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Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance
and Recognition
Titus Stahl
Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt a. M., GermanyMacquarie University, Sydney, Australia
Collective Intentionality VI: Social ChangeJuly 11-14, 2008
University of California at Berkeley
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Power in social institutions
Powera capacity to do things
Social powerthe capacity to influence other people’s actions
Institutional powercapacity of a person to influence other people’s actionsthis capacity being created by a system of rules in virtueof the fact that this system of rules entitles a person toissue demands upon the actions of others and that it iscollectively accepted by others
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Power in social institutions
Powera capacity to do things
Social powerthe capacity to influence other people’s actions
Institutional powercapacity of a person to influence other people’s actionsthis capacity being created by a system of rules in virtueof the fact that this system of rules entitles a person toissue demands upon the actions of others and that it iscollectively accepted by others
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Power in social institutions
Powera capacity to do things
Social powerthe capacity to influence other people’s actions
Institutional powercapacity of a person to influence other people’s actionsthis capacity being created by a system of rules in virtueof the fact that this system of rules entitles a person toissue demands upon the actions of others and that it iscollectively accepted by others
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Power in social institutions
Dispersed institutional powercapability not bound to persons or specific statuspositions(e.g. language)
Institutional power in a narrow sensecapability bound to persons by virtue of them occupyingdifferential status positions accorded by institutional rules(e.g. political power)
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Power in social institutions
Dispersed institutional powercapability not bound to persons or specific statuspositions(e.g. language)
Institutional power in a narrow sensecapability bound to persons by virtue of them occupyingdifferential status positions accorded by institutional rules(e.g. political power)
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Constitutive and non-constitutive power
“Intra-institutional” powerpower in an institution accorded by institutional rules
Constitutive powerpower to change or challenge existing rules, to introducenew rules and statuses
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Constitutive and non-constitutive power
“Intra-institutional” powerpower in an institution accorded by institutional rules
Constitutive powerpower to change or challenge existing rules, to introducenew rules and statuses
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Three constraints on a pragmatic analysis
A plausible account of institutional power must
conceive of institutional power as a capacity
be able to account for the difference between institutionalpower and coercion
be able to account for the difference between(intra-)institutional power and constitutive institutionalpower
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Three constraints on a pragmatic analysis
A plausible account of institutional power must
conceive of institutional power as a capacity
be able to account for the difference between institutionalpower and coercion
be able to account for the difference between(intra-)institutional power and constitutive institutionalpower
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Three constraints on a pragmatic analysis
A plausible account of institutional power must
conceive of institutional power as a capacity
be able to account for the difference between institutionalpower and coercion
be able to account for the difference between(intra-)institutional power and constitutive institutionalpower
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Obedience and intentional states are not
constitutive of power relations
Obedience is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existenceof institutional power.(Hart’s argument)
The existence of specific beliefs, intentions or mental states isneither necessary nor sufficient as well.(relational character of power, non-intentional acceptance,inconsistency between intentions and behavior)
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Obedience and intentional states are not
constitutive of power relations
Obedience is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existenceof institutional power.(Hart’s argument)
The existence of specific beliefs, intentions or mental states isneither necessary nor sufficient as well.(relational character of power, non-intentional acceptance,inconsistency between intentions and behavior)
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
A more plausible model
Intuition: Either conforming to one’s obligations to someoneor accepting accountability for failing to do so.
An intuitive analysis:A accepts B as having a specific institutional status connectedwith specific entitlements which give rise to obligations of A,if and only if
A either accepts being accountable for failing to fulfill herobligations or
A fulfills these obligations but would acceptaccountability if she had failed to fulfill them.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
A more plausible model
Intuition: Either conforming to one’s obligations to someoneor accepting accountability for failing to do so.
An intuitive analysis:A accepts B as having a specific institutional status connectedwith specific entitlements which give rise to obligations of A,if and only if
A either accepts being accountable for failing to fulfill herobligations or
A fulfills these obligations but would acceptaccountability if she had failed to fulfill them.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Acceptance of one’s being accountable I
A sanctioning account:An agent A has certain institutional powers, that is, powersstemming from her status position in an institution in practiceover a set of persons B1...Bn to the extent that these personsgenerally and in most cases accept (sanctioning) evaluations oftheir behavior in regard to the legitimate demands that A putson them.
The pragmatic meaning of “acceptance”:The absence of a serious contestation to the sanction.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Acceptance of one’s being accountable I
A sanctioning account:An agent A has certain institutional powers, that is, powersstemming from her status position in an institution in practiceover a set of persons B1...Bn to the extent that these personsgenerally and in most cases accept (sanctioning) evaluations oftheir behavior in regard to the legitimate demands that A putson them.
The pragmatic meaning of “acceptance”:The absence of a serious contestation to the sanction.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Acceptance of sanctioning authority
An agent A accepts an agent B as being entitled tosanction performances according to a specific rule R in aspecific context C, if and only if
in all cases in which (1) a performance P of A violates R,(2) P happens in context C and (3) P is sanctioned by B,
A either does not contest this sanction at all or only putsit into question.
If the entitlement of B to sanction A’s performances of aspecific type in context C is habitually either not contested atall or only put into question by A, we say that A grants B astandard authority to sanction.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
(Individual) acceptance of institutional authority
(Individual) acceptance of institutional authority:
An agent A (individually) accepts the institutional authorityof an agent B if A accepts B and/or other agents as beingentitled to sanction A’s performances according to a rule Rwhich grants B a status entailing the entitlement to issuedemands on A’s behavior in a specific context C.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Excursus: Authority distributions
Institutional power relations
asymmetric power relation: A has power of a specifictype, but B has no power of the same type over A
symmetric power relation: A and B have power of thesame type over each other
Power distributions in groups: Some cases
monopolization: A has power over everyone else,everyone else has no power at all over A
symmetry: Each agent has power over all other agentsat least in regard to one type of power
egalitarian symmetry: Each agent has power over allother agents in regard to the same type of power
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Excursus: Authority distributions
Institutional power relations
asymmetric power relation: A has power of a specifictype, but B has no power of the same type over A
symmetric power relation: A and B have power of thesame type over each other
Power distributions in groups: Some cases
monopolization: A has power over everyone else,everyone else has no power at all over A
symmetry: Each agent has power over all other agentsat least in regard to one type of power
egalitarian symmetry: Each agent has power over allother agents in regard to the same type of power
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for collective acceptance
Collective acceptance is a requirement shared byimportant theories of institutions
Reason 1: Collective acceptance is necessary to explainobligating character
Reason 2: Collective acceptance is necessary to accountfor shared rule-following
But what are the pragmatic features of collective acceptance?
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for collective acceptance
Collective acceptance is a requirement shared byimportant theories of institutions
Reason 1: Collective acceptance is necessary to explainobligating character
Reason 2: Collective acceptance is necessary to accountfor shared rule-following
But what are the pragmatic features of collective acceptance?
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for “recognition” I
Starting from Gilbert’s account of collective acceptance 1
Pragmatic significance of collective acceptance: Justifiesmutual criticism (“rebukes”)
Collective acceptance is realized by a social arrangementwhere agents accept each other as entitled to evaluateeach other’s actions
1Margaret Gilbert. Modelling collective belief. Synthese, 73(1):185–204, Oct 1987.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for “recognition” II
Collective acceptance can be described as mutualattribution of institutional power (“Every other memberin the community counts as someone who is entitled toevaluate my behavior in a specific context in relation toinstitutional rule R”)
Authority ascription is mutual and symmetric
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for “recognition” III
If interpretation of institutional rule is understood to becollectively governed, authority ascription must also berecursive.Otherwise: collapse into individualist account.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
The case for “recognition” IV
Recognition
Recognition is the readiness for symmetric and recursiveascription of authority between a number of agents in regardto a specific rule.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Institutional Power – final account
(Collectively Accepted) Institutional Power – final account
An agent A has institutional power over a set of personsB1...Bn
if and only if B1...Bn are part of a group in which the membersdisplay a constant readiness or disposition to grant each otherthe recursive and symmetric authority to evaluate each other’sbehavior in regard to a norm which prescribes B1...Bn toaccept accountability (that is, to accept sanctions andevaluations of their behavior) in regard to the normativeconsequences entailed by A’s institutional status.
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Consequences
Consequences for study of power:
Power not to be measured as conformity
Socially shared attitudes towards normative behavior /sanctions
Study of discourses about power
Conception of institutional power provides an ideal type
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance and Recognition
Consequences
Consequences for study of power:
Power not to be measured as conformity
Socially shared attitudes towards normative behavior /sanctions
Study of discourses about power
Conception of institutional power provides an ideal type
Titus Stahl Goethe-Universitat Frankfurt