Post on 07-Oct-2020
transcript
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
TheSeparation
SafetyTriad
Three Legs of the Safety Stool
Safety First and Foremost
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
PositionReporting
IMC Failure Mode 1
Pilots and ControllersUse Position Reportingto Compensate for Lossof Surveillance, UsingExisting Non-radarProcedures
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
RadarVectors
IMC Failure Mode 2
Single Aircraft NavFailures and NAVAIDFailures Managed ThruCommunications andSurveillance
Wide Area of NavFailure Could Overburden Controllers
Interference is line-of-sight
Interference airspacevolume increases
with altitude
A
B
C
Distance FromEmitter Source
Interference airspacevolume increases
with altitude
A
B
C
Distance FromEmitter Source
Airborne EmitterSwallows All In
Line-of-sight
Airborne EmitterSwallows All In
Line-of-sight
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
NORDOProceduresComply with
Last Clearance
IMC Failure Mode 3
Single Aircraft FailureProcedures Exist
Ground Comm FailureUses Adjoining ATCFacilities to ReestablishCommunications
Navigation
Communications Surveillancee.g., Facility
Outage
Maintain LastClearance
Expect ContactFrom Other ATC
Facility
Contingencies Existfor Loss of Communicationsand Surveillance
IMC Failure Mode 4
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
Maintain LastClearance
Dead ReckoningAdvisory Services
From ATC
IMC Failure Mode 4
An ADS-B Scenarioin Non-radar airspacewith radar-like separation
Navigation
Communications Surveillance
ATC UnableTo SustainSeparation
Navigation Interferencewith the Loss of Communications
In Weather andMultiple AircraftWithout NavigationA Controller WithoutCommunicationsBecomes a Spectator
IMC Failure Mode 5
System DisruptionLi
kelih
ood
of O
ccur
renc
e
Threat
Where are we on the curve?
TechnologyExists
Scenarios publicly known• Ground emitter• Intermittent emitter• Airborne emitter
??
?
?
How much “insurance”is needed to providecritical Infrastructureprotection?
Drivers• Workload within interference area• Sustaining separation
• Radar• Non-radar
• Assuring safe recovery and landing of aircraft in IMC• Minimizing disruption of air transportation to reduce threat• Minimum investment for users in backup capability• Some benefit to be realized for carrying redundant capability
• Training reduction• Relief on dual redundant carriage of avionics• Dispatch reliability
• Current rules for navigation Part 91 – capable of navigation and landing as flight planned
General Assumptions
• DoD needs continued TACAN/DME/ILS• Precision landing capability (ILS) at least on one runway at
those airports necessary for recovery of aircraft during aninterference event
• All Category II/III ILS systems retained• New runway landing capabilities can be served by ILS,
GPS(WAAS) or GPS(LAAS)• Approach lights retained at where Category I ILS’s shut off• Sufficient VOR’s retained for VOR-VOR direct navigation
and landing with VOR non-precision approach at selectedairports (minimum operating network)
• DME’s retained to support INS/FMS redundancy• Nav coverage richer where surveillance is limited
• CONUS gaps• Alaska• Offshore
Issues During an Interference Event• Response time in detecting size of service volume disruption
• Will controllers know size of interference area quickly totactically make adjustments
• How do pilots get the information to make route changedecisions
• Controller workload• Pilot workload• Response time to find and shut down interference• Dispatch out of, through and into areas of know interference• Recovery of “operational contingency” and “backup” aircraft
caught in interference area• Terrain avoidance in interference area in IMC
• En route low altitude RNAV routes• Terminal maneuvering
• Procedural separation in absence of navigation
Size (volume) of Interferenceis a critical to extent of retainedground-based infrastructure
Newark ± 100 nmPhoenix ± 180 nmDoD test ± 320 nm
© Mitre CAASD
Lack of SurveillanceCoverage
Greater navigation infrastructure retained where surveillance coverage is lacking for low altitude operations
Secondary SurveillanceCoverage at 6,000 ft AGL
Operational
Contingency
Backup
Capability
Redundant
Capability
Operations Disruption
Threat Mitigation
Intentional Interference Event
Scaled Response
Removing Operational Disruption in 121/135 OperationsSignificantly Reduces Jamming as a Target
Options for backup
• Current mix of navigation and landing aids
• Reduced number of navigation and landing aids• What is retained?• Which ones and where?• How are they linked as a system?
• New capability physically separated from SATNAV• Low-cost inertial• LORAN X• Other technology
• No Backup• Redundant capability• Backup capability• Operational Contingency
?
Operational ContingencyProcedural methods dealing with interference eventsExamples may include:
• VMC alternate for landing• Flight in radar coverage (GA) – radar vectors
clear of area or to VMC conditions• Depart and maintain VFR until clear of interference• Squawk NONAV code• etc.
Designed to provide pilot options in the event of interferencenot unlike NORDO, where controllers can expect certain actions by the pilot.
Provides limited relief from carrying a backup capability incertain airspace.
Backup Capability• Avionics carried on board the aircraft to navigate and land
within an interference area. • The backup capability allows dispatch and departure
within an area of interference through modification to theflight planned route.
• Pilots can fly through areas of interference using ground-based navigation aids.
• Pilots can land at designated recovery airports equipped to support NPA and ILS approaches.
• Some loss of efficiency or inability to reach the filed destination may occur
• Less direct routing• Destination may only be served by SATNAV
Backup Capability (Con’t)
• VOR minimum operating network• ILS on at least the primary (best wind) runway for the airport• Multiple runway ILS’s removed, lighting retained• Some ILS’s retained at delay constrained airports• All CAT II/III ILS’s retained until GPS (LAAS) delivered• DME’s retained
• Operationally:• VOR departure procedure• VOR-VOR direct en route• VOR non-precision approach • VOR radial to ILS final• Radar vectors to ILS final
Military• Continued use of TACAN and ILS
En Route and AirportVOR’s may be relocated at replacementtime to improve coverageand reduce outer markers
VOR Proposal for Minimum Operating Network
• Victor Airways and Jet Routes begin reduction in 2007leading to no airways by 2012
• Replaced with VOR-VOR direct aids and Airport VOR aids• Airport VOR supports either VOR NPA, or VOR radial to ILS• Minimum Operational Network of VOR’s attained by 2012
No location in the CONUS further than 75 miles from VORat 5,000 feet AGL line-of-site
• Mountainous locations treated differently due to altitude andicing concerns
• Replace/relocate MON VOR’s and reduce impact of maskingradials from 2008 through 2012
LORAN as a backup
Best theoretical Part 91 backup• RNAV backup for RNAV • Integrated antenna with GPS• One sensor in an integrated avionics package• Capable of providing alternative independent path for
differential corrections for GPS• Coverage in mountainous terrain for navigation and
differential correction for GPS
But….
LORAN X
• Not the LORAN C avionics as flown today• Existing installed avionics only useful for en route nav• Existing avionics declining as GPS overtakes panel space
in aircraft • Must be able to support non-precision approach• Meets availability though all-in-view receiver
• Each transmitter stick used instead of chains• H-field antenna for improved signal-to-noise (p-static)• Affordable as card in GPS box, not stand alone receiver• Avionics in 5 – 7 years (no MASPS/MOPS or TSO)
LORAN must be able to support non-precisionApproaches to be a credible backup to GPS
Accuracy Threshold 0.43 nmGoal 0.16 nm (RNP 0.3)
Monitor Limit Threshold 0.5 nmGoal 0.3 nm
Integrity 10-7
Integrity Alert 10 secondsContinuity of Service > 10-4
18,200 remaining LORAN-C VFR receivers8,735 remaining IFR receivers remaining
Alaska and Coastal Long-range NDBs
IMC operations in Alaska and offshore airspace requireprocedural separation dependent upon navigation beingavailable.
Low-level helicopter operations in the Gulf and terrainand coverage in Alaska
Redundant Capability• Avionics carried provide equivalent capabilities as
SATNAV, including RNAV and RNP to dispatch and fly to planned destination independent of interference.
• Pilots can fly through areas of interference using INS/FMSwith updates provided by DME and VOR/DME.
• Pilots can fly RNAV non-precision approaches to landing or to an ILS final approach. Issue:
INS or INS/FMS departuresin IMC relating to loss ofprecision over time - ability to fly departure procedures
Operationally:Calibrate INS at gateRecalibrate at runway endDepartUpdate position from DME, DME-DME, or VORRNAV/RNP to non-precision approachRNAV to non-precision approachRNAV to ILS approach
Regulatory Action OptionsAirspace Class of Operators
Class A & B Military [self-regulating]Part 121 & 135
Safety High speed High densityIMC Workload
CapacityEfficiencyPredictability of ServiceDispatch ReliabilityThreat Denial
Proposal:• Backup or Redundant Capability required for safety and
workload for Part 91 & 121/135 operators in Class A and Bairspace
• Redundancy advantageous for dispatch reliability andreducing intentional interference
Retain on at least one runwayILS – CAT I
Navigation and Landing Timeline 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
TACANDME
Minimum Operating NetworkVOR
ILS – CAT II/III Current runways retained for capacity
Long Range NDB – Alaska and Coastal
3-91&210-18
19-27
GPS IIIAGPSIIIB
GPSIIICGPS
WAAS - 250 ft & ¾ mile vis (LPV)3rd GEO
>
LAAS CAT ILAAS CAT II/III R&D Required
6 airports + options for 0 to 40 per year
LORAN ??? Decision on Continued Use In Late 2002
APV 1.0
Block II F L2
Part 91 Options (IMC) – Interference in Area
GPS Only
GPS/VOR
GPS/WAAS
GPS/WAAS+ VOR
GPS/WAAS+ VOR/ILS
GPS Only+ LORAN-x
GPS/ILS+ LORAN-x
Dispatch Depart En Route Arrival Approach & Landing
No No No No
VOR-DP VOR toVOR VOR-AR VOR-NPA
No No No No
VOR-DP VOR-AR VOR-NPAVOR toVOR
VOR-DP VOR-AR VOR orILS
VOR toVOR
RNAV RNAV RNAV RNAV-NPA
RNAV RNAV RNAV ILS
Not
App
licab
le
121/135 Carrier Options (IMC) – Interference in Area
GPS Only
GPS/VOR
GPS/INS(DME-DME)GPS/FMS(VOR/DME)
GPS/VOR+ ILS
GPS/FMS+ ILS
GPS/ILS+ LORAN-x
Dispatch Depart En Route Arrival Approach & Landing
No No No No No
VOR Direct VOR-DP VOR toVOR VOR-AR VOR-NPA
Yes ? RNAV RNAV-AR RNAV-NPA
Yes ? RNAV-AR RNAV-NPARNAV
Yes VOR-DP VOR-AR VOR orILS
VOR toVOR
Yes RNAV RNAV RNAV RNAV-NPAor ILS
Yes RNAV RNAV RNAV ILS
OceanArrivalTransition
Terminal
SurfaceTerminal
En RouteSurface
DepartureTransition
InterferenceArea
Dispatch into areasof known interferencenot authorized withoutbackup capability
RNAV capability or VOR-Direct Flight Plan
A Flight with Interference
Redundancy
Backup
Surface
DepartureTransition
OceanArrivalTransition
Terminal
SurfaceTerminal
En Route
If airborne at time of eventdivert around areaof known interference
Flight plan aroundarea of known interference
Interference Known Before Departure orInterference Reported While Airborne
Surface
DepartureTransition
OceanArrivalTransition
Terminal
SurfaceTerminal
En RouteRNAV to ILS Final orDivert to Alternate
Dispatch into areasof known interferencenot authorized withoutbackup capability
Interference Known Before Departure orInterference Reported While AirborneFor Arrival Case
Ocean
SurfaceTerminal
RNAV Through Area of Interference forUp to 30 minutes(150 – 200 nm)
Oceanic
Dispatch into areasof known interferencenot authorized withoutbackup capability
1000’ MSL Ground LevelVOR 1VOR 3
5000 AGLInterferenceArea
4000’ MSL4000’ MSL
1
23
Airport VOREn Route VOR
4
• Request Climb orRadar Vector
• Climb up to 5000’ AGL• Proceed Direct to VOR• Continue to next VOR• Continue to next VOR• Free of Interference• Request RNAV and
Altitude Change
Part 91 Part 121/135Continue Through AreaAs Planned Using RNAV
6000’ MSL