Post on 27-Dec-2015
transcript
US DOE/NNSA - INECP
InternationalNonproliferation
Export Control Program
Tim HastySavannah River Site
2
INECP Presentation Outline
• Overview, Mission, History
• Proliferation Risk and Assessment-Based Engagement Process
• Spotlights on Three Main Pillars of INECP Activity- Licensing- Enterprise Outreach- Enforcement
• INECP Today
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International NonproliferationExport Control Program
• Strengthen global efforts to prevent
proliferation of WMD-related
materials, equipment, and
technology
• Proliferation Risk Analysis in the Licensing Process
- Ensure the license review process competently assesses proliferation risks associated with end-uses and end-users, and ensure technical specialists are being utilized
• Government Outreach and Enterprise Compliance
- Assist governments to establish outreach programs and promote enterprise compliance at key enterprises and technology holders
• WMD-related Commodity Identification Training and reach-back for Customs
- Ensure enforcement personnel are sensitized to WMD-related materials and equipment, and have access to technical/analytical resources and support
MIS
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International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP)
• Threat- Networks of procurement agents, brokers, and companies
systematically maneuver around and through national export control efforts to obtain commodities and technology needed for WMD development and production facilities
• INECP Mission- Strengthen global efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD-related
materials, equipment, and technology
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Responding to the dynamic threat…INECP evolution over time
• 1990’s: - INECP helped create export control systems from whole cloth in the
Newly Independent States starting in the mid-1990s, focusing on the key nuclear suppliers- Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan
- Initial focus was on outreach to nuclear enterprises and the creation of licensing systems
INECP’s approach is based on identifying, training, and developing a cadre of technical/nonproliferation specialists in each partner country that can sustain that
country’s export control system over the long term
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Responding to the dynamic threat…INECP evolution over time
• 2000’s:- Systematic threat assessment drove geographic expansion
- 1st phase of geographic expansion took the program to the transit states adjacent to the “big-3” nuclear suppliers:- Caucasus, Central Asia, Baltics
- 2nd phase (post 9/11), recognizing the threats of procurement networks, non-state actors, weak links in the regime, and secondary suppliers took the program global:- Asia Pacific, Middle East, Europe, Americas
- Systematic vulnerability assessment drove topical expansion- Recognition that effective export control systems depend not only on
licensing and enterprise compliance, but also on the ability of frontline enforcement agencies to interdict illicit trade, led to development of Commodity Identification Training (CIT)
INECP’s Country Plans implement these systematic assessments
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INECP’s Global Proliferation Risk Assessment guides country selection and prioritization
• Risk is based on Threat and Vulnerability
- Threat = Supply Threat and Conduit Threat- Supply Threat = capacity to supply CBNM-related goods- Conduit Threat = Geostrategic position and trade flows
- Vulnerability = Export Control System defects- Three elements necessary for export control system effectiveness- Licensing- Enterprise Compliance- Enforcement
- Defects in any of these system elements create opportunities for proliferators
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• Threat = Supply Threat and Conduit Threat
- Supply Threat = capacity to supply CBNM-related goods
- Conduit Threat = Geostrategic position and trade flows indicate access to goods and opportunities for diversion
Measuring Proliferation THREAT
Potential Supply Threat Potential Conduit Threat
5Clear capacity to provide the most vital and sensitive items
and know-how.
Suspected/known NW program or possesses enrichment or
reprocessing facilities
Military producer of Cat 1 systems and/or posesses
ICBM capabilitySuspected/known CW program Suspected/known BW program
4 Ability to provide more sensitive items and know-how
Produces/Supplies nuclear fuel cycle faciliites (NSG TL)
Space launch program or produces MTCR Cat I systems
Schedule 1 chemical production capability or legacy
CW program
Declared or suspected biodefense program or BW
legacy program
3Clear capacity to supply many
of the relevant dual-use commodities and technology
Produces/Supplies NSG DU items
Produces MTCR Cat II systems or subsystems
Produces/supplies Schedule 2 chemicals or AG DU chemical
production equipment
Bio-related DU equipment supplier
2Ability to provide at least some strategic commodities on the multilateral export control lists
Nuclear technology holder Active aerospace industry
Produces/supplies unscheduled or Schedule 3 chemicals or utilizes them in
domestic industry
Active biotech or pharmaceutical industry
1 Virtually no capacity to supply the necessary goods
None NoneMinimal capability for producing
controlled chemicalsMinimal capability for producing
bio-agents
GENERALNuclearSupplier
MissileSupplier
ChemicalSupplier
BiologicalSupplier
5 Regime Insider*Significant trading partner with
countries pursuing WMD programs
4 Significant trading partner with a regime insider*
Operates a Free Trade Zone**
3 Geographically adjacent to a regime insider*
Major transit/transshipment hub
2 Adjacent to a country pursuing WMD
Significant international trade relative to GDP
1 Isolated Minimal trade
Geo-strategicposition
Trade Flows
*
**
"regime insider" includes members of the NSG, MTCR, or AG, as well as countries inside a customs union or open market with a regime member
"free trade zone" encompasses the broader category of special economic zones, including free ports, export-processing zones, special economic zones, etc.
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Measuring VULNERABILITY
- Defects in any of these system elements create opportunities for illicit procurement- Licensing- Enterprise Compliance- Enforcement
1 2 3 4 5
No licensing process and no dual-use control lists
Licensing agencies/process identified and rudimentary
control lists in place
Ad hoc links between technical expertise and licensors
employed to review licenses and Control lists consistent NSG Part 1 or AP Annex II.
Dedicated/trained groups of nonproliferation technical
specialists capable of reviewing DU licenses are used and
control lists consistent NSG Part 2.
Competent proliferation risk evaluation, including end
use and end user analysis and ontrol lists consistent
NSG/MTCR/AG/WA.
No inventory of enterprises Enterprises identified;
Guidelines PromulgatedOutreach happening but not to
all key enterprises
US-supported, indigenously-staffed outreach to key
suppliers
Self-sustainable, indigenous outreach at all
key enterprises
No training or no technical expertise available
Basic export control training for enforcement officials and Technical Experts Identified
CIT indigenization underway and
Ad hoc referrals to technical experts
Ongoing US-supported CIT and regularized reachback between front line and technical experts
established
Indigenous and locally customized CIT established
and Technical experts trained and equipped to
provide support as requested
En
terp
rise
sE
nfo
rcem
ent
WMD/DU Training and Reachback for
Customs
Government Outreach to Industry
Proliferation Risk Analysis in Licensing
Process
Lic
ensi
ng
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The combination of threat and vulnerability guides INECP’s country selection and prioritization
INECP Global Risk Assessment
New Zealand
Iceland
Vietnam
AUS
HK
Croatia
ROK
Macedonia
KAZTurkey
US
S&M
Singapore
Indonesia
Azerbaijan
Japan
Ukraine
India
Philippines
Kyrgyzstan
Brazil
Argentina
Canada
SF
Jordan
MalaysiaThailand
Armenia
Mexico
Georgia
Taiwan
Russia
EU
Israel
Pakistan
China
UAE
0%
50%
100%
0% 50% 100%
Proliferation Threat
Sys
tem
Vu
lner
abili
ty
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Tailored ENGAGEMENT
• For each country engaged, INECP tailors its approach according to the assessed deficiencies in the three export control system elements
• The Evaluation and Planning Matrix diagnoses the export control deficiencies that INECP can most effectively target and identifies specific offerings to address those deficiencies
• This matrix forms the basis for all of INECP’s annually updated Country Plans.
1 2 3 4 5
Met
ric No licensing process and no dual-use control lists
Licensing agencies/process identified and rudimentary
control lists in place
Ad hoc links between technical expertise and licensors
employed to review licenses and Control lists consistent NSG Part 1 or AP Annex II.
Dedicated/trained groups of nonproliferation technical
specialists capable of reviewing DU licenses are used and
control lists consistent NSG Part 2.
Competent proliferation risk evaluation, including end
use and end user analysis and ontrol lists consistent
NSG/MTCR/AG/WA.
INE
CP
Offe
rings Tech Exchange
Proliferation Awareness Workshop
Gap Analysis
ELAN
End Use/End User Training I
Share DOE Handbooks/Guidebooks
Multilat Workshop I
Contract with tech experts
TEWG
NSG Outreach Workshop
End Use/End User Training II
Multilat Workshop II
Develop/Deploy Automated License Review
Maintenance
Met
ric
No inventory of enterprises Enterprises identified;
Guidelines PromulgatedOutreach happening but not to
all key enterprises
US-supported, indigenously-staffed outreach to key
suppliers
Self-sustainable, indigenous outreach at all
key enterprises
INE
CP
Offe
rings
Tech Exchange
Proliferation Awareness Workshop
Identify/train cadre to conduct outreach
Indigenous enterprise study
Government-industry seminar
Outreach dataproducts/websites
Site-specific, industry-specific, or regional
outreach workshops to:1. nuclear suppliers2. nuc tech holders
3. AP Annex I Activities4. WMD DU enterprises
Site-Specific Workshops
Handbook Development
Negotiate transfer of responsibility
Maintenance
Met
ric No training or no technical expertise available
Basic export control training for enforcement officials and Technical Experts Identified
CIT indigenization underway and ad-hoc referrals to
technical experts
Ongoing US-supported CIT and regularized reachback between front line and technical experts
established
Indigenous and locally customized CIT established
and Technical experts trained and equipped to
provide support as requested
INE
CP
Offe
rings
CIT Short-Course
Identify potential sources of tech expertise
Trade Flow Analysis
Technical Exchange
Develop Training Plan
Share CIT Instructional Materials
CIT Instructor Training
Share DOE Handbooks/Guidebooks
Nonproliferation/Tech Training (e.g., ELAN)
TEWG
Contract with tech experts
Conduct needs analysis for tech tools and guides
Contract development of indigenous guides
Collaborative CIT Pilot Course(s)
Deploy/train advanced tools (Vision Vest, XRF, etc)
Maintenance
Pro
lifer
atio
n R
isk
Ana
lysi
s in
Lic
ensi
ng P
roce
ss
Lic
en
sin
gE
nfo
rce
me
nt
WM
D/D
U T
rain
ing
and
Rea
chba
ck fo
r C
usto
ms
Gov
ernm
ent O
utre
ach
to In
dust
ry
En
terp
ris
es
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Three Pillars of INECP activity
Major Activity Who Why What
LICENSING
Licensing Officers and Analysts
Need to conduct competent proliferation risk analysis in the licensing process
End Use and End User Analysis Training (EUEU)
COMPLIANCE
Managers of public sector & legacy WMD enterprises, labs, manufacturers, etc.
These major technology holders are targets of opportunity for proliferants
Enterprise Outreach
ENFORCEMENT
Customs Officers and other enforcement personnel
Widespread ignorance regarding strategic commodities
Commodity Identification Training (CIT)
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Spotlight on LICENSING
• End Use/End User (EU/EU) Analysis focuses on strengthening the ability of analysts to uncover suspicious procurement activity and assess proliferation risk.
• Analysis of Strategic Commodity Transfers (ASCOT) helps analysts better understand multilateral controls, including the commercial and WMD applications of listed commodities.
Stated End Use
Commodity
Activities of the Consignees
(including stated end user)
history of diversion?
connections to entities of concern?
proliferation concerns or WMD activities associated with the end user country?
stated end use is a direct proliferation concern?
reason for control?
proliferation concern associated with this commodity?
commodity categorized correctly?
commodity appropriate for the stated end use?
(Quantity, specifications…)
stated end use makes technical sense?
stated end use consistent with the activities of the stated end
user?
existence and activities of the end user confirmed?
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Spotlight on Enterprise Outreach
• Our unique value added- Implementing compliance programs at US National Labs- Intangible technology control- Technical understanding of the control lists, commodities, WMD
programs, acquisition networks
• Our niche- Public sector, tertiary enterprises and legacy WMD sectors (nuclear,
missile, chemical, biological)- INECP’s flexibility has also allowed us to quickly respond to partner
government requests for assistance when other agencies cannot
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Spotlight on Commodity Identification Training• CIT gives inspectors “a trained eye” by familiarizing
them with the materials, components, and equipment sought by WMD procurement programs
• CIT simplifies export control lists by grouping items into technology “bundles” and by aiding recognition through a focus on physical appearance, using pictures and demonstration kits:
- Equipment- Fabricated Parts and Components- Electronics (Components and Equipment)- Industrial Equipment- Systems and Subsystems
- Materials- Structural Materials (metals and non-metals)- Special Materials (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological)
• Indigenization strategy- INECP follows a disciplined indigenization approach
based on our technical partnerships to establish ongoing training programs and reachback capabilities
CIT deployment is underway in 25 countries
Alloy Analysis with XRF provides capability to determine element composition of alloys and other controlled materials
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CIT Implementation Experience
CITConductedCITPlanned
CANAD A
UNITED S TATE S O F AMERI C A
MEXIC OCUB A
JAMAICABELIZE
DOMINICA NREPUBLICHAITI
PUERTO RICO
GUATEMALA
COSTA RI CA
NICARAGU A
HONDURA SEL SALVAD OR
PANA MA
COLOMBI A
VENEZUEL A
TRINIDAD &TOBAG O
GUY ANA
SURINA
M
FREN
CH G
UIAN
A
ECUADO R
BRAZI L
PER U
BOLIVI A
PARAGUAY
ARGENTIN A
URUG UAY
CHIL E
FALKLAND/MALVINA SISLAND S
GREENLAN D
ICELAN D
NORW AY
SWEDE NFINLAN D
DENMAR K
UNITEDKINGDO M
IRELAN D
FRANC E
LUXEMBOUR GGERMAN Y
ESTONIALA TVI ALITHUANI ARUSSI A
POLAN DBELARU S
UKRAIN E
S P AIN
PORTUG AL
CZEC HRE P.
AUSTRI ASWITZERLAN D
ITALY
SLOVENI A
CRO ATIA
SLOVAKI AHUNG ARY
SERBI ABULGARIA
ROMANI A
MOLDOVA
ALBANI A
GREEC ETURKE Y
CYPRU S
MOROCCO
WESTER NSAHARA
ALGERI ALI B Y A
TUNISI A
MAUR ITAN IA
SENEGA LGAMBIA
GUINEA-BISSA UGUINEA
SIER RA LEO NELIBERI A
MAL I
BURKIN AFASO
IVORYCOAST
TOGO
BENI
N
NIGERI A
NIGE R CHA D
EGYP T
SUDA N
ERITRE A
ETHIOPI ACENTRA LAFRICANREPUBLI C
CAMEROONEQUATORIA L
GUINEAGABON
CONG O ZAIR E
RWAN DABURUND I
UGAND A KE NYA
SOMALIA
ANGOL A
NAMIBI A
ZAMBI A
TANZAN IA
MALAWI
ZIMBABW E
BOTSWANA
MOZAMBIQUE
MADAGASCA R
SWAZILA ND
LESOTHOSOU T H AFRI CA
MAURITIU S
RƒUNIO N
GEORGIA
ARMENI A AZERBAIJA N
SYRI A
LEBANO NISRAE L
JORDAN
IRA Q IRA N
SAUD I
AR ABI AQATAR
UNITEDARAB
EMIRATES
OMAN
YEME N
INDI A
AFGHANI STAN
PAKISTAN
TURKMENI STANUZBEKI STAN
KYRGYZ STAN
TAJIKISTAN
KAZAKH S T A N
SRILANKA
NEPALBHUTAN
BANGLADES HBURM A
LAOS
THAILAN D
CAMBODI A
VIETNA M
MA L AYS I ABRUNE I
PHILIPPINE S
TAIWAN
INDON ES I A
PAPU ANE W
GUINE A SOLOMONISLANDS
FIJIVANUA TU
NEW CALEDONI A
AUSTRALI A
NEWZEALAN D
RUSSI A
MONGOLI A
NORTHKOREA
SOUTH KOREAJ A P A N
CHIN A
HONG KONG
ANDORR A
BOSNI A-HERZEGOVIN A
BAHAMAS
GHANA
MACEDONI A
SINGAPOR E
MALTA
GALAPAGOS
ISLANDS
North I .
South I.
Newfoundlan d
South Georgia
W E ST
IN
DI
ES
CANARYISLANDS
E
AS
T I N D I E S
ME
LA
NE
SI
A
A L E U T I A N
S VALBA R D
Z E M LY A F R A N T S A I O S I FA
No
va
ya
Z e m l y a
S E V E R N A Y A
NOVO SIBIRSK IV EOS TRO VO
HAWAIIANISLANDS
I S L A N D S
Z E M L Y A
C ommodi ty Id entif i cati on T ra i nin g
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INECP Today:• International Mandates bolster INECP’s timeliness and significance
- UNSCR 1718 (sanctions on North Korea) benefited by INECP strategic commodity identification training in sensitive destinations surrounding North Korea (e.g., China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Japan)
- UNSCR 1696 (calling upon States to “to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of an items, materials, goods, and technology that could contribute to Iran’s …programmes”) benefited by INECP commodity identification and other export control training to potential suppliers and transit points: Cyprus, the European Union, Jordan, etc.
- UNSCR 1540 includes provisions that reinforce INECP’s three pillars:- Improve Licensing Procedures & Practices: 3.(d) “Establish, develop, review and
maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items…as well as establishing end-user controls…”
- Promote Industry Compliance: 8.(d) “To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;”
- Strengthen Enforcement Capabilities: 3.(c) “Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat…the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items…”
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INECP Today:
• We are THE recognized experts in Strategic Commodity Control - CIT fills a critical need, and demand has far exceeded all
expectations- The recognized need for CIT affords INECP ready access to a wide
range of countries that would not otherwise accept “export control assistance”
• Confidence in INECP results in Outreach Partnerships- Japan, Australia, EU- Technical Experts Working Groups
• Regional institutions extend INECP’s reach and contacts- Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC)- Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)- European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC)