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hilosophical Review
ScepticismAuthor(s): A. K. RogersSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13, No. 6 (Nov., 1904), pp. 627-641Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2176306 .
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SCEPTICISM.
J
the
present rticle
shall
have n mind chiefly,
s the
objec-
tivepoint,
he questionofthepossibility f
a final nd satisfac-
tory hilosophy. And by
scepticism shall
mean here hat
ome-
what
unsystematicttitude
whose ground s tobe found
primarily
in
an appeal to
the factof error,nd a
challenge to point out
the
marksby whichwe might
recognize truth if
we once were
to
stumble on it. I am quitewilling, hesceptic may say, to
renounce he
task of provingdogmatically
hat we cannot
know
reality s it is. I only reserve
he right o
ask: If we can
know
truth, ray
where is it ? Produce a
specimen of truth
that
s
certain, dmitted, ndubitable.
Until this can
be done, you
can
hardlycomplain
f exercise
the privilege f withholding
udg-
ment. And
now what
likelihood s therethatyou will be
suc-
cessful in such a task ? Let me point out first hat there s
indubitably he thingwhich
we are
accustomed to call error.
Men
have
proved to be mistakenn theirmost
cherished
eliefs;
or, better, hese beliefs have
come to be
rejected, nd
rejected
almost
universally. In the
life of the
individual thinker the
same
thing is
true. That man
is rare ndeed, f he exists at
all,
who
has not
been compelled to
discardbeliefs
whichonce seemed
to him fullywarranted. Indeed, the more we examine into it,
the
more we
recognize
n
how
thoroughgoing way human
ex-
perience
s
infectedwiththe
disease of
uncertainty.
Essentially
everybelief
s
fluctuating,ubject to dispute
nd
contradiction,
transitory
n the
sway
which
t
holds over men's minds.
Even
the
testimony
f
the senses is
constantly
eading
us
astray;
judged, indeed,
by the standard
of science, tnever ven approxi-
mates thetruth. And in the realm of opinion, s opposed to
judgments
of
sense perception,
n
even
greater
onfusion xists.
It
is
worst
f
all in
philosophy.
Perhaps there
neverwas
a time
when
men
were
more dividedthan at the
present, nd that,
oo,
not
upondetails
merely, ut on
the great
essentials. One
man
says
mind s real
and not
matter; anothermatter, nd
not mind.
627
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628
THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
XIII.
One saysthat
they
have
equal reality,
nd one
that
neither
ep-
resents he
truth. And none of these
philosophers,withall
his
arguments, an convince he others, lthough all are sincere nd
honest
men,who love the
truth, nd have their
mindsopen
to
admit it.
And
if the most of
them are
certainlywrong,
why
may not this be true of all
? Rather,must not
this be so,
since
otherwise omeone
surely
would be able
to
give
reasons forhis
belief
hat
should
carry
conviction
What,now,
seem
to be
the essential factsof
the
case,
in
view
of thisscepticalcomplaint And first fall, it is to be noticed
thatto
be
a consistent
ceptic,
man
should be
ready to
commit
himself o the
definite osition
hat he has
no reason to
accept
any
one
thing
s true above
any
other
thing.
But,
as a
matter
of
fact,
n
any
reasonable
being
this
can
only
be the veriest
pre-
tence; one
who makes
such
an
assertion
may
without
hesitation
be
set
down
as,
consciously
or
not,
posing
for
effect.
We
are,
as Montaigne ays,naturalbelievers. A man can no morehelp
believing
omething,
f he
is still a
thinking
nimal,
than
he
can
help
breathing,
nd still remain
live. Whetheror not
he can
justify
his
belief o
others,whether
or
not
he
can
point
out
any
standard to which belief
must
conform,
e still
inevitably
will
find
himself
elieving.
He
may
realize
that there s the
abstract
possibility
that
every
one
of his
beliefs
will
sometime n
the
futurebe overturned. But thepresenttruth still seems to him
to
be
true;
he
still
asserts
it
to the exclusion of
its
opposite.
At the
very
east
he
asserts,
.
e.,
he
believes
n,
the truth
hat
he
is
sceptical
of
all
truth.
Otherwise
he
would be
trying o
adopt
the
impossible ttitude
f
asserting
nd
denying
he same
thing
at
the same
time.
The
first
oint s, then,
hat
all men
do believe
something,
nd
that no possible difficultiesbout the theoryof belief will ever
stop
their
doing this,
so
long
as
they
choose to
think
at
all.
Of
course a man
may
stop thinking.
But then he is no
longer
a
sceptic;
he is
intellectually nonentity.
In
other
words,
a
man
cannotthink,
nd at
the
same time
really
nd
fundamentally
doubt the
power
of
thought
o
attain to
some
degree
of
truth.
I
may
doubt
a
former esult of
thought,
ut
only by
accepting
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No. 6.]
SCEPTICISM.
629
forthe
timebeing the validity
f the process
by which
doubt
it. For
the doubt
itself presupposes the
very thing
that is
doubted. Doubt is notmereabsence of belief. In doubting,
am
also
thinking.
I am using
thought to overthrow
hought.
I
am
using
premises,
hat s, whichmy conclusion
ays
are false,
in order
to reach this
very conclusion.
Any particular
ruth
may perhaps
doubt,except the
truth hat
n the thinking
rocess
truth s implied.
And now
the second
point is this: that
if we do
necessarily
believe something,we have no right n thebasis of thesceptic's
argument
merely o
stop at any
particularpoint, nd
say that
beyond
this beliefcannot go.
All I am
justified n
saying is,
that I cannot at
present come
to any
conclusion about the
matter;
not that some one else
may not have
valid reasons
for
belief,
r
that myselfmay not
in
the
future
ee
my
way
clearer.
The fact
hat
am not as yet
convinced,
urnishes
no ground
whatever orthe conclusionthatthe truthwill never be known.
It may,
ndeed, nduce
me to give up the
search as
hopeless.
But this
s
just
the
theoretical
weakness
of scepticism.
Scepti-
cism,
in
other
words, stands
primarily
s a
disinclination
o
prosecute
he search
further. It is a personal
confession
hat,
n
the
face
of
a certain
roblem
or
group
of
problems,
feel
myself
baffled
nd
ready
to
quit.
And it
is
significant
hat
commonly
it is the attitudeof the amateur, f the one who approaches a
subject
withonly
a subsidiarynterest
n
it,
and
who
has not
the
time
or the
will
to
push
through
o
theend.
No
man
s
a
sceptic
in
every
direction.
Few men are
sceptics
in the
special
field
which
they
have
made their own.
We have had in our
own
day
a
striking
llustration
f
this
n the case
of
Professor uxley.
Professor
Huxley
is a
sceptic
n
ultimate
uestions
of
philosophy.
He has
thought
ar
enough
to see the difficultiesf theproblem,
and
his
interest
s not
sufficiento
carry
him
through
these
difficulties
hich
oom
up
before
him.
In
precisely
he same
way,
and
for
he
same
reason,
he is a
sceptic
n
another
ield
lso.
He
has
an
interest
n
a
certain
omplicated
iterary roblem,
the
relationship
f the
first
hree
Gospels,
and
he
has followed
he
discussions
far
enough
to
be
aware of the differences
f
the
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630
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL. XIII.
result,
nd the great complexity
f the
data. And the conse-
quence is that here
too he
is satisfied
o stop the inquiry
n
despairofany final ettlement. The problem,he says, is in all
probability
ncapable
of being solved.
And yet there
really
s
no
ground
for uch
an attitude.
To the one who
has made
a
business
of it, to the
expert in that particular
ield,
here seems
every
reason to believe that
the solution
is not
very far way.
The differences
re
on the
surface; but underneath
here is
a
solid basis of secure
result,whichgives
everypromise
f success.
And the significanthing bout it is this,that ProfessorHuxley
was himself he very
opposite
of a sceptic
n other directions,
n
which scepticism eems
at least
equally justified.
Nothing
can
be finer han his robust
faith
n the future f science,
and in
the
possibility
of
an
answer to the
most intricate uestions,
which
science
has as yet scarcely
proposed
to herself.
Professor
Huxley would have been the
first o decry
a despair
of science
as weak and wholly baseless. And yet here, surely,we have
difficulties
uite
as great as
in the synopticproblem,
t least.
The
difference
s
simply differencef
interest.
One problem
he
approaches
as
an avocation,the other
as a business.
He
is
ready o
give up thefirst ecause
he does
not care for
tsufficiently
to
carry it to its
issue. The
other he
is determined
o solve,
and so he
thinks
t solvable.
The point s, then, hat scepticismmeansa personaldefeat nd
loss
of interest.
There may
be nothing
that
can
compel
the
sceptic
to believe
that a solution
s possible.
But,
on the
other
hand,
his
attitude
ontains bsolutelyno
reason
whythe problem
should be given up, or why
another
man
should
feel the least
hesitation bout grappling
with it, f
he
wants
to
do
so.
It
is
wholly
a matter
whether r not the desire
for
he
solution
xists.
If it does
exist,
a mere
appeal
to past
failureswill
only
act as a
spur
to endeavor.
And this s
just
as
true of
an
ultimate
philo-
sophical
inquiry, s
it
is of
any
minorproblem
of
knowledge.
The line
cannot
be
drawn at any particular
oint.
Now
the fact
is that the
philosophical
or the
metaphysical
mpulse
does
exist.
It shows,
ndeed,
no
sign
of diminution.
And this s
a
sufficient
reason,
notonlywhy metaphysics
will
continue,
ut
why
it
has
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No.
6.]
SCEPTICISM.
63I
a
right
to continue.
The
sceptic
has no more business
to uni-
versalize
his own
attitude,
han a child would have to
demand
thateverybody hould stop playing because he himself s tired.
And
yet
to
stop
here would be
doing
an
injustice
o
the
real
significance
o which
scepticism undoubtedly may lay claim.
And, first,
ts
practical ignificance.
Taken
merely
s one
aspect
of the
thought process, scepticism
has
an
important
unction o
perform.
It stands for criticism
f all
positiveresults,
nd the
demand
that we should not
stop
with too
easy
a
conviction
f
truth. The thinker as always need to be on the alert lest he
acquiesce
too
hastily
n a
particular olution,
nd allow
the
plastic
spirit
f
thought
o
harden
nto ome
narrow
mould.
Scepticism
is the
crystallization
f
the attitude f a distrust f
finality. It
calls
for ontinued
riticism,
or onstant
penness
of mind
to
new
evidence.
Looked
at
in this
way, scepticism
will
always be a
necessary
moment
of
thought. Ideally, every
man
his
own
scepticmightrepresenthehighestpointofefficiencyn thought.
But since it
is
a hard
matter
or
he
philosopher
o
play
the
scep-
tic
towards his own attained
results,
t
perhaps
s
well,
n
addition
to the criticism hat
comes
from ival
theories,
o
have
the
atti-
tude of
scepticism
omewhat
pecialized,
nd
put
in
the hands
of
a fewwhose movements re
as little s
possible hampered
by a
committal o
positive
results.
But at the same
time,
he
need
is
relative, ot absolute. Far from enying hevalidity fthought,
it rather
presupposes
it.
In
other
words,
the
verypossibility f
doubt
rests
upon
the
assumption
f
truth.
It
presupposes
not
only
that truth
s
attainable,
ut also
that
in
some
degree it
has
already
been
attained. No
general
doubt
of
the
senses, e.
g.,
becomes
possible, except
as a
new
standard of
truth has
been
erected,by
reference o which we are able to
condemn
he senses
as fallacious. Anyreal doubtis based upon reasons; and reasons
imply
that
lready
we
take
ourselvesto be in
possession
of
ome-
thing
n
the
nature
of truth.
But
there
s also another and theoretical
spect
of
scepticism,
which
has
not received
ustice
n
what
has
hitherto
een
said.
For
there
s,
after
ll,
a
real
problem
which
scepticism roposes. I
will
grant
o
you, thescepticmight
e
supposedtosay, all
that
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632
THE
PHILOSOPRICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
XIII.
you have claimed.
I will allow that certaingeneral assumptions
about the existence nd nature ftruth re
involved n the attempt
to think at all. I will allow that we always do, as a matter f
fact,findourselvesbelieving many things.
But that does
not
touch
the main point at issue. What I am chiefly oncerned
about, is
not
to
know that there is such a thing
as
truth,
ut to
discoverwhat particular oncrete beliefs
re
true,
nd what
are
not true. And just
this s what I claim
we have no groundsfor
determining. At
a given time,no doubt,
believe that
a certain
thing s true. But I also in thepast have had theexperienceof
believing things ust
as
strongly,which
I afterwards ame
to
doubt.
What
confidence an
I have
that
history
will not
repeat
itself? This
is in a sense an abstractpossibility, o doubt.
But
does
not the bare
possibility
hrow
wavering
nd
uncertain
ight
over all our supposed knowledge? And
must not any reason-
able
man
admit
the
possibilityhat n anyparticular
ase
he
may
be mistaken? He does not believe that he is mistaken. But
would
not the denial of the
bare possibility
hat he may be,
mark
him
at
once as a dogmatist? For, again, how is he to single
out
these beliefs of his which
by no possibility
an change?
He
surely does
not
consider hat all his present
beliefs re eternally
and
unalterably
ixed. If
past experiencebe any guide,
some
of
them
are
sure to
change
in
the future. How
is he to be certain
thatany particular elief s notamongthealtogether ndetermi-
nate number f these
convictions hat
are
destined
o alter?
Has
he
any guarantee
beyond
the
degree
of assurance which
he feels,
the clearnesswithwhich the
truth omes
home to him
?
But is
not this also a clear truth f
experience,
hat,
s a
criterion,
lear-
ness and
warmth
of conviction
may be
misleading? Such
an
assurance
may
fail
us
again,
as it has
often ailed
us
in
the
past.
And still ess does itgive us any rationalgroundfor oming
to
a decision between he beliefs f differenten.
I
have certain
beliefswhich
seem
to
me
true;
and I have
confidence,
herefore,
that when these
beliefs
are
denied by
some
other man, t
is he
who
is
mistaken,
nd
not
myself.
But what
right
have
I to
this
confidence?
Surely
I am not
ready
to set myself up as
the
standard
of
truth,
nd maintain hat whoeverdiffers rom me is
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No.
6.]
SCEPTICISM.
633
thereby roved to be wrong. Every man will no doubt
decide
that his
own final onviction s justified. But this
rationally
s
not satisfying. Must we not, n short,fall back upon thestate-
mentthat we believe a thing implybecause we feel sure
that it
is
true; and is not this practically dmitting he sceptic's
conten-
tion
There is no criterionwhich will enable us to give a
dem-
onstration orour certaintyhat any particular oncrete
udgment
about the world s unalterably rue.
There is much in this position withwhich I find myself n
agreement. In the first lace, I cannot but think here s a sense
in which, n the last analysis,we have to depend upon our own
private assurance, or feeling of conviction. For
himself,
ach
man
is necessarily he court of last resort. In spite of his
dis-
agreementwithother men, n spite of his own past
changes of
opinion,he believes a certain hing; and, while he may be able to
give good reasonsfor his
belief,
fter ll the main point s, n
the
case ofhis reasons as well as of the opinionwhich hese support,
that he
finds himselfbelieving. There is something n him
to
which
the belief ppeals. He finds atisfactionn it.
His whole
nature seems to flow harmoniouslyn this direction. There is
no
sense of conflict. In a word, he is assured of ts truth.
The
second point s closely related o the first. I
think hat t
needs also to be admittedthat logical certainty elongs
only
to
theabstract tatement f the conditions fbelief, nd not to any
single concretebelief bout the actual natureof things.
We are
justified,f we think t all, in saying that true thoughtmust be
consistent, hat t must not contradict tself. But what
the
con-
crete
nature s of the real existencewhich is absolute
and self-
consistent,we are not justified n asserting, except
with the
proviso, n each particular ase, that we may possiblybe
mistaken
in
our judgment. Of course I do not mean thatwe may not
believe withverygreat confidence hat
we are
in
possession
of
a
final
nd essentially nchangeable ruth.
It is
only
the
ustifica-
tion of
the
impossibility
f the
contrary
hat is
lacking.
The
only thing hatwe can restupon
is
the abstract
aw of
contradic-
tion.
If we are
going
to
think,
we
are bound to think
n a
way
which
does
not involve
both
the assertion nd
the denial
of
the
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634
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
XIII.
same
thing
at the
same
time.
No
man can consciously
and
intentionally
o this,
ny
morethan
he
can
move backward
and
forwardt the same time,or lifthis hand at the same timethat
he leaves
it
at
rest. Indeed,
the
law of
contradiction,
ut
in
psycho-physical
erms,
would
seem
to
involve
precisely
this
physical
mpossibility;
he
motor
spects
ofassertion
nd of
nega-
tion
are
contrary,
nd
mutually
inhibit
each other.
But
any
concrete
belief
whatsoever,
ntended
to
refer o the
real
world,
may
conceivably
be outgrown.
Such
a concrete
belief
is
in
every case an hypothesismerely,held subject to correction y
further
nowledge.
If
our
belief rulyrepresents
he
facts,
hen
the
contraryannot
possibly
be true.
Valid knowledge
must
be
consistent.
But
are we
ever
justified
n saying,
bsolutelyand
beyond
the
possibility
f
question:
In this
particular
concrete
judgment
about
reality,
have
reached
the bed rock
of
truth,
and
it is
inconceivable
hat
either
now
or
in
the future
ewlight
should be thrownupon it, or that it should get a different
interpretation
'
Again,
this does
not deny
the practical
fact
of
assurance.
It only
is
meant to point
out
that,
however strong
our conviction,
t
never
warrants
s
in
shutting
ut the
possibility
of what
maybe
a
truer
nterpretation,
n
interpretation
hich
may
conceivably
nvolve
a
modification
n
our
present
belief.
But now
ifwe
grant
this,
does
the
sceptical
conclusion
follow,
that thereforewe have no ground forpreferringne beliefto
another
Does
it make
the mere
factthat
we feelassurance
the
sole
guarantee
or criterion
f truth,
nd
so
take
away
all
possi-
bility
f deciding
n
case
of
conflict
It
seems
clear that
this
s
not
necessarily
consequence
at all.
Let
me
attempt
once more
to state
the
problem.
There
is
a
sense
in
which
t
seems
to
be true
that
the final
guarantee
of our
belief s thefact hatwe believe. The thing s felt o be trueand
self-consistent,
nd
that s the
end of
the matter.
On
the other
hand, the
test
has frequently
ailed.
It
has
not
prevented
our
convictions
from
hanging;
and
it has
not
prevented
men
from
1
I emphasize
the
word concrete.'
In
abstract
hought
e
may
indeed
be sure
that
nothing
ill come
n
to
change
ur
onclusion,
ecause
we
have
arbitrarily
imited
thefield
y
choosing
o confine
ur
meaning
o
certain
articular
ata. This
furnishes
a
specialproblem,
ut do
not think
t nterferes
ith
mypresent
ontention.
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No.
6.]
SCEPTICISM.
635
holding
opposite
beliefs
bout the same
thing.
Why,
then, f
ts
claim
has
been
discredited
once,
shouldwe trust
ust
the
same
claimagain? Orhow, ftwosuch claimscome nconflict,hould
we judge
between
them?
If
the
test is
sufficient
n one case,
it
is
sufficient
n
all,.
and
all beliefs
are
justified.
If
it is
not
sufficient
n every
case,
it
is
sufficient
n
none.
Now practically,
n
spite
of
everything
hat maybe said,
we
do
consider
ourselves
to be
in
possession
of some criterion
e-
yondthe
bare
feeling
of
clearness
or certainty.
How
is it that
this actually works? And I may take the case where two
opposite opinions
about
a
given
matter
are
held
by
different
men.
Now,
in such
a
case,
each
man must be
for himself he
final
udge.
But does
this
mean,
practically,
hat
a
man has no
guarantee
of
the superiority
f
his own belief,
eyond
themere
factthat
t
is
his?
Each
man
will
say
for
himself:
My
conclu-
sion seems
to me to
be
the
truer;
for
otherwise t
could notbe
mine. But it is quitepossiblethathe should see a logical justi-
fication lso
for his partiality
owards
himself,
o that his
recog-
nition
f
the otherman's
equal
confidence
would
have,
and
ought
to have,
no
tendency
o
disturb
his own
opinion.
There are two
ways
in
which beliefs ctually
are
held,
both
of
them
quiteapart
from
the unthinking
ppeal
to
mere blind
personal prejudice,
Some
beliefs
we hold as
probable,
nd
yet
when
we come
up
againsta strongdifferencef opinion, t shakes our confidence
little.
We
find
ourselves
hesitating
nd
wavering,
nd if at
last
we
come to
a
decision
and reassert
our
belief,
we still
feel that
we have
no
way
of
showing
decisively,
ither
to
ourselves or
others,
hat
our
opponent
may
not
possibly
be
right.
It remains
to
some
extent
ust
a conflict
f
authority,
nd we decide
forour
own
side
simply
ecause
we are
ourselves,
nd
no man
can in
the
last resortgo back of whatseemstrueto him. Most of our be-
liefs
nto which
we
grow
without ny
careful
xamination f their
foundations,
re
likely
to
meet with
such
an
experience
s this.
But there
lso are
cases where
none
of
this
hesitation
s
felt.
The
fact that some
one disagrees
with
us
does
not n the least affect
our
confidence.
Indeed,
it
may
even
strengthen
ur
conviction.
We
feel
that
our final
decision
s
dictated,
not
by
the
factthat
t
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636
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
XIII.
is
to us
as
individuals
that the
casting
vote
falls,
but by some-
thing n the situation
which
gives
us
a
logical precedence
which
it denies to our adversary, nd enables us to play the part of
abstract nd impartial
eason.
The practical
ground
for this
distinction t is of course
not
difficult
o discover. Generally speaking,
we have a
logical
right,
s opposed
to
a psychological
disposition,
o prefer ur
own assurance
to that of another,
only
when we are able to
recognize
the relative
ruth
of all forwhich our
opponent
con-
tends, see it fromhis point of view, and understandfully he
reasons
which appeal
to him,and
still can find
hat we are able
to hold
to our
own standpoint
s moreadequate and inclusive,
as accounting
for all
the
facts hat
he
recognizes,
nd others
be-
side.
No one is
in
a position
definitely
nd
finally o reject n
opposing
opinion,
ntilhe can
put
himself
ympathetically
n the
place
of the one who
holds it, and
understand
why t seems to
him true. Justso long as we are simply nthe polemicalatti-
tude,
and
find
the view
that
we are
opposing
wholly
rrational
and absurd and false,
o
long
as there is
anything
n it which
strikes
us
as
entirelywithoutground
and
motive,
we may take
this as
equally
a reflection
pon ourselves, nd
suspect
that the
grounds
of
our own udgment
re
still
ncomplete
nd in
need
of
partial
reconstruction. When,
however,
t is
possible
for us to
say: I also should hold to my opponent'sopinion,f werelim-
ited to
his data;
but these new facts,
r new
aspects of
the old
facts,which
he has
failed
to
recognize,
ompel
a
different
nswer,
-
when one can
say this,
ne
feels
oneself
n safe
ground.
The
new facts
need not
be
part
of the immediate ubject
matter
f
the
problem
in hand. They may
be
obscure
presuppositions
hat
exist in the
background
of
our
opponent's
consciousness,
nd
create prejudiceswhich affecthis attitudetowardconcretemat-
ters
of
opinion.
Then we
give
what we
call
in
a
special
sense a
psychological
xplanation
of
his
belief,
nd
show
how it
springs
naturally
from
these limitations
f his mental
outlook,
which
make
it
impossible
for
him
to
approach
the evidence
n
a
way
to
see what
it
actually
contains.
But in either
case the
general
method
is
the same.
We
feel ourselves
logically justified
n
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No.
6.]
SCEPTICISM.
637
overriding nother's
opinion,
because
we think
that we
have a
point
of view which
includes
all
that our opponent
sees, and
enables us to admit ts relative ustification,utwhichalso goes
beyond
this, nd presents
more
nclusive
ystem
of facts.
It is clear that the
criterion
which
this suggests
goes
back
to
the
conception
f the logical nature
of thought s a unified
ys-
tem of related
facts. Without
amplifying his
conception
any
further,
shall try
merely o sum
up the
bearing
which it has
upon
the
claims of
scepticism.
In the firstplace, it furnishes workingcriterion f belief.
We
no
longer have
to hold that
any
and every
beliefhas
an
equal justification,
r
lack
of justification.
The
merefeeling
f
conviction,
when
nterpreted
s the
feeling
f
consistency,
an
be
supplemented
by the
logical
and rational
test which
consistency
itself mplies. The
idea
of a
consistent
ystem,
ven
thoughit
comes
home
to us
ultimately
n
feeling,
arrieswith
t the
means
ofcomparison etween eliefs, n thebasis of the degree nwhich
the belief
s
inclusive
f the
facts.
Of
course
thiswould
not
work
apart
from
he
presupposition
f
commondata of
experience.
If
beliefs
were
based
uponwholly
different
ets of
facts,
here
would
be
no
way
of
udging
between
hem.
Practically
hisoften
s
the
case.
There are
men
who,
ust
for this
reason,
never
can
by
any
possibility
ome
to a rational mnodus
ivendi,
who live in
differenthought worlds, and have no common ground of
argument.
But
fortunately
his
is
not the
universal
rule.
There
is a
general
fund
of
experience
on
which
we
all are ac-
customed
to draw.
On
the
whole,
there
is
as
much
agreement
as there
is
disagreement,
t
least
in
the
general
data on
the
basis
of which
our
interpretation
f
the world
rests.
And
wher-
ever
this
is
true,
herethe criterion
ill
work,
at
any
rate in
a
rough way.
And
now,
n
the
second
place,
it
may
be
seen,
I
think,
how
it
is
still
possible
to
say
that
our
confidence
ests in
the last resort
upon
itself, pon
the
factthat we do
actually give
assent
to the
truth
f
hings,
nd
yet
do
not
find
t
necessary
o
allow
our
changes
in
belief to
affect
his
confidence
eriously.
In
two
ways
belief
goes back,
in
the
final
nalysis,
not
to
anything
we
can demon-
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638
THE PHILOSOPHICAL
REVIEW.
[VOL.
XIII.
strate, ut to
an assumption,
nd even a personal
assumption.
The
content
f
our belief,
he
data out of which
the
system
of
belief s formed,re, as I believe, postulatedon the basis of cer-
tain
existing
demands
of
our
nature,
nd have no further
ar-
rant.
And so also the consistency
nto which
we tryby think-
ing to bring his
content,
s evidenced ultimately y
the sense of
intellectual
atisfaction,
hose attainment
s the goal
which,
we
set forourselves
when we
aim to be consistent,
nd
in
termsof
which
we have
practically
o
be
content to describe
this
goal.
Now it is truethatwe never can have logical groundfor hecer-
tainty
that
any
particular
state
of
mind
characterized
by
this
sense
of
consistencywill be final.
And
yet
this
does notpre-
vent the
feeling
rom
being
a valid
test.
There
is
even
a
sense
in which t might
be
maintained
hat the feeling,
n so far s
it
has a
logical
value,
is never mistaken.
For all that it really
claims
s
this:
If
the
facts s I now see them
are a
complete
and
adequate expressionof the real facts, hen myunderstandingf
them
s
the
only
consistent
understanding,
nd is the
truth.
If
an
opinion
eems
consistent
o
any man,
t
is
actually
consistent
on the basis merely
of
the
data which enter
consciously
nto
the
forming f
that
opinion;
and
it
ustly
claims the
universality
f
any udgment.
Any
man
whatsoever, eeing
no more
and
no
differentacts,
would arrive t the
same conclusion.
Moreover,
so far as it goes, thebasis on which the judgment is formed
represents
reality.
Nothing
whatever
that is ever taken for
fact
is
wholly
unreal.
The
interpretation
ay
be
wrong. But
some
modicum
of
reality
does underlie
it,
which a
complete
knowledge
would have to take into account. Every
conviction
of
truth, hen,
rests
upon
reality,
nd would be
justified
were
there
no other
factswhich t leaves
out of
account.
The reason,accordingly,whywe cannot set downany partic-
ular
interpretation
f
things
as
fully
nd
irrevocably
dequate,
is
evidently
his: that
we never can be sure
that
we have
ex-
hausted
the relevant data.
So
long
as
there
is
any
outlying
fact,
r
aspect
of a
fact,
which we have
not
recognized,
o
long
there
s the
possibility,
ased
upon
our
experience
of
previous
changes
of
conviction,
hat
we
should,
were we
in
possession
of
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No. 6.]
SCEPTICISM.
639
it, alter
our
presentpoint
of
view.' The sense of consistency
s
the
only
rational
test.
For
practical
purposes
it
is
ultimate.
Any concretepresent udgmenthas to be formed n the basis of
the data
whichwe
possess. On
such a
basis,
we feel that our
sense of convictionustifies
tself,
nd
is for
us, for the
moment,
final.
If
we judge
at
all, we must
do
it
with the material
at
hand.
We cannot
udge
on
the basis of
that which
we
may pos-
sibly know
in
the future,
ut which
by hypothesis
is
to
us
at
present nothing at all. So,
again, the criterion nables us to
compare presentwithpast beliefs, nd say definitelyhat one is
at least truer than the other.
And, finally,
n
the
case even of
the
udgments any possible
udgment
we
imagine
ourselves
passing
in
the future,we
may, although
we
cannot forecast ts
concreteform,
till
recognize
hat the same criterionwill
have to
attend
t,
f
it
is
rationallyustified.
But what
the
possibilities
are
in
the way
of
new facts
f
experience,
we never
by any
chance
can say; and thereforet is thatany beliefmustbe held by us
as
conceivablycapable
of
being
modified
y
further
xperience.
It will always
remain a
logical impossibility, herefore, o
demonstrate he
necessity
f
any particular
view of
the
world.
But,
on the other
hand,
t
needs once more
to
be
pointed out
that this does not
deny
the
possibility
of
practical assurance.
The root
of
assurance
ies
back
of
ogical necessity,
n the
depths
of our activeand practicalnature. No amountofreasoning an
ever
leave
us
absolutely
without
belief, imply
because
we are
more than
reasoningbeings,
nd we never
an
possibly get away
from
urselves.
And
in
the realm
of
logic itself,
we
must dis-
tinguish
between
an
abstract
possibility
nd
a
real
possibility.
That
I
have
a
right
o
believe,
s the one
thing cepticism
annot
touch.
It must
presuppose
the
right
n order
to
be
scepticism.
1
n
making
his
statement
niversal,
have reference
o
beliefswhich
deal
with
the
nterpretation
f
facts,
nd
their
place
in
reality.
I do not
mean
to
maintain
thatwe
may
not
know
with
ertaintyresent
acts f
personal xperience.
I
should
hold that
we
cannotbe
mistaken
n
the
belief
that
some
fact f
experience xists.
Nor
do
I
see
how
we
could
well
go
wrong
n
our
knowledge
f
the
nature
f
at
least
some
of
the
simpler hases
of our
experience,
o
long
as
they
re
regarded imply s
facts
of our
own
immediate
xperiencing
r
meaning.
Even
here,however, ne
needs
of course o
exercise
great aution,
y
reason
of
the well
known
dangers hat
attend
ntrospection
nd
memory.
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640 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Voi,.
XIII.
What
in
particular am,
or am
not,
ustified n believing,
epends
upon concrete
onditions.
In
order to shake my confidence n
my own assurance, t is not enough, practically, o make me
recognize he possibility
hat
my udgment
may be mistaken. I
must have some solid
and
positive
reason,
n
terms
f concrete
experience,
or
believing
hat t
is mistaken. Now evidently
ll
the concretegrounds
for
my judgment
are the
outcomeof past
experience.
New
experiences
may
alter
my opinion
when
they
come.
But until
heycome,
or until
have
some definite eason
to look forthem, hey may rightly e disregarded. Ifmy pres-
ent
point
of view seems
to
me
sufficient,
f
apparentlyt harmo-
nizes
all the facts,
nd
if,
s time
goes
on,
it continues
ermanently
to approve
tselfto
me as
essentially dequate,
afterbeing sub-
jected
to the
testing process
of
added
experience,
hen I
should
be
foolish
f I were not
practically
o
acquiesce
in
it,
and
take it
as
forme an
assured
result,
o be
accepted
as
governing
my life,
withouttheabiding sense of uncertainty,r a continual ooking
to see
it overthrown. Indeed,
cannot
help taking
this
attitude,
so
long
as
the
system
of
belief
s the outcome of
my practical
needs. Apart
from
articular grounds
for
disbelief,
here
s,
to
be
sure,
this
general
ground
once
more,
that
many
beliefs n
the
past
have
changed.
This
is,
of
course,
o
far
s
it
goes,
a
positive
reason, and,
as
I
have
argued,
t
ought
to
teach us
caution.
But
to make it an absolutelygeneralreason forhesitation,s,I think,
only possible
if
we
exaggerate
enormously
he
facts about
the
actual
fluidity
f
belief.
If
a man's intellectual
experience
has
been
entirely
iscontinuous
nd
chaotic,
there
is
indeed
for
him
good
reason
to
distrust
is
newest
opinion.
But this s
the case
at
most
only
very rarely. If,
as
a matter
f
fact,
ur
ntellectual
growth
s more
or less
continuous,
fthe relation o
earlierbeliefs
is normallyone of absorption, ather than of destruction nd
entire
eversal,
hen the
weight
of the
considerationwill not
be
the
same for
all cases
of
belief,
but
will
differ
ccording
to
the
concrete
circumstances;
nd sometimes t
may rightly
be
very
small indeed.
If
the
new
experience
ever does
occur
which
throws
doubt
upon mypast generalization,
hen,ndeed,
should
not
allow
any
attained
resultto lead
me
to
refuse t
welcome. I
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No. 6.] SCEPTICISM. 64I
should be ready to revise my belief as occasion requires. But
until his comes about, am justified n trusting o what I know.
And the more my experience attains certainweight and com-
prehensiveness,he more confident may feel, nd rightlyfeel,
that no new
fact
is likely to overthrow o assured
an
edifice
f
belief, r do more thanalter t
in
itsminorfeatures.
A.
K. ROGERS.
BUTLER COLLEGE.