The Current State of Automotive Security · 2020-07-08 · Title: Automotive Security: A Throwback...

transcript

The Current State

of Automotive Security

Chris Valasek

Director of Vehicle Security Research

Introduction

• Chris Valasek• Director of Vehicle Security

Research• BS in CS from Pitt (2005)• Reverse engineer, Exploitation

research, Automotive security

Agenda

• External perspective

• Concerns and correlations

• Desired advancements

• Q & A

My Perspective

Years of Research

Tools, Analysis, Methods

Outsider’s perspective

• The following presentation is from my perspective

– There’s a chance some issues are being resolved

• Regardless, I think outside assessments are valuable

– Example: Proof reading

http://www.carthrottle.com/post/gangs-are-stealing-17-luxury-cars-every-day-in-london-by-hacking-the-keyless-entry-system/

Concerns

My Concerns

• Revolve around physical safety and remote exploitation

• Worried about remote wireless => ECU compromise

– As opposed to insider threats

• I think privacy is important, but I focus on physical safety

• Outsider threats to cars are difficult to cash in on, so I’ll talk

on physical controls

Concerns: Bus Systems

Bus communications I

• CAN: Invented before vehicle connectivity was even a thing• Trust issues

• Ethernet• Expensive

• Complications

• Fragmentation, out of order, etc

• Could have similar deficiencies as CAN

• Spoofing

• Broadcast communications

• Carry known diagnostic data

• Security limitations usually revolve around diagnostic routines• What about legitimate traffic?

Bus communications II

Bus communications III

• Remote compromise….

• Encryption• Keys will have to reside somewhere the attacker can acquire them

• Diagnostic software or ECU itself

• Authentication• Remote compromise will happen on a pre-authenticated ECU

• Authorization• Legitimate messages will most likely be authorized

• Example: Pre-Collision System messages

Concerns: Connected Devices

Interconnectivity

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/PandaBoard_described.png

Familiar attack surface

http://www.akhbarelyoum.dz/ar/images/ghoughl__tttlk_altttbik_alkhas_bndham_Android_Auto_llsiarat.jpg

http://motorburn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Apple-CarPlay.jpg

http://blogs-images.forbes.com/andygreenberg/files/2014/07/screen-shot-2013-02-05-at-7-35-23-pm-1024x547.png

1-to-N

• Windows does not come

with a VPN to Redmond,

your vehicle does

• Owning 1 internal asset

may lead to N

compromised vehicles

http://electronicdesign.com/site-files/electronicdesign.com/files/uploads/2013/05/0606_Onthesafeside_fig3.gif

No carrier restrictions

Bad at secure coding

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LuWKXsteTNY

Concerns: Architecture

OBD-II connectivity

http://cdn2-

b.examiner.com/sites/default/files/styles/image_content_width/hash/95/b7/95b774c969717ef38e9d

b8e54b2404c1.jpg?itok=e0nlongg

More data, more problems

http://www.zdnet.com/article/fords-big-data-experiments-can-it-transform-the-company/

http://vehicle-electronics.biz/sites/default/files/field/image/redbend.jpg

Desired Advancements

http://blogs-images.forbes.com/tonybradley/files/2014/03/Memo1.png

Patching

IDS / IPS

Conclusions• Let’s admit things are possible and there is a problem

• A breach is bad for everyone, not just the specific vendor

• Hard to justify security when there is no immediate threat

– MSFT 2006 v. MSFT 2014

– Server v. Client side

• Vehicle security is even harder than regular software security

– And more scrutinized

– People are concerned due to the possibility of physical harm

– We need to work together to improve the products we all use

• V2V will bring additional complications

• Patching is a HUGE problem right now

– OTA updates will help address the issue

• I’m Chris and I’m here to help!

Thanks!

• Chris Valasek• Director of Vehicle Security Research | IOActive• chris.valasek@ioactive.com

The Current State of Automotive Security · 2020-07-08 · Title: Automotive Security: A Throwback...

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