Post on 07-Aug-2015
transcript
“It is easier to fool people than to convince them that they have been fooled.”
- Mark Twain
THIS RESEARCH REPORT EXPRESSES ONLY OUR OPINIONS. Use Glaucus Research Group California, LLC’s research
opinions at your own risk. This is not investment advice nor should it be construed as such. You should do your own research
and due diligence before making any investment decisions with respect to the securities covered herein. We have a short interest
in Ozner and therefore stand to realize significant gains in the event that the price of Ozner’s stock declines. Please refer to our
full disclaimer on the final page of this report.
On February 16, 2015, we published a detailed investment opinion (the “Report”) on Ozner Water
International (HK: 2014) (the “Company” or “Ozner”). In our Report, we presented extensive publicly
available evidence, including SAIC filings, government tax records and independent brand rankings,
which in our opinion, indicate that Ozner has made false and misleading representations and disclosures
to the market regarding its financial and operational performance.1 On March 25, 2015, Ozner responded
with a Clarification Announcement (the "Clarification").
Ozner took 39 days to respond to basic questions about its business. Given the length of time, we
expected better. The Clarification is first notable because, buried on page twelve, Ozner admitted that
its prospectus contained a statement that was “not entirely accurate.”2 Which is another way of saying
that the statement was false. Ozner complains that the false statement was immaterial, even though the
statement was regarding its relationship with an entity which it mentioned 26 times in the prospectus.
The bar has apparently been lowered. Now, apparently, investors should only care if statements that are
“not entirely accurate” pertain to items that the Company deems material.
Ozner’s Clarification, in other numerous instances, contains evasions and excuses which are directly
contradicted by Ozner’s prior statements in its prospectus or in its statutory filings in the PRC. For
example, Ozner’s claim that its manufacturing subsidiary is simply an OEM is directly refuted by its
prospectus, which states that the manufacturer takes title to the water purifiers.
Ultimately, investors should think critically about our Report, our rebuttal and Ozner’s Clarification.
They must decide for themselves the true value of Ozner shares. In our opinion, after being confronted
with damning evidence that the Company mislead investors regarding its profitability, Ozner has simply
changed its story to suit its current needs. Our conviction level remains unchanged.
1 Our Report is available for download at our website: https://glaucusresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2015/02/GlaucusResearch-Ozner_Water-HK_2014-Strong_Sell_Feb_16_2015.pdf. 2 Ozner Clarification, p. 12.
COMPANY: Ozner Water International Holding Limited │ HK: 2014
INDUSTRY: Water Purification
2
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
I. SAIC Filings Indicate Material Exaggeration of Sales, Production and Profit.
a. Profitability and Revenues from Leasing Purifiers Much Less than Reported
In our Report, we noted that according SAIC filings, annual rental fees from leasing water purifiers to end
users were 54% less than reported in Ozner’s prospectus for 2012 and 2011, respectively. More
importantly, we noted SAIC filings show that rather than generate RMB 18 million in operating profit in
2011 and RMB 98 million in 2012 as Ozner claims, the leasing subsidiaries were in fact unprofitable in
2011 (losing RMB 3 million) and only generated RMB 18 million in operating profit in 2012 (81%
less than reported).
Ozner responded that the discrepancy is “primarily attributable to the timing difference in revenue
recognition for accounting and tax reporting purposes.”3 Ozner stated that “the Group recognizes rental
income from water purification services on a monthly basis over the one-year lease term under IFRS,
whereas rental income reported to the local tax bureau in SAIC filings was recognized when relevant
invoices were issued to principal distributors.”4
In essence, Ozner claims that in its consolidated financials filed in Hong Kong, revenue is recognized on
a straight-line basis over the term of the lease (per IFRS) and that in financials for subsidiaries filed with
SAIC offices in the PRC, revenue was recognized not on a straight-line basis but when the Company
invoiced distributors.
But this explanation is directly and explicitly contradicted by the very SAIC filings upon which Ozner
relies to exonerate itself.
In the notes to the financial statements of the SAIC filings of Ozner’s primary rental subsidiary, Shaanxi
Haoze, it states explicitly that rental income and related costs generated by operating leases (a category
which include rented water purifying machines) is recognized “on a straight line basis during the
operating term.”
3 Ozner Clarification, p. 5. 4 http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2015/0325/LTN20150325544.pdf p5
3
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Source: 2012 Shaanxi Haoze SAIC Filings – Note to Financial Statement 4.22
The SAIC filings of Ozner’s primary leasing subsidiary directly contradict the response in Ozner’s
Clarification. Rather than recognizing revenue and costs whenever a distributor is invoiced, SAIC filings
state the revenue and costs are recognized on a straight-line basis during the lease term, the same method
by which the Company recognizes revenue and costs in its consolidated statements contained in its
prospectus.
The impact is significant, because it undermines Ozner’s purported explanation of the vast difference in
the profitability of renting water machines between its SAIC filings and its prospectus.
We continue to firmly believe that the discrepancy in profitability between SAIC filings and Hong Kong
financials is because Ozner exaggerated the profitability of its business to Hong Kong investors. SAIC
filings show that rather than generate significant profits as Ozner claims, the leasing subsidiaries were in
fact unprofitable in 2011 (losing RMB 3 million) and only generated RMB 18 million in operating
profit in 2012 (81% less than reported).
In our opinion, such evidence continues to be a damning indictment of the purported profitability of
Ozner’s business as reported to Hong Kong investors.
Leasing out asset by operating lease method
Rental income and related costs generated by operating lease
method is recognized on a straight-line basis during the operating
term
4
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
b. SAIC Filings Indicate Real Production Figures are 90% Less than Reported.
In our report, we presented the SAIC filings of Shangyu Haorun Environmental Technology Co., Ltd.
(“Shangyu Manufacturing”), which showed that Shangyu Manufacturing’s production costs were only
RMB 7.5 million and RMB 12 million in 2012 and 2011, respectively, over 90% less than the costs of
raw materials and components reported in Ozner’s prospectus. In our opinion, this indicates that
Ozner materially exaggerated the scale of its production and business in its prospectus.
Ozner does not dispute the authenticity of the SAIC filings presented in our Report. Rather, Ozner claims
that Shangyu Manufacturing is only responsible for assembling machines with materials and components
procured by other subsidiaries.5 According to the Company, Shangyu Manufacturing “charges service
income to intra-group companies” and the COGS incurred by the subsidiary “mainly consists of staff
costs and production overhead for assembly-related operations.”6 In essence, Ozner is claiming that
Shangyu Manufacturing is an OEM for other subsidiaries, and thus did not incur the procurement or
production costs of manufacturing the machines.
This blatantly contradicts Ozner’s prospectus, in which Ozner stated, without qualification, that
Shangyu Manufacturing owned the title to the water purifying machines it manufactured.
Source: Ozner's Prospectus p224
If Shangyu Manufacturing transfers title to other subsidiaries, the manufacturer must first hold title to the
machines and thus title to the raw materials and components which it must purchase to assemble such
machines.
This means, under PRC tax code, that Shangyu Manufacturing is not and cannot be considered an OEM
and that Shangyu Manufacturing’s statutory SAIC filings should show the production and procurement
costs incurred to make the machine, even if such materials and components were purchased from another
Ozner subsidiary.
5 Ozner Clarification, p. 2. 6 Ozner Clarification, p. 2.
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Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Source: http://www.docin.com/p-398213665.html
Ozner would like to claim that Shanyu Manufacturing is simply an OEM, meaning that title to the raw
materials and components (as well as the finished machines) would rest with other subsidiaries. After all,
this evasion distracts from the fact that SAIC filings show that Ozner’s sole manufacturing subsidiary
incurred costs of only RMB 7 million and RMB 11 million in 2012 and 2011, respectively.
But Ozner stated unequivocally in its prospectus that Shangyu Manufacturing held title to the machines,
meaning that by definition, it must also, at some point in the manufacturing process, hold title to the raw
materials and components required for assembling its machines.
Put simply, as Ozner’s sole manufacturing subsidiary (which by the Company’s admission held title to
the machines), Shangyu Manufacturing should have incurred at least RMB 175 million and RMB 135
million in costs in 2012 and 2011, respectively, as this was the reported cost of raw materials and
components purchased to produce water purifiers. SAIC filings show that it did not.
But even if you accept Ozner’s premise, which we do not, the numbers still do not appear to add up. If
Ozner’s Clarification is to be believed, Shangyu Manufacturing only incurred “staff costs and production
(1) Sales of products. Sales
of products means the
exchange of titles of goods
for a compensation
OEM means being
consigned to process the
goods, while the raw
materials and key
components is supplied by
the consigner; and
consignee follows the
requirement set by
consigner to produce the
goods and collect OEM fee.
Both the titles of raw
materials and produced
products belong to the
consigner
6
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
overhead for assembly-related operations.”7 In Ozner’s prospectus, the Company stated that procurement
costs accounted for 70% of total production costs, meaning that roughly the other ~30% of production
costs should have been incurred on labor and overhead for assembly-related operations.
Source: Ozner Prospectus, p. 27.
Even if Ozner is to be believed, and Shangyu Manufacturing only incurred costs for labor and assembly,
then we estimate that the manufacturing subsidiary should have incurred RMB 75 million and RMB 58
million in labor and assembly-related costs in 2012 and 2011, respectively.
But SAIC filings show that Shangyu Manufacturing true COGS were only a fraction of those figures:
7 Ozner Clarification, p. 2.
Shangyu Manufacturing COGS Calculation
RMB in million 2011 2012
Raw materials & Components Cost1 =
A 135.7 175.1
Raw Material as % of Production Cost2
=B 70% 70%
Total Production Cost = C=A/B 193.9 250.1
Labor Cost & Manufacturing Overheard as % of Production Cost = D =1 - B 30% 30%
Labor Cost & Manufacturing Overheard E=C*D 58.2 75.0
Shangyu Haorun's SAIC COGS3
11.9 7.5
Difference in RMBmm 46.24 67.51
Difference % -80% -90%
Source:
1. Ozner Clarification Announcement on Mar. 25 2015, p. 3
2. Ozner Prospectus p27
3. Shangyu Haorun's SAIC Filings
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Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Source: 2012 Shangyu Manufacturing SAIC Filings – Income Statement
Even if Ozner’s latest explanation, which directly contradicts its previous statements in its prospectus, is
taken at face value, we believe that SAIC filings show that the Company’s sole manufacturer did not
incur sufficient costs to justify the levels of production claimed by Ozner in its prospectus.
II. Same Business, Different Result?
In our Report, we noted that prior to Ozner’s IPO, evidence suggests that Chaoyue Group Limited
(“CGL”) (HK: 0147), a Hong Kong listed company, ran a very similar business, leasing Ozner-branded
water purifying machines to end users, from 2009 through 2012. Despite leasing 63,000 water purifiers8
(including many of the same or similar models as Ozner leases today), CGL’s water purification
machine leasing business was an unprofitable failure. CGL eventually sold the business to Ozner for
HKD 78.5 mm in September 2012, after losses forced CGL to write off most of its value.
How can an almost an identical business could go from small and unprofitable failure in 2012 (under
CGL) to a thriving and profitable operation with a market capitalization of HKD 6.2 billion under Ozner?
In Ozner’s clarification, the Company accused Glaucus of leaving out “key reasons behind the different
results achieved by CGL and the Group in respect of a similar business.”9
But such supposed “key reasons” are nothing but weak excuses, and obfuscate the obvious similarities
between the businesses. Below we present Ozner’s “key reasons” from its Clarification along with our
comments.
8 Ozner Prospectus, p. 2. 9 Ozner Clarification, p. 10.
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Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
CGL Ozner Glaucus Comment
Business focus
CGL operated a wide range of
other unrelated businesses,
including garment manufacturing
and trading, gold mining and
corporate services.
Water purification business is the focus of
the Group’s operations and accounts for the
majority and an increasing portion of the
Group’s revenue.
As a matter of fact, CGL rented Ozner-branded
water purifying machines to end users in the PRC.
That it also had other businesses does not change
that the leasing of Ozner-branded machines was an
unprofitable failure.
Investment
Performance of the water
purification business under CGL’s
ownership was not satisfactory due
to a combination of factors mainly
related to the lack of funding as a
result of the lingering effects of the
global financial crisis.
Between January 2011 and September
2012, the Group had invested approximately
RMB300 million in the water purification
business. The Company made significant
investment in the water purification business
utilizing funds from three rounds of pre-IPO
capital raising.
First, CGL also invested heavily. CGL originally
purchased the water purifying business for HKD 383
million, an amount which was adjusted downward
when the businesses drastically failed to meet profit
targets. CGL also experienced heavy losses: it
reported HKD 213.6 million in losses in FY 2011 as
a result of the Park Wealth business. Second,
dumping more money into a business does not
necessarily produce a different outcome. CGL sold
many of the same (or similar) models as Ozner. It
sold machines under the same brand. CGL even had
the same R&D team as Ozner. Ozner's CEO was
even a director for CGL's leasing subsidiary. CGL
sold machines using the same technology as Ozner.
Expansion of
geographic reach
CGL operated in 10 cities in China
from November 2010 to
September 2012, without
expanding into any new city.
The Group expanded its distribution network
to 125 cities as of December 31, 2013.
This excuse is absurd. CGL got its choice of
10 cities in which to market and rent Ozner
branded purifiers. If CGL could not make the
business work in the top ten cities of its choice,
why would Ozner be able to make the same
business so incredibly profitable in secondary
markets?
Expansion of
distributor network
CGL had nine distribution agents in
2009 and 2010 and a sole agent
since 2011.
The number of distributors of the Group was
714 as of December 31, 2011 and further
increased significantly from 871 as of
December 31, 2012 to 1,702 as of
December 31, 2013.
The Group also implemented a combination
of management measures for its distributor
network, including distributor database, the
two-card system, and inspections and
trainings.
Why would simply adding more distributors make a
business more profitable? We would expect that
more distributors would simply make the business
more expensive to operate, increasing the complexity
of operations and the costs of coordinating between,
collecting from, and directing a much larger network
of third parties. If anything, increasing the number
of distributors from nine to 714 would add cost and
complexity, not increase profitability.
Water purifying
machines
installed
CGL installed approximately
64,000 water purifying machines as
of March 31, 2009, and did not
install any additional water
purifying machines after
November 2010
The Group installed approximately 215,000
water purifying machines between January
2011 and September 2012.
The number of water purifying machines
further increased from approximately
309,000 as of December 31, 2012 to
approximately 463,000 as of December 31,
2013.
The economies of scale in the water purifying
machine business may contribute to a marginal
increase in profitability as the business grows, but
does a tripling of the active machines really explain
how the same business can go from RMB 190.6
million in losses from FY 2010 - 2012 under CGL to
profitable business under Ozner (with 38% net
margins) just a short time later?
Board and
management
expertise
Senior management of Shanghai
Ozner Comfort Environment &
Service Co., Ltd. (‘‘Shanghai
Comfort’’) was not on the CGL
board.
Executive directors with extensive
experience in operating the water
purification business; institutional investors
and board members also provided strategic
advice and business guidance.
Ozner's founder, CEO and Chairman, worked for
CGL as director of the operating subsidiary
responsible for leasing water purifying machines.
His knowledge, experience and expertise did not
seem to make CGL's business profitable, why would
he be able to do so, and so quickly, with the same
business under Ozner?
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Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Nor does Ozner’s response directly address the core of our skepticism. CGL sold many of the same (or
similar) models as Ozner. It sold machines under the same brand. Ozner's founder and CEO was the
director of CGL's subsidiary responsible for leasing water purifying. CGL sold machines using the same
technology as Ozner. CGL even had the same R&D team as Ozner.
In August 2012, CGL sold this business to Ozner for a consideration of HKD 78.5 million, an amount
which is 1.5% of Ozner current market capitalization.10
CGL made clear that water and air
purification business (including the leasing of water purifying machines) had been responsible for HKD
213.6 million in losses in FY 2011 and HKD 0.1 million in losses from operation in FY 2012. The
water and air purification business also carried net liabilities as of March 31, 2012, of HKD 205.7 million.
The core question is not what purported changes Ozner made to the business around the margins. The
core question is how a business which was such an unprofitable failure under CGL suddenly became
extremely profitable (net income margins of 35% and 38% in 2012 and 2013) when it was repackaged in
preparation for the 2014 IPO.
We continue to firmly believe that the most likely explanation, and one that is corroborated by the
additional evidence referenced in our Report, is that Ozner has mislead investors regarding the
profitability of its business.
III. Undisclosed Related Party Transactions
In our Report, we identified a significant undisclosed related party transaction. In the prospectus, Ozner
unequivocally stated in its prospectus that Shanghai Haoyang Environmental Technology (“Shanghai
Haoyang”) was an “independent third party” and went so far to say, in no uncertain terms, that “none
of Shanghai Haoyang or its directors or shareholders had any past or present relationship,
including without limitation, employment or financing relationship with [Ozner] or our …
shareholders during the Track Record Period.”
This turns out to have been blatantly false. SAIC filings show that Xiao Jianping, an Ozner shareholder
and director of one of its operating subsidiaries was in fact the controlling shareholder of Shanghai
Haoyang since 2010. To us, it seems clear that the Shanghai Haoyang Sub-Contract Agreement was a
material undisclosed related party transaction.
In its Clarification, Ozner sheepishly admitted that “the statement in the prospectus referring to the
independent third party status of Shanghai Haoyang was not entirely accurate.”11
That is a polite way of
saying that the statement was false!
Ozner complains that the false statement was immaterial and that it was not really obligated to disclose
the transaction with Shanghai Haoyang to begin with. Ozner is apparently under the misapprehension
that investors only care if a company issues false statements as to items it deems material.
In reality, Shanghai Haoyang was so material that Ozner mentions the entity 26 times in its prospectus!
Now, it dismisses transactions with Shanghai Haoyang as simply irrelevant. If that is the case, why was it
included to begin with? Why was it discussed so many times, if it was simply immaterial?
The Company also claims that it was under no obligation to disclose any transactions with Shanghai
Haoyang because Xiao Jianping does not play a key managerial role in or have significant decision
making power over the Company’s overall business. It dismisses its relationship with Shanghai Haoyang
as minimal and irrelevant.
10 Ozner Prospectus, p. 107. 11 Ozner Clarification, p. 12.
10
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
But a closer look at the SAIC filings reveal even closer ties between Ozner subsidiary Shanghai Haorun
Environmental Works (“Shanghai Haorun”) and Shanghai Haoyang, the supposed independent third
party.
The following are excerpts of SAIC files showing that the supposed independent third party, Shanghai
Haoyang, shares three total individuals, one auditor and one registered office in common with Ozner
subsidiary Shanghai Haorun:
Shanghai Haorun Environmental Works
(Ozner Subsidiary)
Shanghai Haoyang Environmental Technology
(Supposed Independent Third Party)
Xiao Jianping (肖建平)
11
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Shanghai Haorun Environmental Works
(Ozner Subsidiary)
Shanghai Haoyang Environmental Technology
(Supposed Independent Third Party)
Chen Jie (陈洁)
Song Jihua (宋继花)
12
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Shanghai Haorun Environmental Works
(Ozner Subsidiary)
Shanghai Haoyang Environmental Technology
(Supposed Independent Third Party)
Shanghai XINJIE Accounting Firm (上海信捷会计事务所)
*Note: this is the accounting firm which issued the contribution verification report for both entities.
Registered Offices
13
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
Ozner stated unequivocally in its prospectus that “none of Shanghai Haoyang or its directors or
shareholders had any past or present relationship, including without limitation, employment or
financing relationship with [the Company] or our … shareholders during the Track Record
Period.”12
But SAIC filings belie Ozner’s professed independence from Shanghai Haoyang.
That both entities share a common auditor, a common registered building address, and involve, in some
capacity, Xiao Jiangping, Chen Jie, Song Jihua indicates that Shanghai Haoyang is not, as the Company
claims, an independent third party – but rather it is a related party.
IV. Why Doesn’t Ozner Pay Taxes (Part I)
In our Report, we opined that annual tax rankings, available to any investor online from the city of
Shangyu (Zheijiang) province, show that Ozner’s sole manufacturing subsidiary paid 74% less in taxes
than should be the case if Ozner’s prospectus was accurate.
Ozner claimed in response that Shangyu Manufacturing was not the principle revenue generating entity of
the Company.13
This is irrelevant. As we discussed above, Ozner admits in prospectus that Shangyu
Manufacturing took title to the machines it produced, meaning that it would have to pay VAT when it
transfers the title to Ozner’s rental subsidiaries. We believe, that the Shangyu city tax rankings should
reflect such VAT payments. They do not.
V. Why Doesn’t Ozner Pay Taxes (Part II)
Despite reporting an aggregate of RMB 795 million in revenue and RMB 277 million in net income
from 2011 through 2013 (and accruing RMB 64 million in income tax payables by FYE 2013),
Ozner paid less than RMB 3 million in total income taxes during the pre-IPO track-record period.
What other business is excused from paying taxes that it owes?
Ozner complains that this discrepancy was “primarily attributable to the difference in rental income
recognized by the IFRS and under statutory financial statements for SAIC reporting purposes due to the
timing of invoices issuance…”14
12 Ozner Prospectus, p. 107. 13 Ozner Clarification, p. 14. 14 Ozner Clarification, p. 14.
Name Shanghai Haorun Environmental WorksShanghai Haoyang Environmental
Technology
Reported Relationship Ozner Subsidiary Supposed Independent Third Party
Xian Jianping (肖建平) Legal Representative Controlling Shareholder
Independent Director (監事)
Named receiver on approval notice of
registration of establishment
Song Jihua (宋继花)Signed receiver on approval notice of
registration of establishment
Signed receiver on approval notice of
registration amendment
Shanghai XINJIE accounting
firm
(上海信捷会计师事务所)
Issued capital contribution verification
report
Issued capital contribution verification
report
Registered OfficeRoom 208, Building 3, No. 60, Guiqiao Rd,
Pudong New District
Room 203, Building 3, No. 60, Guiqiao Rd,
Pudong New District
Named receiver on approval notice of
registration of establishmentChen Jie (陈洁)
14
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
But as we discussed above, SAIC filings for Ozner’s primary rental subsidiary, Shaanxi Haoze, state that
for the purposes of its statutory financial statements filed in the PRC, rental income and related costs
generated by leasing machines is recognized on a straight-line basis during the lease term.
Even if the Company’s explanation is to be believed, it does not make sense. As we discussed in our
Report, Ozner paid less than RMB 3 million on total income taxes from FY 2011-2013, despite
recording RMB 277 million in net revenue. At FYE 2013, its liability for income tax payable had
ballooned to RMB 64 million. That means that in three years, only paid 4.5% of the taxes it supposedly
accrued.
Are investors to believe that in three years Ozner only invoiced its distributors for 4.5% of
outstanding payments? How did Ozner record RMB 68 million, RMB 150 million and RMB 306
million in cash flow from operations in FY 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively, if it only invoiced
distributors for such a small amount of the revenues it recognized?
We believe that Ozner did not pay meaningful income taxes because it was barely profitable, and that its
explanation of an invoice-based tax exemption is not credible and further evidence that it has been
exaggerating its reported profitability.
VI. Questionable Market Share
In our Report, we presented six different, independent rankings of top water purifying brands conducted
by six different organizations in 2013 and 2014, which did not list Ozner in the top 10, let alone the top
three, of brands of water purifying machines in China. Each list includes Ozner’s purported competitors,
Midea and Qinyuan, in the top 10. These consumer surveys undermine the Company’s claims regarding
its market share, sales and brand awareness.
In its Clarification, Ozner complained that all six surveys were misleading and unreliable because they
did not disclose their ranking criteria, methodology and were published by “uncertified” sources from the
internet.15
This misses the point. We cited the surveys because they were of “brand” rankings, not sales or rentals,
and because they were from independent sources (i.e., neither WE nor OZNER paid them to conduct their
survey).
In comparison, Ozner relies on the Frost & Sullivan market survey featured in its prospectus as supposed
validation for its claimed market share. We believe that this is deliberately misleading because, in our
experience, the Company provides the data upon which the Frost & Sullivan report is built.
In its Clarification, Ozner mentions a number of other sources by which Frost & Sullivan supposedly
corroborated the Company’s market share, including trade interviews. But if the starting point for the
Frost & Sullivan inquiry is data provided by the Company, and subsequent checks are merely
confirmatory, then the Frost & Sullivan report is not an independent source corroborating the Company’s
claims. It is an agent of the Company, preparing a report paid for by the Company, using data
provided to it by the Company.
Ozner makes the further excuse that the market is highly fragmented and thus should not expect to appear
on every brand rankings. Perhaps. But of the six rankings we found, the Company appears on none of
them. Its competitors (#1 and #2 in the market), Midea and Qinyuan, appear on every list.
15 Ozner Clarification, p. 22.
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Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
If Ozner was truly the number #3 water purification company by market share, wouldn’t we expect it to
appear on at least one or two of the surveys?
Indeed, can Ozner point to a single market share survey or brand ranking that it did not pay for or
sponsor which validates its claimed market share?
VII. Conclusion
Ultimately, investors should think critically about our Report, our rebuttal and Ozner’s Clarification.
They must decide for themselves the true value of Ozner shares.
We do not trust, nor do we believe a Company that acknowledges, under scrutiny, that its prospectus
contained material that “was not entirely accurate.” Nor do we trust a Company whose excuses and
evasions directly contradicted its previous statements to the markets.
Based on the preponderance of the available evidence, we continue to believe that the most plausible
interpretation of the facts and documentation available in the public domain is that Ozner’s business is not
as profitable as the Company claims to Hong Kong investors.
16
Ozner Water International Holding Ltd | HK: 2014 www.glaucusresearch.com
DISCLAIMER
We are short sellers. We are biased. So are long investors. So is Ozner. So are the banks that raised money for the Company. If
you are invested (either long or short) in Ozner, so are you. Just because we are biased does not mean that we are wrong. We,
like everyone else, are entitled to our opinions and to the right to express such opinions in a public forum. We believe that the
publication of our opinions and the underlying basis for such opinions is in the public interest.
You are reading a short-biased opinion piece. Obviously, we will make money if the price of Ozner stock declines. This report
and all statements contained herein are solely the opinion of Glaucus Research Group California, LLC, and are not statements of
fact. Our opinions are held in good faith, and we have based them upon publicly available facts and evidence collected and
analyzed, which we set out in our research report to support our opinions. We conducted research and analysis based on public
information in a manner that any person could have done if they had been interested in doing so. You can publicly access any
piece of evidence cited in this report or that we relied on to write this report. Think critically about our report and do your own
homework before making any investment decisions. We are prepared to support everything we say, if necessary, in a court of law.
As of the publication date of this report, Glaucus Research Group California, LLC (a California limited liability company)
(possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our clients and/or
investors has a direct or indirect short position in the stock (and/or options) of the company covered herein, and therefore stands
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