Research Report

Can a Dominating Orientation Enhance the Integrativeness of Negotiated Agreements?

Debra L. Shapiro andJ(Srn Rognes

A dominating orientation is commonly viewed as an impediment to inte-

grat,'ve negotiation. However, a study of Norwegian and American negotia-

tors shows that a dominat ing orientation may, in fact, enhance the

integrative nature o f some negotiations under certain circumstances.

Implications for managers and negotiation trainers are discussed.

F o r the and conflict literature has years, negotiation management c a u -

t i o n e d that a dominating orientation to negotiation hinders the achieve- ment of mutually satisfying, "integrative" agreements (see e.g., Rahim and Bonoma 1979; Thomas 1992). Negotiators with a dominating orientation view the issue under dispute as one that cannot be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. They believe that there must be a winner and a loser, thereby insuring that discussion or negotiation will be characterized by power- related communications (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1989), and that the most convincingly powerfifl party will emerge as the winner (see Lewicki et al., 1994, for a review). This orientation (or stylistic preference) is believed to escalate conflict and impede participants' ability to engage in col~borative behavior (Rahim 1992; Ury et al. 1989). Many training programs for negotia- tors (such as the popular short courses offered by the Program on Negotia- t ion at Harvard Law School) there fore emphas ize the impor t ance of abandoning a dominating orientation if the goal is an integrative agreement.

D e b r a L S h a p i r o is Associate Professor of Management at the Kenan-Flagler Business School of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27599-3490. J 6 r n R o g n e s is Associate Professor of Management at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Breiviken 2, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway.

07484526/96/0100-0081509.50/0 © 1996 Plenum Publishing Corporation NegolgattonJournal January 1996 81

Contrary to this thinking, we found in a recent study that a dominating orientation actually enhances the integrativeness of negotiators' agreements under certain circumstances -- namely, when the negotiators are American rather than Norwegian, and when the negotiators are involved in group rather than dyadic transactions. These findings have practical significance since managers are increasingly engaging in: (1) group (or team) based trans- actions, due to businesses' shedding of traditional hierarchical structures; and (2) cross-cultural transactions, resulting from such political and business events as the GAFF, NAFTA, the enlarged European Union, and the techno- logical revolution that has helped to globalize the marketplace.

M e t h o d o f S t u d y ~

The study's participants were 248 business graduate students (126 Americans and 122 Norwegians), 38 percent of whom were female. The average age of the participants was 32, and the average work experience was eight years.

Before participating in a simulated negotiation exercise, either as a dyad or as a group, the participants read a description of a conflict episode. They then responded to a series of questions that assessed their dominating orien- tation, using questions from the Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventory-2 (Rahim 1983). This questionnaire also asked participants the extent to which they expected the upcoming negotiation to be characterized by competitive behavior. (Consistent with Hoftsede's [1984] cultural descriptions, the Amer- ican negotiators expected more competitiveness than did the Norwegian negotiators.)

The Negotiation Exerc i se The negotiation exercise for both dyads and groups was a "scoreable game" that required negotiators to agree on the terms of various issues that would comprise a business contract. The game was typical of the negotiation exer- cises that are generally used in integrative negotiation research (see empiri- cal reviews by Pruitt 1981; Neale and Bazerman 1991).

Negotiators' preferred terms were reflected in a "net profit schedule" which showed them how much profit was associated with each of the possi- ble terms on each issue. All negotiators were instructed to negotiate an agreement that gave them as much profit as possible.

The challenge in the exercise comes from the fact that each negotiator's net profit schedule is different; thus, terms one negotiator may prefer to obtain (because they are associated with more profit) may be terms that another would prefer to avoid (because they are associated with little profit). The net profit schedules are designed so that more integrative agreements occur when negotiators "logroll," that is, trade concessions on lower-priority issues in exchange for concessions on higher-priority issues (see Pruitt 1981 for an elaborate discussion of integrative bargaining tasks).

8 2 Shapiro and RtJgnes Dominating Orientaffon

Measures and Analyses As is customary in integrative negotiation research, the integrativeness (degree of mutual satisfaction) of negotiators' agreements was measured by summing the profits each negotiator made with their agreement.

To examine the relationship between dominating orientation and the integrativeness of an agreement, we first created an aggregate measure of dominating orientation by adding the scores of the individuals making up each negotiation dyad and group. The aggregate variable (which we call dominating capacity) differentiated dyads and groups in terms of the inten- sity of dominating forces. Using correlation and regression analyses, we then examined the relationships between dominating capacity, culture, and agree- ments' integrativeness in dyads and groups.

F i n d i n g s

The complete findings are reported in Rognes and Shapiro (1995). This arti- cle highlights the relationships (rather than their statistical derivation), which led us to conclude one thing with certainty: It is time to reexamine current assumptions regarding the effect of dominating orientation on nego- tiators' ability to reach integrative agreements.

T w o C u l t u r e s , T w o D i f f e r e n t R e s u l t s

Consistent with current thinking, higher levels of dominating capacity appar- ently reduced the integrativeness of Norwegian negotiators' agreements. But among the American negotiators, the reverse pattern was observed: higher levels of dominating capacity apparently increased the integrativeness of agreements. Consequently, the effect of dominating orientation on dyadic negotiation seems to depend on which culture a negotiator comes from.

One explanation for this finding is based on Hofstede's (1984) finding that Americans are more "culturally masculine" and more "individualistic" than Norwegians, characteristics that are generally associated with higher levels of competitiveness and self-oriented behavior ~ o g n e s 1994). Con- versely, Hofstede's cultural study found Norwegians to be more "culturally feminine" and more "collectivistic" than Americans, characteristics that are generally associated with higher levels of cooperation and collaboration (Rognes 1994).

Integrative bargaining behavior requires negotiators to look for solu- tions of mutual gain, and therefore solutions that give each side better than a compromise (or merely 50 percent of their aspirations). Thus, the greater individualism of Americans relative to Norwegians may make Americans more likely to feel comfortable rejecting a compromise solution (in favor of a more integrative solution).

Similarly, according to the results of this study, American negotiators may be more comfortable (or less offended) when they see negotiation

Negotiation Journal January 1996 83

counterparts rejecting their proposals, and in this sense, acting in a dominat- ing fashion. A greater comfort level with dominating (noncooperative) behavior would, in turn, ease negotiators' ability to keep the negotiation focused on the problem rather than the person (see Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991), and thus, their ability to find integrative agreements.

Rubin's (1991) description of "enlightened self-interest" as the appro- priate approach to integrative bargaining supports our inference that engag- ing in, and tolerating, dominating behavior (e.g., rejecting compromises) is an important antecedent to finding integrative agreements. Rubin describes the approach of enlightened self-interest to be one in which: (1) negotiators are motivated to get the best possible deal for themselves; (2) negotiators expect the other party to think likewise; and therefore (3) negotiators try to fiflfill their own interests by also satisfying the interests of the other party. Notice that the latter point is based not on an altruistic motivation but on the serf-interest-oriented motive Rubin mentions first.

The likelihood that Americans are more comfortable than Norwegians in negotiating with more competitive behavior, such as that expressed in "enlightened self-interest," is supported by our finding that the American negotiators expected the negotiations to be significantly more competitive than their Norwegian counterparts. This finding highlights an aspect of inte- grative bargaining that we believe has generally been neglected in the negoti- ation literature: It requires confrontational behavior (e.g., refusing to accept a compromise); therefore, integrative bargaining includes some elements of dominating behavior• Rognes and Shapiro (1995: 13) elaborate on this point, saying:

• . .too often descriptions of integrative versus distributive [domi- na t ing-o r i en ted ] ba rga in ing behav io r sugges t tha t t he se approaches are mutually exclusive rather than overlapping; and erroneously, that there is no place in integrative behavior for expressing confrontive statements•

Recognition of the overlap that exists between integrating and dominating behaviors leads, similarly, to a conclusion that a n integrat ing or ien ta t ion includes s o m e e l e men t o f a d o m i n a t i n g orientat ion: both share a n expec- tat ion o f confronta t ion a n d a need to pro tec t one's o w n interests. Thus, the good consequences typically associated with an integrating orientation are also possible with a dominating orientation. Our findings, in fact, show that American negotiators achieved more integrative agreements when they had a dominating orientation.

Why, then, did a dominating orientation no t assist the Norwegian nego- tiators in this study to find more integrative agreements? The answer may possibly lie in the cultural norms directing negotiators' judgments about what is appropriate conduct (see Raiffa 1982)• The more competitive norms associated with American culture may make Americans fear appearing weak

84 Shapiro and ROgnes Dominating Orientation

if they do not engage in competitive behavior; thus Americans may view competitive (dominating) behavior as appropriate. However, among Norwe- gians, whose cultural norms emphasize cooperation and consensus (Elder, Thomas, and Arter 1988), it is likely that a dominating orientation will be seen as inappropriate, and thus lead to destructive negotiation processes.

In the future, managers preparing for negotiations may benefit by not- ing that the effect iveness of their or ientat ion toward the negotiat ion depends on the culture they are about to transact with. Negotiation training programs should thus qualify that the ideal orientation toward a negotiation may depend on the cultural background (and consequently norm expecta- tions) of the negotiation participants.

D y a d s a n d G r o u p s

Within each culture, we examined the relationship be tween negotiators' (aggregate) dominating orientation and the integrativeness of their outcomes in dyadic and group negotiations. Among Norwegian negotiators, dominat- ing capacity was negatively related to the integrativeness of agreements in dyadic negotiations (and thus dominating apparently had unproductive effects in two-party exchanges); but it was positively related to the integra- tiveness of agreements in group negotiations (and thus dominating appar- ently had a p roduc t ive impact in group-based t ransact ions) . Among American negotiators, domJnating capacity was positively related to the inte- grativeness of agreements in both dyadic and group negotiations; and the Americans achieved more integrative agreements than Norwegians in both the dyadic and group negotiations.

One possible explanation for the consistently positive effect of dominat- ing orientation in group negotiations is that such behavior helps groups " . . . engage in energetic problem solving and confrontation in order to explore solutions that might improve their joint outcomes" (Kramer 1991: 313). Kramer has theorized that groups who instead have " . . . excessive concern about maintaining high esprit de corps or avoiding conflict may tend to set- fie on relatively inferior compromises . . " (p. 313), and thus, less integrative agreements.

Consistent with Kramer's thinking, our fmdings suggest that negotiators from Norway as well as the United States who engaged in some confronta- tion enhanced the integrativeness of their agreements. Relative to Norwe- gians, the greater competi t iveness of Americans, as found by Hofstede (1984) and our study, makes it likely that more confrontation in exploring solutions occurred in the American than in the Norwegian groups. This com- petitiveness might explain why negotiators in American rather than Norwe- gian groups achieved more integrative agreements.

However, this explanation fails to explain why in dyadic negotiations, dominating orientation hurt the integrativeness of Norwegians' agreements. Earlier, we suggested that the cultural norms of Norway may discourage Nor- wegian negotiators from engaging in any form of noncooperation, such as

Negotiation Journal January 1996 85

refusing compromise offers. Drawing from Kramer's (1991) theorizing, it is possible that these cultural norms are overshadowed in groups - - but not in dyads - - because of the greater information-processing complexity which results from a group's cognitive or "computational" demands (e.g., How can you resolve multiple individuals' needs and concerns?) and the greater "social complexity" of groups (e.g., how can you express what you are think- ing and listen to the ideas of other group members at the same timeO. The cognitive and social complexity of groups may make whatever dominating behavior Norwegians may have observed in their group negotiations more acceptable than would normally be the case in dyadic exchange.

Another possible explanation for why a dominating orientation hin- dered the integrativeness of Norwegian negotiators' agreements in dyadic negotiations is that when the negotiation consists of only two parties, a dom- inating orientation can more easily devil the negotiation process since there are no additional negotiators who may serve an occasional mediation-like role when they see the negotiation headed toward stalemate.

Why, then, did a dominating orientation enhance the integrativeness of American negotiators' agreements in dyadic (as well as group) negotiations? One explanation that evolves from the findings of this study is that the Amer- ican negotiators expected a more competitive interaction than did the Nor- wegian negotiators; consequently, whatever dominating behavior Americans may have observed was "norm-conforming conduct," which Elgstr6m (1990) has observed is efficient in negotiations.

Because of their cultural normative differences, another explanation may be that in dyads comprised of Americans, the power-oriented communi- cations typically associated with a dominating orientation (see Ury et al. 1989) are more likely to be reciprocated, or at least acknowledged, hence "neutralized" (Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991). Fisher et al. say that neutralizing dominating tactics is one means of enhancing the likelihood of finding inte- grative (win-win) agreements.

Although reciprocating power communications can often escalate con- flict and lead to impasse (Pruitt and Rubin 1985), facing stalemate may spur each side to find ways to better satisfy their partner in order to reach agree- ment. Negotiators would be less likely to face a potential stalemate if one responded to another's dominating tactic with capitulation rather than with a dominating tactic. The former rather than the latter response would be more likely, however, from someone wishing to avoid confrontation, such as a negotiator from a culturally collectivistic and culturally feminine society, such as Norway (Hofstede 1984).

Our finding, and the explanations just offered for it, highlight - - again - - that the effect of a dominating orientation on negotiators' outcomes may depend on the cultural background of the participants (e.g., are the nego- tiators American or NorwegianO. Additionally, our explanation points to the importance of assessing the possible effect of a dominating orientation on

86 Shapiro and ROgnes Dominating Ortentatlon

negotiators' outcomes by attending to (or designing) the type of negotiation structure (e.g., is it, or should it be, a dyadic- or group-negotiation?).

I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r M a n a g e r s

One implication of this study for managers is that their negotiation strategy needs to be sensitive to the cultural background of the persons with whom they or their company's representatives will be interacting. If the company's negotiators are American and the other participants are also American, our findings suggest that a dominating orientation, and possibly, dominating behavior (at least refusals of offered compromises), will enhance the integra- tiveness of their potential agreement. Consequently, managers may wish to select negotiators who have, or are receptive to being trained in, a dominat- ing orientation.

On the other hand, if the company's negotiators are American and the other participants are not, then the latter advice may be a recipe for destruc- tive negotiation and unwanted consequences. Our findings suggest that a dominating orientation will hinder the integrativeness of agreements among Norwegian negotiators; similarly, American negotiators who have a dominat- ing orientation may not reach integrative agreements with Norwegians.

In group negotiations, however, our findings suggest that negotiators - - from cultures with characteristics of the United States and Norway - - may obtain more integrative agreements by using a dominating orientation. Thus, managers need to tailor their own (or their representatives') negotiation strategies differently for group rather than dyadic negotiations. Managers may wish to design the negotiation situation to fit their own strengths, or the strengths of the negotiators representing them.

For example, if a manager believes the company representatives are lacking in a dominating orientation, then the manager should request that the negotiation be limited to two participants, since the dominating orienta- tion apparently serves group but not necessarily dyadic negotiations. Con- versely, if the manager's evaluation of the company representatives shows that they have a strong dominating orientation, then the manager should opt for a group negotiation - - especially if the negotiation is to be multicultural, and consequently, comprised of negotiators with potentially different behav- ioral norm expectations.

We must emphasize that we do not equate "dominating orientation" with rude or unethical behavior, nor necessarily with intimidating, power- oriented expressions. Rather, based on our findings, negotiators with a stronger dominating orientation are more likely than negotiators with a weaker one to say "no" to compromise proposals, and to thereby push for more integrative agreements. While Rubin (1991) referred to this behavior as illustrating "enlightened self-interest7 and the appropriate form of integrative behavior, our findings indicate that Norwegians saw this instead as dominat- ing and reacted negatively to it.

Negotiation Journal January 1996 87

While our study did not examine negotiations between Americans and Norwegians, our findings help us speculate about cross-cultural negotiations, at least with these two cultures. Both Americans and Norwegians may fred that whatever negotiation strategy works within their own culture does not necessarily work with negotiators from other cultures. Negotiators from cul- tures that differ in negotiation norms may find it difficult to agree upon a common standard for negotiation behavior.

An "easy solution" may be to encourage Norwegians to adopt a more dominating orientation when negotiating with Americans, and for Americans to adopt a less dominating orientation when negotiating with Norwegians. The risk of this strategy is that if both sides adjust their behaviors, based on expectations of the others' cultural-consistent behavior, then again the nego- tiators would approach the negotiation with different orientations. Thus, the best advice to negotiators may be to get them to stabilize the negotiation relationship by discussing their norms and expectations openly, and jointly developing procedures for the cross-cultural negotiation process.

While the latter advice was offered for managing cross-cultural negotia- tions, it is equally applicable for managing negotiations with diverse groups of people in general, such as in cross-functional teams (see, e.g., Dougherty 1992); in two recently merged organizations with different corporate cul- tures (see Kesner and Shapiro 1991); or in serf-management work teams con- sisting of people with more or less management experience (see Wilson, George, Wellins, and Byham 1994). The need to negotiate with groups is probably increasing since managers are increasingly managing teams (see Kirkman et al. 1996). The need to negotiate with diverse groups of people is probably also increasing since the diversity of the American workforce is increasing, and the number of cross-cultural business transactions is also increasing.

88 Shapiro and R~gnes Dominating Orientation

I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r N e g o t i a t i o n T r a i n e r s

In our study, the types of settlements associated with higher levels of integra- tiveness te l us that those who logroled (i.e., conceded on issues of lesser importance in exchange for concessions on issues of greater importance) achieved more integrative agreements. One implication for negotiation train- ers is to train negotiators to logroll, that is, share their priorities, look for tradeoffs that enable each negotiator to satisfy at least their highest priority, and upon looking, avoid compromising since trading concessions on issues of differing priority can lead to better-than-compromise agreements. The lat- ter lesson is currently being taught in negotiation programs whose message is to find "win-win" solutions, such as the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School-sponsored negotiation training programs.

Although we believe the behaviors we just mentioned are an important part of negotiation training programs, we wish to highlight here that these are behaviors. Our findings show that the or ienta t ion of negotiators influ- ence the integrativeness of the agreements they obtain.

Consequently, it is important for training programs to focus, perhaps more than they have, on the critical influence that a negotiator's orientation may have on the course of a negotiation. In addition, as we have already stated, it is important for training programs to abandon the assumption that a dominating orientation hinders the integrative negotiation process, since our findings point to circumstances in which the reverse may be true.

C o n c l u s i o n

It is simplistic to assume, as many observers have for many years, that a domi- nating orientation will a lways hurt negotiators' ability to reach integrative agreements. Rather, its effect depends on negotiators' culture, the negotiation's (dyadic or group) structure, and perhaps other factors yet to be discovered.

We hope our findings and our discussion will spur negotiation scholars, negotiation trainers, and practitioners to reexamine their assumptions regard- ing the "badness" of a dominating orientation for integrative negotiation.

Negotiation Journal January 1996 8,9

N O T E S

1. Details of the collection of the data are reported in Rognes and Shapiro (1995), and can be obtained by writing Professor J6rn Rognes, Department of Organization Sciences, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Admimstration, Breiviken 2, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway.

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