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QUANTUM HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

Christian Schaffner

(joint work with Yfke Dulek and Florian Speelman)http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.09717

Centrum Wiskunde&Informa3ca

Ins3tuteforLogic,LanguageandComputa3on(ILLC)UniversityofAmsterdam

ResearchCenterforQuantumSoCware

TrustworthyQuantumInforma1on2016,Shanghai,China,Wednesday29June2016

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

SKYLINE JED

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

SKYLINE JED

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

SKYLINE JED

EXAMPLE: IMAGE TAGGING

SKYLINE JED

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

2. PREVIOUS RESULTS

3. NEW RESULT

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

KEY GENERATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keyKEY GENERATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret key

KEY GENERATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION + ↦

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION +(secure)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION +(secure)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION +(secure)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

+(secure)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

JED ↦

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

+

+

(secure)↦

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

JED ↦

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

DECRYPTION

+

+

(secure)↦

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

JED ↦

JED JED↦

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

DECRYPTION

+

+

+

(secure)↦

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

DECRYPTION

+

+

+

(secure)↦x x

x f(x)

f(x) f(x)

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

DECRYPTION

+

+

+

(secure)↦|ψ⟩ |ψ⟩

|ψ⟩ U|ψ⟩

U|ψ⟩ U|ψ⟩

HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

public keysecret keyevaluation key

KEY GENERATION

ENCRYPTION

EVALUATION

DECRYPTION

+

+

+

(secure)↦|ψ⟩ |ψ⟩

|ψ⟩ U|ψ⟩

U|ψ⟩ U|ψ⟩

(quantum)

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

2. PREVIOUS RESULTS

3. NEW RESULT

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

Classical homomorphic encryption: solved! [Gentry 2009]

C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

Classical homomorphic encryption: solved! [Gentry 2009]

Quantum homomorphic encryption: only partial results

Clifford scheme allowing evaluation of {P, H, CNOT}

schemes for {P, H, CNOT} + limited # of T gates

C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

Classical homomorphic encryption: solved! [Gentry 2009]

Quantum homomorphic encryption: only partial results

Clifford scheme allowing evaluation of {P, H, CNOT}

schemes for {P, H, CNOT} + limited # of T gates

C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

encryption:

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

a,bencryption: pick a,b ∈R {0,1}

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

|ψ⟩ a,b

a,bencryption: pick a,b ∈R {0,1}

|ψ⟩ ↦ XaZb|ψ⟩ =

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

|ψ⟩ a,b

a,bencryption: pick a,b ∈R {0,1}

|ψ⟩ ↦ XaZb|ψ⟩

decryption:

=

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

|ψ⟩ a,b

a,bencryption: pick a,b ∈R {0,1}

|ψ⟩ ↦ XaZb|ψ⟩

decryption: XaZb|ψ⟩ ↦ |ψ⟩

=

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Ingredient 2: classical homomorphic encryption

Ingredient 1: quantum encryption (one-time pad)

|ψ⟩ a,b

a,bencryption: pick a,b ∈R {0,1}

|ψ⟩ ↦ XaZb|ψ⟩

decryption: XaZb|ψ⟩ ↦ |ψ⟩

=

[AMTW00]A.Ambainis,M.Mosca,A.Tapp,andR.DeWolf.Privatequantumchannels.FOCS’00[Gentry09]C.Gentry:Fullyhomomorphicencryp3onusingideallaJces.STOC’09

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

a,b

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

a,b

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,a

H|ψ⟩a,b H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b H

H ( ) a,b|ψ⟩

=HXaZb|ψ⟩

=XbZaH|ψ⟩

=

b,aH|ψ⟩

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

b,a

UPDATEFUNCTION(x,y) ↦ (y,x) H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

b,a

UPDATEFUNCTION(x,y) ↦ (y,x) H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

b,a

UPDATEFUNCTION(x,y) ↦ (y,x) H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

a,b

b,a

UPDATEFUNCTION(x,y) ↦ (y,x) H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

a,b

SCHEME FOR {P, H, CNOT}

|ψ⟩

H|ψ⟩

a,b

b,a

UPDATEFUNCTION(x,y) ↦ (y,x) H

Folklore,lastformalizedby[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

H

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

H

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

H

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

H T

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H T

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H

T|ψ⟩ 0,b

T

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H

T|ψ⟩ 0,b

1,b|ψ⟩

T T

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H

T|ψ⟩ 0,b P ( ) T|ψ⟩ 1,b

1,b|ψ⟩

T T

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H

T|ψ⟩ 0,b P ( ) T|ψ⟩ 1,b

1,b|ψ⟩

T Terror!

THE CHALLENGE: T GATE

a,b|ψ⟩

b,aH|ψ⟩

0,b|ψ⟩

H

T|ψ⟩ 0,b P ( ) T|ψ⟩ 1,b

1,b|ψ⟩

T T

how to apply correction P-1 iff a = 1?

error!

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEW

(comparisonbasedonStaceyJeffery’sslides)[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015[OTF15]Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEWhomomorphic for compactness security

Not encrypting Quantum circuits yes no

append evaluation description Quantum circuits

Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates) yes

Quantum OTP no yes inf theoretic

Clifford Scheme Clifford circuits yes computational

(comparisonbasedonStaceyJeffery’sslides)[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015[OTF15]Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEWhomomorphic for compactness security

Not encrypting Quantum circuits yes no

append evaluation description Quantum circuits

Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates) yes

Quantum OTP no yes inf theoretic

Clifford Scheme Clifford circuits yes computational

[BJ15]: AUX QCircuits with constant T-depth

yes computational

[BJ15]: EPR Quantum circuits Comp of Dec is prop to (#T-gates)^2

computational

[OTF15] QCircuits with constant #T-gates

yes inf theoretic

(comparisonbasedonStaceyJeffery’sslides)[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015[OTF15]Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

PREVIOUS RESULTS: OVERVIEWhomomorphic for compactness security

Not encrypting Quantum circuits yes no

append evaluation description Quantum circuits

Complexity of Dec prop to (# gates) yes

Quantum OTP no yes inf theoretic

Clifford Scheme Clifford circuits yes computational

[BJ15]: AUX QCircuits with constant T-depth

yes computational

[BJ15]: EPR Quantum circuits Comp of Dec is prop to (#T-gates)^2

computational

[OTF15] QCircuits with constant #T-gates

yes inf theoretic

Our resultQCircuits of

polynomial size (levelled FHE)

yes computational

(comparisonbasedonStaceyJeffery’sslides)[BJ15]A.Broadbent,S.Jeffery.QuantumHomomorphicEncryp3onforCircuitsofLowT-gateComplexity.CRYPTO2015[OTF15]Y.Ouyang,S-H.Tan,J.Fitzsimons.Quantumhomomorphicencryp3onfromquantumcodes.arxiv:1508.00938

1. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

2. PREVIOUS RESULTS

3. NEW RESULT

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

P ( ) T|ψ⟩ 1,b

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

T|ψ⟩ 1,b

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

T|ψ⟩ 0,b

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

T|ψ⟩ 0,b

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

is destroyed after a single use

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

GADGET

A quantum state that:

can be efficiently constructed and used

applies correction iff error was present (iff a = 1)

is destroyed after a single use

ERROR-CORRECTION “GADGET”

EXCURSIONTheoretical Computer Science

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° π0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid(fixed) cycle

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid(fixed) cycle

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

⇒ f(x,y) = 0

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid(fixed) cycle

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

⇒ f(x,y) = 0⇒ f(x,y) = 1

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid(fixed) cycle

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

⇒ f(x,y) = 0⇒ f(x,y) = 1

length: # of instructions

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

PERMUTATION BRANCHING PROGRAM

computes some Boolean function f(x,y)list of instructions:

xi 1: σ

yj0: π’

xk0: π’’

output: … ° σ’’ ° σ’ ° πid(fixed) cycle

0: π

1: σ’

1: σ’’

⇒ f(x,y) = 0⇒ f(x,y) = 1

length: # of instructionswidth: k

permutations of {1,2, …, k}

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

∈ Sk∈ Sk

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

length 4, width 5:

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

x1

y1

x1

y1

1: id0: (12453)

0: (54321)

0: (12345)

1: id

1: id0: (15243)1: (14235)

length 4, width 5:

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

x1

y1

x1

y1

OR(0,0)

output: id0

1: id0: (12453)

0: (54321)

0: (12345)

1: id

1: id0: (15243)1: (14235)

length 4, width 5:

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

x1

y1

x1

y1

OR(0,0) OR(0,1)

output: id0

(14235)1

1: id0: (12453)

0: (54321)

0: (12345)

1: id

1: id0: (15243)1: (14235)

length 4, width 5:

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

x1

y1

x1

y1

OR(0,0) OR(0,1) OR(1,0) OR(1,1)

output: id0

(14235)1

(14235)1

1: id0: (12453)

0: (54321)

0: (12345)

1: id

1: id0: (15243)1: (14235)

length 4, width 5:

EXAMPLE PBP (OR)

x1

y1

x1

y1

OR(0,0) OR(0,1) OR(1,0) OR(1,1)

output: id0

(14235)1

(14235)1

(14235)1

1: id0: (12453)

0: (54321)

0: (12345)

1: id

1: id0: (15243)1: (14235)

length 4, width 5:

BARRINGTON’S THEOREMTheorem (variation): if f : {0,1}n x {0,1}m → {0,1} is in NC1, then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

[Barrington89]Bounded-WidthPolynomial-SizeBranchingProgramsRecognizeExactlyThoseLanguagesinNC1,J.Comput.Syst.Sci.38(1):150–164,1989[BV11]Z.Brakerski,V.Vaikuntanathan.Efficientfullyhomomorphicencryp3onfrom(standard)LWE.FOCS2011

BARRINGTON’S THEOREMTheorem (variation): if f : {0,1}n x {0,1}m → {0,1} is in NC1, then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

width 5

[Barrington89]Bounded-WidthPolynomial-SizeBranchingProgramsRecognizeExactlyThoseLanguagesinNC1,J.Comput.Syst.Sci.38(1):150–164,1989[BV11]Z.Brakerski,V.Vaikuntanathan.Efficientfullyhomomorphicencryp3onfrom(standard)LWE.FOCS2011

BARRINGTON’S THEOREMTheorem (variation): if f : {0,1}n x {0,1}m → {0,1} is in NC1, then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

width 5length polynomial in (n+m)

[Barrington89]Bounded-WidthPolynomial-SizeBranchingProgramsRecognizeExactlyThoseLanguagesinNC1,J.Comput.Syst.Sci.38(1):150–164,1989[BV11]Z.Brakerski,V.Vaikuntanathan.Efficientfullyhomomorphicencryp3onfrom(standard)LWE.FOCS2011

BARRINGTON’S THEOREMTheorem (variation): if f : {0,1}n x {0,1}m → {0,1} is in NC1, then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

width 5length polynomial in (n+m)

[Barrington89]Bounded-WidthPolynomial-SizeBranchingProgramsRecognizeExactlyThoseLanguagesinNC1,J.Comput.Syst.Sci.38(1):150–164,1989[BV11]Z.Brakerski,V.Vaikuntanathan.Efficientfullyhomomorphicencryp3onfrom(standard)LWE.FOCS2011

P

NC1

L

NP

no proof that NP≠NC1

BARRINGTON’S THEOREMTheorem (variation): if f : {0,1}n x {0,1}m → {0,1} is in NC1, then there exists a permutation branching program for f with:

width 5length polynomial in (n+m)

Classical homomorphic decryption functionshappen to be in NC1… [BV11]

[Barrington89]Bounded-WidthPolynomial-SizeBranchingProgramsRecognizeExactlyThoseLanguagesinNC1,J.Comput.Syst.Sci.38(1):150–164,1989[BV11]Z.Brakerski,V.Vaikuntanathan.Efficientfullyhomomorphicencryp3onfrom(standard)LWE.FOCS2011

P

NC1

L

NP

no proof that NP≠NC1

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {P-1 iff permutation ≠ id {

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {P-1 iff permutation ≠ id {

reverse PBP fordecrypt( , )a {

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {P-1 iff permutation ≠ id {

reverse PBP fordecrypt( , )a {

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

……

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

……

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

………

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

………

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

EPR pairs

EPR pairs

………

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

1: σ0: π

i

1: σ’’0: π’’

k

1: σ’0: π’

a j

1: σ’’’0: π’’’

a l

EPR pairs

EPR pairs

Bellmeasurements

Bellmeasurements

………

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {P-1 iff permutation ≠ id {

reverse PBP fordecrypt( , )a {

ERROR CORRECTION GADGET

GADGET

P-1 P-1 P-1 P-1

PBP fordecrypt( , )a {P-1 iff permutation ≠ id {

reverse PBP fordecrypt( , )a {

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATION

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTION|ψ⟩

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATION

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATIONafter / / : classically update keysH P CNOT

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATIONafter / / : classically update keysafter : use

H P CNOT

T

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATIONafter / / : classically update keysafter : use

DECRYPTION c,dU|ψ⟩ c,d

H P CNOT

T

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATIONafter / / : classically update keysafter : use

DECRYPTIONclassically decrypt pad keys c,dU|ψ⟩ c,d

H P CNOT

T

NEW SCHEME: OVERVIEW

KEY GENERATIONclassical keys gadgets

ENCRYPTIONapply quantum one-time pad classically encrypt pad keys a,b|ψ⟩ a,b

EVALUATIONafter / / : classically update keysafter : use

DECRYPTIONclassically decrypt pad keys remove quantum one-time pad U|ψ⟩

c,d

H P CNOT

T

FUTURE WORK

FUTURE WORK

non-leveled QFHE?

FUTURE WORK

non-leveled QFHE?

verifiable delegated quantum computation

FUTURE WORK

non-leveled QFHE?

verifiable delegated quantum computation

quantum obfuscation?

FUTURE WORK

non-leveled QFHE?

verifiable delegated quantum computation

quantum obfuscation?

THANK YOU!

is hiring two principle investigators: http://tinyurl.com/qusoft-job

Application deadline: 1 September 2016