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POLICY TOWARD THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY: A
FOCUSED COMPARISON OF CASES REGARDING SIERRA
LEONE, CROATIA, AND IRAQ.
Taylor B. Clausen Political Science Honors Thesis, Pepperdine University
March 30, 2015
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On October 2, 2007, the world was introduced to Erik Prince, the CEO of what
would be described as the “worlds most powerful mercenary army” Blackwater USA.1 In
front of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Chairmen Henry
Waxmen (D-CA) began what would be hours of intensive questioning by members of
Congress regarding the most basic questions of private security contracting.2 Why were
they hired? What purpose were they serving? Why were these contractors being used in
place of U.S. soldiers? Not only were these questions being asked by members of
Congress, they reflected questions in the minds of every American and citizen around the
world. This hearing was the coming out party of the private military industry, and the
conversation about conflict, government responsibility, and twenty-first century warfare
would never be the same. The presence of private military firms involved in the process
of twenty-first century conflict effectively ends the long-held theory that states hold a
monopoly of force.3 In the world’s current state of affairs, private military firms are
challenging long held beliefs on how states and non-state actors are able to employ
military force. Today’s current climate of security challenges presents the ideal time to
study this topic. Experts in the field such as P. W. Singer,4 Alan Axelrod,5 and
Christopher Kinsey6 have focused their study by examining one particular firm at time,
drawing from a firm’s operations in multiple states. I seek to re-focus the study of the
1 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, (New York, New York: Nation Books, 2007). 2 Nancy Pelosi’s YouTube Channel, “Blackwater Hearing: Waxman’s Opening,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KseYmZNuE7Y (Oct. 2, 2007). 3 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1918 http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ethos/Weber-vocation.pdf 4 Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). 5 Alan Axelrod, Mercenaries: A Guide to Private Armies and Private Military Companies, (Los Angeles, California: Sage Publications, 2014). 6 Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006).
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private military industry by placing the states and their respective conflicts at the center
of study in order to address policy implications.
Specifically, I seek to address the question of how the U.S. Government should
initiate policy toward the private military industry. The organization of this paper is split
into five sections, which include a literature review, research design, cases studies,
findings, and policy implications and recommendations. The literature review
summarizes the existing literature on the resurgence of private military firms by
addressing the key concepts of stereotypes and definitions, the effect of PMF’s on states,
and the regulation of the industry. This summarization provides the necessary
understanding for questions, included in the research design, that are based on the three
issue areas of effectiveness, private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy” powers of
PMFs that future policy can affect. The research design details the process in which I
conduct a focused comparison of cases that consists of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq.
Based upon the results of the comparisons, I draw several context-dependent
generalizations that serve as the evidence and support for policy directions regarding
future legislation. This method is superior for assessing policy directions because the
evidence generated is from three separate cases that differ in time and regional area.
Other methods only examine one specific situation within the areas of effectiveness,
private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy”. This study is needed because the
context-dependent generalizations that come from the focused comparison of cases have
not been produced by other existing studies.
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Literature Review
Stereotypes and Defining Private Military Firms
Private military firms challenge the basic assumption that warfare is only
conducted by public militaries. In reality, the market for warfare in today’s conflict is a
mixed batch between public and private entities. Private military firms are an essential
part of many developed nations defense infrastructures including the United States,
Britain, and Australia.7 This is because contractors are understood by policy makers to be
both cost-efficient and effective at the jobs they are contracted to perform. However, the
common stereotype exists that all private military contractors are “mercenaries” with the
negative connotation that they cannot fight for just causes.8 In reality, a mercenary is
defined in Article 1 of the UN Mercenary Convention as any person who 1 (a) is
specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict (b) is motivated
to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is
promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict material compensation… (C) is
neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party
to the conflict (d) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and (e)
has not been sent by a state which not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member
of its armed forces.9 The highly corporatized structure of the private military industry
goes beyond this traditional understanding of mercenaries in that many of the employees
of private military firms are nationals of a party to conflicts and private gain is redefined
7 Thomas K. Adams, “The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” Parameters 29:2 (Summer 1999): 103-116. 8 James L. Taulbee, “Reflections on the Mercenary Option,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 9:2 (1998): 145-163. 9 United Nations, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34 (December 1989): Article 1.
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into corporate profit.10 This is not to say that there have been criticisms in the way private
military firms have attempted to legitimize themselves outside this definition of
“mercenaries.” Dr. Abdel-Fatsu Musah of King’s College in London is one such critic
who claims, “Private military companies are nothing but the old poison of vagabond
mercenaries in new designer bottles.”11 While Musah and Fayemi’s criticisms may hold
merit, criticism of the private military industry is not a new phenomenon. The rise of
nationalism as the predominant organization of states began in the 1700’s, which added a
negative connotation to the term “mercenary”.12 These individuals were largely viewed as
disloyal whereas civic soldiers were upheld as patriotic.13
In regards to the academic study of private military firms, researchers have found
it necessary to have clear operational definitions of private military firms. While many
researchers have provided their own definitions, Peter W. Singer provides the most robust
and clear reasoning.14 He breaks the industry down into three distinct types of firms with
the distinguishing factor being the distance of the firm’s activity from the battlefield.15
These three categories are military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military
support firms. Military provider firms administer services at the forefront of battle and
actively engage in conflict, which military consultant and provider firms do not
participate in. Military consultant firms help to train and advise existing armies, but do
not imbed their own employees with these forces on the battlefield as a military provider
firm would. The final type of private military firm is the military support firm. These
10 Singer, 13. 11 Abdel-Fatau Musah, Kayode J. Fayemi, Mercenaries : An African Security Dilemma, (London, United Kingdom: Pluto Press, 2000), 264. 12 Axelrod, 105. 13 Singer, 31. 14 Singer, 91. 15 Singer, 92.
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companies look to specialize in the logistical aspect of war such as transportation, food,
and construction projects. These firms are farthest removed from the trigger-pulling
aspects of warfare. All three of these definitions help to distinguish the industry into parts
that will help to clarify the roles different firms have had in the states chosen for the
focused comparison of cases.
The Effect of PMF’s on States
Dr. Anna Leander, a scholar who has written extensively on the implications of
private military firms, details the influence PMF’s have in lobbying power. She uses the
claim that the dimensions of power lie in the agenda-setting capacity before and after
formal decision-making.16 While governments drove the ascension of private military
firms by their need to reduce budgets and focus on “core functions,”17 she now claims
private military firms have the ability to shape the security agenda. Through their
influence of lobbying and network of powerful key actors, they can influence states
through their “epistemic power.”18 This power can be used to manipulate the
understanding of security into more militaristic terms that empowers private military
firms as legitimate security experts.19 P.W. Singer’s explanations appear to assume
private military firms only react to conditions created by the international system, while
Leander asserts that private military firms have the ability to create employment
16 Peter Bacharach, Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 17 Christopher Coker, “Outsourcing War,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13:1 (1998): 95-113, 111. 18 Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 33 (Summer 2005): 803-825, 811. 19 Leander, 821.
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opportunities through their structural power in the system as security experts.20 This
possibility is examined by the questions of private networks in this study.
Private military firms, as corporate entities, also enjoy the benefits of possessing
the ability to subcontract, “spin-off”, and form shell companies.21 The ability to
subcontract can reduce costs as well as hide the extent to which the firm is involved in
the state. “Spin-off” capability is when a firm can create another company that is
operating within legal boundaries of the client state following the termination of a
contract. The formation of shell companies is similar to subcontracting, except that the
companies that are contracted are still owned by the private military firm in which the
client state formed a contract with. These are all powerful tools that can work both to the
benefit and detriment of the state’s agendas when contracting PMF’s.
While the available tools give PMF’s the ability to influence states, PMF’s can
also be a tool of the state. “Foreign policy by proxy” is a term that refers to a situation in
which a state may choose to employ a PMF to avoid oversight and/or legal parameters.22
Such was the case during the Clinton administration and “Plan Colombia,” where
DynCorp was hired to combat the drug cartels in Colombia due to signals from Congress
there were to be no U.S. troops on the ground for this purpose.23 The tools available to
PMF’s provide a number of interesting implications and options for states as they engage
with the private military industry.
20 Ibid. 21 “Bullets for Hire,” The Economist, November 17, 2012. http://www.economist.com/news/international/21566625-business-private-armies-not-only-growing-changing-shape-bullets-hire 22 Anna Leander, “Privatizing Military Training,” Foreign Policy In Focus 7:6 (May 2002): 3. 23 Jim Rochlin, “Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: The Demise of the FARC,” Review of International Studies 37:02 (April 2011): 715-740, 725.
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Regulation of Private Military Firms The responsibility of regulating private military firms is ultimately placed in the
hands of states.24 However, many countries that have private military firms headquartered
within their borders have failed to legislate appropriate law allowing for effective
regulation of the industry. In order to fill the gap created by the lack of regulation at the
national level, the international system has attempted to better understand how
accountability can be attained within the industry. The United Nations in 2008
established the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Mercenaries.25 Their stated
objective is to investigate the relationship between human rights and the activities of
private military firms. Since the group’s inception, they have come to four main
conclusions about the industries impact on human rights.26 The first finding indicates that
the expansion of the private military industry has increased the amount of contact
between contractors and civilian populations. Second, there currently is no meaningful
regulation of the industry at the national level. Third, there are no vetting standards for
the personnel private military firms sent into conflict zones. The final conclusion reached
by the group was that private military firms are transnational in nature, and international
law does not fill the gap left by the lack of national legislation. One realistic scenario
within the private military industry could be a firm that is contracted by the United
Kingdom, which recruits employees from Malta to work on a vessel flagged in Liberia,
24 Carsten Hoppe, “Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies,” The European Journal of International Law 19:5 (2008): 989-1014, 1012. 25 Human Rights Council, Mandate of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Resolution 7/21 (March 28, 2008). 26Fazia Patel, “Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: A Comprehensive Solution,” American Society of International Law 107 (April 2013): 201-203, 201.
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which in turn protects a crew from Somali pirates in international waters.27 The problem
still exists that even if meaningful regulation were put into place at the national level,
private military firms have a keen ability to work around legislation. Private military
firms have the ability to place their headquarters in any part of the globe. In addition,
some firms are digital in nature, which allows the entire operation to be conducted by a
few employees and a computer. Arms, equipment, and additional personnel can be
summoned in a mere matter of weeks, further complicating the regulatory system toward
the private military industry.28
In the United States, the regulatory framework that applies to private military
firms is a patchwork of different initiatives. While government activities are generally
open to examination under laws such as the Freedom of Information Act, private military
contracts are protected under proprietary law, often making their activities completely
deniable.29 The State Department claims that they cannot provide the information to the
public on private military contracts due to the need to protect proprietary information.
Private military firms claim they cannot disclose details of contracts due to government
restrictions. The end result is a paradox where both parties claim they cannot disclose
information due to the other party, which shields contract work from civilian scrutiny and
congressional oversight.30 This existing regulatory framework allows the private military
industry to be a secret option for the Executive Branch, which is reminiscent of previous
occasions in history where private options allowed for politically expedient policy.31
27 Patel, 202. 28 Singer, 75. 29 Singer, preface. 30 Singer, 214. 31 Deborah C. Kidwell, “Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies: Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 12,” Combat Studies Institute Press (2005): 3.
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The lack of national and international regulation toward private military firms
often leaves the check on power in individual hands. One such example occurred when a
whistleblower working for DynCorp accused fellow employees of sex crimes with girls
as young as twelve years old while operating under a contract in the Balkans.32 DynCorp
fired the whistleblower and whisked the employees back to the United States, out of the
reach of local authorities. DynCorp was later sued for this under the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organization Act33, However, this example demonstrates the lengths to which
private military firms will go to protect their reputation. Often times the reputation of a
firm is the only guarantee of continued contracts from states, which creates an incentive
to avoid legal situations with regulatory systems.34
Due to the extensive use of private military firms to support the U.S. led coalition
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, then Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates and Congress worked to advance a regulatory framework that applied in this
operational situation.35 The first adjustment to existing U.S. law was that private military
contractors were subjected to court-martial jurisdiction under an amendment to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.36 The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was
also amended to apply to certain non-Department of Defense contractors working within
the military overseas.37 However, both of these improvements in the legal framework of
the United States still allows for contractors to remain outside the jurisdiction of U.S.
32 David Isenberg, “It's Déjà Vu for DynCorp All Over Again,” The Huffington Post, Dec. 6, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/its-dj-vu-for-dyncorp-all_b_792394.html?). 33 Robert Capps, “Outside the Law,” Salon, Jun. 26, 2002 (http://www.salon.com/2002/06/26/bosnia_4/). 34 Singer, 74. 35 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, To Receive Testimony on the Challenges Facing the Department of Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., January 7, 2009. 36 Jennifer K. Elsea, “Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues,” Congressional Research Service (January 7, 2010): 29. 37 Elsea, 29.
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courts, civil or military, for improper conduct in Iraq or Afghanistan.38 Recently, four
former guards of the military provider firm Blackwater USA were prosecuted by the U.S.
Justice Department for their role in the Nisour Square shootings that took place in Iraq in
2007.39 The conviction confirmed the possibility of enforcement and regulation of private
military contractors; however, the seven years it took to reach this conviction affirmed
the tedious and difficult process of doing so.40
Following the 2007 Nisour Square shooting in Iraq, the international community
started a drafting process of standards that could be applied internally by Executive
Branch agencies as well as private military firms. The process resulted in the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC).41 This
standard is applied voluntarily and is an alternative to passing legislation through national
bodies or through international assemblies. More information on these standards is
provided in the policy implications section.
The topics of the literature summarized above provide the necessary basis for
further understanding the selected issue areas of effectiveness, private networks, and
“foreign policy by proxy”. These three selected topics are all areas where policy has the
ability to affect the private military industry and are inquired further by the respective
research questions.
38 Elsea, 29. 39 Matt Apuzza, “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings.” The New York Times, Oct. 22, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html). 40 Spencer S. Hsu, "After Seven Years, American Jury to Decide Blackwater Guards' Role in Iraqi Deaths," The Washington Post, Aug. 27, 2014 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/after-seven-years-american-jury-to-decide-blackwater-guards-role-in-iraqi-deaths/2014/08/27/db714136-2d55-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html). 41 ICoC Timeline, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. (http://www.icoc-psp.org/ICoC_Timeline.html).
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Research Design
In this paper, I conducted a focused comparison of cases to better understand how
to initiate policy toward the private military industry.42 The issue areas chosen were
effectiveness, private networks, and “foreign policy by proxy.” The focused comparison
of cases methodology is a systematic comparison of case studies where sets of general,
standardized research questions are applied to the study of each case. In this paper, I
have listed the set of research questions employed in table 1. This research design
produced context-dependent generalizations that proved useful in formulating future
policy toward private military firms.
Table 1
Effectiveness Private Networks Foreign Policy by Proxy
What type of firm(s) was involved in the state?
Did the firm(s) have spin-off capabilities?
Was there a previous military engagement to
provide security by a state or colonial power?
Why was the firm(s) hired? If so, does the firm(s) have any role in the state today?
During the conflict, was there any U.N. law
regulating intervention or engagement?
To what extent was the firm successful?
Is/was the firm(s) involved in any other network of
private firms or individuals?
Is there evidence of the country, in which the PMF
was based, assisting the work of the PMF?
I defined the term “success” in the issue area of effectiveness by using the same
criteria private military firms market their services to states. This included the claims of
reduction in costs, overall skill and professionalism, and completion of the contract
agreed to between the firm and state. Effectiveness was determined by the reasons for
42 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), Ch. 3.
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which the firm was hired. Private investments were examined by the ability to “spin-off”
using shell companies and subcontractors, the level of involvement the firms have in the
state presently, and the networks that made up these firms. Lastly, “foreign policy by
proxy” was examined using the questions listed to get a better understanding of how
these firms might have been used to extend conflicts beyond oversight and legal
boundaries. The data used to evaluate this came from a multitude of sources including
existing case studies, scholarly articles, pieces from investigative journalists, press
releases from private military firms, and existing literature on the operations of these
firms. Each case study is organized in the manner of a brief description of the conflict,
followed by an in-depth look at each selected private military firm that was involved in
the state selected. Next, there is an analysis that covers the overarching themes that each
conflict presented to all international actors involved in the conflict. The conclusion
systematically answers the case study questions, using evidence provided by the in-depth
activities of the firms and the analysis presented.
The three states I compared are Iraq, Croatia, and Sierra Leone. In all three of
these states, private military firms had a significant impact on the formation or
sustainment of the states sovereignty and continuing development. These three states
contain contrasting similarities and differences, which allowed them to be prime
candidates for study. The first difference is that each state is located in a different
regional area of study in the world. Iraq is in the Middle East, Croatia in Eastern Europe,
and Sierra Leone in West Africa. The focused comparison of cases results allowed for the
findings to transcend regional areas of focused research. The second difference is that
private military firms affected each state during different time periods. Private military
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contractors began operating in Iraq from 2003 through the present day while in Croatia
and Sierra Leone they were active in the mid 1990’s. The three states selected cover over
twenty years of recent history. This allows the analysis of the study to go beyond any one
particular time period.
While the states chosen do differ in both time of conflict and geographical
locations, there is one similarity that deserves mention. All three of the states were
significantly impacted by the role of private military firms within their borders. In Iraq,
private military firms were essential in providing logistical support to coalition troops
while also embedding into troop regiments engaged in combat. In Croatia, private
military firms educated Croatian officers and helped to change the tide of war in their
favor. In Sierra Leone, private military firms were able to stop the advance of RUF rebels
threatening the capital Freetown. It is safe to assume that these countries would not be the
same today without the involvement of private military firms.
The results of the focused comparison of cases provided the conclusions
necessary to answer the question how the United States will initiate policy toward the
private military industry. In all three of the core issue areas, future policy has the ability
to vastly change the capability of the industry. Overall, this study was needed because it
generated context-dependent generalizations through the examination of three case
studies. Governments, when formulating future policy toward the private military
industry, will use these generalizations as evidence to support their actions or inactions.
The evidence produced by the focused comparison of cases method is inherently superior
when formulating policy. This is because the generalization that is being used as evidence
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is drawn from multiple cases instead of one specific instance involving a state and a
private military firm.
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Case Studies
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone was engaged in a brutal civil war from 1991 to 2002 that gravely
threatened the stability and sovereignty of the country. The conflict displaced over two
million people with a death toll in the tens of thousands.43 Early in the conflict, the
government of Sierra Leone struggled to combat the rebel Revolutionary United Front
(RUF). In the early part of 1994, the civil war escalated to a point of desperation for the
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Sierra Leone. The RUF had captured the
country’s diamond, titanium oxide, and bauxite mines and was threatening to overrun the
capital city of Freetown. The NPRC sought outside intervention from private military
firms in order to save the country and its fragile economy. A motivating factor for this
decision was that in 1994, forty percent of GDP was represented by the mining industry
that was no longer contributing revenue to the country.44 In examining the roles of private
military firms that operated in Sierra Leone, it is critical to understand that the political
economy of the country largely rests on the desire of individuals and groups to profit
from the resources at the expense of national development.45 While other resource-rich
developing states have this problem as well, it became increasingly difficult for Sierra
Leone to manage the individuals and groups as the civil war progressed.
A curse and blessing throughout the civil war, the Kono diamond fields are
estimated to be worth billions of dollars and rests eight kilometers from neighboring
43 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, Sierra Leone, (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html). 44 World DataBank, “Sierra Leone Industry, Value Added (%GDP),” The World Bank, databank.worldbank.org (February 2015). 45 Paul Williams, “Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone” Contemporary Security Policy 22:3 (September 2010): 141.
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Liberia.46 A classic example of the resource curse, it was a primary source of revenue for
the government and also the lynchpin that could lead to the country’s collapse if
compromised.47 Charles Taylor, a Liberian warlord who would eventually become
president through barbaric and heinous war crimes, sought to cripple Sierra Leone for its
support of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG). This primarily Nigerian-led force tried and failed to prevent Charles Taylor
from winning the Liberian Civil war. Taylor’s response was to assist the RUF with arms,
training, and financial assistance.48 Weapons were able to flow freely across the border
and training was conducted in Benghazi, Libya, where the Commander of the RUF
(Forday Sanko) and Charles Taylor originally met before he became president of
Liberia.49 Taylor was able to provide financial intermediation through the purchase of
looted diamonds, acting as a legitimate threshold into the market and solving the complex
issue of generating revenue from an illegally seized commodity. Evidence of this
relationship appeared during the civil war when Liberia’s diamond exports were greater
then domestic production.50
With limited number of options and an ineffective military, the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) of Sierra Leone contracted J&S Franklin, a British
defense security firm and manufacturer of weapon systems to assist in training its
military officers. J&S Franklin subcontracted this job to Gurkha Security Guards
46 Ian Douglas, “Fighting for Diamonds – Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone,” Institute for Security Studies Africa (1999): 175-197, 175. 47 J. Andrew Grant, “Diamonds, Foreign Aid and the Uncertain Prospects for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone,” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 94:381 (2005): 443-457, 452. 48 Douglas, 177. 49 Leslie Hough, “A Study of Peacekeeping, Peace-Enforcement and Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone,” African Security Review 16:4 (2007): 7-21, 10. 50 Williams, 144.
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(GSG).51 In February of 1994, GSG arrived with fifty-eight Gurkhas and three European
managers to begin training Sierra Leone Special Forces and later infantry officer cadets.
GSG was also responsible for securing the crucial “Camp Charlie” military base and had
early success in pacifying the surrounding rebel-held areas. However, this early success
was marred when the three European managers were scouting a region with Gurkhas and
infantry troops when they stumbled upon a RUF base. All three of the European
managers were killed along with many of the troops.52 At this point, the British
Government feared it would be linked to the activities of GSG and that several of the
British hostages held by the RUF would be executed.53 When deployed in warfare, their
adversaries saw Gurkhas as a proxy of the British Government, despite in this case being
employed by a private firm. In order to respond to the situation, the British Government
released a statement saying:
We have not been giving any military assistance to the government of Sierra Leone. We have made this perfectly clear to the RUF, but if people who are no longer in the British Army decide to sell their services elsewhere we cannot stop them. They can do what they like with their specialist knowledge as long as they don’t break British laws.54
The RUF advances, despite GSG’s services, greatly concerned the NPRC.
Wanting to take greater offensive action, they lobbied GSG to pursue offensive
capabilities in combating the RUF. The NPRC specifically wanted Gurkhas to imbed and
fight alongside Sierra Leone forces (RSLMF) as a military provider firm would be able to
offer. Anthony Husher, the co-director of GSG in an interview with Alex Vines, stated
51 Alex Vines, “Gurkhas and the Private Security Business in Africa,” Institute for Security Studies Africa (1999): 123-136, 128. 52 Charles Dokumbo, “An Army for Rent, Private Military Corporations and Civil Conflicts in Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone,” Civil Wars 3:2 (Summer 2000): 51-64, 57. 53 Vines, 131. 54 Dokumbo, 58.
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that in addition to the firm’s intolerance of offensive capability, Executive Outcomes, a
rival firm bidding for its contract, did not offer their employees comprehensive insurance
cover or demand an upfront fee from the government.55 GSG refused to lower costs and
have Gurkhas fight alongside the Sierra Leone forces, which ultimately resulted in the
NPRC ending their contract and replacing them with Executive Outcomes.
GSG’s loss of senior leadership and refusal to take on offensive warfare
capabilities allowed Executive Outcomes to take over security operations for the NPRC.
Executive Outcomes was classified as a military provider firm that worked in close
concert with a number of different firms that shared a close network of founders and
majority shareholders. In fact, Strategic Resources Corporation was the parent
multinational firm that owned Executive Outcomes as well as Branch Energy (oil
company), DiamondWorks (mining company), and Sandline International (military
consultant firm). All of these firms held significant investments in Sierra Leone.56 This
close network can be largely attributed to one individual, Tony Buckingham, who either
founded or held significant shareholdings in each of the companies as a director at
Strategic Resource Corporation. In addition, he was a former SAS officer in the British
military. His service is believed to have assisted him in developing personal relationships
with influential people in Sierra Leone, as well as in the British Government. GSG, in an
attempt to salvage its position in the country, attempted to form a joint venture with
Sandline, a military consulting firm like itself. However, Sandline rejected its offer,
instead deferring the contract to Executive Outcomes.57 Tony Buckingham represented
55 Antony Husher, as quoted in Vines, 132. 56 David J. Francis, “Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?” Third World Quarterly 20:2 (April 1999): 319-338, 323. 57 Vines, 132
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Executive Outcomes in negotiations between the company and the NPRC, a meeting that
he personally arranged.58 Executive Outcomes, as a military provider firm, was able to
fulfill the NPRC’s request of highly skilled offensive capabilities against the RUF.
The contract between Executive Outcomes and Sierra Leone cost the NPRC
$1.225 million a month as well as large mining concessions in the Kono diamond field,
which were allocated to Branch Energy.59 Upon acceptance of the contract, Executive
Outcomes conducted an internal military analysis of the security situation and
recommended a three-prong approach.60 The first objective was to reverse the RUF
advances toward the surrounding capitol city of Freetown. The second was to stabilize
the mining fields, while the final objective was to locate and destroy the RUF
headquarters. These three mission objectives were seemingly ordinary and predictable.
What was un-predictable and shocking to international observers was the speed and
ruthless efficiency that Executive Outcomes was able to accomplish all three. In two
weeks, the RUF was driven from the outskirts of Freetown. In two months, all three
stated objectives had been accomplished. Executive Outcome operators described
fighting the RUF as “child’s play.”61 For the first time in twenty-three years, Sierra Leone
held free democratic elections. The outcome resulted in Ahmed Tejan Kabbah ascending
to the presidency.62 The RUF had been severely beaten back and was forced to the
negotiating table.
58 Douglas, 179. 59 Dokumbo, 58. 60 Francis, 327. 61 William Reno, “Foreign Firms, Natural Resources and Violent Political Economies,” University of Leipzig Papers on Africa: Politics and Economics Series 46:46 (2001): 1-23. 62 Francis, 327
Clausen 20
On November 30, 1996, the newly elected President Kabbah and Commander
Sanko of the RUF signed a peace accord in Abijan.63 One of the signing conditions for
the RUF was the removal of Executive Outcomes from the country and the establishment
of the RUF as a political party.64 A UN peacekeeping group was assigned to Sierra
Leone, which helped to reassure President Kabbah of the looming security gap caused by
Executive Outcome’s ensuing departure. The International Monetary Fund also played a
role in the peace process and may have also encouraged the termination of Executive
Outcomes from the country. It is known that the IMF pressured Sierra Leone to reduce its
deficit.65 People close to the IMF say they did not specify how, while others claim they
pushed for the expensive contract with Executive Outcomes to be terminated. A famous
declaration as to the confidence and knowledge that Executive Outcomes possessed, the
firm declared that if the contract were terminated, Kabbah would be overthrown by a
coup in less than 100 days.66 On January 31, 1997, Sierra Leone terminated the contract
with Executive Outcomes. The coup took place on May 25, 1997, the eighty-fifth day
after the firm’s withdrawal.67
The decision to expel Executive Outcomes proved disastrous. President Kabbah
was exiled to the Republic of Guinea where he desperately pleaded with the Nigerian
Government to intervene.68 Toward the end of May, a Nigerian led operation attempted
to secure Freetown, but failed miserably, killing hundreds of civilians in the process.69
Seeking other options, Kabbah reached out to Sandline International, the firm tied to
63 Douglas, 186 64 Hough, 9. 65 Douglas, 187 66 Hough, 10. 67 Douglas, 189. 68 Douglas, 189. 69 Douglas, 189.
Clausen 21
Executive Outcomes and DiamondWorks. Executive Outcomes remained present by
protecting the mining fields owned by DiamondWorks and Branch Energy through their
spin off firm Lifeguard, which was essentially Executive Outcomes operating under a
different name.70 Sandline later acquired Lifeguard from Executive Outcomes.
During President Kabbah’s exile, the RUF and a military junta formed the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which ruled the country with devastating
brutality. The ousted government of President Kabbah hired Sandline International for
the purpose of reinstating the civilian led government. The British Foreign Office
covertly approved this action, which was illegal due to United Nations Security
Resolution 1132, which prohibited arms shipments to Sierra Leone.71 Documents later
released by Sandline’s lawyers showed that British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone,
Peter Penfold, was the one who suggested Sandline’s services to Kabbah.72 Financing for
the contract came again from DiamondWorks and Branch Energy. As before, diamond
mine concessions were made as a form of payment for the restoration of the civilian
government. Sandline shipped approximately up to thirty-five tons of Bulgarian arms and
ammunition into the region supporting both the Kabbah administration and ECOMOG
forces fighting in Liberia.73 Sandline’s operational role in the country was limited to that
of a military consulting firm in which it provided arms, advice on air strikes, intelligence,
medical supplies, and transportation of troops.74 Sandline was successful and the civilian
government was restored in February 1998. Despite its military success in reinstating a
70 Francis, 234. 71 UN Security Resolution 1132, S/RES/1132, October 8, 1997 (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/267/13/PDF/N9726713.pdf?OpenElement). 72 Dokubo, 12. 73 Francis, 328. 74 Ibid.
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civilian ran government in Sierra Leone, diplomatic negotiations between the RUF and
the Kabbah administration placed the country in peril. The Lome Peace Accord was
signed in 1999, which gave the RUF commander Foday Sankoh the vice presidency and
control of the remaining, un-appropriated, diamond mines.75 As part of the peace accord,
Sandline’s contract with Sierra Leone was terminated.
In addition, Sandline’s reputation of causing political controversy did not escape
its involvement in Sierra Leone. Previously, the firm’s reputation was scarred as its
actions in Pupae New Guinea and Bougainville caused a political scandal that became
commonly referred to as the “Sandline affair.”76 Once again, British Customs and Excise
officers found Sandline in violation of supplying illicit weaponry to Sierra Leone. Such
actions were illegal under the UN-imposed arms embargo.77 While Sandline came under
investigation as the firm that was conducting arms shipments, the firm’s legal team
retorted stating it had covert approval from the British Foreign Office.78 This contradicted
the actions of Prime Minister Blair against oversight authorities of the British
Government and compliance with international law. Once Sandline provided legitimate
evidence to support its claim of having the blessing of the British Government, all
charges against Sandline were dropped; proving an embarrassing moment for the Blair
Government which had pledged an “ethical foreign policy” in Africa, meaning full
compliance with United Nations law. Going further, Sandline’s lawyers also released
statements saying that they had informed the Clinton administration, the Department of
Defense and the State Department of its activities and that the U.S. gave its tacit approval
75 Douglas, 186. 76 Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: Peace and War and the Sandline Affair, (Edinburgh, Great Britain: Mainstream Publishing, 1999). 203-223. 77 Douglas, 194. 78 Francis, 334.
Clausen 23
to the arms shipments and training.79 It became clear that both Britain and the United
States had circumnavigated a United Nations arms embargo to illegally advance the goal
of re-establishing President Kabbah as the leader of Sierra Leone.80 Both governments
defended their actions of assisting Kabbah, through Sandline, as an ethical foreign policy
objective despite being illegal.
After Sandline’s departure from Sierra Leone, the RUF once again was advancing
upon Freetown. This time Britain, along with the United Nations, decided to intervene
militarily. There were several reasons as to why Britain was now willing to intervene
when it had been previously insistent on keeping ground troops out of Sierra Leone. At
this point, British nationals lives were at risk, the United Kingdom was Sierra Leone’s
former colonial power, there was a great deal of embarrassment due to the failure of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1998 to prevent arms shipments in breach of UN
Sanctions, criticism that the UK was slow to react to the Mozambique floods of 2000,
and finally the fact that UN forces were now present in Sierra Leone.81 This list of
reasons combined with the seemingly undeniable fact that Sierra Leone would fail
without intervention convinced Britain to deploy troops. In 2000, the United Kingdom
launched Operation Palliser along with a United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, which
consequently eliminated the RUF and established President Kabbah as the leader of
Sierra Leone in 2002.82 Shortly after reclaiming the government, President Kabbah
declared the civil war over.
79 Raymond Bonner, “U.S. Reportedly Backed British Mercenary Group in Africa,” New York Times, May 13, 1998 (http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/us-reportedly-backed-british-mercenary-group-in-africa.html). 80 Douglas, 194. 81 Richard Connaughton, “The Mechanics and Nature of British Interventions into Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001-2002),” Civil Wars 5:2 (September 2007): 77-95, 83. 82 Connaughton, p. 83.
Clausen 24
Throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone, two of the three types of private
military firms were active in the state. GSG and Sandline’s operations can be defined
under the definition of a military consulting firm. The firm’s actions fell within the
parameters of training, equipping, and providing tactical logistical support to the existing
state’s forces. Neither firm imbedded its employees into the force that was conducting
combat operations. The NPRC’s security needs changed, which initiated the contract with
military provider firm Executive Outcomes. Its employees conducted full-scale combat
operations in place of Sierra Leone forces, resting it firmly in the military provider
category. GSG was hired for the reason that its services would yield two results. The first
was the belief that its training program would allow Sierra Leone forces to have the
capability and effectiveness to recapture the mining fields. The second was the
subsequent removal of the RUF from Sierra Leone territory. Executive Outcomes was
hired for more desperate reasons. The first was the need for an effective fighting force to
combat the RUF. The assessment by the NPRC of its security situation suggests that they
did not believe there was enough time for the Sierra Leone forces to become this
effective fighting force. The second reason Executive Outcomes was hired was due to the
legitimacy and interpersonal relationships of Tony Buckingham, as evidenced through his
personal negotiation of the Executive Outcomes contract with the NPRC. Due to the
civilian-led governments exile from Sierra Leone as a result of the security vacuum left
by Executive Outcome’s exit, the suggestion of contracting Sandline was the result of a
comment made by the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold.
Sandline was hired to regain lost territory and restore the Kabbah administration to
power. All three firms effectiveness varies depending upon the criterion used to evaluate
Clausen 25
the services that were employed. GSG was effective until its leadership was killed, the
end result of this peculiar event being that it was not able to meet the needs of the client
and therefore, not successful. Executive Outcomes was able to fulfill every request that
was asked of it and is therefore determined successful. Sandline was able to restore the
Kabbah administration as well as force the RUF to the negotiating table. However, their
actions caused a political firestorm in Britain and exposed its illegal involvement in
Sierra Leone’s civil war. In the end, Sandline did everything that was asked of it despite
causing a number of problems for the host country, and can therefore be deemed
successful.
Strategic Resource Corporation, the parent company of Executive Outcomes and
Sandline with ties to Tony Buckingham, displayed spin-off capabilities with the creation
of Lifeguard. When the Kabbah administration was exiled and Executive Outcomes was
banned from the state, Strategic Resource Corportation needed a way to protect its
remaining diamond resources. Lifeguard was simply Executive Outcomes operating
under a different name, although tasked only with the security of Strategic Resource
Corporations portion of the Kono Diamond fields. When Sandline was contracted by the
exiled Kabbah administration, Sandline acquired Lifeguard. For these reasons, Executive
Outcomes and Sandline international, under Strategic Resource Corporation, both had the
ability to operate in the country after its contract was terminated, which therefore, gave
them spin-off capability. Strategic Resource Corporation was a highly sophisticated
network of private firms and individuals having the ability to triangulate profit on
contracts. However; GSG, Executive Outcomes, and Sandline are no longer in operation.
Clausen 26
Sierra Leone was formally under the colonial control of the Britain. This helps to
explain the level of involvement from firms that were based in South Africa and Britain.
There was little doubt that by the launch of Operation Palliser, Britain’s reasoning for
intervention was that it felt some level of responsibility and was not willing to watch
Sierra Leone become a failed state. During the conflict, there was a United Nations law
that prevented intervention by outside forces in the civil war of Sierra Leone. UN
Security Resolution 1132 specifically prevented arms shipments, which Britain
circumnavigated through the use of Sandline. In addition, it was the British High
Commissioner to Sierra Leone that first suggested the use of Sandline to reinstate the
Kabbah administration. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Britain used Sandline as a
proxy for their foreign policy goals in Sierra Leone. In conclusion, the use of private
military firms in Sierra Leone significantly impacted all three areas of effectiveness,
private investment, and intervention.
Clausen 27
Croatia
On March 24, 1994, Gorjko Susak, the Croatian Defense Minister, wrote to the
U.S. Department of Defense. His request was for the guided transition of the Croatian
military “to one which follows the model of the United States.”83 The reason for such a
request becomes clear when examining the short military history of Croatia. In the early
1990’s the former Soviet state of Yugoslavia began to break apart, as different regions of
the former country, which represented different ethnic and religious demographics,
sought independence. When these different ethnic groups resorted to armed conflict with
one another, Croatia’s army was not prepared. It had suffered major losses to Serbian
forces in 1991. This consequently resulted in over thirty percent of Croatia’s territory
occupied with enemy troops.84 The United States saw Susak’s request as an opportunity
to forge a partnership with a moderate ally in the region. This would be accomplished by
strengthening Croatian forces into a regional enforcer and ally them with the Bosnians.
This would then act as a counter to Serbian power.85 However, United Nations Security
Council Resolution 743 prohibited any government from militarily intervening in the
conflict in former Yugoslavia.86 Pentagon officials passed along Susak’s request to a
Virginia-based private military firm called Military Professionals Resources Incorporated
(MPRI).
83 Roger Cohen, “U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at Its Buildup,” The New York Times, October 28, 1995 (http://www.nytimes.com/1995/ 10/28/world/us-cooling-ties-to-croatia-after-winking-at-its-buildup.html?pagewanted=print). 84 Mathew J. Gaul, “Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause.” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 31:4 (June 1998): 1489-1522, 1489. 85 Robert F. Miller, “Tudjman's victory: Croatia, the U.N., NATO and the U.S.,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 25:3 (1997): 501-514, 505. 86 United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, S/Res/798, December 18, 1992, (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/798(1992)).
Clausen 28
MPRI is a private military firm that has a long history of working closely with the
Department of Defense and hiring high-ranking former U.S. military leaders. In fact,
Fmr. Gen. Harry E. Soyster and MPRI executive stated “We’ve [MPRI] got more
generals per square foot here than in the Pentagon.”87 Its actions are limited to consulting
while the firm goes out of its way to distinguish itself as a company that does not provide
force for its clients. Soyster frankly stated, “ If you want Executive Outcomes then you
don't want MPRI.”88 The firm has an extraordinary relationship with the United States
that is characterized by a deep level of trust. One such example of this relationship was
during the budget cuts the Department of Defense faced after the conclusion of the Cold
War. As a result, MPRI took over management and conduct of ROTC programs in June
of 1998.89 This level of trust, coupled with its exclusive employment of senior level U.S.
military personnel, allow it to advance U.S. foreign policy goals as a private firm that is
looked upon with preferential treatment by the U.S. defense community.90
In response to the Croatian Defense Minister’s request for military assistance,
MPRI organized a five-person survey team, which visited Croatia and completed an
analysis of the security situation. 91 The conclusive action taken from this survey was to
employ a democracy transition assistance program (DTAP), which consisted of educating
military officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilian officials of the Ministry of
Defense in the areas of leadership, management, and civil-military operations.92 MPRI
was limited from taking any additional action by the United Nations Arms embargo as 87 Singer, 119. 88 Gen. Harry E. Soyster, as quoted in Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, The Military as Business – Military Professional Resources, Incorporated” Institute for Security Studies (October, 15, 1997): 11-121, 114. 89 Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, “The Military as Business – Military Professional Resources, Incorporated,” Institute for Security Studies Africa, (October 15, 1999): 111-121, 112. 90 Miller, 513. 91 Cilliers and Douglas, 115. 92 Ibid.
Clausen 29
defined by direct military planning, intelligence services, strategy advice, and tactics to
Croatia or any other party in former Yugoslavia.93
Despite these limitations, MPRI is credited with revamping the Croatian military
into a formidable fighting force whose competence was proved in Operation Ulja.94 In a
matter of months after MPRI entered into a contract with the Croatian Government, the
Croatian army repelled much of the enemy from its territory. Battle tactics were
employed that previously had not been witnessed on the battlefield including integrated
airpower, artillery, and quick infantry movements that targeted Serb command and
control networks.95 The overarching consequence of Operation Ulja was a complete
reversal in the tide of warfare in favor of Croatia. This popular narrative tells how MPRI,
by providing minimal instruction, was able to turn the course of events in favor of an
outcome that supported U.S. foreign policy goals in the region.96
Given our understanding of the knowledge Croatian forces learned through
DTAP, there seems to be an obvious gap between the level of instruction that was
presented to the Croatian army officers and the flawless implementation of this
instruction on the battlefield in only a mere couple of months. MPRI’s contract went
through the State Department and did not violate the terms of the United Nations Arms
embargo.97 However, the tactics employed by the Croatian military evidently appear to be
from instruction or guidance that could only come from a violation of the embargo. It
seems highly unlikely that MPRI could have trained the Croatian officers to this level of
93 Gaul, 1489. 94 Michael Lee Lanning, Mercenaries: Soldiers of Fortune, from Ancient Greece to Todays Private Military Companies, (New York, New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 300. 95 Gaul, 1490 96 Miller, 505. 97 Cilliers and Douglas, 122.
Clausen 30
effectiveness while only using the methods outlined in DTAP.98 As one analyst notes,
“That's not something you learn while being instructed about democratic values.”99
Despite much speculation that MPRI violated the arms embargo, the company did not
face any legal repercussions or formal investigations. In fact, their reputation was
bolstered by the events that transpired and the firm was hired by numerous other entities
including the Macedonian military and the Kosovo Liberation Army.100 The closest legal
ramification for the company came in 2010 when a group of Serbs brought a suit against
MPRI, accusing them of participating in genocide.101 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum that the Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply
beyond U.S. borders, which is the act in which the Serbian group founded their claim
upon.102 The end result of events that were initiated through DTAP was a resounding
success for U.S. interests in the region.103 The extent of MPRI’s involvement is unknown
other then the details of DTAP, however, there is consensus from researchers that
additional actions were taken beyond what DTAP consisted of.104
MPRI’s involvement in Croatia and the lack of investigation or consequence into
how the UN arms embargo was violated, presents a fundamental change in the way
private military firms can be used to formulate foreign policy. Ironically, the United
States voted for the UN arms embargo. It is possible that the embargo became a nuisance
after the opportunity presented itself to from a moderate ally in the region. For example,
Senator Bob Dole was a vocal proponent of lifting the UN regulations and increasing 98 Cilliers and Douglas, 116. 99 Singer, 126. 100 Axelrod, 261. 101 David Isenberg, “MPRI Couldn’t Read Minds: Let’s Sue Them,” The Huffington Post, Aug. 19, 2010 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/mpri-couldnt-read-minds-l_b_688000.html). 102 Axelrod, 261. 103 Miller, 507. 104 Axelrod; Cilliers; Douglas; Singer.
Clausen 31
military assistance to Croatia.105 However, it is difficult to ignore the clear benefit of
having the arms embargo because it prevented other international actors from
intervening. MPRI’s DTAP program was specifically designed to make certain it would
not violate the embargo, and was cleared by the State Department. DTAP was not even
news worthy until Operation Ulja occurred and it was clear something more had taken
place other than instruction.106 There are several plausible scenarios that could explain
what occurred.
The first explanation is that MPRI went beyond DTAP and violated international
law. This does not seem out of the realm of possibility, since after the operation took
place, local news reported the CEO of MPRI, retired Army Chief of Staff, General
Vuono, was seen meeting with the Croatian General Varimer Cervenko, the architect of
Operation Ulja. This was believed to have occurred more then ten times in secret on
Brioni Island.107 MPRI’s involvement is almost certainly greater then what was detailed
under the guidelines of DTAP. The second explanation is the reality of U.S. covert
activity in trying to effect events on the ground in favor of U.S. interests.108 Evidence of
covert activity in Croatia was uncovered when journalist Jeremy Scahill was looking into
the past of four Blackwater security guards who were killed in an infamous 2004 ambush
in Fallujah, Iraq. One of the guards killed was a Croatian-American by the name of Jerry
Zovko, whose parents in an interview with Mr. Scahill, claimed that he was deployed to
Yugoslavia as a member of U.S. Special Forces during the civil war in the mid 1990’s.109
In this case, DTAP was able to provide a public and legal explanation for the outcomes
105 Miller, 507. 106 Axelrod, 260. 107 Ibid. 108 Cilliers and Douglas, 116. 109 Scahill, 160..
Clausen 32
that were yielded as a result of clandestine operations and further actions taken by MPRI.
These two explanations most likely occurred congruently with each other and provide a
plausible reason as to how the Croatian army was able to become a capable fighting force
in such a short amount of time.
In the case of Croatia, MPRI can be defined as a military consultant firm. Of all
the evidence presented, never were MPRI employees engaged directly in combat
operations as a military provider firm would. MPRI was hired as a result of the request by
the Croatian defense minister, in which the United States directed this request to MPRI.
The extent to which MPRI was effective can be determined through the success of its
Democracy Transition Assistance Program for Croatia. MPRI’s effectiveness can also be
measured by the increase in global reputation the firm gathered and future contracts that
were initiated as a result of its work in Croatia. It is safe to say that MPRI was extremely
effective and successful in its effort to influence events in the region toward U.S.
interests.
MPRI does not possess the ability to “spin-off” into other firms. It is not managed
by a parent company and does not seek financing outside of securing contracts with
governments, as seen in firms that do have an incentive to continue operation in a country
once its contract has been terminated. It is uncertain if MPRI maintains contracts in the
Balkans today, however Croatia has 264 private military firms operating within the
country as of 2011.110 As a company, it is not a part of any network of private
individuals, however, its close relationship with the Department of the Defense could
certainly count as a close network. It often is referred to as a retirement club for U.S.
110 “Private Security Services In Europe: CoESS Facts & Figures 2011,” Confederation of European Security Services, (2011): 29.
Clausen 33
generals leaving the Pentagon.111 However, for the sake of this study, the firm does not
exist as part of a group of other private entities. The close relationship with the
Department of Defense is not enough to be labeled as existing in the framework of a
network.
Croatia was formally a part of Yugoslavia, which was under heavy Soviet
influence at the time. There is little doubt the Croatians wanted to partner with the U.S.
because of its opposition to Soviet influence and military superiority. The United States
pushed for a UN arms embargo in the region that eventually came to fruition. This had
the net effect of preventing outside actors from interfering with the conflict; yet, there is
much evidence to suggest the United States was actually the one interfering. The U.S.
was the one that helped to assist the agreement of services between Croatia and MPRI.
This certainly would not have occurred if MPRI’s action were not to benefit the United
States in some capacity. At minimum, it can be shown that MPRI worked as a proxy for
U.S. interests in the breakup of Yugoslavia.
111 Singer, 121.
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Iraq
The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq set into
motion a gold rush for private military firms that would become unprecedented in
modern warfare from several perspectives. The first would be the scale to which the
United States would become dependent on these companies for combat essential services.
In 2008, the U.S. was eighty-three percent contractor-dependent for logistical services.112
In addition, there was a 1:1 ratio of contractor to military personnel at the height of the
Iraq war, where at times, the number of contractors even eclipsed the number of active
duty U.S. service members. The second perspective was the amount of funds that were
attributed to the private defense industry for the Iraq war with a shocking lack of
oversight. The federal funds appropriated to private military firms during Operation Iraqi
Freedom were at least $138 billion.113 A final report to Congress by the bipartisan
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan estimates up to sixty
billion dollars was wasted through ill-conceived projects, poor planning and oversight,
and criminal behavior and blatant corruption.114 While there has yet to be a definitive
legacy determined by the U.S. actions in Iraq, it is certain that there has never, in the
history of modern conflict, been a greater experiment in combining military and
contractor services.
112 Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Contingency Contracting throughout U.S. History, (http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/history.html). 113 Anna Fifield, “Contractors Reap $138bn from Iraq war,” Financial Times, March 18, 2013 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f435f048c05-11e2-b001-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Uhd9wngy). 114 “Final Report to Congress,” Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, August 2011, (http://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/08/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf).
Clausen 35
It is said that where the U.S. military goes, so does Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR),115 which received more money than any other company during the Iraq war, with
a total of $39.5 billion from 2003 to 2011.116 In 2010, the company was awarded a no-bid
$568 million contract renewal for housing, meals, water, and bathroom services for
soldiers. KBR is the quintessential military support firm. While it does not have the
excitement and allure of a military provider or consulting firm, its involvement with U.S.
operations in Iraq is staggering. Under a LOGCAP III (Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program) contract with the U.S. Government, the company has provided over one billion
meals, twenty-five billion gallons of drinking water, eight billion gallons of fuel, hosted
more than 170 million patrons at morale, welfare, and recreation facilities, logged more
than 701 million miles transporting supplies and equipment, and laundered seventy-eight
million bundles of laundry.117 These numbers reflect the business model KBR, which
entered the private military industry in the 1990’s. The company has focused on the
market of logistical support, an area that is often the center of attention for cutting costs
in defense budgets. The issues that arose with KBR’s effectiveness were not those that
occurred by the dangers of operating in the battle space, but by mostly self-inflicted
activities.
As KBR continued to provide services throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
firm ran into a number of allegations against it that brought into question its
effectiveness. In November of 2013, the firm was found guilty of negligence in the
115 Singer, 136. 116 Angelo Young. “And The Winner For The Most Iraq War Contracts Is . . . KBR, With $39.5 Billion In A Decade,” International Business Times, March 19 2013 (http://www.ibtimes.com/winner-most-iraq-war-contracts-kbr-395-billion-decade-1135905). 117 “KBR to Continue LOGCAP III Work Supporting Army as LOGCAP IV Solicitation is Cancelled,” KBR Press Release, May 6, 2010 (http://www.kbr.com/Newsroom/Press-Releases/2010/05/06/KBR-to-Continue-LOGCAP-III-Work-Supporting-Army-as-LOGCAP-IV-Solicitation-is-Cancelled/).
Clausen 36
poisoning of a dozen soldiers in an incident regarding a water treatment facility in
2001.118 830 soldiers instructed to secure the facility were told by KBR that sodium
dichromate was no worse than a mild irritant. In reality, the substance is an extreme
carcinogen and may have resulted in the death of Lt. Col. James Gentry, whose death, as
a result of cancer, was ruled by the Veterans Administration as service-related. A jury
ruled that KBR was aware of both the presence and toxicity of the chemical.119 Other
allegations against KBR have surfaced as well. In 2009, KBR’s contracts made up a
majority of the thirty-two recommended for criminal investigation to the Inspector
General from the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency.120 Further investigation
would produce the realization that internal mechanisms both within KBR and the federal
government lacked appropriate oversight for KBR’s subcontracting. In 2014, The U.S.
Government sued KBR for defrauding it’s military in Iraq through inflating costs to
subcontractors.121 The suit alleges that KBR had arranged an agreement with a
subcontractor to supply fuel tankers at triple their value, while the subcontractor gave
kickbacks to KBR employees. The firm also allegedly continued paying for leases on
trucks that had been paid off and then applied for reimbursement. The more macabre of
allegations also claims that KBR used refrigerated trucks as morgues and then did not
sanitize them before hauling ice to be consumed by troops.122 The Congressional
Research Service declares that no one federal agency has the responsibility to audit,
118 Ryan J. Reilly, “KBR, Guilty In Iraq Negligence, Wants Taxpayers To Foot The Bill,” The Huffington Post, January 9, 2013 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/09/kbr-guilty-iraq-negligence_n_2436115.html). 119 Ibid. 120 Ellen Nakashima, “KBR Connected to Alleged Fraud, Pentagon Auditor Says,” The Washington Post, May 5, 2009 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/04/AR2009050403283.html). 121 David Ingram, “U.S. sues KBR for defrauding its army in Iraq,” Reuters, January 23, 2014 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-kbr-fraud-idUSBREA0M1UY20140123). 122 Ibid.
Clausen 37
investigate, or oversee DOD-appropriated funds for troop support services under
LOGCAP.123 The responsibility is fragmented between the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA), the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the Army Audit
Agency (AAA), and the DOD Inspector General.124 This lack of a central federal
oversight, combined with the lack of KBR’s internal audits, allowed for there to be
serious abuses that impacted its overall effectiveness for the U.S. mission in Iraq. Other
accusations centered on the closeness of the firm to administration officials, including its
former CEO Vice President Dick Cheney, and the amount of no-bid contracts the firm
was able to procure.125
No firm, in the history of the private military industry, has gained the notoriety
that Blackwater did from 2003 to 2009 in Iraq. The firm was founded by Erik Prince and
operated under the parent company bearing his name, The Prince Group. During the Iraq
war, Prince enjoyed a close relationship to the GOP due to his fundraising activities.126
The firm’s first public contract, which led to a rapid acquisition of other contracts, was a
$27.7 million sole-source no bid contract to provide personal security for the
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq Paul Bremer III.127
Blackwater created a personal security detail (PSD) program from the ground-up,
consisting of thirty-six personnel protection specialists, two K-9 teams, and three MD-
123 Valerie Bailey Grasso, “Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, (September 10, 2010): 18. 124 Ibid 125 John Soloman, “Halliburton's no-bid contracts for work in Iraq get FBI scrutiny,” Associated Press, October 29, 2004 (http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041029/news_1n29halli.html). 126 Evan Thomas, “Profile: Blackwater’s Erik Prince,” Newsmax, October 13, 2007 (http://www.newsweek.com/profile-blackwaters-erik-prince-103877). 127 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction July 2004 Quarterly Report, October 30, 2004 (http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/us_research_and_oversight/sigir/quarterly_reports_eng/us_sigir__report_to_congress_october_2004.pdf).
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530 helicopters for transporting the ambassador around the country.128 This PSD program
would become the industry standard in protecting high-ranking officials. Blackwater’s
security-first mentality was a paradox in the counter-insurgency warzone of Iraq. Col.
Thomas X. Hammes reflects that “(Blackwater) was doing their job, exactly what they
were paid to do in the way they were paid to do it, and they were making enemies on
every single pass out of town.”129 Blackwater took minimal chances as to the security of
Paul Bremer due to the sky-high stakes for the company. The worst-case scenario for
Blackwater would have been the death of Bremer, in which case, the firm most likely
would have ceased to exist. This assertion is backed by a study that compared the military
cultures of Blackwater to that of DynCorp, another private security firm that was
contracted to provide PSD services in Iraq. The study concluded that Blackwater fired
upon suspected threats more quickly, at greater distances, with a greater quantity of
bullets, and were also more likely to abandon the people fired upon when compared to
DynCorp.130 Due to the legal immunity for the actions of private military contractors at
the time, Blackwater was able to operate with a security-at-any-cost mentality. The
effectiveness of Blackwater’s PSD program reflected a “the end justifies the means”
mentality, as the firm never lost a principal they were in charge of. A key to this
effectiveness was the ability for Blackwater to attract top-level talent through short-term
contracts. Retired Special Forces members could make a considerable amount of money
128 Scahill, 134. 129 Tim Shorrock, “Contractor’s Arrogance Contributed to Iraqi Rebellion, Marine Colonel Says,” January, 31, 2005 (http://timshorrock.blogspot.com/2005/01/contractors-arrogance-contributed-to.html). 130 Scott Fitzsimmons, “Wheeled Warriors: Explaining Variations in the Use of Violence by Private Security Companies in Iraq,” Security Studies 22:4 (November 2013): 707-739.
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through short-term contracts lasting as little as two months, paying anywhere for $600 to
$800 a day.131
The events that occurred on March 31, 2004, marked a turning point in the war on
terror as well as for the private defense industry. On this fateful day, four Blackwater
security guards were delivering kitchen equipment when they were brutally murdered and
hung from a bridge over the Euphrates River in Fallujah. The guards were in Fallujah that
day because Blackwater had recently formed a partnership with Kuwait-based Regency
Hotel and Hospital Company and won a contract with Eurest Support Services, a
subcontractor of Halliburton and KBR. The contract agreed to by Blackwater, Regency,
and ESS on March 8, 2004 required that at least three men were in each vehicle on
security missions, with a minimum of two armored vehicles to support ESS missions.132
However, on March 12, 2004, Blackwater and Regency signed a subcontract that
removed the word “armored”, saving Blackwater $1.5 million.133 In addition to being a
reason why the U.S. subsequently invaded Fallujah, this incident would also serve as the
basis for future legal precedence regarding private military firms.
Less than a week after the infamous ambush and slaughter of the four guards in
Fallujah, Blackwater would be involved in another historic precedent. On the morning of
April 4, 2004, Blackwater guards engaged Iraqi insurgents at the U.S. Occupation
headquarters in Najaf. That day, U.S. Marine Cpl. Lonnie Young was installing
communication equipment. When he heard the sound of Ak-47 fire, he grabbed his
weapon and headed to the roof where Blackwater guards were engaging the enemy. He
131 Scahill, 146. 132 Ibid. 133 “Slain U.S. Security Agents Once Served with Navy Seals, Special Forces,” Agence France-Presse, April 2, 2004 (http://www.spacewar.com/2004/040402173107.qibo9rqg.html).
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quickly acquired a target in his sights and called out for permission to engage the enemy.
As the only active duty U.S. soldier on that rooftop, he sought and was given permission
to engage an enemy combatant by a private security contractor.134 This was the first time
in the history of U.S. military operations that a U.S. soldier took direct orders from a
private security contractor. During the four-hour battle that ensued, Blackwater claimed it
made several attempts to contact U.S. command but was unsuccessful. Apart from
clandestine activities the firm was involved in, this situation represented the height of the
power and influence of Blackwater in Iraq. No other firm during the Iraq war, or likely in
the future, will be able to say it commanded a U.S. Marine in battle.
Separate from the public contracts that Blackwater had to protect senior level
personnel and bases, the firm enjoyed a close relationship to the CIA and its clandestine
activities. From 2001 to 2010, officials estimate Blackwater was awarded up to $600
million in clandestine contracts through the creation of over thirty different shell
companies.135 In 2007, the Iraqi Government banned Blackwater from operating in the
country as a direct consequence of the Nisour Square incident, which resulted in the
death of seventeen Iraqi civilians and wounded twenty.136 However, the firm continued to
operate until the 2009 status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraq took affect.
The creation of these shell companies essentially hid the activities of Blackwater when it
became politically potent, showing a powerful spin-off capability. While Blackwater was
working with the CIA in clandestine activities, several former Blackwater employees
134 Scahill, 186. 135 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, “30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater,” The New York Times, September 3, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04blackwater.html?_r=0). 136 David Johnston, John M. Broder, “F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis Without Cause,” The New York Times, November 14, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/14/world/middleeast/14blackwater.html?_r=0).
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claim that the line between the CIA and Blackwater was blurred. The most infamous of
covert actions taken by the U.S. in Iraq were referred to as “night raids” or “snatch and
grab” operations, which the local populations loathed.137 Blackwater guards routinely
operated alongside CIA forces in these operations, detaining persons suspected of
possesing valuable intelligence.138
Another one of the subsidiaries owned by Blackwater was Presidential Airways,
which has long been suspected of being a partner in the CIA’s “extraordinary rendition”
program. Flight records have shown that Presidential Airways flights landed at the same
airports used by the rendition program, as well as the firm’s assertions that it holds a U.S.
DOD Secret Facility Clearance, which would give the firm access to black sites.139 The
level of involvement Blackwater had with covert activities stems from the acquisition of
several former high-ranking CIA officers. One such CIA officer was Cofer J. Black, who
joined Blackwater in early 2005 and was the former director of the CIA’s counter-
terrorism unit.140 He is also accredited with creating the “extraordinary rendition”
program under President Bush. It is important to note that the first contract Blackwater
had with the U.S. Government was a “black” contract.141 As noted above, Blackwater
was known in the public sphere as primarily the provider of personnel security for high-
ranking U.S. officials and providing base security, but the firm’s clandestine activities
came before its public contracts.
137 Michael Hirsh, “Hirsh: How U.S. Makes Enemies,” Newsweek, July 25, 2006 (http://www.newsweek.com/hirsh-how-us-makes-enemies-112791). 138 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, “Blackwater Guards Tied to Secret C.I.A Raids,” The New York Times, December 10, 2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/us/politics/11blackwater.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). 139 Scahill, 307. 140 Scahill, 327. 141 Ken Silverstein, “Revolving Door to Blackwater Causes Alarm at CIA,” Harpers Magazine, September 12, 2006 (http://www.informationliberation.com/test.php?id=15764).
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Eventually, notoriety of the firm and the reputation it earned through its
operations in Iraq and the war on terror caused too much controversy and political
polarization for the firm to remain effective in the future. The Prince Group sold
Blackwater to a group of private investors, which was then acquired by The Constellis
Group, ending Prince’s role in the company.142 The firm is still in existence under the
name Academi, however, much of the senior leadership who guided the firm during the
Iraq war are no longer with the firm.
During the Iraq war, there were a number of private military firms that were
contracted to oversee and operate interrogation programs alongside the U.S. military and
the CIA. The public first became aware of these programs in 2004, when images of U.S.
soldiers were broadcast to the American public showing gross mistreatment and
humiliation of detainees.143 While this incident did not reflect the intended detainee
policy, the investigation into who was responsible led to the revelation that two private
firms, CACI and Titan Corporation, had provided interrogators and translators to the Abu
Ghraib prison. An Army investigative report by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba found that the
private interrogators and translators were either directly or indirectly responsible for the
abuses at Abu Ghraib.144 Furthermore, CACI’s contract was through the Interior
Department’s National Business Center.145 One possible explanation for this would be to
142 Gopal Ratnam, “Blackwater Founder Sells Company to Private Equity Investors,” Bloomberg Business, December 17, 2010 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-17/blackwater-founder-sells-company-to-private-equity-investors) 143 CBS “Abuse of Iraqi POW’s by GIs Probed,” 60 Minutes II, April 12 2004 (http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-of-iraqi-pows-by-gis-probed/). 144 Deborah Hastings, “Military Reports Match Some Lawsuit Details,” Associated Press, October 24 2004, (http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2004/oct/25/military-reports-match-some-lawsuit-details/). 145 Roxanne Tiron, “Contracting Faulted in Abu Ghraib Abuse,” The Hill, September 28 2005 (http://thehill.com/business--lobby/contracting-faulted-in-abu-ghraib-abuse-2005--09-28.html.).
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hide the CIA’s involvement in the interrogation programs.146 It would also make it very
difficult for anyone trying to find information about contractors or the types of
clandestine programs for detainees. Once details of the mistreatment were made public, it
was not long before human rights abuse allegations came from the international
community. John Pace, the human rights chief for the United Nations Assistance
Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) at the time, claimed that the U.S. had violated UN Security
Council Resolution 1546 due to widespread mistreatment of prisoners.147 This particular
Untied Nations resolution recognized the Iraq Government post-invasion and determined
the status of the multi-national force.
Recently, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence declassified a report
on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. The findings of this report also
disclose the use of private military contracting to conduct and oversee interrogation of
detained individuals during the war on terror. The CIA’s contract with an unnamed
company that provided interrogation services was in excess of $180 million at the end of
2006.148 The actual number of interrogators this company provided to the CIA is still
classified, however, the report states that contractors made up eighty-five percent of the
workforce for detention and interrogation operations.149 In addition, the CIA provided a
multi-year indemnification agreement to protect the contractors from legal liability, of
which more than one million dollars has been exercised.150 These two events provide
evidence to support the assertion that private contractors were an essential part to the 146 Deborah Avant and Lee Sigleman, “Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq,” Security Studies 19:2 (May 28, 2010): 230-265, 245. 147 “US Detentions Abuse Iraq Mandate: UN” Global Policy Forum, December 5 2005 (https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-general/37471.html). 148 United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, (April 3, 2014): 3. 149 Ibid, 12. 150 Ibid.
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United States policy regarding the detention and intelligence gathering of detained
individuals.
The war on terror in Iraq was the catalyst for a national conversation regarding
legal policy toward the private military industry. This conversation is still ongoing, as a
web of lawsuits and countersuits moves it way through the U.S. justice system. At first,
the right to sue an employee or private defense firm for illicit actions was in question.
Paul Bremer’s final order, as his year in Iraq concluded, was immunity from legal
repercussions for private military contractors in Iraq.151 The legal basis for this assertion
was that private security contractors should be included in the “total force” numbers of
the U.S. military, making them immune from tort claims.152 The families of the four
deceased Blackwater guards would eventually sue the firm for negligence on the basis of
such a tort claim. Blackwater countersued, and the case was eventually dismissed in 2011
due to the failure of court-ordered arbitration.153 The families then appealed this ruling,
and in 2012, a federal appeals court ended the case with the families reaching a
confidential settlement with the company.154 The only repercussion to Blackwater’s
activities in Iraq was the successful prosecution of the four guards that were involved in
the Nisour Square killings. The four guards were convicted under the legal pretense that
federal law applies to private security contractors that were working for the Defense
151 Scahill, 143. 152 David Isenberg, “Thinking of Suing a Private Military Contractor? There May Be a Way…,” Time, January 7, 2013 (http://nation.time.com/2013/01/07/thinking-of-suing-a-private-military-contractor-there-may-be-a-way/). 153 Mike Baker, “Iraq Security Contractor Countersues,” Associated Press, January 19, 2007 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/19/AR2007011901673.html). 154 Mike Baker, “Blackwater Deaths Suit Tossed After Six Years,” Associated Press, January 26, 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/25/AR2011012507031.html).
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Department.155 However, Blackwater’s contract was through the State Department, a fact
that the jurors seemed to overlook. The guard’s lawyers are currently appealing the case.
Apart from lawsuits, the lack of a central authority to conduct audits of contracts with
private military contractors led to an environment where “creative accounting” was
common. KBR, Blackwater, and a large number of subcontractors all faced allegations of
fraud. These issues remain largely unsolved and will be an important part of future policy
debate regarding military contractors.
The use of private military firms in Iraq offered several benefits to the executive
branch. The first was that the widespread use of contractors was essentially able to mask
the size and scale of the operation in Iraq, which made the conflict appear much smaller
then it actually was. If an individual had looked only at the size of the military force
during the height of the Iraq war, the actual number of the total force would have been
double. In addition, Congress is able to control the size of the public force and not the
size of the contract force. Thus, contracting allows the executive branch to increase the
scale of conflict without congressional approval. A second benefit of contracting was the
ability to push the conflict beyond what would have been legally or politically possible
with an all-public force. It affords the executive branch the ability to not call up reserves
or institute a draft. The use of contractors, with legal immunity, also allowed for
clandestine operations to circumnavigate oversight from Congress and negate the rules of
engagement that public forces were tied to. When clandestine operations are combined
with private contractors, the impact of each is multiplied.156 The ability of the executive
branch to formulate contracts with any branch of the bureaucracy held under its power
155 Matt Apuzzo, “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings,” New York Times, October 22, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html). 156 Avant and Sigelman, 262.
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effectively hid these contracts from government oversight authorities. Contractors were
also not included in troop causalities, essentially acting as force that did not exist and was
legally immune from repercussions. Essentially, the use of private contractors in Iraq,
coupled with public forces, allowed for the legal barriers to be pushed beyond what
would have been possible if contractors were not involved. It is not a coincidence that
contractors were involved in most aspects of the Iraq war that came under legal scrutiny.
All three types of private military firms were involved in Iraq. Blackwater was a
military provider firm, as it actively engaged in combat both in the role of security guards
and operating in clandestine operations. KBR was the quintessential military support
firm. Outside of actual combat operations, KBR and its subcontractors were essentially
the logistical side of the U.S. operation. CACI and Titan can be categorized as military
consultant firms through proclaimed specialization in interrogation and translating
services. There are several reasons as to why private military firms were hired in Iraq.
The obvious reason was the belief they were highly effective and helped to reduce costs.
While this is true, it is hard to ignore the other effects of using private military
contractors on the scale that the U.S. did. Contracting was able to make the commitment
of U.S. forces to Iraq seem much smaller then it was. The decision to use private security
guards to protect the most senior level U.S. officials implies that they would be able to do
the job more effectively than U.S. military personnel. Given the overwhelming amount of
evidence that these contractors were essentially immune from prosecution, its
effectiveness may have been tied to the ability to engage suspected enemies without a
threat of recourse and disregard for the rules of engagement. The prevalence of
contractors used throughout interrogation and detention programs also implies there was
Clausen 47
a benefit to this, which can most likely to be attributed to secrecy and legal immunity. In
determining the success of the private military contractors examined in this case study, all
firms were able to accomplish what they were hired for despite several accusations of
hurting the overall mission. Blackwater never had someone killed while under their
protection, while KBR was able to provide critical logistical support. While both firms
did come under investigation for fraud, the U.S. Government continued to renew their
contracts. Logically, this would not have occurred if they were deemed ineffective.
The private investment aspects of the firms involved in Iraq are inherently
different than in other cases because the firms were acting in concert with a country’s
military force. The spin off capabilities of these firms was principally defined by their
ability to subcontract, in which both Blackwater and KBR were able to do on a large
scale. Subcontracting allowed these firms to compete for a greater number of contracts,
hid their involvement in Iraq and from oversight authorities, and increased legal
protection to the parent company. Since all of the funds for these contracts came from a
government, outside financing was not necessary. However, Blackwater, as well as KBR,
had a network of private individuals that helped it to secure contracts.
The aspect of intervention for these firms was largely negated due to the reality
that they were assisting a multi-national force in Iraq and were not contracted by the state
in which they were operating. Private military firms were used in conjunction, not in
place of, public forces. This negates the suspicion that Iraq, having once been under a
previous military engagement, motivated a state to use contractors to achieve some
objective in place of using public forces. The widespread use of private contractors in the
interrogation and detention programs raises the suspicion that there was a legal benefit to
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doing so. Once these programs were made public, it seems plausible that there was an
attempt to at least work around domestic and international legal requirements for the
treatment of detained individuals. Finally, the use of no bid contracts and continued
renewal, despite fraud allegations, showed that there was either a questionable reliance on
these firms for mission essential roles or the network of individuals these firms had were
extremely effective in securing future employment.
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Findings
This study produced a number of context-dependent findings based upon the case
studies of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq. The tables below give a visual representation
of the conclusions found across the three cases regarding the issue areas probed.
Effectiveness
Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq What type of firm(s) was employed in the
conflict?
Military Provider, Military Consultant
Military Consultant Military Provider, Military Consultant,
Military Support Why was the firm(s)
hired? Lobbying Power,
Effectiveness Government
Network, Effectiveness
Lobbying Power, Effectiveness
Was the firm(s) successful
2 Successful/1 Not 1 Successful 3 Successful
In examining the types of firms that were employed in the three cases, only the
military consultant firm was used in all. This can be attributed to this type of firm’s
flexibility and usefulness to the states that chose to utilize it. In Sierra Leone, these
contractors provided arms and training to forces, in Croatia they provided specialized
knowledge to military officers, and in Iraq they provided consulting knowledge in
interrogations and translating services. The more controversial military provider firms
were used in Sierra Leone and Iraq. In Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes provided a full
military apparatus to combat the RUF on behalf of the NPRC. In Iraq, Blackwater
provided PSD programs, base security, and assistance with clandestine operations. Both
military provider firms were pushed out of the country it operated in through the process
of political negotiations, a phenomena that did not occur with the other types of firms.
In the three cases examined, private military firms were hired for a variety of
reasons. However, they were always hired under the belief that they would be the most
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effective option given the reality of the situation each country was facing. The second
most utilized reason for the initiation of a contract was the lobbying powers these firms
possessed. In Sierra Leone and Iraq, the leaders of the private military firms held
numerous documented connections to either private interests affected by the conflict or
government officials who held influence regarding the conflict. The case of Croatia
differs from the other two cases due to the request of Croatia’s defense minister to mirror
the military apparatus of the United States. MPRI was selected due to the closeness of the
firm to the Pentagon and the ability for it to represent desired U.S. foreign policy
outcomes through its DTAP program. This case reflects an inverted lobbying power,
where the U.S. Government suggested Croatia employ MPRI.
There was only one instance in which a private military firm, employed
throughout the three cases, was deemed ineffective. GSG’s contract with Sierra Leone
failed primarily because the firm refused to increase its offensive capability and its senior
leadership was killed. In all other instances, the firms contracted were able to fulfill the
reasons for their employment.
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Private Networks Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq
Did the firm(s) employed have
spin-off capabilities
Yes No Yes
Does the firm(s) have any role in the
country it was employed in today?
No Yes No*
Was the firm(s) employed a part of a parent company or
larger network?
Yes No Yes
*Contractors are still active in Iraq; however, the firms included in this study that operated in Iraq from 2003-2010 have changed dramatically in corporate structure that they hardly resemble the same firms that existed pre-drawdown. Firms that operated in Sierra Leone and Iraq presented a number of spin-off
capabilities. Executive Outcomes and Sandline were both apart of Strategic Resource
Corporation that was able to create Lifeguard in order to protect the parent company’s
mining investments in Sierra Leone after its contract was terminated. Blackwater, while
operating in Iraq, was able to create over thirty shell companies to hide its operations
when the firm became a political issue in Iraq. Croatia was the only case where the firm
employed did not possess spin-off capabilities. In examining the current role of PMF’s in
the states that employed their services, there is not a lot of evidence to suggest the firms
have continuing roles post-conflict. The conflict in Sierra Leone essentially destroyed the
reputations of the firms that were employed. KBR had significant public relations
problems that were mostly caused by their own actions, and Blackwater became so
politically volatile it ended their ability to gain future employment. The role of parent
companies and highly influential networks of individuals played a large part in the
conflicts in Sierra Leone and Iraq. Tony Buckingham was able to procure contracts and
negotiate them with Sierra Leone through his involvement in the private interests and
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associations in the British Government. Firms that routinely operated in Iraq had
influential alumni of the organizations. KBR’s former CEO was Vice President Dick
Cheney, and Erik Prince was highly influential in Republican circles as a fundraiser. In
regards to Croatia, MPRI was not apart of a parent company until Level 3 acquired them
in 2000, long after the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Foreign Policy by Proxy
Question Sierra Leone Croatia Iraq
Was there a previous military engagement to provide security by a country or colonial power?
Yes No Yes
During the conflict, was there any UN law regulating intervention or engagement?
Yes Yes Yes
Was there evidence of the country, in which the PMF was based, assisting the work of the PMF?
Yes Yes N/A
Sierra Leone and Iraq had histories of previous military engagements conducted
by the host countries of the PMF’s that operated in the conflicts examined. This reality
provides evidence that the host countries, which held previous and continuing interests in
the countries examined, would use PMF’s to further their own foreign policy objectives.
During the conflict in Sierra Leone, UN Resolution 1132 prevented arms shipments
which resulted in accusations of the British Government and Sandline violating
international law. In Croatia, there are many accusations that MPRI violated a UN arms
Clausen 53
embargo that prevented intervention from foreign entities in the region. In Iraq, the use of
private contractors in interrogation and detention programs have coincided with the use
of enhanced interrogation tactics and methods that have pushed the boundaries set by
international law regarding detainees. In all three cases, contractors were involved in
actions that circumnavigated legal measures set forth by the international community.
Another unanimous finding throughout all three cases was that the host countries assisted
the firm’s activities in the conflicts they operated in. This works against the simple PMF
model where countries, in which the firm is not based in, can hire firms and provide
services without interference from the host country.
The following are context-dependent generalizations that were concluded from
the case studies of Sierra Leone, Croatia, and Iraq.
Context-Dependent Generalizations
Military provider firms are controversial and may be forced out of the battle space due to unintended consequences of its operations. States hire PMF’s because it is effective, however, PMF’s can create future employment
through lobbying powers and government networks. Rarely is a PMF unable to fulfill what it is contracted to do.
When the opportunity arises, PMF’s will take advantage of spin-off capabilities.
PMF’s often use parent companies.
Past military engagements by states can provide incentives to use PMF’s for “foreign policy by proxy.”
PMF’s are often used to circumnavigate international and domestic legal requirements
States often assist PMF’s when its operations align with foreign policy objectives
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Clausen 54
United States policy toward the private military industry will be vastly different
depending on the political party that has control of the executive branch. Specifically, the
tools and powers private military firms give the office of the president are inherently
political and partisan. Democrats and Republicans feel very differently about the ways in
which themselves and the opposing party have used and will use these firms in the future.
They may also feel differently according to which party is in power, and what the
president is trying to accomplish. There is no question that private military firms are here
to stay and that both parties will utilize them. However, how the United States will
develop policy toward these firms is found in the ideological differences between liberal
and conservative views of government.
Liberal policy toward private military firms is grounded in the belief that the use
of these firms erodes checks and balances of the federal government, as well as
congressional oversight.157 Essentially, it usurps power away from Congress and places it
in the hands of the executive branch. Mainstream liberal views toward the private
military industry were lionized by the experience of the Iraq war. While Republicans
controlled the executive branch, Democrats in Congress were essentially hopeless in
trying to reign in the scale of the Iraq war. Congress can only limit the number of troops
through appropriations. If they attempt to limit the contract force, private military firms
can simply employ third party nationals.158 It is also extremely difficult to assess the
contracts of these firms with executive branch agencies, as well as determine the
performance of these companies. Lastly, foreign policy by proxy is another tool that the
executive branch can hold over Congress. Such was the case in Croatia, where the
157 Deborah Avant, “Private Security Contracting Undermines Democratic Control of U.S. Foreign Policy,” The American Interest (Summer 2009): 32-36, 34. 158 Avant, 34.
Clausen 55
executive branch arranged for a contract with MPRI, leaving nothing for Congress to
have oversight over. Democracts’ outlook for government requires that it be efficiently
regulated, and the current state of private military firms reflects anything but this outlook.
It is no shock that then Senator Barack Obama (D-IL), Senator Jim Webb (D-VA),
Representative David E. Price (D-NC), Jan Schakowski (D-IL), and Henry Waxman (D-
CA) have all initiated proposals to increase the transparency and accountability of private
military firms.159
The conservative or even neo-conservative policies toward the private military
industry are much different then what a liberal would advocate for. Many, but not all,
conservatives adhere to a trustee model of government.160 They see the duty of elected
leaders in office to carry out the national interest and not necessarily the mainstream
beliefs of constituents. If constituents are unhappy with the results of actions taken, they
can be voted out of office. Thus, the issues that liberals have with the lack of regulation,
foreign policy by proxy, and oversight are seen as potentially useful benefits to
conservatives.161 For instance, they can continue to operate in Iraq by reducing troop
levels while boosting the contracting force, thereby reducing political pressure to end the
war. They have also been shown to be powerful tools when Democrats have controlled
the White House. Conservative and neo-conservative policy will look to preserve the
powerful tool that private military companies have shown to be capable of. This however,
does not mean that they will not want changes to be made. Conservatives will focus on
getting better value out of the use of these companies, whereas, the liberal focus will tend
159 Ibid. 160 Douglas Foyle, Counting the Public In, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 161 Eliot Cohen, “Defending America in the Twenty-First Century,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000): 40-56.
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to restrict the capability of the firms. The fraud that many contractors were found guilty
of during the Iraq war gathered bi-partisan anger and frustration, as well as excess abuses
of power such as the Nisour Square incident and Abu Ghraib.
Liberal and Conservative attitudes have roughly aligned in this manner. However,
it is impossible to know if these positions are rooted in ideology or simply over the Iraq
war. It is also extremely difficult to strip power away from one branch of government.
Each party, when in control of the White House, would think twice before limiting this
powerful foreign policy tool. This partisanship, coupled with hesitation, is why
international bodies are far more advanced in promoting effective regulation of the
private military industry.
Shortly after the Nisour Square shooting in Iraq, the international community
initiated efforts to provide effective regulation. The “Swiss Initiative” led by the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Law Division of
the Swiss Foreign Ministry created the Montreux Document on Pertinent International
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military
and Security Companies during Armed Conflict.162 Seventeen states, including the U.S.,
ratified this document on September 17, 2008, which contains twenty-seven paragraphs
restating international legal obligations toward private military firms and an additional
seventy-three paragraphs detailing “good practices” for states.163 After the initial
ratification, The European Union, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Office
for Security and Cooperation in Europe have endorsed the Montreux Document, making
162 Ian Ralby, “Accountability For Armed Contractors,” Fletcher Security Review 2:1 (January 12, 2015): 2. 163 United Nations, The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, A/63/467-S/2008/636 (2008). www.eda.admin.ch/psc
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it the most important international standard concerning the private military industry.164 It
is important to note that this document is not an enforcement mechanism against the
actions that may be taken on behalf of states, but rather a set of standards that the
international community wishes to be incorporated into each member state’s system of
government. The goal is that if states conform to the principals outlined in the document,
over time they will become obligatory rather than voluntary.165
While the Montreux document is focused on the standards that states need to
implement, experts and officials also recognized the need for there to be standards
regarding contractors as well.166 Apart from the ICRC, the Human Rights Division of the
Swiss Foreign Ministry led a process from 2009 to 2010 that developed a code of conduct
for private military firms. The resulting International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers (ICOC) was signed into existence on November 9, 2010
including an initial fifty-eight PMF’s as sponsors.167 This led to the creation of the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers Association, which
gathers together the private military firms that subscribes to the ICOC.168 The incentive
for PMF’s is the procurement of future contracts, as adhering to these standards
voluntarily shows that they are responsible and will not cause human rights issues to the
countries that choose to employ them.
Following the international communities lead, the U.S. Department of Defense
contracted ASIS International, the premier security-related standards drafting
organization, to synchronize internal regulations with the formal standards set forth by
164 Ralby, 2. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (2010), http://icoc-psp.org 168 Ralby, 3.
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ICOC.169 The process that ASIS recommended that standards be developed by the rules
of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and then converted to international
standards under the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).170 The two
standards that apply to the present analyses are ANSI PSC.1 and ANSI PSC. 2. The first
essentially commits signatories to adhering to human right principals regardless of
whether it is necessitated by law. The latter is an auditing standard that is specifically
attuned to the private military industry.171
Given the significant steps the international community has taken to implement
these standards, there are still many issues that could be addressed. The ability for the
international community to enforce these mechanisms is shaky at best. None of these
initiatives address the core issue of regulation in the United States, which is any
executive branch agency, can hire private security firms even when the operations of that
firm do not fit within the confines of that agency’s purpose. Such was the case with
CACI and Titan Corporation in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. While it may be seen by
some people in the policy realm that the Department of Defense adhering to these
standards is a positive development, the capability for private defense contractors to
operate essentially outside of oversight still exists. One such example of this was in May
of 2012, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor could not answer in the affirmative when asked whether the State Department
would try and implement the standards set forth by the international community.172 Since
169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ralby, 4. 172 Ralby, 5.
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that statement, the agency has said they would begin doing so but have not yet taken the
steps necessary to do so.
The current legal status, both within the Untied States and in the international
community, leaves open a wide spectrum of options to what the regulatory status of the
private defense industry could become. In reality, there are only two paths that future
policy can follow.
The first option for future policy initiations is to resist increased regulations of the
industry. This view of the private military industry favors the tools it gives the executive
branch over human rights abuses and proper oversight. Certainly at a point during the
Iraq war this choice was made, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that both
Democrats and Republicans could see the potential benefits of having an unregulated
private security industry at their disposal. Such an industry would be able to provide a
means to pursue foreign policy objectives that are unpopular at home but may be, in the
view of the executive branch, vital to U.S. interests and national security. Britain was
able to take advantage of this by utilizing Sandline, while the U.S. was able to provide a
higher level of security to its diplomats in Iraq by utilizing security guards that were
practically immune from legal ramifications for a time. There are also obvious benefits to
clandestine operations if you are pursing programs that are outside the realm of legality
by international standards. The use of private military contractors alongside clandestine
operations escalates the impact of both. While this view of the private military industry
certainly fits within the neo-conservative political view more easily than a liberal view, it
is a powerful tool none-the-less where policy makers may be hesistant to remove it from
the powers of the executive branch.
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The second option is for the effective regulation of the industry. This view places
a higher value on the human rights and oversight of the industry over any tools it may
give the Executive Branch in conducting foreign policy. Advocates of this approach will
look to standardize the regulations set forth by the international community across all
Executive Branch agencies. This view will also advocate a number of policy changes that
could be initiated through Congress. Currently proprietary information protects many of
the contracts with the federal government from freedom of information requests. Forced
transparency through legislation passed by Congress could end this. In addition, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act could
be applied to all contractors, regardless of the federal agency they are working for.
Another policy option could be the designation of a sole auditing power of private
military contracts, regardless of federal agency. Congress could also strip the power of
the Executive Branch to hire private military firms that do not adhere to the ICOC
standards of operations, or that do not have internal review boards that have
consequences for abuses committed by their respective employees. These are just some
of the options that will be needed to taken if an effective regulation of the industry is to
come to fruition.
However, a central problem still exists if the private military industry is to be
regulated to the same level as public forces. The two central reasons why private military
firms are employed are because they are cost effective and highly capable. Increased
regulations pass on costs to the firms, which will then pass on costs to the governments
that employ them. The most effective way to overcome this paradox is to eliminate the
patchworks that exist within the regulatory system and to remove uncertainty. There is a
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strong possibility that national legislation could be passed that does not worked in synch
with the international standards that are being put into place by the Department of
Defense. This would be the worse case scenario, where PMF’s would have to adhere to a
number of standards, without any one of these standards having authority over the other.
This would eliminate the very reasons why the United States have become so dependent
on private defense contractors. This is not to say that an effective regulation of the
industry could not be accomplished, however, it does have to be standardized with the
international regulations already being put into place.
Based upon the context-dependent generalizations found in this study, the
following recommendations are made regardless of which option the policy making
community chooses to follow.
Recommendation #1
In the issue area of effectiveness, it was found that military provider firms were
controversial and forced out of the battle space due to the unintended consequences of
their operations. While it was rare that any firm was not successful in its contractual
obligations, the military provider firm provided more risk to the client when compared to
the other types of private military firms. Therefore, military provider firms should only
be used when deemed absolutely necessary and mission essential. It was also found that
states hired PMF’s because they find them effective. In addition, this study concluded
that private military firms work to maintain important personal connections to states in
order to assist its ability to gain contracts in the future. The United States should end its
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practice of no-bid contracts in order to maintain the cost effectiveness of the firms and to
reduce the risk that personal connections can guarantee future contracts.
Recommendation #2
In the issue area of private networks, this study found that private military firms
used spin-off capabilities and were often under a parent company. The acquisition of new
firms by the parent company can radically alter the capability of the firm regarding spin-
off capability, subcontracting, and the formation of shell companies. When making the
decision to contract out a specific job, the United States should use a review process that
ensures that the Executive Branch is aware of all capabilities regarding the firm it is
awarding a contract to. That review process should be conducting in each renewal of the
contract as well, given the ability of private companies to alter corporate structure
quickly. This would eliminate the risk of the United States being held accountable for the
actions of a firm in a foreign country after its contract with the United States had been
terminated.
Recommendation #3
The policy recommendations for the last issue area, “foreign policy by proxy”,
largely rest on whether the direction of policy toward the private military industry
follows option one or two. Regardless, private military firms provide the Executive
Branch with extraordinary capability and power. This study found that past military
engagements could provide incentives for intervention with PMF’s. In all cases, there
was at least one domestic or international legal requirement that was circumnavigated
using PMF’s. Lastly, states were found to have a tendency to assist PMF’s that are based
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within its borders when the firms operations aligned with the states foreign policy
interests. Whether or not these powers are put to use is in the hands of the President, who
is ultimately held responsible by the American people. Any national legislation to
regulate the industry would have to be approved with the President’s signature unless
passed with a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. The recommendation
toward this issue area is that policy makers should use their power to increase awareness
about this tool the Office of the President can exercise during conflicts.