieversalike.However,supernaturalmonitoring,tothedegreethatitisgenuinelybelievedandcognitivelysalient,offersthepowerfuladvantagethatcooperativeinteractionscanbeobservedevenintheabsenceofsocialmonitoring.52
Becausekinshipselectionmechanismsandreciprocalaltruismmodelsputabiologicalcap
onthesizeofsocialgroups,theriseoflargecommunitiesofgeneticallyunrelated
individualsneedsexplaining.NorenzayanandShariffproposethatitisreligiouspro-
socialitythat,infact,enabledsocietiestomovepasttherestrictionsplacedongroupsizes
bytherelativelyweakhumanabilitytomonitorgroupmembers’behavior;itwasthepro-
socialbehaviorthatresultedfromreligiousbeliefs,theyargue,thatfacilitatedtheriseof
largersocieties.Inshort:ifreligionprovidesaGodorgod-conceptthatservestomonitor
myneighbor’sbehaviorinawaythatIcannot,thenthatGodorgod-conceptwilleffectively
51Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.58.52Ibid.,pg.58.
59
facilitatemytrustingmyneighbor,mygoodfaithtowardmyneighbor,andmycontinued
altruismtowardmyneighbor.Further,ifaGodorgod-conceptprovidedbyareligious
systemcanstandintofacilitateabehaviortowardstrangersthatmirrorsmybehavior
towardmykinortowardthosewhohaveactedaltruisticallytowardme,thensuchaGodor
god-conceptcanbeexpectedtocontributetothegrowthandstabilityofagroupentity.
NorenzayanandShariffdiscusstheeffectsofreligiousbeliefongroupcohesionin
particular:
…religiousbehaviorthatsignalsgenuinedevotionwouldbeexpectedtomobilizegreatercooperationandtrust,andwheninternalandexternalthreatstogroupsurvivalarehigh,religiousgroupswouldbeexpectedtooutlastsecularones…largesocietiesthathavesuccessfullystabilizedhighlevelsofcooperativenormswouldbemorelikelythansmalleronestoespousebeliefinmorallyconcernedgodswhoactivelymonitorhumaninteractions.53Attitudinalsurveysshowthatreligiousindividualsareperceivedtobemoretrustworthyandmorecooperative.54
NorenzayanandShariffconcludethat,towhateverextentreligiousbeliefcanbeeffectively
signaled,thenitmightenhancein-grouppersonaltrust,lowerthecostsofmonitoring
others’behavior,andtheneventuallyreinforceintra-grouppro-socialtendencies.Insmall-
scalesocieties,freeloadingisnotmuchofanissue,asthebehaviorsofindividualscanbe
easilymonitored.However,inlarger-scalesocieties,thebehaviorofindividualsismuch
moredifficulttokeeptrackof;assuch,inlarger-scalesocietiesfreeloadingisaweightier
issue.So,religionmightproperlyberegardedasasuccessfulanti-freeloadingadaptation,
bywhichcommittedindividualsarepressuredtocooperatenotbyotherindividuals,butby
53Ibid.,pg.59.54Ibid.,pg.60.
60
God,god-concepts,orreligioussystemsofmoralnorms,obligations,andexpectations.The
costofsuchsignalsholdsthesignalersaccountabletotheircommitments.
ManyofNorenzayanandShariff’s(2007)conclusionsarebasedonresearchthey
conductedintheareaofreligiousprimesandeconomicgames.Theirfindingsare
fascinating:primingtheirsubjectsimplicitlywithGod-conceptsledtheirsubjectsto
allocatemoremoneytoananonymousstranger,relativetowhenaneutral(orno)concept
wasactivated.Theirconclusionsarethattheimplicitactivationofreligiousconceptsgave
individualsagreatertendencytowardpro-social,moralbehavior.Theyproposetwo
explanationsofthepro-socialbehavior(2007):(1)suchGod-conceptsareunconsciously
linkedtoconceptsofgenerosity,andwhenaGod-conceptisactivatedthereisan
“ideomotor”effect(apowerofsuggestion)ongenerosity,and(2)theactivationofaGod-
conceptactivatesinthesubjectsa“feltpresenceofsupernaturalwatchers.”Iseenoreason
whybothcannotbethecase;ifgod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effectonmore
generousbehavior,itmightbethatthegod-conceptprimeshavean“ideomotor”effecton
thenotionofanall-seeingwatcherandanypro-socialbehaviorassociatedwiththat.
Interestingly,thepro-socialeffectwasactivatedjustasstronglywhensubjectswere
primedwithconceptsassociatedwithsecularmoralauthority—governmentprimes,police
primes,lawprimes,etc.NorenzayanandShariff(2008)discussthesefindingsandtherise
ofmorally“reliable”secularinstitutions:
Althoughreligionscontinuetobepowerfulfacilitatorsofprosocialityinlargegroups,theyarenottheonlyones.Theculturalspreadofreliablesecularinstitutions,suchascourts,policingauthorities,andeffectivecontract-enforcingmechanisms,althoughhistoricallyrecent,haschangedthecourseofhumanprosociality.Consequently,activemembersofmodernsecularorganizationsareatleastaslikelytoreportdonatingtocharityasactivemembersofreligiousones…therearemanyexamplesofmodern,large,cooperative,andnotveryreligious
61
societies…that,nonetheless,retainagreatdegreeofintragrouptrustandcooperation.55
So,both“God-concept”and“secularmoralauthorityconcept”primesleadindividualsto
greaterpro-socialbehavior.Thisisamattertobesettledbyempiricalpsychologists,butit
seemsthatthecommonthreadbetweenthosetwokindsofprimesarethenotionsof
“authority”and“beingwatched.”RegardlessofwhethertheprimeisaGod-authorityora
secular-authority,itmightbetheactivationofan“authority”conceptthatissufficientfor
theactivationofthetendencytowardpro-social,morallyresponsiblebehavior.Thatwe
havesocial,moralauthoritiesthataresecularisadistinctlymodernphenomenon—it
mightbethatour“moralauthority”conceptsaresoconceptuallyrelatedtoour“God”
conceptsthattheactivationofa“secularmoralauthorityconcept”actuallyactivatesour
“God”concepts,too.Thereismuchgroundforinsightfulempiricalwork,here.Atthevery
least,thetwo(“God”conceptsand“secularmoralauthority”concepts)aresufficiently
related,suchthattheactivationofeachindividually,independentfromtheintended
activationoftheother,successfullyyieldspro-socialbehavior.
TheinformationprovidedbyNorenzayanandShariffgivesusgoodreasonto
supposethat“Godconcepts”mighthavehelpedtofacilitatetheriseoflarge,stable
societiesinourevolutionarypast.Theseconceptsarethoughttoengenderintra-group
trustandcooperation,andtheyarethoughttohavecontributedtotheemergenceof
particularkindsofgroupsthatwouldhavebeenmoresuccessfulthantheirrivals(i.e.,the
kindsofgroupsinwhichindividualsareprimedbytheircultureandreligionforpro-social
behavior).Contemporarystudiesofthesepro-socialreligiousprimes(andnowsecular
55Norenzayan&Shariff,2008,pg.62.
62
primes)areglimpsesintoourevolutionarypastthathelpustounderstandtheinner
workingsofourancestorsandtheirdevelopingsocieties.Further,theyreveal,tosome
extent,theevolutionaryeffectthatreligiousbeliefsandsystemsmighthavehadonthem
socially.
C-4.ReligionasCostly
Givencurrentevents,itmightseemstrangethatIamarguingthatreligiousbeliefs
areadvantageous,inanysense.Indeed,theresponsibilityformuchviolentconflictin
historicalandmoderntimesbelongstothosemotivatedbyreligiousreasonsorbyreligious
conflict.Crusades,Inquisitions,andwitchhunts,forinstance,werecarriedoutforthe
gloryofGod;theriseandfallofIslamickingdomsintheMiddleEasthasbeencharacterized
byreligiousconquestandSunni-Shi’aideologicaldisputes;thedistinctlymodernthreatsof
terrorism,violentreligiousextremism,andreligiouspersecutionarecarriedoutby
practitionersfromnearlyeveryprimaryworldreligion;entireminoritygroupsarewiped
fromexistenceinreligiously-motivatedgenocide;andreligiousconflictsteersmany
nations’geopoliticsandmilitaryengagement.
Inlightofthesethings,astatementlike,“Religiousbeliefisadaptivelyadvantageous,”
mightseemabsurd.Afterall,noneofthoseconsequencesofreligiousbeliefis
“advantageous”inanynormalsenseoftheword.Imustconcede,ofcourse,thatreligious
conflictisindeedcostly.Whenreligiousconflictbecomeswar,itisimpossibletodenythat
theeconomic,societal,andhumantollsof“religion”arefrighteninglyhigh.So,inorderfor
metomaintainthatreligiousbeliefsareadvantageous,Imustdosoinlightofthese
undeniabletruths.Myclaimmustbethat,despitetheseapparentcosts,god-beliefsyieldto
usanetadaptiveadvantage.
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Wewillbeginwithreligiouswarandconflict.Itseemsimpossibletosaythat
religiousbeliefisadaptivelybeneficialtoindividualsengagedinreligiousconquest—beit
religiousconflictonthescaleoftheCrusades,orreligiousconflictbetweentwo
neighboringtribes.Clearly,sincerelyheldreligiousbeliefsaredetrimentaltoonewhodies
inreligiousconflict(assuming,ofcourse,thatitwasareligiousbeliefthatlandedthis
individualorhissocietyinviolentconflict).Religiousbeliefsareequallycostlytothe
culturethatiswipedouteitherbyforcedassimilationintoaninvadingreligioussocietyor
byacatastrophiclossofpopulationinviolentconflict.Putinverycrassterms,religious
beliefiscostlytothelosersofreligiousconflict.However,whatisreligiousbelieftothe
winnersofreligiousconflict?Iproposethat,forthevictorsofreligiouslymotivatedconflict,
religionisasuccessfultoolofconquest;itisaunifier,motivator,justifier,andcultural
symbol.Religionprovidesjustificationforgoingtowar(andforreapingthebenefitsof
war).Certainly,therearematerialandhumanlossestoallsidesinnearlyeveryviolent
religiousconflict;however,therearealsowinnersinmostsuchconflicts.Foragiven
society,forinstance,warisagreatmeansofmaterialgain—anenemy’sresources,an
enemy’spopulation,anenemy’sstrategiclocation,anenemy’sexploitedlabor,etc.
Itistruethatthewinnersofreligiouslymotivatedconflictalsosufferlossesof
resourcesandlife.Icangrantthis,however,andsimultaneouslymaintainthatreligious
beliefisadaptivelyadvantageousatthegrouplevel,aslongasthesocietyinquestiongains
morethanitloses—resources,location,ideologicalsupremacy,thepopulationofa
conqueredpeople,etc.Certainly,atleastsomereligiouslymotivatedconflictsin
evolutionaryhistoryhaveresultedinanetlossforareligiousgroup.However,myposition
(thatrefinedgod-beliefisawinningstrategy)dependsonlyonthepropositionthat
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religiousconflictsresultedinanetgainforthoseinvolvedofthereligioussort.Inthisway,
refinedgod-beliefcanbeconceivedofasadaptive,eveninlightoftheresourceslostbythe
winningside.Itisworthnoting,too,thatwarriorscanbekilledandcropsburned(or
whatever),butthatreligiousconceptsandideasarenotsimilarlydestructible.Lossesthat
areshortofcatastrophictoareligiousgroupthathas“won”(orlost)agivenconflictmight
servetogalvanizetheirreligiousconcepts,stories,andculture.Whateverthecase,success
atwarisagreatwaytomitigatecompetitionwithneighboringgroups.Attheculturallevel,
warisalsoasuccessfulstrategyofideologicalconquest:howbettertoensurethespreadof
asociety’sbeliefsandvaluesthanbythatsociety’simpositionofitsbeliefsupon
neighboringpopulations?
Ifreligioncanbeproperlyconceivedofasamotivatorforwarandconquest,asI
believeitcan,andifthebenefitsofwartoasocietyandtoitsindividualssometimes
outweighthecosts,thenacasecanbemadethatreligiouslymotivatedwarisactually,inat
leastsomecases,beneficialtothecultureorsocietythatholdsthosereligiousbeliefs.56
Thus,thegenesandideologiesofthepeoplewhoholdtothosereligiousbeliefsenjoy
relativesuccessinthenextgeneration.Certainly,thecostsofreligiouswararemassive,
andthesecostsreflectnegativelyupontheadvantageousnessofreligiousbeliefto
whateverextentsincerereligiousbelieversarethelosersinagivenconflict.However,such
conflictsalsohavewinners,andthewinnersenjoybenefits;towhateverextentsincere
religiousbelievers(individualorgroup)“win”inagivenconflict,thebenefitsreflect
positivelyupontheadvantageousnessofthewinner’sreligiousbeliefs.Presumably,to
whateverextentgod-beliefsmakeasocietybetteratwar—forinstance,towhateverextent
56Thatis,inthesecasesreligionhelpstofurtherthesurvivalandspreadofthatculture.
65
fightingforreligiousreasonsemboldensanarmy,makesthearmyfearlessofdeath,etc.—
suchgod-beliefsyieldtothatsocietyevenfurtherbenefit.
Letitbeknownthatinusingtermslike“winner”and“successfulstrategy,”Iamnot
advocatingforreligiouswarorprovidingjustificationforreligiouswar—thatmuchshould
beclear!Rather,Imeantoshowthatthereismoretotherelationshipbetweenreligious
conflictandevolutionthanjustmassivecost;infact,therearewinners.Ialsothinkit
helpfultopointoutthatmassivelycostlyconflictisnotuniquetoreligiousbelief.Secular
andatheiststateshavecommittedatrocitiesagainsthumanitywithoutreligiousmotivation
orjustification;seeHitler’s,Stalin’s,andMao’scontributionstothebloodytwentieth
century.Thecarnagewroughtinthesesituationsisideological,butitisnotcharacterized
bygod-beliefs.Imentionthis,becausereligionhasfarfromcorneredthemarketinarmed
conflict;societiesareperfectlycapableoffindingreasonforgoingtowarwithother
societies,oroffindingjustificationfortheeradicationofminoritygroupsfromtheir
population,sansreligiousbelief.Certainly,theabilitytowageareligiouswar,andthe
justificationfordoingso,isabyproductofreligiousbelief;buthumansocietiesexcelat
wagingwarindependentofreligiousbelief.Itisamischaracterizationofgod-beliefs(andof
thehistoryofviolentconflict)tosaythatgod-beliefsaremaladaptationsthatgiverisetothe
humancapacitytokillandbekilledinwar.Tocharacterizegod-beliefsinthiswayalso
betraysanassumption—thatthe“religiouswars”weobserveinmoderntimesaretruly
religiousinnature.Granted,somereligiousconflictistrulyreligiousinnature;other
“religiousconflict,”however,ismoreplausiblypoliticalorgeopoliticalinnature,with
religiousideologyusedasajustificationforconflictorasatoolforrecruitmenttoacause.
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Asidefromviolentreligiousconflict,theothercommonlyenumeratedcostsof
religiousbeliefincludetime,resourceallocationandopportunitycost,pain(physicalor
emotional),costlycommitmenttoritual,adherencetomoralnormsandstandardsthatare
adaptivelycostly,etc.(Sosis,2009).Onthesurfaceofthings,eachofthesecanindeedbe
understoodasacost.However,Ihavepresentedevidence(Norenzayan&Shariff,2008)for
theconclusionthatitwasgod-beliefsthathelpedenablehumangroupstogrowbeyondthe
relativelysmallgroupsizesofourdistantancestors,andIhavepresentedBoyerand
Bergstrom’s(2008)argumentthatreligiousbeliefisbestunderstoodasacostlysignal.
Eachofthecostslistedabove,inadditiontobeingunderstoodasevolutionarilycostly,may
beunderstoodasanevolutionaryinvestment.Iftheorganismsthatinvestinthesecostly
practicesreaptheadaptivebenefitsofgroupmembershipandstablegroupcohesion
(religionasacostlysignalthatyieldsapayoff),thensuchinitiallycostlypracticeswere
wiseadaptiveinvestments,indeed.Iftheorganismsandsocietiesthatarereligiousare
madestrongerandmorestablebytheirreligiousbeliefs,thentheinitialcoststhatcome
withparticipationinreligionarejustsubsumedbythebroadersuccessfulstrategyof
refinedgod-beliefthatisimplementedatthegrouplevel.Inbothcases,thebenefits
outweighthecosts.
4.Conclusions
Areourgod-beliefsevolutionarilycostlyorevolutionarilybeneficial?Ihavebuilta
caseforthenetadaptiveadvantageofrefinedgod-beliefs,byshowingtheeffectsthat
religionandreligiousbehaviorhaveonanindividual’saccesstogroupmembership
(religionasanadaptiveinvestment/costlysignal),groupcohesion(religionasafacilitatorof
67
theriseoflarge,stablesocieties),pro-socialbehavior(religionasamoralizingforce),
psychologicalwell-being(religionasasourceofindividualsecurityandwell-being),and
physicalhealth(religiousproscriptionsasconducivetophysicallyhealthybehavior).Those
whowouldarguethatourgod-beliefsaremaladaptiveneedtoshowthatthecostsofsuch
beliefsoutweighthebenefitsthatweresurveyedintheprevioussection.
Thecostsofreligiousbeliefthatareoftencited—religiousconflictandcostly
adherencetosocialnorms,forinstance—arenotnegligible.Indeed,manypeoplehavedied
orlosttheircultureinthenameofgod-beliefs,andthatseemsobviouslycostly.Ina
possibleworldinwhichtherewerenotraceofreligiousbelief,however,therewould
certainlybeotherreasonsforconflict(likescarcityofresources).Ihavearguedthatitwas
religionitselfthathelpedtofacilitatethedevelopmentofhumansociety.Insofaras
religionfacilitatesgroupcooperationandthebenefitsthatcomewithit(group
membership,groupcohesion,andaltruism),religionoughttoberegardedasimmensely
beneficial.Indeed,fortheretoberecognizablehumansocietiesorculturesinanother
possibleworldthatlacksgod-beliefs,someothersocietalgluewouldbeneededtostandin
for“religion”anditsroleinthecohesionofsociety.Inourworld,itwasreligionthatinfact
servedasthisglue.Intheimaginingofaworldwithoutreligiousconflict(andtherefore
withoutreligiousbelieforitsevolutionarybenefits),perhapswecanhaveourcakeandeat
it,too;butperhapswecannot.
Theoriginsofourgod-beliefscannotbeadequatelyexplainedbyappealtoselective
pressuresoccurringatthegeneticlevel.Thefoundationsofreligiousbelief—rawgod-
belief—arenotadaptationsthatwereselected-for.Rather,whatwasselectedwere
cognitivemechanismsthatyieldbyproductrawgod-beliefs.Thesemechanismscomposea
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religion-generatingcognitivesuite,theRGCMsofwhichoperateinevolutionarily
unintendeddomainstoyieldtheirbyproducts.Thereligion-generatingcognitivesuite
facilitatestheformationofbyproductgod-beliefs,andthesebyproductsaredevelopedover
timebyculturesintorefinedgod-beliefs;theserefinedsystemsofbeliefaretheadaptively
advantageoustraitsofgroupsandcultures.Thatis,theyyieldcertainbehaviorsthatare
beneficialtobothgroupsandindividuals.Theprocessesofmulti-levelselectiondotheir
workontheseconsequentbehaviorsandgroup-organismictraits.Individualsand
societieswiththeproperkindsofreligiousstoriestotell(refinedgod-beliefs)wouldhave
yieldedadaptivelyadvantageousbehaviorsandsurviveddisproportionatelywell,relative
tothosewithouttherightkindsofadaptivelyadvantageousrefinedgod-beliefs.
IhaveadvocatedforafusionoftheByproductandAdaptationistaccountsforthe
phenomenonofreligiousbelief.Ihavearguedthatourrawgod-beliefsarethecognitive
byproductsofbrainsliketheonesthatwehave,andthatourrefinedgod-beliefsareformed
byhumanprocessesoflearning(including,forthetheist,revelation),rationalization,meme
transmission,andgroup-levelselection.Rawgod-beliefsarethearchitecturalspandrelsof
ourcognitivemechanisms—thespacesbetweenthe“arches”ofourcognition.Thecontent
ofourrefinedgod-beliefsisdeterminedbyculturalevolutionandthecontingenciesof
humanculturaltransmissionandstorytelling.Modernbeliefsystemsareindeedthe
productsofselection,butatthegrouplevel,ratherthanatthegeneticlevel.Thesespecific
beliefsystemsledgroupsandculturesinourevolutionarypasttobehaveincertainways;
theseparticularbehavioraltendenciesledtotheirgroups’successand,therefore,tothe
continuedtransmissionoftheirrespectiveculturalstoriesandtotheflourishingofthe
individualsofthesesocieties.
69
Itisamistaketoappealexclusivelytoadaptationiststoriesinexplainingthe
phenomenonofreligiousbelief,anditisamistaketoconceiveofrefinedreligiousbeliefsas
themerebyproductsofourcognitivestructures.Weneedultimatelytoappealtoboth
kindsofstories.Theadaptationiststoriesofferedbyevolutionarypsychologistsmightbe
abletoaccountforspecificcognitivemechanisms(theRGCMs),psychologicalprocesses,
andbelief-formationtendencies,buttheyfailtoaccountfortheoriginsoftheinitialcontent
ofourgod-beliefsinawaythatourbyproductstorycan.Itishighlyquestion-beggingto
positthatbeliefsthemselvesareselectableatthegeneticlevel,orthatreligiousbeliefs
themselves(thatis,thosebeliefsthataredemonstrablyculturallytransmitted)are
transmittablegenetically.Itisalsodifficulttoseehowadaptationiststoriesmightexplain
theconfluenceofthevaryingsystemsandcomponentsinvolvedinreligiousbeliefsand
systems—morality,ritual,beliefsinsupernaturalbeings,emotionalsymbolismand
experience,etc.—eachofwhichhasitsownuniqueevolutionaryhistoryapartfromreligion,
morebroadlyconstrued.Ifreligionjustistheconfluenceofthesevarioussystemsinan
evolutionarilyunintendedreligiousdomain,thenreligionoughttobeconceivedofasa
byproduct.However,thatrefinedgod-beliefsareculturaladaptationsisclear.
Oneisrighttoask,“Why,despitetheexplanatoryalternativestoreligionthatwe
haveathand,anddespitethecontradictionsinherenttomanyreligioussystems,dosuch
god-beliefspersist?”Wemightaddtothatquestion,“Whyarethesereligiousstoriesso
unified,andwhyaretheysoagreeduponwithinagivensociety?”Afterall,itseems
strange,giventheabilityoftheempiricalsciencestodebunkmanyofourreligiousclaims,
thatreligionremainsasubiquitousasitis.Ifreligionisproperlyconceivedofasa“virusof
themind,”shouldwenotexpectscienceandtechnologytoserveascapable“anti-viral”
70
medications?AsImentionedabitearlier,someofthesereligiousbeliefsactuallyfitquite
wellintotheintuitiveconceptualexpectationsthatwehavefortheworldaroundus
(although,successfulgod-beliefs,accordingtoBoyer(2001),willviolateconceptual
expectationstotheproperdegree).Indeed,weshouldexpectourrefinedgod-beliefs,ifthey
didevolvefromourintuitiverawgod-beliefs,toalignconsistentlywiththesereligious
biases.Thisconsonanceofourrefinedgod-beliefswithourintuitiveunderstandingofthe
worldaroundus(deliveredtousbyourRGCMs)shouldonlybeexpectedtoreinforcethe
variousreligiousbeliefstowhichpeoplehold.
Inexplainingthepersistenceofreligiousbelief,itisimportanttonotethat,while
ourscientificmethodhasmovedusbeyondneedingtopositbeliefinGod(orgods)inorder
topossesssatisfactoryexplanationsofthephenomenaweexperience,thestrong
Byproductclaimstillstands:that,byvirtueofthewayourbrainsarestructured,we
naturallyconceiveoftheworldintermsofgod-beliefs.Thescientificmethodandempirical
sciencescanleadustodisavowcertaingod-beliefs,butIfinditunlikelythatourempirical
pursuitswilleversuccessfullyoverridethebyproductbeliefsofthestructuresofour
brains;wecannot,afterall,convinceourowncognitivemechanismstostopforming
byproductgod-beliefs.Thatis,wecannotstepawayfromourowncognition(Kahneman,
2011).Perhapsreligiousbeliefpersists,becauseourautomaticrawgod-beliefspersist.To
expectreligiousbeliefnottopersististoexpectpeopletoignorethereligiousinclinations
deliveredtothembytheirbrains—thatthingsaredesigned,thatthereisagency“outthere,”
thattheobjectsofourperceptionhavementalstates,etc.—andtooperatebyworldviews
thatareveryunnaturalforpeoplewithbrainslikeourstohold.Ifthesereligiousbiasesare
aspervasiveasIhavemadethemouttobe,thenastrictlysecularworldviewisactually
71
inconsistentwithmuchofthehumanexperience.Bythat,Imeanthatitwouldbestrange
foronetodenyone’sreligiouslybiasedinclinations,ifweassumesufficientignoranceof
anynon-religiousexplanationforthephenomenathatwenaturallyexplainbyappealto
god-beliefs.Addtothisone’splacementinareligiousculturalcontext,anditisevenless
surprisingthatone’sgod-beliefspersistinthemidstofalternative,non-religiouswaysof
seeingtheworld.
Perhapsthemostobviousexplanationonemightofferforwhycertainreligious
beliefspersististhattheytellatruestoryaboutthewaytheworldactuallyis;or,itmaybe
thattheytellapartiallytruestoryaboutthewaytheworldis.Thisiscertainlypossible.It
isnotpossible,however,thateveryreligiousstoryexplainshowtheworldactuallyis,for
acrossreligiousstories(andwithincertainindividualstories)thereisgreatincompatibility.
Therearenumerousreligioustraditions,forinstance,thatclaimtoworshiptheone,true
(and,therefore,mutuallyexclusive)God.So,ifwearetoexplainwhyreligiousbelief
persistsbygrantingthattheymightpossiblybetruebeliefs,weneedtofigureoutwhich
religiousbeliefsaretrueandwhicharefalse.But,thoughinprinciplepossible,thatwill
takeusfarafieldofthescopeofthispaper.Instead,Iofferthatreligiousbeliefpersists,
becausereligiousworldviewsarecomposedofbeliefsthatpersistentlymeshwiththe
believers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthem.Thehumanexperienceyieldsapanoply
ofvaryingreligiousbeliefs,becausepeopleexperiencetheworlddifferentlyandform
religiousbeliefsaccordingly;thedifferingreligiousbeliefspersist,becausethebeliefs’
consonancewiththebelievers’experiencesoftheworldaroundthempersists.
Ifreligiousbeliefswereoutrageouslyandobviouslyfalseorself-contradictory,and
werethisoutrageousfalsityorself-contradictionobvioustothebeliever,weshouldexpect
72
thesebeliefsnottopersist.Similarly,itseemsthat,werethereligiousbeliefsincoherentor
conceptuallyabsurd,wewouldexpectthemnottobepropagated(muchasBoyer(2001)
insistedwithhismodelofintuitiveconceptualtemplates).However,religiousbeliefdoes
persist.Ibelieveweareanchoredtoourreligiousworldviewsbecause1)itismostnatural
forustoconceiveoftheworldinreligiousterms,asIexplainedearlier,andbecause2)
thesereligiousbeliefsandexplanationsareconsistentlyre-confirmedtousbyour
experiencesoftheworld(whichareeithertrulyreligiousinnature,merelyperceivedtobe
religiousinnature,orsimplydonotcontradictwiththereligiousexplanationswehave
formedforthem).Itisalsolikelythatourgod-beliefsenjoytheboonsofthevarious
familiarityandconfirmationbiasesatworkinourpsychologies.
Thepersistenceofourgod-beliefsmightalsobepartiallyexplainedbytheriseof
verycomplicated,rigorous,andsystematizedrefinedgod-beliefs.Suchextensivebelief
systemshavegivenrisetoentirefieldsofintellectualpursuit(theology,anthropology,
philosophyofreligion,etc.).Abelief,orbeliefsystem,shouldbeexpectedtopersistmore
easilywhereverwehavethesehighlyintellectualized,counter-intuitiveapproachestogod-
beliefs(rememberBarrett&Keil’s“ontologicalgap”and“theologicalcorrectness”).Such
approachestogod-beliefsspendconsiderableeffortexplainingawayanyseeming
inconsistencybetweenagod-beliefandthebeliever’sexperienceoftheworld,orany
incompatibilitybetweenagod-beliefandsomecontrarybodyofevidence.Ifabeliever(or
culture)ishelpedtoreconcilehisorhergod-beliefswithotherideasormattersoffactthat
arecontrarytohisorhergod-beliefs,suchreconciliationshouldbeexpectedtoaidinthe
beliefs’persistence.Manyrefinedgod-beliefsenjoythisstatusofhavingbeenreconciledto
73
bodiesofevidence(orideas)thataretothecontrary—thankstophilosophicaltheology,
theisticapologetics,andsoon.
Asforwhyagivensociety’sreligiousstoriesseemsounifiedandagreed-upon,I
believewecanpursueasimilarexplanation:weshouldexpectonetoassenttosome
degreetoanexplanatorystory,religiousornot,totheextentthatthereligiousstory
mesheswithone’sexperiencesofone’senvironment.Thefactthataparticularreligious
storymakessenseofalocalenvironment(or,dependingonthegod-belief,theentire
cosmos)serves,formany,asgoodreasonforbuyingintothatparticularstory.Giventhat
everyoneinaparticularenvironmentwillhaveverysimilarexperiencesofthat
environment,weshouldnotbesurprisedthatthereligiousexplanationsoftheir
environment—events,phenomena,thenaturalenvironment,theirplacementthere,etc.—
aresharedincommoninthewaythatreligionsseemtobesharedincommon.Theclaimis
notthatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousstoriesarerational,orthattheyoughtto
persistoroughttobeunified(although,theymayverywellberational,anditmaywellbe
thecasethatbelieversarejustifiedinmaintainingtheirbeliefs).Rather,myclaimisjust
thatthepersistenceandunityofreligiousbeliefsystemscanbeunderstoodbyappealto
theexperiencesofbelievingindividuals.
Theimplicationsfortheismofanevolutionaryaccountlikemineare,atthispoint,
unclear.Ontheonehand,thatreligiousbeliefisabyproductofourcognitivestructures
shouldgivethetheistpause,asshouldtheideathatGodorspiritsmaybethespandrelsof
evolutionaryprocessesandcognitivemechanisms.Ontheotherhand,however,allofour
cognitiveandbelief-formationfacultieshavetheirorigininevolutionaryprocesses.At
somelevelofgenerality,thefollowingholds:ifthetheistoughttobeconcernedaboutthe
74
justifiabilityandtruthofhisorhergod-beliefsinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins,thenthe
theist(andnon-theist)alsooughttobeconcernedaboutthejustifiabilityandtruthofother
typesoftruthclaimswemakeabouttheworldinlightoftheirevolutionaryorigins.Tobe
sure,manyofournon-religiousbeliefsareempiricallyverifiableandtestableinwaysthat
ourgod-beliefsarenot,andthesestandardsofjustificationservetoisolateournon-
religiousbeliefsfrombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory.However,god-beliefs
mayhavetheirownstandardsofjustification:factorslikereligiousexperience,miracles,
andreliabletestimonymayreasonablybetakentoisolateatleastsomeofourgod-beliefs
frombeingunderminedbyanevolutionarystory.
Perhapsmyraw/refinedgod-beliefdistinctionwillproveusefultothetheistinthis
realm:itmaybethatabyproducttheoryoftheoriginsofreligiousbeliefsseriously
underminesthejustificationofrawgod-beliefs(becausetheyaredeliveredtousbytheoff-
line,automaticprocessesofourcognitivemechanismsfunctioninginanimproperdomain),
whileitfailstosimilarlyunderminethejustificationofrefinedgod-beliefs(becausethey
includeclaimsthataremoreintellectually,empirically,andinferentiallyinvolved).Itismy
hopethatfutureresearchinthisfieldwilltakeonamoreeven-handedtone,ratherthan
beginningwiththepresuppositionthat“Allgod-beliefsarefalse.”Certainly,god-beliefsare
notfalsemerelybecausetheiroriginscanbeexplainedbyappealtoevolutionaryprocesses.
75
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