Fidel Castro-el líder cubano.pdf

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Fidel Castro: el líder cubano

PRISCILA BITTENCOURT RIBEIRO DE OLIVEIRA, MSc, Universidade de Sao Paolo (USP)/

PLAMEN P. PENEV (co-author), PhD, University of Vienna

Bittencourt R. de Oliveira/Penev P. Plamen 2

Table of Contents

Introduction 3

El Revolucionário 5

El Líder Máximo 15

El Anti-Americano 24

Patria o Muerte 30

Conclusion 35

References 36

Introduction

History offers a large number of political leaders who somehow exert an irresistible

fascination and curiosity due to their exceptional psychological/political skills and

abilities.

Among those, undoubtedly is Fidel Castro. The polemic and talented Cuban leader, who

had seized power in his country through a revolutionary endeavor,managed to conduct

an extremely powerful policy that made his small and powerless country to be known

worldwide.

Good leaders may be trained, but Fidel was born as so. From his early years, he was

already obsessed with the goal of becoming an enduring historic figure. In that

enterprise he has also performed well, Fidel remained in power longer than any other

world leader except King Hussein of Jordan. Yet, his rule was brought to an end due to

the weaknesses of his health – rather thanof his political authority.

One of the most influential and important leaders of the twentieth century, Castro has

confronted the United States, survived to the collapse of the Soviet Union and

perseverated his leadership. How? How can a leader of such a small poor country be so

strong and prominent? How has he managed to remain in power for such a long time?

What are his main leadership traits? Are those traits the main source of his political

authority?

Those are the questions this research paper aims to address. By analyzing Castro’s

leadership characteristics, this work expects to reveal how Castro inspires the devotion

of his followers, tackled the challenges posed to his rule, shaped and reshaped his

country’s policies to nurture his need of maximum power.

The present research paper is divided in four historical sections that underline Fidel’s

most expressive leadership traits. Accordingly, the purpose of the first part(El

Revolucionário) is to analyze Castro’s transformational leadership style, more

specifically his revolutionary spirit from the start of his political career until his seizure

of the power in Cuba.The second chapter (El Líder Máximo) assigns Castro’s first

decades in power by highlighting his charismatic domination over the Cuban

population. The third section (El Anti-Americano) concentrates on Fidel’s endless

struggle against U.S. imperialism, more specifically on the gains and losses this political

tool hasgrantedhim. The fourth chapter (Patria o Muerte) recalls the policies adopted by

Castro during the hardest years of his rule, as well as his attempt to guarantee the

perpetuation of his legacy. Finally, a brief conclusion will be presented.

El Revolucionário (The Revolutionary)

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruiz’s participation and involvement in politics began in 1945

when, at the age of nineteen, he entered Law school at the University of Havana.

Different to many student activists, Castro had no political formation; his ideological

convictions were a product of heroic myths of Cuban history, and strongly associated to

José Martí1’s ideas of nationhood (Balfour 57). Influenced by Martí’s ideas, Fidel

depicted an “idealistic and almost ahistorical image of a true Cuba, free of dictatorial

aberrations, which essence was still to be discovered” (Bourne 10).

Fidel’s convictions were in stark contrast with the island’s political history,

characterized by intense instability and an extensive record of political and economic

abuses that Cubans, as few people in the world, have been subjected to. At university

Castro has came upon with that state of affairs, which resulted in a fragmented society

where confidence and mutual trust were completely undermined. According to Castro,

in such environment anti-imperialist spirit had been forgotten and the few communists

that were there could be counted on one hand (Castro and Shnookal 108).

Castro’s initial concerns regarding student politics soon had given place to a broader

worry over national matters. By that time, the history of Cuba was characterized by two

historic cycles: the independent struggles between 1868 and 1898, and the revolutionary

movement between 1927 and 1933 – which led to downfall of the dictator Machado and

the ascension of Batista, who would stay in office until 1959 (Balfour 21).

Within a short period, Fidel developed an incredible obstinacy in holding on to power to

regenerate Cuban politics. By questioning the political status quo in the island, Castro’s

transformative leadership traits were early manifested. According to Burns,

transformational leader “recognizes and exploits an existing need or demand of a

potential follower” and “looks for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher

needs, and engages the full person of the follower”(4). Accordingly, Castro

acknowledged the need Cubans had to identify themselves with a leader who would

1 The ‘apostle’ of Cuban independence.

restore their national pride and self-esteem by struggling against U.S. imperialism and

the stratification of Cuban society.

Additionally, by being a disciple of Martí, Castro has followed an important

Machiavelli’s leadership advice, which asserts that “a wise man should always enter

those paths trodden by great men, and imitate those who have been most excellent, so

that if one’s own virtue does not match theirs, at least it will have the smell of it”

(Machiavelli and Bondanella 20). Martí was a perfect choice, evoking his mentorship

has granted to Fidel’s cause not only legitimacy but also an extensive action guide.

Partisan of Martí’s anti-imperialist and revolutionary traditions, Fidel rejected bourgeois

parliamentary democracy and its fraudulent electoral practices. However, resented with

the impossibility of fomenting a Revolution within the University and convinced of the

inevitability of being rapidly thwarted - if attempting to bring it about, Castro decided to

run for Congress as a candidate of the Orthodox Party.

Far from representing an ideological move, Fidel’s candidature was embedded by his

political pragmatism and strong revolutionary consciousness. At the side of his

candidacy for Congress, Castro had developed a plan to launch a revolutionary program

and organize a people’s uprising from within the government and within the Congress

itself. Barely six years after having started University, Fidel had his first revolutionary

strategy totally worked out, with his concepts, the measures that were required and how

to institute them (Castro and Shnookal 104-105).

Few months before elections, Fulgencio Batista seized his second coup d’état, seizing

power over the island and canceling scheduled elections. Fidel Castro unsuccessfully

attempted to have the coup declared unconstitutional but, shortly after taking office,

Batista suspended Cubans constitutional guarantees, the Congress and all political

parties; as well as established tighter censorship of the media (Balfour 59).

The 1952 coup of Batista was the most significant milestone in Fidel’s political life,

when it came to preclude any attempt Castro could still have in regenerating Cuban

politics via parliamentarism. Whatever possibility might have existed for a political

career within a democratic process had vanished overnight, yet any movement that

would aim to liberate Cuba from Batista’s dictatorship would have to take-up to the

arms (Balfour 59).

Either way, Castro didn’t feel particularly leaning to conform to proper parliamentary

procedures. Ambitious and impatient, he was most comfortable while acting in concert

with his deep total and irrevocable commitment to revolution, which at this point not

only fitted his fundamental psychological needs, but was also consistent with the

prevailing political situation (Bourne 67).

Unsuccessfully, Fidel had also attempted to build a vast network by uniting all different

forces, who shared his opposition to Batista’s coup and commitment to armed

insurrection. Fidel would later explain his thinking during that period: “My idea then

was not to organize a movement, but to try to unite all different forces against Batista. I

intended to participate in the struggle simply as one more soldier… But when none of

these leaders showed they had either the ability or the seriousness of purpose, or the

way to overthrow Batista, it was then I finally worked a strategy of my own” (Bourne

Early in 1953, Fidel had consolidated his “command staff” (together with his comrades)

and began to discuss concrete plans for an attack on the Moncada barracks in Oriente

province, where he had attended school. The plan was minimally orchestrated, but Fidel

knew that to give credibility to their movement, some sort of ideological document was

necessary. Hence, he prepared “The Moncada Manifesto”, the first and foremost

exhortation to revolution for the people of Cuba. In it Castro had explained the need for

the attack, and outlined a program of political and social reforms. The eleven-point

revolutionary program was an extensive array of liberal reformist ideology and fervent

nationalism. But it is obvious that the military and historic aspects of the insurrection

were vastly more important to him at this moment than the promotion of a particular

program (Bourne 76).

As the final minutes approached, Fidel began an oration aimed at inspiring the fighting

force. He said in part:

In a few hours you will be victorious or defeated, but regardless of the outcome –

listen well, companeros! – this movement will triumph. If you win today, the

aspirations of Martí will be fulfilled sooner. If the contrary occurs, our action will

set an example for the Cuban people, and from the people will arise young men

willing to die for Cuba. They will pick up our banners and move forward. The

people of Oriente Province will support us, the entire island will do so. Young

men of the Centennial [referring to 1953 as the centennial of Martí’s birth], as in

1868 and 1895, here in Oriente we make our first cry of “Liberty or Death!”

(Bourne 79-80).

Castro’s aforementioned quote illustrates well his revolutionary as well as charismatic

leadership traits. Fidel willingness to persevere against all odds inspires his followers,

becoming an even stronger motivation force by being associated with his inherent

genius for communication and persuasion. For Burns, “revolutionary leadership

demands commitment, persistence, courage, perhaps selflessness and even self-

abnegation (169).

Castro has proved to be a master strategist in designing his plan. Strategically, there was

no better battle field than Oriente province. The region farthest from the capital, and its

ideal geographic features would offer strategic advantages for the attack. On top of all

else, Castro skillfully rooted his program according to the Cuban revolutionary tradition

of radical nationalism, which has Oriente province as its symbolic center – uprisings for

independence from Spain in 1868 and 1895 had both begun there (Deac 51-52).

According to Balfour (63)some of the most orthodox stories of the Cuban Revolution

present the assault to Moncada headquarters, on the 26th of July 1953, as the beginning

of a partially defined strategy that leads to the proclamation of a Marxist-Leninist state

in 1961. However, Castro conversely affirms that, by that time, he was not a Marxist

neither considered himself to be a Socialist. The objective of the assault was to initiate a

popular revolt to overthrow U.S.-backed dictator Batista and to restore the Constitution

of 1940 (Castro and Ramonet).

Nonetheless, the Moncada action was a precipitated incursion and has turned into a

failure, due to a misfortune encounter of a group of rebels with a military patrol in the

entrance of the military headquarters. Government forces quickly defeat the attack and

the group was forced to retreat. After six hard days in the mountains, Castro and a small

group of surviving militants were captured (Balfour 63).

The Moncada attack and its following trial have put Castro in the center of public

attention. What otherwise might have been dismissed as just another rebel maneuvering

of a young political maverick and his friends became an episode of great heroism in

which any shortcoming was obscured by sympathy for the rebel’s bravery and suffering.

The extent of torture and killing inflicted by Batista’s government on the attackers

caused consternation among public opinion, increased popular sympathy towards the

rebels and allowed Castro a trial in the courts (Bourne 88).

The trial began on September 21, 1953. During two hours of testimony on the opening

day, Fidel, assertive and gesticulating, seized the initiative from the prosecutor, and

freely admitting his role in the attack, used the forum of the crowded to give his own

version of it. He persuasively articulated his motives, and ridiculed the government’s

contention that he was part of a conspiracy. Before the end of the first day’s testimony,

Fidel requested and received permission to act as the lawyer in his own defense (Bourne

Fidel made good use of the license to act as his own attorney. By exploring his oratory

skills with withering effect, he decided to use his trial and to turn the proceedings into

his own political forum (Deac 56). Assertive and gesticulating, Fidel has freely admitted

his role in the attack, using the forum of the crowded to give his own version of it. Fidel

monopolized two hours of the proceedings to persuasively state his motivations,

extensively attack Batista’s dictatorship, and to state the necessity of promoting a

revolutionary change in the country. Castro’s speech included an explanation of most

political, economic and social reforms that his regime would establish after the 1959

triumph. He has ended his defense in a challenging tone: “Se que la prisón será dura,

más dura de lo que ha sido para cualquier otro, llena de amenazas, de una barbarie

insensible y cruel, pero no le temo, así como no temo la furia el despreciable tirano que

arrancó la vida de mis setenta hermanos. Condenadme, no importa, la historia me

absolverá” (Balfour 65).

Fidel’s trial speech was just a sample of his outstanding rhetorical ability, extensively

explored throughout his revolutionary enterprise and governmental rule. A

reconstruction of that was taken out of prison to appear in 1954 as the pamphlet ‘La

historia me absolverá’. It became the official testimonial of the Cuban Revolution, a

manifest to the Cubans, that although inserted within the referential mark of the 1940

Constitution proposed the complete transformation of the island, from a less developed

and dependent nation to a progressive and modern nation.

The assault on the Moncada Barracks and its subsequent trial transformed Castro from

an almost unknown revolutionary to a national character and the unquestioned leader of

Batista’s opposition (Balfour 67) (Deac 56). Cubans had an overwhelmingly need to

identify themselves with a leader that was truly strong and nationalistic. They sought for

a figure who could restore their self-respect and succeed in building a truly sovereign

nation; someone ready to rid the country of the plague of corruption at all levels of the

government, and who would eliminate the epidemic of political violence that had been

inflicted on the country for generations. If such a man appeared, most Cubans were

ready to accept him as a messiah (Bourne 12).

Sentenced to fifteen years, Castro has flown the next day to Presidio Modelo (Model

Prison) at the Isle of Pines (Deac 56). The nineteen months Fidel has spent in prison

were dedicated to the study and discussion of their program. As soon as Castro met his

comrades, he started to reassert his authority and to organize their activities. According

to Castro they were not in prison merely to serve their sentences, their role was to be

combative, to use that time to prepare themselves for the continuing struggle after their

release. In the Isle of Pines, Castro and his comrades established the basis of the 26th of

July Movement (M-26-7) and designed a new strategy for seizing power in Cuba.

Although without reasons to believe in the concession of amnesty, Castro’s optimism

seemed to be limitless (Balfour 67).

In 1955, popular support to the release of rebels led Batista, in an overestimation of his

power, to concede amnesty to Castro, his brother Raul and 18 other Moncada veterans

(Deac 56). Celebrated by many, the young rebel returned to the political arena

launching new attacks against Batista, which has answered by intensifying his regime’s

repressive measures (Balfour 68).

Castro immediately planned to launch a “revolutionary organization of the masses”, but

his chances were reduced each day. Already in the awe of being arrested or executed, he

decided to go into exile (Deac 56).

Castro’s decision to leave Cuba was preeminently a pragmatic one. However, it had a

particular romantic appeal. Fidel was following in the footsteps of his hero, José Martí,

who had similarly gone into exile at a crucial stage in the independence struggle

(Bourne 110).

Castro has left to Mexico, just six weeks after being released. There he would design a

new plan to overthrow the dictator. While in exile, Castro assembled a small guerrilla

band that included Ernesto Che Guevara, a quixotic Argentine-born revolutionary, who

would play a significant role during the Revolution (Deac 80).

The rebels’ new strategy was an extension of the original plan carried out in Moncada.

In contrast with Moncada, the new plan didn’t depend on a unique exemplary action,

which would be able to promote a spontaneous resurrection. Castro’s new program

combined sabotage, guerrilla activities, and urban rebellion in a strategy of declared war

to Batista. Another lesson learnt from the 1953 failure was the necessity of a logistics

group to give support to the armed rebels and to incite workers and civic groups towards

the general struggle (Balfour 68-69).

On December 2, 1956 Castro and over 81 men landed at Las Coloradas Beach in

Oriente province, and instead of envisioned mass uprisings, the group was only met by

and mowed by Cuban warplanes. The M-26-7 faced a reprise of the Moncada fiasco.

Castro and no more than 20 other survivors - including a severely wounded Guevara

found refuge in the nearby Sierra Maestre (Deac 80).

Patiently building up his rebel army over a two-year period, Castro made good use of

time and of Batista’s increasingly unpopularity to reach his goal of overthrowing him.

In pursuing his objective, Castro had to focus on convincing fellow Cubans of his

Revolution’s legitimacy and prospect to success, and on deterring U.S involvement in

Cuban domestic affairs (Hampsey 94).

Throughout his endeavor, along with his charisma, Castro’s most powerful weapon

against the dictator was his skillful use of propaganda and political warfare. Since his

years at university, Castro knew the power of communication vehicles in the diffusion

of his ideas. The Cuban Revolution’s propaganda “illustrates a well-planned and

executed psychological operation (PSYOP) that influenced numerous target audiences

and led to behavioral changes that helped Castro seize power while commanding a

numerically and technologically inferior force (Hampsey 93).

Ten days after disembarking in Cuba, Castro has organized a publicity maneuver that

has favored him more than any combat against the Army. With his group reduced to

eighteen men, Castro - by strategically placing his comrades and counting on their talent

to dramaturgy - has managed to give an impression of controlling an extensive zone in

the mountains and innumerous combatants. The article released by the New York Times

and afterwards in Cuban media has caused sensation, especially because it suggested

that Castro’s strength was invincible (Balfour 77-78).

Castro’s publicity scheme was further extended with release of a newspaper and the

installation of a radio station. Articles were written to illustrate the ideology of the

Movement and their plans for Cuba’s future (Hampsey 95). Yet, Castro has used the

‘Radio Rebel’ to disseminate his reform programs, and a news bulletin with detailed

and accurate information regarding the war, which contrasted with Batista’s channels

triumphant fantasy (Balfour 78).

Psychological operations like that are designed “to influence the attitudes and

perceptions and ultimately change the behavior of selected groups so their thoughts and

actions favor the goals and objectives of the initiator” (Hampsey 98). Castro’s

propaganda warfare set the conditions he needed to control the political loyalty of his

followers.

With increasing support of Cuban society, Castro has directed his efforts to gaining U.S.

audience in order to prevent the Empire intervention in the Revolution. Castro’s

contacts led him to Herbert L. Matthews, a Latin America expert for ‘The New York

Times’ who conducted an interview with Castro. Matthew’s articles were filled with

admiration for Castro and his cause. Those have not just allowed Americans to assess

Castro’s idea; it gave him an opportunity of distancing his Revolution from

communism. “Above all”, Castro declared, “we are fighting for a democratic Cuba and

an end to dictatorship” (Hampsey 96).

Later in February 1958, in a Look magazine interview, Fidel disavowed any interest in

becoming president, pointing out that under Constitution he was ten years too young to

assume the position. Among the objectives of his revolution, he cited immediate

freedom for all political prisoners, full and untrammeled freedom of public information,

and the wiping out of corruption. He also said to “have no plans for the expropriation or

nationalization of foreign investments here” (Bourne 148).

As it is widely known, propaganda can take a life of its own; however on Castro’s hand

it has worked under strictly discipline and on his benefit at all times. His understanding

of target audiences and his sense of timing make all the difference when it comes to

evaluate his leadership.

The Batista offensive was a seventy-six-day failure. By that time, guerrilla links were

already all-embracing. Fidel was day by day strengthening his control over the country

at the expense of all other opposition groups. The growing confidence and skill of the

rebels were reflected in their repeated victories (Hampsey 95)(Bourne 155).

The morale of the government forces was in collapse, soldiers began deserting and

coming over to the guerilla side. Seeing his Army disintegrating, Batista has prepared to

leave Cuba, and finally flew out of the country to refugee in the Dominican Republic on

January 1st(Balfour 87).

A group of high-rank officials was organized a Civic and Military Junta that replaced

Batista and enjoyed a short instant of power. From his general headquarters, Castro has

incited a general struggle, to defeat the coup d’Etat and was supported by an immense

mass of workers (Balfour 87).

The survivors formed the nucleus of a rebel army that marched to Havana to form a

revolutionary government, which under Castro’s leadership would influence the

international relations of the Western Hemisphere for almost fifty years.

In the aftermath of the Revolution, Castro would change his mind regarding many

commitments agreed upon before his triumph. Nevertheless, the internalization of the

revolution’s assumptions, values, and institutional norms, as defined by the leadership

became a critical component of Fidel’s unshared and total power over the island (Mora

27). Castro, elevated by the population to legendary status, was revered as “Savior of

the Fatherland” and “The Maximum leader” (Hampsey 97).

While being acclaimed by the crowd he has declared: “we cannot become dictators, we

shall never need to use force because we have the people, and because the people shall

judge, and because the day people want I shall leave”(Hampsey 97-98). Another

statement that would have to be readjusted after his taking office.

El Líder Máximo (The Maximum Leader)

The next day after his great victory, Fidel Castro made his major address to a multitude

of Cubans at the military headquarters in Campo Colombia. His emotional speech

reinforced the rise of nationalistic feelings and the mobilization of the population

behind his leadership. Yet, according to the theory of charismatic leadership, Castro’s

ascension to power was propelled by the nationalistic wave he has incited (Bream 133).

The Cuban Revolution was proclaimed as a glorious triumph. For the Cubans, it

symbolized their rupture with the past, the disintegration of the old, corrupt institutions

and administration that had been established in the island. Moreover, the Revolution

was considered a personal triumph of Castro, their undisputed leader, nascent of the

spirit of idealism, nationalism, and vigor radiated over the island, the savior who would

erect a new Cuba free from all evils of the past (Bourne 171).

For Fidel the aftermath of the Revolution was a period of personal crisis, in which he

desperately sought to work out what his new role would be. Harbored by an

internationalist perspective and his strong identification with Simon Bolivar – the great

Latin American liberator, his first plan was to export his revolution throughout the

region (Bourne 165).

In his speeches, Fidel reiterated that he was not interested in becoming president of

Cuba and that his Revolution was not communist-driven. He talked about the potential

for a common market in Latin America, and his desire for a special relationship between

Cuba and Venezuela in which visas should be abolished, and many other enterprises

that had not been thought through any depth by that time (Bourne 170).

Conversely to what critics have claimed, in the aftermath of the Revolution, Fidel was

not aiming to execute a Machiavellian plan to acquire total power. Castro had made no

plans to run the government; for six years, he had prepared himself with rigid discipline

to being a revolutionary military commander, and that was his sense of himself. Dr.

Antonio Núnez Jimenez, archivist of the Revolution, says, “Fidel has said on several

occasions that when the war was finished he noticed the only thing he had learned to do

well, in which he had become a specialist, was in how to win a war… He was not

prepared, nobody was prepared for the government...” (Bourne 164-165).

Constitutionally Fidel was also impeded of assuming the Presidency. He was seven

years below the minimum age of forty stipulated for the presidency in the 1940

Constitution. Still, at the point had he wanted the job, there would have been little

public complaint to a special provision.

Whatever the motivations for Fidel’s reluctance to become directly involved in the

governing of the country, he spent hours with the people in the streets, in their homes,

and at their jobs. His interest in their problems had the effect of creating a level of

popular support and faith in his personal leadership that made it increasingly difficult

for those charged with running the country to establish any credit for themselves

(Bourne 166). Perhaps, Fidel was already evaluating how big a challenge the running of

Cuba would be.

Throughout his political life, Castro’s trajectory had never gone straight in any

direction; but rather in endless circles and cycles (Geyer 401). Accordingly, after a trip

to Venezuela, Fidel decided to assume as Cuban Prime Minister in order to face a

rapidly worsening political crisis and to solve the problem of power dispersion in the

country. From that moment on the government, the revolution and the people would

follow the same path under Fidel directives (Bourne 171).

Castro made use of his magnetic hold over the Cuban people by announcing his

decision to a mass audience. Bourne’s following observation about charismatic leaders

certainly holds true for Castro:

Most charismatic leaders learn early that political power can derive from the

ability to deliver a truly rousing speech. They find that people are quite willing to

surrender their individuality to their demagogic leadership. This is particularly true

in times of low national self-esteem, when people have a hunger for someone to

restore their self-respect and make them feel good about their countries and

themselves(Bourne 183).

The astonishing and unrealistic expectations Cubans had on Fidel is reflected in an

article by a prominent Presbyterian minister who wrote, “Fidel Castro is an instrument

in the hand of God for the establishment of His reign among men” (Fagen 278).

Additionally, in a 1960 sample survey conducted by Lloyd Free, 86 per cent of his

respondents were classified as supporters of Castro’s regime, and one-third of those (43

per cent) sub-classified as fervent supporters (Fagen 278). Few leaders have

experienced such godlike praise, and it is perhaps not surprisingly that Castro has begun

to feel like “the maximum leader”.

Cubans were attracted by his personalized, down-to-earth style of government

(Suchlicki, Cuba, Castro, and Revolution 18). Extensive popular support enabled Fidel

to consolidated power by making allegiance to himself and his aspirations a prerequisite

for political survival. To all appearances, his leadership seems to be absolute with no

other public figure able to challenge his undisputed authority. The new political system

was structured around Castro’s charismatic leadership, to which all Cubans were

submitted to (Bream 134).

In his writings about charismatic authority, sociologist Max Weber considers charisma

to be “the unusual circumstances that have called it into being by destroying existing

norms and transforming old values” (Bream 133). Moreover, Weber argued that in their

most extreme form charismatic movements overturn norms, tradition, and “all notions

of sanctity. Instead of reverence for customs that are… sacred, it enforces inner

subjection to the unprecedented and absolutely unique and therefore Divine”. In view of

that “charisma is indeed the specifically creative revolutionary force of history” (Weber

Although opposing the return to democracy by establishing a new government,

Castro’s inauguration brought about an atmosphere of euphoria and excitement in the

country. Cubans were willing to dispense what in other countries is viewed as the

fundamental institution of democracy to empower Fidel. In Cuba, rather than a

fundamental right, elections symbolic represented the vestiges of a corrupt past they

wanted to forget (Bourne 171).

Nonetheless, Fidel’s decision to eliminate elections was motivated by two

considerations. First, having achieved total power over the island it was pointless to him

incurring the risk of sharing it. Second, and mostly, Fidel had become eager to portray

himself as a dedicated Marxist due to his desperate need for Soviet economic help.

Holding elections would potentially have called into question his pledge to transform

Cuba in a Marxist state. Either way, that decision account as a concrete example of

double-standards in Castro’s rule (Bourne 227).

In contrast to the fatuous dishonesty that characterized Batista, Castro was a much

sagacious analyst of cultural, political and human events. Political action has become

his life, consequently marked by an insatiable hunger for power. To consolidate and

strengthen his authority, Castro has first favored Cuban middle and lower economic

classes(Solozábal 93). Hence, one of Castro’s first enactments was the confiscation and

redistribution of private-owned properties in order to abolish class disparities. After that

the government quickly expropriated land for agrarian reform and housing for urban

reform (Bunck 9). Once he felt power was firmly in his hands, he went on implementing

more intense measures to assert total psychological and moral control over the rest of

the population (Solozábal 93).

Fidel Castro moved swiftly to create different political and economic institutions.

Indeed, change became the Revolution’s overarching theme. The revolutionary

government nationalized all foreign and many domestic enterprises and institutions,

from schools to banks. It seized control of communications media, and religious

institutions to eliminate their influence (Bunck 9).

Because these types of developing political system demand deferred gratification of

material results, Castro took care of following each of these abrupt changes with

material incentives such as: cutting the cost of housing and electricity, increasing

salaries, providing wage benefits to Cuban workers, and providing free public services

such as medical care, recreation and education (Bunck 9).

Although many of their initial efforts were directed toward changing pre-Revolutionary

institutions, the Cuban communist leaders viewed cultural change as the most important

goal of the Revolution. Thus, after the preliminary assault on institutions, the leaders

immediately turned their full attention toward eliminating and replacing certain aspects

of pre-Revolutionary culture. Over the ensuing years the leaders expended astounding

amounts of energy and resources in their efforts to bring about extensive cultural change

(Bunck 2).

In Cuba, cultural change was taken to be the government’s transcendent goal. However,

the doctrinaire notion that cultural change must follow the construction of a secure

economic foundation was neglected by Fidel’s administration. Cuban leaders believed

that transforming the country’s institutions would not necessarily, nor eventually,

transform Cuban culture (Bunck 3).

A little over a decade of the Revolution, Castro himself confessed that the greatest

obstacle in his rule had been creating the “proper way of thinking” in the present

generation. “There remains,” said Fidel, “the most difficult Moncada of all, the

Moncada of the old ideas, of old selfish sentiments, of old habits of thinking and ways

of viewing everything, and this fortress has not been completely taken” (Suchlicki,

Cuba, Castro, and Revolution 16).

The revolutionary government viewed pre-Revolutionary Cuban culture through the

prism of its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Cultural ills such as racism and machismo,

laziness, elitism, materialism and greed were seen as direct consequences of an

exploitative mode of production. Fidel Castro and his assistants believed that many of

Cuban’s most persuasive attitudes could be traced through the country’s historical

experience. Castro leadership thus sought to replace these attitudes with a set of beliefs

and values more appropriate to a Marxist-Leninist society (Bunck 3).

The leaders ventured to create a society that would adopt values and attitudes different

from, and even opposed to, those of the old order. Much like Lenin’s model of the ideal

citizen, Castro’s so-called “new man” would be imbued with a communist

consciencia2(Bunck 4). The aversion of the Cubans to manual labor and the tradition

that women’s place is in the home have to be eradicated; besides that they should

assume a positivist perspective, by transforming their belief that events are determined

2 “A Spanish term employed by the Cuban Communist leaders to denote a proper set of revolutionary

values, beliefs and attitudes, such as dedication, selflessness, sacrifice and loyalty” (Bunck 4).

by nature. Castro’s government urged Cubans to adopt as a role model someone selfless

and cooperative, obedient and hardworking, gender-blind, incorruptible, and non-

materialistic. Fidel described the type of man his regime proposed to create: “We will

bring up human beings devoid of selfishness, devoid of defects of the past, human

beings with a collective sense of effort, a collective sense of strength” (Suchlicki, Cuba,

Castro, and Revolution 15).

Castro also expected that in the new society devotion to the cause of communism and

love of the fatherland would prevail. Man will consciously labor for the welfare of

society. Each will work for all and all for each. The collective interest will supersede the

individual one. “That is what is meant by revolution,” explained Fidel, “that everyone

shall benefit from the work of everyone else” (Suchlicki, Cuba, Castro, and Revolution

This attack on the past has not meant a total rejection of Cuba’s cultural tradition. On

the contrary, to advance revolutionary causes, the leadership emphasized and relied on

many pre-Revolutionary attitudes. For instance, Castro unmistakably used Cuba’s

Hispanic tradition of a strong, highly centralized, authoritarian government to legitimize

his communist government. He also frequently drew on Cuban society’s military values

and its general acceptance of, or passivity toward, a political role for the military. It

seemed as if the Castro regime was attempting to find a new identity, in what it

considered “good” in Cuba’s past. At the same time it seeks to preserve and give

continuity to Cuba’s political tradition – based on nationalism, anti-Americanism, and

reformism (Suchlicki, Cuba, Castro, and Revolution 16-17).

The vast majority of citizens accepted, indeed enthusiastically supported, those

revolutionary goals and measures Fidel claimed necessary to attain. Making use of that

great approval, Castro further centralized economic and political power by taking over

the remaining privately owned business in Cuba. Fidel claimed that those pockets of the

“petty bourgeoisie” represented the capitalism and greed materialism his Revolution

sought to eradicate. Above all, these measures together with a rejection of its policy of

material incentives aimed to address the weaknesses of Cuban economy (Bunck 10).

Castro had to ensure and compel citizens’ conformity to the established norms. For that

purpose, he has developed a unique system of population control based on a

sophisticated program of deliberate psychological domination supported by an element

of coercion. Rather than being characterized by indiscriminate bloodshed and mass

coercion – although selectively employing intimidation and state terrorism; the Cuban

regime imposes a mental and spiritual oppression upon the population. “It conditions

the psychological outlook of the populace through a calculated policy that narrows

expectations by limiting individual choices across the social spectrum” (Solozábal 93-

94). Consequently, Castro’s regime has gradually habituated the Cuban population to

accept “a life of limited choice that produces accepted dependence on the

state”(Solozábal 93-94). This virtual psychological status quo is now an element

entrenched in the national character of the Cuban population. The evidence of Castro’

success in holding control of his population is manifested by the insignificance of

organized resistance to his government.

The cornerstone of Cuba’s program for mass domination is the principle of exploiting

the influence of the charismatic leader. Castro himself responds as the base and

foundation of this pyramid of control, which over time has conditioned Cubans to

accept his decisions as infallible and his authority as inviolable—so completely that he

can neither be successfully defied nor challenged (Solozábal 94).

Nowhere is Castro’s political ability shown better than in the way he manages the

system to retain political control. The regime’s frontline defense – which prevents

discontent from consolidating an effective opposition force – is not the state security,

nor the armed forces, nor the party, nor any other mass organization. Its first line of

defense is a consequence of the system itself, which Castro works to his advantage: the

individual’s need to show loyalty and adherence to the revolution’s policies as means of

survival. Regularly, stimulating support for the revolution has become necessary to

continue to receive privileges, to derive benefits that only the system can provide and to

escape punishment that affects not only the individual but his family as well (Planas

Nevertheless, the stability of the regime is based primarily on the strength of the armed

forces. This is undoubtedly the most vital of the three “legs” on which the revolution

stands. The other two – the party and the Committees for the Defense of Revolution –

serve under increased military supervision to control, mobilize, socialize and

indoctrinate the population (Suchlicki 19). Cuba’s security apparatus is monolithic and

highly centralized; Castro learned the lesson of Rumania - where forces from the

ministry of the interior and the military fought each other - and unlike this and other

Eastern European countries. With this strategy, Castro eliminated possible rivals within

his military and security forces and placed the ministry of the interior under the control

of the military, headed by an officer he and Raul trusted(Suchlicki, Castro's Cuba: more

continuity than change 132).

Cuban people know how strong and efficient the country’s security services are, and

they overwhelmingly fear their repressive capabilities. To foster population respect,

Castro has dealt cruelly with his enemies; he executing them, sentencing them to long

prison terms, or exiling them. Repression of all opposition is secured by government

control of communications and by conscious efforts to show mistrust and the danger of

potential opposition elements(Solozábal 95). Like this, Castro has prevented the

development of any civilian group that aims threatening his authority (Suchlicki,

Castro's Cuba: more continuity than change 132).

Around the world, Fidel Castro is synonym of a cruel dictator. The number of people

who owed their deaths to him is difficult to be established, his influence and power

were often as amorphous as decisive. But when one simply tallies up the force of his

influence in countries like Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and even

forgotten places and situations like Zanzibar, one has to come to the conclusion that

under his rule hundreds of thousands of persons lost their lives (Geyer 392). In Cuba,

Fidel is seen as acting in concert with larger historical forces not always visible to

ordinary men. Being the symbol of revolution, he alone detains the right to determine

“correct” behavior in the service of the common interests of the society(Fagen 278).

In controlling large groups, the influence of charismatic leadership cannot be overstated.

A leader’s authority should be enhanced and a cult following developed around his or

her figure. Charismatic leaders know they have to exploit mass appeal through the

organizations of meetings and demonstrations, as well as by the delivery of impassioned

speeches (Solozábal 97). In Cuba, the personality cult which surrounds Castro has been

a significant element in his control over the population, when it comes to make them

incapable of opposing the regime. Above all, Cuba provides a number of case studies

illustrating how Castro has made use of public demonstrations to achieve his leadership

goals. A remarkable example is the mobilization carried out by the government to

neutralize a mass exodus from Mariel harbor in 1980. In that occasion, almost one

million people gathered to demonstrate support for the Castro regime (Solozábal 98).

Nonetheless, according to Weber’s theory, charismatic authority is distinguished by its

unstable dynamism. He argued that a personalist regime is precarious because “unless

the publicists maintain sufficient confidence in the existing regime to give it their loyal

support,” the leader will not preserve his or her popularity. Moreover, citizens have a

desire to fulfill material and financial needs, and when a leader fails to meet on his or

her promises, the power of charisma proves incapable of maintaining the leader’s

absolute control (Bream 135). In what regards to Castro, his rule of almost fifty years

under extreme economic conditions and external political pressure poses as an

outstanding exception to Weber’s theory.

El Anti-Americano (The Anti-American)

Since the beginning of the Revolution, Fidel Castro and his comrades knew that getting

rid of Fulgencio Batista was only the first step on a long hard road. In a letter from the

Sierra Maestra in June 1958, Fidel wrote: “when this war is over, a much wider and

bigger war will commence for me: the war that I am going to wage against them

[Americans]. I am aware this is my true destiny” (Bourne 155).

Accordingly, as soon as Fidel came to power, he began to prepare for the struggle

against U.S. imperialism. He mobilized the population with speeches, rejecting U.S.

attempts to interfere in Cuban internal matters, began to import arms and build up its

military for the sake of an imminent U.S. armed intervention (Boorstein 6).

Soon Fidel would turn to the Soviet Union, which besides been an important economic

sponsor was the principal enemy of the United States. There could be no greater way for

any nation in the Western Hemisphere to make a statement about its freedom from U.S.

domination than to embrace communism.

Castro has been brilliant in using anti-Americanism as a political tool to reinforce the

loyalty of Cubans, and as a scapegoat which allowed him to convert Cuba into a

socialist nation (McPherson 145). Castro’s determination and tenacity in opposing “U.S.

imperialism” and “capitalism” have been attested since ever by his support of anti-

American guerrillas and terrorist groups, his military involvement with anti-American

regimes (especially in Africa and the Middle East, during the 1970s and 1980s), and his

constant denunciations of American policies in international organizations and forums.

For their turn, the United States objected to the actions of the Revolutionary

government from its early days and for almost fifty years pursued the overthrow of

Fidel through all available means - a combination of political isolation, military

intervention, and economic sanctions (Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of Fidel Castro 14).

Initially, Americans attempt to strangle the Revolutionary government focused on

Cuban economy. Fidel responded by approving a land reform and increasing trade with

socialist countries. This opened the door for Americans next step, armed intervention.

Since 1959, the CIA started planning an invasion near Guantanamo Bay at the Bay of

Pigs (Playa Girón). However, just under the Kennedy’s administration that covert

invasion of Cuba by some 1,400 anti-Castro Cuban counterrevolutionaries was

approved. Ill-conceived, rapidly staged and based on the CIA expectation of popular

support, the invasion was a total failure. The militia soldiers at the beaches had warned

Castro that the invasion was taking place shortly before they withdrew. Master in

guerrilla warfare, Fidel took command in the early time to prevent the attackers from

establishing a beachhead and led the revolutionaries to victory in three days (Bourne

The area around the Bay of Pigs was one of Fidel’s favorite haunts. The austerity of the

area appealed to what he described as his “guerrilla mentality,” and the population

extreme poverty aroused in him sympathetic concern. Perhaps nowhere in Cuba the

local population was more committed to Fidel and his revolution than in the area around

Girón (Bourne 223).

The American fiasco inflamed powerful nationalist sentiments within Cuba and led to

the reemergence of long-standing historical grievances, which in turn contributed to a

singular unanimity of national purpose - perhaps unattainable by any other means

(Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba's Future 14).

Cuba’s position in the world ascended to new heights, and Fidel’s role as the adored and

revered leader among ordinary Cuban people received a renewed boost. His popularity

and authority were greater than ever. “In his own mind he had done what generations of

Cubans had only fantasized about: he had taken on the United States and won. He had

broken through an important threshold established by the independence movement at

the turn of the century” (Bourne 226).

Moreover, the victory at the Bay of Pigs helped Fidel to reorganize Cuban domestic

politics. Within a matter of forty-eight hours, Castro was able to eliminate the remaining

opposition to his regime and to portray his regime as Socialist. From that time on,

anyone who would oppose the government’s policies would be immediately labeled a

counterrevolutionary (Bourne 229).

The spirit of the victory, the nation’s sense of national pride and gratitude to their

leader, would be nurture and restored by Fidel whenever a sense of disillusionment with

the regime arose. Throughout decades confrontation with the United States served as a

powerful tool of political mobilization and an unlimited source of moral subsidy to

Castro’s government, a political coin that U.S. policies have helped to appreciate (

(Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba's Future 14).

Shortly after the “victory of Girón”, Castro announced the resumption of diplomatic

relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union – which had been broken off during

Batista’s dictatorship. Fidel told Krushchev that he wanted to establish close ties with

the Soviet Union, and then, referring to the CIA attempts to instruct and arm exile

groups in the U.S., he requested Krushchev to provide him with military support to

defend Cuba (Bourne 207).

The Soviets worked quickly and secretly to build their missile installations in the island.

U.S. spy planes revealed the construction before the missiles were deployed and

precipitated the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, during which the world seemed precariously

on the brink of nuclear war (Bourne 223).

The missiles in 1962, the subsequent deployment of Soviet combat troops, the

establishment of intelligence gathering facilities, and the maintenance of a Soviet

submarine base in Cuba challenged some of the central postulations of U.S. strategic

planning. In a security culture largely based on notions of ‘balance of power’ and

struggle to consolidate ‘spheres of influence’, an outpost of Soviet-style communism at

a distance of a mere ninety miles stunned and sickened US officials (Pérez Jr., Fear and

loathing of Fidel Castro 232).

The crisis was settled through a negotiated settlement between the United States and the

Soviet Union, the highlights of the agreement established that the Soviet Union would

withdraw the missiles from Cuba and the U.S. committed itself not to use direct military

force against Cuba. Cuba openly expressed its disagreement both with the manner the

settlement was negotiated – by the U.S. and the Soviet Union without its participation –

and with its terms – which violated her sovereignty when it came to allow U.S.

inspection flights over Cuba to ensure that the missiles were withdrawn (Boorstein 6-7).

The missile crisis and Fidel’s prestige within the Soviet Union had proved him that

through the skillful use of his political talent he could exert great power over the major

nations of the world and seize his place among a handful of leaders shaping the global

affairs. Despite leading such a small country - with a near bankrupt economy and

modest military potential, Fidel had acquired an enviable position of freedom of action.

He no longer needed to pay much attention to the United States, which had exhausted

all courses of action through which they might have wielded control over him. He also

benefited from the Soviet’s determination to preserve the image of successful

Communist revolutions, as well as from Sino-Soviet dispute to retain the leadership of

the Communist world. The Soviets were paying a price for Cuba’s support and they

could hardly condemn Fidel, no matter what he did (Bourne 253)(Suchlicki, Cuba,

Castro, and Revolution 156).

After the missile crises, U.S. policy on Cuba shifted somewhat. The basic hostility,

specific acts of aggression and sabotage continued. However, the U.S. stopped actively

planning to topple Fidel Castro through a military invasion and resorted to economic

sanctions as a means of impelling Cuban people to rebel (Boorstein 7).

Four key sectors of the Cuban economy were targeted by the American government:

electric power facilities, petroleum refineries, railroad and transportation infrastructure,

and production and manufacturing sectors. Yet, the assault against Cuban economy

involved fire-raising of cane fields, sabotage of machinery, and acts of chemical warfare

– which included the spreading of chemicals in sugar cane fields to sicken Cuban cane

cutters (Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of Fidel Castro 244).

Fidel Castro’s answer to the U.S. government costed approximately $1.5 billion in the

form of sugar corporations and cattle ranches; expanding to oil refineries, utilities,

mines, railroads, and banks, previously owned by U.S. citizens and now nationalized by

the Cuban government (Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of Fidel Castro 230-231).

During the 1960s, the impact of U.S. sanction in the island’s economy was modest, due

to its integration to the trade system of the socialist bloc. Still the embargo has remained

in place as part of U.S. endless hope to remove Fidel from power. Through much of the

1970s and 1980s the United States maintained unremitting pressure on Cuba. Only

briefly under the administration of Jimmy Carter relations between both countries

improved. Nevertheless the possibility of expanded ties was frustrated by U.S. demand

of ‘linkages’ that included Cuba distancing itself from the Soviet Union and the

withdrawal of Cuban armed forces from Africa. Cuba rejected these demands outright

(Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of Fidel Castro 245-246)

Many in Washington had initially viewed sanctions with reservations and were reluctant

to adopt measures that would punish the Cuban people for the sins of their leader.

Nonetheless, the realization that Castro enjoyed widespread popular support acted early

to vanish official reservations (Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of Fidel Castro 240).

With the aggravation of the island’s economic situation, many Cubans started to fell

harshly the burden of U.S. economic sanctions, an outcome the American government

have been pursuing from the early 1960s through the enactment of Torricelli and

Helms-Burton Laws in the 1990s. The U.S. government has minuciously designed its

economic embargo over Cuba, aiming to make daily life in the island as difficult and

desperate as possible, to inflict hardship, to increase suffering, and to strengthen popular

discontent with the goal of impelling the population to rebellion (Pérez Jr., Thinking

Back on Cuba's Future 14).

The U.S. intent to foment popular disaffection was well understood by the Cuban

leadership. Still, the embargo did contribute to escalating the level of political

disaffection. Many Cubans raised in protest asking for change and demanding reforms.

Strangled by the deepening of Cuba’s economic crisis and increasing U.S. pressure,

Fidel’s government act rapidly to contain those expressions of dissent and punish

protesters (Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba's Future 14-15).

Washington’s pressure against Cuba was increased during the Reagan administration.

Reagan accused Castro’s government of subversion and mischief in Central America.

Moreover, President Reagan increased restrictions on travels from the U.S. to Cuba, as a

way to deprive the island of a source of foreign exchange; besides that new limits were

placed on cash and gifts Cubans residing in the U.S. were able to send to relatives on

the island. In 1986, Washington tightened still further the trade and financial embargo

against Cuba. Behind the scenes, the Reagan administration also maneuvered to make

Cuban foreign debt negotiations as difficult as possible (Pérez Jr., Fear and loathing of

Fidel Castro 245-246).

“Within the context of Cuban historic sensibilities, U.S. policy has not only contributed

to Cuban intransigence but, more importantly, has lent credibility to that intransigence.

Rather than weakening Cuban tenacity, sanctions have strengthened Cuban

determination” (Pérez Jr., Thinking Back on Cuba's Future 16). By defending and

exalting notions of Cuban resistance and self-emulation against imperialism, Fidel has

been managing to gather popular support to some of his most intractable policies.

What may appear to U.S. eyes as Cuban intransigence is, in part, a manifestation of

Cuban refusal to submit to the United States. Cubans were within the first people in the

world to experience, be menaced by, and suffer from U.S. imperialism. Convinced that

they have a right to national sovereignty and self-determination and commanded by

Fidel, Cubans have engaged the United States with a powerful sense of self-esteem and

survival.

As America celebrated the inauguration of its forty-fourth President on January 20,

2009, Cubans commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of their revolution. Over most of

the previous half century, U.S. policy has been based on the premise that it could not

coexist with Cuba’s revolutionary government – either because of the threat of

communism or because of its authoritarianism. The policy of perpetual, unrelenting

hostility has served neither the interests of the United States nor those of the Cuban

people (LeoGrande 98).

Patria o Muerte (Motherland or Death)

Undoubtedly, there is something exceptional in Castro’s leadership and in the nature of

Cuban state that have made them so long-lasting. Castro’s revolution, its inherently

conquest of sovereignty and imperial independence of the fatherland, has survived to a

large number of international catastrophes, to U.S. political, military, and economic

attacks; the collapse of the Soviet Union; and the capitalist threat.

During the early years of the Revolution, Castro lured Cubans by the promise of a better

life; in one occasion, he has even predicting a future where “our production of milk will

exceed that of Holland, and our production of cheese will exceed that of France”

(Gjelten 23). Nevertheless, the economic dependence of Cuban economy on its main

trading partners could never be overstated. Even during the perestroika period of the

early 1980, when Soviet support of Cuba began to diminish, “86% of Cuban trade was

with the countries of the Eastern bloc, at preferential or subsidized prices” (Spenser 26).

In 1986, with the very future of socialism apparently at stake, Castro’s regime initiated

its most comprehensive program to date: the ‘Rectification Campaign’. The program

centered on three main goals. First, to address the economic crisis, the government

implemented an austerity program labeled by Castro “an economic war of all the

people” (Bunck 17-18). With the country’s hard-currency reserves declining throughout

the late 1980s, the Castro administration increasingly moved to cut consumption,

minimize imports, and reduced daily food rations. Second, the Rectification openly and

determinedly condemned the Soviet Union’s “betrayal of Marxism-Leninism” and its

move toward market-oriented economic policies and a more open society. Soviet

newspapers were confiscated so that news of what was happening in Europe did not

become contagious among the Cuban population. Castro ascertained that the Cuban

citizen would not adopt “any methods that reek of capitalism” and went on to ban

private constructions and enterprises, to prohibit private manufacturing and street

vending, and to assume greater control over sales and rentals. Last and most important,

the Rectification aimed to revigorate mass consciencia, to purify the population

ideologically, to eliminate increasing problems of social attitudes and behavior, and to

mobilize the masses to labor for patriotic and moral reasons (Bunck 18).

During the Rectification, Castro opted to intensify moral stimuli and mass political

education as the means of keeping his authority, reshape citizens’ attitudes, as well as

bringing about higher productivity. The Cuban leader called for renewed inflexibility

against the ills of imperialism and the dismantling of the Revolution; he uttered Cuban

people for a rebirth of “consciousness, a communist spirit, a revolutionary will” that,

according to him, “will always be a thousand times more powerful than money” (Bunck

As the U.S.S.R. disintegrated, there was an increasingly fear of an U.S. intervention in

Cuba that helped making Castro’s case even more persuasive. And indeed, with the

termination of Soviet economic and military support, the United States started to adopt

new measures to intensify the effect of their economic embargo on the island. For

instance, in 1992, in an attempt to put an end to Russia customary trade relations with

Cuba, the first Bush administration concede Boris Yeltsin a loan that would allow him

to purchase sugar on the world market. In the following year, Clinton’s administration

agreed to grant economic aid to Russia on the condition that it would cease selling oil to

Cuba (Spenser 26).

With the collapse of the socialist bloc and solidarity, Cuban situation was even more

aggravated. During most of the 1990s, as the lone dictatorship in the Western

Hemisphere and one of the few remaining communist countries, Cuba was left isolated

and became increasingly irrelevant. Fidel Castro struggled to avert his country’s

economic collapse as the United States focused on consolidating democratic regimes

throughout Latin American (Erikson 32).

It was then that Cuba entered on the so-called “Special Period”, during which Castro

leadership turned the state as much to patriotism as it did to mobilize popular support to

socialism. All through this period, Castro’s policy led the country to attain a degree of

autarchy highlighted as “genuine independence in the face of overbearing

neoliberalism” (Spenser 26). In 1991, Fidel warned the Cuban population that they

should be ready “to live in hell” if necessary. A year later, he added that Cubans should

be willing to devote “the last drop of sweat and the last drop of blood” to support

socialism (Gjelten 23). Would it be necessary to return to pre-modern lifestyle in order

to endure, then so be it.

Tremendously clever and talented to manipulate his masses, by recreating and reshaping

reality Castro has managed to neutralize increasing dissent within Cuba. Due to the

manipulation of media, censorship and disinformation, life in Cuban society has been

traditionally conditioned by distorted reality. However, Castro’s strategy would be

different this time; by lifting censorship of events in Eastern Europe and the former

USSR, he managed to show Cuban population that free-market-type reforms, desertion

of socialism and the one-party rule system, resulted in massive unemployment, chaos,

civil strife, and hunger (Planas 90).

Castro kept on presenting powerful arguments to defend the Cuban system. He

ascertained that despite all its problems, both the regime and socialism are still the

better alternative for the population. He warned Cubans about American attempts to

seduce them, pointing to Nicaragua and Panama as examples of he demonstrates to

Cubans that life quality in these countries have not improved due to U.S. failed

promises of reconstruction. Cuban media also inform to the population the great number

of people dying of hunger and starvation in Latin America every day, to subsequently

contrast these reports with life conditions in the island. The administration goes further

in manipulating its citizens by promising that, despite the decline in food availability,

Cuban people will not be allowed to starve. The effectiveness of such propaganda is

undeniable and the content of Cuban arguments irrefutable from abroad because most of

the data released coincide with real conditions (Planas 90).

At this point - after evaluating Castro’s major accomplishments and skills, it becomes

imperative to assess Burn’s theory of amoral leadership, which rejects the “naked power

wielding coercive” dictators(20). According to Burns “naked power-wielding can be

neither transformational nor transactional; only leadership can be” (20). It is regrettable

that instead of evaluating leadership skills and psychological traits in different bases,

Burns have made morality a requisite of leadership. It was considered that by following

Burns’ theory much of the geniality of Fidel Castro as a leader would be disregarded.

Accordingly, without praising Fidel’s atrocities, this paper aimed to analyze the

conquests and failures of his rule

Through the use of the media and in his speeches, Castro went on resisting to hitherto

inevitable transition to free-market economy and playing a major role of resistance in

Latin America. Still, Castro’s accomplishment cannot be entirely credit on him; the

failure of neoliberal policies that aggravated stagnation and inequality in vast parts of

the world.

Castro is a widely regarded leader among Latin American masses. A visit with Castro

became valuable in confirming a politician left-wing bona fides and asserting an image

of its administration independence from the United States. It could actually be

politically hazardous for a leader to go up against Fidel. However, nothing can be more

dangerous than confronting the United States, and for this reason few leader extends

relations with Cuba’s government beyond limited trade and symbolic cooperation

agreements (Erikson 39).

Cuba has secured its legitimacy throughout Latin America by struggling for its right to

be different and for its incredible ability to defend itself against major adversities. In

2003, the arrival of new wave of leftist leaders on the Latin American scene also

contributed to increase Castro’s prominence and to grant him a number of opportunities

to burnish his charismatic skills in many presidential inaugurations.

The resistance that Cuba put forth against U.S. rule reflects a common desire of all

countries of the region. Still, this small island in the Caribbean has been the only

country in the continent able to hold off the American Empire; whilst other countries,

bigger and more abundant in resources, have been dominated by that. Castro’s

leadership has resisted to U.S. domination and outlasted Eisenhower and nine other

presidents (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton and Bush

Politically stronger, due to his alliances with the new Latin American left,the eighty-

one-year-old leader was suffering from failing health and after some chirurgical

procedures and few public appearances, Fidel Castro ceded power after almost five

decades. Respected for his courage, talent, and altruism, he left office confident on the

legacy of his leadership. Fidel affirmed to be certain about the continuity of his

Revolution: “we will survive by our human capital. With that human capital we can

help many people, with our experience we can do that, and with that experience we can

help ourselves” (Castro and Ramonet 623).

According to Fidel the new Cuban regime, commanded by the other Castro (Fidel’s

brother, Raúl), will initiate necessary changes at the economic level without promoting

any opening of policies or introducing multiparty elections. There will be no Cuban

perestroika. Cuban authorities are convinced that socialism is the right choice for their

country and that it is their duty to improve it forever. Yet, with Castro’s retirement, their

current preoccupation is concerned with the preservation of the national unity

(Ramonet).

Fidel Castro’s rule, despite being remarkable by its total control over the population and

authoritative policies, has attained several legitimate accomplishments, which include

its achievements in education, universal health-care and racial harmony. Fidel’s

retirement as it has already been proved is not enough to provoke a rapprochement of

Cuba and the United States. For that to happen it will be necessary a seismic shift in

Cuban politics, which is unlikely while Washington persists in barriering the island’s

economic growth through its trade embargo.

Cuban people may seek the prosperity produced by capitalism, but do not want to risk

their socialism’s gains. The Cuban administration know that any transition to new

economic structures should be careful managed not to repeat the mistakes made in

Russia and Eastern Europe after the Cold War - which approved an economic free-for-

all but failed to hold up their social institutions.

There was never such an opportune occasion for the improvement of Cuban-U.S.

relations. Changes in the administration of both countries bring to their leaders

possibility of a better engagement. Cuba provides the U.S. with a chance to restore their

international reputation, so damaged by the Bush administration. America can rescue

the island from its economic catastrophe. The future is unpredictable, but it will be

possible take a combination of constructive developments for a change to come.

Conclusion

If moral and ideological values can be exempted of an analysis of political leadership

(as Max Weber had proposed) Fidel Castro would definitely accounted as one of the

greatest leaders of world history. The rare combination of a young rebel and a strategic

genius, a populist and an authoritarian, a charismatic and perverse leader, has enabled

him to orchestrate a successful revolution, to seize power in the country, and govern it

for almost half a century. Under Castro’s rule, Cuba has suffered as many political and

social transformations ashe intended to promote; his compelling appealwould always

guaranteed the motivation and commitment of his followers.

Castro’s perseverance, strong sense of destiny and mission assured the survival of his

Revolution throughout those decades in which shortcomings abounded;economic

collapse, nutritional and material shortages, corruption, bureaucratic incompetence;

none of these obstacles where enough to depose Castro. With or without the Soviet

support, and against the United Stated his leadership perseverated.

However, the immorality of his rule is attributed to the non-democratic methods, and

cruel punishment Castro has not hesitated to employ against popular dissident.

Moreover, international human rights organizations criticize the total control and denial

of universal freedoms that Castro’s leadership hold over the Cuban population.

Moral or amoral the exceptionalism of Fidel Castro’s leadership is undeniable.

Moreover, if not recognized as one of the greatest leaders of world history, to date

Castro is irrefutably the Maximum leader of Cuba.

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Fidel Castro-el líder cubano.pdf

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