Post on 18-Nov-2014
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SCADA Security: The Five Stages of Cyber Grief
Tom Cross Director of Security Research
Vulnerabilities I’m credited on…
• MFSA2008-‐37 Mozilla Stack Buffer Overflow • cisco-‐sa-‐20070808-‐IOS-‐IPv6-‐leak InformaDon Leakage Using IPv6 RouDng Header in Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS-‐XR
• MS07-‐033 Internet Explorer COM object instanDaDon • CVE-‐2007-‐2388 Apple QuickDme for Java remote code execuDon
• MS06-‐036 Windows SMB Denial of Service • X-‐Force Alert 228 Asterisk PBX Denial of Service • X-‐Force Alert 229 Asterisk PBX Traffic AmplificaDon
The 5 Stages of Cyber Grief
Its not connected to the Internet.
Stage 1: Denial
"In our experience in conduc.ng hundreds of vulnerability assessments in the private sector, in no case have we ever found the opera.ons network, the SCADA system or energy management system separated from the enterprise network. On average, we see 11 direct connec.ons between those networks.” Source: Sean McGurk, Verizon The Subcommi_ee on NaDonal Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign OperaDons May 25, 2011 hearing.
Its connected to the Internet.
SHODAN
• Project STRIDE: “To date, we have discovered over 500,000 control system related nodes world-‐wide on the internet. About 30% are from the US, and most are on ISP addresses.”
ICS Cert • In February 2011, independent security researcher Ruben Santamarta
used SHODAN to idenDfy online remote access links to mul0ple u0lity companies’ Supervisory Control and Data Acquisi0on (SCADA) systems.
• In April 2011, ICS-‐CERT received reports of 75 Internet facing control system devices, mostly in the water sector. Many of those control systems had their remote access configured with default logon creden0als.
• In September 2011, independent researcher Eireann Levere_ contacted ICS-‐CERT to report several thousand Internet facing devices that he discovered using SHODAN.
Stage 2: Anger
Stage 3: Bargaining
Stage 3: Bargaining • Stuxnet
• First widely reported use of malware to destroy a physical plant • Extremely sophisDcated • Jumped the air-‐gap via USB keys • Widespread infecDons throughout the Internet
• Shamoon • Targeted the energy sector • DestrucDve
• Over writes files • Destroys the Master Boot Record
Stuxnet infecDons, source Symantec:
ICS Honeypot Results • Kyle Wilhoit – Trend Micro Threat Research Team
DDOS AFacks More Automated & Powerful
• Prolexic Q2 2012 to Q2 2013 – 33% increase in a_acks – 925% increase in bandwidth
• 4.47 Gbps to 49.24 Gbps – 1655% increase in packets per second
• 2.7 Mpps to 47.4 Mpps
Stage 4: Depression
Stage 4: Depression The Patching Treadmill • Control systems are not designed to be shut down regularly
• EnDre systems may need to be shut down for a single patch install • Patching may mean upgrading
• Upgrades can cascade through a system
• Even assessments may require downDme!
• Patching leads to InterconnecDvity • InterconnecDvity leads to compromise
• SoluDons? – Third-‐Party Run-‐Time In-‐Memory Patching? – Intrusion PrevenDon Systems?
Stage 5: Acceptance What would acceptance mean? • Genng serious about interconnecDvity
• We need to find new ways to work • We need to accept some inconvenience
• Designing systems for patchability
• Systems that can be patched without being restarted • Hot Standby failover
• Patches that do not require upgrades • Security patches that can be accepted without performance concerns
• Built in IDS capability?
• Designing systems for failure
Lancope does Netflow
Network Visibility through Netflow
DMZ
VPN
Internal Network
Internet NetFlow Packets
src and dst ip
src and dst port
start time
end time
mac address
byte count
- more - NetFlow
3G Internet
3G Internet
NetFlow
NetFlow
NetFlow
NetFlow
NetFlow Collector
Intrusion Audit Trails
1:06:15 PM: Internal Host Visits Malicious
Web Site
1:06:30 PM: Malware InfecDon Complete, Accesses
Internet Command and Control
1:06:35 PM: Malware begins scanning internal
network
1:13:59 PM: MulDple internal infected hosts
1:07:00 PM: Gateway malware
analysis idenDfies the transacDon as malicious
1:14:00 PM: Administrators
manually disconnect the iniDal infected host
Do you know what went on while you were miDgaDng?
Behavioral Anomaly Detection
Thank you!
Tom Cross Director of Security Research