SecuriTay IV Comey Crypto · PDF file• US Govt offered export easing if you included key...

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Comey CryptoMichael Jack

mikey$ whoami• Michael Jack

• 2nd Year Ethical Hacking BSc @ Abertay

• Member Abertay Ethical Hacking Society

• I <3 Cryptography

• @MikeyJck

• mikeyjck.io

Few Things

• Not a Lawyer or Cryptographer

• ‘classified/ top secret’ leaked material warning

• Nothing new, all info is public domain

• Objective as possible

What’s all this then?

Correcting Misconceptions“misconception that building a lawful intercept solution… requires a so-called “back door,” one that foreign adversaries and hackers may try to exploit.

But that isn’t true. We aren’t seeking a back-door approach. We want to use the front door, with clarity and transparency, and with clear guidance provided by law.”James Comey Oct 2014 -

– David Cameron January 2015

“One is communications data, that is not the content of a phone call. It is just who made which call to which

person and when… And what matters, in simple terms is that we can access this data [on all platforms]… I have a very simple principle to apply here… in our country do

we want to allow a means of communication that in extremis we can’t read with a signed warrant…”

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1670893/where-are-these-keys.pdf

❤ Adam Boylan

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2015/02/19/cne-access-core-mobile-networks-2/

• Never roll your own crypto!

• Crypto is a tool not a security silver bullet

• Security of crypto is not binary

Cryptography 101

Modern Cryptography

World War II Crypto• Enigma

(electromechanical)

• Broken by Marian Rejewski

• Continued decryption by Alan Turning et al @ Bletchley Park

Modern Cryptography

• post World War II

• more accurately 1970s >

• NSA, GCHQ, IBM

Modern Crypto - Timeline• 1971 - IBM Lucifer Block Cipher (Watson Lab)

• 1973 - NBS asks for Data Encryption Standard (DES) designs

• 1973-4 - IBM develop & submit DES candidate

• 1976 - Diffie & Hellman publish “New Directions in Cryptography”

• 1976 - After alterations by NSA IBMs design chosen as DES

• 1977 - “Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems" by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman (RSA) @ MIT

• 1984 - RC4 Stream Cipher RSA Labs (Rivest)

• 1991 - Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Phil Zimmerman

• 1994 - Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) conceived @ Netscape

• 1999 - SSL Standardised by IETF becomes Transport Layer Security (TLS)

• 1999 - NIST wants successor to DES asks for public input for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

• 1999 - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) uses RC4

• 2001 - NIST approves AES (Rijndael) for use as FIPS 197

• 2004 - Wi-fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)

Modern Crypto - Timeline

Modern Crypto - 2015

• Data at Rest = AES or PGP

• Data in Motion = TLS1.2 or IPSEC

• Data in air = WPA2 or SNOW 3G(?)

math• factoring integers into primes (RSA)

• discrete log modulo prime (DSA)

• discrete log in elliptic curve groups (ECDH)

Crypto Wars

Export Controls• 1970s Crypto is added to US Munitions List

• USML part of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)

• ITAR licensing requires case by case consideration for export of munitions on USML

• Justice Department told White House in 1978 that ITAR restriction on crypto is unconstitutional.

NSA Controls

• 1974 - IBM discover differential cryptanalysis NSA ask them to keep it secret

• Limit on key size of exported crypto systems

• IBM Notes Int version 64-bit key, 24-bits know to NSA

Clipper Chip• Announced 1993 by NSA

• Skipjack algorithm + DH for key distribution

• Built in Key escrow :(

• Matt Blaze et al

• US Govt offered export easing if you included key escrow

• Dead by 1996

Export Controls

• December 1996 - Bureau of Export Administration transfers jurisdiction over "commercial encryption products” to the Commerce Department

• Encryption products specifically designed or modified for military use remain subject to ITAR controls.

PRISM/ TEMPORA3 slides

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/813847/prism.pdf

BETTER IMAGE NEEDED

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/813847/prism.pdf

Bullrun & EdgehillTOP SECRET/ STRAP1

nsa$ whoamiNational Security Agency

• 2013 Budget: $10.8B

• $2.5B on data collection

• $1.6B on processing/ exploitation

• Upwards of 40k employees

• Created by Truman in secret 1952

• FISA/ National Security Letters/CALEA

gchq$ whoami

Government Communications HQ

• Originally founded 1919 as GC&CS

• Unique access to backbone infrastructure

• Upwards of 6k employees

• RIPA

Cryptanalysis is good

BULLRUN

• Ability to defeat encryption

• BULLRUN sources “extremely sensitive”

• TLS/ SSH/ OTR/ VPN/ VoIP/ etc

https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf

www.spiegel.de/media/media-35532.pdf

Circa September 2005

National Intelligence Budget 2013DNI Statement

The Curious Case of the Dual_EC_DRBG

here be backdoors• RSA accepted $10M from NSA to use Dual EC

DRBG as default in BSAFE library (2004/5)

• RSA “relied on guidance from NIST”

• RSA claim they didn’t know it was weakened or contained a backdoor

• Dual_EC_DRBG withdrawn after NIST issues new guidlines Sept 2013

math • Constants that define the EC

• should be random

• NIST doesn't say how or where the constants come from

• If these constants were picked specially there is a ‘skeleton key’

• after recovery of 32bytes of output attacker can predict DRBG output

On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC in TLS Implementations

Matt Green, DJB, Tanja Lange et al

Sys Admins• GCHQ/ CSEC venture

to ‘automate’ NOC hunting

• identifying sys admins and NOCs

• compromise privileged users, fight smart right?

Countermeasures

• be pissed

• good encryption

• research

• Kerckhoffs 2nd principle

http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-35535.pdf

Conclusion

• Undermining encryption is a terrible plan

• Step the fuck away from our crypto

• Education & discussion

ThanksQuestions?

@MikeyJck

Regin Malware• ‘nation state’

• US(NSA?) & GCHQ

• months/ years to develop

• designed to gather ‘intelligence’

• focus on remaining undetected

Regin Malware• ‘nation state’

• NSA & GCHQ

• months/ years to develop

• designed to gather ‘intelligence’

• focus on remaining undetected

Why? UK uses CNE against close ally(s) within the EU

the fuck are Belgacom?

Belgacom - Timeline• At some point before March 2011 GCHQ had compromised

Belgacom with what would later be discovered as Regin

• the name appeared for the first time on the VirusTotal website on March 9th 2011

• Undetected in Belgacoms networks until symptoms in Summer 2012

• June 2013 - after an update exchange falls over Belgacom contact M$ who had no clue?

• Belgacom sys admins suspect virus > hire Fox IT

• Belgacom informs authorities & Belgian MI get involved

GCHQ Belgacom Status Reports 😏

April - June 2011

July - Sept 2011

Jan - March 2012

Using Belgacom to ‘seed’

one more thing…

the damage?• 120 ‘systems’, 70 personal computers

• Backbone cisco routers…

• belgacom got ownd

• sept 16th pr: “At this stage there is no indication of any impact on the customers or their data,” it said. “At no point in time has the delivery of our telecommunication services been compromised.””

SecuriTay IV Comey Crypto · PDF file• US Govt offered export easing if you included key...

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