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Congress 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Congress – July 18, 2011
←← Recap:
American political system has not been a linear progression over
time, but rather a serpentine ebb and flow.
Roger Smith: American political development has had a serpentine
development over time, and that multiple traditions better explain
this ebb and flow over time than would a single tradition.
o Eg. Emancipation
← Practice questions
Federalism is:
o Sep (horizontal) of powers across different institutions within
the same level of governt
o Division (vertical) of powers across multiple levels of
government in which each level enjoys at least some
power independent of others.
o Division powers across multiple levels of govt must be
independent
o None of the above
Smith (1993) argues that:
o American political culture consists of multiple interacting
traditions including liberal democratic thought but also in
egalitarian ideologies
←← Congress
← 1. Basic Facts
Leg branch of US fed govt
Bicameral leg – two chambers
o The House
Members
435 Members
2-year terms
More formalized, and under control of majority party,
than senate
Campaigns less $$ and higher incumbency rate
o The Senates
Senators
100 Members
6-year staggered terms
Confirms presidential appointments
Indirect elections pre-1913
Confirms presidential appointments and ratifies treaties
Campaigns more $ and lower incumbency rate
“Congress” can also refer to a period of time
Relationship between 2 chambers
o Both must pass all laws
o Nominally requires a majority in both chambers
BUT in the Senate often requires 60 out of 100 to head
off a filibuster (i.e. 60 votes needed to use cloture on a
filibuster, down from 67 votes pre-1975)
Check and balances: between branches
o Presidency
Veto bills passed by Congress
Congress can override by 2/3 votes in BOTH houses
Can remove precedence through an impeachment
process
Confirms presidential appointments
o Judiciary
Strike down acts of congress
Senate must confirm judicial appointments
Congress has some control over the structure
Parties
o Majority party controls the leadership positions in the house
House: the Speaker
Senate: Majority Leader
Both Houses: leadership of the committees
o Party caucuses in each chamber choose their own leaders
o Strength of party leaders has ebbed and flowed over time,
centralized now, committee used to be more powerful
o B&W: Leaders can only exercise the powers that their
party members give them”
o Canadian comparison: CDN leaders have greater leverage
over their legislators – much higher party discipline in Canada
than the USA. (eg. Party leaders can refuse to sign
nominations, but party caucuses cannot typically depose their
leaders)
Committees
o Main functions
Scrutinize legislation
Engage in congressional oversight
Arguably also provide credit claiming opportunities for
MCs (Mayhews 1974)
o Power of committees has an inverse relationship to the power
of party leaders
How a Bill becomes Law
o Bill is introduced
o Committee and sub-committee consider bill
o House and Senate consider bill and vote (presented to floor)
o Conference committee resolves any differences between
House and Senate
o Bill passes both houses
o President sign or vetoes the legislation
Agenda control in HOUSE
o Standing committee votes in favour of bill, it’s sent to House
Rules Committee for a rules that sets out how bill will be
considered on floor of House
Open rule: any germane amendments from the floor)
Closed rule: restriction on types of amendments
o These restrictions can have a big effect.
Closed: take it or leave it offer
Open: opportunity for compromise
These restrictive rules are typically not present in the
Senate
o Median voter theorem with closed and open rules, and the
take-it or leave-it approach
← Smith – “Congress, the Troubled Institution:
Main argument: their are 4 interrelated trends in congressional
politics. These trends are undesirable, and can only be reversed by
electing more moderates
1. Party Polarization
o Caused by sorting of both MCs and voters (liberals more likely
to be democrats, conservatives more likely to be republicans)
o Parties are becoming more internally homogenous and pulling
apart over time
o Cause of sorting is as of yet unclear
2. Procedural abuses
o In House: cohesive majority party able to freeze our minority
party
o In Senate: cohesive minority party able to filibuster (or
threaten to filibuster) more effectively
o Consequence: gridlock – things can shoot through the house,
but get stuck in the senate
3. Ceding of congressional power to the president
o Leads to a weakened congress
Crises (e.g. terrorism, Iraq, economy) lead Congress to
delegate powers to president
Weak oversight of George W. Bush presidency when
GOP majority party in Congress
4. The unpopularity of congress
o Approval rating of Congress in the tank. Caused in part by
highly visible scandals, partisanship, and apparent gridlock.
←← What Drives Congress?
What drives congressional decision making? Why do MCs do what
they do?
o 1. General motivation and incentives (Fenno 1973, Mayhew
1974, Hall 1996)
o 2. Constituency (Clinton 2006, Bartels 2008)
o 3. Party (Krehbiel 1993, Ansolabehere et all 2001, Cox and
McCubbins 2005)
o 4. Organized
← Fenno, Richard – Congressmen in Committees
Main arguments:
o 3 basic goals: re-election, influence in House, and make good
public policy
o mix of 3 goals varies across MCs and time
o opportunities to achieve these goals vary across committees
Evidence
o Uses surveys of and interviews with MCs on 6 standing
committees in the 50s and 60s to ID goals of these MCs
o Finds that eg. personal influence is dominant goal of members
to Appropriations Committee while constituency service is
dominant goal of Interior Committee
← Mayhew, David
Main argument: assumes that MCs are primarily interested in
reelections
o From this we should see them take part in 3 activities:
o 1. Advertising 2. Credit claiming 3. Position taking
o Congress in well-suited to allowing members of congress to
get reelected
Typology
o Advertising
Promote name and positive image, but with little
political content
Non political speech, congratulations etc.
o Credit claiming
Generate BELIEF that one is personally responsible for
government doing something good
Often accomplished through delivery of
particularized benefits (pork)
o Position Taking
Public enunciation of a judgmental statement eg. Roll
call vote, policy interview
Consequences of single-minded reelection seeking
o Delay, particularism, servicing of organized interest, symbolic
but unsubstantial legislative action
Evidence
o Largely destructive
Key point – BOTH FENNO AND MAYHEW
o Internal practices
←← Carson and Jenkins: Examining the Electoral Connection
Question: Does Mayhewian electoral incentive apply to previous
congressional eras?
Main argument: yes, four necessary condition for Mayhewian
electoral incentive are present at least as early 1980s
o Ambition
Have to want to get re-elected
Congressional careerism beginning in 1890s
Political ‘leap-frog’ careerism from even earlier
o Autonomy
Development of direct primary election in early 1900s.
Earlier still: could print own ballots – avoided need for
nominations
o Responsiveness
Eg. Rivers and harbours legislation in 1880s
Earlier still use of private bills for pensioners
o Accountability
Evidence: state-generated ballot beginning in 1880s
makes ticket splitting easier
← Hall: Participation in Congress
Puzzle: Why do MCs engage in committee work to produce public
goods for floor when have incentives to free ride on efforts of
others.?
Main argument:
o MCs still decide to act out of some sense of self-interest
(electoral or personal), not because of congressional norms or
socialization.
o 3 types of interest
1. Enhance likelihood of reelection (Mayhew)
2. Pursue their own personal policy preference (Fenno)
3. Prosecute the president’s agenda
Evidence: interviews with MCs staff
←← Constituency
Lots of research on the role of the constituency on the behavior of
MCs
o Similar trends between parties, but difference in actual
placement. Eg. Bartells constituency opinion vs. voting score
← Clinton – Representation in Congress (based on party affiliation)
o Question: To what extent are constituency and partisan
subconsti. Preferences reflected in MCs roll call voting in 106th
House
o Findings
Reps are not completely responsive to the district of the
whole (geographic)
Majority party R. are especially responsive to the prefs
of R constituents and
Minority party D. are most responsive to the
preferences of non-Democratic constituents
Bartels – Unequal Democracy (based on income)
o Question: How has rising economic inequality and increased
role of money in the political process affected who actually
governs the USA
o Finding: late 80s and early 90s, senators were WAY more
responsive to rich constituents than they were to poorer
constituents
Krehbiel – Where’s the Party
o Main Argument: Signigicant party effects are rare
o Correlation-causation problem:
Observes that just because party affiliation is correlated
with voting behaviou does not necessarily mean that
party CAUSED the voting behaviour
o Evidence:
Party behaviour in assignment of members to standing
committees and conference committees. Finds Majority
party status is a weak predictor of committee
assignments
Ansolabehere
o Main arguemnet: BOTH MCs party affiliation andpreferences
do matter
o Evidence: statistical analysis in which MCs preelection
preferences are measured using candidate surveys
o Finding
Party exerted an independent effect on members voting
behaviour in roughly 40% of roll calls taken during 103,
4, 5th congress
Jump seen on graph is called the ‘Party effect’
Cox and McCubbins
o Main Argument: Maj. Party contrls house’s agenda and uses
agenda control to
Block bills that majority of majority party opposes
Promotes bills taht they favour
o Key Assumption
MCs delegate power to their party leaders who take
action to build and maintain a desirable party brand for
re-election purposes
o Evidence
Eg. Committee roll calls
4/5628 bills that the majoirty of the majority party
opposed were reported from the committee to the
floor. (Democratic majority)
←← Summary
General motivations and incentives
o Fenno, Mayhew, Hall
Constituency
o Clinton, Bartels
Party
o Krehbiel, Ansolabehere, Cox and McCubbins
Organized interest – later class
Presidency and Bureaucracy 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Recap:
Filibuster – West Wing “Stackhouse filibuster”
o Essentially just means that you need 60 votes, not a simple
majority to pass anything in the Senate
Clinton – 1 unit change is more highly related to change in
Republicans in 106 (majority) congress.
o Could this be because Reps are appealing to their base, while
Dems are trying to bring more people into the fold?
Cox and McCubbins
Congressional Committees
o Joint and Conference (from both houses)
←← Main questions
←← Selection
President and VP are only nationally elected offices in fed gov’t
Details of selection process are complex
Not exactly popular vote, but a weighted popular vote (Electoral
College)
← Succession
President
o Vice-president
Speaker of the House
President pro tempore of Senate
Cabinet Secretaries
← Removal
Impeachment
o Treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors
o 2 steps
House votes to impeach
Charged with a crime
Majority vote
Trial in Senate
Can convict and remove by 2/3rds vote
← Powers in three categories
Executive
o Chief administrator
o Appoints heads of civil service depts and ambassadors,
subject to Senate approval
o Commander-in-chief of armed forces
Cannot declare war themselves, but once war has been
declared, the president is in charge
o Empowered to negotiate treaties, subject to Senate approval
Legislative
o State of Union address (weak proposal power)
o VP as tie-breaker vote in Senate
o Executive orders: nominally clarifications of laws already
passed by Congress
To direct civil service to a particular type of action
o Signing statements
Attaches a statement when it signs a bill into the law. A
way where the president can pick and chose which parts
of the law they want to follow
o Presidential veto, subject to congressional override
Judicial
o Appoints federal judges, subject to Senate approval (includes
senatorial courtesy and holds)
The president is expected to consult with the Senators
that the appointment is being made in, and to appoint
someone they like
o Direction of activities of the Justice Dept.
Some leverage over what they choose to litigate,
defend
o Pardoning power
← Historical Evolution
Tradition (Founding to 1930s)
o Relatively weak executive
o Position dwarfed by legislative power of Congress
Modern (1930s to Present)
o Same constitutional powers as during traditional period
o Now greater public expectations, greater role of government
Ebb and Flow of Presidential Power
o Serpent returns
o Considerable delegation of Congressional power to FDR during
Great Depression
o Vietnam War – alleged abuses by president caused Congress
to enact new laws to decrease power of president
o Bush/Cheney seek to revive muscular presidency (theory of
unitary executive, where all executive power is concentrated
in the president)
← Strategy
Persuasion of MCs, state official, etc.
Going public
o Seeks to get what they want from other politicians by
leveraging public support
o Contingent on presidential approval ratings
← Kernell bumpersticker
Act of going public by presidents increased a lot since 50s and 60s
Tension between going public and Neustadts opinion of behind the
scenes bargaining
←← Group discussion
Persuaded:
Can going public/threat be effective
Good or bad thing?
o Bypassing?
Is the public incompetent? Does it matter
←← Presidential Success
Divided government: president is different party than one/both
houses
o Much more successful at having bills that the president
supports passed when government is united (legistlative
program)
←←
← Bureaucracy
Key point: both president and congress compete for control of the
bureaucracy MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM
In the US: certain presidential appts (eg. Heads of departments) are
subject to congressional confirmation, congress holds the purse
strings, congress engages in oversight
In Canada: PM had free hand in appointment of heads of depts.
o This same type of multiple principal problem doesn’t exist in
Canada, where the bureaucracy only has one master
← US Cabinet
15 cabinet level departments
← Executive Office of the President (EOP)
Fed bureaucracy that is under the direct control of the president
Office of Management and Budget
o National Security Council
White House Office
← From Lewis, in Kernell and Smith
Because the president cannot be assured of the loyalty of the
burreaucracy, the president politicizes the burreaucracy
o Career bureaucrats and political appointments
← Moe 1985
Key point: President is driven by expectations gap to pursue
responsive competence (in response to president’s political needs)
How is responsive competence achieved
o central policy making in White House (bring the decision
making power closer to himself)
o appoint officials all over the federal bureaucracy, based on
loyalty, ideology and programmatic support
Rudalevige (2002)
o Centralization is contingent on political environment and
policy
Lewis (2008)
o Politicization hasn’t changed over time, nor with republicans
← Moe 1989
Key point: Federal bureaucracy is not designed to be effective (267)
Underlying logic of Moe’s argument?
Contrast with Canada – should we expect Canadian bureaucracy be
better designed?
o Yes – because we don’t have the issue of multiple principals,
so the PM SHOULD be able to just fix the problem.
← Who is the most powerful chief executive? PM or President
←← Richard Neustadt (1960) – gov’t of separated institutions SHARING
powers
←←←
Judiciary 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Outstanding questions:
What constitutes a majority in congress?
o IT depends – simple majority of both houses is a quorum
o Sometimes you need a super majority of not just those
present, but of all member
What is a treaty for the purposes of senate approval (while the
same technically, but go through different routes)
o Treaty – approval of the senate
o Executive agreement – just the approval of the president,
does not need the senate
Conference committees – mechanism by which two houses
reconcile – each house only has one vote in the process (decided
upon by the majority of each house)
Iraq war – powers to declare war (congress) vs. exercise way
(president)
o Was a congressional approval of war in 2002
← Recap
Presidency
o Contemporary presidents have high levels of public
expectation, but also have constitutionally limited powers
Incentives to pursue non-traditional strategies
o Competition between presidency and bureaucracy (responsive
competence)
Prompts president to politicize the bureaucracy
Appoint bureaucratic heads who agree with the
president’s agenda
Facilitates inefficient agency processes
← Big questions
What drives judiciary decision making? Why do judges rule as they
do?
Given what we know about what drives decision making Congress
and the courts – who should be making laws? Does it matter?
← Judiciary
Lots of kinds of laws
Laws can come from several different institutions
o Statutory laws
o Administrative laws
o Executive orders
o Judicial decisions
2 separate court systems
o federal courts
powers to fed government in constitution
o state courts
powers reserved for state governments in constitution
State Courts
o Most legal action is at the state level (Barbour and Wright)
o Some variation in structure and selection processes across
the 50 states
o Usually 3 tiers
Court of original jurisdiction
Intermediate courts of appeal
State’s supreme court (decision final, unless entails a
federal question, then can be appealed to federal court
system)
o Selection
Not appointed for life, but elected or appointed for a
certain time period
Judicial elections often means election campaigns
o Face some kind of regular election – 3 common types
Partisan elections
Run with a partisan label
Non partisan elections
Run without partisan labels
Retention elections
Incumbent judge runs for reelection without
partisan label or challenger (wins if he gets a
certain % of voters continue to support him)
o Canes-Wrone et all (2010)
Trend over time
Partisan>non-partisan>retention
Which election system do you think is most likely to
favor judicial independence (from public opinion)
Main argument: retention elections will not insulate
judges from pressure to cater to public pressure. In the
context of modern judicial campaigns (with interest
groups). An absence of party label makes judges
susceptible to being characterized by one or two
isolated decisions.
If you dont know a lot about a candidate, then a
lack of label can be difficult to overcome, in the
face of a few well marketed decisions. If you have
a party label, then it gives more information about
values.
Data:
Abortion decisions
Findings
Retention election
10 pt increase in pro-life public opionion =
pro life decision increased by 8-10%
Non partisan elections
Positive relationship
Partisan elections
Almost no relationship, almost a negative
relationship
Conclusion
Contrary to conventional wisdom, retention
elections do not insulate judges from public
opinion on hot button issues, and in fact
creates greater pressure than a partisan
election system
K’s questions – does this control for judges who
are not seeking reelection, do term limits apply to
judges, why the negative relationship for partisan
elections
Federal Courts
o 3 tiers
federal district courts (94 districts, geographically)
US courts of appeal (12 circuits, geographically)
US Supreme Court (1 court, 9 justices, all based in DC)
considers only small fraction of cases
o The appellate courts DO NOT make any new judgements
regarding facts, but are concerned with how the trial judge
made decisions
o Selection
Appointed by president, confirmed by senate
Lifetime appointments on good behaviors
Basis of president’s selection
Electoral needs
Ideological compatibility
Libs vs. cons, constructionist vs.
interpretivist, activist vs. restrained
Merit (ABA reviews)
Reward
o Confirmation
Senatorial courtesy, not for USSC
Informal process
Increasingly politicized and partisan Senate
confirmation process
MALTZMAN (2005)
Purpose: examine confirmation process of lower
federal courts (district and circuit)
Data: length of confirmation, likelyhood of
confirmation over 25 years
Result: less likely to be confirmed, and more likely
to take longer to be confirmed now than 25 years
ago
Suggested causes:
Divided party control of White House and
Senate
Increased ideological distance between
parties
Partisan balance in federal courts (new
appts would tip in favour of 1 party)
Increased policy importance of federal
courts
Suggested Consequences
Vacancies may hurt performance of federal
courts
Politicized confirmation process may harm
legitimacy of courts
Partisan tension may harm senate
Acrimonious confirmation process may
discourage promising judicial nominees
KASTELLAC et al.
Main question: does public opinion influence
Supreme Court confirmation politics
Data: Senate vote and state-level opinion on
recent USSC nominees.
Finding: Greater home-state public support
increase significantly the probability that a
nominee with be confirmed.
50% public support = 50/50 chance of yes
vote from Senator, high quality nominee
low quality nominee needs 65% support to
have the same chance
o Canadian Comparison
CDN reflects a federal arrangement. But is more
integrated, than the American system
Criminal law is a federal jurisdiction
Provinces have some control over the structure of
the courts, but feds appoint and pay all superior
court judges. No confirmation process in Canada
(appointed by Cabinet)
Decision Making
o BAUM, LAWRENCE
3 dominant models
strategic model
Persue own policy prefs, BUT instead of
taking ideal point, they strategically modify
their opinion to:
o Secura approval of rest of court
o Avoid reversal on appeal
o Win the compliance of mass public
o Avoid provoking legistalture
Most widely used
Strategic in their choices
Pure attitudinal model
Pick the decision that most pleases them,
regardless of the other factors
Pure legal model
Interpret the law accurately, without
concern for their own preferences or the
desirability of the policies that results
No longer commonly accepted by Political
Scientists, as the decision making model of
judges
Critique of 3 models
All 3 assume that judges act solely on their own
interest in the substance of legal policy, but this
doesn’t make sense, because achieving these
goals is hard work, and subject to free-riding.
SO....discard this assumption
Main argument
Craft rulings to gain and maintain regard of
audiences that they care about. Their desire to be
liked by certain groups.
o Discussion
Do Scalia and Segal and Cover fit somewhere in these
three models? Where?
Scalia:
Does not want judges to rule on own policy
prefernces.
Prefers the pure legal model
Segal and Cover
Pure attitudinal model at the USSC level
← Segal and Cover (1989)
Main argument
o USSC judges’ policy preferences have large effect on their
votes
Evidence
o DV: votes on civil liberties cases
o Explanatory Va: policy preferences, inferred from content
analysis of editorial written about them between nomination
and confirmation
←←
← Regression questions to consider:
Do the variables measure the concept of interest well? Could they
be measured better? Would this produce a different results?
Are there omissions from the analysis that might change the key
inferences?
If a causal claim is being tested, is their hypothesis causal
mechanism clear? Does the step from A-B-C-D make sense?
Are the authors’ conclusions reasonable given their results?
(generalizability)
←← Scalia, A.
Where would he be placed?
o Very conservative
o Textualism – just the text, not concerned about intent
o Pure legal model of Baum
← Preview
Public opinion and representation
Talk about the analytic essay
Summarize Stimson et al.,
Druckman and Lupia.
Chapter 10 of B&W
Public Opinion 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Review from last class
What to do if there are an even number of justices sitting on the
USSC
o Majority of those present – so if there were 8 sitting, you need
5 to agree. Quorum of 6 to funtion
Life-terms at the USSC – what to do if a judge is debilitated
o No provision for removing a judge due to inability to preform,
much more likely now that they will do into retirement
Analysis of Kaplan - NYT
o How does the news relate to the course material?
Challenging constitutionality of a federal law – federal
court
interested parties, but not actual litigents, seek to
influence judicial decisions making by filing amicus
curiae briefs
President’s judicial powers: ability to direct the
department of Justice’s actions
Brain storming exercise re. judiciary
o Factors in judicial decisions
Attitudinal model
Pure legal model
Strategic attitudinal model
← How to write the analytic essay
2 stages
o When it comes to politics is the American puplic competent?
Why?
o If it is not competent, does it matter? Why?
o
← Public Opinion – Areas of Consensus
Beyond the fundamental setup of US govt
o No longer basic facts like we have been doing
o Will now talk about scholarly consensus and controversy.
←← Kinder - 1988
Sample survey is dominant measurement tool, but also as
weaknesses
American lack important political information (see Carpini and
Keeter)
Evidence of intolerance is ambiguous
o Tolerant in abstaract, less in specific situations
o Mixed if Americans have becomes more tolerant since 1950s
3 ingredients of opinions
o Material self-interest
Little evidence to suggest its important, but matters
more when teh cost/benefit is well publicized
o Attitudes towards groups
Opposition to social welfare programs derives from
hostility to towards the poor.
o Principles and Values
Individualism, equality, limited government
American are programatically liberal (specific
policies)
Don’t like it in the abstract, big pictures
Opinion and Action
o Campaign effects mixed
Dueling campaigns with competing messages
Durable party attachments
Large segments of public pay little attention
o Bigger effects when information flow is one-sided (only one
candidate is well-known)
Framing: a central organizing idea or story line
Priming: rendering certain consideration more prominent
Considerable evidence that framing, agenda-setting and priming all
strongly affect how cititzens form opinions
Elites attempt to prime and frame in order to shape public opinion
←← Druckman and Lupia – Preference Formation
Purpose: Review literature on how individuals form and change
preferences
o Dominant model of preference formation and change
Information-beliefs – evaluation (attitudes about an
object) – preference
Conclusion
o 1. Preferences are a result of individuals personal experience
AND interaction with his/her environment
o 2.Individuals process information using a memory-based
model
o 3.Middle attentive individuals are more susceptible to
preference change (Zaller 1992). Why?
Requires receipt and acceptance of message
Low-attentiveness don’t even receive teh message
High-attentiveness receive the message, but know
enough to generate internal counter-arguments
o 4. People are risk averse when it comes to politics: so
negative messages are more persuasive than positive
messages
o 5. Individuals evaluate source of information when updating
their beliefs and preferences
←←← Controversy #1 – Online vs. Memory Models
Memory Models - Zaller
o Main Idea: people base their evaluation on information that
they retrieve from long-term memory
o Examples
Individual receives information about a candidate
When prompted, searches memory for relevant
information and generates and evaluation, based on
what she remembers
o Variant
Limited processing capacity, evaluation is based on top
of mind information (easily recalled)
o Implication
Citizens are unlikely to have true attitudes (Drukmen
and Lupia)
People don’t have fixed, stable, coherent attitutdes, but
rather about how people search their memories
Online Models - Lodge
o Main idea
Base evaluations on a running taly
o How it works
Recieves information about a candidate
Retrieves her running taly from long term memory,
updates with new information, refiles in long term
memory, and eventually forgets where/how/that she got
the new information
Remembers the what, but not the why
o Implications
Ppl can’t remember or explain the basis of their
evaluation, so while initially informed, it might not
appear so at a later date
Preferences are more stable than accessibility-based
memory models
Which model is correct?
o Both are likely used, depending on context and political
sophistication
o ONLINE: believe judgment will be required later, MEMORY:
when not (Druckman and Lupia, Kinder)
o Some evidence that online processing occurs more often
among political sophisticates (Druckman and Lupia)
←← Controversy #2 – Competence
Many ways competence can be assessed
Essay reading highlights ONE major aspect of competence debate:
whether or not lack of political knowledge makes them incompetent
Essay reading
o Uncontroversial – lack of political information
o Very controversial – lack of information undermines
competence
Some reading aggress (Bartels, Carpini and Keeter,
Quirk and Kuklinski)
Ppl can get buy relatively well with other methods
Lupia 1994, Barbour and Wright
Political ignorance is not necessarily ignorant
Lupia 2007
o Note: Lupia et al. in a reply to early piece
Bartels: Homer gets a tax cut
Why did most American support large Bush era
tax cuts that mostly benefited the wealthy?
Argument: not because they were indifferent to
economic inequality, but because they didn’t
connect their concern for inequality with the tax
cuts
Data: 2002 ANES, asked several questions about
econ. Inequality and Bush tax cuts
Findings:
MANY american dont’ know if they support
tax cuts, but of those that do, 2:1 in favour
of Bush tax cuts
Hypothesis: Because they like equality
opportunity so much, they are willing to
accept economic inequality as a result
o Found wrong: widespread recognition
and disapproval of economic
inequality
Hypothesis: Support due to simple minded
and misguided consideration of self0interst
o Found: perception of own tax burden
was a good predictor of support for
Bush tax cuts, but perceptions of the
rich tax burden was not
Hypothesis: support due in large part so
misguided considerations of self-interest
o Found: rich families less supportive of
Bush tax cuts
o Those who wanted more government,
spending more likely to favor Bush tax
cuts
o Better informed, are less in favor of
tax cuts
Some readings have a helpful summary of the debate,
we must adjudicate which we find most helpful
←
← Controversy #3 – Partisan Bias
Definition
o No standard definition
o Ppl resist, or selectively ignore information which challenges
their partisan predispositions and loyalties
Findings
o Berelson (1954)
Perceive own candidates stand as similar to own, and
opponents stand as dissimilar, and this misperception is
stronger among partisans. A projection effect.
Gerber and Green (1998, 1999)
There is no partisan bias
Tracking aggregate level evaluation, across 3
groups, move at the same speed and direction
over time.
Bartels (2002)
Large aggregate differences between partisan
groups exist for many factual beliefs (objective
economic conditions during Reagan Admin.)
Gaines et al. (2007)
Theory: Complete updating
Reality-beliefs-interpretations-opinions
Data: Panel studies of university students. Asked
factual and opinion questions about Iraq war and
its conduct
Finding
Most respondents, regardless of PID, had
similar factual beliefs, their interpretations
of these facts differed across groups
← Controversy #4 - Representation
Interest Groups and Media 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Review of material
Consensus
o Lack important political information
o Self interest, attitudes towards groups, values, impact P.O.
o Middle-attentive most susceptible
Controversy
o Online vs. memory models
o Competence without information
o Partisan bias
← Controversy #4 – Representation
Manza and Cook – Public Opinion on Public Policy
o Large effects
3 types of evidence
quantitative studies
intensive, policy domain-specific, qualitative
journalistic accounts of politicians consumption of
polling data
o Small effects
o Contingent Effects
Relationships between po and pp changes depending on
institution, policy area, time etc.
← Stimson et al.
Does po influence pp?
Theory
o Indirectly
Electoral turnover, kicked out of office
o Directly
Rational anticipation, change to reflect, so they don’t
get kicked out office
Data
o Large surveys of p.o. and policymaking in House, Senate,
Presidency, USSC
Findings
o Changes in public opinion and public policy correspond over
time.
o
←←← Interest Groups
Groups with the same political goal, and unite to influence policy in
their favour
Many types of interest groups: economic, civil rights, public interest,
govts etc
← Collective action problem (free rider problem)
o Why join if I can benefit without joining
o Like in Baum, or Halls
Overcoming the collective action problem
o Selective incentives (member-only benefits)
Material benefits ( newsletter, discount)
Solidarity benefits (bonding with other members)
Expressive benefits (strongly expressive values)
Strategies
o Direct lobbying
Long-term contacts with congressional members
Expertise to MCs
Fundraising for MCs (max $5000.00)
Meet with bureaucrats
Litigate/intervene in court cases
o Indirect lobbying
Mobilizing membership or wider public to pressure
polticians
Akin to ‘going public’ strategy (Kernell)
Guest Lecture, Interest Groups and Media 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Deliberation in congress TEXTBOOK
Committee hearings
o Witnesses called and questioned
Committee Markups
o Amendments offered by both parties
Floor debates
o Final opportunity for amending by both parties
The textbook assumes that both parties have an equal opportunity
to amend and present their ideas on a bill.
← Increasing Partisanship
Change in the way that bills become laws.
o No a proposal is discussed, and introduced, but no may just
be written up behind closed doors, without the opportunity for
markups, and goes straight to the rules committee, followed
by a very limited debate
o Total majority domination of the process and content of a bill
← Speakers use Partisan Task Forces/Design Teams
Ad hoc informal groups to work in place of the committees.
Newt Gingrich – headed most task forces, and would be surrounded
by favored legislators and lobbyists.
Nancy Pelosi – first 6 bills presented were written behind closed
doors by favoured senior Democrats.
←← Legislative deliberation
Definition: gather, discuss and evaluate policy information to make
policy decisions (Quirk 2005) Runs along a continuum from one
extreme to the other.
One-party deliberation
o Speaker and likeminded colleagues
o Involves only majority party
Two-party deliberation
o Committee of jurisdiction
o Involves both parties.
←← Which conditions encourage one- and two-party deliberations?
H1: As parties become more polarized, the majority party will
control bill deliberations
H2: More 1-party bill deliberations when the majority party’s
support decreases. When it looks like its majority may be under
threat.
H3: Majority party will dominate deliberatsion more during unified
control.
o President becomes the ‘legislator in chief’, and congress
majority party wants to look like they support their president.
H4: R. control of House will lead to more 1-party deliberations than
D. control
o Republicans as daddy party, Dems as Mommy party
←← Findings:
Partisan polarization and electoral pressures encourage house
majority leaders to omit hearing and markups
o As the parties move further apart, the less likely it is for a bill
to go through a 2-party process
Contrary to Expectations
o 1. Bipartisan debate more likely in periods of unified control
Unified: Majority wants to avoid obstruction later, and to
have the president’s agenda enacted. If we allow open
debate, and involved the majority party, and then send
the bill to the house. IT is harder to justify a filibuster a
bill that the minority party has been thoughtfully
involved with.
Divided: Majority wants to put our strong bill initially to
boost its bargaining power, because they know that
most things will die. By pushing out the most extreme
bills possible, you will satisfy the debate, and you want
to start from the strongest possible position, knowing
whatever will make it into the final bill, will be diluted
down.
o 2. Republicans are more willing to engage in open debate
than Democrats.
Republicans have more party discipline, and are more
unified than democrats.
← Consequences of 1-party deliberation
1.Gridlock
o 21% less likely to be signed into law if they do not undergo
hearings.
2. Flawed Policy
o to evaluate 1-party bills, examine negative predictions before
enactment and then see whether prediction materialize
look at editorials on legislation before and after passage
o example: Iraq Reconstruction
2003, REPs pushed through 22 billion bill to rebuild
papers warned bill lacked sufficient oversight
concerns that crony capitalists would pocket money
without fulfilling contracts
9 billion disappeared and never recovered
5.6 billion diverted to security needs
contractors bribed US officials with cash and
prostitutes
← Conclusions
1. Sharp increase in partisan deliberations over the last 2 decades
2. Ideological divisions, electoral competition and divided
government all encourage one-party lawmaking
3. Partisan deliberation produces policy mistakes
←← Review of Material From Last Class
Brainstorming:
o Interest groups face the “Collective action problem” so they
offer selective incentives
o Interest groups can influence through Direct Lobbying and
Indirect Lobbying (like going public)
o Difficult to cleanly identify interest groups influence
←← Interest Groups
Disagreement about extent to which interest groups influence
policymaking, especially the extent to which interest groups “buy”
floor votes in Congress
Wright, John
o Argument
Fundraising structures of certain types of PACs
undercuts their ability to influence congressional roll
calls.
Political Action Committee – Fundraising arm of
interest groups
“If person X raises 10K at the local level for
candiate Y, who we don’t think is deserving, we’ll
support person X’s work. If we didn’t support
person X, next time, he might not raise the same
amount of money for us.
o Theory
PACs confronted by a paradox
Local, grassroots most effective way to raise
money
BUT this allows grassroots to influence allocation
of PAC contribution
Grassroots are AMATEURS, and they want money
to go to sympathetic, threatened MCs and
candidates, rather than those who are on the
fence, and might be swayed.
Structure limits the ability to deploy money effectively
o Findings
1. Larger contributions to sympathetic, needy
candidates rather than those in leaderships positions,
who are potentially influential
2. Contributions had miniscule effect on probability of
vote in selected key roll call votes
Hall and Wayman
o Argument
PAC money should be allocated in order to mobilize
legislative support and demobilize opposition,
particularly at the most important points in the
legislative process
Critique of Wright – looking in the wrong place, lots of
stuff happends before the bill gets to the floor, and the
extent that different members participate in bill
development
o Theory
Should be looking at participation at the committee
stage, not roll calls
o Findings
1. PAC contributions to supporters increased
participation in all three policy areas
2. In 2/3 policy issues, PAC contibutions to opponents
decreased participation, but change was not statistically
significant.
←← News Media
1. Does the American news media do an adequate job of informing
Americans about politics
← Motivation
80% of American reports consuming some kind of news on any
given day
BUT...in same survey, only 14% of Americans were able to correctly
answer 4 knowledge questions about news items
o 1. Majority part in the house
o post held by Eric Holder
o company run by Steve Jobs
o country with active volcano that recently disrupted air travel
Possible explanations for this apparent disjuncture – they consume
a lot of media, but don’t know a lot. Exposure vs. recall?
o 1. Problems of measures of exposure and knowledge
o 2. Online model – informed but lacking in recall
o 3. Media not doing a very good job
Threats to an informative media
o Ideological bias in reporting
o Commercial biases
Building and maintaining and audience
← Commercial Biases
← Lance Bennett
Arguments
o 1. 4 information biases that keep people from learning about
political events and see the big picture
o 2. Political actors take advantage of these traditional
informational biases
o 3. Ideological biases – more difficult to correct and less
dangerous than people think
o 4. Thematic, in-depth coverage would be better than episodic
coverage
4 information biases
o Personalization
Focus on actors involved at the expense of the big
picture, causes etc.
o Dramatization
Emphasized crisis, present rather than the future focus.
Personal scandal rather than institutional context.
Chronic issues go unreported as we lurch from crisis to
crisis
o Fragmentation
Stories isolated from each other, encapsulated, little
background provided, within and between reports
o Normalization
Officials promise return to normalcy, framing through
traditional values, demobilizes people rather than
becoming more concerned and active
Evidence: Secondary studies, anecdotes, and case studies
←←
Race, Gender and Politics
← Define AND give example of the presidential strategy of going public.
Examples should be from the readings. Try not to through out information in
word vomit. Be selective.
←← Returning to where we started with Smith in “Beyond Tocqueville”. Ebb
and flow. Many different traditions that work together.
←← Two key questions
← 1)How does race shape political preferences
Gilens, Martin. Race coding and White Opposition to Welfare.
o Like Kinder. Attitudes towards groups
o 1988 Willie Horton Attack ad.
o Research questions: Do white Americans’ racial attitudes
shape their posistions on “ostensibly race-neutral” welfare
policy?
o Define welfare: gov’t cheques in the mail.
o Argument: Literature has failed to consider racial views.
Focused instead on individualism and economic self-interest
o 2 types of evidence
phone survey
DV: support for welfare
IV: racial attitudes, poor attitudes, income etc.
Finding: Perception of blacks as lazy single largest
predictor
experiment embedded in a telephone survey
b/c measurement problems in traditional survey
Main finding: While avr. Belief about welfare
mother same in both treatments, neg. beliefs
about black welfare mothers associated with
much more negative view of welfare. Priming
race.
o Race does influence the levels of support for welfare
programs amongst whites.
Abramowitz. Triumph of Diversity
o B&W – Obama’s victory suggest that racism is on the wane.
o Preliminaries
20% White. 18% of Hispanics & Asian Americans said
the possibility of a Black president made them
uncomfortable.
Less that ½ of white americans voted democrats.
Lingering racial prejudice.
o Findings
Racial prejudice in high-school educated whites, had a
negative impact on the likelihood of voting for Obama.
Nonwhite share of US electorate increased from 13% in
1992 to 26% in 2008
o Conclusion
Growth in non-white electorate as a whole, helped
Obama out, as did the large margin he won in the non-
white population, to offset a minimal change in support
levels among White voters
← 2) How well are hisorically disadvantaged groups representd?
Griffin and Newman.
o 2 questions
Are white prefs better represetned than Latinos in
congressional voting
What affects relative representation of two groups
o Method
Make assumption sin order to place MCs and voters on
the same scale. (Roll call and phone surveys)
o Findings
1. White preferences are much closer ideologically to
MCs actions than those of Latinos to their MCs
← Macdonald and O’Brien.
Research question
o Do female of MCs better represetn women’s interest than
male MC
Problems
o Prev. work often omitted measures of constituency
preferences, potentially biasing effects of gender
Solution
o Sample pair where MCs where female preceded or succeeded
a male MC
Data
o # of sponsorships of feminist and social welfare bills
Findings
o Women, on average, sponsor more feminist bills
o Effect of gender on feminist bills contingent on number of
female MCs
Low number of women, similar number of sponsored
bills btwn men and women
More women, number of bills by women goes up, and
number by men goes down
Bumper sticker work 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← My house, my rules.
Cox and McCubbins. Setting the agenda.
← Angry voter driving to the polls
Valentino et al.
← Odds of being a judge – 50/50
Retention elections
← Where you stand doesn’t depend on where you sit.
Khreible. Where’s the party
← Attention! Breaking –
← Dems, Republicans & Independents. (rainbow)
←← Account of Tea Party movement. Nationally and in E. Mass.
Williamson. Tea party remaking republican conservativism
← Deliberative democracy was the concious creation of the founders.
Besett. Mild voice of reason
← Benefits available to members, not non-members
Material Benefits
← 1970 Congress polarization leading to party homogenity
Jacobson. Party polarization
← Ppl voted for tax cuts because they were incompetant and ignorant
Bartells. Homer gets a tax cut
← Open to amendment
Open rule
← Bureaucrats: Who’s your daddy? The president!
Moe. Polarized Presidency
← Are you scared of 6.5% of the workforce. The democrats are.
Wills. Obama and Big Labour
← Carston & Jenkins. Rub it in why don’t you.
Credit claiming.
← Don’t rush judgement
Maltman. Advice and consent
← Big happy family
Party in government
← Pick a team.
Closed primary
← Don’t blame us, we’re just responding to demands
Hamilton: Media and market
← I’m a D. What R you?
Party identification
← Washington one level, states another
Federalism
← You don’t get a say. Tough.
Closed rule
← We just arent into each other.
Fiorina. Polarization in US public
← Do what I say, or I go to the ppl.
Kernell. Going Public.
← Why did I convict you? Because I don’t like your face.
Segal and Cover. Ideological values on supreme court votes
← Opposites are opposites
Party polarization
← IIIII
Online modle
← Fox news missed a memo
Groseclose. Social science perspective on Media Biases
← Amateurs waste $
Wright. PAC
← B/C nobody like NJ
Great compromise
← Break a filibuster
Cloture
← Small states are over represented.
Leohardt. 1 ppl, 1 vote. Hardly.
← Politicians still learning to share: Fed vs. state powers
Kettle. Federalism battlelines
← Infotainment
Commercial bias
← Split power is stagnant power
Divided govt
← Passing means president
electoral college
← Spidey sense btwn elections (sorta)
Stimson et al. Dynamic representation
← I want you to want me
Baum. Judges and audiences.
Domestic and Foreign Policy 7/18/11 6:03 PM
← Argument: US foreign policy-making is influences by US domestic
politics and institutions
Tools used to understand domestic politics can be extended to
foreign policy making
←← Jacobs and Page. Who influences US Foreign Policy
Data: Survey of US foreign policymakers
Finding: Business leaders>experts>labor>public opinion, level of
influence on policy makers
← Bartels. Reagan Defense Build up
Data: MC voting behaviour and NES survey
Finding: in early 80s MCs vot on defense budget related to
constituency preferences.
← Will Georege: Obama and free trade: Appease big labor. Washington
Post.
Being in bed with big labour is driving foreign policy regarding free
trade. To the detriment of the American economy
← Rubenzer. Campaign Contributions and FP outcomes
Question
o Level that ethinic minority interst groups are able to influence
US FP.
Data/Method
o Contribution affects re 2005 cuban embargo.
Findings – contrary to Wright
o Campaign contributions from pro-embargo groups increased
likelihood of pro-embargo vote.
o Impact of campaign contributions on congressional roll calls
was more limited when vote concerned, clear, non-technical
and salient issues.
← Lieberman
Purpose
o Reexamine claim that pro-Israel foreign policy is caused by
the ‘Isreal Policy’. Collection of Jewish & Christians individuals
and organizations
Findings
o Small percent of contributions, and group so small that they
are statistically insignificant in elections. Eg. 2004 Bush win.