Post on 08-Jul-2020
transcript
Presentation by SRSG Chambas
The Security Situation in the Sahel and Piracy
13th ACP–EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly Regional Meeting
Freetown – Sierra Leone, 22-24 February 2017
Honorable Ibrahim Bundu, Speaker of Parliament and Leader of the Majority,
Honorable Netty Baldeh, Co-President of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary
Assembly,
Mrs Michelle Rivasi, representing the EU Co-Presidency of the ACP-EU Joint
Parliamentary Assembly,
Honorable Ministers,
Distinguished Members of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly,
Distinguished Members of the ECOWAS Parliament,
Members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me to thank the authorities of Sierra Leone, and especially the
speaker of Parliament and His honorable colleagues, for their endearing
hospitality. The presence today of ECOWAS members of Parliament,
African Caribbean and Pacific group of states, and European delegates, is
heartwarming. It illustrates the lasting spirit of the Cotonou Agreement. I
have no doubt that our discussions will enable the ACP and European
Parliaments to advance their common understanding of critical issues
affecting the region, including economic integration, natural resources,
migration, peace and security.
Excellences,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Security situation in Sahel is one of the pressing issues mobilizing
attention at the national level, in regional instances, and in larger
international fora. It has featured high on the agenda of the European Union
since the Arab Spring protests in Libya in 2011, and the crisis in Mali, in
2012. [The ACP/EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, as I recall, conducted
early fact finding missions to Mali soon afterwards]. The EU strategy for the
Sahel, adopted in March 2011, signaled a comprehensive approach on
development and security cooperation, which has subsequently been
reinforced by other programmes. The UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel,
for its part, was launched in September 2013. Since then, initiatives have
multiplied to mobilize support for the region, boost resilience and
development, and stem the spread of violent extremism and illicit
trafficking. The situation we are facing today continues to call for a multi-
dimensional response: it involves strengthening the ties between the region
and its partners, and also examining together the measures taken by the
countries themselves, who are on the front line.
As you will recall, 2016 was marked by an overall increase in security
incidents in the Sahel, including terrorist attacks targeting areas previously
spared by such violence – Cote d’Ivoire in particular, as well as Burkina
Faso. Violence has continued unabated in the Northern and Central parts
of Mali. Since its inception in April 2013, the UN Mission in Mali has suffered
over 110 casualties. The most recent terrorist violence has threatened the
Malian peace agreement: the attack on the Gao assembly camp on 18
January led to 77 casualties and over 100 wounded among the armed
groups signatories to the agreement. It remains essential for Mali’s
territorial unity that contentious issues between the Malian parties be
resolved through negotiations and reconciliation. We hope that the current
efforts of the Mediation will allow to reinvigorate consensual solutions.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
There are multiple reasons to the insecurity in the Sahel region. Among
legitimate causes for concern, I can mention the continuous flow of
weapons from Libya in particular, but also the risks associated with ISIS
and other armed groups’ combatants operating in Libya or Syria returning
to their countries of origin in West Africa, or join local insurgencies. These
phenomenon have been observed in the Lake Chad Basin area, where the
violence related to Boko Haram activities causes major humanitarian
upheaval. Furthermore, it is established that criminal activities and illicit
trafficking in the region have increased in parallel to the threats posed by
extremist agendas and terrorism. Other types of violence, including
tensions between pastoralist/farming communities are being observed
throughout the Sahel. The price payed by the local population is high, as
the violence takes human lives, disrupts livelihoods and forces
communities to displace. Insecurity compromises their fair chance for
development and economic prosperity. It also undermines the confidence
of the population in central governments, and in the security forces in
charge of protecting them. In view of these intertwined phenomena, efforts
for conflict prevention, as well as local mechanisms to guarantee national
and social cohesion, appear as necessary as the proper military response.
Faced with the threat posed by extremist groups, Governments in the
affected countries have had to mobilize human and financial resources in
ever growing volume. Launching a heavy-handed counter-terrorism
response bears the risks of alienating further the affected communities. As
illustrated during the discussions at recent Summits of ECOWAS and G5,
all countries are confronted with similar constraints. In view of this situation,
coming together to combine expertise and resources has become urgent.
It is in this perspective that, on 24 January, the Heads of State of Mali, Niger
and Burkina Faso met under the « Liptako-Gurma » integrated
development Authority, to adopt a new mechanism for military cooperation
– as you are aware, this triangle area between the three countries, with a
significant population involved in trade and border exchanges, has
encountered increasing challenges to security and development in recent
years. It is foreseen that this “G3” military option would fall under the larger
G5 Sahel project for a regional force formalized at the G5 Heads of States
Summit in Bamako, on 6 February, attended by EU, AU, ECOWAS and
bilateral partners. The United Nations is currently studying options to
support the regional Force, which the G5 countries have described as
essential to supplement the responses already provided under national and
international frameworks. I believe the EU, in particular, has already been
approached for support. Issues related to rules of engagement, force
generation, logistics and sustainability will have to be carefully examined.
As I mentioned earlier, tackling insecurity in the Sahel requires a broad
focus. One of the next presentations, I believe, will focus on migration and
related developments in the region. These issues are also of significant
consequence to the overall stability of the Sahel. It appears very relevant
for both parliamentarian delegations to seize the opportunity of this forum,
and others, and exchange on these phenomenon in order to forge a
common perception and understanding. The situation in Niger, in particular,
and the dependency of communities in the Agadez region upon the
“migration economy”, should be taken into consideration when
implementing measures to regulate population movements.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Allow me to conclude with a few words on the UN engagement in the Sahel,
before I move to the topic of Piracy, which is my second presentation.
Since November 2013, the UN, AU, EU, World Bank and others have
established a Ministerial Platform of Coordination for the Sahel. This
platform was designed to discuss peace and security dynamics, as well as
strategic considerations guiding bilateral and multilateral interventions; it
was established with the view that the needs of Sahel countries in terms of
support could be matched with the available offers of assistance. Other
fora, including the forthcoming meeting of the Special Envoys on the Sahel,
to take place in Luxembourg on 14 and 15 March, also serve for
coordination purpose between the partners. Concerning the G5 and its
Secretariat, the UN opened a liaison office in Nouakchott less than a year
ago, which centralizes the support provided by UN entities. We are also
involved in setting up the Center for Threat Analysis and Early Warning
which is attached to the G5 Secretariat, as well as a regional cell for the
prevention of radicalization and violent extremism. This is in accordance
with the vision of the Secretary-General for conflict prevention and
preventive diplomacy, around which my office has designed its
engagement in the region. It is through this lens, also, that we intend to
contribute to national and regional efforts to curb insecurity in the Sahel.
******************
Turning now to Piracy - and Maritime Security - as it is often referred to.
A quick overview of the trends in maritime security, over the past three
years, show a sharp increase of criminal activities in particular in the Gulf
of Guinea – in contrast to the global reduction across international waters.
Kidnapping for ransom, oil bunkering and sabotage have increased in
2016, with most cases reported in Nigerian waters. Incidents showing illicit
trafficking in small arms, weapons, drugs, and persons, as well as piracy,
armed robbery, but also illegal fishing and industrial waste disposal,
continue to be observed in the Gulf of Guinea. In volume, the number of
kidnapping for ransom during 2016 in the Gulf of Guinea surpassed the
total number of local maritime incidents recorded in 2015 by the
International Maritime Bureau1.
Simultaneously, attacks against foreign oil companies, bunkering and oil
pipeline vandalism has had serious economic and security implications for
Nigeria and consequences for countries in the Gulf of Guinea, as most
criminal activities are perpetrated by the groups operating from the Niger
Delta Region. The response and decisions made by the Government in
1 Sources and data based on “Ocean beyond Piracy” reports.
Abuja are therefore key to managing the phenomenon. For example,
decisions to resume the payment of stipends to the members of these
groups early 2016 allowed for a temporary lull in predatory activities in
coastal areas. However, last year was also marked by a level of
sophistication in militant attacks against oil rigs in the Niger Delta region,
including through the use of explosives in strategic locations deep
underwater. The current approach of the Nigerian Government shows the
will to engage in dialogue with the militants, while also addressing issues
related to public investment in the concerned areas and the grievances of
local communities, which are among the root causes of the problem.
Meanwhile, in order to address the threats to security and support the blue
economy, regional organizations and the international community have
multiplied initiatives in recent years. ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of
Guinea Commission (GGC) met in Yaoundé on 25th June 2013 to develop
a comprehensive maritime security strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.
Subsequently, the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety
and Security in the Gulf of Guinea (ICC) was inaugurated in September
2014, to coordinate all activities with regards to the suppression of piracy
and other criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea.
In 2014 also, the AU adopted its Strategic Plan of Action 2050 which
encourages sub-regional institutions and member states to take concerted
actions to improve maritime sector governance. An extraordinary summit
of the Assembly of African Union (AU) Heads of States and governments
was held in Lomé, Togo, on 15 October 2016. The summit reviewed and
adopted the AU Charter on maritime security, safety and development in
Africa, as recommended by the Executive Council of Ministers. In addition,
the AU Commission was requested to convene the relevant Specialised
Technical Committees (STCs), which were not involved in the elaboration
process of the Charter, to submit their contributions to the Charter in the
form of annexes for consideration in July 2017.
Some key recommendations were made at the summit last October, to
achieve safety, security and economic development for coastal states. This
is also for the benefit of land-locked nations, who rely on the coast for
transportation of goods and services. These recommendations include
international support to the regional maritime security architecture. It also
includes a specific focus on effective information-sharing, spanning from
national to subregional mechanisms. The meeting recommended effective
coordination with the private sector, civil society, coastal communities and
services involved in curbing crimes at sea and the development of the Blue
Economy. The role of national Navies and Coast Guards, the judiciary and
other national institutions involved in maritime activities remains essential.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that solutions to the two security
topics I have discussed today will require a similar engagement for effective
partnering, and regular exchanges to build mutual understanding. The
larger objectives, beyond providing immediate support to address both
phenomenon, should be sustainable economic development and prosperity
for the populations. This remains at the center of the vision for the region
developed by the African, Caribbean and Pacific States, the European
Union, and the United Nations.
I thank you for your attention and look forward to our discussions.*******************