Post on 19-Apr-2018
transcript
Potential High Impact Incidents Ports of Port Hedland and Dampier
Session 2 Potential high impact incidents and trends
Myron Fernandes, Pilbara Ports Authority
Pilbara Ports Authority incident statistics and trends
Port of Port Hedland potential high impact incidents
Reza Vind, Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Port state control statistics and risk assessments
Port of Dampier potential high impact incidents
WHY ARE WE SHARING
THIS INFORMATION
Culture of transparency
Incident prevention Continuous
improvement
PPA Marine Incidents 1 September 2016 – 31 August 2017
172 Port Hedland
51 Dampier
3
Ashburton Types of Marine Incidents
Mechanical - Main Engine
Mechanical - Other
Mooring
Towage
36 Marine Events
18 Other
6
5
7
3
15 Other
Main Engine
Mechanical
Other
Mooring
Towage
Dampier Incidents
Port Hedland
Incidents
150 Marine Events
22 Other 46
12 42
12
38 Main Engine Other
Towage
Mooring
Mechanical
Other
FMG GRACE (renamed) 17 September 2016
Vessel Details • 300m LOA and 50m Beam
• 205,000 DWT
• 18.41m Draft
Weather & Tide • Light airs – South 3-4 knots
• 6.10m flood tide range
Berth Details and Location
General Statistics September 2014 – September 2016
• Total departures - 378
• Total departures > 200,000 DWT - 168
Berth Details • Commissioned July 2013
• Declared depth 19.7m
• Layby berth configuration
Incident Summary
2154 Last Line FMG Grace – AP4 Outbound (DUKC window closes 2300hrs)
2215 Port Emergency declared. VTS noted vessel was not in it’s normal departure position
2217 5 extra tugs supplied to FMG Grace – total 9 tugs attending vessel
2232 Adjacent vessel reported coming off the berth (due to interaction). 2 tugs diverted to
hold vessel in position
2238 FMG Grace repositioned in inner harbour turning circle
2239 FMG Grace departs outbound with 6 accompanying tugs
2244 Following vessel departure cancelled to allow safe outbound passage of FMG Grace
with allocated resources
2309 FMG Grace passing Hunt Point outbound, no further issues reported by pilot
throughout channel transit
Standard departure from AP4 berth
FMG Grace departure from AP4 berth
Comparison with other departures
Assessment of 37 previous departures from berth (October 2014 – January 2016) • 90% of departures logged a true heading at low speed in SWC of between 000o and 020o
• Most easterly heading in the 37 departures is 028o
Allocation of tugs Opportunity to make better use of the
allocated tugs based on tug capability
Departure heading Highly unusual north easterly heading
Reduction of UKC Reduced UKC impacted bow movement
towards port side
Pilot Training Mentoring a trainee pilot and pilot training
methodology
Towage Performance Port bow tug had little or no effect for at least
three (3) minutes
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Bridge Team Communication between the bridge team
was positive and outcome based.
Communication Marine pilot to be immediately informed
when tug performance is not to plan
Allocation of tugs Appropriate positioning of tugs based on
their capability
Towlines Adequate length of towline to be deployed
prior to the manoeuver commencing
Pilot training Clear guidelines on mentor and trainee
interaction
Incident was incorporated in the pilot training
simulator
Tidal flow model Tidal flow data for the port was updated in
training simulator
ACTIONS ARISING
Actual Impact ACTUAL IMPACT
Safety (No injuries)
Environment (No impact)
Infrastructure (No damage)
Operations (minor scheduling impacts)
Resources (tugs allocated)
POTENTIAL IMPACT?
FPMC 26 Near Miss Incident 30 January 2017
Vessel Details • 182.5 LOA and 32.2m Beam
• 50,076 DWT
• 10.8m arrival draft (loaded tanker)
Metocean • NW x 7/10 kts
• Tide range 5.42m
• Low water 18:38 – 1.42m
• Slack water at time of incident
Tanker statistics and incident location
General Statistics 1 January 2015 – 31 December 2016
• Total tanker arrivals – 86
• Total tanker deadweight > 50,000 - 19
Metocean – Wind and Tidal height Monday 30 January 2017
Wind Gust: 9.5kts
Tidal height: 1.5m
Shipping Schedule Monday 30 January 2017
17:30 POB – extended arrival passage for draft of 10.9m (beacon 15/16 entry)
17:30 – 19:00 Inbound passage with no reported steering issues
19:04 Passing hunt point (speed 8.5kts)
19:05 Pilots both commented that the vessel was exactly on the normal check headings for
a flood tide arrival
19:06 Vessels ROT is increasing rapidly and hard to starboard rudder is applied with
engine full ahead
19:06 Stern tug ordered to pull back on emergency full. Vessel engine and rudder still
applied to attempt to regain heading
19:07 ROT under control. Vessel passes at close quarter to tug haven. Port shoulder tug
lets go tug line to prevent collision with another tug moored outside the tug haven.
19:09 Vessel clears tug haven and berth 1 infrastructure and moves towards a safe
location in the inner harbour (swing basin)
Incident Summary
PPU Footage
CCTV Footage
Positive pilot action Decisive action taken by the unrestricted
pilot to regain control of the situation
Effects of tug wash Tug wash from the berthing ship was a
contributing factor
Unstable vessel dynamics The vessel’s manoeuvrability when at even
keel and potential squatting by the head
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Shipping Schedule The tanker arrived into the harbour earlier
than scheduled
ACTIONS ARISING
PPA investigation methodology Use of the simulator to understand possible
contributing factors
Vessel evidence The vessel did not take any measures to
download the VDR data post incident
Pilot training Effects of tug wash incorporated in the pilot
simulator training
Actual Impact ACTUAL IMPACT
Safety (no injuries)
Environment (no impact)
Infrastructure (towline)
Operations (no impact)
Resources (minor impact)
POTENTIAL IMPACT?
Braverus – Main Engine Failure 9 July 2017
Vessel Details • 287.5m LOA and 45m Beam
• 170,015 DWT
• 17.7m Draft
Weather & Tide • South east 5 knots
• 4.16m flood tide range
Incident Location – AP1
Shipping Schedule and Metocean Sunday 09 July 2017 First of 5 outbound vessels
Wind Gust: 9.5kts
Tidal height: 3.8m
Incident Summary
07:20 Pilot on board, preparations made for departure.
07:42 Vessel departed berth (AP1), first movement dead slow astern – no issues
experienced.
07:48 Engine ordered to slow ahead. Fluctuation in engine RPM’s noticed by pilot. Dead
slow to slow was within critical RPM range.
07:54 Main engine unable to increase RPM. Pilot decides to stop vessel in the Inner
Harbour area.
08:00 Port emergency declared, additional towage assistance requested. Assessment
made on re-berthing the vessel at AP1.
08:17 Pilot informed by Master that the vessel requires 1 hour to fix the main engine
problem.
08:25 Second pilot boarded the vessel to assist with re-berthing. 7 tugs allocated.
09:15 Vessel re-berthed at AP1.
PPU Footage
Re-berthing fully loaded
vessels Managing the berthing of a fully loaded
vessel due to the design capacity of wharf
infrastructure
Ships equipment • Defective puncture valves on two main
engine cylinders
• Excessive carbon deposits in the main
engine air chamber
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Periodic Maintenance Puncture valves overhauling periods were
not specified in vessel’s PMS
Communications Prompt and accurate communication
between bridge team to ensure a safe
outcome
Actual Impact ACTUAL IMPACT
Safety (no injuries)
Environment (no impact)
Infrastructure (no damage)
Operations (minor impact)
Resources (minor impact)
POTENTIAL IMPACT?
Personnel injury Ports of Dampier and Port Hedland
Failure of pilot ladder Port of Dampier
Bottom rung failed when pilot stepped
on ladder
Point of failure
Pilot fell approximately 1m to the deck
of the pilot boat
Minor superficial injury to the boarding
pilot
Incident Summary
Assurance process Failure to identify deficiencies associated
with the pilot ladders within the ship
operators assurance process
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Planned maintenance Ship board pilot ladders were not maintained
in accordance with ISO 799: 2004
Pre arrival process Information on pilot ladder condition to be included
as part of the pre arrival documentation
Approved design
Bottom terminations of newly purchased replacement pilot ladder (alternative design using continuous loop arrangement)
Vessel inbound to berth during
hours of darkness
Tugs line was being let go in
preparation for reconfiguration
Crew member’s leg got caught
between the messenger line and
ship’s fairlead
Injury during mooring operations Port of Port Hedland
Crew member suffered two broken
ribs and soft tissue leg injury
Incident Summary
Crew member standing between the tug
line and messenger line (Note deck equipment configuration and positioning of
ships crew)
Officer assisting crew member with letting
go the tug line
Tug line not connected. Crew member
positioned between the messenger line, tugs
line and with weight on the rope stopper. Tow
line is being lowered, messenger is
connected to the ships warping drum. Crew
members legs gets entangled with the
messenger line.
Due to the weight of the tow line, the crew
member is dragged towards the roller
fairlead. His leg is caught between the
fairlead and messenger line. The
messenger line has to be cut to free the
crew members leg.
Handling of towline • Towlines on new tugs are significantly heavier
• Use of mechanical means to handle towlines
• Use of rope stoppers to handle tow lines
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Deck equipment configuration Configuration did not lend itself to an inherently
safe mooring operation
Lighting on deck Lighting on deck and at the mooring location was
reported to be inadequate
Manning requirements Officer in charge was required to physically support
the operation – may not have allowed him to focus
on the bigger picture
Note: investigation is ongoing at the time of the presentation
Unannouced severe weather event 23 March 2017
Tropical System 22U Bureau of Metrology Track Maps issued for Port of Port Hedland
Update 1 – 20 March Update 2 – 21 March
Tropical System 22U Bureau of Metrology Track Maps issued for Port of Port Hedland
FINAL Update – 22 March
Bn16 – Recorded Wind, Gusts, Swell & Waves 23 March: 0600 – 1800
Maximum Wind Gust: 61 kts
Wind: 48 kts Swell: 2.1 m
Waves: 2.2 m
Shipping Schedule
15 vessels in the Inner
Harbour
40 vessels
at anchorage
0900 to 1500
Shipping suspended
DUKC – Predicted Plan
0920 – 1020: continuously reducing DUKC window for the vessel’s departure
INVESTIGATION OUTCOMES
Data analysis Actual wind data
recorded by PPA
analysed post event
indicated a category
1 cyclone event
impact on Port
Hedland
Actual Impact ACTUAL IMPACT
Safety (no injuries)
Environment (no impact)
Infrastructure (no damage)
Operations (6 hour suspension of shipping)
Resources (15 tugs strategically positioned to
respond to berthed vessels needs)
POTENTIAL IMPACT?
Past 40 years Tropical Cyclone Formation North West Australia
Port Hedland
Dampier
Ashburton
Cyclone Response Plan
Response Stages
VESSEL PREPAREDNESS
Local Knowledge (PPA cyclone plan, local port traffic
and local metocean conditions)
Awareness (VTS communications on
evacuation plans)
Commercial Impact (vessel does not lose it’s position in
berth line up if departing due to
cyclone avoidance)
Vessel fitness (Management of loading operation
to ensure vessel can depart berth at
short notice)
KEY MESSAGES
Any vessel can have an
incident
All incidents can impact
the port and the vessel
Local knowledge helps
with managing an
incident
Culture of transparency
when dealing with
incidents