Post on 10-Mar-2018
transcript
Encrypting stored data
Tuomas AuraCSE-C3400 Information security
Aalto University, autumn 2014
Outline
1. Scenarios
2. File encryption
3. Encrypting file system
4. Full disk encryption
5. Data recovery
Acknowledgement: These slides are partly based on Microsoft material.
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Simple application of cryptography — and a good example of how difficult it is to build secure system
This lecture is uses Windows as an example. The same principles and questions apply to competing file and disk encryption products
Scenarios for data encryption
Lost and stolen laptops
– Contain confidential data and access credentials
Physically compromised servers
– Contain business secrets, customer data and PII
– Unauthorized insiders have physical access
Decommissioned hard disks
– Secure decommissioning is expensive
– Hardware recycling is typically done in the cheapest and fastest way: no time for secure disk wipe
– Old PCs from the US are shipped to China for recycling
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Data encryption Scenarios:
– lost and stolen laptop computers
– stolen servers
– decommissioning hard disks
Risk of disclosure of confidential data
The obvious solution: encrypt data on disk
But computer security is never quite so simple:
– Security often conflicts with usability
– Security often conflicts with reliability; plan for datarecovery is needed
– System design mistakes or programming errors could compromise data
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FILE ENCRYPTION
Simple file encryption1. User enters
passphrase2. Passphrase hashed
with a cryptographic hash functionto produce a key
3. File encrypted with the key– E.g. AES in CBC mode– Decryption with
the same key– Examples:
crypt(1), GPG
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1*****
**
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SHA-1
d70f3619a209b
Our plan is.…3
% gpg --output ciphertext.gpg --symmetric plaintext.docEnter passphrase:
Limitations of file encryption User action needed, and users are lazy Automated use (scripting) hard to implement because
where do you store the secret passphrase? Brute-forcing the passphase possible
– Can be mitigate with a slow hash (e.g. PBKDF2)
Encrypting a file normally creates an encrypted copy; what happens to the old plaintext file?– No guarantee that the plaintext is not left on the disk
Word processors and other software create temporary files and backup copies– Unencrypted versions and fragments of the file may be left in
locations that the user does not even know about
There are tools for deleting temporary files and for wiping free disk space, but none is completely reliable
Cloud storage keep all old data
Wiping files Deleting a file simply marks the space free but does not
erase the contents: raw data is still on the disk Overwriting a file does not always erase the old contents:
– File system may organize data in unexpected ways: backups, revision control, copy on write, journal, etc.
– Solid state disks (SSD) write in complex patterns
Wiping all empty disk space by overwriting– Deletes most data but no guarantee– Disk drive behavior is not always controllable by the file system
driver: bad block replacement, optimizations
Magnetic data remanence: magnetic medium may retain traces of previous contents even after overwritten
Physical destruction: grinding disks, heating magnetic medium above Curie temperature– Flash memory (SSD) fragments may retain data
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ENCRYPTING FILE SYSTEM
Windows encrypting file system (EFS)
Encryption is a file attribute
Possible to enable encryption for all files in a folder new files encrypted
Files are readable only when the user is logged in
Encryption and decryption are transparent to applications
Similar products exist for Unix
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EFS key management
1. User logs in, enters password
2. Hashed to produce key
3. Used to decrypt User’s Master Key
4. Used to decrypt User’s Private EFS Key
5. Used to decrypt File Encryption Key (FEK)
6. Used to encrypt on write and decrypt on read
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PBKDF2
d70f3619a209b15
Our plan is.…
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User
name:
Windows
Password:
Log on to:
Username
*********
Domain
OK Cancel Shut Down... Options <<
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4
key
User’s DPAPI*Master Key
User’s PrivateEFS Key
5 FEK
User profile
User profile
$EFS alternate
data stream
EncryptedFile
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Plaintextfile
RSA
AES or 3DES
*) DPAPI = Data Protectionapplication programminginterface
EFS limitations Encrypts contents of specific files only User login credentials (password) needed for decryption
– System has no access to encrypted files unless user logs in– System cannot index files without the user password– Backups contain encrypted files, not the plaintext
When encrypting plaintext files, the original file is not wiped, just deleted; the data remains on the disk– User should create files in an encrypted folder
Transparent decryption– e.g. data decrypted transparently when copying to a file share over network or
to an un-encrypted FAT partition
Some data is not encrypted:– folder and file names– temp files, earlier unencrypted versions, printer spool– registry, system files and logs– page file can now be encrypted but requires policy configuration
Hibernation file may contain decryption keys
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EFS and password cracking EFS security depends on the secrecy of user password
Password hashes are stored in a database on the disk
Password are vulnerable to brute-force attacks– NT hash and historical LM hash use no salt and are
therefore especially vulnerable
– Rainbow tables (Hellman90, Oechslin03)
Attacker can boot to another OS, extract the password hashes from the hard disk and crack the user password– Note: resetting user or admin password does not enable
access to encrypted files
EFS supports smart cards as an alternative login method
Trojans, root kits etc.
EFS data is vulnerable to Trojans, viruses and key loggers
Attacker with access to hardware can compromise OS and install a root kit or key logger
Note that these problems do not apply to lost or stolen laptops
EFS summary Encrypts single files and folders; leaves a lot of
information unencrypted Requires care from user
– User must understand what is encrypted and what else happens to the data
– User of a non-domain computer must backup keys or risk data loss
– Security depends on a strong password
System cannot access encrypted files for admin tasks like backup and indexing
Hibernation breaks the security Apart from the hibernation issue, EFS would be pretty
secure way of encrypting all files on a data disk (D:)
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FULL DISK ENCRYPTION
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Full disk encryption Entire disk is encrypted:
– Protects all information on disk– Easier to use correctly than EFS
Products are available from various hardware and software vendors including hard disk manufacturers
Password, key or physical token required to boot or to mount disk; thereafter transparent– Usability and reliability issues?– Requires user/admin to be present at boot time
In software-based products:– Password must be strong enough to resist brute-force guessing– Hibernation is a problem
Hardware solution would be better
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Trusted platform module
Trusted hardware enables some things that otherwise would be impossible
Trusted platform module (TPM) is a smart-card-like module on the computer motherboard or, preferably, embedded in the CPU – Holds crypto keys and platform measurements in
platform configuration registers (PCR)
Useful TPM operations:– TMP_Seal: encrypt data — in any platform
configuration
– TPM_Unseal: decrypt the data, but only if the platform configuration is the same as when sealing
Windows BitLocker
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Full-volume encryption in Windows– Uses TPM for key management
– Optional PIN input and/or USB dongle at boot time
– System volume must be NTFS, data disks can also be FAT
Sealing the entire system partition:– Encrypt data with a symmetric key
– Seal the key; store sealed key on disk; unseal when booting
TPM checks the OS integrity before unsealing the key– Can boot to another OS but then cannot unseal the
Windows partition cannot bypass OS access controls
– For a stolen laptop, forces the thief to hardware attack against TPM
BitLocker partitions
EncryptedWindows partition
Boot partition
Windows partition contains:
Volume metadata with MAC
Encrypted OS
Encrypted page file
Encrypted temp files
Encrypted data
Encrypted hibernation file
Boot partition contains: MBROS loaderBoot utilities
1.5 GB
BitLocker keys
Storage Root Key (SRK) inside TPM1
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2 Volume Master Key (VMK)
3Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK)
Plaintext data
and bring
milk …
Separate VMK/FVEK adds flexibility — how?
Encrypted keys in
volume metadata
d70f3619a209b15
Encrypted data
Algorithms and key sizes Storage root key (SRK) is a 2048-bit RSA key Volume master key (VMK) is a 256-bit symmetric key Full volume encrypt key (FVEK) is a 128 or 256-bit
symmetric key The disk in encrypted with AES-CBC
– Initialization vector (IV) derived from sector number (because there is no space for storing a random IV in the disk block)
No integrity check – Adding a MAC would increase the data size
Disk sectors are pre-processed with a proprietary diffuseralgorithm– Makes attacks against integrity more difficult; the whole sector
is encrypted as if it was one cipher block (512..8192 bytes)
Software authentication with TPM Measuring platform configuration:
– Module n computes hash of module n+1 and extends the hash into a platform configuration register (PCR) in TPM
– Module n transfers control to module n+1
At any point, PCRs contain a cumulative fingerprint (hashes) of all software loaded up to that point
Sealing and unsealing data:– TPM binds selected PCR values to the sealed secrets– TPM unseals secrets only if these PCR values have not changed– If attacker tampers with the OS or the boot process, the OS cannot
unseal the data
Originally designed as a DRM feature:– Decrypt music only for untampered OS and media player– Slightly different from traditional secure boot: does not prevent booting
to any OS or system configuration– Another feature based on the TPM and platform measurements is
attestation i.e. proving host integrity to another host server across the Internet
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Secure boot with TPM
CRTM
Boot manager
NTFS boot block
NTFS boot sector
MBR
BIOS
measure and load
Static OS Dynamic OSPre-OS
PCRson TPM
decrypt,verify signatureand load
load volume metadata,
unseal VMK,verify MAC1
on metadata,decrypt FVEK
1MAC keyed with VMK. 2Different loaders for boot, resume etc.
Windows
OS loader2
Which PCR values are used for sealing? *PCR 00: CRTM, BIOS and Platform Extensions(PCR 01: Platform and Motherboard Configuration and Data)
*PCR 02: Option ROM Code(PCR 03: Option ROM Configuration and Data)
*PCR 04: Master Boot Record (MBR) Code(PCR 05: Master Boot Record (MBR) Partition Table)(PCR 06: State Transitions and Wake Events)(PCR 07: Computer-Manufacturer Specific)
*PCR 08: NTFS Boot Sector*PCR 09: NTFS Boot Block*PCR 10: Boot Manager*PCR 11: BitLocker Critical Components
If any of the *-values has changed, the decryption key will not be unlocked and a recovery password is neededBitLocker keys will be unlocked before OS upgrade
BitLocker modes TPM only:
– Unsupervised boot (VMK unsealed if the PCR values correct)– Attacker can boot stolen laptop but not log in security depends on OS access controls
– Very attractive mode of operation enabled by TPM — but see the following slides!
TPM and PIN: – TPM requires a PIN during the secure boot– TMP will be locked after a small number of incorrect PINs– Attacker must break the TPM hardware to decrypt the disk – Attacker may also sniff communication between chips on a live system
TPM (and PIN) and USB stick: – Secure boot and strong keys on a physical token high security
USB stick without TPM– Traditional software-based full-disk encryption; no secure boot
Network unlock– Server can reboot if on the same network with AD
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eDrive
Authentication Key:sent to the drive, decrypts the Data Encryption Key
Data Encryption Key (DEK)never leaves the drive
Separate VMK/FVEK adds flexibility — how?
Encrypted key on the drive
and bring
milk …
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4Plaintext data
d70f3619a209b15
Encrypted data
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Obtain the Authentication Key e.g. by unsealing it
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Offloading the data encryption and decryption (AES) to hardware on the drive(in Windows 8 and Server 2012)
Secure path issues The PIN input is not secure if the attacker can hack the
hardware– Attacker can modify the BIOS or by replace the computer
without the user’s knowledge– Key logger on external keyboard can capture the PIN
Similarly, a hacked computer can capture the keys on the USB stick
Malware can also fake the reboot process and ask for the PIN
This requires the attacker to have access to the computer twice: first to install the Trojan, then to use the captured PIN– Inside attacker, e.g. IT support– Not a problem for lost and stolen computers
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Cold boot attack Laptop memory is designed for low power consumption slow
refresh rate data stays in memory for seconds after power loss Data remanence in DRAM:
– Pull out memory from a running computer and plug it into a reader– Some bits will be random but some will retain their values might be
possible to recover most bits of a cryptographic key in the memory– Use cold spray or liquid nitrogen to reduce data loss
Cold boot attack:– Reboot into minimal hacker OS from USB stick or CD– Memory power lost only for a fraction of a second during reboot memory contents remain almost unchanged
Lessons:– Breaks full-disk encryption if attacker has access to the running
computer – Sleeping laptop = running laptop most laptops vulnerable– Breaks BitLocker in TPM-only mode even if it is powered down– OS access controls, e.g. screen lock, do not stop a physical attacker
from gaining access to memory and files
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DATA REVOCERY
Need for data recovery If the decryption key is lost, encrypted files will be lost
If Admin resets user password, EFS files cannot be read– Password reset and hacking tools have the same effect
– User can change the password back to the old one – if remembered
Backup files become unreadable if the user’s old (archived) private key’s is lost– Can happen when rebuilding or cleaning user profile
BitLocker risks: installing Linux boot loader, replacing the motherboard, TPM boot PIN forgotten or mistyped many times, moving disk to another computer
Good idea to backup decryption keys
Data recovery in EFS Windows domain has a data recovery agent (DRA)
– FEK is encrypted also with DRA public key – Domain Admin is the default DRA– Other DRAs can be defined in a Group Policy in the domain
Standalone machine has no default DRA– Latest password reset disk also recovers EFS private key– User may also export the user’s EFS certificate (including
the private key) to a backup disk– Local Admin can configure a DRA on the local machine (see
cipher.exe)
Questions:– Local Admin cannot read the users’ encrypted files without
the user passwords; can the Admin get around this?– Win 2000 had local Admin as default DRA for non-domain
machines; why was this not a good idea?32
Data recovery in EFS File encryption key (FEK) is encrypted with one or more
recovery agents’ public keys– The same mechanism is used for sharing encrypted files
between users
d70f3619a209b15
Fileattribute
Our plan is.…
User’s PrivateEFS Key
FEK
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EncryptedFile
Our plan is.…
FEK
Recovery Agent’s Private EFS Key
Plaintextfile
Plaintextfile
Data recovery in BitLocker Recovery password:
– User can print a 48-digit recovery password or store it on a USB stick, CD or remote disk; it is actually a 128-bit key
– BitLocker encrypts the VMK with the recovery password and stores it with the volume metadata (in the same way as theTMP-sealed VMK)
– Multiple backups of volume metadata are stored in the volume in case a part of the volume is corrupted
– User can save the recovery key to Microsoft account (online)
Organizational recovery policy:– Windows Domain Admin can require the recovery password to
be uploaded to the Active Directory
Installing another OS for dual boot will trigger recovery– User can accept the new boot configuration after entering the
recovery password
Exercises What secure methods are there for erasing magnetic hard drives and
tapes, USB stick or solid-state drives (SSD), and paper documents? How to delete a specific file from a computer securely without erasing the
whole disk? What security properties does GPG file encryption or EFS provide that full-
disk encryption does not? How vulnerable is EFS to password guessing? Why do EFS and BitLocker have so many levels of keys? Are some
unnecessary? Compare the security of software-based full-disk encryption and the TPM
approach against brute-force password guessing How to mitigate the risk of cold-boot attacks (both against BitLocker and
more generally)? Explain what effect do powering down the laptop computer, hibernation
and sleep mode have on the cold boot attack? Transparent operation (happens without the user or application even
knowing) improves usability of data encryption, but are there risks associated with the transparency?
How would you design the encryption of files in cloud strorage?
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Related reading
Online:
– Halderman et al., Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys.http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/
Stallings and Brown: Computer security, principles and practice, 2008, chapter 10.5
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