Pricing and Efficiency in Competitive Markets Market Interventions & Institutions Dr. Nikos...

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Pricing and Efficiency in Competitive Markets

Market Interventions & InstitutionsDr. Nikos NikiforakisThe University of Melbourne

Overview

The purpose of this talk: Part I: To show how we can utilize

theoretical tools to evaluate the effect of different policies.

Part II: To show the importance of experiments in evaluating different institutions

Ultimately, the goal is to let you know some of the policy analysis that is out there and importance of experiments

Pricing and Efficiency in Competitive Markets

Part I:Market Interventions

Introduction Earlier on we saw that…

In a competitive market the equilibrium price (p*) will be the one where quantity demanded will equal quantity supplied.

p* is the price that maximizes efficiency as all gains from trade are exhausted

What happens to p* and q* as the economic environment changes?

Introduction

We will discuss two types of policy:

1. Taxes2. Price controls

“Comparative statics”: change in equilibrium outcomes as a result of a change in economic environment.

Imposition of tax Different taxes (direct-indirect, value-

quantity, progressive-regressive etc.) We will consider effects of a quantity

tax on sellers (for further discussion see Stiglitz (2000))

Quantity tax – a tax levied per unit of quantity bought or sold

For simplicity let’s consider that there exist many buyers and sellers

That is, demand and supply curves are straight lines

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

q0

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

q0

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

p1

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

p1

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

p1- p0< t

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

p1

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

ps

p1- p0< t

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

pb

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

ps

Consumer surplus

p1- p0< t

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

pb

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

ps

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

p1- p0< t

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

pb

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

Tax revenueps

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

p1- p0< t

Imposition of tax

quantity

price Demand curve Supply curve beforetax

e0

e1

q0q1

pb

p0

Example 1: Tax imposed to sellers

Tax revenueps

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

Deadweight loss

Tax in the first experiments

A Perfectly Inelastic Supply

quantity

priceDemand curve

Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

Supply cannot increase or decrease (at least in the short-run). That is, supply curve won’t be shifted and market price (p0) will remain the same. Therefore, all the tax will be paid by the suppliers.

A Perfectly Inelastic Supply

quantity

priceDemand curve

Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

Supply cannot increase or decrease (at least in the short-run). That is, supply curve won’t be shifted and market price (p0) will remain the same. Therefore, all the tax will be paid by the suppliers.

p0 - t

A Perfectly Inelastic Demand

quantity

priceDemand curve

Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

Demand will not react to price changes (important drugs, cigarettes) As a result sellers will pass along all the tax to the buyers.

A Perfectly Inelastic Demand

quantity

priceDemand curve

Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

p0 + t

Demand will not react to price changes (important drugs, cigarettes) As a result sellers will pass along all the tax to the buyers.

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence

p0

pb

ps

Demand curveSupply curve before tax

TLSE says that it is irrelevant who is responsible for payingthe tax – the equilibrium price facing buyers and sellers willbe the same as the tax will be passed on.

quantity

price

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence

p0

p1

p2

Demand curveSupply curve before tax

Demand curvebefore tax

Supply curve

TLSE says that it is irrelevant who is responsible for payingthe tax – the equilibrium price facing buyers and sellers willbe the same as the tax will be passed on.

quantity

price

quantity

price

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence Experimental evidence support TLSE (Borck et

al., 2001; Ruffle, 2004)

TLSE might not be clearly understood by some policy makers and civilians who confuse statutory with economic incidence.

One explanation is that there is confusion between gross and net earnings. (See Ruffle (2004) for Canadian Conservative Party shift from a manufacturer to a consumer tax and Krugman (2000) discussion on Bush’s gasoline tax cuts.

Special cases: if demand/supply are perfectly inelastic/elastic, i.e. if one of the curves is horizontal/vertical, then only one side will pay the tax.

Price Controls

Term ‘price controls’ refers to the imposition of a price floor, i.e. minimum price, or a price ceiling, i.e. maximum price.

Recent example in Australia minimum wages in the labour market.

What is the effect of such a policy?

Price Controls

We saw that competitive markets maximize efficiency by exhausting all gains from trade.

A price floor (like a price ceiling) will prohibit some of the trades and thus lower efficiency.

Price Controls

quantity

priceDemand curve Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

Price Controls

quantity

priceDemand curve Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

pmin

qb qs

Price Controls

quantity

priceDemand curve Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

pmin

qb qs

Efficiency losses not only due to prohibition of trades, but also due to ‘anchoring effects’ (Falk et al., 2006).

Consumer surplus

Price Controls

quantity

priceDemand curve Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

pmin

qb qs

Efficiency losses not only due to prohibition of trades, but also due to ‘anchoring effects’ (Falk et al., 2006).

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

Price Controls

quantity

priceDemand curve Supply curve

e0

q0

p0

pmin

qb qs

Deadweight loss

Efficiency losses not only due to prohibition of trades, but also due to ‘anchoring effects’ (Falk et al., 2006).

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

Market Predictions

Market Predictions

Market Predictions

Market Predictions

Consumer surplus

Market Predictions

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

Market Predictions

Deadweight lossConsumer surplus

Producer surplus

Experimental Results

0

10

20

30

40

50

1 2 3 4 5 6

Period

Price

Experimental Results

Summary (Part I) We saw how economic theory can help

us predict the impact of imposing taxes and price controls.

Experiments indicate that theory predicts well actual behaviour.

Removing the price control does not necessarily improve efficiency due to anchoring effects (see Isaac and Plott (1981) for anchoring effects after price controls).

Pricing and Efficiency in Competitive Markets

Part IIInstitutions

Introduction The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic

Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002

Vernon Smith: “for the use of laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, in particular, for the study of different market mechanisms”.

Institution: Rules of the game Feasible actions Sequence of actions Information conditions

Introduction

Does it matter if only sellers can post prices (like in retail markets)?

Many institutions: Double auction markets, English Auctions, Dutch Auctions, government grants.

How can we compare performance: Experiments

Posted Offer Markets

Most retail markets in western countries

Sellers quote prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis

Sometimes due to government regulation (shipping, alcoholic beverages)

Double Auction

Double Auction

Posted Offer

Posted Offer

Summary (Part II)

Institutions are important Experiments ideal in helping us

evaluate which institution is optimal for each situation

… and to convince decision makers!!

AND NOW …

Before we decide which experiment will decide your payments you get to vote …

Average payoffs: Experiment 1: $ 37.17 Votes: Experiment 2: $ 35.29 Votes: Experiment 3: $ 22.00 Votes:

Further reading Borck, R., Engelmann, D., Müller, W., Normann, H.T. (2001)

Tax Liability-Side Equivalence in Experimental Posted-Offer Markets, Southern Economic Journal, 68:3, 672-692.

Falk, A., Fehr, E., Zehnder, C. (2006) Fairness Perceptions and Reservations Wages - The Behavioral Impact of Minimum Wage Laws, forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Isaac, M., Plott, C. (1981) Price Controls and the Behavior of Auction Markets, American Economic Review, 71, 448-459.

Ruffle, Bradley J. (2005) "Tax and Subsidy Incidence Equivalence Theories: Experimental Evidence from Competitive Markets", Journal of Public Economics, 89:8, 1519-1542.

Stiglitz, Joseph. (2000) Economics of the public sector, Norton & Co.

Ketcham, J., Smith, V., Williams, A. (1984) A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions, The Review of Economic Studies, 51:4, 595-614.