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The stand-out development countrywide
during the past fortnight was the spectacu-
lar attack launched by Harakat al-Shabaab
al-Mujahedin (HSM) militants against the
Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi,
the largest asymmetric operation the
group has ever staged inside Kenya. The
incident, a Mumbai-style ‘assault and siege’
operation, was the realisation of an objec-
tive held by the Somali group since Ken-
yan military intervention in Somalia in
2011; from that time onwards, HSM has
been attempting to demonstrate to the
Kenyan government and people, as well as
the large foreign national presence here,
that this intervention—seen by the group
as violating the religious and political free-
dom of Somalia—would come with blow-
back.
With more than 60 people, the majority
civilians, dead and almost 200 injured—
and more expected to be found during the
ongoing forensic investigation—this is the
most serious instance of Islamist militancy
in Kenya since the 1998 bombing of the
US embassy, and is therefore a major coup
for HSM. However, it is unlikely that it
represents a decisive shift in the security
environment of Nairobi or the wider
country. Such high-impact acts of militan-
cy are rare for a variety of reasons, includ-
ing cost, likelihood of detection, and post-
incident governmental learning.
As such, we are highly unlikely to see fur-
ther such attacks even in the medium
term. Instead, it is much more probable
that HSM, after a period of quiet, will try
to launch more of the small-scale opera-
tions for which it is best known in this
country, which are easier and less risky,
but allow it to demonstrate a continued
presence in Kenya in spite of security
force actions to deny and disrupt them.
Evidence of this approach was already
visible during the period, with a HSM at-
tacks on police in the North East’s Man-
dera town shortly after the Westgate inci-
dent. Unusually for attacks on this nature
in the province, HSM publicly claimed
responsibility for the Mandera attack,
clearly to capitalise on attention they had
garnered during the Nairobi siege.
Also in the North East, two NGO facili-
ties were attacked with small arms in sepa-
rate incidents in Dadaab, although they
were both attributed not to HSM but to
armed criminals. Yet that in itself is prob-
lematic, as part of a recent increase in the
willingness of non-HSM local actors to
use violence to settle social and commer-
cial grievances, particularly in relation to
the presence of non-local Kenyans.
INSO Kenya is Supported
By
Confidential - NGO use only
No copy, forward or sale
© INSO 2013
COUNTRY SUMMARY
REPORT:
16-30 Sept 2013
The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) is a registered charity in England & Wales
no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737
KEY POINTS
HSM attack of unpre-
cedented scale on West-
gate shopping centre in
Nairobi
Elevated level of HSM
activity in North Eastern
in wake of Nairobi at-
tack
Armed criminality targe-
ting NGOs in Dadaab
INDEX
Nairobi 2
North East 6
Coast 9
Rift Valley 10
Map References 11
INSO Info Page 12
KENYA Issue 21
Page 2 The INSO Report - Kenya
Nairobi Metropolitan Region
Armed Siege of Westgate Shopping Centre
In the past fortnight, for the first time since 1998, Nairobi
found itself the scene of a major instance of Islamist militan-
cy, when more than a dozen al-Shabaab militants launched a
Mumbai-style assault and siege against the upmarket Westgate
shopping centre on September 21st.
At approximately 1240hrs on Saturday, during the peak com-
mercial period, 10-15 militants armed with assault rifles and
grenades stormed into the shopping centre through its three
Total Incidents 377
NGO Incidents 12
main entrances, firing coolly but randomly at civilians—
although subsequently allowing those who could demonstrate
they were Muslims to go free.
Before the first group of governmental security responders
arrived, more than two hours later, many of the more than 60
fatalities (of which one was a Kenyan NGO staff member), and
175 non-fatal casualties, had already been inflicted. Many oth-
ers also remained trapped inside, including staff and/or family
from four NGOs, having managed to hide themselves inside
shops, bathrooms or other locations in the building. And by
this time, the attackers are believed to have already taken doz-
ens of hostages.
KDF-Led Breach Operation
Thus began a three day siege inside the complex, which, in
spite of repeated attempts by a KDF-led force, could not be
broken. The attackers were understood to have holed up in
two separate locations—inside the large Nakumatt supermarket
on the ground floor, and in a premises on the second floor—
from where they effectively repealed multiple penetration at-
tempts over the coming days, using professional sniper and
Nairobi Met. Region Cont.
small unit tactics to do so.
The first minor success scored by the KDF-led force, which
was backed up by foreign military advisors, were the release
of three hostages on Monday. However, by this time it was
also becoming clear to the security forces that the assailants
were much better prepared, both tactically and logistically,
than had been initially thought, meaning that this minor suc-
cess was unlikely to translate into a decisive end to the stand-
off. Security force suspicions from that time that the attack-
ers had in fact pre-placed equipment such as weaponry, am-
munition and explosives were ultimately validated; a vehicle
was later found in the basement car park that had been there
for more than a month, and used as an armoury for the at-
tackers during the siege.
As such, by Monday afternoon, the KDF had determined to
use stronger tactics to get inside and end the situation. To
start with, the force lit a generator located to the rear on fire
on Monday afternoon, to divert the assailants’ attention while
attempting to breach at the front of the complex. This is not
thought to have succeeded, and this led to much of the de-
struction inside the Nakumatt.
On Tuesday, with the siege into its fourth day and no defini-
tive gains made in penetrating the Nakumatt stronghold, the
Kenyan military made a fateful decision. After considering
and abandoning other options, the army is believed to have
decided to rig and detonate an explosive device which col-
lapsed the ceiling and upper floors of the Nakumatt on the
attackers, none of whom are thought to have survived.
While the government stated, on September 30th, that they
believe there were no hostages remaining at the end of the
siege after all, this is impossible to believe and inconsistent
with what was understood during the siege, with Red Cross
estimates at the time of writing suggesting that 39 people re-
main missing. This number may fall, but it is extremely un-
likely that it will fall to zero.
Parsing HSM’s Responsibility
That being said, there remains significant opacity regarding
even some of the basic details of the incident, including the
number and fate of the attackers, their national origins, and the
precise group responsible.
On the latter subject, while al Shabaab has claimed responsibil-
ity, what this means in practice remains unclear. It is likely that
al Qaeda, with whom al Shabaab has rhetorically (and in some
ways, operationally) aligned itself, were involved at the manage-
ment level, perhaps assisting in training, target selection and
operational protocols such as filtering out Muslims.
Similarly, it is likely that the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), also
known as al-Hijra, played some role, either indirect or more
immediate. On the one hand, it is believed that at least some of
the attackers were non-Somali Kenyans, which, if true, would
strongly point to MYC involvement in the recruitment stage at
the very least, given their central role in recruitment for al Sha-
baab within Kenya. However, it is also probable that the MYC
was more directly involved, for example in facilitating weaponry
and operatives in Nairobi, and even perhaps at the operational
management level.
However, at its core this is understood to have been an al Sha-
baab operation, launched in a manner consistent with their es-
tablished operational parameters inside Kenya. It is moreover
faithful to their oft-asserted strategic intent with regard to the
Kenyan government; since KDF military intervention in Soma-
lia in 2011, al Shabaab has consistently stated that it is seeking
to strike inside Kenyan territory for the purpose of demonstrat-
ing costs to this military mission. And this was precisely the
message communicated via public channels by senior HSM fig-
ures as the Westgate incident was ongoing.
In this way, the underlying message HSM intended to com-
municate with this attack is identical to that of its previous but
smaller kinetic operations in Kenya. All that differed, therefore,
in this operation was the scale of its ambition—an ambition
that, through a high degree of tactical sophistication (even with
simple weaponry), information security, and willingness to tar-
get civilians, was powerfully realised.
Absence of Forewarning
Most significantly, the attack seems to have come out of the
Page 3 The INSO Report - Kenya
Nairobi Met. Region Cont. 2
blue, with no real forewarning on the part of domestic or
foreign security agencies. While reports are circulating at the
time of writing that there was some prior knowledge of an
impending attack, this was very generic information about
HSM intent vis-à-vis Kenya, and would not have allowed for
any specific operational response by the security forces. As
such, as so often with large attacks such as this, there appears
to have been no meaningful detection of the operation all the
way up until it was launched on the morning of the 21st.
Nairobi’s Security Environment
Even if the information had been somewhat less generic, the
nature of Nairobi’s security environment makes it very diffi-
cult to take concrete security precautions in the absence of
highly specific information of an impending attack. The city,
a wealthy economic and political hub which is also home to
highly deprived areas within city limits, is also just hours away
from the Somali border. As such, since the KDF interven-
tion in Somalia, Nairobi has existed in a kind of inverse
‘Goldilocks Zone’, where there are sufficient threats from
HSM that the environment cannot be called truly permissive,
but where there is sufficient normal life to make operational
responses to general threat warnings of HSM intent extreme-
ly difficult to implement.
Absent a total shutdown of much of the city—an inconceiva-
ble measure—the most plausible response to general threat
warnings would have been to detail multiple armed teams at
major facilities throughout the city, such as hotels, shopping
centres and governmental complexes. However, it can be
very difficult for governments to take such decisions, because
of concerns over causing popular panic, and because of the
financial and logistical implications of such a decision
(especially for Kenya’s badly under-resourced security sector).
The is particularly the case if the threat warning is not time-
bound.
As such, the best the government can do in this inverse
‘Goldilocks Zone’ is to focus on pre-attack detection and
disruption. Indeed, since 2011 the government has had an
excellent record in detecting and disrupting HSM activity in
the national capital; about half a dozen major HSM operations
had been defeated, as well as some minor ones, missing just
three significant kinetic incidents (two IEDs and a grenade at-
tack) during 2012.
However, it is not possible to stop every attack. And equipped
with that knowledge, al Shabaab is likely to have specifically
chosen to use simple weaponry, thereby lowering the chance of
being detected, as well as to have chosen a soft target such as
the Westgate, where superficial and ineffective security
measures, such as simplistic sweeps of bags with metal-
detecting wands, and cars with mirrors on wheels, would not
offer any credible defence against a highly motivated and well-
trained groups of militants.
Security Force Response
After such a game-changing incident as this, the response by the
security forces will be multi-faceted. For one, they have already
begun search and arrest operations in eastern parts of the city
where HSM and affiliated networks are long known to have a
presence. On the 28th, APTU led an operation in Majengo to
arrest MYC-affiliated youths, arresting 38, and further such op-
erations in eastern Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa can be ex-
pected.
Furthermore, an enormous expansion of security force weapon-
ry, gear and vehicles has begun, in what it still a nascent process
but which is expected to be the single largest up-grade to Ken-
ya’s police and security force capabilities in the past two dec-
ades. A numerical expansion of the police was already in the
pipeline after the March elections, but it is expected that this
process will be quickened, all pointing towards a much more
visible, operational capable security sector. This may include
private security companies too, who are now pushing for a
change to the current law that prevents them using firearms or
wearing body armour.
The Humanitarian Community Response
Many NGOs are currently asking themselves the question of
what this attack means for them, and their presence in Kenya.
Page 4 The INSO Report - Kenya
Nairobi Met. Region Cont. 3
Much of the answer depends on whether this was an outlier
in the prevailing security environment, or instead marks the
beginning of a new trend of such large-scale, civilian-focused
militancy in urban Kenya.
For INSO, the answer is the former. Large-scale operations
like this are expensive—probably somewhere between
$50,000-$100,000—and are therefore necessarily a rarely used
weapon in the arsenal of groups such as al Shabaab, particu-
larly in an area of secondary importance to them such as
Kenya is. Furthermore, attacks such as this have a high
chance of failure through detection, given the scale of activi-
ties needed to prepare and implement them. The history of
such large plots in Nairobi demonstrates this; of the estimat-
ed half dozen since 2011, this is the first to have gotten
through. It is, by contrast, much easier to launch a small-
scale attack, such as a hit-and-run grenade or SAF attack,
without being detected. As a result, low-impact operations
tend to be high-frequency for militant groups like al Shabaab,
just as high-impact operations tend to be low-frequency.
Moreover, the powerful shock this will have delivered to the
government—in terms of re-evaluating its defence prepared-
ness and the scale of the threat posed by HSM—will have
been expected by HSM; groups in their strategic position usual-
ly know that in the wake of such an effective, high-casualty at-
tack, it is much better to rest on your laurels for a time, rather
than attempt another.
Much more likely, therefore, than an attempt at a further large
attack, is that—after a period of quiet to protect against the
governmental response to the Westgate incident—al Shabaab
will engage in a number of smaller, easier operations. These
would allow them to demonstrate their sustained presence in
Kenya, in gloating defiance of post-Westgate governmental ef-
forts, without the attendant risks of losing money and men to a
security sector eager to score a retaliatory win against them.
Indeed, some of this has already been seen in the North East
during the period, with an attacks on a police target in Mandera
(see North Eastern for further details), which was publicly
claimed by al Shabaab in a way not common for the group be-
fore the Westgate incident.
As such, the threat environment for NGOs in Nairobi in the
wake of this attack is highly likely to default to its pre-attack
paradigm; that is, of widespread armed criminality and infre-
quent low-level HSM activity in the eastern districts of the city.
Page 5 The INSO Report - Kenya
North Eastern Province Total Incidents 390
NGO Incidents 35
For one, the targeting profile in these incidents is somewhat
different from the typical pattern of HSM’s kinetic activity.
For example, the perpetrators did not target public locations
frequented by non-local Kenyans, such as tea shops or restau-
rants—an established HSM targeting pattern—but instead
focused their efforts on economic targets.
Also of note, to the best of our knowledge there was no com-
munication from HSM to the targeted NGO of an impending
attack, a fact which is inconsistent with known parameters of
their behaviour vis-à-vis the NGO community (although there
is not a strong history of this to draw on in the North East).
In Somalia, HSM typically writes a letter to an NGO or makes
a public statement, warning of its displeasure and demanding
a change in behaviour or location, before they would choose
the kinetic option.
Moreover, a HSM assault can be expected to be more deadly.
While the attack on the 26th demonstrated little regard for
human life, neither was it a determined attempt to kill NGO
staff. The assailants did not use great deal of ammunition,
Humanitarian Community Incidents
This reporting period witnessed one of the most serious attacks
upon an NGO in Dadaab since INSO commenced operations,
when, on September 26th, an unknown group of men attacked
an NGO compound in Dadaab’s IFO 1 camp using small arms
and explosive devices. Lasting approximately ten minutes, the
attack primarily targeted the mess hall where a number of staff
were watching television, though residential tents and rooms
were also hit. Fortunately, no NGO staff members were seri-
ously injured as a result of the incident.
On September 29th a second, somewhat similar attack occurred,
targeting an NGO construction site in Dagahaley in the early
evening. A grenade was thrown into the site, where a non-local
construction company sub-contracted by a local company to
build a primary school for an NGO was working. In the inci-
dent, five non–local Kenyan builders were injured, with no
NGO staff were onsite at the time of the incident.
HSM Authorship?
Seen in the light of the HSM attacks on Nairobi’s Westgate
shopping centre, and on Wajir and Mandera police positions
during the fortnight (discussed below), these events are very
concerning. However, while HSM involvement in these inci-
dents is possible, it is very unlikely. Instead, both incidents are
much more likely to have been driven by community or crimi-
nal considerations.
Page 6 The INSO Report - Kenya
North Eastern Cont.
their explosive devices did not fragment, and they did not
enter the compound to press the attack. The attack on the
29th did inflict significant casualties, but again, this disregard
for the welfare of its targets does not exclude non-HSM ac-
tors from potential responsibility, and the tactical simplicity
of the incident also points away from HSM.
Non-HSM Kinetic Activity in Dadaab
Instead, it is much more likely that both of these attacks were
community or criminally driven, because of the presence of
non-local Kenyans and their social and commercial activities.
Socially, non-locals are mostly non-Muslims, and local dis-
pleasure has previously been publicly communicated over
such issues as the playing of loud music and concerns about
sexual relations with local women.
The attack on the 26th is likely connected to this dynamic.
However, it is notable that there was no communication of
grievance from the local community immediately prior to the
attack on the 26th (either through letters, meetings or demon-
strations), indicating that it was probably the work of a small,
independent and perhaps professionally criminal section of it.
Commercially, the Dadaab camps have a history of criminally
motivated kinetic attacks on both NGOs and non-local busi-
nesses, mostly in response to dissatisfaction with things like
contract and employment choices, anti-corruption measures,
and commercial competition.
For example, an attack that took place in January of this year
against an NGO then operating in IFO 1, injuring one staff
member, is believed to have been programme-related. Simi-
larly, grenade attacks on non-local Kenyan contractors, in
Hagadera in 2012 and Dagahaley in 2011, were understood to
be about commercial competition. The limited socio-political
sway and significance of non-local private sector companies
in Dadaab, when compared to the UN/NGO community for
example, reduces the potential blowback on their assailants
and therefore makes them much easier to strike.
The incident on the 29th—primarily affecting a non-local
company, although involving an NGO—exhibited strong
similarities to this pattern of criminally motivated attacks.
Implications for NGOs
Yet, the potential emergence of a pattern of contractual or em-
ployment dispute resolution through violence is arguably a de-
velopment of equal concern to HSM targeting, and would, giv-
en the frequency of such disputes in Dadaab, present a signifi-
cant risk to NGOs operating in the camps, and particularly to
their non-local staff.
Formerly, while widely thought a permanent possibility, the use
of violence during contractual or employment disputes was
more sporadic in Dadaab; the Dadaab camps have a large
NGO residential footprint, mostly non-local Kenyan staff who
have lived alongside refugees since the 1990s, for the most part
without incident. From the start of 2013 up to August this
year, only a single instance of such use of violence was record-
ed.
However, three occurrences have been observed since the start
of August, each with key characteristics in common: non-local
Kenyan presence in the camps and sensitivity over contractual/
employment issues. As such, there has been a notable increase
in this type of activity in the past two months, even if during
this period other disputes between NGOs and the local com-
munity—some involving prolonged tension and sizeable dis-
turbances—did not erupt into actual violence.
While incidents of violent direct action against NGOs are so far
isolated to those humanitarian organisations operational in IFO
1 and may very well be unique to that camp, their specific pro-
grammatic cause remains unclear. This lack of clarity regarding
a specific driver is concerning, and emphasises the need for
other organisations, particularly those operating in IFO 1, to
take prudent steps to minimise potential vulnerability.
While it is too early in this nascent trend to say that this repre-
sents a definitive change in the security environment faced by
NGOs, the community would be well advised to review its ac-
ceptance strategies, both generally and as they pertain to resi-
dential compounds, ensuring that, amongst other things, music
and television is kept to acceptable volumes and times; that
alcohol is not overtly consumed; and that staff maintain posi-
tive and appropriate relations with the refugee and host com-
Page 7 The INSO Report - Kenya
North Eastern Cont. 2
munities, particularly with local women.
In addition to acceptance, NGOs should also review security
in residential compounds more generally. This would include
ensuring the presence of first aid kits and trained responders;
developing reaction plans to armed attacks on camps, cover-
ing a variety of scenarios and drilling staff on them; ensuring
the wide dissemination of emergency numbers, particularly
the nearest deployable police units; and developing the physi-
cal security of compounds, particularly in regard to maximis-
ing cover from view.
HSM Activity in Mandera
On September 26th at 0240hrs, HSM operatives attacked the
Central AP Camp in Mandera using small arms, RPGs and
grenades. During a 30 minute gun battle, they killed one po-
lice officer and wounded two, incurring one casualty them-
selves. One of the wounded officers later succumbed to his
wounds. The attack caused considerable destruction to the
camp, seriously damaging two buildings and destroying a
large number of cars. Not long afterwards, HSM claimed the
attack on Twitter.
Elements of the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) conducted a
seemingly punitive operation on the afternoon of the 26th,
assaulting a number of people in the Miraa market and forci-
bly closing businesses. Following on from suspicions that
the perpetrators of the 26th escaped to Ethiopia, the Ethiopi-
an security forces have reinforced their border crossing
points and are conducting checks of guest houses and visitors
in villages and towns close to the border.
There was considerable apprehension in Mandera in the lead
up to the attack, which came on the back of a series of HSM
operations in Mandera in September, predominantly focused
on the town, but also including an attack on a police post in
remote Harer-Hosle. That campaign caused serious damage
to public confidence in the security forces and local govern-
ment officials. Furthermore, police actions in the wake of
earlier attacks, which included arresting a number of taxi
drivers only to release them for a fee, served only to reduce
their standing further. Anecdotal reporting from the area
indicates that, as a result, many members of the public are re-
luctant to cooperate with the police, fearing either extortion
attempts or that that they themselves will come under suspi-
cion.
It is very likely that one of the primary aims of this attack was
to reinforce the impact of Westgate. HSM attacks in Mandera
spiked sharply in September, witnessing six in the course of the
month, against an average of one per month in 2013, excepting
the election period in March. It is unclear if this increased op-
erational focus on the town is coincidental or has a direct con-
nection to Westgate. The attack on the 26th was widely reported
in the international media however, somewhat adding to the
sense of insecurity in Kenya, thus achieving the aim outlined
above.
Located right on the Kenya-Somali border, Mandera is proba-
bly the easiest major town that HSM can strike in Kenya. The
movement has active service units operating around nearby
Bulo Xawa/Garbahaarey and it enjoys considerable support
amongst sections of the Marehan clan in neighbouring Gedo
Region. Thus HSM units can conduct hit and run attacks
against security forces with relative ease, using tactics honed
against SNA and ENDF forces and exploiting the border to
prevent pursuit. Furthermore, the daily cross border flow of
goods and people between Mandera and Bulo Xawa allow for
easy infiltration to carry out more asymmetric attacks.
It remains to be seen however, if HSM can maintain its opera-
tional focus on Mandera into the medium term. It is under
some pressure in Gedo, which may distract it from less immedi-
ate targets, though the organisation may well maintain their fo-
cus, aiming to further reinforce a Kenyan sense of insecurity.
While the campaign is ongoing, attacks on police stations in
Mandera town, or in remote areas, will present the most risk to
NGOs; as will police responses, such as nervous gunfire or pu-
nitive police operations. IEDs and targeted killings, while a risk,
have so far caused little in the way of collateral damage.
Page 8 The INSO Report - Kenya
Coast Province Total Incidents 132
NGO Incidents 1
regard to combatting this Islamist militancy in the Coast,
which ultimately contributes to al Shabaab’s numbers inside
Somalia, is weakness in the judicial system. This is thought to
be the reason why some leading Islamists have been killed
rather than captured in recent years, and this fate is likely to
be shared by Makaburi, once the immediate focus on the
Westgate and its authors dies down. However, as in Nairobi
such kinetic actions against the group is unlikely to lead to its
death—perhaps instead galvanising the group’s anti-state
agenda.
Security Force Activity
Away from Westgate-related developments, September has
seen the security forces continue their focus on drug-related
activity impacting the Coast. There have been a number of
arrests of criminals for drug-dealing in Kilifi, and seizure
there, in Mombasa, and in Kwale, in the past six weeks. The
security forces take a very intolerant approach to this sort of
activity, making it worth avoiding if one is enjoying some
coastal holiday time.
Coastal Fallout from Westgate Incident
With the militant assault on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, it is
likely that post-incident security focus will also turn to the
Coast, where the Muslim Youth Centre (or al-Hijra), an affiliate
of al Shabaab, has long maintained a presence. While there is
no conclusive proof of these suspicions thus far, the Centre, or
MYC, is believed to have been involved in the Westgate inci-
dent in some capacity; either indirectly—through recruitment—
or more directly through facilitation and use of its urban Ken-
yan infrastructure, which is focused on Muslim-majority parts
of Nairobi and Mombasa, by the attack team.
Already in Nairobi, an ATPU-led operation in an MYC area on
September 28th led to the arrest of 38 individuals, and it is likely
that the security forces are looking to their existing profiles of
the group to identify individuals of interest in Mombasa too. In
this port city, the north-eastern district of Kisauni has a well-
established MYC presence, with significant numbers of Ken-
yans from across the country known to have been radicalised in
the district’s mosques and to have subsequently crossed over to
Somalia to fight on behalf of al Shabaab. Indeed, the only Is-
lamist figure in Kenya to have spoken out in support of the
Westgate incident has been the cleric popularly known as Maka-
buri, an MYC-affiliated man self-identified as sympathetic al
Shabaab and al Qaeda, who is partly based in this part of the
city.
What such operations might mean in practice remains unclear,
as much of the problem that the security forces have had with
Page 9 The INSO Report - Kenya
Rift Valley Province Total Incidents 277
NGO Incidents 10
Going forward, the current pastoralist conflict in the North
Rift has not led to significant alteration of the security envi-
ronment in the region, with the latest attacks largely taking
place in the traditional hotspots. However, the onset of de-
layed dry spells will likely alter regional security dynamics, like-
ly leading to an increase in roadside banditry as affected com-
munities seek alternative livelihoods to augment depleting
livestock numbers.
For the past one month, cattle rustling activities have been
largely concentrated in the four counties of the North Rift:
West Pokot, Samburu, Baringo and Turkana. These counties
also continue to register the majority of inter-communal clashes
in the region, mostly revolving around cattle theft, with other
conflict-prone counties such as Elgeyo Marakwet and Trans-
Nzoia progressively registering a decreasing percentage of all
the incidences recorded in the region in the past one year.
During the past fortnight, the three main protagonists in the
conflict—the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana—each carried out
the same number of raids, at three each. All the attacks were
targeted against settlements occupied by rival communities, and
focused on the region’s rustling-prone areas, such as Pokot
North, Samburu North, Turkana South and East Baringo—
where different communities border with each other.
However, the latest attacks don’t represent a significant escala-
tion in pastoralist conflict in the North Rift. Rather, they serve
to highlight the persistent nature of the conflict in the region, as
well as highlighting the emerging trend in pastoralist conflict;
that of minors herding livestock being abducted or killed during
such raids. As an example, the attack against Pusol village in
West Pokot by the Turkana on September 17th, and the two
attacks perpetrated by the Samburu at Nalingangor village and
against a settlement near Baragoi town on September 28th, all
together resulted in the killing of three teenage girls. A teenage
Samburu boy and girl were also shot and critically injured in
Baragoi Division on the 18th and 27th respectively, in attacks
perpetrated by Turkana raiders.
Page 10 The INSO Report - Kenya
Legend
Data sources - Administrative boundaries: OCHA; Incidents reported: INSO.
Mapping - With the kind assistance of ACTED
Data, designations and boundaries contained on the maps included in this report are not guaranteed to be error-
free and do not imply acceptance by INSO.
Map References
The INSO Report - Kenya Page 11
CONTACTS & INFORMATION NOT INCLUDED THIS PERIOD:
Western, Eastern, Central and Nyanza Provinces
These areas will be included in subsequent reports. If you
have any information that would help us better understand
the dynamics, please contact your local INSO Kenya office.
ADVISORY BOARD:
INSO Kenya is overseen by an NGO Advisory Board.
If you have any questions or feedback, good or bad, let
them know on: advisory.ken@ngosafety.org
REGISTRATION:
NGOs can register up to five persons to each of INSO
mailing lists. For a registration form please contact-
registration.ken@ngosafety.org
CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (NAIROBI)
Central Regional Safety Analyst: Rory Brown,
central.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 288 409
Central Counterpart: Julius Kiprono,
central2.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 289 730
NORTH REGION OFFICE (DADAAB)
NEP Regional Safety Analyst: Sean McDonald,
north.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 289 571
NEP Counterpart: Abdullahi Dimbil,
north2.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 288 392
COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (NAIROBI)
INSO Kenya Director: Neil Barriskell,
director.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 729 205 005
Admin: Christine Kariuki,
admin.ken@ngosafety.org +254 (0) 712 295 203
COMMON ACRONYMS
ACG - Armed Criminal Group AOG - Armed Opposition Group
AP - Administration Police ATPU - Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
GoK - Government of Kenya GSU - General Service Unit (Police)
HSM - Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen IAF - Irregular Armed Forces
IDF - Indirect Fire IED - Improvised Explosive Device
IO - International Organisation KDF - Kenyan Defence Forces
KPR - Kenyan Police Reserve KWS - Kenya Wildlife Service
MRC - Mombasa Republican Council MY - Mombasa Youth
NMI - Nyuki Movement for Independence NYS - National Youth Service
RDU - Rapid Deployment Unit (Police) RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
RTA - Road Traffic Accident SF - Security Forces
TTP - Tactics, Techniques & Procedures UXO - Unexploded Ordnance
www.ngosafety.org
Circulation of this report for non-commercial
purposes is permissible only with prior
permission.
Please contact director.ken@ngosafety.org INFO
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