Presented at:

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia

13 December 2011

Demography & Liberal Democracy

The Age-structural Maturity Thesis

(or “How Political Demography Foretold the Arab Spring”)

Richard Cincotta

The Stimson Center

rcincotta@stimson.org

Cincotta & Hummel, 2009

The Demographic Transition

Age structural Classes: Japan 1935 to 2025.Class

Median age range

Intermediate

25 – 35 yrs

Post-mature

45 – 55 yrs

Youthful

15 – 25 yrs

Mature

35 – 45 yrs

Cincotta, in press

(69.2 million) (104.4 million)

(Population)

(123.2 million) (120.8 million)

DATA SOURCE: UN Population Division, 2011

Four categories: four individual countries, 2010

Transitional

Population age structures

2010

Data: UN Population Division, 2009

Median Age (Years)

15 25 35 45 55

Likelihood

Youthful Intermediate Mature Post-Mature

Liberal Democracy

Political Violence

The Empirical Narrative

Median Age (Years)

15 25 35 45 55

Net Benefits

Youthful Intermediate Mature Post-Mature

Unconstrained executive power

Civil liberties & political rights

The Theoretical Narrative

Y: Youthful (<25.0 yrs)

I : Intermediate (25.1-35.0)

M: Mature (35.1 to 45.0)

*P: Post-mature (>45.1)

*(no states yet within this category as of 2010)

Age structure (median age)

Pro

po

rtio

n

“F

RE

E”

no

states

Age structure & Freedom Scores

1975 to 2005

50-50 chance of “Free”

Pro

po

rtio

n (

%)

“F

ree”

Youthfulness and the path to liberal democracy: 8 selected states

Cincotta, 2009

Some anecdotal evidence of rises in democracy scores as age-structural youthfulness declines.

Why does this model work?

No

. o

f S

tate

s

<0.42 >.42

Youth Proportion*

1980s

Fate of States rising to liberal democracy during the decade

Durability of Regime

<29 years >29 years

Median Age

Youthful states

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

from Barnett, 2004

Youthful states

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states

Youthful states

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Data: UN 2010 Rev.

Youthful states

Presented at:

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia

13 December 2011

The Intelligence Value of

“Age Structure”

Richard Cincotta

Demographer-in-residenceThe Stimson Center

rcincotta@stimson.org

Year (5-yr period)

Data: UN Population Div., 2010 Rev.

Model results & forecasts: Cincotta, unpublished

Population data: UN Population Division, 2010 Rev.

Age structure and the “naïve probability” of liberal democracy

Pro

port

ion

of s

tate

s e

xper

ienc

ing

civi

l con

flict

* Conflict involves a more youthful minority

“The first (and perhaps most surprising) region that promises a shift to liberal democracy is a cluster along Africa’s Mediterranean coast: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, none of which has experienced liberal democracy in the recent past. The other is in South America: Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, each of which attained liberal democracy demographically “early” but was unable to sustain it. Interpreting these forecasts conservatively, we can expect there will be one, maybe two, in each group that will become stable liberal democracies by 2020.”

Cincotta, R.P. 2008. “How Democracies Grow Up.” Foreign Policy: March/April, 80-82 (plus supplementary map and graph online).

Cincotta, R.P. 2008/09. “Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy,” Environmental Change and Security Project Report, 13: 10-18. Available at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ECSPReport13_Cincotta.pdf

These predictions are the subject of the presentation on C-Span: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/richardcincotta

2008 Forecast

4. Rapid democratization in North Africa and the Rise of Islamic Parties. One component of “youth-bulge theory” is a model that suggests that the probability of attaining a stable liberal democracy increases as a state’s age structure matures. North African countries are rapidly maturing toward the 50-50 break-even point (a half a chance for a liberal democracy). In this scenario, a North African state, probably Tunisia, undergoes a “color revolution”—a swift and non-violent transition to liberal democracy. This may bring Islamists into power—or maybe not. However, the possibilities for spreading democracy through the region and for new political dynamics to play out in an age-structurally mature Arab state could produce both risks and opportunities for the US.

Rationale: Age-structural maturation & liberal democracy. Declines in the proportion of young adults in the working age population tends to make youth recruitment to political violence more difficult and promote a more manageable political environment. As politics lose their volatility, commercial and military elites see opportunities under democratic rule and a marketplace free of the patron-client relationships supported by the autocrat.

Low probability, High Impact Analysis, LRAU, Oct. 2010.

Product of political demographic research.

Submitted by R.P. Cincotta, Oct. 2010